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i 
PREFACE 
In 1868, Michigan professor and jurist Thomas M. Cooley published the first edition of 
his classic treatise on Constitutional Limitations. Therein Judge Cooley described the powers of 
sovereignty: the eminent domain; the power of taxation; and the police power. Then with 
“judicial decisions, legal treatises, and historical events, as a convenient guide” he undertook the 
task of considering the constitutional limitations that restrict the exercise of these sovereign 
powers. Cooley wrote in “full sympathy with all those restraints . . . upon the exercise of the 
powers of government,” thus leading the way in safeguarding vested rights and private property.1   
Early in the twentieth century the mood shifted. In 1921 jurist Benjamin N. Cardozo 
pioneered a “sociological jurisprudence.” He argued that “[t]he final cause of law is the welfare 
of society” and that existing legal principles and judicial precedents should be “extended or 
restricted” so as to fix the path of the law in the direction of “justice and general utility.”  
“Property . . . though immune under the Constitution from destruction, [was] not immune from 
regulation essential for the common good.”2 
Cardozo’s argument carried the day as Progressive jurists fluidly and dynamically 
interpreted the Constitution so as to legitimize land planning, zoning, slum clearance, and urban 
renewal. But some of today’s jurisprudents have second thoughts. Regulations, rather than 
promoting the common good, may be “designed to . . . forc[e] some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”3 And 
recently the U.S. Supreme Court has reconsidered various constitutional provisions to call into 
question the legitimacy of land-use controls, environmental regulations, economic restrictions, 
and public exactions. Thomas Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations is once again in 
jurisprudential fashion.  
Now seems the time to readdress attention to this clash between sovereignty and 
property. This compilation does so by presenting a number of cases from over the two hundred 
year history of the American Republic wherein the courts have considered the legitimacy of 
government intervention in private affairs. It takes a detailed look at the constitutional history 
behind many of the legal controversies of today: the legitimacy of government-sponsored wealth 
redistributions; the “navigability” boundary on federal power; the “public use” limitation on 
eminent domain; the tension between government authority and religious freedom; the 
“leveraging” of the police power; the fine line between confiscation and taxation; and more.  
                                                 
1
 Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the 
States of the American Union, at iii (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 5th ed. 1883).  
2
 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 66-87 (1921). 
3
 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
ii 
Since the 2012 decision addressing the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act 
[“Obamacare”] considered many of the same issues it is also considered. 
The casebook, which is electronically published in PDF format, is a part of the E-
scholarship Repository of the University of Maryland School of Law. It consists of non-
copyrighted material and is intended for classroom use. Professors and students are free to use it 
in whole or part. As the Table of Contents indicates, 170 odd cases have been grouped into 37 
“sessions.” Most sessions consist of five  or six tightly-edited cases and the related statutes, if 
any. The readings are intended to be historically, economically, politically, and legally evocative; 
they are designed to provide an assignment appropriate for a 55 minute class discussion. The 
compilation is approximately 1150 pages in length. It is up-dated annually. 
Note on Editing Style 
These are teaching materials. The cases herein have been drastically cut in length and 
fundamentally altered in structure. In many instances salient points are lost. Footnotes are 
omitted and those that remain are renumbered; citations to judicial opinions are also often 
deleted; concurring and dissenting opinions are sometimes cut. Omissions are not noted with 
ellipsis marks. Asterisks are only employed when necessary to signal to the reader the reason for 
an otherwise unexplained non-sequitur in the text. 
An effort has been made not to distort or manipulate the language of the courts but 
inevitably context is lost, and meanings change. The reader is reminded that she must look to the 
original for a complete appreciation of the text. 
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 1 
PART I. INTRODUCTION 
"A fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and 
the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That 
rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized." MR. JUSTICE 
STEWART in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972). 
Session 1. Sovereignty, Liberty & Property 
MUNN v. ILLINOIS  
94 U.S. 113 (1876) 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. 
The question to be determined in this case is whether the general assembly of Illinois can, 
under the limitations upon the legislative power of the States imposed by the Constitution of the 
United States, fix by law the maximum of charges for the storage of grain in warehouses at 
Chicago and other places in the State having not less than one hundred thousand inhabitants, "in 
which grain is stored in bulk, and in which the grain of different owners is mixed together, or in 
which grain is stored in such a manner that the identity of different lots or parcels cannot be 
accurately preserved." 
It is claimed that such a law is repugnant – 
To that part of amendment 14 which ordains that no State shall "deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
Every statute is presumed to be constitutional.  The courts ought not to declare one to be 
unconstitutional, unless it is clearly so.  If there is doubt, the expressed will of the legislature 
should be sustained. 
The Constitution contains no definition of the word "deprive," as used in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  To determine its signification, therefore, it is necessary to ascertain the effect 
which usage has given it, when employed in the same or a like connection. 
While this provision of the amendment is new in the Constitution of the United States, as 
a limitation upon the powers of the States, it is old as a principle of civilized government.  It is 
found in Magna Charta, and, in substance if not in form, in nearly or quite all the constitutions 
that have been from time to time adopted by the several States of the Union.  By the Fifth 
Amendment, it was introduced into the Constitution of the United States as a limitation upon the 
powers of the national government, and by the Fourteenth, as a guaranty against any 
encroachment upon an acknowledged right of citizenship by the legislatures of the States. 
2 
When the people of the United Colonies separated from Great Britain, they changed the 
form, but not the substance, of their government.  They retained for the purposes of government 
all the powers of the British Parliament, and through their State constitutions, or other forms of 
social compact, undertook to give practical effect to such as they deemed necessary for the 
common good and the security of life and property.  All the powers which they retained they 
committed to their respective States, unless in express terms or by implication reserved to 
themselves.  Subsequently, when it was found necessary to establish a national government for 
national purposes, a part of the powers of the States and of the people of the States was granted 
to the United States and the people of the United States.  This grant operated as a further 
limitation upon the powers of the States, so that now the governments of the States possess all 
the powers of the Parliament of England, except such as have been delegated to the United States 
or reserved by the people.  The reservations by the people are shown in the prohibitions of the 
constitutions. 
When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or 
privileges which, as an individual not affected by his relations to others, he might retain.  "A 
body politic," as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, "is a social 
compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole 
people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good."  This does not confer 
power upon the whole people to control rights which are purely and exclusively private but it 
does authorize the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use 
his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another.  This is the very essence of government, 
and has found expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non loedas. From this source 
come the police powers, which, as was said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5 
How. 583, "are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every 
sovereignty, . . . that is to say, . . . the power to govern men and things." 
Under these powers the government regulates the conduct of its citizens one towards 
another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation 
becomes necessary for the public good.  In their exercise it has been customary in England from 
time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common 
carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, &c., and in so doing to fix a 
maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles 
sold.  To this day, statutes are to be found in many of the States upon some or all these subjects; 
and we think it has never yet been successfully contended that such legislation came within any 
of the constitutional prohibitions against interference with private property. 
It is apparent that, down to the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was 
not supposed that statutes regulating the use, or even the price of the use, of private property 
necessarily deprived an owner of his property without due process of law.  Under some 
circumstances they may, but not under all.  The amendment does not change the law in this 
particular: it simply prevents the States from doing that which will operate as such a deprivation. 
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of 
public consequence, and affect the community at large.  When, therefore, one devotes his 
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property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest 
in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of 
the interest he has thus created.  He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so 
long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control. When private property is devoted to 
a public use, it is subject to public regulation. 
The warehouses of these plaintiffs and the business which is carried on there  [are]a 
business in which the whole public has a direct and positive interest. It presents, therefore, a case 
for the application of a long-known and well-established principle in social science, and this 
statute simply extends the law so as to meet this new development of commercial progress.  
There is no attempt to compel these owners to grant the public an interest in their property, but to 
declare their obligations, if they use it in this particular manner. 
Rights of property which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away 
without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will, or even 
at the whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations.  Indeed, the great 
office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to adapt it to 
the changes of time and circumstances.  To limit the rate of charge for services rendered in a 
public employment, or for the use of property in which the public has an interest, is only 
changing a regulation which existed before.  It establishes no new principle in the law, but only 
gives a new effect to an old one. 
We come now to consider the effect upon this statute of the power of Congress to 
regulate commerce. Their regulation is a thing of domestic concern, and, certainly, until 
Congress acts in reference to their inter-state relations, the State may exercise all the powers of 
government over them, even though in so doing it may indirectly operate upon commerce 
outside its immediate jurisdiction.  We do not say that a case may not arise in which it will be 
found that a State, under the form of regulating its own affairs, has encroached upon the 
exclusive domain of Congress in respect to inter-state commerce, but we do say that, upon the 
facts as they are represented to us in this record, that has not been done. 
We conclude, therefore, that the statute in question is not repugnant to the Constitution of 
the United States, and that there is no error in the judgment.  In passing upon this case we have 
not been unmindful of the vast importance of the questions involved.  This and cases of a kindred 
character were argued before us more than a year ago by most eminent counsel, and in a manner 
worthy of their well-earned reputations.  We have kept the cases long under advisement, in order 
that their decision might be the result of our mature deliberations. 
Judgment affirmed. 
MR. JUSTICE FIELD and MR. JUSTICE STRONG dissented. 
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UNITED STATES v. CAROLENE PRODUCTS CO.  
304 U.S. 144 (1938) 
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question for decision is whether the "Filled Milk Act" of Congress of March 4, 1923 
(c. 262, 42 Stat. 1486, 21 U. S. C. §§61-63), which prohibits the shipment in interstate commerce 
of skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat, so as to resemble milk or 
cream, transcends the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce or infringes the Fifth 
Amendment. 
Congress is free to exclude from interstate commerce articles whose use in the states for 
which they are destined it may reasonably conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or 
welfare.... And it is no objection to the exertion of the power to regulate interstate commerce that 
its exercise is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the 
states.  The prohibition of the shipment of filled milk in interstate commerce is a permissible 
regulation of commerce, subject only to the restrictions of the Fifth Amendment. 
The prohibition of shipment of appellee's product in interstate commerce does not 
infringe the Fifth Amendment.  Twenty years ago this Court, in Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297, 
held that a state law which forbids the manufacture and sale of a product assumed to be 
wholesome and nutritive, made of condensed skimmed milk, compounded with coconut oil, is 
not forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.  The power of the legislature to secure a minimum 
of particular nutritive elements in a widely used article of food and to protect the public from 
fraudulent substitutions, was not doubted; and the Court thought that there was ample scope for 
the legislative judgment that prohibition of the offending article was an appropriate means of 
preventing injury to the public. 
We see no persuasive reason for departing from that ruling here, where the Fifth 
Amendment is concerned; and since none is suggested, we might rest decision wholly on the 
presumption of constitutionality.  But affirmative evidence also sustains the statute.  In twenty 
years evidence has steadily accumulated of the danger to the public health from the general 
consumption of foods which have been stripped of elements essential to the maintenance of 
health... 
Appellee raises no valid objection to the present statute by arguing that its prohibition has 
not been extended to oleomargarine or other butter substitutes in which vegetable fats or oils are 
substituted for butter fat.  The Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause, and even that of 
the Fourteenth, applicable only to the states, does not compel their legislatures to prohibit all like 
evils, or none.  A legislature may hit at an abuse which it has found, even though it has failed to 
strike at another. 
Legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary 
commercial transactions [and] is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the 
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facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption 
that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.
1
 
Here the demurrer challenges the validity of the statute on its face and it is evident from 
all the considerations presented to Congress, and those of which we may take judicial notice, that 
the question is at least debatable whether commerce in filled milk should be left unregulated, or 
in some measure restricted, or wholly prohibited.  As that decision was for Congress, neither the 
finding of a court arrived at by weighing the evidence, nor the verdict of a jury can be substituted 
for it. 
The prohibition of shipment in interstate commerce of appellee's product, as described in 
the indictment, is a constitutional exercise of the power to regulate interstate commerce.  As the 
statute is not unconstitutional on its face the demurrer should have been overruled and the 
judgment will be 
Reversed. 
LYNCH v. HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORP.  
405 U.S. 538 (1972) 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In 1968, the appellant, Mrs. Dorothy Lynch, a resident of New Haven, Connecticut, 
directed her employer to deposit $10 of her $69 weekly wage in a credit union savings account.  
In 1969, appellee Household Finance Corp. sued Mrs. Lynch for $525 in a state court, alleging 
nonpayment of a promissory note. Before she was served with process, the appellee corporation 
garnished her savings account under the provisions of Connecticut law that authorize summary 
pre-judicial garnishment at the behest of attorneys for alleged creditors.  
The appellant then brought this class action in a federal district court against Connecticut 
sheriffs who levy on bank accounts and against creditors who invoke the garnishment statute. 
Mrs. Lynch alleged that she had no prior notice of the garnishment and no opportunity to be 
                                                 
1
  There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its 
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are 
deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. 
   It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily 
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny 
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.... 
   Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular 
religious, or national, or racial minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 
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heard.  She claimed that the state statutes were invalid under the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1343 (3).
2
 
The District Court did not reach the merits of the case.  It dismissed the complaint 
without an evidentiary hearing on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction under §1343 (3). We 
hold, for the reasons that follow, that §1343 (3) [does not] warrant dismissal of the appellant's 
complaint.  Accordingly, we remand the case to the District Court for consideration of the 
remaining issues in this litigation. 
In dismissing the appellant's complaint, the District Court held that §1343 (3) applies 
only if "personal" rights, as opposed to "property" rights, are allegedly impaired. This Court has 
never adopted the distinction between personal liberties and proprietary rights as a guide to the 
contours of §1343 (3) jurisdiction.  Today we expressly reject that distinction. 
Neither the words of §1343 (3) nor the legislative history of that provision distinguishes 
between personal and property rights.  In fact, the Congress that enacted the predecessor of 
§[1343 (3) seems clearly to have intended to provide a federal judicial forum for the redress of 
wrongful deprivations of property by persons acting under color of state law. Acquisition, 
enjoyment, and alienation of property were among those rights.  Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 
409, 432. "It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be protected from 
discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own 
and dispose of property.  Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the 
framers of that Amendment as an essential pre-condition to the realization of other basic civil 
rights and liberties which the Amendment was intended to guarantee." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
U.S. 1, 10. See also, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74-79; H. Flack, The Adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 75-78, 81, 90-97 (1908); J. ten Broek, The Antislavery Origins of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (1951). 
A … compelling reason for rejecting a "personal liberties" limitation upon §1343 (3) is 
the virtual impossibility of applying it. The federal courts have been particularly bedeviled by 
"mixed" cases in which both personal and property rights are implicated, and the line between 
them has been difficult to draw with any consistency or principled objectivity. The case  before 
us presents a good example of the conceptual difficulties created by the test.  
                                                 
2
 The statute states in relevant part: 
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any 
person: 
 . . . . 
 "(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any 
right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing 
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. . . ." 
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Such difficulties indicate that the dichotomy between personal liberties and property 
rights is a false one.  Property does not have rights. People have rights.  The right to enjoy 
property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in 
truth a "personal" right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a home, or a 
savings account.  In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to 
liberty and the personal right in property.  Neither could have meaning without the other.  That 
rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized.  J. Locke, Of Civil Government 
82-85 (1924); J. Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of 
America, in F. Coker, Democracy, Liberty, and Property 121-132 (1942); 1 W. Blackstone, 
Commentaries *138-140.  Congress recognized these rights in 1871 when it enacted the 
predecessor of §1343 (3).  We do no more than reaffirm the judgment of Congress today. 
We conclude, therefore, that the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appellant's 
suit for an injunction.  Accordingly, the judgment before us is reversed, and the case remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.  
PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER v. ROBINS 
447 U.S. 74 (1980) 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.  
We postponed jurisdiction of this appeal from the Supreme Court of California to decide 
the important federal constitutional questions it presented.  Those are whether state constitutional 
provisions, which permit individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on the property of 
a privately owned shopping center to which the public is invited, violate the shopping center 
owner's property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments or his free speech rights 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
I 
Appellant Prune Yard is a privately owned shopping center in the city of Campbell, Cal. 
It covers approximately 21 acres – 5 devoted to parking and 16 occupied by walkways, plazas, 
sidewalks, and buildings that contain more than 65 specialty shops, 10 restaurants, and a movie 
theater.  The Prune Yard is open to the public for the purpose of encouraging the patronizing of 
its commercial establishments.  It has a policy not to permit any visitor or tenant to engage in any 
publicly expressive activity, including the circulation of petitions, that is not directly related to its 
commercial purposes.  This policy has been strictly enforced in a nondiscriminatory fashion. The 
Prune Yard is owned by appellant Fred Sahadi. 
Appellees are high school students who sought to solicit support for their opposition to a 
United Nations resolution against "Zionism."  On a Saturday afternoon they set up a card table in 
8 
a corner of Prune Yard's central courtyard.  They distributed pamphlets and asked passersby to 
sign petitions, which were to be sent to the President and Members of Congress.  Their activity 
was peaceful and orderly and so far as the record indicates was not objected to by Prune Yard's 
patrons. 
Soon after appellees had begun soliciting signatures, a security guard informed them that 
they would have to leave because their activity violated Prune Yard regulations.  The guard 
suggested that they move to the public sidewalk at the Prune Yard's perimeter.  Appellees 
immediately left the premises and later filed this lawsuit in the California Superior Court of 
Santa Clara County.  They sought to enjoin appellants from denying them access to the Prune 
Yard for the purpose of circulating their petitions. 
The Superior Court held that appellees were not entitled under either the Federal or 
California Constitution to exercise their asserted rights on the shopping center property.  The 
California Court of Appeal affirmed.  The California Supreme Court reversed. 
III 
Appellants first contend that Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), prevents the 
State from requiring a private shopping center owner to provide access to persons exercising 
their state constitutional rights of free speech and petition when adequate alternative avenues of 
communication are available.  Lloyd dealt with the question whether under the Federal 
Constitution a privately owned shopping center may prohibit the distribution of handbills on its 
property when the handbilling is unrelated to the shopping center's operations.  Id., at 552. 
Respondents in Lloyd argued that because the shopping center was open to the public, the First 
Amendment prevents the private owner from enforcing the handbilling restriction on shopping 
center premises.  Id., at 564.  We stated that property does not "lose its private character merely 
because the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes," and that "[the] 
essentially private character of a store and its privately owned abutting property does not change 
by virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a modern shopping center."  407 U.S., at 
569. 
Our reasoning in Lloyd, however, does not ex proprio vigore limit the authority of the 
State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual 
liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.  It is, of course, well 
established that a State in the exercise of its police power may adopt reasonable restrictions on 
private property so long as the restrictions do not amount to a taking without just compensation 
or contravene any other federal constitutional provision.  See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U.S. 365 (1926); Young v.American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).  Lloyd held 
that when a shopping center owner opens his private property to the public for the purpose of 
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shopping, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution does not thereby create 
individual rights in expression beyond those already existing under applicable law. 
IV 
Appellants next contend that a right to exclude others underlies the Fifth Amendment 
guarantee against the taking of property without just compensation and the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantee against the deprivation of property without due process of law. 
It is true that one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right to 
exclude others.  Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-180 (1979).  And here there 
has literally been a "taking" of that right to the extent that the California Supreme Court has 
interpreted the State Constitution to entitle its citizens to exercise free expression and petition 
rights on shopping center property.
1
 But it is well established that "not every destruction or 
injury to property by governmental action has been held to be a ‘taking’ in the constitutional 
sense."  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960).  Rather, the determination whether 
a state law unlawfully infringes a landowner's property in violation of the Taking Clause requires 
an examination of whether the restriction on private property "[forces] some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."  Id., 
at 49.  This examination entails inquiry into such factors as the character of the governmental 
action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed 
expectations.  Kaiser Aetna v. United States, supra, at 175.  When "regulation goes too far it will 
be recognized as a taking."  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
Here the requirement that appellants permit appellees to exercise state-protected rights of 
free expression and petition on shopping center property clearly does not amount to an 
unconstitutional infringement of appellants' property rights under the Taking Clause.  There is 
nothing to suggest that preventing appellants from prohibiting this sort of activity will 
unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a shopping center.  The Prune Yard is a 
large commercial complex that covers several city blocks, contains numerous separate business 
establishments, and is open to the public at large.  The decision of the California Supreme Court 
makes it clear that the Prune Yard may restrict expressive activity by adopting time, place, and 
manner regulations that will minimize any interference with its commercial functions.  Appellees 
                                                 
1
 The term "property" as used in the Taking Clause includes the entire "group of rights inhering in the citizen's 
[ownership]."  United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).  It is not used in the "vulgar and 
untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. [Instead, 
it] [denotes] the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and 
dispose of it . . . .  The constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess."  Id., at 
377-378. 
10 
were orderly, and they limited their activity to the common areas of the shopping center.  In 
these circumstances, the fact that they may have "physically invaded" appellants' property cannot 
be viewed as determinative. 
V 
Appellants finally contend that a private property owner has a First Amendment right not 
to be forced by the State to use his property as a forum for the speech of others. 
We conclude that neither appellants' federally recognized property rights nor their First 
Amendment rights have been infringed by the California Supreme Court's decision recognizing a 
right of appellees to exercise state-protected rights of expression and petition on appellants' 
property.  The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is therefore Affirmed.  
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PART II. DOMINIUM/PROPERTY 
"Dominion, from the Roman concept Dominium, was concerned with property 
and ownership, as against imperium, which related to political sovereignty." MR. 
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting in U.S. v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947) 
Session 2. Public Domain 
JOHNSON v. M’INTOSH 
21 U.S. 543 (1823) 
Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.   
The plaintiffs in this cause claim the land, in their declaration mentioned, under two grants, 
purporting to be made, the first in 1773, and the last in 1775, by the chiefs of certain Indian tribes, 
constituting the Illinois and the Piankeshaw nations; and the question is, whether this title can be 
recognised in the Courts of the United States? 
The facts, as stated in the case agreed, show the authority of the chiefs who executed this 
conveyance, so far as it could be given by their own people; and likewise show, that the particular 
tribes for whom these chiefs acted were in rightful possession of the land they sold.  The inquiry, 
therefore, is, in a great measure, confined to the power of Indians to give, and of private individuals 
to receive, a title which can be sustained in the Courts of this country. 
As the right of society, to prescribe those rules by which property may be acquired and 
preserved is not, and cannot be drawn into question; as the title to lands, especially, is and must be 
admitted to depend entirely on the law of the nation in which they lie; it will be necessary, in 
pursuing this inquiry, to examine, not singly those principles of abstract justice, which the Creator 
of all things has impressed on the mind of his creature man, and which are admitted to regulate, in a 
great degree, the rights of civilized nations, whose perfect independence is acknowledged; but those 
principles also which our own government has adopted in the particular case, and given us as the 
rule for our decision. 
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of Europe were eager to 
appropriate to themselves so much of it as they could respectively acquire.  Its vast extent offered an 
ample field to the ambition and enterprise of all; and the character and religion of its inhabitants 
afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe 
might claim an ascendency.  The potentates of the old world found no difficulty in convincing 
themselves that they made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new, by bestowing on them 
civilization and Christianity, in exchange for unlimited independence.  But, as they were all in 
pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements, and 
consequent war with each other, to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as the law 
by which the right of acquisition, which they all asserted, should be regulated as between 
themselves.  This principle was, that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or 
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by whose authority, it was made, against all other European governments, which title might be 
consummated by possession. 
The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation making the discovery 
the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it. It was a 
right with which no Europeans could interfere.  It was a right which all asserted for themselves, and 
to the assertion of which, by others, all assented. 
Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives, were to be 
regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose 
between them. 
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no 
instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired.  They were 
admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain 
possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete 
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the 
soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental 
principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it. 
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives, as occupants, they 
asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of 
this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives.  These 
grants have been understood by all, to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right 
of occupancy.  The history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves, we think, the 
universal recognition of these principles. 
No one of the powers of Europe gave its full assent to this principle, more unequivocally 
than England.  The documents upon this subject are ample and complete.  So early as the year 1496, 
her monarch granted a commission to the Cabots, to discover countries then unknown to Christian 
people, and to take possession of them in the name of the king of England.  Two years afterwards, 
Cabot proceeded on this voyage, and discovered the continent of North America, along which he 
sailed as far south as Virginia.  To this discovery the English trace their title. 
In this first effort made by the English government to acquire territory on this continent, we 
perceive a complete recognition of the principle which has been mentioned.  The right of discovery 
given by this commission, is confined to countries "then unknown to all Christian people;" and of 
these countries Cabot was empowered to take possession in the name of the king of England.  Thus 
asserting a right to take possession, notwithstanding the occupancy of the natives, who were 
heathens, and, at the same time, admitting the prior title of any Christian people who may have 
made a previous discovery.  
Thus has our whole country been granted by the crown while in the occupation of the 
Indians.  These grants purport to convey the soil as well as the right of dominion to the grantees.  
The governments of New-England, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and a part of 
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Carolina, were thus created.  In all of them, the soil, at the time the grants were made, was occupied 
by the Indians.  Yet almost every title within those governments is dependent on these grants. 
These various patents cannot be considered as nullities; nor can they be limited to a mere 
grant of the powers of government.  A charter intended to convey political power only, would never 
contain words expressly granting the land, the soil, and the waters.  Some of them purport to convey 
the soil alone; and in those cases in which the powers of government, as well as the soil, are 
conveyed to individuals, the crown has always acknowledged itself to be bound by the grant.  
Though the power to dismember regal governments was asserted and exercised, the power to 
dismember proprietary governments was not claimed; and, in some instances, even after the powers 
of government were revested in the crown, the title of the proprietors to the soil was respected. That 
title was respected till the revolution, when it was forfeited by the laws of war. 
Thus, all the nations of Europe, who have acquired territory on this continent, have asserted 
in themselves, and have recognised in others, the exclusive right of the discoverer to appropriate the 
lands occupied by the Indians.  Have the American States rejected or adopted this principle? 
By the treaty which concluded the war of our revolution, Great Britain relinquished all 
claim, not only to the government, but to the "propriety and territorial rights of the United States," 
whose boundaries were fixed in the second article.  By this treaty, the powers of government, and 
the right to soil, which had previously been in Great Britain, passed definitively to these States.  We 
had before taken possession of them, by declaring independence; but neither the declaration of 
independence, nor the treaty confirming it, could give us more than that which we before possessed, 
or to which Great Britain was before entitled.  It has never been doubted, that either the United 
States, or the several States, had a clear title to all the lands within the boundary lines described in 
the treaty, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and that the exclusive power to extinguish 
that right, was vested in that government which might constitutionally exercise it. 
Virginia, particularly, within whose chartered limits the land in controversy lay, passed an 
act, in the year 1779, declaring her "exclusive right of pre-emption from the Indians, of all the lands 
within the limits of her own chartered territory, and that no person or persons whatsoever, have, or 
ever had, a right to purchase any lands within the same, from any Indian nation, except only persons 
duly authorized to make such purchase; formerly for the use and benefit of the colony, and lately for 
the Commonwealth." The act then proceeds to annul all deeds made by Indians to individuals, for 
the private use of the purchasers. 
Without ascribing to this act the power of annulling vested rights, it may safely be 
considered as an unequivocal affirmance, on the part of Virginia, of the broad principle which had 
always been maintained, that the exclusive right to purchase from the Indians resided in the 
government. 
The States, having within their chartered limits different portions of territory covered by 
Indians, ceded that territory, generally, to the United States, on conditions expressed in their deeds 
of cession, which demonstrate the opinion, that they ceded the soil as well as jurisdiction, and that in 
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doing so, they granted a productive fund to the government of the Union.  The lands in controversy 
lay within the chartered limits of Virginia, and were ceded with the whole country northwest of the 
river Ohio.  This grant contained reservations and stipulations, which could only be made by the 
owners of the soil; and concluded with a stipulation, that "all the lands in the ceded territory, not 
reserved, should be considered as a common fund, for the use and benefit of such of the United 
States as have become, or shall become, members of the confederation," &c. "according to their 
usual respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and shall be faithfully and bona 
fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever." 
The ceded territory was occupied by numerous and warlike tribes of Indians; but the 
exclusive right of the United States to extinguish their title, and to grant the soil, has never, we 
believe, been doubted. The magnificent purchase of Louisiana, was the purchase from France of a 
country almost entirely occupied by numerous tribes of Indians, who are in fact independent.  Yet, 
any attempt of others to intrude into that country, would be considered as an aggression which 
would justify war. 
Our late acquisitions from Spain are of the same character; and the negotiations which 
preceded those acquisitions, recognise and elucidate the principle which has been received as the 
foundation of all European title in America. 
The United States, then, have unequivocally acceded to that great and broad rule by which 
its civilized inhabitants now hold this country.  They hold, and assert in themselves, the title by 
which it was acquired.  They maintain, as all others have maintained, that discovery gave an 
exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest; and 
gave also a right to such a degree of sovereignty, as the circumstances of the people would allow 
them to exercise. 
The power now possessed by the government of the United States to grant lands, resided, 
while we were colonies, in the crown, or its grantees.  The validity of the titles given by either has 
never been questioned in our Courts.  It has been exercised uniformly over territory in possession of 
the Indians.  The existence of this power must negative the existence of any right which may 
conflict with, and control it. An absolute title to lands cannot exist, at the same time, in different 
persons, or in different governments.  An absolute, must be an exclusive title, or at least a title 
which excludes all others not compatible with it.  All our institutions recognise the absolute title of 
the crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and recognise the absolute title of the 
crown to extinguish that right.  This is incompatible with an absolute and complete title in the 
Indians. 
Although we do not mean to engage in the defence of those principles which Europeans 
have applied to Indian title, they may, we think, find some excuse, if not justification, in the 
character and habits of the people whose rights have been wrested from them. 
[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose occupation was 
war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest.  To leave them in possession of their 
country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, 
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because they were as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms 
every attempt on their independence. 
What was the inevitable consequence of this state of things?  The Europeans were under the 
necessity either of abandoning the country, and relinquishing their pompous claims to it, or of 
enforcing those claims by the sword, and by the adoption of principles adapted to the condition of a 
people with whom it was impossible to mix, and who could not be governed  as a distinct society, or 
of remaining in their neighbourhood, and exposing themselves and their families to the perpetual 
hazard of being massacred. 
Frequent and bloody wars, in which the whites were not always the aggressors, unavoidably 
ensued.  European policy, numbers, and skill, prevailed.  As the white population advanced, that of 
the Indians necessarily receded.  The country in the immediate neighbourhood of agriculturists 
became unfit for them.  The game fled into thicker and more unbroken forests, and the Indians 
followed.  The soil, to which the crown originally claimed title, being no longer occupied by its 
ancient inhabitants, was parcelled out according to the will of the sovereign power, and taken 
possession of by persons who claimed immediately from the crown, or mediately, through its 
grantees or deputies. 
After bestowing on this subject a degree of attention which was more required by the 
magnitude of the interest in litigation, and the able and elaborate arguments of the bar, than by its 
intrinsic difficulty, the Court is decidedly of opinion, that the plaintiffs do not exhibit a title which 
can be sustained in the Courts of the United States; and that there is no error in the judgment which 
was rendered against them in the District Court of Illinois. Judgment affirmed, with costs. 
MARTIN v. THE LESSEE OF WADDELL 
41 U.S. 367 (1842) 
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case is brought here by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States, for 
the district of New Jersey.  The questions before us arise upon an action of ejectment, instituted 
by the plaintiff in the Court below, to recover one hundred acres of land, covered with water 
situated in the township of Perth Amboy, in the state of New Jersey.  At the trial in the Circuit 
Court, the jury found a special verdict, setting forth, among other things, that the land claimed 
lies beneath the navigable waters of the Raritan river and bay, where the tide ebbs and flows.  
And it appears that the principal matter in dispute, is the right to the oyster fishery in the public 
rivers and bays of East New Jersey. 
The plaintiff makes title under the charters granted by Charles the Second to his brother 
the Duke of York, in 1664 and 1674, for the purpose of enabling him to plant a colony on this 
continent.  The boundaries embrace the territory which now forms the state of New Jersey.   
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The [plaintiff] claims the land covered with water, mentioned in the declaration, [as 
successors in title to a deed] made under the authority of the proprietors, and fully recorded in 
the proper office.  And, if they were authorized to make this grant, he is entitled to the premises 
as owner of the soil, and has an exclusive right to the fishery in question.  The [defendant] also 
claims an exclusive right to take oysters in the same place; and derives his title under a law of the 
state of New Jersey, passed in 1824. 
The point in dispute between the parties, therefore, depends upon the construction and 
legal effect of the letters patent to the Duke of York, and of the deed of surrender subsequently 
made by the proprietors. 
The letters patent to the duke included a very large territory, extending along the Atlantic 
coast from the river St. Croix to the Delaware bay, and containing within it many navigable 
rivers, bays, and arms of the sea; and after granting the tract of country and islands therein 
described, "together with all the lands, islands, soils, rivers, harbours, mines, minerals, quarries, 
woods, marshes, waters, lakes, fishings, hawkings, huntings, and fowlings, and all other 
royalties, profits, commodities, and hereditaments to the said several islands, lands, and premises 
belonging and appertaining with their and every of their appurtenances, and all the estate, right, 
title, interest, benefit, and advantage, claim, and demand of the king, in the said land and 
premises;" the letters patent proceed to confer upon him, his heirs, deputies, agents, 
commissioners, and assigns, the powers of government with a proviso that the statutes, 
ordinances, and proceedings, established by his authority should "not be contrary to, but as 
nearly as might be, agreeable to the laws, statutes, and government of the realm of England; 
saving also an appeal to the king, in all cases, from any judgment or sentence which might be 
given in the colony, and authorizing the duke, his heirs and assigns, to lead and transport out of 
any of the realms of the king to the country granted, all such and so many of his subjects or 
strangers not prohibited, or under restraint, who would become the 'loving subjects' of the king, 
and live under his allegiance, and who should willingly accompany the duke, his heirs and 
assigns." 
The right of the king to make this grant, with all of its prerogatives and povers of 
government, cannot at this day be questioned.  But in order to enable us to determine the nature 
and extent of the interest which it conveyed to the duke, it is proper to inquire into the character 
of the right claimed by the British crown in the country discovered by its subjects, on this 
continent; and the principles upon which it was parcelled out and granted. 
The English possessions in America were not claimed by right of conquest but by right of 
discovery.  For according to the principles of international law, as then understood by the 
civilized powers of Europe, the Indian tribes in the new world were regarded as mere temporary 
occupants of the soil, and the absolute rights of property and dominion were held to belong to the 
European nation by which any particular portion of the country was first discovered.  Whatever 
forbearance may have been sometimes practised towards the unfortunate aborigines, either from 
humanity or policy, yet the territory they occupied was disposed of by the governments of 
Europe at their pleasure, as if it had been found without inhabitants.  The grant to the Duke of 
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York, therefore, was not of lands won by the sword; nor were the government or laws he was 
authorized to establish intended for a conquered people. 
The country mentioned in the letters patent, was held by the king in his public and regal 
character as the representative of the nation, and in trust for them.  The discoveries made by 
persons acting under the authority of the government were for the benefit of the nation; and the 
crown, according to the principles of the British constitution, was the proper organ to dispose of 
the public domains; and upon these principles rest the various charters and grants of territory 
made on this continent.  According to the theory of the British constitution all vacant lands are 
vested in the crown as representing the nation, and the exclusive power to grant them is admitted 
to reside in the crown, as a branch of the royal prerogative. It has been already  shown that this 
principle was as fully recognised in America as in the island of Great Britain." 
We do not propose to meddle with the point which was very much discussed at the bar, as 
to the power of the king since Magna Charta to grant to a subject a portion of the soil covered by 
the navigable waters of the kingdom, so as to give him an immediate and exclusive right of 
fishery either for shell fish or floating fish within the limits of his grant.  The question is not free 
from doubt, and the authorities referred to in the English books cannot perhaps be altogether 
reconciled.  The point does not, however, arise in this case unless it shall first be decided that in 
the grant to the Duke of York the king intended to sever the bottoms of the navigable waters 
from the prerogative powers of government conferred by the same charter; and to convert them 
into mere franchises in the hands of a subject, to be held and used as his private property.  And 
we the more willingly forbear to express an opinion on this subject, because it has ceased to be a 
matter of much interest in the United States.  For when the Revolution took place, the people of 
each state became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their 
navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights 
since surrendered by the Constitution to the general government.  A grant made by their 
authority must therefore manifestly be tried and determined by different principles from those 
which apply to grants of the British crown, when the title is held by a single individual in trust 
for the whole nation. 
We can entertain no doubt as to the true construction of these letters patent. The object in 
view appears upon the face of them.  They were made for the purpose of enabling the Duke of 
York to establish a colony upon the newly discovered continent, to be governed, as nearly as 
circumstances would permit, according to the laws and usages of England; and in which the 
duke, his heirs and assigns, were to stand in the place of the king, and administer the government 
according to the principles of the British constitution.  And the people who were to plant this 
colony, and to form the political body over which he was to rule, were subjects of Great Britain, 
accustomed to be governed according to its usages and laws. 
It is said by Hale in his Treatise de Jure Maris, Harg. Law Tracts, 11, when speaking of 
the navigable waters, and the sea on the coasts within the jurisdiction of the British crown, "that 
although the king is the owner of this great coast, and, as a consequent of his propriety, hath the 
primary right of fishing in the sea and creeks, and arms thereof, yet the common people of 
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England have regularly a liberty of fishing in the sea, or creeks, or arms thereof, as a public 
common of piscary, and may not, without injury to their right, be restrained of it, unless in such 
places, creeks, or navigable rivers, where either the king or some particular subject hath gained a 
propriety exclusive of that common liberty." 
And there is nothing in the charter before us indicating that a different and opposite line 
of policy was designed to be adopted in that colony. Whatever was held by the king as a 
prerogative right, passed to the duke in the same character.  No words are used for the purpose of 
separating them from the jura regalia, and converting them into private property, to be held and 
enjoyed by the duke, apart from and independent of the political character with which he was 
clothed by the same instrument.  [Were]  the shores, and rivers, and bays, and arms of the sea, 
and the land under them, instead of being held as a public trust for the benefit of the whole 
community, to be freely used by all for navigation and fishery, as well for shell-fish as floating 
fish, had been converted by the charter itself into private property, to be parcelled out and sold 
by the duke for his own individual emolument?  There is nothing we think in the terms of the 
letters patent, or in the purposes for which it was granted, that would justify this construction.  
And in the judgment of the Court, the land under the navigable waters passed to the grantee as 
one of the royalties incident to the powers of government; and were to be held by him in the 
same manner, and for the same purposes that the navigable waters of England, and the soils 
under them, are held by the crown. 
And when the people of New Jersey took possession of the reins of government, and took 
into their own hands the powers of sovereignty, the prerogatives and regalities which before 
belonged either to the crown or the parliament, became immediately and rightfully vested in the 
state. We are of opinion that the proprietors are not entitled to the rights in question; and the 
judgment of the Circuit Court must, therefore, be reversed. 
Mr. Justice THOMPSON. 
The premises in question in this case are a mud-flat covered by the waters of the bay of 
Amboy, in the state of New Jersey.  The cause comes up on facts found by a special verdict in 
the Court below; by which it appears that the lessors of the plaintiff produced upon the trial a 
regular deduction of title from Charles the Second down to themselves, and the premises in 
question are admitted to be within the grant.  And the general question in the case is whether this 
mud-flat passed under the grant, and in virtue of the several conveyances set out in the special 
verdict, became vested in the proprietors of New Jersey, as private property.  The opinion of a 
majority of the Court is against this right, in which opinion, however, I cannot concur, and shall 
briefly assign the reasons upon which my opinion rests. 
That the title to land under a navigable stream of water must be held subject to certain 
public rights, cannot be denied.  But the question still remains, what are such public rights?  
Navigation, passing and repassing, are certainly among those public rights.  And should it be 
admitted that the right to fish for floating fish was included in this public right, it would not 
decide the present question.  The premises in dispute are a mud-flat; and the use to which it has 
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been and is claimed to be applied is the growing and planting of oysters. It is the use of land, and 
not of water, that is in question.   
These rules, as laid down by Lord Hale, have always been considered as settling the law 
upon the subjects to which they apply, and have been understood by all elementary writers as 
governing rules, and have been recognised by Courts of justice  as controlling doctrines.  They 
establish that by the common law the king is the owner of all navigable rivers, bays, and shores.  
That he owns them in full dominion and propriety, and has full power and authority to convey 
the same; that he may grant a several fishery in a navigable stream, and the common law has 
annexed only two limitations upon this power.  That these waters shall remain highways for 
passage and navigation, and that whilst they remain ungranted, there is a common right of 
fishery in them; but, subject to these limitations, the king has as full power to convey as an 
individual has to convey the land of which he is the owner. 
If, then, according to the principles of the common law, the king had the power to grant 
the soil under the waters of a navigable stream, where the tide ebbs and flows; and if such grant 
of soil carries with it the right of a several fishery, to the exclusion of a public use, the remaining 
inquiries are whether the grant of Charles the Second to the Duke of York, in the year 1664, did 
convey the premises in question.  And, if as I think the authorities clearly show, a grant of the 
soil carries with it the right to every private use to which it can be applied, including the 
cultivation of oysters, there can be no ground upon which this can be claimed as a common right. 
A several fishery and a common fishery are utterly incompatible with each other.  The former is 
founded upon and annexed to the right of soil. And when that right of soil is acquired by an 
individual, the several fishery begins, and the common fishery ends. 
And I must again repeat, if the king held such lands as trustee for the common benefit of 
all his subjects, and inalienable as private property, I am unable to discover on what ground the 
state of New Jersey can hold the land discharged of such trust, and can assume to dispose of it to 
the private and exclusive use of individuals.  If it was a trust estate in the king for the benefit of 
his subjects, and upon the Revolution, the government of New Jersey became the trustee in the 
place of the king, and the trust devolved upon such government, and the land became as 
inalienable in the government of New Jersey as in the hands of the king, and the state must be 
bound to hold all such lands subject to the trust, which, as contended, embraces  a common right 
of fishery in the waters, and the dredging for oysters in the land covered by the waters; and if this 
be so, there certainly can be no power in the state, without a breach of trust, to deprive the 
citizens of New Jersey of such common right, and convert these oyster grounds to the private and 
exclusive use of individuals. 
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the judgment of the Circuit Court ought to be 
affirmed.  
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POLLARD v. HAGAN 
44 U.S. 212 (1845)  
When Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the original states, 
she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which Georgia 
possessed at the date of the cession, except so far as this right was diminished by the public lands 
remaining in the possession and under the control of the United States, for the temporary 
purposes provided for in the deed of cession and the legislative acts connected with it. Nothing 
remained to the United States, according to the terms of the agreement, but the public lands. The 
right of Alabama and every other new state to exercise all the powers of government, which 
belong to and may be exercised by the original states of the union, must be admitted, and remain 
unquestioned, except so far as they are, temporarily, deprived of control over the public lands. 
* 
* 
* 
Alabama is … entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the territory within her 
limits, subject to the common law, to the same extent that Georgia possessed it before she ceded 
it to the United States.  To maintain any other doctrine, is to deny that Alabama has been 
admitted into the union on an equal footing with the original states, the constitution, laws, and 
compact, to the contrary notwithstanding.  But her rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction are not 
governed by the common law of England as it prevailed in the colonies before the Revolution, 
but as modified by our own institutions.  In the case of Martin and others v. Waddell, 16 Peters, 
410, the present chief justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "When the Revolution 
took place, the people of each state became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the 
absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under them for their own common use, 
subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution." Then to Alabama belong the 
navigable waters, and soils under them, in controversy in this case, subject to the rights 
surrendered by the Constitution to the United States. 
SHIVELY v. BOWLBY 
152 U.S. 1 (1894) 
Mr. Justice Gray, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. 
This case concerns the title in certain lands below high water mark in the Columbia River 
in the State of Oregon; the defendant claiming under the United States, and the plaintiffs 
claiming under the State of Oregon; and is in substance this: James M. Shively, being the owner, 
by title obtained by him from the United States under the act of Congress of September 27, 1850, 
c. 76, while Oregon was a Territory, of a tract of land in Astoria, bounded north by the Columbia 
River, made a plat of it, laying it out into blocks and streets, and including the adjoining lands 
below high water mark . . . The plaintiffs afterwards obtained from the State of Oregon deeds of 
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conveyance of the tide lands in front of these blocks, and built and maintained a wharf upon part 
of them.  The defendant, by counter-claim, asserted a title, under a subsequent conveyance from 
Shively. 
The counter-claim depended upon the effect of the grant from the United States to 
Shively of land bounded by the Columbia River, and of the conveyance from Shively to the 
defendant, as against the deeds from the State to the plaintiffs.  The Supreme Court of Oregon, 
affirming the judgment of a lower court of the State, held the counter-claim to be invalid. 
The judgment against its validity proceeded upon the ground that the grant from the 
United States upon which it was founded passed no title or right, as against the subsequent deeds 
from the State, in lands below high water mark.  This is a direct adjudication against the validity 
of a right or privilege claimed under a law of the United States, and presents a Federal question 
within the appellate jurisdiction of this court. 
The briefs submitted to the court in the case at bar have been so able and elaborate, and 
have disclosed such a diversity of view as to the scope and effect of the previous decisions of this 
court upon the subject of public and private rights in lands below high water mark of navigable 
waters, that this appears to the court to be a fit occasion for a full review of those decisions and a 
consideration of other authorities upon the subject. 
I 
By the common law, both the title and the dominion of the sea, and of rivers and arms of 
the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, and of all the lands below high water mark, within the 
jurisdiction of the Crown of England, are in the King.  Such waters, and the lands which they 
cover, either at all times, or at least when the tide is in, are incapable of ordinary and private 
occupation, cultivation and improvement; and their natural and primary uses are public in their 
nature, for highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose of 
fishing by all the King’s subjects.  Therefore the title, jus privatum, in such lands, as of waste 
and unoccupied lands, belongs to the King as the sovereign; and the dominion thereof, jus 
publicum, is vested in him as the representative of the nation and for the public benefit. 
The great authority in the law of England upon this subject is Lord Chief Justice Hale, 
whose authorship of the treatise De Jure Maris, sometimes questioned, has been put beyond 
doubt by recent researches. In England, from the time of Lord Hale, it has been treated as settled 
that the title in the soil of the sea, or of arms of the sea, below ordinary high water mark, is in the 
King, except so far as an individual or a corporation has acquired rights in it by express grant, or 
by prescription or usage and that this title, jus privatum, whether in the King or in a subject, is 
held subject to the public right, jus publicum, of navigation and fishing. 
It is equally well settled that a grant from the sovereign of land bounded by the sea, or by 
any navigable tide water, does not pass any title below high water mark, unless either the 
language of the grant, or long usage under it, clearly indicates that such was the intention.  
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By recent judgments of the House of Lords, after conflicting decisions in the courts 
below, it has been established in England, that the owner of land fronting on a navigable river in 
which the tide ebbs and flows has a right of access from his land to the river . . . The right thus 
recognized, however, is not a title in the soil below high water mark, nor a right to build thereon, 
but a right of access only, analogous to that of an abutter upon a highway.  Buccleuch v. 
Metropolitan Board of Works, L.R. 5 H.L. 418; Lyon v. Fishmongers Co., 1 App. Cas. 662.  
II 
The common law of England upon this subject, at the time of the emigration of our 
ancestors, is the law of this country, except so far as it has been modified by the charters, 
constitutions, statutes or usages of the several Colonies and States, or by the Constitution and 
laws of the United States. 
The English possessions in America were claimed by right of discovery. Having been 
discovered by subjects of the King of England, and taken possession of in his name, by his 
authority or with his assent, they were held by the King as the representative of and in trust for 
the nation; and all vacant lands, and the exclusive power to grant them, were vested in him.  The 
various charters granted by different monarchs of the Stuart dynasty for large tracts of territory 
on the Atlantic coast conveyed to the grantees both the territory described and the powers of 
government, including the property and the dominion of lands under tide waters.  And upon the 
American Revolution, all the rights of the Crown and of Parliament vested in the several States, 
subject to the rights surrendered to the national government by the Constitution of the United 
States.  Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 595; Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 408-410, 414. 
The leading case in this court, as to the title and dominion of tide waters and of the lands 
under them, is Martin v. Waddell, (1842) 16 Pet. 367, which arose in New Jersey. This court, in 
the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Taney, summed up in his own words:  “the dominion and 
propriety in the navigable waters, and in the soils under them, passed, as a part of the prerogative 
rights annexed to the political powers conferred on the Duke;” and “in his hands they were 
intended to be a trust for the common use of the new community about to be established”–”a 
public trust for the benefit of the whole community, to be freely used by all for navigation and 
fishery, as well for shell fish as floating fish”–and not as “private property, to be parcelled out 
and sold . . .” 
III 
The governments of the several Colonies, with a view to induce persons to erect wharves 
for the benefit of navigation and commerce, early allowed the owners of lands bounding on tide 
waters greater rights and privileges in the shore below high water mark, than they had in 
England.  But the nature and degree of such rights and privileges differed in the different 
Colonies, and in some were created by statute, while in others they rested upon usage only. 
The laws of the original States shows that there is no universal and uniform law upon the 
subject; but that each State has dealt with the lands under the tide waters within its borders 
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according to its own views of justice and policy, reserving its own control over such lands, or 
granting rights therein to individuals or corporations, whether owners of the adjoining upland or 
not, as it considered for the best interests of the public. Great caution, therefore, is necessary in 
applying precedents in one State to cases arising in another. 
IV 
The new States admitted into the Union since the adoption of the Constitution have the 
same rights as the original States in the tide waters, and in the lands below the high water mark, 
within their respective jurisdictions. 
The act of 1783 and the deed of 1784, by which the State of Virginia, before the adoption 
of the Constitution, ceded “unto the United States in Congress assembled, for the benefit of the 
said States, all right, title and claim, as well of soil as jurisdiction,” to the Northwest Territory, 
and the similar cession by the State of Georgia to the United States in 1802 of territory including 
great parts of Alabama and of Mississippi, each provided that the territory so ceded should be 
formed into States, to be admitted, on attaining a certain population, into the Union, (in the 
words of the Virginia cession) “having the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and 
independence as the other States,” or (in the words of the Ordinance of Congress of July 13, 
1787, for the government of the Northwest Territory, adopted in the Georgia cession) “on an 
equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever;” and that “all the lands within” the 
territory so ceded to the United States, and not reserved or appropriated for other purposes, 
should be considered as a common fund for the use and benefit of the United States.  In Pollard 
v. Hagan (1844) this court, upon full consideration, adjudged that upon the admission of the 
State of Alabama into the Union, the title in the lands below high water mark of navigable waters 
passed to the State, and could not afterwards be granted away by the Congress of the United 
States. 
VII 
The later judgments of this court clearly establish that the title and rights of riparian or 
littoral proprietors in the soil below high water mark of navigable waters are governed by the 
local laws of the several States, subject, of course, to the rights granted to the United States by 
the Constitution.  
VIII 
Notwithstanding the dicta contained in some of the opinions of this court, already quoted, 
to the effect that Congress has no power to grant any land below high water mark of navigable 
waters in a Territory of the United States, it is evident that this is not strictly true. By the 
Constitution, as is now well settled, the United States, having rightfully acquired the Territories, 
and being the only government which can impose laws upon them, have the entire dominion and 
sovereignty, national and municipal, Federal and state, over all the Territories, so long as they 
remain in a territorial condition. 
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We cannot doubt, therefore, that Congress has the power to make grants of lands below 
high water mark of navigable waters in any Territory of the United States, whenever it becomes 
necessary to do so in order to perform international obligations, or to effect the improvement of 
such lands for the promotion and convenience of commerce with foreign nations and among the 
several States, or to carry out other public purposes appropriate to the objects for which the 
United States hold the Territory. 
IX 
But Congress has never undertaken by general laws to dispose of such lands.  And the 
reasons are not far to seek. In the words of Chief Justice Taney, “the country” discovered and 
settled by Englishmen “was held by the King in his public and regal character as the 
representative of the nation, and in trust for them;” and the title and the dominion of the tide 
waters and of the soil under them, in each colony, passed by the royal charter to the grantees as 
“a trust for the common use of the new community about to be established;” and, upon the 
American Revolution, vested absolutely in the people of each State “for their own common use, 
subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the general government.” 
Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 409-411. 
The Congress of the United States, in disposing of the public lands, has constantly acted 
upon the theory that those lands, whether in the interior, or on the coast, above high water mark, 
may be taken up by actual occupants, in order to encourage the settlement of the country; but that 
the navigable waters and the soils under them, whether within or above the ebb and flow of the 
tide, shall be and remain public highways; and, being chiefly valuable for the public purposes of 
commerce, navigation and fishery, and for the improvements necessary to secure and promote 
those purposes, shall not be granted away during the period of territorial government; but, . . . 
shall be held by the United States in trust for the future States, and shall vest in the several 
States, when organized and admitted into the Union, with all the powers and prerogatives 
appertaining to the older States in regard to such waters and soils within their respective 
jurisdictions; in short, shall not be disposed of piecemeal to individuals as private property, but 
shall be held as a whole for the purpose of being ultimately administered and dealt with for the 
public benefit by the State, after it shall have become a completely organized community. 
X 
The title of the United States to Oregon was founded upon original discovery and actual 
settlement by citizens of the United States, authorized or approved by the government of the 
United States; as well as upon the cession of the Louisiana Territory by France in the treaty of 
1803, and the renunciation of the claims of Spain in the treaty of 1819. 
The United States, on assuming undisputed dominion over the Territory, owned all the 
lands therein; and Congress had the right to confine its bounties to settlers within just such limits 
as it chose. The first act of Congress which granted to settlers titles in such lands was the Oregon 
Donation Act of September 27, 1850, c. 76.  That act required the lands in Oregon to be surveyed 
as in the Northwest Territory; and it made grants or donations of land, measured by sections, half 
 25 
sections and quarter sections, to actual settlers and occupants.  It contains nothing indicating any 
intention on the part of Congress to depart from its settled policy of not granting to individuals 
lands under tide waters or navigable rivers.  9 Stat. 496; Rev. Stat. §§2395, 2396, 2409. 
It is evident, therefore, that a donation claim under this act, bounded by the Columbia 
River, where the tide ebbs and flows, did not, of its own force, have the effect of passing any title 
in lands below high water mark.  Nor is any such effect attributed to it by the law of the State of 
Oregon. 
By the law of the State of Oregon, as declared and established by the decisions of its 
Supreme Court, the owner of upland bounding on navigable water has no title in the adjoining 
lands below high water mark, and no right to build wharves thereon, except as expressly 
permitted by statutes of the State; but the State has the title in those lands, and, unless they have 
been so built upon with its permission, the right to sell and convey them to any one, free of any 
right in the proprietor of the upland, and in the case at bar, the lands in controversy are below 
high water mark of the Columbia River where the tide ebbs and flows; and the defendant  claims 
them by a deed from John M. Shively, who, while Oregon was a Territory, obtained from the 
United States a donation claim, bounded by the Columbia River, at the place in question. 
The plaintiffs claim title to the lands in controversy by deeds executed in behalf of the 
State of Oregon, pursuant to a statute of the State of 1872, as amended by a statute of 1874, 
which recited that the annual encroachments of the sea upon the land, washing away the shores 
and shoaling harbors, could be prevented only at great expense by occupying and placing 
improvements upon the tide and overflowed lands belonging to the State, and that it was 
desirable to offer facilities and encouragement to the owners of the soil abutting on such harbors 
to make such improvements; and therefore enacted that the owner of any land abutting or 
fronting upon, or bounded by the shore of any tide waters, should have the right to purchase the 
lands belonging to the State in front thereof; and that, if he should not do so within three years 
from the date of the act, they should be open to purchase by any other person who was a citizen 
and resident of Oregon, after giving notice and opportunity to the owner of the adjoining upland 
to purchase; and made provisions for securing to persons who had actually made improvements 
upon tide lands a priority of right so to purchase them. 
Neither the defendant nor his grantor appears to have ever built a wharf or made any 
other improvement upon the lands in controversy, or to have applied to the State to purchase 
them.  But the plaintiff after their purchase from the State, built and maintained a wharf upon the 
part of these lands nearest the channel, which extended several hundred feet into the Columbia 
River, and at which ocean and river craft were wont to receive and discharge freight. 
By the law of the State of Oregon, therefore, as enacted by its legislature and declared by 
its highest court, the title in the lands in controversy is in the [plaintiffs]; and, upon the principles 
recognized and affirmed by a uniform series of recent decisions of this court, above referred to, 
the law of Oregon governs the case. 
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The conclusions from the considerations and authorities above stated may be summed up 
as follows:  Lands under tide waters are incapable of cultivation or improvement in the manner 
of lands above high water mark. They are of great value to the public for the purposes of 
commerce, navigation and fishery. Their improvement by individuals, when permitted, is 
incidental or subordinate to the public use and right.  Therefore the title and the control of them 
are vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people. 
At common law, the title and the dominion in lands flowed by the tide were in the King 
for the benefit of the nation.  Upon the settlement of the Colonies, like rights passed to the 
grantees in the royal charters, in trust for the communities to be established.  Upon the American 
Revolution, these rights, charged with a like trust, were vested in the original States within their 
respective borders, subject to the rights surrendered by the Constitution to the United States. 
Upon the acquisition of a Territory by the United States, whether by cession from one of 
the States, or by treaty with a foreign country, or by discovery and settlement, the same title and 
dominion passed to the United States, for the benefit of the whole people, and in trust for the 
several States to be ultimately created out of the Territory. 
The new States admitted into the Union since the adoption of the Constitution have the 
same rights as the original States in the tide waters, and in the lands under them, within their 
respective jurisdictions.  The title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil below 
high water mark, therefore, are governed by the laws of the several States, subject to the rights 
granted to the United States by the Constitution. 
The United States, while they hold the country as a Territory, having all the powers both 
of national and of municipal government, may grant, for appropriate purposes, titles or rights in 
the soil below high water mark of tide waters. But they have never done so by general laws; and, 
unless in some case of international duty or public exigency, have acted upon the policy, as most 
in accordance with the interest of the people and with the object for which the Territories were 
acquired, of leaving the administration and disposition of the sovereign rights in navigable 
waters, and in the soil under them, to the control of the States, respectively, when organized and 
admitted into the Union. 
Grants by Congress of portions of the public lands within a Territory to settlers thereon, 
though bordering on or bounded by navigable waters, convey, of their own force, no title or right 
below high water mark, and do not impair the title and dominion of the future State when 
created; but leave the question of the use of the shores by the owners of uplands to the sovereign 
control of each State, subject only to the rights vested by the Constitution in the United States. 
The donation land claim, bounded by the Columbia River, upon which the [defendant] 
relies, includes no title or right in the land below high water mark; and the statutes of Oregon, 
under which the [plaintiffs]  hold, are a constitutional and legal exercise by the State of Oregon 
of its dominion over the lands under navigable waters. 
Judgment affirmed.  
 27 
BORAX CONSOLIDATED, LTD v. LOS ANGELES 
296 U.S. 10 (1935) 
 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The City of Los Angeles brought this suit to quiet title to land claimed to be tideland of 
Mormon Island situated in the inner bay of San Pedro now known as Los Angeles Harbor.  The 
City asserted title under a legislative grant by the State.  Petitioners claimed under a preemption 
patent issued by the United States on December 30, 1881, to one William Banning.  The District 
Court entered a decree, upon findings, dismissing the complaint upon the merits and adjudging 
that petitioner, Borax Consolidated, Limited, was the owner in fee simple and entitled to the 
possession of the property. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decree.  Because of the 
importance of the questions presented, and of an asserted conflict with decisions of this Court, 
we granted certiorari, June 3, 1935. 
In May, 1880, one W. H. Norway, a Deputy Surveyor, acting under a contract with the 
Surveyor General of the United States for California, made a survey of Mormon Island.  The 
surveyor's field notes and the corresponding plat of the island were approved by the Surveyor 
General and were returned to the Commissioner of the General Land Office.  The latter, having 
found the survey to be correct, authorized the filing of the plat.  The land which the patent to 
Banning purported to convey was described by reference to that plat as follows: "Lot numbered 
one, of section eight, in township five south, of range thirteen west of San Bernardino Meridian, 
in California, containing eighteen acres, and eighty-eight hundredths of an acre, according to the 
Official Plat of the Survey of the said Lands, returned to the General Land Office by the 
Surveyor General."  
The District Court found that the boundaries of "lot one," as thus conveyed, were those 
shown by the plat and field notes of the survey; that all the lands described in the complaint were 
embraced within that lot; and that no portion of the lot was or had been tideland or situated 
below the line of mean high tide of the Pacific Ocean or of Los Angeles Harbor.  The District 
Court held that the complaint was a collateral, and hence unwarranted, attack upon the survey, 
the plat and the patent; that the action of the General Land Office involved determinations of 
questions of fact which were within its jurisdiction and were specially committed to it by law for 
decision; and that its determinations, including that of the correctness of the survey, were final 
and were binding upon the State of California and the City of Los Angeles, as well as upon the 
United States. 
The Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with this view as to the conclusiveness of the 
survey and the patent.  The court held that the Federal Government had neither the power nor the 
intention to convey tideland to Banning, and that his rights were limited to the upland. The court 
also regarded the lines shown on the plat as being meander lines and the boundary line of the 
land conveyed as the shore line of Mormon Island. The court declined to pass upon petitioners' 
claim of estoppel in pais and by judgment, upon the ground that the question was not presented 
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to or considered by the trial court, and was also of the opinion that the various questions raised as 
to the failure of the City to allege and prove the boundary line of the island were important only 
from the standpoint of the new trial which the court directed.  For the guidance of the trial court 
the Court of Appeals laid down the following rule: The "mean high tide line" was to be taken as 
the boundary between the land conveyed and the tideland belonging to the State of California, 
and in the interest of certainty the court directed that "an average for 18.6 years should be 
determined as near as possible by observation or calculation."  
Petitioners contest these rulings of the Court of Appeals.  With respect to the 
ascertainment of the shore line, they insist that the court erred in taking the "mean high tide line" 
and in rejecting "neap tides" as the criterion for ordinary high water mark. 
1. The controversy is limited by settled principles governing the title to tidelands.  The soils 
under tidewaters within the original States were reserved to them respectively, and the 
States since admitted to the Union have the same sovereignty and jurisdiction in relation 
to such lands within their borders as the original States possessed.  This doctrine applies 
to tidelands in California.  Upon the acquisition of the territory from Mexico, the United 
States acquired the title to tidelands equally with the title to upland, but held the former 
only in trust for the future States that might be erected out of that territory.   It follows 
that if the land in question was tideland, the title passed to California at the time of her 
admission to the Union in 1850.  That the Federal Government had no power to convey 
tidelands, which had thus vested in a State, was early determined.  
2. So far as pertinent here, the jurisdiction of the Land Department extended only to "the 
public lands of the United States." The patent to Banning was issued under the 
preemption laws, which expressly related to lands "belonging to the United States." R. S. 
2257, 2259.  Obviously these laws had no application to lands which belonged to the 
States.  Specifically, the term "public lands" did not include tidelands.  Mann v. Tacoma 
Land Co., 153 U.S. 273, 284. "The words 'public lands' are habitually used in our 
legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws." 
Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 763; Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 490; Union Pacific 
R. Co. v. Harris, 215 U.S. 386, 388. 
Here, the question goes to the existence of the subject upon which the Land Department 
was competent to act.  Was it upland, which the United States could patent, or tideland, 
which it could not?  Such a controversy as to title is appropriately one for judicial 
decision upon evidence, and we find no ground for the conclusion that it has been 
committed to the determination of administrative officers. 
3. As the District Court fell into a fundamental error in treating the survey and patent as 
conclusive, it was not incumbent upon the Court of Appeals to review the evidence and 
decide whether it showed, or failed to show, that the land in question was tideland.  The 
court remanded the cause for a new trial in which the issues as to the boundary between 
upland and tideland, and as to the defenses urged by petitioners, are to be determined.  In 
that disposition of the case we find no error. 
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4. There remains for our consideration, however, the ruling of the Court of Appeals in 
instructing the District Court to ascertain as the boundary "the mean high tide line" and in 
thus rejecting the line of "neap tides." 
5. Petitioners claim under a federal patent which, according to the plat, purported to convey 
land bordering on the Pacific Ocean.  There is no question that the United States was free 
to convey the upland, and the patent affords no ground for holding that it did not convey 
all the title that the United States had in the premises.  The question as to the extent of 
this federal grant, that is, as to the limit of the land conveyed, or the boundary between 
the upland and the tideland, is necessarily a federal question.  It is a question which 
concerns the validity and effect of an act done by the United States; it involves the 
ascertainment of the essential basis of a right asserted under federal law. 
The tideland extends to the high water mark.  This does not mean, as petitioners contend, 
a physical mark made upon the ground by the waters; it means the line of high water as 
determined by the course of the tides.  By the civil law, the shore extends as far as the highest 
waves reach in winter.  Inst. lib. 2, tit. 1, § 3; Dig. lib. 50, tit. 16, § 112.  But by the common law, 
the shore "is confined to the flux and reflux of the sea at ordinary tides." Blundell v. Catterall, 5 
B. & A. 268, 292. It is the land "between ordinary high and low-water mark, the land over which 
the daily tides  ebb and flow. When, therefore, the sea, or a bay, is named as a boundary, the line 
of ordinary high-water mark  is always intended where the common law prevails." United States 
v. Pacheco, 2 Wall. 587, 590. 
In view of the definition of the mean high tide, as given by the United States Coast and 
Geodetic Survey, that "Mean high water at any place is the average height of all the high waters 
at that place over a considerable  period of time," and the further observation that "from 
theoretical considerations of an astronomical character" there should be a "a periodic variation in 
the rise of water above sea level having a period of 18.6 years," the Court of Appeals directed 
that in order to ascertain the mean high tide line with requisite certainty in fixing the boundary of 
valuable tidelands, such as those here in question appear to be, "an average of 18.6 years should 
be determined as near as possible." We find no error in that instruction.   The decree of the Court 
of Appeals is Affirmed. 
PPL MONTANA v. MONTANA 
132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012) 
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case concerns three rivers which flow through Montana and then beyond its borders. 
The question is whether discrete, identifiable segments of these rivers in Montana were non-
navigable, as federal law defines that concept for purposes of determining whether the State 
acquired title to the riverbeds underlying those segments, when the State entered the Union in 
1889. Montana contends that the rivers must be found navigable at the disputed locations. From 
this premise, the State asserts that in 1889 it gained title to the disputed riverbeds under the 
constitutional equal-footing doctrine. Based on its title claims, Montana sought compensation 
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from PPL Montana, LLC, a power company, for its use of the riverbeds for hydroelectric 
projects. The Montana courts granted summary judgment on title to Montana, awarding it $41 
million in rent for the riverbeds for the period from 2000 to 2007 alone. That judgment must be 
reversed. 
I 
The three rivers in question are the Missouri River, the Madison River, and the Clark 
Fork River. The Missouri and the Madison are on the eastern side of the Continental Divide. The 
Madison flows into the Missouri, which then continues at length to its junction with the 
Mississippi River. The Clark Fork River is on the western side of the Continental Divide. Its 
waters join the Columbia River system that flows into the Pacific Ocean. Each river shall be 
described in somewhat more detail. 
The Missouri River originates in Montana and traverses seven States before a point just 
north of St. Louis where it joins the Mississippi. The upstream part of the Missouri River in 
Montana, known as the Upper Missouri River, is better characterized as rocky rather than 
muddy. It descends through scenic mountain terrain including the deep gorge at the Gates of the 
Mountains; turns eastward through the Great Falls reach, cascading over a roughly 10-mile 
stretch of cataracts and rapids over which the river drops more than 400 feet; just after Montana 
became a State, the Upper Missouri River was "seriously obstructed by numerous rapids and 
rocks," and [was] called the rocky river."  
The second river to be considered is the Madison, one of the Missouri River's headwater 
tributaries. Named by Lewis and Clark for then-Secretary of State James Madison, the Madison 
River courses west out of the Northern Rocky Mountains of Wyoming and Montana in what is 
now Yellowstone National Park, then runs north and merges with the Jefferson and Gallatin 
Rivers at Three Forks, Montana, to form the Upper Missouri.  
The third river at issue in this case is the Clark Fork. The Clark Fork is "one of the 
wildest and most picturesque streams in the West," marked by "many waterfalls and boxed 
gorges." Federal Writers' Projects of the Works Progress Administration, Idaho: A Guide in 
Word and Picture 230 (2d ed. 1950). 
II 
Petitioner PPL Montana, LLC (PPL), owns and operates hydroelectric facilities that serve 
Montana residents and businesses. Ten of its facilities are built upon riverbeds underlying 
segments of the Upper Missouri, Madison, and Clark Fork Rivers. It is these beds to which title 
is disputed. 
PPL's power facilities have existed at their locations for many decades, some for over a 
century. Until recently, these facilities were operated without title based objection by the State of 
Montana. The State was well aware of the facilities' existence on the riverbeds--indeed, various 
Montana state agencies had participated in federal licensing proceedings for these hydroelectric 
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projects. Yet the State did not seek, and accordingly PPL and its predecessor did not pay, 
compensation for use of the riverbeds. Instead, the understanding of PPL and the United States is 
that PPL has been paying rents to the United States for use of those riverbeds, as well as for use 
of river uplands flooded by PPL's projects.  
In 2003, parents of Montana schoolchildren sued PPL in the United States District Court 
for the District of Montana, arguing that PPL had built its facilities on riverbeds that were state 
owned and part of Montana's school trust lands. Prompted by the litigation, the State joined the 
lawsuit, for the first time seeking rents for PPL's riverbed use.  
PPL and two other power companies sued the State of Montana in the First Judicial 
District Court of Montana, arguing that the State was barred from seeking compensation for use 
of the riverbeds. By counterclaim, the State sought a declaration that under the equal-footing 
doctrine it owns the riverbeds used by PPL and can charge rent for their use. The Montana trial 
court granted summary judgment to Montana as to navigability for purposes of determining 
riverbed title. The court ordered PPL to pay $40,956,180 in rent for use of the riverbeds between 
2000 and 2007.  
In a decision by a divided court, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The court 
reasoned from the background principle that "navigability for title purposes is very liberally 
construed." It dismissed as having "limited applicability" this Court's approach of assessing the 
navigability of the disputed segment of the river rather than the river as a whole. The Montana 
court accepted that certain relevant stretches of the rivers were not navigable but declared them 
"merely short interruptions" insufficient as a matter of law to find non-navigability, since traffic 
had circumvented those stretches by overland portage. Placing extensive reliance upon evidence 
of present-day use of the Madison River, the court found that river navigable as a matter of law 
at the time of statehood.  
This Court granted certiorari and now reverses the judgment. 
III 
The rule that the States, in their capacity as sovereigns, hold title to the beds under 
navigable waters has origins in English common law. See Shively v. Bowlby. A distinction was 
made in England between waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide (royal rivers) and 
nontidal waters (public highways). With respect to royal rivers, the  Crown was presumed to 
hold title to the riverbed and soil, but the public retained the right of passage and the right to fish 
in the stream. With respect to public highways, as the name suggests, the public also retained the 
right of water passage; but title to the riverbed and soil, as a general matter, was held in private 
ownership.  Riparian landowners shared title, with each owning from his side to the center thread 
of the stream, as well as the exclusive right to fish there.  
While the tide-based distinction for bed title was the initial rule in the 13 Colonies, after 
the Revolution American law moved to a different standard. Some state courts came early to the 
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conclusion that a State holds presumptive title to navigable waters whether or not the waters are 
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.  
The tidal rule of "navigability" for sovereign ownership of riverbeds, while perhaps 
appropriate for England's dominant coastal geography, was ill suited to the United States with its 
vast number of major inland rivers upon which navigation could be sustained. By the late 19th 
century, the Court had recognized "the now prevailing doctrine" of state sovereign "title in the 
soil of rivers really navigable." Shively, supra, This title rule became known as "navigability in 
fact." 
The rule for state riverbed title assumed federal constitutional significance under the 
equal-footing doctrine. In 1842, the Court declared that for the 13 original States, the people of 
each State, based on principles of sovereignty, "hold the absolute right to all their navigable 
waters and the soils under them," subject only to rights surrendered and powers granted by the 
Constitution to the Federal Government. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 16 Pet. 367, 
410, 10 L. Ed. 997 (1842). In a series of 19th-century cases, the Court determined that the same 
principle applied to States later admitted to the Union, because the States in the Union are 
coequal sovereigns under the Constitution. See, e.g., Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 3 
How. 212, 228-229, 11 L. Ed. 565 (1845). These precedents are the basis for the equal-footing 
doctrine, under which a State's title to these lands was "conferred not by Congress but by the 
Constitution itself." It follows that any ensuing questions of navigability for determining state 
riverbed title are governed by federal law.  
The title consequences of the equal-footing doctrine can be stated in summary form: 
Upon statehood, the State gains title within its borders to the beds of waters then navigable.  It 
may allocate and govern those lands according to state law subject only to "the paramount power 
of the United States to control such waters for purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign 
commerce." The United States retains any title vested in it before statehood to any land beneath 
waters not then navigable (and not tidally influenced), to be transferred or licensed if and as it 
chooses.  
Returning to the "navigability in fact" rule, it should be noted, that the test for 
navigability is not applied in the same way in these distinct types of cases. For state title under 
the equal-footing doctrine, navigability is determined at the time of statehood and based on the 
"natural and ordinary condition" of the water. In contrast federal regulatory authority 
encompasses waters that only recently have become navigable, were once navigable but are no 
longer, or are not navigable and never have been but may become so by reasonable 
improvements. With respect to the federal commerce power, the inquiry regarding navigation 
historically focused on interstate commerce. In contrast, for title purposes, the inquiry depends 
only on navigation and not on interstate travel. 
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IV 
A 
To determine title to a riverbed under the equal-footing doctrine, this Court considers the 
river on a segment by-segment basis to assess whether the segment of the river, under which the 
riverbed in dispute lies, is navigable or not. The Montana Supreme Court discounted the segment 
by-segment approach of this Court's cases, calling it "a piecemeal classification of navigability--
with some stretches declared navigable, and others declared non navigable." The segment-by-
segment approach to navigability for title is well settled, and it should not be disregarded. A key 
justification for sovereign ownership of navigable riverbeds is that a contrary rule would allow 
private riverbed owners to erect improvements on the riverbeds that could interfere with the 
public's right to use the waters as a highway for commerce. While the Federal Government and 
States retain regulatory power to protect public navigation, allocation to the State of the beds 
underlying navigable rivers reduces the possibility of conflict between private and public 
interests. By contrast, segments that are non-navigable at the time of statehood are those over 
which commerce could not then occur. Thus, there is no reason that these segments also should 
be deemed owned by the State under the equal-footing doctrine. 
Practical considerations also support segmentation. Physical conditions that affect 
navigability often vary significantly over the length of a river. This is particularly true with 
longer rivers, which can traverse vastly different terrain and the flow of which can be affected by 
varying local climates. The Missouri River provides an excellent example: Between its 
headwaters and mouth, it runs for over 2,000 miles out of steep mountains, through canyons and 
upon rocky beds, over waterfalls and rapids, and across sandy plains, capturing runoff from snow 
melt and farmland rains alike. These shifts in physical conditions provide a means to determine 
appropriate start points and end points for the segment in question. Topographical and 
geographical indicators may assist.  
A segment approach to riverbed title allocation under the equal-footing doctrine is 
consistent with the manner in which private parties seek to establish riverbed title. For centuries, 
where title to the riverbed was not in the sovereign, the common-law rule for allocating riverbed 
title among riparian landowners involved apportionment de fined both by segment (each 
landowner owns bed and soil along the length of his land adjacent) and thread (each landowner 
owns bed and soil to the center of the stream).  
This Court determines, based on evidence in the record, that there is a significant 
likelihood that some of the river stretches in dispute fail the federal test of navigability for the 
purpose of determining title. While the ultimate decision as to disputed river stretches is to be 
determined, in the first instance, by the Montana courts upon remand, the relevant evidence 
should be assessed in light of the principles discussed in this opinion. 
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B 
The Montana Supreme Court further erred as a matter of law in its reliance upon the 
evidence of present-day, primarily recreational use of the Madison River. Navigability must be 
assessed as of the time of statehood, and it concerns the river's usefulness for "'trade and travel,'" 
rather than for other purposes. True, river segments are navigable not only if they "[were] used," 
but also if they "[were] susceptible of being used," as highways of commerce at the time of 
statehood. Evidence of recreational use, depending on its nature, may bear upon susceptibility of 
commercial use at the time of statehood. Similarly, post-statehood evidence may show 
susceptibility of use at the time of state hood.  
The Montana Supreme Court opinion offered no indication that it made these necessary 
findings. The court concluded the evidence of present-day use of the Madison was probative of 
its susceptibility of use at statehood, but there is no apparent basis for its conclusion. Modern 
recreational fishing boats, including inflatable rafts and lightweight canoes or kayaks, may be 
able to navigate waters much more shallow or with rockier beds than the boats customarily used 
for trade and travel at statehood. 
As to the river's physical condition, the Montana Supreme Court did not assess with care 
PPL's evidence about changes to the river's flow and the location and pattern of its channel since 
statehood. Thus, the river may well be easier to navigate now than at statehood. The Montana 
Supreme Court altogether ignored the expert's reasoning about the past condition of the river's 
channels and the significance of that information for navigability. The Montana Supreme Court's 
reliance upon the State's evidence of present-day, recreational use, at least without further 
inquiry, was wrong as a matter of law. 
As the litigation history of this case shows, Montana filed its claim for riverbed rent over 
a century after the first of the dams was built upon the riverbeds. Montana had not sought 
compensation before then, despite its full awareness of PPL's hydroelectric projects and despite 
the State's own participation in the projects' federal licensing process. While this Court does not 
reach the question, it may be that by virtue of the State's sovereignty, neither laches nor estoppel 
could apply in a strict sense to bar the State's much belated claim. Still, the reliance by PPL and 
its predecessors in title upon the State's long failure to assert title is some evidence to support the 
conclusion that the river segments were non-navigable for purposes of the equal-footing 
doctrine. 
The Montana Supreme Court's ruling that Montana owns and may charge for use of 
riverbeds across the State was based upon an infirm legal understanding of this Court's rules of 
navigability for title under the equal footing doctrine. The judgment of the Montana Supreme 
Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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Session 3. National Dominion 
UNITED STATES v. CALIFORNIA 
332 U.S. 19 (1947) 
Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The United States by its Attorney General and Solicitor General brought this suit against 
the State of California invoking our original jurisdiction under Article III, §2, of the Constitution 
which provides that “In all Cases . . . in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall 
have original Jurisdiction.”  The complaint alleges that the United States “is the owner in fee 
simple of, or possessed of paramount rights in and powers over, the lands, minerals and other 
things of value underlying the Pacific Ocean, lying seaward of the ordinary low water mark on 
the coast of California and outside of the inland waters of the State, extending seaward three 
nautical miles and bounded on the north and south, respectively, by the northern and southern 
boundaries of the State of California.” It is further alleged that California, acting pursuant to state 
statutes, but without authority from the United States, has negotiated and executed numerous 
leases with persons and corporations purporting to authorize them to enter upon the described 
ocean area to take petroleum, gas, and other mineral deposits, and that the lessees have done so, 
paying to California large sums of money in rents and royalties for the petroleum products taken. 
The prayer is for a decree declaring the rights of the United States in the area as against 
California and enjoining California and all persons claiming under it from continuing to trespass 
upon the area in violation of the rights of the United States.  
California has filed an answer to the complaint.  It admits that persons holding leases 
from California, or those claiming under it, have been extracting petroleum products from the 
land under the three-mile ocean belt immediately adjacent to California.  The basis of 
California’s asserted ownership is that a belt extending three English miles from low water mark 
lies within the original boundaries of the state, Cal. Const. Art. XII (1849); that the original 
thirteen states acquired from the Crown of England title to all lands within their boundaries 
under navigable waters, including a three-mile belt in adjacent seas; and that since California 
was admitted as a state on an “equal footing” with the original states, California at that time 
became vested with title to all such lands. 
First. It is contended that the pleadings present no case or controversy under Article III, 
§2, of the Constitution.  The contention rests in the first place on an argument that there is no 
case or controversy in a legal sense, but only a difference of opinion between federal and state 
officials.  It is true that there is a difference of opinion between federal and state officers.  But 
there is far more than that.  The point of difference is as to who owns, or has paramount rights in 
and power over several thousand square miles of land under the ocean off the coast of California. 
The difference involves the conflicting claims of federal and state officials as to which 
government, state or federal, has a superior right to take or authorize the taking of the vast 
quantities of oil and gas underneath that land, much of which has already been, and more of 
which is about to be, taken by or under authority of the state.  Such concrete conflicts as these 
constitute a controversy in the classic legal sense, and are the very kind of differences which can 
only be settled by agreement, arbitration, force, or judicial action. 
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Second. It is contended that we should dismiss this action on the ground that the Attorney 
General has not been granted power either to file or to maintain it.  It is not denied that Congress 
has given a very broad authority to the Attorney General to institute and conduct litigation in 
order to establish and safeguard government rights and properties.  The argument is that 
Congress has for a long period of years acted in such a way as to manifest a clear policy to the 
effect that the states, not the Federal Government, have legal title to the land under the three-mile 
belt.  Although Congress has not expressly declared such a policy, we are asked to imply it from 
certain conduct of Congress and other governmental agencies charged with responsibilities 
concerning the national domain.  And, in effect, we are urged to infer that Congress has by 
implication amended its long-existing statutes which grant the Attorney General broad powers to 
institute and maintain court proceedings in order to safeguard national interests. 
[T]he matters to which we have [referred . . . do not] afford support for a holding that 
Congress has either explicitly or by implication stripped the Attorney General of his statutorily 
granted power to invoke our jurisdiction in this federal-state controversy.  This brings us to the 
merits of the case. 
Third. The crucial question on the merits is not merely who owns the bare legal title to 
the lands under the marginal sea.  The United States here asserts rights in two capacities 
transcending those of a mere property owner.  In one capacity it asserts the right and 
responsibility to exercise whatever power and dominion are necessary to protect this country 
against dangers to the security and tranquility of its people incident to the fact that the United 
States is located immediately adjacent to the ocean.  The Government also appears in its capacity 
as a member of the family of nations.  In that capacity it is responsible for conducting United 
States relations with other nations.  It asserts that proper exercise of these constitutional 
responsibilities requires that it have power, unencumbered by state commitments, always to 
determine what agreements will be made concerning the control and use of the marginal sea and 
the land under it.  In the light of the foregoing, our question is whether the state or the Federal 
Government has the paramount right and power to determine in the first instance when, how, and 
by what agencies, foreign or domestic, the oil and other resources of the soil of the marginal sea, 
known or hereafter discovered, may be exploited. 
California claims that it owns the resources of the soil under the three-mile marginal belt 
as an incident to those elements of sovereignty which it exercises in that water area.  The state 
points out that and that California was admitted “on an equal footing with the original States in 
all respects whatever.”  With these premises admitted, California contends that its ownership 
follows from the rule originally announced in Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; see also 
Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410. 
The Government does not deny that under the Pollard rule, as explained in later cases, 
California has a qualified ownership of lands under inland navigable waters such as rivers, 
harbors, and even tidelands down to the low water mark.  It does question the validity of the 
rationale in the Pollard case that ownership of such water areas, any more than ownership of 
uplands, is a necessary incident of the state sovereignty contemplated by the “equal footing” 
clause.  Cf. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14.  For this reason, among others, it argues that 
the Pollard rule should not be extended so as to apply to lands under the ocean.  It stresses that 
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the thirteen original colonies did not own the marginal belt; that the Federal Government did not 
seriously assert its increasingly greater rights in this area until after the formation of the Union; 
that it has not bestowed any of these rights upon the states, but has retained them as 
appurtenances of national sovereignty.  And the Government insists that no previous case in this 
Court has involved or decided conflicting claims of a state and the Federal Government to the 
three-mile belt in a way which requires our extension of the Pollard inland water rule to the 
ocean area. 
From all the wealth of material supplied, however, we cannot say that the thirteen 
original colonies separately acquired ownership to the three-mile belt or the soil under it, even if 
they did acquire elements of the sovereignty of the English Crown by their revolution against it. 
At the time this country won its independence from England there was no settled 
international custom or understanding among nations that each nation owned a three-mile water 
belt along its borders.  Those who settled this country were interested in lands upon which to 
live, and waters upon which to fish and sail.  There is no substantial support in history for the 
idea that they wanted or claimed a right to block off the ocean’s bottom for private ownership 
and use in the extraction of its wealth. 
It did happen that shortly after we became a nation our statesmen became interested in 
establishing national dominion over a definite marginal zone to protect our neutrality.  Largely as 
a result of their efforts, the idea of a definite three-mile belt in which an adjacent nation can, if it 
chooses, exercise broad, if not complete dominion, has apparently at last been generally accepted 
throughout the world. 
There are innumerable executive declarations to the world of our national claims to the 
three-mile belt, and more recently to the whole continental shelf. The latest and broadest claim is 
President Truman’s recent proclamation that the United States “regards the natural resources of 
the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts 
of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control 
. . .” Exec. Proc. 2667, Sept. 28, 1945, 10 F. R. 12303. 
Not only has acquisition, as it were, of the three-mile belt been accomplished by the 
National Government, but protection and control of it has been and is a function of national 
external sovereignty. The belief that local interests are so predominant as constitutionally to 
require state dominion over lands under its land-locked navigable waters finds some argument 
for its support.  But such can hardly be said in favor of state control over any part of the ocean or 
the ocean’s bottom.  This country, throughout its existence has stood for freedom of the seas, a 
principle whose breach has precipitated wars among nations.   
The ocean, even its three-mile belt, is thus of vital consequence to the nation in its desire 
to engage in commerce and to live in peace with the world; it also becomes of crucial importance 
should it ever again become impossible to preserve that peace.  And as peace and world 
commerce are the paramount responsibilities of the nation, rather than an individual state, so, if 
wars come, they must be fought by the nation.  The state is not equipped in our constitutional 
system with the powers or the facilities for exercising the responsibilities which would be 
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concomitant with the dominion which it seeks.  Conceding that the state has been authorized to 
exercise local police power functions in the part of the marginal belt within its declared 
boundaries, these do not detract from the Federal Government’s paramount rights in and power 
over this area.  Consequently, we are not persuaded to transplant the Pollard rule of ownership as 
an incident of state sovereignty in relation to inland waters out into the soil beneath the ocean, so 
much more a matter of national concern.  If this rationale of the Pollard case is a valid basis for a 
conclusion that paramount rights run to the states in inland waters to the shoreward of the low 
water mark, the same rationale leads to the conclusion that national interests, responsibilities, and 
therefore national rights are paramount in waters lying to the seaward in the three-mile belt. 
The question of who owned the bed of the sea only became of great potential importance 
at the beginning of this century when oil was discovered there. As a consequence of this 
discovery, California passed an Act in 1921 authorizing the granting of permits to California 
residents to prospect for oil and gas on blocks of land off its coast under the ocean.  Cal. Stats. 
1921, c. 303.  This state statute, and others which followed it, together with the leasing practices 
under them, have precipitated this extremely important controversy, and pointedly raised this 
state-federal conflict for the first time.  Now that the question is here, we decide for the reasons 
we have stated that California is not the owner of the three-mile marginal belt along its coast, and 
that the Federal Government rather than the state has paramount rights in and power over that 
belt, an incident to which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water area, 
including oil. 
We hold that the United States is entitled to the relief prayed for.  The parties, or either of 
them, may, before September 15, 1947, submit the form of decree to carry this opinion into 
effect, failing which the Court will prepare and enter an appropriate decree at the next term of 
Court. 
It is so ordered. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting. 
By this original bill the United States prayed for a decree enjoining all persons, including 
those asserting a claim derived from the State of California, from trespassing upon the disputed 
area.  An injunction against trespassers normally presupposes property rights.  The Court, 
however, grants the prayer but does not do so by finding that the United States has proprietary 
interests in the area.  To be sure, it denies such proprietary rights in California.  But even if we 
assume an absence of ownership or possessory interest on the part of California, that does not 
establish a proprietary interest in the United States. It is significant that the Court does not adopt 
the Government’s elaborate argument, based on dubious and tenuous writings of publicists, see 
Schwarzenberger, Inductive Approach to International Law, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 539, 559, that this 
part of the open sea belongs, in a proprietary sense, to the United States.  See American Banana 
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 351.  Instead, the Court finds trespass against the United 
States on the basis of what it calls the “national dominion” by the United States over this area. 
To speak of “dominion” carries precisely those overtones in the law which relate to 
property and not to political authority.  Dominion, from the Roman concept dominium, was 
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concerned with property and ownership, as against imperium, which related to political 
sovereignty.  One may choose to say, for example, that the United States has “national 
dominion” over navigable streams.  But the power to regulate commerce over these streams, and 
its continued exercise, do not change the imperium of the United States into dominium over the 
land below the waters.  Of course the United States has “paramount rights” in the sea belt of 
California- the rights that are implied by the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, 
the power of condemnation, the treaty-making power, the war power.  We have not now before 
us the validity of the exercise of any of these paramount rights.  Rights of ownership are here 
asserted- and rights of ownership are something else. Ownership implies acquisition in the 
various ways in which land is acquired- by conquest, by discovery and claim, by cession, by 
prescription, by purchase, by condemnation.  When and how did the United States acquire this 
land? 
The fact that these oil deposits in the open sea may be vital to the national security, and 
important elements in the conduct of our foreign affairs, is no more relevant than is the existence 
of uranium deposits, wherever they may be, in determining questions of trespass to the land of 
which they form a part. This is not a situation where an exercise of national power is actively and 
presently interfered with.  In such a case, the inherent power of a federal court of equity may be 
invoked to prevent or remove the obstruction.  In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564; Sanitary District v. 
United States, 266 U.S. 405. Neither the bill, nor the opinion sustaining it, suggests that there is 
interference by California or the alleged trespassers with any authority which the Government 
presently seeks to exercise.  It is beside the point to say that “if wars come, they must be fought 
by the nation.” Nor is it relevant that “The very oil about which the state and nation here contend 
might well become the subject of international dispute and settlement.” It is common knowledge 
that uranium has become “the subject of international dispute” with a view to settlement. 
Compare Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416. 
To declare that the Government has “national dominion” is merely a way of saying that 
vis-à-vis all other nations the Government is the sovereign.  If that is what the Court’s decree 
means, it needs no pronouncement by this Court to confer or declare such sovereignty.  If it 
means more than that, it implies that the Government has some proprietary interest.  That has not 
been remotely established except by sliding from absence of ownership by California to 
ownership by the United States. 
Let us assume, for the present, that ownership by California cannot be proven.  On a fair 
analysis of all the evidence bearing on ownership, then, this area is, I believe, to be deemed 
unclaimed land, and the determination to claim it on the part of the United States is a political 
decision not for this Court. The Constitution places vast authority for the conduct of foreign 
relations in the independent hands of the President.  See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 
299 U.S. 304.  It is noteworthy that the Court does not treat the President’s proclamation in 
regard to the disputed area as an assertion of ownership.  See Exec. Proc. 2667 (Sept. 28, 1945) 
10 F. R. 12303.  If California is found to have no title, and this area is regarded as unclaimed 
land, I have no doubt that the President and the Congress between them could make it part of the 
national domain and thereby bring it under Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitution.  The 
disposition of the area, the rights to be created in it, the rights heretofore claimed in it through 
usage that might be respected though it fall short of prescription, all raise appropriate questions 
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of policy, questions of accommodation, for the determination of which Congress and not this 
Court is the appropriate agency. 
Today this Court has decided that a new application even in the old field of torts should 
not be made by adjudication, where Congress has refrained from acting.  United States v. 
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301. Considerations of judicial self-restraint would seem to me far 
more compelling where there are obviously at stake claims that involve so many far-reaching, 
complicated, historic interests, the proper adjustments of which are not readily resolved by the 
materials and methods to which this Court is confined. 
This is a summary statement of views which it would serve no purpose to elaborate.  I 
think that the bill should be dismissed without prejudice.  
SUBMERGED LANDS ACT OF 1953 
43 U.S.C. §§1301-1315 
§1301. Definitions  
When used in this Act [43 USCS §§1301-1315]— 
The term "lands beneath navigable waters" means— 
all lands within the boundaries of each of the respective States which are covered by 
nontidal waters that were navigable under the laws of the United States at the time such State 
became a member of the Union, or acquired sovereignty over such lands and water thereafter, up 
to the ordinary high water mark as heretofore or hereafter modified by accretion, erosion, and 
reliction; 
all lands permanently or periodically covered by tidal waters up to but not above the line 
of mean high tide and seaward to a line three geographical miles distant from the coast line of 
each such State and to the boundary line of each such State where in any case such boundary as 
it existed at the time such State became a member of the Union, or as heretofore approved by 
Congress, extends seaward (or into the Gulf of Mexico) beyond three geographical miles, and 
all filled in, made, or reclaimed lands which formerly were lands beneath navigable 
waters, as hereinabove defined; 
The term "boundaries" includes the seaward boundaries of a State or its boundaries in the 
Gulf of Mexico or any of the Great Lakes as they existed at the time such State became a 
member of the Union, or as heretofore approved by the Congress, or as extended or confirmed 
pursuant to section 4 hereof [43 USCS §1312] but in no event shall the term "boundaries" or the 
term "lands beneath navigable waters" be interpreted as extending from the coast line more than 
three geographical miles into the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, or more than three marine 
leagues into the Gulf of Mexico, except that any boundary between a State and the United States 
under this Act [43 USCS §§1301-1315] which has been or is hereafter fixed by coordinates 
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under a final decree of the United States Supreme Court shall remain immobilized at the 
coordinates provided under such decree and shall not be ambulatory; 
The term "coast line" means the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast 
which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland 
waters; 
The terms "grantees" and "lessees" include (without limiting the generality thereof) all 
political subdivisions, municipalities, public and private corporations, and other persons holding 
grants or leases from a State, or from its predecessor sovereign if legally validated, to lands 
beneath navigable waters if such grants or leases were issued in accordance with the constitution, 
statutes, and decisions of the courts of the State in which such lands are situated, or of its 
predecessor sovereign: Provided, however, That nothing herein shall be construed as conferring 
upon said grantees or lessees any greater rights or interests other than are described herein and in 
their respective grants from the State, or its predecessor sovereign; 
The term "natural resources" includes, without limiting the generality thereof, oil, gas, 
and all other minerals, and fish, shrimp, oysters, clams, crabs, lobsters, sponges, kelp, and other 
marine animal and plant life but does not include water power, or the use of water for the 
production of power; 
The term "lands beneath navigable waters" does not include the beds of streams in lands 
now or heretofore constituting a part of the public lands of the United States if such streams were 
not meandered in connection with the public survey of such lands under the laws of the United 
States and if the title to the beds of such streams was lawfully patented or conveyed by the 
United States or any State to any person; 
The term "State" means any State of the Union; 
The term "person" includes, in addition to a natural person, an association, a State, a 
political subdivision of a State, or a private, public, or municipal corporation. 
§1302.  Resources Seaward of the Continental Shelf  
Nothing in this Act [43 USCS §§1301-1315] shall be deemed to affect in any wise the 
rights of the United States to the natural resources of that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the 
Continental Shelf lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters, as 
defined in section 2 hereof [43 USCS §1301], all of which natural resources appertain to the 
United States, and the jurisdiction and control of which by the United States is hereby confirmed. 
§1303.  Amendment, modification, or repeal of other laws  
Nothing in this Act [43 USCS §§1301-1315] shall be deemed to amend, modify, or repeal 
the Acts of July 26, 1866 (14 Stat. 251), July 9, 1870 (16 Stat. 217), March 3, 1877 (19 Stat. 
377), June 17, 1902 (32 Stat. 388), and December 22, 1944 (58 Stat. 887), and Acts amendatory 
thereof or supplementary thereto. 
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§1311. Rights of the States  
Confirmation and establishment of title and ownership of lands and resources; 
management, administration, leasing, development, and use.  It is hereby determined and 
declared to be in the public interest that (1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable 
waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and the natural resources within such lands 
and waters, and (2) the right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said 
lands and natural resources all in accordance with applicable State law be, and they are hereby, 
subject to the provisions hereof, recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned 
to the respective States or the persons who were on June 5, 1950, entitled thereto under the law 
of the respective States in which the land is located, and the respective grantees, lessees, or 
successors in interest thereof; 
Release and relinquishment of title and claims of United States; payment to States of 
moneys paid under leases.  (1) The United States hereby releases and relinquishes unto said 
States and persons aforesaid, except as otherwise reserved herein, all right, title, and interest of 
the United States, if any it has, in and to all said lands, improvements, and natural resources; (2) 
the United States hereby releases and relinquishes all claims of the United States, of any it has, 
for money or damages arising out of any operations of said States or persons pursuant to State 
authority upon or within said lands and navigable waters; and (3) the Secretary of the Interior or 
the Secretary of the Navy or the Treasurer of the United States shall pay to the respective States 
or their grantees issuing leases covering such lands or natural resources all moneys paid 
thereunder to the Secretary of the Interior or to the Secretary of the Navy or to the Treasurer of 
the United States and subject to the control of any of them or to the control of the United States 
on the effective date of this Act [enacted May 22, 1953], except that portion of such moneys 
which (1) is required to be returned to a lessee; or (2) is deductible as provided by stipulation or 
agreement between the United States and any of said States; 
Omitted 
Authority and rights of the United States respecting navigation, flood control and 
production of power.  Nothing in this Act [43 USCS §§1301-1315] shall affect the use, 
development, improvement, or control by or under the constitutional authority of the United 
States of said lands and waters for the purposes of navigation or flood control or the production 
of power, or be construed as the release or relinquishment of any rights of the United States 
arising under the constitutional authority of Congress to regulate or improve navigation, or to 
provide for flood control, or the production of power…. 
omitted. 
§1312.  Seaward boundaries of States  
The seaward boundary of each original coastal State is hereby approved and confirmed as 
a line three geographical miles distant from its coast line or, in the case of the Great Lakes, to the 
international boundary. Any State admitted subsequent to the formation of the Union which has 
not already done so may extend its seaward boundaries to a line three geographical miles distant 
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from its coast line, or to the international boundaries of the United States in the Great Lakes or 
any other body of water traversed by such boundaries. Any claim heretofore or hereafter asserted 
either by constitutional provision, statute, or otherwise, indicating the intent of a State so to 
extend its boundaries is hereby approved and confirmed, without prejudice to its claim, if any it 
has, that its boundaries extend beyond that line. Nothing in this section is to be construed as 
questioning or in any manner prejudicing the existence of any State's seaward boundary beyond 
three geographical miles if it was so provided by its constitution or laws prior to or at the time 
such State became a member of the Union, or if it has been heretofore approved by Congress. 
§1313.  Exceptions from confirmation and establishment of States' title, power and rights  
There is excepted from the operation of section 3 of this Act [43 USCS §1311]— 
all tracts or parcels of land together with all accretions thereto, resources therein, or 
improvements thereon, title to which has been lawfully and expressly acquired by the United 
States from any State or from any person in whom title had vested under the law of the State or 
of the United States, and all lands which the United States lawfully holds under the law of the 
State; all lands expressly retained by or ceded to the United States when the State entered the 
Union (otherwise than by a general retention or cession of lands underlying the marginal sea); all 
lands acquired by the United States by eminent domain proceedings, purchase, cession, gift, or 
otherwise in a proprietary capacity; all lands filled in, built up, or otherwise reclaimed by the 
United States for its own use; and any rights the United States has in lands presently and actually 
occupied by the United States under claim of right; 
such lands beneath navigable waters held, or any interest in which is held by the United 
States for the benefit of any tribe, band, or group of Indians or for individual Indians; and 
all structures and improvements constructed by the United States in the exercise of its 
navigational servitude. 
§1314.  Rights and powers retained by the United States; purchase of natural resources; 
condemnation of lands  
The United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights in and powers of 
regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of 
commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs, all of which shall be 
paramount to, but shall not be deemed to include, proprietary rights of ownership, or the rights of 
management, administration, leasing, use, and development of the lands and natural resources 
which are specifically recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to the 
respective States and others by section 3 of this Act [43 USCS §1311]. 
In time of war or when necessary for national defense, and the Congress or the President 
shall so prescribe, the United States shall have the right of first refusal to purchase at the 
prevailing market price, all or any portion of the said natural resources, or to acquire and use any 
portion of said lands by proceeding in accordance with due process of law and paying just 
compensation therefor. 
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§1315.  Rights acquired under laws of the United States unaffected  
Nothing contained in this Act [43 USCS §§1301-1315] shall affect such rights, if any, as 
may have been acquired under any law of the United States by any person in lands subject to this 
Act [43 USCS §§1301-1315] and such rights, if any, shall be governed by the law in effect at the 
time they may have been acquired: Provided, however, That nothing contained in this Act [43 
USCS §§1301-1315] is intended or shall be construed as a finding, interpretation, or construction 
by the Congress that the law under which such rights may be claimed in fact or in law applies to 
the lands subject to this Act [43 USCS §§1301-1315], or authorizes or compels the granting of 
such rights in such lands, and that the determination of the applicability or effect of such law 
shall be unaffected by anything contained in this Act [43 USCS §§1301-1315]. 
UNITED STATES v. FLORIDA 
363 U.S. 121 (1960) 
[The present controversy involves the interests of Florida, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Alabama in the submerged lands off their shores.] 
MR.  JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring 
Considering the variety of views evoked by these cases, I deem it appropriate to add a 
few words The one thing which I take to be incontestable is that Congress did not, by the 
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, make an outright grant to any of the Gulf States in excess of 
three miles. Congress only granted to each of these States the opportunity to establish at law that 
it possessed a boundary in excess of three miles, either by virtue of possession of such a 
boundary at the time of its admission to the Union or by virtue of congressional "approval" of 
such a boundary prior to the enactment of the Submerged Lands Act. A Gulf State that can 
successfully establish such a judicially ascertainable fact is entitled to a grant of the submerged 
lands beyond three miles to a distance of the lesser of three leagues or of the boundary so 
established. Congress, in the Submerged Lands Act itself, did not determine the existence of a 
boundary for any State beyond three miles, either explicitly or by implied approval of a claim 
presented to it in the course of the legislative process. Nor of course did Congress vest this Court 
with determination of a claim based on "equity" in the layman's loose sense of the term, for it 
could not. Congress may indulge in largess based on considerations of policy; Congress cannot 
ask this Court to exercise benevolence on its behalf. There is no foundation in the Act of 1953 or 
its legislative history for the view that particularized, express approval of a State's boundary 
claim by a prior Congress is required to make a defined boundary the measure of the grant. To 
the contrary, in the case of Florida, authoritative legislative history makes it perfectly clear that 
the very question deliberately preserved by the Act of 1953 was whether congressional approval 
of the new Florida Constitution in the Reconstruction legislation of 1867-1868, by which Florida 
was restored to full participation in the Union, amounted to an approval of the three-league 
boundary which that constitution explicitly set forth.  
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UNITED STATES v. MAINE 
420 U.S. 515 (1975) 
Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. III, §2, of the Constitution . . . 
the United States in April 1969 asked leave to file a complaint against the 13 States bordering on 
the Atlantic Ocean–Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New 
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.
1
 
We granted leave to file on June 16, 1969. The complaint asserted a separate cause of action 
against each of the States which alleged that: 
“[T]he United States is now entitled to the exclusion of the defendant State, to 
exercise sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil underlying the Atlantic 
Ocean, lying more than three geographical miles seaward from the ordinary low-
water mark and from the outer limit of inland waters on the coast, extending 
seaward to the outer edge of the continental shelf, for the purpose of exploring the 
area and exploiting its natural resources.” 
It was therefore prayed that a decree be entered declaring the rights of the United States 
and that such further relief be awarded as might prove proper. 
The defendants answered, each generally denying proprietary rights of the United States 
in the seabed in the area beyond the three-mile marginal sea. Each of them, except Florida, 
claimed for itself, as successor in title to certain grantees of the Crown of England (and in the 
case of New York, to the Crown of Holland), the exclusive right of dominion and control over 
the seabed underlying the Atlantic Ocean seaward from its coastline to the limits of the 
jurisdiction of the United States, asserting as well that any attempt by the United States to 
interfere with these rights would in itself violate the Constitution of the United States. 
We entered an order appointing the Honorable Albert B. Maris as Special Master and 
referred the case to him with authority to request further pleadings, to summon witnesses, and to 
take such evidence and submit such reports as he might deem appropriate.  Before the Special 
Master, the United States contended that based on United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 
(1947), United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), and United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 
707 (1950), it was entitled to judgment in accordance with its motion. The defendant States 
asserted that their cases were distinguishable from the prior cases and that in any event, 
California, Louisiana, and Texas were erroneously decided and should be overruled. 
At the conclusion of the proceeding before him, the Special Master submitted a Report 
(hereinafter Report) which the United States supports in all respects, but to which the States have 
                                                 
1
 The State of Connecticut was not made a defendant, apparently because that State borders on Long Island Sound, 
which is considered inland water rather than open sea. 
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submitted extensive and detailed exceptions. The controversy is now before us on the Report, the 
exceptions to it, and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties. 
In his Report, the Special Master concluded that the California, Louisiana, and Texas 
cases, which he deemed binding on him, governed this case and required that judgment be 
entered for the United States. 
Assuming, however, that those cases were open to re-examination, the Special Master 
went on independently to examine the legal and factual contentions of the States and concluded 
that they were without merit and that the Court’s prior cases should be reaffirmed. 
We fully agree with the Special Master that California, Louisiana, and Texas rule the 
issues before us. We also decline to overrule those cases as the defendant States request us to do.  
The Special Master was correct in concluding that these cases, unless they are to be 
overruled, completely dispose of the States’ claims of ownership here. These decisions 
considered and expressly rejected the assertion that the original States were entitled to the seabed 
under the three-mile marginal sea. They also held that under our constitutional arrangement 
paramount rights to the lands underlying the marginal sea are an incident to national sovereignty 
and that their control and disposition in the first instance are the business of the Federal 
Government rather than the States. 
The States seriously contend that the prior cases, as well as the Special Master, were in 
error in denying that the original Colonies had substantial rights in the seabed prior to 
independence, and afterwards, by grant from or succession to the sovereignty of the Crown. 
Given the dual basis of the California decision, however, and of those that followed it, the States’ 
claims of ownership prior to the adoption of the Constitution are not dispositive. Whatever 
interest the States might have had immediately prior to statehood, the Special Master was correct 
in reading the Court’s cases to hold that as a matter of “purely legal principle . . . the Constitution 
. . . allotted to the federal government jurisdiction over foreign commerce, foreign affairs and 
national defense” and that “it necessarily follows, as a matter of constitutional law, that as 
attributes of these external sovereign powers the federal government has paramount rights in the 
marginal sea.” Report, 23. 
Assuming the possibility, however, that the Court might re-examine the constitutional 
premise of California and similar cases, the Special Master proceeded, with admirable diligence 
and lucidity, to address the historical evidence presented by the States aimed primarily at 
establishing that the Colonies had legitimate claims to the marginal sea prior to independence 
and statehood and that the new States never surrendered these rights to the Federal Government. 
The Special Master’s ultimate conclusion was that the Court’s view of our history expressed in 
the California case was essentially correct and that if prior cases were open to re-examination, 
they should be reaffirmed in all respects. 
We need not retrace the Special Master’s analysis of historical evidence, for we are 
firmly convinced that we should not undertake to re-examine the constitutional underpinnings of 
the California case and of those cases which followed and explicated the rule that paramount 
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rights to the offshore seabed inhere in the Federal Government as an incident of national 
sovereignty. That premise, as we have indicated, has been repeated time and again in the cases. It 
is also our view, contrary to the contentions of the States, that the premise was embraced rather 
than repudiated by Congress in the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. §1301. 
In that legislation, it is true, Congress transferred to the States the rights to the seabed underlying 
the marginal sea; however, this transfer was in no wise inconsistent with paramount national 
power but was merely an exercise of that authority.  As the Special Master said, the Court in its 
prior cases “did not indicate that the federal government by Act of Congress might not, as it did 
by the subsequently enacted Submerged Lands Act, grant to the riparian states rights to the 
resources of the federal area, subject to the reservation by the federal government of its rights 
and powers of regulation and control for purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, 
and international affairs.” Report, 16. The question before the Court in the California case was 
“whether the state or the Federal Government has the paramount right and power to determine in 
the first instance when, how, and by what agencies, foreign or domestic, the oil and other 
resources of the soil of the marginal sea, known or hereafter discovered, may be exploited.”  332 
U.S., at 29.  The decision there was that the National Government had the power at issue, the 
Court declining to speculate that “Congress, which has constitutional control over Government 
property, will execute its powers in such a way as to bring about injustices to states, their 
subdivisions, or persons acting pursuant to their permission.” Id., at 40. 
The Submerged Lands Act did indeed grant to the States dominion over the offshore 
seabed within the limits defined in the Act and released the States from any liability to account 
for any prior income received from state leases that had been granted with respect to the 
marginal sea. But in further exercise of paramount national authority, the Act expressly declared 
that nothing in the Act “shall be deemed to affect in any wise the rights of the United States to 
the natural resources of that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the Continental Shelf lying 
seaward and outside of [the marginal sea], all of which natural resources appertain to the United 
States, and the jurisdiction and control of which by the United States is confirmed.” 43 U.S.C.  
§1302. 
This declaration by Congress is squarely at odds with the assertions of the States in the 
present case.  So, too, is the provision of the Act by which the grant to the States is expressly 
limited to the seabed within three miles (or three marine leagues in some cases) of the coastline, 
whether or not the States’ historic boundaries might extend farther into the ocean.  §1301 (b).  
Congress emphatically implemented its view that the United States has paramount rights 
to the seabed beyond the three-mile limit when a few months later it enacted the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C.  §1331 et seq. Section 3 of the Act  
“declared [it] to be the policy of the United States that the subsoil and seabed of 
the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its 
jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition as provided in this subchapter.” 43 
U.S.C.  §1332 (a). 
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The Act then proceeds to set out detailed provisions for the exercise of exclusive 
jurisdiction in the area and for the leasing and development of the resources of the seabed.  
Of course, the defendant States were not parties to United States v. California or to the 
relevant decisions, and they are not precluded by res judicata from litigating the issues decided 
by those cases. But the doctrine of stare decisis is still a powerful force in our jurisprudence; and 
although on occasion the Court has declared–and acted accordingly–that constitutional decisions 
are open to re-examination, we are convinced that the doctrine has peculiar force and relevance 
in the present context. It is apparent that in the almost 30 years since California, a great deal of 
public and private business has been transacted in accordance with those decisions and in 
accordance with major legislation enacted by Congress, a principal purpose of which was to 
resolve the “interminable litigation” arising over the controversy of the ownership of the lands 
underlying the marginal sea. See H.R. Rep. No. 215, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1953). Both the 
Submerged Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act which soon followed 
proceeded from the premises established by prior Court decisions and provided for the orderly 
development of offshore resources. Since 1953, when this legislation was enacted, 33 lease sales 
have been held, in which 1,940 leases, embracing over eight million acres, have been issued. The 
Outer Continental Shelf, since 1953, has yielded over three billion barrels of oil, 19 trillion m.c.f. 
of natural gas, 13 million long tons of sulfur, and over four million long tons of salt. In 1973 
alone, 1,081,000 barrels of oil and 8.9 billion cubic feet of natural gas were extracted daily from 
the Outer Continental Shelf.  We add only that the Atlantic States, by virtue of the California, 
Louisiana, and Texas cases, as well as by reason of the Submerged Lands Act, have been on 
notice of the substantial body of authoritative law, both constitutional and statutory, which is 
squarely at odds with their claims to the seabed beyond the three-mile marginal sea. Neither the 
States nor their putative lessees have been in the slightest misled. Judgment shall be entered for 
the United States. 
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Session 4. The Public Trust 
ILLINOIS CENTRAL R. CO. v. ILLINOIS 
146 U.S. 387 (1892) 
Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court. 
This suit was commenced on the 1st of March, 1883, in a Circuit Court of Illinois, by an 
information or bill in equity, filed by the Attorney General of the State, in the name of its people 
against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, a corporation created under its laws, and against the 
city of Chicago. 
The object of the suit is to obtain a judicial determination of the title of certain lands on the 
east or lake front of the city of Chicago, situated between the Chicago River and Sixteenth Street, 
which have been reclaimed from the waters of the lake, and are occupied by the tracks, depots, 
warehouses, piers and other structures used by the railroad company in its business; and also of the 
title claimed by the company to the submerged lands, constituting the bed of the lake, lying east of 
its tracks, within the corporate limits of the city, for the distance of a mile, and between the south 
line of the south pier near Chicago River extended eastwardly, and a line extended, in the same 
direction, from the south line of lot 21 near the company’s round-house and machine shops.  The 
determination of the title of the company will involve a consideration of its right to construct, for its 
own business, as well as for public convenience, wharves, piers and docks in the harbor. 
We agree with the court below that, to a clear understanding of the numerous questions 
presented in this case, it was necessary to trace the history of the title to the several parcels of land 
claimed by the company.  And the court, in its elaborate opinion, (33 Fed. Rep. 730) for that 
purpose referred to the legislation of the United States and of the State, and to ordinances of the city 
and proceedings thereunder, and stated, with great minuteness of detail, every material provision of 
law and every step taken.  We have with great care gone over the history detailed and are satisfied 
with its entire accuracy.  It would, therefore, serve no useful purpose to repeat what is, in our 
opinion, clearly and fully narrated.  In what we may say of the rights of the railroad company, of the 
State, and of the city, remaining after the legislation and proceedings taken, we shall assume the 
correctness of that history. 
The State of Illinois was admitted into the Union in 1818 on an equal footing with the 
original States in all respects. It is sufficient for our purpose to observe that they include within their 
eastern line all that portion of Lake Michigan lying east of the main land of the State and the middle 
of the lake. 
It is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over 
lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of the several States, belong to the respective States 
within which they are found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof, 
when that can be done without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the waters, and 
subject always to the paramount right of Congress to control their navigation so far as may be 
necessary for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among the States. This doctrine 
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has been often announced by this court, and is not questioned by counsel of any of the parties.   
Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212. 
The same doctrine is in this country held to be applicable to lands covered by fresh water in 
the Great Lakes over which is conducted an extended commerce with different States and foreign 
nations.  These lakes possess all the general characteristics of open seas, except in the freshness of 
their waters, and in the absence of the ebb and flow of the tide. In England the ebb and flow of the 
tide constitute the legal test of the navigability of waters.  But in this country the case is different.  
Some of our rivers are navigable for great distances above the flow of the tide; indeed, for hundreds 
of miles, by the largest vessels used in commerce. 
We hold, therefore that the same doctrine as to the dominion and sovereignty over and 
ownership of lands under the navigable waters of the Great Lakes applies, which obtains at the 
common law as to the dominion and sovereignty over and ownership of lands under tide waters on 
the borders of the sea, and that the lands are held by the same right in the one case as in the other, 
and subject to the same trusts and limitations.  Upon that theory we shall examine how far such 
dominion, sovereignty and proprietary right have been encroached upon by the railroad company, 
and how far that company had, at the time, the assent of the State to such encroachment, and also 
the validity of the claim which the company asserts of a right to make further encroachments 
thereon by virtue of a grant from the State in April, 1869. 
The city of Chicago is situated upon the south western shore of Lake Michigan. For a long 
time after the organization of the city its harbor was the Chicago River, a small, narrow stream 
opening into the lake near the center of the east and west line of section 10, and in it the shipping 
arriving from other ports of the lake and navigable waters was moored or anchored, and along it 
were docks and wharves. The growth of the city in subsequent years in population, business and 
commerce required a larger and more convenient harbor, and the United States, in view of such 
expansion and growth, commenced the construction of a system of breakwaters and other harbor 
protections in the waters of the lake in front of the fractional sections mentioned.  In the prosecution 
of this work there was constructed a line of breakwaters or cribs of wood and stone covering the 
front of the city between the Chicago River and Twelfth street, with openings in the piers or lines of 
cribs for the entrance and departure of vessels, thus enclosing a large part of the lake for the uses of 
shipping and commerce, and creating an outer harbor for Chicago. 
The case proceeds upon the theory and allegation that the defendant, the Illinois Central 
Railroad Company, has, without lawful authority, encroached, and continues to encroach, upon the 
domain of the State, and its original ownership and control of the waters of the harbor and of the 
lands thereunder, upon a claim of rights acquired under a grant from the State and ordinance of the 
city to enter the city and appropriate land and water two hundred feet wide in order to construct a 
track for a railway, and to erect thereon warehouses, piers and other structures in front of the city, 
and upon a claim of riparian rights acquired by virtue of ownership of lands originally bordering on 
the lake in front of the city.  It also proceeds against the claim asserted by the railroad company of a 
grant by the State, in 1869, of its right and title to the submerged lands, constituting the bed of Lake 
Michigan lying east of the tracks and breakwater of the company, for the distance of one mile; and 
of a right thereby to construct at its pleasure, in the harbor, wharves, piers and other works for its 
use. 
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The State prays a decree establishing and confirming its title to the bed of Lake Michigan 
and exclusive right to develop and improve the harbor of Chicago by the construction of docks, 
wharves, piers and other improvements, against the claim of the railroad company, that it has an 
absolute title to such submerged lands by the act of 1869, and the right, subject only to the 
paramount authority of the United States in the regulation of commerce, to fill all the bed of the lake 
within the limits above stated, for the purpose of its business; and the right, by the construction and 
maintenance of wharves, docks and piers, to improve the shore of the lake for the promotion 
generally of commerce and navigation.  And the State, insisting that the company has, without right, 
erected and proposes to continue to erect wharves and piers upon its domain, asks that such alleged 
unlawful structures may be ordered to be removed, and the company be enjoined from erecting 
further structures of any kind. 
We proceed to consider the claim of the railroad company to the ownership of submerged 
lands in the harbor, and the right to construct such wharves, piers, docks and other works therein as 
it may deem proper for its interest and business.  The claim is founded upon the third section of the 
act of the legislature of the State passed on the 16th of April, 1869, the material part of which is as 
follows: 
“SEC. 3.  The right of the Illinois Central Railroad Company under the grant from 
the State in its charter, which said grant constitutes a part of the consideration for 
which the said company pays to the State at least seven per cent of its gross earnings, 
and under and by virtue of its appropriation, occupancy, use and control, and the 
riparian ownership incident to such grant, appropriation, occupancy, use and control, 
in and to the lands submerged or otherwise lying east of the said line running parallel 
with and four hundred feet east of the west line of Michigan Avenue, in fractional 
sections ten and fifteen, township and range as aforesaid, is hereby confirmed; and 
all the right and title of the State of Illinois in and to the submerged lands 
constituting the bed of Lake Michigan, and lying east of the tracks and breakwater of 
the Illinois Central Railroad Company, for the distance of one mile, and between the 
south line of the south pier extended eastwardly and a line extended eastward from 
the south line of lot twenty-one, south of and near to the round-house and machine 
shops of said company, in the south division of the said city of Chicago, are hereby 
granted in fee to the said Illinois Central Railroad Company, its successors and 
assigns: provided, however, that the fee to said lands shall be held by said company 
in perpetuity, and that the said company shall not have power to grant, sell or convey 
the fee to the same; and that all gross receipts from use, profits, leases or otherwise 
of said lands, or the improvements thereon, or that may hereafter be made thereon, 
shall form a part of the gross proceeds, receipts and income of the said Illinois 
Central Railroad Company, upon which said company shall forever pay into the 
State treasury, semi-annually, the per centum provided for in its charter, in 
accordance with the requirements of said charter: and provided also, that nothing 
herein contained shall authorize obstructions to the Chicago harbor, or impair the 
public right of navigation; nor shall this act be construed to exempt the Illinois 
Central Railroad Company, its lessees or assigns, from any act of the general 
assembly which may be hereafter passed regulating the rates of wharfage and 
dockage to be charged in said harbor.” 
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The act, of which this section is a part, was accepted by a resolution of the board of directors 
of the company at its office in the city of New York, July 6, 1870; but the acceptance was not 
communicated to the State until the 18th of November, 1870.  A copy of the resolution was on that 
day forwarded to the Secretary of State, and filed and recorded by him in the records of his office.  
On the 15th of April, 1873, the legislature of Illinois repealed the act.  The questions presented 
relate to the validity of the section cited of the act and the effect of the repeal upon its operation. 
As to the grant of the submerged lands, the act declares that all the right and title of the State 
in and to the submerged lands, constituting the bed of Lake Michigan, and lying east of the tracks 
and breakwater of the company for the distance of one mile, and between the south line of the south 
pier extended eastwardly and a line extended eastwardly from the south line of lot twenty one, south 
of and near to the round-house and machine shops of the company “are granted in fee to the railroad 
company, its successors and assigns.” The grant is accompanied with a proviso that the fee of the 
lands shall be held by the company in perpetuity, and that it shall not have the power to grant, sell 
or convey the fee thereof.  It also declares that nothing therein shall authorize obstructions to the 
harbor or impair the public right of navigation, or be construed to exempt the company from any act 
regulating the rates of wharfage and dockage to be charged in the harbor. 
This clause is treated by the counsel of the company as an absolute conveyance to it of title 
to the submerged lands, giving it as full and complete power to use and dispose of the same, except 
in the technical transfer of the fee, in any manner it may choose, as if they were uplands, in no 
respect covered or affected by navigable waters, and not as a license to use the lands subject to 
revocation by the State.  Treating it as such a conveyance, its validity must be determined by the 
consideration whether the legislature was competent to make a grant of the kind. 
The act, if valid and operative to the extent claimed, placed under the control of the railroad 
company nearly the whole of the submerged lands of the harbor, subject only to the limitations that 
it should not authorize obstructions to the harbor or impair the public right of navigation, or exclude 
the legislature from regulating the rates of wharfage or dockage to be charged.  A corporation 
created for one purpose, the construction and operation of a railroad between designated points, is, 
by the act, converted into a corporation to manage and practically control the harbor of Chicago, not 
simply for its own purpose as a railroad corporation, but for its own profit generally. 
The circumstances attending the passage of the act through the legislature were on the 
hearing the subject of much criticism.  As originally introduced, the purpose of the act was to enable 
the city of Chicago to enlarge its harbor and to grant to it the title and interest of the State to certain 
lands adjacent to the shore of Lake Michigan on the eastern front of the city, and place the harbor 
under its control, giving it all the necessary powers for its wise management.  But during the 
passage of the act its purport was changed.  Instead of providing for the cession of the submerged 
lands to the city, it provided for a cession of them to the railroad company.  The question, therefore, 
to be considered is whether the legislature was competent to thus deprive the State of its ownership 
of the submerged lands in the harbor of Chicago, and of the consequent control of its waters; or, in 
other words, whether the railroad corporation can hold the lands and control the waters by the grant, 
against any future exercise of power over them by the State. 
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That the State holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters of Lake Michigan, 
within its limits, in the same manner that the State holds title to soils under tide water, by the 
common law, we have already shown, and that title necessarily carries with it control over the 
waters above them whenever the lands are subjected to use.  But it is a title different in character 
from that which the State holds in lands intended for sale.  It is different from the title which the 
United States hold in the public lands which are open to preemption and sale.  It is a title held in 
trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce 
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private 
parties. . . .  The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be discharged by 
the management and control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished 
by a transfer of the property.  The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, 
except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be 
disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters 
remaining. . . .  The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are 
interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and 
control of private parties, except in the instance of parcels mentioned for the improvement of the 
navigation and use of the waters, or when parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the 
public interest in what remains, than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of 
government and the preservation of the peace.  In the administration of government the use of such 
powers may for a limited period be delegated to a municipality or other body, but there always 
remains with the State the right to revoke those powers and exercise them in a more direct manner, 
and one more conformable to its wishes.  So with trusts connected with public property, or property 
of a special character, like lands under navigable waters, they cannot be placed entirely beyond the 
direction and control of the State. 
The harbor of Chicago is of immense value to the people of the State of Illinois in the 
facilities it affords to its vast and constantly increasing commerce; and the idea that its legislature 
can deprive the State of control over its bed and waters and place the same in the hands of a private 
corporation created for a different purpose, one limited to transportation of passengers and freight 
between distant points and the city, is a proposition that cannot be defended. 
Any grant of the kind is necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by which the 
property was held by the State can be resumed at any time. Undoubtedly there may be expenses 
incurred in improvements made under such a grant which the State ought to pay; but, be that as it 
may, the power to resume the trust whenever the State judges best is, we think, incontrovertible. 
It follows from the views expressed, and it is so declared and adjudged, that the State of 
Illinois is the owner in fee of the submerged lands constituting the bed of Lake Michigan, which the 
third section of the act of April 16, 1869, purported to grant to the Illinois Central Railroad 
Company, and that the act of April 15, 1873, repealing the same is valid and effective for the 
purpose of restoring to the State the same control, dominion and ownership of said lands that it had 
prior to the passage of the act of April 16, 1869. 
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NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY v. SUPERIOR COURT OF ALPINE COUNTY 
33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709 (1983) 
Opinion by Broussard, Justice. 
Mono Lake, the second largest lake in California, sits at the base of the Sierra Nevada 
escarpment near the eastern entrance to Yosemite National Park.  The lake is saline; it contains no 
fish but supports a large population of brine shrimp which feed vast numbers of nesting and 
migratory birds.  Islands in the lake protect a large breeding colony of California gulls, and the lake 
itself serves as a haven on the migration route for thousands of Northern Phalarope, Wilson’s 
Phalarope, and Eared Grebe. Towers and spires of tufa on the north and south shores are matters of 
geological interest and a tourist attraction. 
Although Mono Lake receives some water from rain and snow on the lake surface, 
historically most of its supply came from snowmelt in the Sierra Nevada.  Five freshwater streams 
(Mill, Lee Vining, Walker, Parker and Rush Creeks) arise near the crest of the range and carry the 
annual runoff to the west shore of the lake.  In 1940, however, the Division of Water Resources, the 
predecessor to the present California Water Resources Board, granted the Department of Water and 
Power of the City of Los Angeles (hereafter DWP) a permit to appropriate virtually the entire flow 
of four of the five streams flowing into the lake.  DWP promptly constructed facilities to divert 
about half the flow of these streams into DWP’s Owens Valley aqueduct.  In 1970 DWP completed 
a second diversion tunnel, and since that time has taken virtually the entire flow of these streams. 
As a result of these diversions, the level of the lake has dropped; the surface area has 
diminished by one-third; one of the two principal islands in the lake has become a peninsula, 
exposing the gull rookery there to coyotes and other predators and causing the gulls to abandon the 
former island.  The ultimate effect of continued diversions is a matter of intense dispute, but there 
seems little doubt that both the scenic beauty and the ecological values of Mono Lake are imperiled.  
Plaintiffs filed suit in superior court to enjoin the DWP diversions on the theory that the 
shores, bed and waters of Mono Lake are protected by a public trust.  Plaintiffs’ suit was transferred 
to the federal district court, which requested that the state courts determine the relationship between 
the public trust doctrine and the water rights system, and decide whether plaintiffs must exhaust 
administrative remedies before the Water Board prior to filing suit.  The superior court then entered 
summary judgments against plaintiffs . . . ruling that the public trust doctrine offered no 
independent basis for challenging the DWP diversions. . . . Plaintiffs petitioned us directly for writ 
of mandate to review that decision; in view of the importance of the issues presented, we issued an 
alternative writ. 
This case brings together for the first time two systems of legal thought:  the appropriative 
water rights system which since the days of the gold rush has dominated California water law, and 
the public trust doctrine which, after evolving as a shield for the protection of tidelands, now 
extends its protective scope to navigable lakes.  Ever since we first recognized that the public trust 
protects environmental and recreational values (Marks v. Whitney (1971) 6 Cal.3d 251 [98 Cal. 
Rptr. 790, 491 P.2d 374]), the two systems of legal thought have been on a collision course.  
(Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels (1980) 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
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233.) They meet in a unique and dramatic setting which highlights the clash of values.  Mono Lake 
is a scenic and ecological treasure of national significance, imperiled by continued diversions of 
water; yet, the need of Los Angeles for water is apparent, its reliance on rights granted by the board 
evident, the cost of curtailing diversions substantial. 
Attempting to integrate the teachings and values of both the public trust and the 
appropriative water rights system, we have arrived at certain conclusions which we briefly 
summarize here.  In our opinion, the core of the public trust doctrine is the state’s authority as 
sovereign to exercise a continuous supervision and control over the navigable waters of the state 
and the lands underlying those waters.  This authority applies to the waters tributary to Mono Lake 
and bars DWP or any other party from claiming a vested right to divert waters once it becomes clear 
that such diversions harm the interests protected by the public trust.  The corollary rule which 
evolved in tideland and lakeshore cases barring conveyance of rights free of the trust except to serve 
trust purposes cannot, however, apply without modification to flowing waters. The prosperity and 
habitability of much of this state requires the diversion of great quantities of water from its streams 
for purposes unconnected to any navigation, commerce, fishing, recreation, or ecological use 
relating to the source stream.  The state must have the power to grant nonvested usufructuary rights 
to appropriate water even if diversions harm public trust uses.  Approval of such diversion without 
considering public trust values, however, may result in needless destruction of those values.  
Accordingly, we believe that before state courts and agencies approve water diversions they should 
consider the effect of such diversions upon interests protected by the public trust, and attempt, so far 
as feasible, to avoid or minimize any harm to those interests. 
The water rights enjoyed by DWP were granted, the diversion was commenced, and has 
continued to the present without any consideration of the impact upon the public trust.  An objective 
study and reconsideration of the water rights in the Mono Basin is long overdue.  The water law of 
California- which we conceive to be an integration including both the public trust doctrine and the 
board-administered appropriative rights system- permits such a reconsideration; the values 
underlying that integration require it.
1
 
The Public Trust Doctrine in California. 
“By the law of nature these things are common to mankind- the air, running water, 
the sea and consequently the shores of the sea.” (Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1.) From 
this origin in Roman law, the English common law evolved the concept of the public 
trust, under which the sovereign owns “all of its navigable waterways and the lands 
lying beneath them ‘as trustee of a public trust for the benefit of the people.’” 
(Colberg, Inc. v. State of California ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 408, 
416 [62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 432 P.2d 3].)  The State of California acquired title as trustee 
to such lands and waterways upon its admission to the union (City of Berkeley v. 
Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515, 521 [162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362] and 
                                                 
1
 For the history of the public trust doctrine, see generally Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine In Natural Resource Law: 
Effective Judicial Intervention (1970) 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471. 
56 
cases there cited); from the earliest days (see Eldridge v. Cowell (1854) 4 Cal. 80, 
87) its judicial decisions have recognized and enforced the trust obligation.  
Three aspects of the public trust doctrine require consideration in this opinion: the purpose 
of the trust; the scope of the trust, particularly as it applies to the nonnavigable tributaries of a 
navigable lake; and the powers and duties of the state as trustee of the public trust.  We discuss 
these questions in the order listed. 
(a) The purpose of the public trust. 
The objective of the public trust has evolved in tandem with the changing public perception 
of the values and uses of waterways.  As we observed in Marks v. Whitney, supra, 6 Cal.3d 251, 
“[public] trust easements [were] traditionally defined in terms of navigation, 
commerce and fisheries.  They have been held to include the right to fish, hunt, 
bathe, swim, to use for boating and general recreation purposes the navigable waters 
of the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or 
other purposes.” (P. 259.) 
We went on, however, to hold that the traditional triad of uses- navigation, commerce and 
fishing –did not limit the public interest in the trust res.  In language of special importance to the 
present setting, we stated that “[the] public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently 
flexible to encompass changing public needs.  In administering the trust the state is not burdened 
with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization over another.  [Citation.] There is 
a growing public recognition that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands– a use 
encompassed within the tidelands trust -is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so 
that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments 
which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and 
climate of the area.” (pp. 259-260.) 
Mono Lake is a navigable waterway. It supports a small local industry which harvests brine 
shrimp for sale as fish food, which endeavor probably qualifies the lake as a “fishery” under the 
traditional public trust cases.  The principal values plaintiffs seek to protect, however, are 
recreational and ecological–the scenic views of the lake and its shore, the purity of the air, and the 
use of the lake for nesting and feeding by birds.  Under Marks v. Whitney, supra, 6 Cal.3d 251, it is 
clear that protection of these values is among the purposes of the public trust. 
(b) The scope of the public trust. 
Early English decisions generally assumed the public trust was limited to tidal waters and 
the lands exposed and covered by the daily tides (see Stevens, op. cit. supra, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
195, 201 and authorities there cited); many American decisions, including the leading California 
cases, also concern tidelands.  (See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515 
[162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362]; Marks v. Whitney, supra, 6 Cal.3d 251; People v. California 
Fish Co. (1913) 166 Cal. 576 [138 P. 79].)  It is, however, well settled in the United States generally 
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and in California that the public trust is not limited by the reach of the tides, but encompasses all 
navigable lakes and streams. 
Mono Lake is, as we have said, a navigable waterway.  The beds, shores and waters of the 
lake are without question protected by the public trust.  The streams diverted by DWP, however, are 
not themselves navigable. Accordingly, we must address in this case a question not discussed in any 
recent public trust case– whether the public trust limits conduct affecting non-navigable tributaries 
to navigable waterways. 
We conclude that the public trust doctrine, as recognized and developed in California 
decisions, protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of non-navigable tributaries.
2
 
(c) Duties and powers of the state as trustee.  
In the following review of the authority and obligations of the state as administrator of the 
public trust, the dominant theme is the state’s sovereign power and duty to exercise continued 
supervision over the trust.  One consequence, of importance to this and many other cases, is that 
parties acquiring rights in trust property generally hold those rights subject to the trust, and can 
assert no vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust. 
As we noted recently in City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.3d 515, the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, supra, 
146 U.S. 387, “remains the primary authority even today, almost nine decades after it was decided.” 
(p. 521.)  The California Supreme Court endorsed the Illinois Central principles in People v. 
California Fish Co., supra, 166 Cal. 576 [138 P. 79]. California Fish concerned title to about 80,000 
acres of tidelands conveyed by state commissioners pursuant to statutory authorization.  The court 
first set out principles to govern the interpretation of statutes conveying that property: “[Statutes] 
purporting to authorize an abandonment of . . . public use will be carefully scanned to ascertain 
whether or not such was the legislative intention, and that intent must be clearly expressed or 
necessarily implied.  It will not be implied if any other inference is reasonably possible.  And if any 
interpretation of the statute is reasonably possible which would not involve a destruction of the 
public use or an intention to terminate it in violation of the trust, the courts will give the statute such 
interpretation.” (Id., at p. 597.)  Applying these principles, the court held that because the statute in 
question and the grants pursuant thereto were not made for trust purposes, the grantees did not 
acquire absolute title; instead, the grantees “own the soil, subject to the easement of the public for 
the public uses of navigation and commerce, and to the right of the state, as administrator and 
controller of these public uses and the public trust therefore, to enter upon and possess the same for 
the preservation and advancement of the public uses and to make such changes and improvements 
as may be deemed advisable for those purposes.”  (Id., at pp. 598-599.) 
                                                 
2
 In view of the conclusion stated in the text, we need not consider the question whether the public trust extends for 
some purposes–such as protection of fishing, environmental values, and recreation interests–to non-navigable streams.  
For discussion of this subject, see Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The Wrong 
Environmental Remedy (1982) 22 Santa Clara L. Rev. 63, 85. 
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Finally, rejecting the claim of the tideland purchasers for compensation, the court stated they 
did not lose title, but retained it subject to the public trust.  (See pp. 599-601.) While the state may 
not “retake the absolute title without compensation” (p. 599), it may without such payment erect 
improvements to further navigation and take other actions to promote the public trust.  
Boone v. Kingsbury (1928) 206 Cal. 148 [273 P. 797], presents another aspect of this 
matter. The Legislature authorized the Surveyor-General to lease trust lands for oil drilling. 
Applying the principles of Illinois Central, the court upheld that statute on the ground that the 
derricks would not substantially interfere with the trust.  Any licenses granted by the statute, 
moreover, remained subject to the trust: “The state may at any time remove [the] structures. . . even 
though they have been erected with its license or consent, if it subsequently determines them to be 
purprestures or finds that they substantially interfere with navigation or commerce.” (pp. 192-193.) 
Finally, in our recent decision in City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.3d 515, 
we considered whether deeds executed by the Board of Tidelands Commissioners pursuant to an 
1870 act conferred title free of the trust.  Applying the principles of earlier decisions, we held that 
the grantees’ title was subject to the trust, both because the Legislature had not made clear its 
intention to authorize a conveyance free of the trust and because the 1870 act and the conveyances 
under it were not intended to further trust purposes. 
Once again we rejected the claim that establishment of the public trust constituted a taking 
of property for which compensation was required: “We do not divest anyone of title to property; the 
consequence of our decision will be only that some landowners whose predecessors in interest 
acquired property under the 1870 act will, like the grantees in California Fish, hold it subject to the 
public trust.” (p. 532.)3 
In summary, the foregoing cases amply demonstrate the continuing power of the state as 
administrator of the public trust, a power which extends to the revocation of previously granted 
rights or to the enforcement of the trust against lands long thought free of the trust (see City of 
Berkeley v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.3d 515). Except for those rare instances in which a 
grantee may acquire a right to use former trust property free of trust restrictions, the grantee holds 
subject to the trust, and while he may assert a vested right to the servient estate (the right of use 
subject to the trust) and to any improvements he erects, he can claim no vested right to bar 
recognition of the trust or state action to carry out its purposes. 
Thus, the public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use public property for 
public purposes.  It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people’s common heritage 
                                                 
3
 We noted, however, that “any improvements made on such lands could not be appropriated by the state without 
compensation.” (Pp. 533-534, citing Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, supra, 146 U.S. 387, 455 [36 L. Ed. 1018, 
1043].) In State of California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), supra, 29 Cal.3d 240, 249, we stated that owners of shoreline 
property in Lake Tahoe would be entitled to compensation if enforcement of the public trust required them to remove 
improvements.  By implication, however, the determination that the property was subject to the trust, despite its 
implication as to future uses and improvements, was not considered a taking requiring compensation. 
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of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases 
when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust. 
3. The California Water Rights System. 
“It is laid down by our law writers, that the right of property in water is usufructuary, and 
consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its use.” (Eddy v. Simpson (1853) 3 Cal. 
249, 252.) Hence, the cases do not speak of the ownership of water, but only of the right to its use. 
[T]he Water Board has steadily evolved from the narrow role of deciding priorities between 
competing appropriators to the charge of comprehensive planning and allocation of waters.  This 
change necessarily affects the board’s responsibility with respect to the public trust.  The board of 
limited powers of 1913 had neither the power nor duty to consider interests protected by the public 
trust; the present board, in undertaking planning and allocation of water resources, is required by 
statute to take those interests into account. 
4. The relationship between the Public Trust Doctrine and the California Water Rights 
System. 
As we have seen, the public trust doctrine and the appropriative water rights system 
administered by the Water Board developed independently of each other.  Each developed 
comprehensive rules and principles which, if applied to the full extent of their scope, would occupy 
the field of allocation of stream waters to the exclusion of any competing system of legal thought. 
Plaintiffs, for example, argue that the public trust is antecedent to and thus limits all appropriative 
water rights, an argument which implies that most appropriative water rights in California were 
acquired and are presently being used unlawfully.  Defendant DWP, on the other hand, argues that 
the public trust doctrine as to stream waters has been “subsumed” into the appropriative water rights 
system and, absorbed by that body of law, quietly disappeared; according to DWP, the recipient of a 
board license enjoys a vested right in perpetuity to take water without concern for the consequences 
to the trust. 
We are unable to accept either position.  In our opinion, both the public trust doctrine and 
the water rights system embody important precepts which make the law more responsive to the 
diverse needs and interests involved in the planning and allocation of water resources.  To embrace 
one system of thought and reject the other would lead to an unbalanced structure, one which would 
either decry as a breach of trust appropriations essential to the economic development of this state, 
or deny any duty to protect or even consider the values promoted by the public trust.  Therefore, 
seeking an accommodation which will make use of the pertinent principles of both the public trust 
doctrine and the appropriative water rights system, and drawing upon the history of the public trust 
and the water rights system, the body of judicial precedent, and the views of expert commentators, 
we reach the following conclusions: 
The state as sovereign retains continuing supervisory control over its navigable waters and 
the lands beneath those waters.  This principle, fundamental to the concept of the public trust, 
applies to rights in flowing waters as well as to rights in tidelands and lakeshores; it prevents any 
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party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the interests 
protected by the public trust. 
As a matter of current and historical necessity, the Legislature, acting directly or through an 
authorized agency such as the Water Board, has the power to grant usufructuary licenses that will 
permit an appropriator to take water from flowing streams and use that water in a distant part of the 
state, even though this taking does not promote, and may unavoidably harm, the trust uses at the 
source stream.  The population and economy of this state depend upon the appropriation of vast 
quantities of water for uses unrelated to in-stream trust values.  California’s Constitution (see art. X, 
§2), its statutes (see Water Code, §§100, 104), decisions (see, e.g., Waterford I. Dist. v. Turlock I. 
Dist. (1920) 50 Cal. App. 213, 220 [194 P. 757]), and commentators (e.g., Hutchins, The Cal. Law 
of Water Rights, op. cit. supra, p. 11) all emphasize the need to make efficient use of California’s 
limited water resources: all recognize, at least implicitly, that efficient use requires diverting water 
from in-stream uses.  Now that the economy and population centers of this state have developed in 
reliance upon appropriated water, it would be disingenuous to hold that such appropriations are and 
have always been improper to the extent that they harm public trust uses, and can be justified only 
upon theories of reliance or estoppel. 
The state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and 
allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible.  Just as the history 
of this state shows that appropriation may be necessary for efficient use of water despite 
unavoidable harm to public trust values, it demonstrates that an appropriative water rights system 
administered without consideration of the public trust may cause unnecessary and unjustified harm 
to trust interests.  (See Johnson, op. cit. supra, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 233, 256-257; Robie, Some 
Reflections on Environmental Considerations in Water Rights Administration (1972) 2 Ecology 
L.Q. 695, 710-711; Comment, op. cit. supra, 33 Hastings L.J. 653, 654.) As a matter of practical 
necessity the state may have to approve appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses.  
In so doing, however, the state must bear in mind its duty as trustee to consider the effect of the 
taking on the public trust (see United Plainsmen v. N.D. State Water Cons. Commission (N.D. 
1976) 247 N.W.2d 457, 462-463), and to preserve, so far as consistent with the public interest, the 
uses protected by the trust.  It is clear that some responsible body ought to reconsider the allocation 
of the waters of the Mono Basin.  No vested rights bar such reconsideration.  We recognize the 
substantial concerns voiced by Los Angeles--the city’s need for water, its reliance upon the 1940 
board decision, the cost both in terms of money and environmental impact of obtaining water 
elsewhere.  Such concerns must enter into any allocation decision.  We hold only that they do not 
preclude a reconsideration and reallocation which also takes into account the impact of water 
diversion on the Mono Lake environment. 
6. Conclusion. 
This has been a long and involved answer to the question posed by the federal district court.  
In summarizing our opinion, we will essay a shorter version of our response. 
The federal court inquired first of the interrelationship between the public trust doctrine and 
the California water rights system, asking whether the “public trust doctrine in this context [is] 
subsumed in the California water rights system, or . . . [functions] independently of that system?” 
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Our answer is “neither.” The public trust doctrine and the appropriative water rights system are 
parts of an integrated system of water law.  The public trust doctrine serves the function in that 
integrated system of preserving the continuing sovereign power of the state to protect public trust 
uses, a power which precludes anyone from acquiring a vested right to harm the public trust, and 
imposes a continuing duty on the state to take such uses into account in allocating water resources. 
Restating its question, the federal court asked: “[Can] the plaintiffs challenge the 
Department’s permits and licenses by arguing that those permits and licenses are limited by the 
public trust doctrine, or must the plaintiffs . . . [argue] that the water diversions and uses authorized 
thereunder are not ‘reasonable or beneficial’ as required under the California water rights system?” 
We reply that plaintiffs can rely on the public trust doctrine in seeking reconsideration of the 
allocation of the waters of the Mono Basin. 
The federal court’s second question asked whether plaintiffs must exhaust an administrative 
remedy before filing suit.  Our response is “no.” The courts and the Water Board have concurrent 
jurisdiction in cases of this kind.  If the nature or complexity of the issues indicate that an initial 
determination by the board is appropriate, the courts may refer the matter to the board.  
This opinion is but one step in the eventual resolution of the Mono Lake controversy. We do 
not dictate any particular allocation of water.  Our objective is to resolve a legal conundrum in 
which two competing systems of thought–the public trust doctrine and the appropriative water 
rights system--existed independently of each other, espousing principles which seemingly suggested 
opposite results.  We hope by integrating these two doctrines to clear away the legal barriers which 
have so far prevented either the Water Board or the courts from taking a new and objective look at 
the water resources of the Mono Basin.  The human and environmental uses of Mono Lake--uses 
protected by the public trust doctrine--deserve to be taken into account.  Such uses should not be 
destroyed because the state mistakenly thought itself powerless to protect them. 
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding the Superior Court of Alpine County to 
vacate its judgment in this action and to enter a new judgment consistent with the views stated in 
this opinion.  
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. v. MISSISSIPPI 
484 U.S. 469 (1988) 
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Brennan, 
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ. joined.  O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and 
Scalia, JJ. joined. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
The issue here is whether the State of Mississippi, when it entered the Union in 1817, took 
title to lands lying under waters that were influenced by the tide running in the Gulf of Mexico, but 
were not navigable in fact. 
 
 
62 
I 
As the Mississippi Supreme Court eloquently put it: “Though great public interests and 
neither insignificant nor illegitimate private interests are present and in conflict, this in the end is a 
title suit.” Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 510 (1986). More specifically, in 
question here is ownership of 42 acres of land underlying the north branch of Bayou LaCroix and 
11 small drainage streams in southwestern Mississippi; the disputed tracts range from under one-
half acre to almost 10 acres in size. Although the waters over these lands lie several miles north of 
the Mississippi Gulf Coast and are not navigable, they are nonetheless influenced by the tide, 
because they are adjacent and tributary to the Jourdan River, a navigable stream flowing into the 
Gulf.  The Jourdan, in the area involved here, is affected by the ebb and flow of the tide. Record 
title to these tracts of land is held by petitioners, who trace their claims back to pre-statehood 
Spanish land grants. 
The State of Mississippi, however, claiming that by virtue of the “equal footing doctrine” it 
acquired at the time of statehood and held in public trust all land lying under any waters influenced 
by the tide, whether navigable or not, issued oil and gas leases that included the property at issue.  
This quiet title suit, brought by petitioners, ensued.  The Mississippi Supreme Court, affirming the 
Chancery Court with respect to the lands at issue here, held that by virtue of becoming a State, 
Mississippi acquired “fee simple title to all lands naturally subject to tidal influence, inland to 
today’s mean high water mark . . . .”  Ibid.  Petitioners’ submission that the State acquired title to 
only lands under navigable waters was rejected. 
We granted certiorari to review the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision, 479 U.S. 1084 
(1987), and now affirm the judgment below. 
 
II 
As petitioners recognize, the “seminal case in American public trust jurisprudence is Shively 
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).” The issue in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894), was whether the 
State of Oregon or a prestatehood grantee from the United States of riparian lands near the mouth of 
the Columbia River at Astoria, Oregon, owned the soil below the high-water mark.  Following an 
extensive survey of this Court’s prior cases, the English common law, and various cases from the 
state courts, the Court concluded: 
At common law, the title and dominion in lands flowed by the tide water were in the King 
for the benefit of the nation . . . . Upon the American Revolution, these rights, charged with a like 
trust, were vested in the original States within their respective borders, subject to the rights 
surrendered by the Constitution of the United States. 
The new States admitted into the Union since the adoption of the Constitution have the same 
rights as the original States in the tide waters, and in the lands under them, within their respective 
jurisdictions.  Id., at 57.     
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Shively rested on prior decisions of this Court, which had included similar, sweeping 
statements of States’ dominion over lands beneath tidal waters.  Knight v. United States Land 
Association, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891), for example, had stated that “[i]t is the settled rule of law in 
this court that absolute property in, and dominion and sovereignty over, the soils under the tide 
waters in the original States were reserved to the several States, and that the new States since 
admitted have the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction in that behalf as the original States 
possess within their respective borders.” On many occasions, before and since, this Court has stated 
or restated these words from Knight and Shively. 
Against this array of cases, it is not surprising that Mississippi claims ownership of all of the 
tidelands in the State. Other States have done as much. The 13 original States, joined by the Coastal 
States Organization (representing all coastal States), have filed a brief in support of Mississippi, 
insisting that ownership of thousands of acres of tidelands under nonnavigable waters would not be 
disturbed if the judgment below were affirmed, as it would be if petitioners’ navigability-in-fact test 
were adopted.  See Brief for 13 Original States as Amici Curiae 3-5, 26-27. 
Petitioners rely on early state cases to indicate that the original States did not claim title to 
nonnavigable tidal waters.  But it has been long established that the individual States have the 
authority to define the limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such 
lands as they see fit.  Shively v. Bowlby, supra, at 26. Some of the original States, for example, did 
recognize more private interests in tidelands than did others of the 13–more private interests than 
were recognized at common law, or in the dictates of our public trusts cases. Because some of the 
cases which petitioners cite come from such States (i.e., from States which abandoned the common 
law with respect to tidelands), they are of only limited value in understanding the public trust 
doctrine and its scope in those States which have not relinquished their claims to all lands beneath 
tidal waters. 
Consequently, we reaffirm our longstanding precedents which hold that the States, upon 
entry into the Union, received ownership of all lands under waters subject to the ebb and flow of the 
tide.  Under the well-established principles of our cases, the decision of the Mississippi Supreme 
Court is clearly correct:  the lands at issue here are “under tide waters,” and therefore passed to the 
State of Mississippi upon its entrance into the Union. 
III 
Petitioners do not deny that broad statements of public trust dominion over tidelands have 
been included in this Court’s opinions since the early 19th century. Rather, they advance two 
reasons why these previous statements of the public trust doctrine should not be given their apparent 
application in this case. 
A 
First, petitioners contend that these sweeping statements of state dominion over tidelands 
arise from an oddity of the common law, or more specifically, of English geography.  Petitioners 
submit that in England practically all navigable rivers are influenced by the tide. 
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The cases relied on by petitioners, however, did not deal with tidal, nonnavigable waters. 
And we will not now enter the debate on what the English law was with respect to the land under 
such waters, for it is perfectly clear how this Court understood the common law of royal ownership, 
and what the Court considered the rights of the original and the later-entering States to be.  As we 
discuss above, this Court has consistently interpreted the common law as providing that the lands 
beneath waters under tidal influence were given States upon their admission into the Union.  See 
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S., at 57.  It is true that none of these cases actually dealt with lands such 
as those involved in this case, but it has never been suggested in any of this Court’s prior decisions 
that the many statements included therein–to the effect that the States owned all the soil beneath 
waters affected by the tide–were anything less than an accurate description of the governing law. 
Petitioners, in a related argument, contend that even if the common law does not support 
their position, subsequent cases from this Court developing the American public trust doctrine make 
it clear that navigability–and not tidal influence–has become the sine qua non of the public trust 
interest in tidelands in this country. 
That States own freshwater river bottoms as far as the rivers are navigable, however, does 
not indicate that navigability is or was the prevailing test for state dominion over tidelands. Rather, 
this rule represents the American decision to depart from what it understood to be the English rule 
limiting Crown ownership to the soil under tidal waters. 
Finally, we observe that not the least of the difficulties with petitioners’ position is their 
concession that the States own the tidelands bordering the oceans, bays, and estuaries–even where 
these areas by no means could be considered navigable, as is always the case near the shore. It is 
obvious that these waters are part of the sea, and the lands beneath them are state property; 
ultimately, though, the only proof of this fact can be that the waters are influenced by the ebb and 
flow of the tide.  This is undoubtedly why the ebb-and-flow test has been the measure of public 
ownership of tidelands for so long. 
Admittedly, there is a difference in degree between the waters in this case, and nonnavigable 
waters on the seashore that are affected by the tide.  But there is no difference in kind.  For in the 
end, all tidewaters are connected to the sea:  the waters in this case, for example, by a navigable, 
tidal river.  Perhaps the lands at issue here differ in some ways from tidelands directly adjacent to 
the sea; nonetheless, they still share those “geographical, chemical and environmental” qualities that 
make lands beneath tidal waters unique. 
Indeed, we find the various alternatives for delineating the boundaries of public trust 
tidelands offered by petitioners and their supporting amici to be unpersuasive and unsatisfactory. As 
the State suggested at argument, and as recognized on several previous occasions, the ebb-and-flow 
rule has the benefit of “uniformity and certainty, and . . . eas[e] of application.”  See, e.g., Cobb v. 
Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 379 (1867).  We are unwilling, after its lengthy history at common law, 
in this Court, and in many state courts, to abandon the ebb-and-flow rule now, and seek to fashion a 
new test to govern the limits of public trust tidelands.  Consequently, we hold that the lands at issue 
in this case were within those given to Mississippi when the State was admitted to the Union. 
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V 
Because we believe that our cases firmly establish that the States, upon entering the Union, 
were given ownership over all lands beneath waters subject to the tide’s influence, we affirm the 
Mississippi Supreme Court’s determination that the lands at issue here became property of the State 
upon its admission to the Union in 1817.  Furthermore, because we find no reason to set aside that 
court’s state-law determination that subsequent developments did not divest the State of its 
ownership of these public trust lands, the judgment below is 
Affirmed. 
Justice O’Connor, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia join, dissenting. 
Breaking a chain of title that reaches back more than 150 years, the Court today announces a 
rule that will disrupt the settled expectations of landowners not only in Mississippi but in every 
coastal State. Neither our precedents nor equitable principles require this result, and I respectfully 
dissent from this undoing of settled history.  
I 
As the Court acknowledges, this case presents an issue that we never have decided: whether 
a State holds in public trust all land underlying tidally influenced waters that are neither navigable 
themselves nor part of any navigable body of water.  In holding that it does, the majority relies on 
general language in opinions that recognized state claims to land underlying tidewaters.  But those 
cases concerned land lying beneath waters that were in fact navigable, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 
U.S. 1 (1894) (Columbia River in Oregon), or beneath waters that were part of or immediately 
bordering a navigable body of water, e.g., Mann v. Tacoma Land Co., 153 U.S. 273 (1894) (shallow 
tidelands in Commencement Bay in Washington).  Until today, none of our decisions recognized a 
State’s public trust title to land underlying a discrete and wholly nonnavigable body of water that is 
properly viewed as separate from any navigable body of water. 
In my view, the public trust properly extends only to land underlying navigable bodies of 
water and their borders, bays, and inlets.  This Court has defined the public trust repeatedly in terms 
of navigability.  It is true that these cases did not involve waters subject to the ebb and flow of the 
tide.  But there is no reason to think that different tests of the scope of the public trust apply to 
saltwater and to freshwater.  Navigability, not tidal influence, ought to be acknowledged as the 
universal hallmark of the public trust. 
The public trust doctrine has its roots in English common law. Traditionally, all navigable 
waterways in England were by law common highways for the public.  M. Hale, De Jure Maris et 
Brachiorum ejusdem, cap. iii (1667), reprinted in R. Hall, Essay on the Rights of the Crown and the 
Privileges of the Subject in the Sea Shores of the Realm, App. v (2d ed. 1875). Furthermore, the 
King held title to the soil beneath the sea and the arms of the sea, “where the sea flows and 
reflows.”  Hale, cap. iv, reprinted in Hall, supra, at App. vii, ix.  When the first American States 
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became sovereign after our Revolution, their governments succeeded to the King’s rights with 
respect to waters within their borders.  Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410 (1842). New States like 
Mississippi, upon entering the Union, acquired equivalent rights under the equal-footing doctrine.  
Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, supra, at 228-229. Hence both petitioners and respondents have made an 
effort to ascertain the extent of the King’s rights under English common law. 
Unfortunately, English cases of the late 18th and early 19th centuries did not directly 
address whether the King held title to lands underlying tidally influenced, nonnavigable waters. 
Certainly the public’s right of navigation was limited to waterways that were navigable in fact, and 
did not extend to every waterway subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.  As Lord Mansfield 
explained: 
How does it appear that this is a navigable river?  The flowing and reflowing of the 
tide does not make it so, for there are many places into which the tide flows that are 
not navigable rivers; and the place in question may be a creek in their own private 
estate.  Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, 1 Cowp. 86, 98 Eng. Rep. 980, 981 (K.B. 1774). 
American cases have developed the public trust doctrine in a way that is consistent with its 
common-law heritage.  Our precedents explain that the public trust extends to navigable waterways 
because its fundamental purpose is to preserve them for common use for transportation.  “It is, 
indeed, the susceptibility to use as highways of commerce which gives sanction to the public right 
of control over navigation upon [navigable waterways], and consequently to the exclusion of private 
ownership, either of the waters or the soils under them.” Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891).  
Similarly, the Court has emphasized that the public trust doctrine “is founded upon the necessity of 
preserving to the public the use of navigable waters from private interruption and encroachment.”  
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436 (1892). 
Although the States may commit public trust waterways to uses other than transportation, 
such as fishing or land reclamation, this exercise of sovereign discretion does not enlarge the scope 
of the public trust.  Even the majority does not claim that the public trust extends to every waterway 
that can be used for fishing or for land reclamation.  Nor does the majority explain why its tidal test 
is superior to a navigability test for the purpose of identifying waterways that are suited to these 
other uses.  For public trust purposes, navigable bodies of water include the nonnavigable areas at 
their boundaries.  The question whether a body of water is navigable is answered waterway by 
waterway, not inch by inch.  The borders of the ocean, which certainly is navigable, extend to the 
mean high tide line as a matter of federal common law.  United States v. Pacheco, 2 Wall. 587, 590 
(1865); see Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 376 
(1977).  Hence the States’ public trusts include the ocean shore over which the tide ebbs and flows.  
This explains why there is language in our cases describing the public trust in terms of tidewaters: 
each of those cases concerned the shores of a navigable body of water.   This does not imply, 
however, that all tidally influenced waters are part of the sea any more than it implies that the 
Missouri River is part of the Gulf of Mexico. 
The Court holds today that the public trust includes not only tidewaters along the ocean 
shore, but also discrete bodies of water that are influenced by the tide but far removed from the 
ocean or any navigable tidal water, such as the separate little streams and bayous at issue here. The 
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majority doubts whether a satisfactory test could be devised for distinguishing between the two 
types of tidally influenced waters. It therefore adopts a test that will include in the public trust every 
body of water that is interconnected to the ocean, even indirectly, no matter how remote it is from 
navigable water.  This is wholly inconsistent with the federal law that identifies what inland 
freshwaters belong to the public trust.  For example, if part of a freshwater river is navigable in fact, 
it does not follow that all contiguous parts of the river belong to the public trust, no matter how 
distant they are from the navigable part.  Conversely, federal law does not exclude from the public 
trust all nonnavigable portions of a navigable river, such as shallow areas near the banks. 
“The question here is not with respect to a short interruption of navigability in a 
stream otherwise navigable, or of a negligible part, which boats may use, of a stream 
otherwise non-navigable.  We are concerned with long reaches with particular 
characteristics of navigability or non-navigability . . . .”  United States v. Utah, 283 
U.S. 64, 77 (1931) (footnote omitted).  See Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922) 
(applying the navigability test to identify what parts of the Red and Arkansas Rivers 
belong to the public trust). To decide whether the tidewaters at issue in this case 
belong to the public trust, the Court should apply the same fact-specific navigability 
test that it applies to inland waters.  It should distinguish between navigable bodies 
of water and connected, but discrete, bodies of tidally influenced water.  To this end, 
Justice Field once applied the headland to headland test, a “universal rule governing 
the measurement of waters,” and drew a boundary dividing the navigable waters of 
San Francisco Bay from the tidally influenced waters of Mission Creek.  Knight v. 
United States Land Assn, 142 U.S. 161, 207 (1891) (concurring opinion).  Only 
waterways that are part of a navigable body of water belong to the public trust. 
II 
The controversy in this case concerns more than cold legal doctrine.  The particular facts of 
this case to which the Court’s opinion gives short shrift, illustrate how unfortunate it is for the Court 
to recognize a claim that appears belated and opportunistic. 
Mississippi showed no interest in the disputed land from the time it became a State until the 
1970s.  Petitioners, or prior titleholders, recorded deeds on the land and paid property taxes 
throughout this period.  These waterways are not used for commercial navigation.  None of the 
drainage streams is more than a mile long; all are nameless.  Mississippi is not pressing its claim for 
the sake of facilitating commerce, or even to protect the public’s interest in fishing or other 
traditional uses of the public trust. Instead, it is leasing the land to a private party for exploitation of 
underlying minerals.  Mississippi’s novel undertaking has caused it to press for a radical expansion 
of the historical limits of the public trust. 
The Court’s decision today could dispossess thousands of blameless record owners and 
leaseholders of land that they and their predecessors in interest reasonably believed was lawfully 
theirs.  The Court concludes that a decision favoring petitioners would be even more disruptive, 
because titles may have been adjudicated on the assumption that a tidal test defines the public trust.  
Ante, at 483.  There is no way to ascertain, as a general matter, what assumptions about the public 
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trust underlie existing property titles.  What evidence there is suggests that the majority’s rule is the 
one that will upset settled expectations. 
Although there is no way to predict exactly how much land will be affected by the Court’s 
decision, the magnitude of the problem is suggested by the fact that more than 9 million acres have 
been classified as fresh or saline coastal wetlands.  S. Shaw & C. Fredine, Wetlands of the United 
States, United States Department of the Interior, Fish & Wildlife Service, Circular 39, p. 15 (1956). 
The Court’s decision departs from our precedents, and I fear that it may permit grave 
injustice to be done to innocent property holders in coastal States.  I dissent. 
MERRILL v. OHIO DNR 
2011 Ohio 4612; 955 N.E. 2d 935 
O'DONNELL, J. 
Ohio law with respect to the territory of Lake Erie held in trust by the state and the rights of 
littoral-property owners has been settled for more than a century, and we see no reason to change 
the existing law. Based on opinions of this court from as early as 1878 and the Ohio General 
Assembly's statement of public policy enunciated in the Fleming Act in 1917, we conclude that the 
territory of Lake Erie held in trust by the state of Ohio for the people of Ohio extends to the "natural 
shoreline," which is the line at which the water usually stands when free from disturbing causes. 
Factual and Procedural History  
In May 2004  lakefront-property owners filed a complaint  for declaratory judgment and 
mandamus seeking declarations that owners of property abutting Lake Erie hold title to the land 
"between [the ordinary high-water mark] and the actual legal boundary of their properties * * * as 
defined by their deeds" and that the public trust does not include non-submerged lands   
The state counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that the state of Ohio holds the lands and 
waters of Lake Erie to the ordinary high-water mark, as set by the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers in 1985, in trust for the people of Ohio, subject only to the paramount authority retained 
by the United States for the purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international 
affairs. 
ODNR  [Ohio Department of Natural Resources]  advised the court that it welcomed 
resolution of the controversy and posited that it "must and should honor the apparently valid real 
property deeds of the plaintiff-relator lakefront owners unless a court determines that the deeds are 
limited by or subject to the public's interests in those lands or are otherwise defective or 
unenforceable."  
After review, the trial court conclude[ed] that the public trust neither extended to the 
ordinary high-water mark nor terminated at the low-water mark; rather, the trial court determined 
that the boundary of the public-trust territory is "a moveable boundary consisting of the water's 
edge, which means the most landward place where the lake water actually touches the land at any 
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given time." The state of Ohio appealed to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals challenging the 
trial court's determination that the public-trust territory of Lake Erie is a moveable boundary 
consistent with the water's edge. The court of appeals also affirmed the trial court's determination 
regarding the boundary of the public trust, holding that the boundary is the shoreline, which it 
defined as "the actual water's edge."  
The Public Trust  
The substantive issue for our resolution concerns the territory of the public trust, and the 
parties here disagree as to its boundary. The state, the National Wildlife Federation, and the Ohio 
Environmental Council all urge us to hold that the court of appeals erred in setting the landward 
boundary of the public trust at the water's edge, arguing instead that the boundary is the ordinary 
high-water mark, which they claim that case law has construed to mean the natural shoreline, as 
well as "the line where the water usually stands when free from disturbing causes." 
The plaintiffs assert that the boundary is the natural shoreline, which it claims is the line at 
which the water meets the shore wherever that may be at any given time, and they urge this court to 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
We conclude that the territory of Lake Erie held in trust by the state of Ohio for the people 
of the state extends to the natural shoreline, which is the line at which the water usually stands when 
free from disturbing causes.  Our decision reaffirms this court's previous determination that the 
territory of the public trust in Lake Erie extends to the natural shoreline, which is the line at which 
the water usually stands when free from disturbing causes, which we first announced in 1878 and 
clarified in 1916, and which the General Assembly codified in 1917. Nothing contained in our 
opinion interferes with the presumptively valid deeds of the lakefront owners.  
Conclusion  
Having clarified that the territory of Lake Erie is held in trust for the people of Ohio and 
extends to the natural shoreline, the line at which the water usually stands when free from disturbing 
causes. Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
O'CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, J., concur in judgment only. 
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PART III. IMPERIUM/SOVEREIGNTY 
“The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our 
citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each 
protected from incursion by the other. The resulting Constitution created a legal 
system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government, 
each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights 
and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.” Justice 
Kennedy concurring in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 
(1995) 
Session 5. Dual Sovereignty 
GIBBONS v. OGDEN 
22 U.S. 1 (1824) 
Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court, and, after stating the 
case, proceeded as follows: 
As preliminary to the very able discussions of the constitution, which we have heard from 
the bar, and as having some influence on its construction, reference has been made to the 
political situation of these States, anterior to its formation.  It has been said, that they were 
sovereign, were completely independent, and were connected with each other only by a  league.  
This is true.  But, when these allied sovereigns converted their league into a government... 
deputed to deliberate on their common concerns, and to recommend measures of general utility, 
into a Legislature, empowered to enact laws on the most interesting subjects, the whole character 
in which the States appear, underwent a change, the extent of which must be determined by a fair 
consideration of the instrument by which that change was effected. 
This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to 
their government.... We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers, other than is 
given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connection with the 
purposes for which they were conferred. 
The words are, "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." 
The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our constitution being, as was aptly said at 
the bar, one of enumeration, and not of definition, to ascertain the extent of the power, it 
becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee would limit it 
to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it 
comprehends navigation.  This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one 
of its significations.  Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is 
intercourse.  It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all 
its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.  The mind can 
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scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations, which shall exclude all 
laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of the one 
nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to prescribing rules for the conduct of 
individuals, in the actual employment of buying and selling, or of barter. 
The word used in the constitution, then, comprehends, and has been always understood to 
comprehend, navigation within its meaning; and a power to regulate navigation, is as expressly 
granted, as if that term had been added to the word "commerce." 
We are now arrived at the inquiry— What is this power? 
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be 
governed.  This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised 
to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the 
constitution.  These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the questions which arise in 
this case, or which have been discussed at the bar.  If, as has always been understood, the 
sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the 
power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress 
as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same 
restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States.  
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence 
which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for 
example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its 
abuse.  They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative 
governments. 
The appellant contends that full power to regulate a particular subject, implies the whole 
power, and leaves no residuum; that a grant of the whole is incompatible with the existence of a 
right in another to any part of it.  The sole question is, can a State regulate commerce ... among 
the States, while Congress is regulating it? 
It is obvious, that the government of the Union, in the exercise of its express powers, that, 
for example, of regulating commerce ... among the States, may use means that may also be 
employed by a State, in the exercise of its acknowledged powers; that, for example, of regulating 
commerce within the State.  If Congress license vessels to sail from one port to another, in the 
same State, the act is supposed to be, necessarily, incidental to the power expressly granted to 
Congress, and implies no claim of a direct power to regulate the purely internal commerce of a 
State, or to act directly on its system of police.  So, if a State, in passing laws on subjects 
acknowledged to be within its control, and with a view to those subjects, shall adopt a measure 
of the same character with one which Congress may adopt, it does not derive its authority from 
the particular power which has been granted, but from some other, which remains with the State, 
and may be executed by the same means.  All experience shows that the same measures, or 
measures scarcely distinguishable from each other, may flow from distinct powers; but this does 
not prove that the powers themselves are identical.  Although the means used in their execution 
may sometimes approach each other so nearly as to be confounded, there are other situations in 
which they are sufficiently distinct to establish their individuality. 
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[Such] ...  acts were cited at the bar for the purpose of showing an opinion in Congress, 
that the States possess, concurrently with the Legislature of the Union, the power to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations and among the States. Upon reviewing them, we think they do 
not establish the proposition they were intended to prove.  They show the opinion, that the States 
retain powers enabling them to pass the laws to which allusion has been made, not that those 
laws proceed from the particular power which has been delegated to Congress. 
It has been contended by the counsel for the appellant, that, as the word "to regulate" 
implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action 
of all others that would perform the same operation on the same thing.  That regulation is 
designed for the entire result, applying to those parts which remain as they were, as well as to 
those which are altered.  It produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged 
by changing what the regulating power designs to leave untouched, as that on which it has 
operated. 
There is great force in this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has been 
refuted. 
In argument, however, it has been contended, that if a law passed by a State, in the 
exercise of its acknowledged sovereignty, comes into conflict with a law passed by Congress in 
pursuance of the constitution, they affect the subject, and each other, like equal opposing powers.  
But the framers of our constitution foresaw this state of things, and provided for it, by declaring 
the supremacy not only of itself, but of the laws made in pursuance of it.  The nullity of any act, 
inconsistent with the constitution, is produced by the declaration, that the constitution is the 
supreme law.  The appropriate application of that part of the clause which confers the same 
supremacy on laws and treaties, is to such acts of the State Legislatures as do not transcend their 
powers, but, though enacted in the execution of acknowledged State powers, interfere with, or 
are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution, or some treaty made 
under the authority of the United States.  In every such case, the act of Congress, or the treaty, is 
supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, 
must yield to it. 
As our whole course of legislation on this subject shows, the power of Congress has been 
universally understood in America, to comprehend navigation.... The subject is transferred to 
Congress, and no exception to the grant can be admitted, which is not proved by the words or the 
nature of the thing.  
The Court is aware that, in stating the train of reasoning by which we have been 
conducted to this result, much time has been consumed in the attempt to demonstrate 
propositions which may have been thought axioms.  It is felt that the tediousness inseparable 
from the endeavour to prove that which is already clear, is imputable to a considerable part of 
this opinion.  But it was unavoidable.  The conclusion to which we have come, depends on a 
chain of principles which it was necessary to preserve unbroken; and, although some of them 
were thought nearly self-evident, the magnitude of the question, the weight of character 
belonging to those from whose judgment we dissent, and the argument at the bar, demanded that 
we should assume nothing. 
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Powerful and ingenious minds, taking, as postulates, that the powers expressly granted to 
the government of the Union, are to be contracted by construction, into the narrowest possible 
compass, and that the original powers of the States are retained, if any possible construction will 
retain them, may, by a course of well digested, but refined and metaphysical reasoning, founded 
on these premises, explain away the constitution of our country, and leave it, a magnificent 
structure, indeed, to look at, but totally unfit for use.  They may so entangle and perplex the 
understanding, as to obscure principles, which were before thought quite plain, and induce 
doubts where, if the mind were to pursue its own course, none would be perceived.  In such a 
case, it is peculiarly necessary to recur to safe and fundamental principles to sustain those 
principles, and, when sustained, to make them the tests of the arguments to be examined. 
DECREE.  This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the Court for 
the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors of the State of New-York, and was argued 
by counsel.  On consideration whereof, this Court is of opinion, that the several licenses to the 
steam boats the Stoudinger and the Bellona, to carry on the coasting trade, which were granted 
under an act of Congress, passed in pursuance of the constitution of the United States, gave full 
authority to those vessels to navigate the waters of the United States, by steam or otherwise, for 
the purpose of carrying on the coasting trade, any law of the State of New-York to the contrary 
notwithstanding; and that so much of the several laws of the State of New-York, as prohibits 
vessels, licensed according to the laws of the United States, from navigating the waters of the 
State of New-York, by means of fire or steam, is repugnant to the said constitution, and void. 
GILMAN v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 
70 U.S. 713 (1865) 
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court. 
The complainants are citizens of other States, and own a valuable and productive wharf 
and dock property above the site of a contemplated bridge . . . . Commerce has been carried on in 
all kinds of vessels for many years to and from the complainants’ property.  The bridge will not 
be more than thirty feet above the ordinary high-water surface of the river, and hence will 
prevent the passage of vessels having masts.  This will largely reduce the income from the 
property, and render it less valuable. 
The injury to the property of the complainants will be entirely consequential.  A large city 
is rising up on the opposite side of the river.  The new bridge is called for by public convenience. 
The case resolves itself into questions of law.  The defendants assert that the act of the 
legislature, under which they are proceeding, justifies the building of the bridge. The 
complainants insist that such an obstruction to the navigation of the river is repugnant to the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, touching the subject of commerce. 
These provisions of the Constitution bear upon the subject: 
“Congress shall have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes; . . . to 
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make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into execution the foregoing powers.   
“This Constitution, and the laws which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof, . . . shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or 
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. 
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”  
Commerce includes navigation.  The power to regulate commerce comprehends the 
control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United 
States which are accessible from a State other than those in which they lie.  For this purpose they 
are the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress. This 
necessarily includes the power to keep them open and free from any obstruction to their 
navigation, interposed by the States or otherwise; to remove such obstructions when they exist; 
and to provide, by such sanctions as they may deem proper, against the occurrence of the evil 
and for the punishment of offenders. For these purposes, Congress possesses all the powers 
which existed in the States before the adoption of the national Constitution, and which have 
always existed in the Parliament in England. 
We will now turn our attention to the rights and powers of the States which are to be 
considered. 
The national government possesses no powers but such as have been delegated to it.  The 
States have all but such as they have surrendered.  The power to authorize the building of bridges 
is not to be found in the Federal Constitution.   It has not been taken from the States.  It must 
reside somewhere.  They had it before the Constitution was adopted, and they have it still. 
“When the Revolution took place the people of each State became themselves sovereign, and in 
that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soil under them for 
their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the 
General Government.”  Martin et al. v. Waddell, 16 Peters, 410. 
The power to regulate commerce covers a wide field, and embraces a great variety of 
subjects.  Some of these subjects call for uniform rules and national legislation; others can be 
best regulated by rules and provisions suggested by the varying circumstances of different 
localities, and limited in their operation to such localities respectively.  To this extent the power 
to regulate commerce may be exercised by the States. 
It must not be forgotten that bridges, which are connecting parts of turnpikes, streets, and 
railroads, are means of commercial transportation, as well as navigable waters, and that the 
commerce which passes over a bridge may be much greater than would ever be transported on 
the water it obstructs. 
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It is for the municipal power to weigh the considerations which belong to the subject, and 
to decide which shall be preferred, and how far either shall be made subservient to the other. The 
States have always exercised this power, and from the nature and objects of the two systems of 
government they must always continue to exercise it, subject, however, in all cases, to the 
paramount authority of Congress, whenever the power of the States shall be exerted within the 
sphere of the commercial power which belongs to the nation. 
A State law, requiring an importer to pay for and take out a license before he should be 
permitted to sell a bale of imported goods, is void, and a State law, which requires the master of 
a vessel, engaged in foreign commerce, to pay a certain sum to a State officer on account of each 
passenger brought from a foreign country into the State, is also void.  But, a State, in the exercise 
of its police power, may forbid spirituous liquor imported from abroad, of from another State, to 
be sold by retail or to be sold at all without a license; and it may visit the violation of the 
prohibition with such punishment as it may deem proper.  Under quarantine laws, a vessel 
registered, or enrolled and licensed, may be stopped before entering her port of destination, or be 
afterwards removed and detained elsewhere, for an indefinite period; and a bale of goods, upon 
which the duties have or have not been paid, laden with infection, may be seized under “health 
laws,” and if it cannot be purged of its poison, may be committed to the flames. 
The inconsistency between the powers of the States and the nation, as thus exhibited, is 
quite as great as in the case before us; but it does not necessarily involve collision or any other 
evil.  None has hitherto been found to ensue.  The public good is the end and aim of both. 
Congress may interpose, whenever it shall be deemed necessary, by general or special 
laws.  It may regulate all bridges over navigable waters, remove offending bridges, and punish 
those who shall thereafter erect them.  Within the sphere of their authority both the legislative 
and judicial power of the nation are supreme.  A different doctrine finds no warrant in the 
Constitution, and is abnormal and revolutionary. 
The defendants are proceeding in no wanton or aggressive spirit.  The authority upon 
which they rely was given, and afterwards deliberately renewed by the States.  The case stands 
before us as if the parties were the State of Pennsylvania and the United States.  The river, being 
wholly within her limits, we cannot say the State has exceeded the bounds of her authority.  Until 
the dormant power of the Constitution is awakened and made effective, by appropriate 
legislation, the reserved power of the States is plenary, and its exercise in good faith cannot be 
made the subject of review by this court.  It is not denied that the defendants are justified if the 
law is valid.  We find nothing in the record which would warrant us in disturbing the decree of 
the Circuit Court, which is, therefore, AFFIRMED WITH COSTS. 
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD dissenting: 
Dissenting from the opinion of the majority of the court on this point, I hold that 
Congress has regulated the navigation of this river within the meaning of the Constitution, and 
that the law of the State, pleaded in justification of the acts of the respondents, so far as it 
authorizes an obstruction to the free navigation of the river, is an invalid law . . . . 
 77 
Complete protection is afforded . . . to all ships and vessels of the United States, duly 
enrolled and licensed, in navigating all the public navigable rivers of the United States which 
empty into the sea or into the bays and gulfs, which form a part of the sea, and they are all 
treated as arms of the sea and public rivers of the United States . . . .  Public navigable rivers, 
whose waters fall into the sea, are rivers of the United States in the sense of the law of nations 
and of the Constitution of the United States.  They are so treated by all writers upon public law, 
and there is no well-considered decision of the Federal courts which does not treat them in the 
same way.   
Looking at these several acts it is not surprising that Marshall, C.J., should have said, in 
Gibbons v. Ogden, that “to the court it seems clear that the whole act on the subject of the 
coasting trade, according to those principles which govern the construction of statutes, implies, 
unequivocally, an authority to licensed vessels to carry on the coasting trade.” 
Conclusion is, that Congress has regulated the navigation of this river, and that the State 
law under which the respondents attempt to justify is in conflict with those regulations, and 
therefore is void, and affords no justification to the respondents. Admitting the facts to be so, 
then the complainants are entitled to recover even upon the principle maintained in the opinion 
of the majority of the court. 
THE DANIEL BALL 
77 U.S. 557 (1871) 
Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows: 
Two questions are presented in this case for our determination. 
First: Whether the steamer was at the time designated in the libel engaged in transporting 
merchandise and passengers on a navigable water of the United States within the meaning of the 
acts of Congress; and, Second: Whether those acts are applicable to a steamer engaged as a 
common carrier between places in the same State, when a portion of the merchandise transported 
by her is destined to places in other States, or comes from places without the State, she not 
running in connection with or in continuation of any line of steamers or other vessels, or any 
railway line leading to or from another State. 
Upon the first of these questions we entertain no doubt. The doctrine of the common law 
as to the navigability of waters has no application in this country. Here the ebb and flow of the 
tide do not constitute the usual test, as in England, or any test at all of the navigability of waters. 
There no waters are navigable in fact, or at least to any considerable extent, which are not subject 
to the tide, and from this circumstance tide water and navigable water there signify substantially 
the same thing. But in this country the case is widely different. Some of our rivers are as 
navigable for many hundreds of miles above as they are below the limits of tide water, and some 
of them are navigable for great distances by large vessels, which are not even affected by the tide 
at any point during their entire length. A different test must, therefore, be applied to determine 
the navigability of our rivers, and that is found in their navigable capacity. Those rivers must be 
regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in 
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fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as 
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary 
modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the United States 
within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the 
States, when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other 
waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or 
foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.  
If we apply this test to Grand River, the conclusion follows that it must be regarded as a 
navigable water of the United States. From the conceded facts in the case the stream is capable of 
bearing a steamer of one hundred and twenty-three tons burden, laden with merchandise and 
passengers, as far as Grand Rapids, a distance of forty miles from its mouth in Lake Michigan. 
And by its junction with the lake it forms a continued highway for commerce, both with other 
States and with foreign countries, and is thus brought under the direct control of Congress in the 
exercise of its commercial power. 
That power authorizes all appropriate legislation for the protection or advancement of 
either interstate or foreign commerce, and for that purpose such legislation as will insure the 
convenient and safe navigation of all the navigable waters of the United States, whether that 
legislation consists in requiring the removal of obstructions to their use, in prescribing the form 
and size of the vessels employed upon them, or in subjecting the vessels to inspection and 
license, in order to insure their proper construction and equipment. "The power to regulate 
commerce," this court said in Gilman v. Philadelphia, "comprehends the control for that purpose, 
and to the extent necessary, of all navigable waters of the United States which are accessible 
from a State other than those in which they lie. For this purpose they are the public property of 
the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation of Congress." 
But it is contended that the steamer Daniel Ball was only engaged in the internal 
commerce of the State of Michigan, and was not, therefore, required to be inspected or licensed, 
even if it be conceded that Grand River is a navigable water of the United States; and this brings 
us to the consideration of the second question presented. 
There is undoubtedly an internal commerce which is subject to the control of the States. 
The power delegated to Congress is limited to commerce "among the several States," with 
foreign nations, and with the Indian tribes. This limitation necessarily excludes from Federal 
control all commerce not thus designated, and of course that commerce which is carried on 
entirely within the limits of a State and does not extend to or affect other States. In this case it is 
admitted that the steamer was engaged in shipping and transporting down Grand River, goods 
destined and marked for other States than Michigan, and in receiving and transporting up the 
river goods brought within the State from without its limits; but inasmuch as her agency in the 
transportation was entirely within the limits of the State, and she did not run in connection with, 
or in continuation of, any line of vessels or railway leading to other States, it is contended that 
she was engaged entirely in domestic commerce. But this conclusion does not follow. So far as 
she was employed in transporting goods destined for other States, or goods brought from without 
the limits of Michigan and destined to places within that State, she was engaged in commerce 
between the States, and however limited that commerce may have been, she was, so far as it 
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went, subject to the legislation of Congress. She was employed as an instrument of that 
commerce; for whenever a commodity has begun to move as an article of trade from one State to 
another, commerce in that commodity between the States has commenced. The fact that several 
different and independent agencies are employed in transporting the commodity, some acting 
entirely in one State, and some acting through two or more States, does in no respect affect the 
character of the transaction. To the extent in which each agency acts in that transportation, it is 
subject to the regulation of Congress. 
It is said that if the position here asserted be sustained, there is no such thing as the 
domestic trade of a State; that Congress may take the entire control of the commerce of the 
country, and extend its regulations to the railroads within a State on which grain or fruit is 
transported to a distant market. 
We answer that the present case relates to transportation on the navigable waters of the 
United States, and we are not called upon to express an opinion upon the power of Congress over 
interstate commerce when carried on by land transportation. And we answer further, that we are 
unable to draw any clear and distinct line between the authority of Congress to regulate an 
agency employed in commerce between the States, when that agency extends through two or 
more States, and when it is confined in its action entirely within the limits of a single State. If its 
authority does not extend to an agency in such commerce, when that agency is confined within 
the limits of a State, its entire authority over interstate commerce may be defeated. Several 
agencies combining, each taking up the commodity transported at the boundary line at one end of 
a State, and leaving it at the boundary line at the other end, the Federal jurisdiction would be 
entirely ousted, and the constitutional provision would become a dead letter. 
We perceive no error in the record, and the decree of the Circuit Court must be affirmed. 
WICKARD v. FILBURN 
317 U.S. 111 (1942) 
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The appellee filed his complaint against the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States, 
three members of the County Agricultural Conservation Committee for Montgomery County, 
Ohio, and a member of the State Agricultural Conservation Committee for Ohio.  He sought to 
enjoin enforcement against himself of the marketing penalty imposed by the amendment of May 
26, 1941, to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, upon that part of his 1941 wheat crop 
which was available for marketing in excess of the marketing quota established for his farm. He 
also sought a declaratory judgment that the wheat marketing quota provisions of the Act as 
amended and applicable to him were unconstitutional because not sustainable under the 
Commerce Clause.  
The Secretary moved to dismiss the action against him for improper venue, but later 
waived his objection and filed an answer.  The other appellants moved to dismiss on the ground 
that they had no power or authority to enforce the wheat marketing quota provisions of the Act, 
and after their motion was denied they answered, reserving exceptions to the ruling on their 
80 
motion to dismiss. The case was submitted for decision on the pleadings and upon a stipulation 
of facts. 
The appellee for many years past has owned and operated a small farm in Montgomery 
County, Ohio, maintaining a herd of dairy cattle, selling milk, raising poultry, and selling poultry 
and eggs.  It has been his practice to raise a small acreage of winter wheat, sown in the Fall and 
harvested in the following July; to sell a portion of the crop; to feed part to poultry and livestock 
on the farm, some of which is sold; to use some in making flour for home consumption; and to 
keep the rest for the following seeding.  The intended disposition of the crop here involved has 
not been expressly stated. 
In July of 1940, pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as then amended, 
there were established for the appellee's 1941 crop a wheat acreage allotment of 11.1 acres and a 
normal yield of 20.1 bushels of wheat an acre. He was given notice of such allotment in July of 
1940, before the Fall planting of his 1941 crop of wheat, and again in July of 1941, before it was 
harvested. He sowed, however, 23 acres, and harvested from his 11.9 acres of excess acreage 239 
bushels, which under the terms of the Act as amended on May 26, 1941, constituted farm 
marketing excess, subject to a penalty of 49 cents a bushel, or $117.11 in all.  The appellee has 
not paid the penalty and he has not postponed or avoided it by storing the excess under 
regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture, or by delivering it up to the Secretary.  The 
Committee, therefore, refused him a marketing card, which was, under the terms of Regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary, necessary to protect a buyer from liability to the penalty and upon 
its protecting lien.  
The general scheme of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as related to wheat is to 
control the volume moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses and 
shortages and the consequent abnormally low or high wheat prices and obstructions to 
commerce. Within prescribed limits and by prescribed standards the Secretary of Agriculture is 
directed to ascertain and proclaim each year a national acreage allotment for the next crop of 
wheat, which is then apportioned to the states and their counties, and is eventually broken up into 
allotments for individual farms.  Loans and payments to wheat farmers are authorized in stated 
circumstances.  
The court below permanently enjoined appellants from collecting a marketing penalty… 
The Secretary and his co-defendants have appealed.  
It is urged that under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Article I, §8, clause 3, 
Congress does not possess the power it has in this instance sought to exercise. Appellee says that 
this is a regulation of production and consumption of wheat. Such activities are, he urges, beyond 
the reach of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, since they are local in character, 
and their effects upon interstate commerce are at most "indirect." In answer the Government 
argues that the statute regulates neither production nor consumption, but only marketing; and, in 
the alternative, that if the Act does go beyond the regulation of marketing it is sustainable as a 
"necessary and proper" 15 implementation of the power of Congress over interstate commerce. 
Constitution, Article I, §8, cl. 18. 
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At the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the federal commerce power with a 
breadth never yet exceeded.  Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194-195. He made emphatic the 
embracing and penetrating nature of this power by warning that effective restraints on its 
exercise must proceed from political rather than from judicial processes.  Id. at 197. 
It was not until 1887, with the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act, that the 
interstate commerce power began to exert positive influence in American law and life.  This first 
important federal resort to the commerce power was followed in 1890 by the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act 19 and, thereafter, mainly after 1903, by many others.  These statutes ushered in new phases 
of adjudication, which required the Court to approach the interpretation of the Commerce Clause 
in the light of an actual exercise by Congress of its power thereunder. 
When it first dealt with this new legislation, the Court adhered to its earlier 
pronouncements, and allowed but little scope to the power of Congress.  United States v. Knight 
Co., 156 U.S. 1.  
Even while important opinions in this line of restrictive authority were being written, 
however, other cases called forth broader interpretations of the Commerce Clause destined to 
supersede the earlier ones, and to bring about a return to the principles first enunciated by Chief 
Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, supra. The present Chief Justice has said in summary of 
the present state of the law: "The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the 
regulation of commerce among the states.  It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect 
interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of 
them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the 
granted power to regulate interstate commerce. . . .  The power of Congress over interstate 
commerce is plenary and complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution. . . .  It follows that no 
form of state activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce 
clause to Congress.  Hence the reach of that power extends to those intrastate activities which in 
a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power." United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119.  
It is well established by decisions of this Court that the power to regulate commerce 
includes the power to regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce are dealt in and 
practices affecting such prices. One of the primary purposes of the Act in question was to 
increase the market price of wheat, and to that end to limit the volume thereof that could affect 
the market.  It can hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and variability as home-
consumed wheat would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions. This record 
leaves us in no doubt that Congress may properly have considered that wheat consumed on the 
farm where grown, if wholly outside the scheme of regulation, would have a substantial effect in 
defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased prices. 
It is said, however, that this Act, forcing some farmers into the market to buy what they 
could provide for themselves, is an unfair promotion of the markets and prices of specializing 
wheat growers. It is of the essence of regulation that it lays a restraining hand on the self-interest 
of the regulated and that advantages from the regulation commonly fall to others.  The conflicts 
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of economic interest between the regulated and those who advantage by it are wisely left under 
our system to resolution by the Congress under its more flexible and responsible legislative 
process. 29 Such conflicts rarely lend themselves to judicial determination.  And with the 
wisdom, workability, or fairness, of the plan of regulation we have nothing to do. 
Reversed.  
RANCHO VIEJO, LLC v. NORTON 
323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
US Supreme Court certiorari denied 
Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges. 
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND. Concurring opinion filed by Chief 
Judge GINSBURG.   
GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Rancho Viejo is a real estate development company that 
wishes to construct a 202-acre housing development in San Diego County, California. The 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service determined that Rancho Viejo's construction plan was 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the arroyo southwestern toad, which the Secretary 
of the Interior has listed as an endangered species since 1994. Rather than accept an alternative 
plan proposed by the Service, Rancho Viejo filed suit challenging the application of the 
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq., to its project as an unconstitutional exercise 
of federal authority under the Commerce Clause. The district court dismissed the suit. We 
conclude that this case is governed by our prior decision in National Association of Home 
Builders v. Babbitt, 327 U.S. App. D.C. 248, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and therefore 
affirm. 
I 
The Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq., is "the most 
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any 
nation." Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180, 57 L. Ed. 2d 117, 98 S. Ct. 2279 
(1978). Finding that "various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been 
rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered by 
adequate concern and conservation," 16 U.S.C. §1531(a)(1), Congress passed the ESA "to 
provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species 
depend may be conserved," id. §1531(b). 
The ESA directs the Secretary of the Interior to list fish, wildlife, or plant species that she 
determines are endangered or threatened. 16 U.S.C. §1533(a). Section 9 of the Act makes it 
unlawful to "take" any such listed species without a permit. Id. §1538(a)(1)(B). "The term 'take' 
means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to 
engage in any such conduct." Id. §1532(19). The Secretary has promulgated, and the Supreme 
Court has upheld, a regulation that defines "harm" as including "significant habitat modification 
or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential 
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behavioral patterns, including breeding." 50 C.F.R. §17.3; see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 708, 132 L. Ed. 2d 597, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995) 
(sustaining 50 C.F.R. §17.3 as a reasonable interpretation of 16 U.S.C. §1532(19)). 
Section 7 of the ESA requires all federal agencies to ensure that none of their activities, 
including the granting of licenses and permits, will "jeopardize the continued existence of any 
endangered species ... or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such 
species which is determined by the Secretary ... to be critical." When an agency concludes that 
its activities may adversely affect a listed species, it must engage in a formal consultation with 
the Interior Department's Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). 50 C.F.R. §402.14. Where 
applicable, such consultations result in the issuance of a Biological Opinion that includes a 
"jeopardy" or "no jeopardy" determination. If the FWS decides that the proposed action is likely 
to "jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or result in the destruction or adverse 
modification of critical habitat," the opinion must set forth "reasonable and prudent alternatives," 
if any, that will avoid such consequences.  
The Secretary listed the arroyo toad as an endangered species on December 16, 1994. The 
toads live in scattered populations from California's Monterey County in the north to Mexico's 
Baja California in the south. They breed in shallow, sandy, or gravelly pools along streams, and 
spend most of their adult lives in upland habitats. The toads range no farther than 1.2 miles from 
the streams where they breed, and none in the area at issue in this case travel outside the state of 
California. Habitat destruction has driven the toad from approximately 76% of its former 
California range.  
Plaintiff Rancho Viejo plans to build a 280-home residential development on a 202-acre 
site in San Diego County. The property is bordered on the south by Keys Creek, a major 
tributary of the San Luis Rey River, and is just east of Interstate 15. FWS, Biological/Conference 
Opinion on the Rancho Viejo Residential Development at 8, 26 (Aug. 24, 2000). The company's 
construction plan is to build homes in an upland area of approximately 52 acres, and to use an 
additional 77 acres of its upland property and portions of the Keys Creek streambed as a "borrow 
area" to provide fill for the project. Rancho Viejo wants to remove six feet or more of soil from 
the surface of the borrow area, amounting to approximately 750,000 cubic yards of material, and 
to transport that soil to the 52-acre housing site to the north. Surveys of Keys Creek have 
confirmed the presence of arroyo toads on and adjacent to the project site. 
Because Rancho Viejo's plan would involve the discharge of "fill into waters of the 
United States, including wetlands," the company was required by section 404 of the Clean Water 
Act, 33 U.S.C. §1344, to obtain a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the "Corps"). 
The Corps determined that the project "may affect" the arroyo toad population in the area, and 
sought a formal consultation with the FWS pursuant to ESA §7. 
In May 2000, Rancho Viejo excavated a trench and erected a fence, each running parallel 
to the bank of Keys Creek. Arroyo toads were observed on the upland side of the fence. In the 
FWS's view, the fence has prevented and may continue to impede movement of the toads 
between their upland habitat and their breeding habitat in the creek. On May 22, the FWS 
informed Rancho Viejo that construction of the fence "has resulted in the illegal take and will 
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result in the future illegal take of federally endangered" arroyo toads "in violation of the 
Endangered Species Act."  
In August 2000, the FWS issued a Biological Opinion that determined that excavation of 
the 77-acre borrow area would result in the taking of arroyo toads and was "likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence" of the species. The FWS proposed an alternative that would, without 
jeopardizing the continued existence of the toad, allow Rancho Viejo to complete its 
development by obtaining fill dirt from off-site sources instead of from the proposed borrow 
area.  
Rancho Viejo neither removed the fence nor adopted the FWS's proposed alternative. 
Instead, it filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
against the Secretary of the Interior and other federal defendants, alleging that the listing of the 
arroyo toad as an endangered species under the ESA, and the application of the ESA to Rancho 
Viejo's construction plans, exceeded the federal government's power under the Commerce 
Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate 
Commerce ... among the several States...."). 
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. In ruling on those motions, the 
district court noted that this circuit had only recently sustained, against a Commerce Clause 
challenge, a determination by the FWS that hospital construction in San Bernardino County, 
California would likely lead to the take of the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly in violation of the 
ESA. See National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt ("NAHB"), 327 U.S. App. D.C. 248, 130 
F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Holding that Rancho Viejo's case was indistinguishable from 
NAHB, and finding nothing in subsequent Supreme Court opinions to cast doubt on that 
decision, the court granted the government's motion.  
II 
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, and in so doing 
accord the ESA a "presumption of constitutionality," United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
607, 146 L. Ed. 2d 658, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). In this Part, we first discuss the NAHB decision, 
focusing particularly on the Supreme Court opinion that provided that case's analytic framework, 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). We then 
consider the application of NAHB and Lopez to the complaint filed by Rancho Viejo.  
A 
In Lopez, the Supreme Court considered whether a provision of the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. §922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V), which made it a federal offense to 
possess a firearm near a school, exceeded Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. 514 
U.S. at 551. The Court held that the clause authorizes Congress to regulate "three broad 
categories of activity": 
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second, 
Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or 
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persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate 
activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities 
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce. 
In NAHB, this circuit applied Lopez in a case challenging the application of the ESA to a 
construction project in an area that contained the habitat of the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly. 
130 F.3d at 1043 . The fly, an endangered species, is found in only two counties, both in 
California. Id. One of those counties reported to the FWS that it planned to construct a hospital 
and power plant on a site occupied by the fly, and to expand a highway intersection in 
connection with that work. 130 F.3d at 1044-45. The FWS informed the county that the 
expansion of the intersection would likely lead to a take of the fly in violation of section 9 of the 
ESA. Thereafter, the county filed suit against the Secretary of the Interior, contending that 
application of the ESA in those circumstances exceeded the authority of the federal government 
under the Commerce Clause. 
A majority of the NAHB court held that the take provision of ESA §9, and its application 
to the facts of that case, constituted a valid exercise of Congress' commerce power. The court 
found that application of the ESA fell within the third Lopez category, concluding that the 
regulated activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce. In so holding, the majority agreed 
upon two rationales: (1) "the loss of biodiversity itself has a substantial effect on our ecosystem 
and likewise on interstate commerce"; and (2) "the Department's protection of the flies regulates 
and substantially affects commercial development activity which is plainly interstate." 
Examining those two rationales within the context of Lopez' the NAHB court concluded that 
application of the ESA to the county's proposed construction project was constitutional. Because 
the second NAHB rationale readily resolves this case, it is the focus of the balance of our 
discussion.
1
 
B 
Secretary Norton argues, and the district court concluded, that application of … four 
Lopez factors leads to the same result here as it did in NAHB. We agree. 
The first Lopez factor is whether the regulated activity has anything "to do with 
'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms." 
                                                 
1
 In focusing on the second NAHB rationale, we do not mean to discredit the first. Nor do we mean to discredit 
rationales that other circuits have relied upon in upholding endangered species legislation. We simply have no need 
to consider those other rationales to dispose of the case before us. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 497 (4th 
Cir. 2000) ("The protection of the red wolf on both federal and private land substantially affects interstate commerce 
through tourism, trade, scientific research, and other potential economic activities."); United States v. Bramble, 103 
F.3d 1475, 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act's prohibition on the 
possession of eagle feathers, see 16 U.S.C. §668(a), because "extinction of the eagle would substantially affect 
interstate commerce by foreclosing any possibility of several types of commercial activity," including "future 
commerce in eagles," "future interstate travel for the purpose of ... studying eagles," "or future commerce in 
beneficial products derived ... from analysis of their genetic material"). 
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Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; accord Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. The regulated activity at issue in 
NAHB—the construction of a hospital, power plant, and supporting infrastructure—was plainly 
an economic enterprise. The same is true here, where the regulated activity is the construction of 
a 202-acre commercial housing development. 
Second, the court must consider whether the statute in question contains an "express 
jurisdictional element." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62. Section 9 of the ESA has no express 
jurisdictional hook that limits its application, for example, to takes "in or affecting commerce." 
Lopez did not indicate that such a hook is required, however, and its absence did not dissuade the 
NAHB court from finding application of the ESA constitutional. Rather, in a case like this, "the 
absence of such a jurisdictional element simply means that courts must determine independently 
whether the statute regulates activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial 
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce." United 
States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 1999). 
The third Lopez factor looks to whether there are "express congressional findings" or 
legislative history "regarding the effects upon interstate commerce" of the regulated activity. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62. There are no such findings or history with respect to the specific 
rationale that we rely upon here, the effect of commercial housing construction on interstate 
commerce. But neither findings nor legislative history is necessary. As Lopez acknowledged, 
"Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an 
activity has on interstate commerce." Id. at 562.  Rather, such evidence merely "enables [the 
court] to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected 
interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye." 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. As we discuss in the remainder of this section, the naked eye requires no 
assistance here.  
The fourth Lopez factor is whether the relationship between the regulated activity and 
interstate commerce is too attenuated to be regarded as substantial. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-
67. Although Rancho Viejo avers that the effect on interstate commerce of preserving 
endangered species is too tenuous to satisfy this test, it does not argue that the effect of 
commercial construction projects is similarly attenuated. Because the rationale upon which we 
rely focuses on the activity that the federal government seeks to regulate in this case (the 
construction of Rancho Viejo's housing development), and because we are required to accord 
congressional legislation a "presumption of constitutionality," plaintiff's failure to demonstrate 
(or even to argue) that its project and those like it are without substantial interstate effect is fatal 
to its cause. 
This conclusion is not diminished by the fact that the arroyo toad, like the Flower-Loving 
Fly, does not travel outside of California, or that Rancho Viejo's development, like the San 
Bernardino hospital, is located wholly within the state. As Judge Henderson said in NAHB, the 
regulation of commercial land development, quite "apart from the characteristics or range of the 
specific endangered species involved, has a plain and substantial effect on interstate commerce." 
There, "the regulation related to both the proposed redesigned traffic intersection and the hospital 
it [was] intended to serve, each of which had an obvious connection with interstate commerce." 
Id. (Henderson, J., concurring). Here, Rancho Viejo's 202-acre project, located near a major 
 87 
interstate highway, is likewise one that "is presumably being constructed using materials and 
people from outside the state and which will attract" construction workers and purchasers "from 
both inside and outside the state." Id. at 1048.
2
 
This analysis is perfectly consistent with Lopez. In that case, the Court noted that it had 
"upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we 
have concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate commerce." 514 U.S. at 559. 
Such conclusions were often based upon viewing "regulations of activities that arise out of or are 
connected with a commercial transaction ... in the aggregate." Id. at 561.
3 
To survive Commerce 
Clause review, all the government must establish is that "a rational basis exists for concluding 
that a regulated activity sufficiently affects interstate commerce." Id. at 557. And there can be no 
doubt that such a relationship exists for costly commercial developments like Rancho Viejo's. As 
Judge Henderson made clear in NAHB, "insofar as application of section 9(a)(1) of [the] ESA  ... 
acts to regulate commercial development of the land inhabited by the endangered species, 'it may 
... be reached by Congress' because 'it asserts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce.'" 130 F.3d at 1059-60 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 111, 125, 87 L. Ed. 122, 63 S. Ct. 82 (1942))). 
III 
Rancho Viejo does not seriously dispute that NAHB is indistinguishable from this case. 
Rather, plaintiff argues that, as a result of subsequent Supreme Court decisions in United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 146 L. Ed. 2d 658, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000), and Solid Waste Agency 
of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"), 531 U.S. 159, 148 L. 
Ed. 2d 576, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001), NAHB is no longer "good law."  
A 
Rancho Viejo contends that Morrison stands for the proposition that whether the 
regulated activity is economic is not simply a factor in the analysis, but instead is outcome 
determinative: that noneconomic activity, whatever its effect on interstate commerce, cannot be 
regulated under the Commerce Clause. But how close the Court came to embracing plaintiff's 
view is irrelevant to the disposition of this appeal, because the ESA regulates takings, not toads. 
Morrison instructs that "the proper inquiry" is whether the challenge is to "a regulation of 
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce." 529 U.S. at 609 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, SWANCC declares that what is required is an evaluation of "the precise object or 
activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce." 531 U.S. at 173 
(emphasis added). When, as directed, we turn our attention to the precise activity that is 
regulated in this case, there is no question but that it is economic in nature.  
                                                 
2
 Application of the ESA to habitat degradation has a further impact on interstate commerce by removing the 
incentives for states "to adopt lower standards of endangered species protection in order to attract development," 
thereby preventing a destructive "race to the bottom." NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1054-56 (Wald, J.). 
3
 The cases cited by the Court include: Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 69 L. 
Ed. 2d 1, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981). 
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That regulated activity is Rancho Viejo's planned commercial development, not the 
arroyo toad that it threatens. The ESA does not purport to tell toads what they may or may not 
do. Rather, section 9 limits the taking of listed species, and its prohibitions and corresponding 
penalties apply to the persons who do the taking, not to the species that are taken. See 16 U.S.C. 
§1538(a)(1), (a)(1)(B) (making it "unlawful for any person ... to take any such species") 
(emphasis added). In this case, the prohibited taking is accomplished by commercial 
construction, and the unlawful taker is Rancho Viejo. 
B 
Rancho Viejo suggests that even if the regulated activity here is the taking of the toads 
through economic activity, that fact still does not end the matter. Although the ESA may regulate 
economic activity, plaintiff insists that the statute has a noneconomic purpose: the preservation 
of biodiversity, and, in this case, the preservation of toads that Rancho Viejo maintains are 
without commercial value. Asserting that to survive Commerce Clause scrutiny a statute must be 
aimed at economic activity and not simply regulate it for some other purpose, Rancho Viejo 
concludes that the ESA (at least as applied to its project) must fall. This argument suffers from a 
number of serious defects. 
First, the ESA, like many statutes, has multiple purposes. Whether or not economic 
considerations were the primary motivation for the Act, there is no question that the commercial 
value of preserving species diversity played an important role in Congress' deliberations. Thus, 
to use a "noneconomic purpose" test to overturn a multi-purpose statute like the ESA, we would 
have to do so on the ground that economic concerns were not the Act's "true" or "primary" 
motivation. Such an enterprise is fraught with both difficulty and danger. The enterprise is 
difficult because distilling the true or primary legislative purpose out of the motivations of 435 
representatives and 100 senators is inherently problematic. And it is that difficulty that makes the 
project a dangerous one -- dangerous because the indeterminacy of outcome leaves courts open 
to the charge that they have manipulated the determination of purpose in order to achieve their 
own policy preferences, and because rejecting a stated congressional purpose as "untrue" reflects 
considerable disrespect for the pronouncements of a democratically elected branch of 
government. Is the ESA's true purpose to preserve the economic potential of species whose 
commercial value we cannot now foresee, or did Congress regard species protection as a moral 
imperative? Did Congress pass the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts out of concern that pollution 
hurts the economy, or out of a fundamental concern for the health of the citizenry? For courts to 
insist on making these kinds of determinations a prerequisite for upholding the validity of 
congressional legislation is a recipe for judicial intervention in the political process.  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has long held that Congress may act under the Commerce 
Clause to achieve noneconomic ends through the regulation of commercial activity. Perhaps the 
most important of the … cases is Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 
261-62, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258, 85 S. Ct. 348 (1964), in which the Court rebuffed a Commerce Clause 
attack on Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000a et seq. The Court 
acknowledged that "the Senate Commerce Committee made it quite clear that the fundamental 
object of Title II was to vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies 
denials of equal access to public establishments." Id. at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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But the fact that Congress passed the statute to attack the moral outrage of racial discrimination 
did not lead the Supreme Court to find it unconstitutional.  
The position urged by Rancho Viejo puts the constitutionality of many of the above-
described statutes at risk. There is nothing in Morrison or Lopez to put the Heart of Atlanta line 
of precedent in doubt. Thus, neither case precludes the conclusion that it is constitutional to 
apply the ESA to a commercial construction project like Rancho Viejo's.  And a court must 
hesitate before extending those two cases, neither of which involved economic regulation of any 
kind, to require the unraveling of a vast fabric of Supreme Court precedent and congressional 
legislation. 
C 
Rancho Viejo next argues that even if the taking regulated in this case is commercial in 
character, the ESA bans other takings that are not. Because the ESA's prohibition on takings 
applies as much to a hiker's "casual walk in the woods" as to the commercial activities of a real 
estate company, Rancho Viejo contends that the statute cannot constitutionally be applied to its 
taking of arroyo toads. Plaintiff's "overbreadth" argument is unavailing. 
In Lopez, the Supreme Court noted that "where a general regulatory statute bears a 
substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under 
that statute is of no consequence." Hence, because much activity regulated by the ESA does bear 
a substantial relation to commerce, it may well be that the hiker hypothetical proffered by the 
plaintiff is "of no consequence" to the statute's constitutionality.  
But we need not decide that question here because there is a more basic answer to 
Rancho Viejo's hiker hypothetical: it is not this case. Plaintiff characterizes its complaint as 
"fundamentally ... an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the Defendants' regulation of 
the 'taking' of Arroyo toads under the ESA." And as we have already discussed, the particular 
application before us involves the regulation of Rancho Viejo's commercial real estate 
development, which falls well within the powers granted Congress under the Commerce Clause. 
Before leaving this point, we further note that the constitutional circumstances we rely on 
here – takings by commercial developers – are neither an unintended nor an insignificant portion 
of the activities regulated by the ESA. In that statute, "Congress expressly found that 'economic 
growth and development untempered by adequate concern and conservation' was the cause for 
'various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States having been rendered extinct.'" 
NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring) (quoting 16 U.S.C. §1531(a)(1)). 
Moreover, as Secretary Norton points out, "the activities that cause the loss of endangered 
species and that are regulated by the take prohibition are themselves generally commercial and 
economic activities." Appellees' Br. at 34. Finally, in listing the arroyo toad as an endangered 
species, the FWS specifically found that "development projects in riparian wetlands have caused 
permanent losses of riparian habitats and are the most conspicuous factor in the decline of the 
arroyo toad." 59 Fed. Reg. at 64,863. Because Congress has constitutional authority to regulate 
such development projects, Rancho Viejo's complaint fails regardless of whether it is 
characterized as an as-applied or facial challenge. 
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D 
Finally, Rancho Viejo draws our attention to Morrison's declaration that "the Constitution 
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local." 529 U.S. at 617-18. 
Plaintiff argues that the ESA represents an unlawful assertion of congressional power over local 
land use decisions, which it describes as an area of traditional state regulation. The ESA, 
however, does not constitute a general regulation of land use. Far from encroaching upon 
territory that has traditionally been the domain of state and local government, the ESA represents 
a national response to a specific problem of "truly national" concern.  
IV 
"Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we 
invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its 
constitutional bounds." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (citations omitted). Rancho Viejo has not 
made that "plain showing" here. Rather, its attack on the constitutionality of the application of 
the ESA to its commercial housing development is indistinguishable from the attack we turned 
back in NAHB, and nothing in subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence has undermined the 
precedential authority of that decision. Accordingly, NAHB controls our decision in this case, 
and the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Secretary Norton is therefore 
Affirmed.   
GINSBURG, Chief Judge, concurring: Although I do not disagree with anything in the 
opinion of the court, I write separately because I do not believe our opinion makes clear, as the 
Supreme Court requires, that there is a logical stopping point to our rationale for upholding the 
constitutionality of the exercise of the Congress's power under the Commerce Clause here 
challenged. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 ("if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we 
are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to 
regulate"). 
In this case I think it clear that our rationale for concluding the take of the arroyo toad 
affects interstate commerce does indeed have a logical stopping point, though it goes unremarked 
in the opinion of the court. Our rationale is that, with respect to a species that is not an article in 
interstate commerce and does not affect interstate commerce, a take can be regulated if - but only 
if - the take itself substantially affects interstate commerce. The large-scale residential 
development that is the take in this case clearly does affect interstate commerce. Just as 
important, however, the lone hiker in the woods, or the homeowner who moves dirt in order to 
landscape his property, though he takes the toad, does not affect interstate commerce. 
Without this limitation, the Government could regulate as a take any kind of activity, 
regardless whether that activity had any connection with interstate commerce. With this 
understanding of the rationale of the case, I concur in the opinion of the court. 
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NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS v. SEBELIUS  
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (individual mandate: commerce power) 
Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the Court  
Today we resolve constitutional challenges to [a] provisions of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010: the individual mandate, which requires individuals to purchase a 
health insurance policy providing a minimum level of coverage… We ask whether Congress has 
the power under the Constitution to enact the challenged provisions. 
In our federal system, the National Government possesses only limited powers; the States 
and the people retain the  remainder.  Nearly two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall observed 
that "the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted" to the Federal 
Government "is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system 
shall exist." McCulloch v. Maryland, (1819). In this case we must again determine whether the 
Constitution grants Congress powers it now asserts, but which many States and individuals 
believe it does not possess. Resolving this controversy requires us to examine both the limits of 
the Government's power, and our own limited role in policing those boundaries. 
The Federal Government "is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.". That 
is, rather than granting general authority to perform all the conceivable functions of government, 
the Constitution lists, or enumerates, the Federal Government's powers. Congress may, for 
example, "coin Money," "establish Post Offices," and "raise and support Armies." Art. I, § 8, cls. 
5, 7, 12. The Constitution's express conferral of some powers makes clear that it does not grant 
others. And the Federal Government "can exercise only the powers granted to it." McCulloch 
The same does not apply to the States, because the Constitution is not the source of their 
power. The Constitution may restrict state governments--as it does, for example, by forbidding 
them to deny any person the equal protection of the laws. But where such prohibitions do not 
apply, state governments do not need constitutional authorization to act. The States thus can and 
do perform many of the vital functions of modern government--punishing street crime, running 
public schools, and zoning property for development, to name but a few--even though the 
Constitution's text does not authorize any government to do so. Our cases refer to this general 
power of governing, possessed by the States but not by the Federal Government, as the "police 
power." See, e.g., United States v. Morrison (2000). 
State Sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens the 
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power." New York v. United States, (1992). 
Because the police power is controlled by 50 different States instead of one national sovereign, 
the facets of governing that touch on citizens' daily lives are normally administered by smaller 
governments closer to the governed. The Framers thus ensured that powers which "in the 
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people" were held by 
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governments more local and more accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy. The Federalist 
No. 45, at 293 (J. Madison).  
In 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119 
The Act aims to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the 
cost of health care. The Act's 10 titles stretch over 900 pages and contain hundreds of provisions. 
This case concerns constitutional challenges to the individual mandate. 
The individual mandate requires most Americans to maintain "minimum essential" health 
insurance coverage. Many individuals will receive the required coverage through their employer, 
or from a government program such as Medicaid or Medicare. But for individuals who do not 
receive health insurance through a third party, the means of satisfying the requirement is to 
purchase insurance from a private company. 
Beginning in 2014, those who do not comply with the mandate must make a "[s]hared 
responsibility payment" to the Federal Government. That payment, which the Act describes as a 
"penalty," is calculated as a percentage of household income, subject to a floor based on a 
specified dollar amount and a ceiling based on the average annual premium the individual would 
have to pay for qualifying private health insurance. In 2016, for example, the penalty will be 2.5 
percent of an individual's household income, but no less than $695 and no more than the average 
yearly premium for insurance that covers 60 percent of the cost of 10 specified services (e.g., 
prescription drugs and hospitalization). The Act provides that the penalty will be paid to the 
Internal Revenue Service with an individual's taxes, and "shall be assessed and collected in the 
same manner" as tax penalties, such as the penalty for claiming too large an income tax refund.  
On the day the President signed the Act into law, Florida and  other States filed a 
complaint in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Florida.  Those plaintiffs 
alleged, among other things, that the individual mandate provisions of the Act exceeded 
Congress's powers under Article I of the Constitution. The District Court agreed, holding that 
Congress lacked constitutional power to enact the individual mandate.  
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's holding that 
the individual mandate exceeds Congress's power. The panel unanimously agreed that the 
individual mandate did not impose a tax, and thus could not be authorized by Congress's power 
to "lay and collect Taxes." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. A majority also held that the individual 
mandate was not supported by Congress's power to "regulate Commerce  . . . among the several 
States." According to the majority, the Commerce Clause does not empower the Federal 
Government to order individuals to engage in commerce, and the Government's efforts to cast 
the individual mandate in a different light were unpersuasive.  
We granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit with respect to the individual mandate.   
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The Government advances two theories for the proposition that Congress had 
constitutional authority to enact the individual mandate. First, the Government argues that 
Congress had the power to enact the mandate under the Commerce Clause. Under that theory, 
Congress may order individuals to buy health insurance because the failure to do so affects 
interstate commerce, and could undercut the Affordable Care Act's other reforms. Second, the 
Government argues that if the commerce power does not support the mandate, we should 
nonetheless uphold it as an exercise of Congress's power to tax. According to the Government, 
even if Congress lacks the power to direct individuals to buy insurance, the only effect of the 
individual mandate is to raise taxes on those who do not do so, and thus the law may be upheld 
as a tax.  
[CONGRESS'S POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE] 
[Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito join Chief Justice Roberts to create a 5-4 
majority with respect to this portion of the opinion of the Court. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Sotomayer  and Kagan dissent] 
The Government's first argument is that the individual mandate is a valid exercise of 
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. According 
to the Government, the health care market is characterized by a significant cost-shifting problem. 
Everyone will eventually need health care at a time and to an extent they cannot predict, but if 
they do not have insurance, they often will not be able to pay for it. Because state and federal 
laws nonetheless require hospitals to provide a certain degree of care to individuals without 
regard to their ability to pay, hospitals end up receiving compensation for only a portion of the 
services they provide. To recoup the losses, hospitals pass on the cost to insurers through higher 
rates, and insurers, in turn, pass on the cost to policy holders in the form of higher premiums. 
Congress estimated that the cost of uncompensated care raises family health insurance 
premiums, on average, by over $1,000 per year.  
In the Affordable Care Act, Congress addressed the problem of those who cannot obtain 
insurance coverage because of preexisting conditions or other health issues. It did so through the 
Act's "guaranteed-issue" and "community-rating" provisions. These provisions together prohibit 
insurance companies from denying coverage to those with such conditions or charging unhealthy 
individuals higher premiums than healthy individuals.  
The guaranteed-issue and community-rating reforms do not, however, address the issue 
of healthy individuals who choose not to purchase insurance to cover potential health care needs. 
In fact, the reforms sharply exacerbate that problem, by providing an incentive for individuals to 
delay purchasing health insurance until they become sick, relying on the promise of guaranteed 
and affordable coverage. The reforms also threaten to impose massive new costs on insurers, 
who are required to accept unhealthy individuals but prohibited from charging them rates 
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necessary to pay for their coverage. This will lead insurers to significantly increase premiums on 
everyone.  
The individual mandate was Congress's solution to these problems. By requiring that 
individuals purchase health insurance, the mandate prevents cost-shifting by those who would 
otherwise go without it. In addition, the mandate forces into the insurance risk pool more healthy 
individuals, whose premiums on average will be higher than their health care expenses. This 
allows insurers to subsidize the costs of covering the unhealthy individuals the reforms require 
them to accept. The Government claims that Congress has power under the Commerce and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses to enact this solution. 
The Government contends that the individual mandate is within Congress's power 
because the failure to purchase insurance "has a substantial and deleterious effect on interstate 
commerce" by creating the cost-shifting problemThe path of our Commerce Clause decisions has 
not always run  smooth, but it is now well established that Congress has broad authority under 
the Clause. We have recognized, for example, that "[t]he power of Congress over interstate 
commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states," but extends to 
activities that "have a substantial effect on interstate commerce." United States v. Darby (1941). 
Congress's power, moreover, is not limited to regulation of an activity that by itself substantially 
affects interstate commerce, but also extends to activities that do so only when aggregated with 
similar activities of others. See Wickard, 317 U.S., at 127-128, (1941) 
Given its expansive scope, it is no surprise that Congress has employed the commerce 
power  in a wide variety of ways to address the pressing needs of the time. But Congress has 
never attempted to rely on that power to compel individuals not engaged in commerce to 
purchase an unwanted product. Legislative novelty is not necessarily fatal; there is a first time for 
everything. But at the very least, we should "pause to consider the implications of the 
Government's arguments" when confronted with such new conceptions of federal power. Lopez, 
supra,  
The Constitution grants Congress the power to "regulate Commerce." Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 
(emphasis added). The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial 
activity to be regulated. If the power to "regulate" something included the power to create it, 
many of the provisions in the Constitution would be superfluous. The language of the 
Constitution reflects the natural understanding that the power to regulate assumes there is already 
something to be regulated.  Our precedent also reflects this understanding. As expansive as our 
cases construing the scope of the commerce power have been, they all have one thing in 
common: They uniformly describe the power as reaching "activity."  
The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing commercial activity. It 
instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the 
ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce. Construing the Commerce Clause 
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to permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open 
a new and potentially vast domain to congressional authority. Every day individuals do not do an 
infinite number of things. In some cases they decide not to do something; in others they simply 
fail to do it. Allowing Congress to justify federal regulation by pointing to the effect of inaction 
on commerce would bring countless decisions an individual could potentially make within the 
scope of federal regulation, and--under the Government's theory--empower Congress to make 
those decisions for him. Indeed, the Government's logic would justify a mandatory purchase to 
solve almost any problem.  
People, for reasons of their own, often fail to do things that would be good for them or 
good for society. Those failures – joined with the similar failures of others – can readily have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Under the Government's logic, that authorizes 
Congress to use its commerce power to compel citizens to act as the Government would have 
them act. 
To an economist, perhaps, there is no difference between activity and inactivity; both 
have measurable economic effects on commerce. But the distinction between doing something 
and doing nothing would not been lost on the Framers, who were "practical statesmen," not 
metaphysical philosophers. The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to 
compel it, and for over 200 years both our decisions and Congress's actions have reflected this 
understanding. There is no reason to depart from that understanding now. 
The proposition that Congress may dictate the conduct of an individual today because of 
prophesied future activity finds no support in our precedent. We have said that Congress can 
anticipate the effects on commerce of an economic activity.  But we have never permitted 
Congress to anticipate that activity itself in order to regulate individuals not currently engaged in 
commerce. Each one of our cases involved preexisting economic activity.  
Everyone will likely participate in the markets for food, clothing, transportation, shelter, 
or energy; that does not authorize Congress to direct them to purchase particular products in 
those or other markets today. The Commerce Clause is not a general license to regulate an 
individual from cradle to grave, simply because he will predictably engage in particular 
transactions. Any police power to regulate individuals as such, as opposed to their activities, 
remains vested in the States. 
The Government next contends that Congress has the power under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to enact the individual mandate because the mandate is an "integral part of a 
comprehensive scheme of economic regulation"--the guaranteed-issue and community-rating 
insurance reforms. Under this argument, it is not necessary to consider the effect that an 
individual's inactivity may have on interstate commerce; it is enough that Congress regulate 
commercial activity in a way that requires regulation of inactivity to be effective. 
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As our jurisprudence under the Necessary and Proper Clause has developed, we have 
been very deferential to Congress's determination that a regulation is "necessary." But we have 
also carried out our responsibility to declare unconstitutional those laws that undermine the 
structure of government established by the Constitution. Such laws, which are not "consist[ent] 
with the letter and spirit of the constitution," McCulloch, supra, are not "proper [means] for 
carrying into Execution" Congress's enumerated powers. Rather, they are, "in the words of The 
Federalist, 'merely acts of usurpation' which 'deserve to be treated as such.'  
Applying these principles, the individual mandate cannot be sustained under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause as an essential component of the insurance reforms.  Just as the 
individual mandate cannot be sustained as a law regulating the substantial effects of the failure to 
purchase health insurance, neither can it be upheld as a "necessary and proper" component of the 
insurance reforms. The commerce power thus does not authorize the mandate.  
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Session 6. Waters of the United States 
THE RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT OF 1899 
 
33 U.S.C. §401 
“It shall not be lawful to construct or commence the construction of any bridge, 
dam, dike, or causeway over or in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, 
navigable river, or other navigable water of the United States until the consent of 
Congress to the building of such structures shall have been obtained and until the 
plans for the same shall have been submitted to and approved by the Chief of 
Engineers and by the Secretary of the Army: Provided, That such structures may 
be built under authority of the legislature of a State across rivers and other 
waterways the navigable portions of which lie wholly within the limits of a single 
State, provided the location and plans thereof are submitted to and approved by 
the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of the Army before construction is 
commenced  . . .”  
33 U.S.C. §403 
“The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the 
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it shall not be 
lawful to build or commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, 
bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, 
or other water of the United States, outside established harbor lines, or where no harbor lines 
have been established, except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized 
by the Secretary of the Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to 
alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, 
canal, lake, harbor or refuge, or inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or of the channel 
of any navigable water of the United States, unless the work has been recommended by the Chief 
of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same. 
UNITED STATES v. APPALACHIAN ELECTRIC POWER CO. 
311 U.S. 377 (1940) 
Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case involves the scope of the federal commerce power in relation to conditions in 
licenses, required by the Federal Power Commission, for the construction of hydroelectric dams 
in navigable rivers of the United States.  To reach this issue requires, preliminarily, a decision as 
to the navigability of the New River, a watercourse flowing through Virginia and West Virginia. 
The district court and the circuit court of appeals have both held that the New River is not 
navigable, and that the United States cannot enjoin the respondent from constructing and putting 
into operation a hydroelectric dam situated in the river just above Radford, Virginia. 
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Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 make it unlawful to construct a 
dam in any navigable water of the United States without the consent of Congress.  By the Federal 
Water Power Act of 1920, however, Congress created a Federal Power Commission with 
authority to license the construction of such dams upon specified conditions.  
The Radford Dam project was initiated by respondent’s predecessor . . . . On October 12, 
1932, the [Federal Power] Commission without notice adopted a resolution that the New River, 
from the mouth of Wilson Creek, Virginia, north, was navigable.  The respondent began 
construction work on the dam about June 1, 1934. 
On May 6, 1935, the United States filed this bill for an injunction against the construction 
or maintenance of the proposed dam otherwise than under a license from the Federal Power 
Commission.  It alleged that the New River is navigable; that the dam would constitute an 
obstruction to navigation and would impair the navigable capacity of the navigable waters of the 
United States on the New, Kanawha and Ohio Rivers; that the Commission had found the dam 
would affect the interests of interstate or foreign commerce; and that its construction therefore 
violated both the Rivers and Harbors Act and the Federal Water Power Act.  Respondent denied 
these allegations, and also set forth a number of separate defenses based on the assumption that 
the New River was non-navigable. 
Navigability.  The power of the United States over its waters which are capable of use as 
interstate highways arises from the commerce clause of the Constitution.  “The Congress shall 
have Power . . .  To regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” It was held early in our 
history that the power to regulate commerce necessarily included power over navigation.  To 
make its control effective the Congress may keep the “navigable waters of the United States” 
open and free and provide by sanctions against any interference with the country’s water assets. 
It may legislate to forbid or license dams in the waters; its power over improvements for 
navigation in rivers is “absolute.” 
The states possess control of the waters within their borders, “subject to the 
acknowledged jurisdiction of the United States under the Constitution in regard to commerce and 
the navigation of the waters of rivers.”  It is this subordinate local control that, even as to 
navigable rivers, creates between the respective governments a contrariety of interests relating to 
the regulation and protection of waters through licenses, the operation of structures and the 
acquisition of projects at the end of the license term.  But there is no doubt that the United States 
possesses the power to control the erection of structures in navigable waters. 
The navigability of the New River is, of course, a factual question but to call it a fact 
cannot obscure the diverse elements that enter into the application of the legal tests as to 
navigability.  We are dealing here with the sovereign powers of the Union, the Nation’s right that 
its waterways be utilized for the interests of the commerce of the whole country.  It is obvious 
that the uses to which the streams may be put vary from the carriage of ocean liners to the 
floating out of logs; that the density of traffic varies equally widely from the busy harbors of the 
seacoast to the sparsely settled regions of the Western mountains.  The tests as to navigability 
must take these variations into consideration. 
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Both lower courts based their investigation primarily upon the generally accepted 
definition of The Daniel Ball.
1
  In so doing they were in accord with the rulings of this Court on 
the basic concept of navigability. 
To appraise the evidence of navigability on the natural condition only of the waterway is 
erroneous.  Its availability for navigation must also be considered. “Natural and ordinary 
condition” refers to volume of water, the gradients and the regularity of the flow.  A waterway, 
otherwise suitable for navigation, is not barred from that classification merely because artificial 
aids must make the highway suitable for use before commercial navigation may be undertaken. 
These limits are necessarily a matter of degree.  There must be a balance between cost and need 
at a time when the improvement would be useful.  When once found to be navigable, a waterway 
remains so.  The power of Congress over commerce is not to be hampered because of the 
necessity for reasonable improvements to make an interstate waterway available for traffic. In 
determining the navigable character of the New River it is proper to consider the feasibility of 
interstate use after reasonable improvements which might be made. 
The evidence of actual use of the Radford-Wiley’s Falls section for commerce and for 
private convenience when taken in connection with its physical condition, makes it quite plain 
that by reasonable improvement the reach would be navigable for the type of boats employed on 
the less obstructed sections.  Respondent denied the practicability of artificial means to bring 
about the navigability of the New River and the effectiveness of any improvement to make the 
river a navigable water of the United States.  The Government supported its allegation of 
improvability by pointing out that the use of the section for through navigation and local boating 
on favorable stretches of the Radford-Wiley’s Falls reach showed the feasibility of such use and 
that little was needed in the way of improvements to make the section a thoroughfare for the 
typical, light commercial traffic of the area.  From the use of the Radford-Wiley’s Falls stretch 
and the evidence as to its ready improvability at a low cost for easier keelboat use, we conclude 
that this section of the New River is navigable.  It follows from this, together with the undisputed 
commercial use that the New River from Allisonia, Virginia, to Hinton, West Virginia, is a 
navigable water of the United States. 
License Provisions. The determination that the New River is navigable eliminates from 
this case issues which may arise only where the river involved is nonnavigable.  But even 
accepting the navigability of the New River, the respondent urges that certain provisions of the 
license, which seek to control affairs of the licensee, are unconnected with navigation and are 
beyond the power of the Commission, indeed beyond the constitutional power of Congress to 
authorize. 
                                                 
1
 10 Wall. 557, 563:  “. . . Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in 
fact.  And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, 
as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade 
and travel on water.  And they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of the acts of 
Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition by 
themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with 
other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.” 
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The respondent’s objections to the statutory and license provisions, as applied to 
navigable streams, are based on the contentions (1) that the United States’ control of the waters 
is limited to control for purposes of navigation, (2) that certain license provisions take its 
property without due process, and (3) that the claimed right to acquire this project and to regulate 
its financing, records and affairs, is an invasion of the rights of the states, contrary to the Tenth 
Amendment. 
Forty-one states join as amici in support of the respondent’s arguments.  While 
conceding, as of course, that Congress may prohibit the erection in navigable waters of the 
United States of any structure deemed to impair navigation, the Attorneys General speaking for 
the states insist that this power of prohibition does not comprehend a power to exact conditions, 
which are unrelated to navigation, for the permission to erect such structures.  To permit, the 
argument continues, the imposition of licenses involving conditions such as this acquisition 
clause, enabling the Federal Government to take over a natural resource such as water-power, 
allows logically similar acquisition of mines, oil or farmlands as consideration for the privilege 
of doing an interstate business.  The states thus lose control of their resources and property is 
withdrawn from taxation in violation of the Tenth Amendment. 
Further, the point is made that a clash of sovereignty arises between the license 
provisions of the Power Act and state licensing provisions.  The Commonwealth of Virginia 
advances forcibly its contention that the affirmative regulation of water-power projects on its 
navigable streams within its boundaries rests with the state, beyond that needed for navigation.  
In our view, it cannot properly be said that the constitutional power of the United States 
over its waters is limited to control for navigation.  By navigation respondent means no more 
than operation of boats and improvement of the waterway itself.  In truth the authority of the 
United States is the regulation of commerce on its waters.  Navigability, in the sense just stated, 
is but a part of this whole.  Flood protection, watershed development, and recovery of the cost of 
improvements through utilization of power are likewise parts of commerce control.  As 
respondent soundly argues, the United States cannot by calling a project of its own “a multiple 
purpose dam” give to itself additional powers, but equally truly the respondent cannot, by 
seeking to use a navigable waterway for power generation alone, avoid the authority of the 
Government over the stream.  That authority is as broad as the needs of commerce.  Water power 
development from dams in navigable streams is from the public’s standpoint a by-product of the 
general use of the rivers for commerce. To this general power, the respondent must submit its 
single purpose of electrical production.  The fact that the Commission is willing to give a license 
for a power dam only is of no significance in appraising the type of conditions allowable.  It may 
well be that this portion of the river is not needed for navigation at this time.  Or that the dam 
proposed may function satisfactorily with others, contemplated or intended.  It may fit in as a 
part of the river development.  The point is that navigable waters are subject to national planning 
and control in the broad regulation of commerce granted the Federal Government.  The license 
conditions to which objection is made have an obvious relationship to the exercise of the 
commerce power.  Even if there were no such relationship the plenary power of Congress over 
navigable waters would empower it to deny the privilege of constructing an obstruction in those 
waters.  It may likewise grant the privilege on terms.  It is no objection to the terms and to the 
exertion of the power that “its exercise is attended by the same incidents which attend the 
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exercise of the police power of the states.”  The Congressional authority under the commerce 
clause is complete unless limited by the Fifth Amendment. 
Such an acquisition or such an option to acquire is not an invasion of the sovereignty of a 
state.  At the formation of the Union, the states delegated to the Federal Government authority to 
regulate commerce among the states.  So long as the things done within the states by the United 
States are valid under that power, there can be no interference with the sovereignty of the state. It 
is the non-delegated power which under the Tenth Amendment remains in the state or the people. 
Reversed and remanded to the District Court with instructions to enter an order enjoining 
the construction, maintenance or operation of the Radford project otherwise than under a license, 
accepted by the respondent within a reasonable time, substantially in the form tendered 
respondent by the Federal Power Commission on or about May 5, 1931, or in the alternative, as 
prayed in the bill. 
Reversed. 
ZABEL v. TABB 
430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971) 
BROWN, Chief Judge: 
It is the destiny of the Fifth Circuit to be in the middle of great, often times explosive 
issues of spectacular public importance.  So it is here as we enter in depth the contemporary 
interest in the preservation of our environment.  By an injunction requiring the issuance of a 
permit to fill in eleven acres of tidelands in the beautiful Boca Ciega Bay in the St. Petersburg-
Tampa, Florida area for use as a commercial mobile trailer park, the District Judge held that the 
Secretary of the Army and his functionary, the Chief of Engineers, had no power to consider 
anything except interference with navigation.  There being no such obstruction to navigation, 
they were ordered to issue a permit even though the permittees acknowledge that "there was 
evidence before the Corps of Engineers sufficient to justify an administrative agency finding that 
[the] fill would do damage to the ecology or marine life on the bottom." 
We hold that nothing in the statutory structure compels the Secretary to close his eyes to 
all that others see or think they see.  The establishment was entitled, if not required, to consider 
ecological factors and, being persuaded by them, to deny that which might have been granted 
routinely five, ten, or fifteen years ago before man's explosive increase made all, including 
Congress, aware of civilization's potential destruction from breathing its own polluted air and 
drinking its own infected water and the immeasurable loss from a silent-spring-like disturbance 
of nature's economy.  
Genesis: The Beginning 
In setting the stage we draw freely on the Government's brief.  This suit was instituted by 
Landholders, Zabel and Russell, on May 10, 1967, to compel the Secretary of the Army to issue 
a permit to dredge and fill in the navigable waters of Boca Ciega Bay, in Pinellas County near St. 
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Petersburg, Florida.  After a hearing, the District Court, on February 17, 1969, granted summary 
judgment for Landholders and directed the Secretary of the Army to issue the permit.  It granted 
a stay of execution of the judgment until this appeal could be heard and decided.  We invert the 
summary judgments, reversing Appellees and rendering judgment for the United States. 
Landholders own land riparian to Boca Ciega Bay and adjacent land underlying the Bay.  
It is navigable water of the United States on the Gulf side of Pinellas Peninsula, its length being 
traversed by the Intracoastal Waterway, which enters Tampa Bay from Boca Ciega Bay and is 
thus an arm of the Gulf of Mexico. 
Landholders desire to dredge and fill on their property in the Bay for a trailer park, with a 
bridge or culvert to their adjoining upland. To this purpose they first applied to the state and local 
authorities for permission to perform the work and obtained the consent or approval of all such 
agencies having jurisdiction to prohibit the work, namely Pinellas County Water and Navigation 
Control Authority (which originally rejected permission, but ultimately issued a permit pursuant 
to state Court order), Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of the State, of Florida, Central 
and South Florida Flood Control District, and Board of Pilot Commissioners for the Port of St. 
Petersburg. 
Landholders then applied to the Corps of Engineers for a federal permit to perform the 
dredging and filling. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, 
also opposed the dredging and filling because it "would have a distinctly harmful effect on the 
fish and wildlife resources of Boca Ciega Bay." 
A public hearing was held in St. Petersburg in November, 1966, and on December 30, 
1966, the District Engineer at Jacksonville, Florida, Colonel Tabb, recommended to his superiors 
that the application be denied.  He said that "The proposed work would have no material adverse 
effect on navigation," but that: 
"Careful consideration has been given to the general public interest in this case.  
The virtually unanimous opposition to the proposed work as expressed in the 
protests which were received and as exhaustively presented at the public hearing 
have convinced me that approval of the application would not be in the public 
interest.  The continued opposition of the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service despite 
efforts on the part of the applicants to reduce the extent of damage leads me to the 
conclusion that approval of the work would not be consistent with the intent of 
Congress as expressed in the Fish & Wildlife Coordination Act, as amended, 12 
August 1958." 
The Division Engineer, South Atlantic Division, Atlanta, Georgia, concurred in that 
recommendation stating: "In view of the wide spread opposition to the proposed work, it is 
apparent that approval of the application would not be in the public interest."  The Chief of 
Engineers concurred for the same reasons.  Finally, the Secretary of the Army denied the 
application on February 28, 1967, because issuance of the requested permit: 
 103 
Would result in a distinctly harmful effect on the fish and wildlife resources in Boca 
Ciega Bay, 
Would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 
1958, as amended (16 U.S.C. 662), 
Would be contrary to the public interest. 
Landholders then instituted this suit to review the Secretary's determination and for an 
order compelling him to issue a permit.  They urged that the proposed work would not hinder 
navigation and that the Secretary had no authority to refuse the permit on other grounds.  They 
acknowledged that "there was evidence before the Corps of Engineers sufficient to justify an 
administrative agency finding that our fill would do damage to the ecology or marine life on the 
bottom." 
The District Court held : 
“The taking, control or limitation in the use of private property interests by an 
exercise of the police power of the government for the public interest or general 
welfare should be authorized by legislation which clearly outlines procedure 
which comports to all constitutional standards. This is not the case here. 
“As this opinion is being prepared the Congress is in session.  Advocates of 
conservation are both able and effective.  The way is open to obtain a remedy for 
future situations like this one if one is needed and can be legally granted by the 
Congress.” 
The Court granted summary judgment for Landholders and directed the Secretary of the 
Army to issue the permit.  This appeal followed. 
The question presented to us is whether the Secretary of the Army can refuse to authorize 
a dredge and fill project in navigable waters for factually substantial ecological reasons even 
though the project would not interfere with navigation, flood control, or the production of power.  
To answer this question in the affirmative, we must answer two intermediate questions 
affirmatively. (1) Does Congress for ecological reasons have the power to prohibit a project on 
private riparian submerged land in navigable waters? (2) If it does, has Congress committed the 
power to prohibit to the Secretary of the Army? 
Constitutional Power 
The starting point here is the Commerce Clause and its expansive reach.  The test for 
determining whether Congress has the power to protect wildlife in navigable waters and thereby 
to regulate the use of private property for this reason is whether there is a basis for the 
Congressional judgment that the activity regulated has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce. Wickard v. Filburn, 1942, 317 U.S. 111, 125, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122, 135. That 
this activity meets this test is hardly questioned.  In this time of awakening to the reality that we 
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cannot continue to despoil our environment and yet exist, the nation knows, if Courts do not, that 
the destruction of fish and wildlife in our estuarine waters does have a substantial, and in some 
areas a devastating, effect on interstate commerce. Landholders do not contend otherwise.  Nor is 
it challenged that dredge and fill projects are activities which may tend to destroy the ecological 
balance and thereby affect commerce substantially. Because of these potential effects Congress 
has the power to regulate such projects. 
Prohibiting Obstructions to Navigation 
The action of the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of the Army under attack rests 
immediately on the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §403, which declares that "the creation 
of any obstruction * * * to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is 
prohibited."  The Act covers both building of structures and the excavating and filling in 
navigable waters.  It is structured as a flat prohibition unless— the unless being the issuance of 
approval by the Secretary after recommendation of the Chief of Engineers. 
The question for us is whether under the Act the Secretary may include conservation 
considerations as conditions to be met to make the proposed project acceptable.  Until now there 
has been no absolute answer to this question. 
Governmental agencies in executing a particular statutory responsibility ordinarily are 
required to take heed of, sometimes effectuate and other times not thwart other valid statutory 
governmental policies.  And here the government-wide policy of environmental conservation is 
spectacularly revealed in at least two statutes, The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act and the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act clearly requires the dredging and filling agency 
(under a governmental permit), whether public or private, to consult with the Fish and Wildlife 
Service, with a view of conservation of wildlife resources.  If there be any question as to whether 
the statute directs the licensing agency (the Corps) to so consult it can quickly be dispelled.  
Common sense and reason dictate that it would be incongruous for Congress, in light of the fact 
that it intends conservation to be considered in private dredge and fill operations (as evidenced 
by the clear wording of the statute), not to direct the only federal agency concerned with 
licensing such projects both to consult and to take such factors into account. 
The intent of the three branches has been unequivocally expressed: The Secretary must 
weigh the effect a dredge and fill project will have on conservation before he issues a permit 
lifting the Congressional ban. 
The parallel of momentum as the three branches shape a national policy gets added 
impetus from the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Public Law 91-190, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§4331-47.  This Act essentially states that every federal agency shall consider ecological factors 
when dealing with activities which may have an impact on man's environment. 
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When the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [is]... considered together with the 
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act and its interpretations, there is no doubt that the Secretary 
can refuse on conservation grounds to grant a permit under the Rivers and Harbors Act. 
Taking Without Compensation 
Landholders last contention is that their private submerged property was taken for public 
use without just compensation.  They proceed this way: (i) the denial of a permit constitutes a 
taking since this is the only use to which the property could be put; (ii) the public use is as a 
breeding ground for wildlife; and (iii) for that use just compensation is due. 
Our discussion of this contention begins and ends with the idea that there is no taking. 
The waters and underlying land are subject to the paramount servitude in the federal government. 
Conclusion 
Landholders' contentions fail on all grounds.  The case is reversed and since there are no 
questions remaining to be resolved by the District Court, judgment is rendered for the 
Government and the associated agent-defendants. 
REVERSED and RENDERED. 
UNITED STATES v. RIVERSIDE BAYVIEW HOMES, INC. 
474 U.S. 121 (1985) 
Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U. S. C. §1251 
et seq., together with certain regulations promulgated under its authority by the Army Corps of 
Engineers, authorizes the Corps to require landowners to obtain permits from the Corps before 
discharging fill material into wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributaries. 
The relevant provisions of the Clean Water Act originated in the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816, and have remained essentially unchanged since 
that time.  Under §§301 and 502 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. §§1311 and 1362, any discharge of 
dredged or fill materials into “navigable waters”–defined as the “waters of the United States”–is 
forbidden unless authorized by a permit issued by the Corps of Engineers pursuant to §404, 33 
U. S. C. §1344. 
After initially construing the Act to cover only waters navigable in fact, in 1975 the 
Corps issued interim final regulations redefining “the waters of the United States” to include not 
only actually navigable waters but also tributaries of such waters, interstate waters and their 
tributaries, and nonnavigable intrastate waters whose use or misuse could affect interstate 
commerce.  40 Fed. Reg. 31320 (1975).  More importantly for present purposes, the Corps 
construed the Act to cover all “freshwater wetlands” that were adjacent to other covered waters. 
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A “freshwater wetland” was defined as an area that is “periodically inundated” and is “normally 
characterized by the prevalence of vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions for growth 
and reproduction.” 33 CFR §209.120(d)(2)(h) (1976).  In 1977, the Corps refined its definition of 
wetlands by eliminating the reference to periodic inundation and making other minor changes. 
The 1977 definition reads as follows: 
“The term ‘wetlands’ means those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface 
or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under 
normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for 
life in saturated soil conditions.  Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, 
bogs and similar areas.”  33 CFR §323.2(c) (1978). 
In 1982, the 1977 regulations were replaced by substantively identical regulations that 
remain in force today.  See 33 CFR §323.2 (1985). 
Respondent Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (hereafter respondent), owns 80 acres of 
low-lying, marshy land near the shores of Lake St. Clair in Macomb County, Michigan.  In 1976, 
respondent began to place fill materials on its property as part of its preparations for construction 
of a housing development. The Corps of Engineers, believing that the property was an “adjacent 
wetland” under the 1975 regulation defining “waters of the United States,” filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking to enjoin respondent 
from filling the property without the permission of the Corps. 
The District Court held that the portion of respondent’s property lying below 575.5 feet 
above sea level was a covered wetland and enjoined respondent from filling it without a permit. 
Respondent appealed, and the Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of the effect of the 
intervening 1977 amendments to the regulation.  615 F.2d 1363 (1980).  On remand, the District 
Court again held the property to be a wetland subject to the Corps’ permit authority. 
Respondent again appealed, and the Sixth Circuit reversed.  729 F.2d 391 (1984).  The 
court construed the Corps’ regulation to exclude from the category of adjacent wetlands–and 
hence from that of “waters of the United States”–wetlands that were not subject to flooding by 
adjacent navigable waters at a frequency sufficient to support the growth of aquatic vegetation. 
The court adopted this construction of the regulation because, in its view, a broader definition of 
wetlands might result in the taking of private property without just compensation.  The court also 
expressed its doubt that Congress, in granting the Corps jurisdiction to regulate the filling of 
“navigable waters,” intended to allow regulation of wetlands that were not the result of flooding 
by navigable waters.  Under the court’s reading of the regulation, respondent’s property was not 
within the Corps’ jurisdiction, because its semiaquatic characteristics were not the result of 
frequent flooding by the nearby navigable waters.  Respondent was therefore free to fill the 
property without obtaining a permit. 
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We granted certiorari to consider the proper interpretation of the Corps’ regulation 
defining “waters of the United States” and the scope of the Corps’ jurisdiction under the Clean 
Water Act, both of which were called into question by the Sixth Circuit’s ruling.  469 U.S. 1206 
(1985).  We now reverse. 
II 
The question whether the Corps of Engineers may demand that respondent obtain a 
permit before placing fill material on its property is primarily one of regulatory and statutory 
interpretation: we must determine whether respondent’s property is an “adjacent wetland” within 
the meaning of the applicable regulation, and, if so, whether the Corps’ jurisdiction over 
“navigable waters” gives it statutory authority to regulate discharges of fill material into such a 
wetland. 
The question whether the regulation at issue requires respondent to obtain a permit before 
filling its property is an easy one.  The regulation extends the Corps’ authority under §404 to all 
wetlands adjacent to navigable or interstate waters and their tributaries.  Wetlands, in turn, are 
defined as lands that are “inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and 
duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of 
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.”  33 CFR §323.2(c) (1985) 
(emphasis added).  The plain language of the regulation refutes the Court of Appeals’ conclusion 
that inundation or “frequent flooding” by the adjacent body of water is a sine qua non of a 
wetland under the regulation.  Indeed, the regulation could hardly state more clearly that 
saturation by either surface or ground water is sufficient to bring an area within the category of 
wetlands, provided that the saturation is sufficient to and does support wetland vegetation. 
The history of the regulation underscores the absence of any requirement inundation. The 
interim final regulation that the current regulation replaced explicitly included a requirement of 
“[periodic] inundation.”  33 CFR §209.120(d)(2)(h) (1976).  In deleting the reference to 
“periodic inundation” from the regulation as finally promulgated, the Corps explained that it was 
repudiating the interpretation of that language “as requiring inundation over a record period of 
years.”  42 Fed. Reg. 37128 (1977).  In fashioning its own requirement of “frequent flooding” 
the Court of Appeals improperly reintroduced into the regulation precisely what the Corps had 
excised. 
Without the nonexistent requirement of frequent flooding, the regulatory definition of 
adjacent wetlands covers the property here.  The District Court found that respondent’s property 
was “characterized by the presence of vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions for 
growth and reproduction,”  App. to  Pet. for Cert. 24a, and that the source of the saturated soil 
conditions on the property was ground water.  There is no plausible suggestion that these 
findings are clearly erroneous, and they plainly bring the property within the category of 
wetlands as defined by the current regulation.  In addition, the court found that the wetland 
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located on respondent’s property was adjacent to a body of navigable water, since the area 
characterized by saturated soil conditions and wetland vegetation extended beyond the boundary 
of respondent’s property to Black Creek, a navigable waterway.  Again, the court’s finding is not 
clearly erroneous.  Together, these findings establish that respondent’s property is a wetland 
adjacent to a navigable waterway.  Hence, it is part of the “waters of the United States” as 
defined by 33 CFR §323.2 (1985), and if the regulation itself is valid as a construction of the 
term “waters of the United States” as used in the Clean Water Act, a question which we now 
address, the property falls within the scope of the Corps’ jurisdiction over “navigable waters” 
under §404 of the Act. 
On a purely linguistic level, it may appear unreasonable to classify “lands,” wet or 
otherwise, as “waters.” Such a simplistic response, however, does justice neither to the problem 
faced by the Corps in defining the scope of its authority under §404(a) nor to the realities of the 
problem of water pollution that the Clean Water Act was intended to combat.  In determining the 
limits of its power to regulate discharges under the Act, the Corps must necessarily choose some 
point at which water ends and land begins.  Our common experience tells us that this is often no 
easy task:  the transition from water to solid ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt 
one.  Rather, between open waters and dry land may lie shallows, marshes, mudflats, swamps, 
bogs–in short, a huge array of areas that are not wholly aquatic but nevertheless fall far short of 
being dry land.  Where on this continuum to find the limit of “waters” is far from obvious. 
Faced with such a problem of defining the bounds of its regulatory authority, an agency 
may appropriately look to the legislative history and underlying policies of its statutory grants of 
authority.  Neither of these sources provides unambiguous guidance for the Corps in this case, 
but together they do support the reasonableness of the Corps’ approach of defining adjacent 
wetlands as “waters” within the meaning of §404(a).  Section 404 originated as part of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, which constituted a comprehensive 
legislative attempt “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters.” CWA §101, 33 U. S. C. §1251.  This objective incorporated a broad, systemic 
view of the goal of maintaining and improving water quality: as the House Report on the 
legislation put it, “the word ‘integrity’ . . . refers to a condition in which the natural structure and 
function of ecosystems [are] maintained.” H. R. Rep. No. 92-911, p. 76 (1972).  Protection of 
aquatic ecosystems, Congress recognized, demanded broad federal authority to control pollution, 
for “[water] moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be 
controlled at the source.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 77 (1972). 
In keeping with these views, Congress chose to define the waters covered by the Act 
broadly.  Although the Act prohibits discharges into “navigable waters,” see CWA §§301(a), 
404(a), 502(12), 33 U. S. C. §§1311(a), 1344(a), 1362(12), the Act’s definition of “navigable 
waters” as “the waters of the United States” makes it clear that the term “navigable” as used in 
the Act is of limited import.  In adopting this definition of “navigable waters,” Congress 
evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed on federal regulation by earlier water 
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pollution control statutes and to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at 
least some waters that would not be deemed “navigable” under the classical understanding of 
that term.  See S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 144 (1972); 118 Cong. Rec. 33756-33757 (1972) 
(statement of Rep. Dingell). 
Of course, it is one thing to recognize that Congress intended to allow regulation of 
waters that might not satisfy traditional tests of navigability; it is another to assert that Congress 
intended to abandon traditional notions of “waters” and include in that term “wetlands” as well. 
Nonetheless, the evident breadth of congressional concern for protection of water quality and 
aquatic ecosystems suggests that it is reasonable for the Corps to interpret the term “waters” to 
encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more conventionally defined.  Following the lead of 
the Environmental Protection Agency, see 38 Fed. Reg. 10834 (1973), the Corps has determined 
that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters do as a general matter play a key role in protecting 
and enhancing water quality: 
“The regulation of activities that cause water pollution cannot rely on . . . artificial 
lines . . . but must focus on all waters that together form the entire aquatic system.  
Water moves in hydrologic cycles, and the pollution of this part of the aquatic 
system, regardless of whether it is above or below an ordinary high water mark, or 
mean high tide line, will affect the water quality of the other waters within that 
aquatic system. 
“For this reason, the landward limit of Federal jurisdiction under Section 404 
must include any adjacent wetlands that form the border of or are in reasonable 
proximity to other waters of the United States, as these wetlands are part of this 
aquatic system.” 42 Fed. Reg. 37128 (1977). 
We cannot say that the Corps’ conclusion that adjacent wetlands are inseparably bound 
up with the “waters” of the United States–based as it is on the Corps’ and EPA’s technical 
expertise–is unreasonable.  In view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated 
by the Act itself and the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable waters, the 
Corps’ ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and their adjacent wetlands 
provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters 
under the Act. 
This holds true even for wetlands that are not the result of flooding or permeation by 
water having its source in adjacent bodies of open water.  The Corps has concluded that wetlands 
may affect the water quality of adjacent lakes, rivers, and streams even when the waters of those 
bodies do not actually inundate the wetlands.  For example, wetlands that are not flooded by 
adjacent waters may still tend to drain into those waters.  In such circumstances, the Corps has 
concluded that wetlands may serve to filter and purify water draining into adjacent bodies of 
water, see 33 CFR §320.4(b)(2)(vii) (1985), and to slow the flow of surface runoff into lakes, 
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rivers, and streams  and thus prevent flooding and erosion, see §§320.4(b)(2)(iv) and (v).  In 
addition, adjacent wetlands may “serve significant natural biological functions, including food 
chain production, general habitat, and nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites for aquatic . . . 
species.”  §320.4(b)(2)(i).  In short, the Corps has concluded that wetlands adjacent to lakes, 
rivers, streams, and other bodies of water may function as integral parts of the aquatic 
environment even when the moisture creating the wetlands does not find its source in the 
adjacent bodies of water.  Again, we cannot say that the Corps’ judgment on these matters is 
unreasonable, and we therefore conclude that a definition of “waters of the United States” 
encompassing all wetlands adjacent to other bodies of water over which the Corps has 
jurisdiction is a permissible interpretation of the Act.  Because respondent’s property is part of a 
wetland that actually abuts on a navigable waterway, respondent was required to have a permit in 
this case. 
B 
Following promulgation of the Corps’ interim final regulations in 1975, the Corps’ 
assertion of authority under §404 over waters not actually navigable engendered some 
congressional opposition.  The controversy came to a head during Congress’ consideration of the 
Clean Water Act of 1977, a major piece of legislation aimed at achieving “interim improvements 
within the existing framework” of the Clean Water Act.  H. R. Rep. No. 95-139, pp. 1-2 (1977). 
In the end, however, as we shall explain, Congress acquiesced in the administrative construction. 
In both Chambers, debate on the proposals to narrow the definition of navigable waters 
centered largely on the issue of wetlands preservation.  See id., at 10426-10432 (House debate); 
id., at 26710-26729 (Senate debate).  Proponents of a more limited §404 jurisdiction contended 
that the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over wetlands and other nonnavigable “waters” had far 
exceeded what Congress had intended in enacting §404.  Opponents of the proposed changes 
argued that a narrower definition of “navigable waters” for purposes of §404 would exclude vast 
stretches of crucial wetlands from the Corps’ jurisdiction, with detrimental effects on wetlands 
ecosystems, water quality, and the aquatic environment generally. 
The significance of Congress’ treatment of the Corps’ §404 jurisdiction in its 
consideration of the Clean Water Act of 1977 is twofold.  First, the scope of the Corps’ asserted 
jurisdiction over wetlands was specifically brought to Congress’ attention, and Congress rejected 
measures designed to curb the Corps’ jurisdiction in large part because of its concern that 
protection of wetlands would be unduly hampered by a narrowed definition of “navigable 
waters.”  Although we are chary of attributing significance to Congress’ failure to act, a refusal 
by Congress to overrule an agency’s construction of legislation is at least some evidence of the 
reasonableness of that construction, particularly where the administrative construction has been 
brought to Congress’ attention through legislation specifically designed to supplant it.  See Bob 
Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599-601 (1983); United States v. Rutherford, 
442 U.S. 544, 554, and n. 10 (1979). 
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Second, it is notable that even those who would have restricted the reach of the Corps’ 
jurisdiction would have done so not by removing wetlands altogether from the definition of 
“waters of the United States,” but only by restricting the scope of “navigable waters” under §404 
to waters navigable in fact and their adjacent wetlands.  In amending the definition of “navigable 
waters” for purposes of §404 only, the backers of the House bill would have left intact the 
existing definition of “navigable waters” for purposes of §301 of the Act, which generally 
prohibits discharges of pollutants into navigable waters.  As the House Report explained: 
“‘Navigable waters’ as used in section 301 includes all of the waters of the United States 
including their adjacent wetlands.”  H. R. Rep. No. 95-139, p. 24 (1977).  Thus, even those who 
thought that the Corps’ existing authority under §404 was too broad recognized (1) that the 
definition of “navigable waters” then in force for both §301 and §404 was reasonably interpreted 
to include adjacent wetlands, (2) that the water quality concerns of the Clean Water Act 
demanded regulation of at least some discharges into wetlands, and (3) that whatever jurisdiction 
the Corps would retain over discharges of fill material after passage of the 1977 legislation 
should extend to discharges into wetlands adjacent to any waters over which the Corps retained 
jurisdiction.  These views provide additional support for a conclusion that Congress in 1977 
acquiesced in the Corps’ definition of waters as including adjacent wetlands. 
We are thus persuaded that the language, policies, and history of the Clean Water Act 
compel a finding that the Corps has acted reasonably in interpreting the Act to require permits 
for the discharge of fill material into wetlands adjacent to the “waters of the United States.”  The 
regulation in which the Corps has embodied this interpretation by its terms includes the wetlands 
on respondent’s property within the class of waters that may not be filled without a permit; and, 
as we have seen, there is no reason to interpret the regulation more narrowly than its terms would 
indicate.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. 
SOLID WASTE AGENCY OF NORTHERN COOK COUNTY v. UNITED STATES 
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 
531 U.S. 159 (2000) 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA or Act regulates the discharge of dredged 
or fill material into “navigable waters.” The United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), has 
interpreted §404(a) to confer federal authority over an abandoned sand and gravel pit in northern 
Illinois which provides habitat for migratory birds. We are asked to decide whether the 
provisions of §404(a) may be fairly extended to these waters, and, if so, whether Congress could 
exercise such authority consistent with the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3. We 
answer the first question in the negative and therefore do not reach the second. 
Petitioner, the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC), is a 
consortium of 23 suburban Chicago   cities and villages that united in an effort to locate and 
develop a disposal site for baled nonhazardous solid waste. The Chicago Gravel Company 
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informed the municipalities of the availability of a 533-acre parcel, bestriding the Illinois 
counties Cook and Kane, which had been the site of a sand and gravel pit mining operation for 
three decades up until about 1960. Long since abandoned, the old mining site eventually gave 
way to a successional stage forest, with its remnant excavation trenches evolving into a 
scattering of permanent and seasonal ponds of varying size (from under one-tenth of an acre to 
several acres) and depth (from several inches to several feet). 
The municipalities decided to purchase the site for disposal of their baled nonhazardous 
solid waste. By law, SWANCC was required to file for various permits from Cook County and 
the State of Illinois before it could begin operation of its balefill project. In addition, because the 
operation called for the filling of some of the permanent and seasonal ponds, SWANCC 
contacted federal respondents (hereinafter respondents), including the Corps, to determine if a 
federal landfill permit was required under §404(a) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §1344(a). 
Section 404(a) grants the Corps authority to issue permits “for the discharge of dredged 
or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.” The term “navigable waters” 
is defined under the Act as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” 
§1362(7). The Corps has issued regulations defining the term “waters of the United States” to 
include: 
“waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), 
mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa 
lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect 
interstate or foreign commerce . . . .” 33 CFR §328.3(a)(3) (1999). 
In 1986, in an attempt to “clarify” the reach of its jurisdiction, the Corps stated that 
§404(a) extends to intrastate waters: 
“a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird 
Treaties; or 
“b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross 
state lines; or 
“c. Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species; or 
“d. Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.” 51 Fed. Reg. 41217.    
This last promulgation has been dubbed the “Migratory Bird Rule.” 
The Corps asserted jurisdiction over the balefill site pursuant to subpart (b) of the 
“Migratory Bird Rule.”  
Despite SWANCC’s securing the required water quality certification from the Illinois 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Corps refused to issue a §404(a) permit. The Corps found 
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that the impact of the project upon area-sensitive species was “unmitigatable since a landfill 
surface cannot be redeveloped into a forested habitat.”  
Petitioner challenged both the Corps’ jurisdiction over the site and the merits of its denial 
of the §404(a) permit. Petitioner argued that respondents had exceeded their statutory authority 
in interpreting the CWA to cover non-navigable, isolated, intrastate waters based upon the 
presence of migratory birds and, in the alternative, that Congress lacked the power under the 
Commerce Clause to grant such regulatory jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals held that the CWA reaches as many waters as the Commerce 
Clause allows and, given its earlier Commerce Clause ruling, it therefore followed that 
respondents’ “Migratory Bird Rule” was a reasonable interpretation of the Act. See 191 F.3d at 
851-852. 
We granted certiorari, 529 U.S. 1129 (2000), and now reverse. 
Congress passed the CWA for the stated purpose of “restoring and maintaining the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. §1251(a). In so 
doing, Congress chose to “recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights 
of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including 
restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the 
Administrator in the exercise of his authority under this chapter.” §1251(b). Relevant here, 
§404(a) authorizes respondents to regulate the discharge of fill material into “navigable waters,” 
33 U.S.C. §1344(a), which the statute defines as “the waters of the United States, including the 
territorial seas,” §1362(7). Respondents have interpreted these words to cover the abandoned 
gravel pit at issue here because it is used as habitat for migratory birds. We conclude that the 
“Migratory Bird Rule” is not fairly supported by the CWA. 
This is not the first time we have been called upon to evaluate the meaning of §404(a). In 
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 88 L. Ed. 2d 419, 106 S. Ct. 455 
(1985), we held that the Corps had §404(a) jurisdiction over wetlands that actually abutted on a 
navigable waterway. In so doing, we noted that the term “navigable” is of “limited import” and 
that Congress evidenced its intent to “regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed 
‘navigable’ under the classical understanding of that term.” Id. at 133. But our holding was based 
in large measure upon Congress’ unequivocal acquiescence to, and approval of, the Corps’ 
regulations interpreting the CWA to cover wetlands adjacent to navigable waters. See 474 U.S. 
at 135-139. We found that Congress’ concern for the protection of water quality and aquatic 
ecosystems indicated its intent to regulate wetlands “inseparably bound up with the ‘waters’ of 
the United States.” 474 U.S. at 134. 
It was the significant nexus between the wetlands and “navigable waters” that informed 
our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes. Indeed, we did not “express any opinion” 
on the “question of the authority of the Corps to regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands 
that are not adjacent to bodies of open water . . . .” 474 U.S. at 131-132. In order to rule for 
respondents here, we would have to hold that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds that 
are not adjacent to open water. But we conclude that the text of the statute will not allow this. 
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Section 404(g) is unenlightening. In Riverside Bayview Homes we recognized that 
Congress intended the phrase “navigable waters” to include “at least some waters that would not 
be deemed ‘navigable’ under the classical understanding of that term.” 474 U.S. at 133. But 
§404(g) gives no intimation of what those waters might be; it simply refers to them as “other . . . 
waters.” The exact meaning of §404(g) is not before us and we express no opinion on it, but for 
present purposes it is sufficient to say, as we did in Riverside Bayview Homes, that “§404(g)(1) 
does not conclusively determine the construction to be placed on the use of the term ‘waters’ 
elsewhere in the Act (particularly in §502(7), which contains the relevant definition of ‘navigable 
waters’) . . .” 474 U.S. at 138, n. 11. 
We thus decline respondents’ invitation to take what they see as the next ineluctable step 
after Riverside Bayview Homes: holding that isolated ponds, some only seasonal, wholly located 
within two Illinois counties, fall under §404(a)’s definition of “navigable waters” because they 
serve  as habitat for migratory birds. We cannot agree that Congress’ separate definitional use of 
the phrase “waters of the United States” constitutes a basis for reading the term “navigable 
waters” out of the statute. We said in Riverside Bayview Homes that the word “navigable” in the  
statute was of “limited effect” and went on to hold that §404(a) extended to nonnavigable 
wetlands adjacent to open waters. But it is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite 
another to give it no effect whatever.  The term “navigable” has at least the import of showing us 
what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over 
waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made. See, e.g., 
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-408, 85 L. Ed. 243, 61 S. Ct. 
291 (1940). 
Twice in the past six years we have reaffirmed the proposition that the grant of authority 
to Congress under the Commerce Clause, though broad, is not unlimited. See United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 146 L. Ed. 2d 658, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). Respondents argue that the “Migratory Bird 
Rule” falls within Congress’ power to regulate intrastate activities that “substantially affect” 
interstate commerce.  They note that the protection of migratory birds is a “national interest of 
very nearly the first magnitude,” Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435, 64 L. Ed. 641, 40 S. 
Ct. 382 (1920), and that, as the Court of Appeals found, millions of people spend over a billion 
dollars annually on recreational pursuits relating to migratory birds. These arguments raise 
significant constitutional questions. For example, we would have to evaluate the precise object or 
activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. This is not clear, for 
although the Corps has claimed jurisdiction over petitioner’s land because it contains water areas 
used as habitat by migratory birds, respondents now, post litem motam, focus upon the fact that 
the regulated activity is petitioner’s municipal landfill, which is “plainly of a commercial 
nature.” But this is a far cry, indeed, from the “navigable waters” and “waters of the United 
States” to which the statute by its terms extends. 
We find nothing approaching a clear statement from Congress that it intended §404(a) to 
reach an abandoned sand and gravel pit such as we have here. Permitting respondents to claim 
federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the “Migratory Bird Rule” would 
result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over land and 
water use. See, e.g., Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30, 44, 130 L. 
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Ed. 2d 245, 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994) (“Regulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed 
by local governments”).  Rather than expressing a desire to readjust the federal-state balance in 
this manner, Congress chose to “recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and 
rights of States . . . to plan the development and use . . . of land and water resources . . . .” 33 
U.S.C. §1251(b). We thus read the statute as written to avoid the significant constitutional and 
federalism questions raised by respondents’ interpretation, and therefore reject the request for 
administrative deference. 
We hold that 33 CFR §328.3(a)(3) (1999), as clarified and applied to petitioner’s balefill 
site pursuant to the “Migratory Bird Rule,” 51 Fed. Reg. 41217 (1986), exceeds the authority 
granted to respondents under §404(a) of the CWA. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit is therefore Reversed.   
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and 
JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting. 
It is fair to characterize the Clean Water Act as “watershed” legislation. The statute 
endorsed fundamental changes in both the purpose and the scope of federal regulation of the 
Nation’s waters. In §13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (RHA), 30 Stat. 
1152, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §407, Congress had assigned to the Army Corps of Engineers 
(Corps) the mission of regulating discharges into certain waters in order to protect their use as 
highways for the transportation of interstate and foreign commerce; the scope of the Corps’ 
jurisdiction under the RHA accordingly extended only to waters that were “navigable.” In the 
CWA, however, Congress broadened the Corps’ mission to include the purpose of protecting the 
quality of our Nation’s waters for esthetic, health, recreational, and environmental uses. The 
scope of its jurisdiction was therefore redefined to encompass all of “the waters of the United 
States, including the territorial seas.” That definition requires neither actual nor potential 
navigability. 
The Court has previously held that the Corps’ broadened jurisdiction under the CWA 
properly included an 80-acre ]parcel of low-lying marshy land that was not itself navigable, 
directly adjacent to navigable water, or even hydrologically connected to navigable water, but 
which was part of a larger area, characterized by poor drainage, that ultimately abutted a 
navigable creek.  United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 88 L. Ed. 2d 
419, 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985). Moreover, once Congress crossed the legal watershed that separates 
navigable streams of commerce from marshes and inland lakes, there is no principled reason for 
limiting the statute’s protection to those waters or wetlands that happen to lie near a navigable 
stream. 
In its decision today, the Court draws a new jurisdictional line, one that invalidates the 
1986 migratory bird regulation as well as the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over all waters 
except for actually navigable waters, their tributaries, and wetlands adjacent to each. Its holding 
rests on two equally untenable premises: (1) that when Congress passed the 1972 CWA, it did 
not intend “to exert anything more than its commerce power over navigation,”; and (2) that in 
1972 Congress drew the boundary defining the Corps’ jurisdiction at the odd line on which the 
Court today settles. 
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As I shall explain, the text of the 1972 amendments affords no support for the Court’s 
holding, and amendments Congress adopted in 1977 do support the Corps’ present interpretation 
of its mission as extending to so-called “isolated” waters. Indeed, simple common sense cuts 
against the particular definition of the Corps’ jurisdiction favored by the majority. 
I 
The significance of the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 is illuminated by a reference to the 
history of federal water regulation, a history that the majority largely ignores. Federal regulation 
of the Nation’s waters began in the 19th century with efforts targeted exclusively at “promoting 
water transportation and commerce.” Kalen, “Commerce to Conservation: The Call for a 
National Water Policy and the Evolution of Federal Jurisdiction Over Wetlands,” 69 N. D. L. 
Rev. 873, 877 (1993). This goal was pursued through the various Rivers and Harbors Acts, the 
most comprehensive of which was the RHA of 1899. Section 13  of the 1899 RHA, commonly 
known as the Refuse Act, prohibited the discharge of “refuse” into any “navigable water” or its 
tributaries, as well as the deposit of “refuse” on the bank of a navigable water “whereby 
navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed” without first obtaining a permit from the 
Secretary of the Army. 30 Stat. 1152.  
During the middle of the 20th century, the goals of federal water regulation began to shift 
away from an exclusive focus on protecting navigability and toward a concern for preventing 
environmental degradation.   This awakening of interest in the use of federal power to protect the 
aquatic environment was helped along by efforts to reinterpret §13 of the RHA in order to apply 
its permit requirement to industrial discharges into navigable waters, even when such discharges 
did nothing to impede navigability. See, e.g., United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 
482, 490-491, 4 L. Ed. 2d 903, 80 S. Ct. 884 (1960) (noting that the term “refuse” in §13 was 
broad enough to include industrial waste).
1
 Seeds of this nascent concern with pollution control 
can also be found in the FWPCA, which was first enacted in 1948 and then incrementally 
expanded in the following years. 
The shift in the focus of federal water regulation from protecting navigability toward 
environmental protection reached a dramatic climax in 1972, with the passage of the CWA. The 
Act, which was passed as an amendment to the existing FWPCA, was universally described by 
its supporters as the first truly comprehensive federal water pollution legislation. The “major 
purpose” of the CWA was “to establish a comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination of 
water pollution.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 95 (1971). 
                                                 
1
 In 1970, the House Committee on Government Operations followed the Court’s lead and advocated the use of §13 
as a pollution control provision. H. R. Rep. No. 91-917, pp. 14-18 (1970). President Nixon responded by issuing 
Executive Order No. 11574, 35 Fed. Reg. 19627 (1970) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 12553, 51 Fed. Reg. 7237 
(1986)), which created the Refuse Act Permit Program. Power, The Fox in the Chicken Coop: The Regulatory 
Program of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 63 Va. L. Rev. 503, 512 (1977) (hereinafter Power). 
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Section 404 of the CWA resembles §13 of the RHA, but, unlike the earlier statute, the 
primary purpose of which is the maintenance of navigability, §404 was principally intended as a 
pollution control measure.  
Because of the statute’s ambitious and comprehensive goals, it was, of course, necessary 
to expand its jurisdictional scope. Thus, although Congress opted to carry over the traditional 
jurisdictional term “navigable waters” from the RHA and prior versions of the FWPCA, it 
broadened the definition of that term to encompass all “waters of the United States.” §1362(7). 
Indeed, the 1972 conferees arrived at the final formulation by specifically deleting the word 
“navigable” from the definition that had originally appeared in the House version of the Act. The 
majority today undoes that deletion. 
By 1972, Congress’ Commerce Clause power over “navigation” had long since been 
established.  The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 10 Wall. 557, 19 L. Ed. 999 (1871); Gilman v. 
Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713, 3 Wall. 713, 18 L. Ed. 96 (1866); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 9 
Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824). Why should Congress intend that its assertion of federal 
jurisdiction be given the “broadest possible constitutional interpretation” if it did not intend to 
reach beyond the very heartland of its commerce power? The activities regulated by the CWA 
have nothing to do with Congress’ “commerce power over navigation.” Indeed, the goals of the 
1972 statute have nothing to do with navigation at all. 
As we recognized in Riverside Bayview, the interests served by the statute embrace the 
protection of “‘significant natural biological functions, including food chain production, general 
habitat, and nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites’” for various species of aquatic wildlife. 
474 U.S. at 134-135. For wetlands and “isolated” inland lakes, that interest   is equally powerful, 
regardless of the proximity of the swamp or the water to a navigable stream. Nothing in the text, 
the stated purposes, or the legislative history of the CWA supports the conclusion that in 1972 
Congress contemplated–much less commanded–the odd jurisdictional line that the Court has 
drawn today. 
The majority accuses respondents of reading the term “navigable” out of the statute. But 
that was accomplished by Congress when it deleted the word from the §502(7) definition. 
Viewed in light of the history of federal water regulation, the broad §502(7) definition, and 
Congress’ unambiguous instructions in the Conference Report, it is clear that the term “navigable 
waters” operates in the statute as a shorthand for “waters over which federal authority may 
properly be asserted.”  
II 
As the majority correctly notes, when the Corps first promulgated regulations pursuant to 
§404 of the 1972 Act, it construed its authority as being essentially the same as it had been under 
the 1899 RHA. The reaction to those regulations in the federal courts, in the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), and in Congress, convinced  the Corps that the statute required it “to 
protect water quality to the full extent of the Commerce Clause” and to extend federal regulation 
over discharges “to many areas that have never before been subject to Federal permits or to this 
form of water quality protection.” 40 Fed. Reg. 31320 (1975). 
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As we noted in [ Riverside Bayview] case, the new regulations understood “the waters of 
the United States” to include, not only navigable waters and their tributaries, but also 
“nonnavigable intrastate waters whose use or misuse could affect interstate commerce.” 474 U.S. 
at 123. The final version of these regulations, adopted in 1977, made clear that the covered 
waters included “isolated lakes and wetlands, intermittent streams, prairie potholes, and other 
waters that are not part of a tributary system to interstate waters or to navigable waters of the 
United States, the degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate commerce.”  
III 
Although it might have appeared problematic on a “linguistic” level for the Corps to 
classify “lands” as “waters” in Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131-132, we squarely held that 
the agency’s construction of the statute that it was charged with enforcing was entitled to 
deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
81 L. Ed. 2d 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, the Corps’ 
interpretation of the statute does not “encroach” upon “traditional state power” over land use. 
“Land use planning in essence chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation, at 
its core, does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires only that, however the land is 
used, damage to the environment is kept within prescribed limits.” California Coastal Comm’n v. 
Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 587, 94 L. Ed. 2d 577, 107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987).  The CWA is 
not a land-use code; it is a paradigm of environmental regulation. Such regulation is an accepted 
exercise of federal power.  Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 
U.S. 264, 282, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).  
V 
Because I am convinced that the Court’s miserly construction of the statute is incorrect, I 
shall comment briefly on petitioner’s argument that Congress is without power to prohibit it from 
filling any part of the 31 acres of ponds on its property in Cook County, Illinois. The Corps’ 
exercise of its §404 permitting power over “isolated” waters that serve as habitat for migratory 
birds falls well within the boundaries set by this Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-559, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626, 115 S. Ct. 1624 
(1995), this Court identified “three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under 
its commerce power”: (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or persons and things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities that “substantially 
affect” interstate commerce. Ibid. The migratory bird rule at issue here is properly analyzed 
under the third category. In order to constitute a proper exercise of Congress’ power over 
intrastate activities that “substantially affect” interstate commerce, it is not necessary that each 
individual instance of the activity substantially affect commerce; it is enough that, taken in the 
aggregate, the class of activities in question has such an effect.  Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 
146, 28 L. Ed. 2d 686, 91 S. Ct. 1357 (1971) (noting that it is the “class” of regulated activities, 
not the individual instance, that is to be considered in the “affects” commerce analysis); see also 
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 277; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-128, 87 L. Ed. 122, 63 S. Ct. 82 
(1942). 
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The power to regulate commerce among the several States necessarily and properly 
includes the power to preserve the natural resources that generate such commerce. Cf.  Sporhase 
v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1254, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982) 
(holding water to be an “article of commerce”). Migratory birds, and the waters on which they 
rely, are such resources. Moreover, the protection of migratory birds is a well-established federal 
responsibility. As Justice Holmes noted in Missouri v. Holland, the federal interest in protecting 
these birds is of “the first magnitude.” 252 U.S. at 435. Because of their transitory nature, they 
“can be protected only by national action.” Ibid. 
Whether it is necessary or appropriate to refuse to allow petitioner to fill those ponds is a 
question on which we have no voice. Whether the Federal Government has the power to require 
such permission, however, is a question that is easily answered. If, as it does, the Commerce 
Clause empowers Congress to regulate particular “activities causing air or water pollution, or 
other environmental hazards that may have effects in more than one State,” Hodel, 452 U.S. at 
282, it also empowers Congress to control individual actions that, in the aggregate, would have 
the same effect.  Perez, 402 U.S. at 154; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-128. n18 There is no merit in 
petitioner’s constitutional argument. 
Because I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, I respectfully dissent. 
RAPANOS v. UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 
547 U.S. 715 (2006) 
SCALIA, J., announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered an opinion, in which 
ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a concurring 
opinion. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. STEVENS, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion. 
JUSTICE SCALIA announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered an opinion, in 
which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE ALITO join. 
In April 1989, petitioner John A. Rapanos backfilled wetlands on a parcel of land in 
Michigan that he owned and sought to develop. This parcel included 54 acres of land with 
sometimes-saturated soil conditions. The nearest body of navigable water was 11 to 20 miles 
away. Regulators had informed Mr. Rapanos that his saturated fields were "waters of the United 
States," 33 U.S.C. §1362(7), that could not be filled without a permit. Twelve years of criminal 
and civil litigation ensued. 
The burden of federal regulation on those who would deposit fill material in locations 
denominated "waters of the United States" is not trivial. In deciding whether to grant or deny a 
permit, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) exercises the discretion of an enlightened 
despot, relying on such factors as "economics," "aesthetics," "recreation," and "in general, the 
120 
needs and welfare of the people," 33 CFR §320.4(a) (2004).
1
 The average applicant for an 
individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing the process, and the average 
applicant for a nationwide permit spends 313 days and $28,915 -- not counting costs of 
mitigation or design changes. Sunding & Zilberman, The Economics of Environmental 
Regulation by Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process, 
42 Natural Resources J. 59, 74-76 (2002). "Over $1.7 billion is spent each year by the private 
and public sectors obtaining wetlands permits." Id., at 81. These costs cannot be avoided, 
because the Clean Water Act "imposes criminal liability," as well as steep civil fines, "on a broad 
range of ordinary industrial and commercial activities." Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 
1102, 1103, 120 S. Ct. 860, 145 L. Ed. 2d 710 (2000) (THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). In this litigation, for example, for backfilling his own wet fields, Mr. Rapanos faced 
63 months in prison and hundreds of thousands of dollars in criminal and civil fines. See United 
States v. Rapanos, 235 F.3d 256, 260 (CA6 2000). 
The enforcement proceedings against Mr. Rapanos are a small part of the immense 
expansion of federal regulation of land use that has occurred under the Clean Water Act -- 
without any change in the governing statute -- during the past five Presidential administrations. 
In the last three decades, the Corps and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have 
interpreted their jurisdiction over "the waters of the United States" to cover 270-to-300 million 
acres of swampy lands in the United States—including half of Alaska and an area the size of 
California in the lower 48 States. And that was just the beginning. The Corps has also asserted 
jurisdiction over virtually any parcel of land containing a channel or conduit—whether man-
made or natural, broad or narrow, permanent or ephemeral—through which rainwater or 
drainage may occasionally or intermittently flow. On this view, the federally regulated "waters of 
the United States" include storm drains, roadside ditches, ripples of sand in the desert that may 
contain water once a year, and lands that are covered by floodwaters once every 100 years. 
Because they include the land containing storm sewers and desert washes, the statutory "waters 
of the United States" engulf entire cities and immense arid wastelands. In fact, the entire land 
area of the United States lies in some drainage basin, and an endless network of visible channels 
furrows the entire surface, containing water ephemerally wherever the rain falls. Any plot of land 
containing such a channel may potentially be regulated as a "water of the United States." 
I 
Congress passed the Clean Water Act (CWA or Act) in 1972. The Act's stated objective 
is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's 
waters." 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. §1251(a). The Act also states that "it is the policy of Congress to 
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, 
reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, 
                                                 
1
 In issuing permits, the Corps directs that "all factors which may be relevant to the proposal must be considered 
including the cumulative effects thereof: among those are conservation, economics, aesthetics, general 
environmental concerns, wetlands, historic properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain values, land 
use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply and conservation, water quality, energy needs, 
safety, food and fiber production, mineral needs, considerations of property ownership and, in general, the needs and 
welfare of the people." §320.4(a). 
 121 
preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the 
Administrator in the exercise of his authority under this chapter." §1251(b). 
One of the statute's principal provisions is 33 U.S.C. §1311(a), which provides that "the 
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." "The discharge of a pollutant" is 
defined broadly to include "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point 
source," §1362(12), and "pollutant" is defined broadly to include not only traditional 
contaminants but also solids such as "dredged spoil, . . . rock, sand, [and] cellar dirt," §1362(6). 
And, most relevant here, the CWA defines "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United 
States, including the territorial seas." §1362(7). 
The Act also provides certain exceptions to its prohibition of "the discharge of any 
pollutant by any person." §1311(a). Section 1342(a) authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to 
"issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, . . . notwithstanding section 1311(a) of this 
title." Section 1344 authorizes the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Corps, to "issue 
permits . . . for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified 
disposal sites." §1344(a), (d). It is the discharge of "dredged or fill material" -- which, unlike 
traditional water pollutants, are solids that do not readily wash downstream -- that we consider 
today. 
For a century prior to the CWA, we had interpreted the phrase "navigable waters of the 
United States" in the Act's predecessor statutes to refer to interstate waters that are "navigable in 
fact" or readily susceptible of being rendered so. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 10 Wall. 557, 
563, 19 L. Ed. 999 (1871); see also United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 
406, 61 S. Ct. 291, 85 L. Ed. 243 (1940). After passage of the CWA, the Corps initially adopted 
this traditional judicial definition for the Act's term "navigable waters." See 39 Fed. Reg. 12119, 
codified at 33 CFR §209.120(d)(1) (1974); see also Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army 
Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 168, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576 (2001) (SWANCC). After 
a District Court enjoined these regulations as too narrow, Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (DC 1975), the Corps adopted a far broader definition. 
See 40 Fed. Reg. 31324-31325 (1975); 42 Fed. Reg. 37144 (1977). The Corps' new regulations 
deliberately sought to extend the definition of "the waters of the United States" to the outer limits 
of Congress's commerce power.  
The Corps' current regulations interpret "the waters of the United States" to include, in 
addition to traditional interstate navigable waters, 33 CFR §328.3(a)(1) (2004), "all interstate 
waters including interstate wetlands," §328.3(a)(2); "all other waters such as intrastate lakes, 
rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie 
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of 
which could affect interstate or foreign commerce," §328.3(a)(3); "tributaries of [such] waters," 
§328.3(a)(5); and "wetlands adjacent to [such] waters [and tributaries] (other than waters that are 
themselves wetlands)," §328.3(a)(7). The regulation defines "adjacent" wetlands as those 
"bordering, contiguous [to], or neighboring" waters of the United States. §328.3(c). It 
specifically provides that "wetlands separated from other waters of the United States by man-
made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are 'adjacent wetlands.'" 
Ibid. 
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We first addressed the proper interpretation of 33 U.S.C. §1362(7)'s phrase "the waters of 
the United States"  in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 106 S. Ct. 
455, 88 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1985). That case concerned a wetland that "was adjacent to a body of 
navigable water," because "the area characterized by saturated soil conditions and wetland 
vegetation extended beyond the boundary of respondent's property to . . . a navigable waterway." 
Id., at 131, 106 S. Ct. 455, 88 L. Ed. 2d 419; see also 33 CFR §328.3(b) (2004). Noting that "the 
transition from water to solid ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt one," and that 
"the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends and land begins," 474 U.S., 
at 132, 106 S. Ct. 455, 88 L. Ed. 2d 419, we upheld the Corps' interpretation of "the waters of the 
United States" to include wetlands that "actually abutted on" traditional navigable waters. Id., at 
135, 106 S. Ct. 455, 88 L. Ed. 2d 419. 
Following our decision in Riverside Bayview, the Corps adopted increasingly broad 
interpretations of its own regulations under the Act. For example, in 1986, to "clarify" the reach 
of its jurisdiction, the Corps announced the so-called "Migratory Bird Rule," which purported to 
extend its jurisdiction to any intrastate waters "which are or would be used as habitat" by 
migratory  birds. 51 Fed. Reg. 41217; see also SWANCC, supra, at 163-164, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 
L. Ed. 2d 576. In addition, the Corps interpreted its own regulations to include "ephemeral 
streams" and "drainage ditches" as "tributaries" that are part of the "waters of the United States," 
see 33 CFR §328.3(a)(5), provided that they have a perceptible "ordinary high water mark" as 
defined in §328.3(e). 65 Fed. Reg. 12823 (2000). This interpretation extended "the waters of the 
United States" to virtually any land feature over which rainwater or drainage passes and leaves a 
visible mark -- even if only "the presence of litter and debris." 33 CFR §328.3(e). Prior to our 
decision in SWANCC, lower courts upheld the application of this expansive definition of 
"tributaries" to such entities as storm sewers that contained flow to covered waters during heavy 
rainfall, United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1340-1342 (CA11 1997), and dry arroyos 
connected to remote waters through the flow of groundwater over "centuries," Quivira Mining 
Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129 (CA10 1985). 
In SWANCC, we considered the application of the Corps' "Migratory Bird Rule" to "an 
abandoned sand and gravel pit in northern Illinois." 531 U.S., at 162, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 
2d 576. Observing that "it was the significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters' 
that informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview," id., at 167, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. 
Ed. 2d 576 (emphasis added), we held that Riverside Bayview did not establish "that the 
jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds that are not adjacent to open water." 531 U.S., at 168, 
121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576 (emphasis deleted). On the contrary, we held that 
"nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters," id., at 171, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576 -- 
which, unlike the wetlands at issue in Riverside Bayview, did not "actually abut on a navigable 
waterway," 531 U.S., at 167, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576 -- were not included as "waters 
of the United States." 
Following our decision in SWANCC, the Corps did not significantly revise its theory of 
federal jurisdiction under §1344(a). The Corps provided notice of a proposed rulemaking in light 
of SWANCC, 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (2003), but ultimately did not amend its published regulations. 
Because SWANCC did not directly address tributaries, the Corps notified its field staff that they 
"should continue to assert jurisdiction over traditional navigable waters . . . and, generally 
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speaking, their tributary systems (and adjacent wetlands)." 68 Fed. Reg. 1998. In addition, 
because SWANCC did not overrule Riverside Bayview, the Corps continues to assert 
jurisdiction over waters "'neighboring'" traditional navigable waters and their tributaries. 68 Fed. 
Reg. 1997 (quoting 33 CFR §328.3(c) (2003)). 
Even after SWANCC, the lower courts have continued to uphold the Corps' sweeping 
assertions of jurisdiction over ephemeral channels and drains as "tributaries." For example, 
courts have held that jurisdictional "tributaries" include the "intermittent flow of surface water 
through approximately 2.4 miles of natural streams and manmade ditches (paralleling and 
crossing under I-64)," Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., LLP, 344 F.3d 407, 410 (CA4 2003); a 
"roadside ditch" whose water took "a winding, thirty-two-mile path to the Chesapeake Bay," 
United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 702 (CA4 2003); irrigation ditches and drains that 
intermittently connect to covered waters, Community Assn. for Restoration of Environment v. 
Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 954-955 (CA9 2002); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation 
Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 534 (CA9 2001); and (most implausibly of all) the "washes and arroyos" of 
an "arid development site," located in the middle of the desert, through which "water courses . . . 
during periods of heavy rain," Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1118 (CA9 
2005).
2
 
These judicial constructions of "tributaries" are not outliers. Rather, they reflect the 
breadth of the Corps' determinations in the field. The Corps' enforcement practices vary 
somewhat from district to district because "the definitions used to make jurisdictional 
determinations" are deliberately left "vague." GAO Report 26; see also id., at 22. But district 
offices of the Corps have treated, as "waters of the United States," such typically dry land 
features as "arroyos, coulees, and washes," as well as other "channels that might have little water 
flow in a given year." Id., at 20-21. They have also applied that definition to such manmade, 
intermittently flowing features as "drain tiles, storm drains systems, and culverts." Id., at 24 
(footnote omitted). 
In addition to "tributaries," the Corps and the lower courts have also continued to define 
"adjacent" wetlands broadly after SWANCC. For example, some of the Corps' district offices 
have concluded that wetlands are "adjacent" to covered waters if they are hydrologically 
connected "through directional sheet flow during storm events," GAO Report 18, or if they lie 
within the "100-year floodplain" of a body of water -- that is, they are connected to the navigable 
water by flooding, on average, once every 100 years. Others have concluded that presence within 
200 feet of a tributary automatically renders a wetland "adjacent" and jurisdictional. Id., at 19. 
And the Corps has successfully defended such theories of "adjacency" in the courts, even after 
SWANCC's excision of "isolated" waters and wetlands from the Act's coverage. And even the 
most insubstantial hydrologic connection may be held to constitute a "significant nexus."  
                                                 
2
 We are indebted to the Sonoran court for a famous exchange, from the movie Casablanca (Warner Bros. 1942), 
which portrays most vividly the absurdity of finding the desert filled with waters: 
"'Captain Renault [Claude Rains]: "What in heaven's name brought you to Casablanca?" 
"'Rick [Humphrey Bogart]: "My health. I came to Casablanca for the waters." 
"'Captain Renault: "The waters? What waters? We're in the desert." 
"'Rick: "I was misinformed.'" 408 F.3d at 1117. 
124 
II 
In these consolidated cases, we consider whether four Michigan wetlands, which lie near 
ditches or man-made drains that eventually empty into traditional navigable waters, constitute 
"waters of the United States" within the meaning of the Act. The Rapanos and their affiliated 
businesses, deposited fill material without a permit into wetlands on three sites near Midland, 
Michigan. It is not clear whether the connections between these wetlands and the nearby drains 
and ditches are continuous or intermittent, or whether the nearby drains and ditches contain 
continuous or merely occasional flows of water. 
The United States brought civil enforcement proceedings against the Rapanos petitioners. 
The District Court found that the three described wetlands were "within federal jurisdiction" 
because they were "adjacent to other waters of the United States," and held petitioners liable for 
violations of the CWA at those sites.  On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed, holding that there was federal jurisdiction over the wetlands at all three sites 
because "there were hydrological connections between all three sites and corresponding adjacent 
tributaries of navigable waters." 376 F.3d at 643. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether these wetlands constitute "waters of the United 
States" under the Act, and if so, whether the Act is constitutional. 
III 
The Rapanos petitioners contend that the terms "navigable waters" and "waters of the 
United States" in the Act must be limited to the traditional definition of The Daniel Ball, which 
required that the "waters" be navigable in fact, or susceptible of being rendered so. See 77 U.S. 
557, 10 Wall., at 563, 19 L. Ed. 999. But this definition cannot be applied wholesale to the 
CWA. The Act uses the phrase "navigable waters" as a defined term, and the definition is simply 
"the waters of the United States." 33 U.S.C. §1362(7). Moreover, the Act provides, in certain 
circumstances, for the substitution of state for federal jurisdiction over "navigable waters . . . 
other than those waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to use in their natural 
condition or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport interstate or foreign commerce . 
. . including wetlands adjacent thereto." §1344(g)(1) (emphasis added). This provision shows 
that the Act's term "navigable waters" includes something more than traditional navigable 
waters. We have twice stated that the meaning of "navigable waters" in the Act is broader than 
the traditional understanding of that term, SWANCC, 531 U.S., at 167, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. 
Ed. 2d 576; Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S., at 133, 106 S. Ct. 455, 88 L. Ed. 2d 419. We have also 
emphasized, however, that the qualifier "navigable" is not devoid of significance, SWANCC, 
supra, at 172, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576. 
We need not decide the precise extent to which the qualifiers "navigable" and "of the 
United States" restrict the coverage of the Act. Whatever the scope of these qualifiers, the CWA 
authorizes federal jurisdiction only over "waters." 33 U.S.C. §1362(7). The only natural 
definition of the term "waters," our prior and subsequent judicial constructions of it, clear 
evidence from other provisions of the statute, and this Court's canons of construction all confirm 
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that "the waters of the United States" in §1362(7) cannot bear the expansive meaning that the 
Corps would give it. 
The Corps' expansive approach might be arguable if the CWA defined "navigable waters" 
as "water of the United States." But "the waters of the United States" is something else. The use 
of the definite article ("the") and the plural number ("waters") show plainly that §1362(7) does 
not refer to water in general. In this form, "the waters" refers more narrowly to water "as found 
in streams and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes," or "the 
flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams or bodies." Webster's 
New International  Dictionary 2882 (2d ed. 1954) (hereinafter Webster's Second). On this 
definition, "the waters of the United States" include only relatively permanent, standing or 
flowing bodies of water.  The definition refers to water as found in "streams," "oceans," "rivers," 
"lakes," and "bodies" of water "forming geographical features." Ibid. All of these terms connote 
continuously present, fixed bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily dry channels through which 
water occasionally or intermittently flows. Even the least substantial of the definition's terms, 
namely "streams," connotes a continuous flow of water in a permanent channel -- especially 
when used in company with other terms such as "rivers," "lakes," and "oceans." None of these 
terms encompasses transitory puddles or ephemeral flows of water. 
The restriction of "the waters of the United States" to exclude channels containing merely 
intermittent or ephemeral flow also accords with the commonsense understanding of the term. In 
applying the definition to "ephemeral streams," "wet meadows," storm sewers and culverts, 
"directional sheet flow during storm events," drain tiles, man-made drainage ditches, and dry 
arroyos in the middle of the desert, the Corps has stretched the term "waters of the United States" 
beyond parody. The plain language of the statute simply does not authorize this "Land Is Waters" 
approach to federal jurisdiction. 
Even if the phrase "the waters of the United States" were ambiguous as applied to 
intermittent flows, our own canons of construction would establish that the Corps' interpretation 
of the statute is impermissible. As we noted in SWANCC, the Government's expansive 
interpretation would "result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary 
power over land and water use." 531 U.S., at 174, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576. Regulation 
of land use, as through the issuance of the development permits sought by petitioners in both of 
these cases, is a quintessential state and local power. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 
768, n. 30, 102 S. Ct. 2126, 72 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1982); Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson 
Corporation, 513 U.S. 30, 44, 115 S. Ct. 394, 130 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1994). The extensive federal 
jurisdiction urged by the Government would authorize the Corps to function as a de facto 
regulator of immense stretches of intrastate land -- an authority the agency has shown its 
willingness to exercise with the scope of discretion that would befit a local zoning board. See 33 
CFR §320.4(a)(1) (2004). We ordinarily expect a "clear and manifest" statement from Congress 
to authorize an unprecedented intrusion  into traditional state authority. See BFP v. Resolution 
Trust Corporation, 511 U.S. 531, 544, 114 S. Ct. 1757, 128 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1994). The phrase 
"the waters of the United States" hardly qualifies. 
Likewise, just as we noted in SWANCC, the Corps' interpretation stretches the outer 
limits of Congress's commerce power and raises difficult questions about the ultimate scope of 
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that power. See 531 U.S., at 173, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576. (In developing the current 
regulations, the Corps consciously sought to extend its authority to the farthest reaches of the 
commerce power. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37127 (1977).) Even if the term "the waters of the United 
States" were ambiguous as applied to channels that sometimes host ephemeral flows of water 
(which it is not), we would expect a clearer statement from Congress to authorize an agency 
theory of jurisdiction that presses the envelope of constitutional validity. See Edward J. 
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 
108 S. Ct. 1392, 99 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1988).  
In sum, on its only plausible interpretation, the phrase "the waters of the United States" 
includes only those relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water 
"forming geographic features" that are described in ordinary parlance as "streams[,] . . . oceans, 
rivers, [and] lakes." See Webster's Second 2882. The phrase does not include channels through 
which water flows intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide drainage 
for rainfall. The Corps' expansive interpretation of the "the waters of the United States" is thus 
not "based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 
837, 843, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984). 
IV 
In Rapanos, the Sixth Circuit under §328.3(a)(5). 376 F.3d at 643 stated that, even if the 
ditches were not "waters of the United States," the wetlands were "adjacent" to remote traditional 
navigable waters in virtue of the wetlands' "hydrological connection" to them. This statement 
reflects the practice of the Corps' district offices, which may "assert jurisdiction over a wetland 
without regulating the ditch connecting it to a water of the United States." GAO Report 23. We 
therefore address in this Part whether a wetland may be considered "adjacent to" remote "waters 
of the United States," because of a mere hydrologic connection to them. 
In Riverside Bayview, we acknowledged that there was an inherent ambiguity in drawing 
the boundaries of any "waters": 
"The Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends and land 
begins. Our common experience tells us that this is often no easy task: the 
transition from water to solid ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt 
one. Rather, between open waters and dry land may lay shallows, marshes, 
mudflats, swamps, bogs—in short, a huge array of areas that are not wholly 
aquatic but nevertheless fall far short of being dry land. Where on this continuum 
to find the limit of 'waters' is far from obvious." Ibid. 
Because of this inherent ambiguity, we deferred to the agency's inclusion of wetlands 
"actually abutting" traditional navigable waters: "Faced with such a problem of defining the 
bounds of its regulatory authority," we held, the agency could reasonably conclude that a 
wetland that "adjoined" waters of the United States is itself a part of those waters. The difficulty 
of delineating the boundary between water and land was central to our reasoning in the case: "In 
view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by the Act itself and the 
inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable waters, the Corps' ecological 
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judgment about the relationship between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate 
basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the Act." Id., at 
134, 106 S. Ct. 455, 88 L. Ed. 2d 419 (emphasis added).  
When we characterized the holding of Riverside Bayview in SWANCC, we referred to 
the close connection between waters and the wetlands that they gradually blend into: "It was the 
significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters' that informed our reading of the 
CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes." 531 U.S., at 167, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576 
(emphasis added). In particular, SWANCC rejected the notion that the ecological considerations 
upon which the Corps relied in Riverside Bayview -- and upon which the dissent repeatedly 
relies today provided an independent basis for including entities like "wetlands" (or "ephemeral 
streams") within the phrase "the waters of the United States." SWANCC found such ecological 
considerations irrelevant to the question whether physically isolated waters come within the 
Corps' jurisdiction. It thus confirmed that Riverside Bayview rested upon the inherent ambiguity 
in defining where water ends and abutting ("adjacent") wetlands begin, permitting the Corps' 
reliance on ecological considerations only to resolve that ambiguity in favor of treating all 
abutting wetlands as waters. Isolated ponds were not "waters of the United States" in their own 
right, see 531 U.S., at 167, 171, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576, and presented no boundary-
drawing problem that would have justified the invocation of ecological factors to treat them as 
such. 
Therefore, only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are 
"waters of the United States" in their own right, so that there is no clear demarcation between 
"waters" and wetlands, are "adjacent to" such waters and covered by the Act. Wetlands with only 
an intermittent, physically remote hydrologic connection to "waters of the United States" do not 
implicate the boundary-drawing problem of Riverside Bayview, and thus lack the necessary 
connection to covered waters that we described as a "significant nexus" in SWANCC, 531 U.S., 
at 167, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576. Thus, establishing that wetlands such as those at the 
Rapanos sites are covered by the Act requires two findings: First, that the adjacent channel 
contains a "water of the United States," (i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to 
traditional interstate navigable waters); and second, that the wetland has a continuous surface 
connection with that water, making it difficult to determine where the "water" ends and the 
"wetland" begins. 
V 
Respondents and their amici urge that such restrictions on the scope of "navigable 
waters" will frustrate enforcement against traditional water polluters under 33 U.S.C. §§1311 and 
1342. Because the same definition of "navigable waters" applies to the entire statute, respondents 
contend that water polluters will be able to evade the permitting requirement of §1342(a) simply 
by discharging their pollutants into noncovered intermittent watercourses that lie upstream of 
covered waters.  
That is not so. Though we do not decide this issue, there is no reason to suppose that our 
construction today significantly affects the enforcement of §1342, inasmuch as lower courts 
applying §1342 have not characterized intermittent channels as "waters of the United States." 
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The Act does not forbid the "addition of any pollutant directly to navigable waters from any 
point source," but rather the "addition of any pollutant to navigable waters." §1362(12)(A) 
(emphasis added); §1311(a). Thus, from the time of the CWA's enactment, lower courts have 
held that the discharge into intermittent channels of any pollutant that naturally washes 
downstream likely violates §1311(a), even if the pollutants discharged from a point source do not 
emit "directly into" covered waters, but pass "through conveyances" in between. United States v. 
Velsicol Chemical Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945, 946-947 (WD Tenn. 1976) (a municipal sewer 
system separated the "point source" and covered navigable waters). See also Sierra Club v. El 
Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1137, 1141 (CA10 2005) (2.5 miles of tunnel separated 
the "point source" and "navigable waters"). 
In contrast to the pollutants normally covered by the permitting requirement of §1342(a), 
"dredged or fill material," which is typically deposited for the sole purpose of staying put, does 
not normally wash downstream,  and thus does not normally constitute an "addition . . . to 
navigable waters" when deposited in upstream isolated wetlands. §§1344(a), 1362(12). The Act 
recognizes this distinction by providing a separate permitting program for such discharges in 
§1344(a). It does not appear, therefore, that the interpretation we adopt today significantly 
reduces the scope of §1342 of the Act. 
Finally, respondents and many amici admonish that narrowing the definition of "the 
waters of the United States" will hamper federal efforts to preserve the Nation's wetlands. It is 
not clear that the state and local conservation efforts that the CWA explicitly calls for, see 33 
U.S.C. §1251(b), are in any way inadequate for the goal of preservation. In any event, a 
Comprehensive National Wetlands Protection Act is not before us, and the "wisdom" of such a 
statute, post, at 19 (opinion of STEVENS, J.), is beyond our ken. What is clear, however, is that 
Congress did not enact one when it granted the Corps jurisdiction over only "the waters of the 
United States." 
* 
* 
* 
VIII 
Because the Sixth Circuit applied the wrong standard to determine if these wetlands are 
covered "waters of the United States," and because of the paucity of the record in both of these 
cases, the lower courts should determine, in the first instance, whether the ditches or drains near 
each wetland are "waters" in the ordinary sense of containing a relatively permanent flow; and (if 
they are) whether the wetlands in question are "adjacent" to these "waters" in the sense of 
possessing a continuous surface connection that creates the boundary-drawing problem we 
addressed in Riverside Bayview. 
We vacate the judgments of the Sixth Circuit and remand both cases for further 
proceedings. 
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It is so ordered. 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, concurring. 
Five years ago, this Court rejected the position of the Army Corps of Engineers on the 
scope of its authority to regulate wetlands under the Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 
33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576 (2001) (SWANCC). The Corps had taken the view that its 
authority was essentially limitless; this Court explained that such a boundless view was 
inconsistent with the limiting terms Congress had used in the Act. Id., at 167-174, 121 S. Ct. 675, 
148 L. Ed. 2d 576. 
In response to the SWANCC decision, the Corps and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) initiated a rulemaking to consider "issues associated with the scope of waters that 
are subject to the Clean Water Act (CWA), in light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
[SWANCC]." 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (2003). The "goal of the agencies" was "to develop proposed 
regulations that will further the public interest by clarifying what waters are subject to CWA 
jurisdiction and affording full protection to these waters through an appropriate focus of Federal 
and State resources consistent with the CWA."  
Agencies delegated rulemaking authority are afforded generous leeway by the courts in 
interpreting the statute they are entrusted to administer under a statute such as the Clean Water 
Act. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-845, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 
694 (1984). Given the broad, somewhat ambiguous, but nonetheless clearly limiting terms 
Congress employed in the Clean Water Act, the Corps and the EPA would have enjoyed plenty 
of room to operate in developing some notion of an outer bound to the reach of their authority. 
The proposed rulemaking went nowhere. Rather than refining its view of its authority in 
light of our decision in SWANCC, and providing guidance meriting deference under our 
generous standards, the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially boundless view of the scope of its 
power. The upshot today is another defeat for the agency. 
It is unfortunate that no opinion commands a majority of the Court on precisely how to 
read Congress' limits on the reach of the Clean Water Act. Lower courts and regulated entities 
will now have to feel their way on a case-by-case basis.  
JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in the judgment. 
This case requires the Court to decide whether the term "navigable waters" in the Clean 
Water Act extends to wetlands that do not contain and are not adjacent to waters that are 
navigable in fact. In Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 
121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576 (2001) (SWANCC), the Court held, under the circumstances 
presented there, that to constitute "'navigable waters'" under the Act, a water or wetland must 
possess a "significant nexus" to waters that are or were navigable in fact or that could reasonably 
be so made. Id., at 167, 172, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576. In the instant cases neither the 
plurality opinion nor the dissent by JUSTICE STEVENS chooses to apply this test; and though 
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the Court of Appeals recognized the test's applicability, it did not consider all the factors 
necessary to determine whether the lands in question had, or did not have, the requisite nexus. In 
my view the cases ought to be remanded to the Court of Appeals for proper consideration of the 
nexus requirement. 
Twice before the Court has construed the term "navigable waters" in the Clean Water 
Act. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 106 S. Ct. 455, 88 L. Ed. 
2d 419 (1985), the Court upheld the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-
fact waterways. Id., at 139, 106 S. Ct. 455, 88 L. Ed. 2d 419.. The Court reserved, however the 
question of the Corps' authority to regulate wetlands other than those adjacent to open waters.  
In SWANCC, the Court considered the validity of the Corps' jurisdiction over ponds and 
mudflats that were isolated in the sense of being unconnected to other waters covered by the Act. 
531 U.S., at 171, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576. Asserting jurisdiction pursuant to a 
regulation called the "Migratory Bird Rule," the Corps argued that these isolated ponds were 
"waters of the United States" (and thus "navigable waters" under the Act) because they were 
used as habitat by migratory birds. The Court rejected this theory. "It was the significant nexus 
between wetlands and 'navigable waters,'" the Court held, "that informed our reading of the [Act] 
in Riverside Bayview Homes." Because such a nexus was lacking with respect to isolated ponds, 
the Court held that the plain text of the statute did not permit the Corps' action. Id., at 172, 121 S. 
Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576. 
Riverside Bayview and SWANCC establish the framework for the inquiry in the cases 
now before the Court: Do the Corps' regulations, as applied to the three wetlands parcels in 
Rapanos, constitute a reasonable interpretation of "navigable waters" as in Riverside Bayview or 
an invalid construction as in SWANCC? Taken together these cases establish that in some 
instances, as exemplified by Riverside Bayview, the connection between a nonnavigable water or 
wetland and a navigable water may be so close, or potentially so close, that the Corps may deem 
the water or wetland a "navigable water" under the Act. In other instances, as exemplified by 
SWANCC, there may be little or no connection. Absent a significant nexus, jurisdiction under 
the Act is lacking.  
In sum the plurality's opinion is inconsistent with the Act's text, structure, and purpose. 
The concerns addressed in SWANCC do not support the plurality's interpretation of the Act. In 
SWANCC, by interpreting the Act to require a significant nexus with navigable waters, the Court 
avoided applications -- those involving waters without a significant nexus—that appeared likely, 
as a category, to raise constitutional difficulties and federalism concerns. Here, in contrast, the 
plurality's interpretation does not fit the avoidance concerns it raises. On the one hand, when a 
surface-water connection is lacking, the plurality forecloses jurisdiction over wetlands that abut 
navigable-in-fact waters—even though such navigable waters were traditionally subject to 
federal authority. On the other hand, by saying the Act covers wetlands (however remote) 
possessing a surface-water connection with a continuously flowing stream (however small), the 
plurality's reading would permit applications of the statute as far from traditional federal 
authority as are the waters it deems beyond the statute's reach. Even assuming, then, that federal 
regulation of remote wetlands and nonnavigable waterways would raise a difficult Commerce 
Clause issue notwithstanding those waters' aggregate effects on national water quality, but cf. 
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Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1942); the plurality's reading is 
not responsive to this concern.  
While the plurality reads nonexistent requirements into the Act, the dissent reads a central 
requirement out -- namely, the requirement that the word "navigable" in "navigable waters" be 
given some importance. Although the Court has held that the statute's language invokes 
Congress' traditional authority over waters navigable in fact or susceptible of being made so, 
SWANCC, 531 U.S., at 172, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576 (citing Appalachian Power, 311 
U.S., at 407-408, 61 S. Ct. 291, 85 L. Ed. 243), the dissent would permit federal regulation 
whenever wetlands lie alongside a ditch or drain, however remote and insubstantial, that 
eventually may flow into traditional navigable waters. The deference owed to the Corps' 
interpretation of the statute does not extend so far. 
I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for consideration 
whether the specific wetlands at issue possess a significant nexus with navigable waters. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and 
JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting. 
The  question is whether regulations that have protected the quality of our waters for 
decades, that were implicitly approved by Congress, and that have been repeatedly enforced in 
case after case, must now be revised in light of the creative criticisms voiced by the plurality and 
JUSTICE KENNEDY today. Rejecting more than 30 years of practice by the Army Corps, the 
plurality disregards the nature of the congressional delegation to the agency and the technical and 
complex character of the issues at stake. JUSTICE KENNEDY similarly fails to defer 
sufficiently to the Corps, though his approach is far more faithful to our precedents and to 
principles of statutory interpretation than is the plurality's. 
In my view, the proper analysis is straightforward. The Army Corps has determined that 
wetlands adjacent to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters preserve the quality of our 
Nation's waters by, among other things, providing habitat for aquatic animals, keeping excessive 
sediment and toxic pollutants out of adjacent waters, and reducing downstream flooding by 
absorbing water at times of high flow. The Corps' resulting decision to treat these wetlands as 
encompassed within the term "waters of the United States" is a quintessential example of the 
Executive's reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision. See Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. 
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-845, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984). 
Our unanimous decision in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 
121, 106 S. Ct. 455, 88 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1985), was faithful to our duty to respect the work product 
of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government. Today's judicial amendment of 
the Clean Water Act is not. Our unanimous opinion in Riverside Bayview squarely controls these 
cases.  
I would affirm the judgments in both cases, and respectfully dissent from the decision of 
five Members of this Court to vacate and remand. I close, however, by noting an unusual feature 
of the Court's judgments in these cases. It has been our practice in a case coming to us from a 
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lower federal court to enter a judgment commanding that court to conduct any further 
proceedings pursuant to a specific mandate. In these cases, however, while both the plurality and 
JUSTICE KENNEDY agree that there must be a remand for further proceedings, their respective 
opinions define different tests to be applied on remand. Given that all four Justices who have 
joined this opinion would uphold the Corps' jurisdiction in both of these cases -- and in all other 
cases in which either the plurality's or JUSTICE KENNEDY's test is satisfied -- on remand each 
of the judgments should be reinstated if either of those tests is met.  
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Session 7. Police Power of the States 
BARRON v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE 
32 U.S. 243 (1833) 
This case was instituted by the plaintiff in error against the city of Baltimore to recover 
damages for injuries to the wharf- property of the plaintiff, arising from the acts of the 
corporation. Craig and Barron, of whom the plaintiff is survivor, were owners of an extensive 
and highly productive wharf in the eastern section of Baltimore, enjoying, at the period of their 
purchase of it, the deepest water in the harbour. 
The city, in the asserted exercise of its corporate authority over the harbour, the paving of 
streets, and regulating grades for paving, and over the health of Baltimore, directed from their 
accustomed and natural course, certain streams of water which flow from the range of hills 
bordering the city, and diverted them, partly by adopting new grades of streets, and partly by the 
necessary results of paving, and partly by mounds, embankments and other artificial means, 
purposely adapted to bend the course of the water to the wharf in question.  These streams 
becoming very full and violent in rains, carried down with them from the hills and the soil over 
which they ran, large masses of sand and earth, which they deposited along, and widely in front 
of the wharf of the plaintiff.  The alleged consequence was that the water was rendered so 
shallow that it ceased to be useful for vessels of any important burthen, lost its income, and 
became of little or no value as a wharf. 
This injury was asserted to have been inflicted by a series of ordinances of the 
corporation, between the years 1815 and 1821; and that the evil was progressive; and it was 
active and increasing even at the institution of this suit in 1822. 
At the trial of the cause in Baltimore county court, the plaintiff gave evidence tending to 
prove the original and natural course of the streams, the various works of the corporation from 
time to time to turn them in the direction of this wharf, and the ruinous consequences of these 
measures to the interests of the plaintiff.  It was not asserted by the defendants that any 
compensation for the injury was ever made or proffered; but they justified under the authority 
they deduced from the charter of the city, granted by the legislature of Maryland, and under 
several acts of the legislature conferring powers on the corporation in regard to the grading and 
paving of streets, the regulation of the harbour and its waters, and to the health of the city. 
The decision of Baltimore county court was against the defendants, and a verdict for four 
thousand five hundred dollars was rendered for the plaintiff.  An appeal was taken to the court of 
appeals, which reversed the judgment of Baltimore county court, and did not remand the case to 
that court for a further trial.  From this judgment the defendant in the court of appeals, 
prosecuted a writ of error to this court. 
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. 
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The judgment brought up by this writ of error having been rendered by the court of a 
state, this tribunal can exercise no jurisdiction over it, unless it be shown to come within the 
provisions of the twenty-fifth section of the judicial act. 
The plaintiff in error contends that it comes within that clause in the Fifth Amendment to 
the constitution, which inhibits the taking of private property for public use, without just 
compensation. He insists that this amendment, being in favour of the liberty of the citizen, ought 
to be so construed as to restrain the legislative power of a state, as well as that of the United 
States.  If this proposition be untrue, the court can take no jurisdiction of the cause. 
The question thus presented is, we think, of great importance, but not of much difficulty. 
The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for 
themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual states.  Each 
state established a constitution for itself, and, in that constitution, provided such limitations and 
restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated.  The people of 
the United States framed such a government for the United States as they supposed best adapted 
to their situation, and best calculated to promote their interests.  The powers they conferred on 
this government were to be exercised by itself; and the limitations on power, if expressed in 
general terms, are naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government created by 
the instrument.  They are limitations of power granted in the instrument itself; not of distinct 
governments, framed by different persons and for different purposes. 
If these propositions be correct, the Fifth Amendment must be understood as restraining 
the power of the general government, not as applicable to the states.  In their several 
constitutions they have imposed such restrictions on their respective governments as their own 
wisdom suggested; such as they deemed most proper for themselves.  It is a subject on which 
they judge exclusively, and with which others interfere no farther than they are supposed to have 
a common interest. 
The counsel for the plaintiff insists that the constitution was intended to secure the people 
of the several states against the undue exercise of power by their respective state governments; as 
well as against that which might be attempted by their general government. 
Had congress engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the constitutions of 
the several states by affording the people additional protection from the exercise of power by 
their own governments in matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have declared 
this purpose in plain and intelligible language. 
But it is universally understood, it is a part of the history of the day that the great 
revolution which established the Constitution of the United States, was not affected without 
immense oppositions. Fears were extensively entertained that those powers which the patriot 
statesmen, who then watched over the interests of our country, deemed essential to union, and to 
the attainment of those invaluable objects for which union was sought, might be exercised in a 
manner dangerous to liberty.  In almost every convention by which the constitution was adopted, 
amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended.  These amendments 
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demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government- not 
against those of the local governments. 
In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed, to quiet fears thus extensively 
entertained, amendments were proposed by the required majority in congress, and adopted by the 
states.  These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the 
state governments.  This court cannot so apply them. 
We are of opinion that the provision in the Fifth Amendment to the constitution, 
declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, is 
intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, 
and is not applicable to the legislation of the states.  We are therefore of opinion that there is no 
repugnancy between the several acts of the general assembly of Maryland, given in evidence by 
the defendants at the trial of this cause, in the court of that state, and the constitution of the 
United States.  This court, therefore, has no jurisdiction of the cause; and it is dismissed. 
FERTILIZING COMPANY v. HYDE PARK 
97 U.S. 659 (1878) 
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.  
This case was brought here by a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of 
Illinois.  
The alleged ground of our jurisdiction is, that the record presents a question of Federal 
jurisprudence.  A brief statement of the facts will be sufficient for the purposes of this opinion.  
The plaintiff in error was incorporated by an act of the legislature, approved March 8, 
1867.  The act declared that the corporation should "have continued succession and existence for 
the term of fifty years." The fourth and fifth sections are as follows: 
"SECT. 4.  Said corporation is hereby authorized and empowered to establish and 
maintain chemical and other works at the place designated herein, for the purpose 
of manufacturing and converting dead animals and other animal matter into an 
agricultural fertilizer, and into other chemical products, by means of chemical, 
mechanical, and other processes.  
"SECT. 5.  Said chemical works shall be established in Cook County, Illinois, at 
any point south of the dividing line between townships 37 and 38.  Said 
corporation may established and maintain depots in the city of Chicago, in said 
county, for the purpose of receiving and carrying off, from and out of the said 
city, any and all offal, deal animals, and other animal matter, which they may buy 
or own, or which may be delivered to them by the city authorities and other 
persons."  
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The company organized pursuant to the charter. Its capital stock is $250,000, all of which 
has been paid up and invested in its business.  
It owns ground and has its receiving depot about three miles from Chicago.  The cost of 
both exceeded $15,000.  Thither the offal arising from the slaughtering in the city was conveyed 
daily.  The chemical works of the company are in Cook County, south of the dividing line of 
townships 37 and 38, as required by the charter. When put there, the country  around was 
swampy and neatly uninhabited, giving little promise of further improvement.  They are within 
the present limits of the village of Hyde Park.  The offal procured by the company was 
transported from Chicago to its works through the village by the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne, and 
Chicago Railroad. There was no other railroad by which it could be done.  The court below, in its 
opinion, said: 
"An examination of the evidence in this case clearly shows that this factory was 
an unendurable nuisance to the inhabitants for many miles around its location; 
that the stench was intolerable, producing nausea, discomfort, if not sickness, to 
the people; that it depreciated the value of property, and was a source of immense 
annoyance.  It is, perhaps, as great a nuisance as could be found or even created; 
not affecting as many persons as if located in or nearer to the city, but as intense 
in its noisome effects as could be produced.  And the transportation of this putrid 
animal matter through the streets of the village, as we infer from the evidence, 
was offensive in a high degree both to sight and smell."  
This characterization is fully sustained by the testimony.  
In March, 1869, the charter of the village was revised by the legislature, and the largest 
powers of police and local government were conferred.  The trustees were expressly authorized 
to "define or abate nuisances which are, or may be, injurious to the public health," -- to compel 
the owner of any grocery-cellar, tallow-chandler shop, soap factory, tannery, or other 
unwholesome place, to cleanse or abate such place, as might be necessary, and to regulate, 
prohibit, or license breweries, tanneries, packing-houses, butcher-shops, stock-yards, or 
establishments for steaming and rendering lard, tallow-offal, or other substances, and all 
establishments and places where any nauseous, offensive, or unwholesome business was carried 
on.  The sixteenth section contains a proviso that the powers given should not be exercised 
against the Northwestern Fertilizing Company until after two years from the passage of the act.  
This limitation was evidently a compromise by conflicting parties.  
On the 5th of March, 1867, a prior act, giving substantially the same powers to the 
village, was approved and became a law.  This act provided that nothing contained in it should 
be construed to authorize the officers of the village to interfere with parties engaged in 
transporting any animal matter from Chicago, or from manufacturing it into a fertilizer or other 
chemical product.  The works here in question were in existence and in operation where they 
now are before the proprietors were incorporated.  
After the last revision of the charter the municipality passed an ordinance whereby, 
among other things, it was declared that no person should transport any offal or other offensive 
 137 
or unwholesome matter through the village, and that any person employed upon any train or 
team conveying such matter should be liable to a fine of not less than five nor more than fifty 
dollars for each offence; and that no person should maintain or carry on any offensive or 
unwholesome business or establishment within the limits of the village, nor within one mile of 
those limits.  Any person violating either of these provisions was subjected to a penalty of not 
less than fifty nor more than two hundred dollars for each offence, and to a like fine for each day 
the establishment or business should be continued after the first conviction.  
After the adoption of this ordinance and the expiration of two years from the passage of 
the act of 1869, notice was given to the company, that, if it continued to transport offal through 
the village as before, the ordinance would be enforced. This having no effect, thereafter, on the 
8th of January, 1873, the village authorities caused the engineer and other employes of the 
railway company, who were engaged in carrying the offal through the village, to be arrested and 
tried for violating the ordinance. They were convicted, and fined each fifty dollars. This bill was 
thereupon filed by the company.  It prays that further prosecutions may be enjoined, and for 
general relief.  The Supreme Court of the State, upon  appeal, dismissed the bill, and the 
company sued out this writ of error.  
The plaintiff in error claims that it is protected by its charter from the enforcement 
against it of the ordinances complained of, and that its charter is a contract within the meaning of 
the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States.  Whether this is so, is the question to 
be considered.  
The rule of construction in this class of cases is that it shall be most strongly against the 
corporation.  Every reasonable doubt is to be resolved adversely.  Nothing is to be taken as 
conceded but what is given in unmistakable terms, or by an implication equally clear.  The 
affirmative must be shown.  Silence is negation, and doubt is fatal to the claim.  This doctrine is 
vital to the public welfare. There is silence in the charter here in question as to taxation and as to 
liability for nuisances. Can exemption be claimed as to one more than the other?   
Continued succession is given to corporations to prevent embarrassment arising from the 
death of their members. One striking difference between the artificial and a natural person  is, 
that the latter can do anything not forbidden by law, while the former can do only what is so 
permitted.  Its powers and immunities depend primarily upon the law of its creation.  Beyond 
that it is subject, like individuals, to the will of the law-making power.  
If the intent of the legislature touching the point under consideration be sought in the 
charter and its history, it will be found to be in accordance with the view we have expressed as 
matter of law.  Three days before the charter of the plaintiff in error became a law, the legislature 
declared that the power of the village as to nuisances should not extent to those engaged in the 
business to which the charter relates.  The subject must have been fully present to the legislative 
mind when the company's charter was passed.  If it were intended the exemption should be 
inviolable, why was it not put in the company's charter as well as in that of the village? The 
silence of the former, under the circumstances, is a pregnant fact.  In one case it was doubtless 
known to all concerned that the restriction would be irrepealable, while in the other, that it could 
be revoked at any time.  In the revised village charter of 1869, the exemption was limited to two 
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years from the passage of the act.  This was equivalent to a declaration that after the lapse of the 
two years the full power of the village might be applied to the extent found necessary.  
Corporations in such cases are usually prolific of promises, and the legislature was willing to 
await the event for the time named.  
That a nuisance of a flagrant character existed, as found by the court below, is not 
controverted. We cannot doubt that the police power of the State was appliable and adequate to 
give an effectual remedy.  That power belonged to the States when the Federal Constitution was 
adopted.  They did not surrender it, and they all have it now. It extends to the entire property and 
business within their local jurisdiction.  Both are subject to it in all proper cases.  It rests upon 
the fundamental principle that every one shall so use his own as not to wrong and injure another.  
To regulate and abate nuisances is one of its ordinary functions.  The adjudged cases showing its 
exercise where corporate franchises were involved are numerous.  
In such cases, prescription, whatever the length of time, has no application.  Every day's 
continuance is a new offence, and it is no justification that the party complaining came 
voluntarily within its reach.  Pure air and the comfortable enjoyment of property are as much 
rights belonging to it as the right of possession and occupancy.  If population, where there was 
none before, approaches a nuisance, it is the duty of those liabel at once to put an end to it.  
Brady v. Weeks, 3 Barb. (N.Y.) 157.  
Perhaps the most striking application of the police power is in the destruction of buildings 
to prevent the spread of a conflagration.  This right existed by the common law,  and the  owner 
was entitled to no compensation.  Russel v. The Mayor of New York, 2 Den. (N.Y.) 461; 
American Print Works v. Lawrence, 23 N.J.L. 590.  
In the case before us it does not appear that factory could not be removed to some other 
place south of the designated line, where it could be operated, and where offal could be conveyed 
to it from the city by some other railroad, both without rightful objection.  The company had the 
choice of any point within the designated limits.  In that respect there is not restriction.  
The charter was a sufficient license until revoked; but we cannot regard it as a contract 
guaranteeing, in the locality originally selected, exemption for fifty years from the exercise of the 
police power of the State, however serious the nuisance might become in the future, by reason of 
the growth of population aroung it.  The owners had no such exemption before they were 
incorporated, and we think the charter did not give it to them.  
There is a class of nuisances designated "legalized." These are cases which rest for their 
sanction upon the intent of the law under which they are created, the paramount power of the 
legislature, the principle of "the greatest good of the greatest number," and the importance of the 
public benefit and convenience involved in their continuance.  The topic is full discussed in 
Wood on Nuisances, c. 23, p. 781.  This case is not within that category.  We need not, therefore, 
consider the subject in this opinion.  
Decree affirmed.  
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MR. JUSTICE STRONG dissented.   
CONCUR BY: MILLER; STRONG  
CONCUR 
MR. JUSTICE MILLER.  I concur in the judgment of the court, but cannot agree to the 
principal argument by which it is supported in the opinion.  As the question turns upon the 
existence of a contract and its nature, and not upon the power of the legislature to pass laws 
affecting the health and comfort of the community, a reference to them and to the power to 
repeal and modify them, where no contract is in question, is irrelevant.  It is said that such 
contract as may be found in the present case was made subject to the police power of the 
legislature over the class of subjects to which it relates.  The extent to which this is true depends 
upon the specific character of the contract and not upon the general doctrine.  This court has 
repeatedly decided that a State may by contract bargain away her right of taxation.  I have not 
concurred in that view, but it is the settled law of this court.  If a State may make a contract on 
that subject which it cannot abrogate or repeal, it may, with far more reason, make a contract for 
a limited time for the removal of a continuing nuisance from a populous city.  
The nuisance in the case before us was the very subject-matter of the contract.  The 
consideration of the contract was that the company might and should do certain things which 
affected the health and comfort of the community; and the State can no more impair the 
obligation of that contract than it can resume the right of taxation which it has on valid 
consideration agreed not to exercise, because in either case the wisdom of its legislation has 
become doubtful.  
If the good of the entire community requires the destruction of the company's rights 
under this contract, let the entire community pay therefor, by condemning the same for public 
use.  
But I agree that contracts like this must be clearly established, and the powers of the 
legislature can only be limited by the express terms of the contract, or by what is necessarily 
implied.  In the case before us, the company has two correlative rights in regard to the offal at the 
slaughter-houses in Chicago.  One is to have within the limit of that city depots for receiving it, 
and the other is to carry it to a place in Cook County south of the dividing line between 
townships 37 and 38.  The city or the State legislature is not forbidden by the contract to locate 
such depots within the city, where the health of the city requires; in other words, the company 
has not the choice of location within the city.  So, in regard to the chemical works.  The 
company, by its contract, is entitled to have them in Cook County south of the line mentioned; 
but the precise locality within that large space is a fair subject of regulation by the police power 
of the State, or of any town to which it has been delegated.  If within the limits of Hyde Park, 
that town may pass such laws concerning its health and comfort as may require the company to 
seek another location south of the designated line, without impairing the terms of the contract.  
It is said that the only railroad by which the company can carry offal passes through Hyde 
Park, and that the ordinance is fatal to the use of the road.  But the State did not contract that the 
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company might carry by railroad, still less by that road.  In short, in my opinion, there is within 
the limits of the original designation of boundary ample space where the company may exercise 
the power granted by the Contract, without violating the ordinances of Hyde Park, and they, as a 
police regulation of health and comfort, are therefore valid, as not infringing that contract.  
For this reason alone, I think the decree should be affirmed.  
MR. JUSTICE STRONG.  I cannot concur in the judgment directed by the court in this 
case.  That the charter granted by the legislature, March 8, 1867, and accepted by the company, 
is a contract protected by the Constitution of the United States, cannot be denied, in the face of 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518), and the long line of decisions that have 
followed in its wake and reasserted its  doctrines.  And if the company holds its rights under and 
by force of the contract, those rights cannot be taken away or impaired, either directly or 
indirectly, by any subsequent legislation.  This I believe to be incontrovertible, though the 
opinion just delivered may seem to express a doubt of it.  
Nothing, I admit, is more indefinite than the extent or limits of what is called police 
power.I will not undertake to define them.  Certainly it has limits.  I refer to what Judge Cooley 
has said in reference to the exercise of the power over private corporations.  Cooley, Const. Lim. 
577.  He says, "The exercise of the police power in these cases must be this: the regulations must 
have reference to the comfort, safety, or welfare of society; they must not be in conflict with any 
of the provisions of the charter, and they must not, under the pretence of regulations, take from 
the corporation any of the essential rights and privileges which the charter confers.  In short, they 
must be police regulations in fact, and not amendments of the charter in curtailment of the 
corporate franchise." This I understand to be entirely correct.  In support of it he refers to 
numerous decisions, which I will not cite, but to which I also refer.  There are many others fully 
sustaining the text as I have quoted it.  
There is no authority to the contrary. The cases relied upon to uphold the exercise of the 
power which the defendants in error assert are all clearly distinguishable.  They are not cases 
where the police power was exerted for the destruction of a chartered right distinctly granted by a 
contract.  
I have said enough to indicate the reasons for my dissent.  To me they appear very grave.  
In my judgment, the decision of the court denies the power of a State legislature to legalize, 
during a limited period, that which without its action would be a nuisance. It enables a 
subsequent legislature to take away, without compensation, rights which a former one has 
accorded, in the most positive terms, and for which a valuable consideration has been paid.  And, 
in its application to the present case, it renders it impossible to remove from Chicago the vast 
bodies of animal offal there accumulated; for if the ordinance of Hyde Park can stand, every 
other municipality around the city can enforce similar ordinances.  
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MUGLER v. KANSAS 
123 U.S. 623 (1887) 
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court. 
These cases involve an inquiry into the validity of certain statutes of Kansas relating to 
the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. 
In 1880, the people of Kansas adopted a stringent policy.  On the 2d of November of that 
year, they ratified an amendment to the state constitution, which declared that the manufacture 
and sale of intoxicating liquors should be forever prohibited in that State, except for medical, 
scientific, and mechanical purposes. 
In order to give effect to that amendment, the legislature passed an act, approved 
February 19, 1881, to take effect May 1, 1881, entitled “An act to prohibit the manufacture and 
sale of intoxicating liquors, except for medical, scientific, and mechanical purposes, and to 
regulate the manufacture and sale thereof for such excepted purposes.” 
The facts necessary to a clear understanding of the questions, common to these cases, are 
the following: Mugler and Ziebold & Hagelin were engaged in manufacturing beer at their 
respective establishments, (constructed specially for that purpose,) for several years prior to the 
adoption of the constitutional amendment of 1880.  They continued in such business in defiance 
of the statute of 1881. 
The buildings and machinery constituting these breweries are of little value if not used 
for the purpose of manufacturing beer; that is to say, if the statutes are enforced against the 
defendants the value of their property will be very materially diminished. 
The general question in each case is, whether the foregoing statutes of Kansas are in 
conflict with that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that “no State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.” 
That legislation by a State prohibiting the manufacture within her limits of intoxicating 
liquors, to be there sold or bartered for general use as a beverage, does not necessarily infringe 
any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States, is made clear 
by the decisions of this court, rendered before and since the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; to some of which, in view of questions to be presently considered, it will be well to 
refer. 
In the License Cases, 5 How. 504, the question was, whether certain statutes of 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire, relating to the sale of spirituous liquors were 
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.  In determining that question, it became 
necessary to inquire whether there was any conflict between the exercise by Congress of its 
power to regulate commerce with foreign countries, or among the several States, and the exercise 
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by a State of what are called police powers.  Although the members of the court did not fully 
agree as to the grounds upon which the decision should be placed, they were unanimous in 
holding that the statutes then under examination were not inconsistent with the Constitution of 
the United States, or with any act of Congress.  Chief Justice Taney said: “If any State deems the 
retail and internal traffic in ardent spirits injurious to its citizens, and calculated to produce 
idleness, vice, or debauchery, I see nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent it 
from regulating and restraining the traffic, or from prohibiting it altogether, if it thinks proper.” 
(p. 577.) 
In Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33, it was said, that “as a measure of police 
regulation, looking to the preservation of public morals, a state law prohibiting the manufacture 
and sale of intoxicating liquors is not repugnant to any clause of the Constitution of the United 
States.”  Finally, in Foster v. Kansas, 112 U.S. 201, 206, the court said that the question as to the 
constitutional power of a State to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors was 
no longer an open one in this court.  These cases rest upon the acknowledged right of the States 
of the Union to control their purely internal affairs, and, in so doing, to protect the health, morals, 
and safety of their people by regulations that do not interfere with the execution of the powers of 
the general government, or violate rights secured by the Constitution of the United States.  The 
power to establish such regulations, as was said in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203, reaches 
everything within the territory of a State not surrendered to the national government. 
It is, however, contended, that, although the State may prohibit the manufacture of 
intoxicating liquors for sale or barter within her limits, for general use as a beverage, “no 
convention or legislature has the right, under our form of government, to prohibit any citizen 
from manufacturing for his own use, or for export, or storage, any article of food or drink not 
endangering or affecting the rights of others.”  The argument made in support of the first branch 
of this proposition, briefly stated, is, that in the implied compact between the State and the 
citizen certain rights are reserved by the latter, which are guaranteed by the constitutional 
provision protecting persons against being deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law, and with which the State cannot interfere; that among those rights is that of 
manufacturing for one’s use either food or drink; and that while, according to the doctrines of the 
Commune, the State may control the tastes, appetites, habits, dress, food, and drink of the people, 
our system of government, based upon the individuality and intelligence of the citizen, does not 
claim to control him, except as to his conduct to others, leaving him the sole judge as to all that 
only affects himself. 
But by whom, or by what authority, is it to be determined whether the manufacture of 
particular articles of drink, either for general use or for the personal use of the maker, will 
injuriously affect the public?  Power to determine such questions, so as to bind all, must exist 
somewhere; else society will be at the mercy of the few, who, regarding only their own appetites 
or passions, may be willing to imperil the peace and security of the many, provided only they are 
permitted to do as they please.  Under our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch 
of the government.  It belongs to that department to exert what are known as the police powers of 
the State, and to determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or needful for the 
protection of the public morals, the public health, or the public safety. 
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It does not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of these 
ends, is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police powers of the State.  There are, of 
necessity, limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go.  While every possible 
presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of a statute, Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 
700, 718, the courts must obey the Constitution rather than the law-making department of 
government, and must, upon their own responsibility, determine whether, in any particular case, 
these limits have been passed.  If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect 
the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to 
those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of 
the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution. 
Keeping in view these principles, as governing the relations of the judicial and legislative 
departments of the government with each other, it is difficult to perceive any ground for the 
judiciary to declare that the prohibition by Kansas of the manufacture or sale, within her limits, 
of intoxicating liquors for general use there as a beverage, is not fairly adapted to the end of 
protecting the community against the evils which confessedly result from the excessive use of 
ardent spirits.  There is no justification for holding that the State, under the guise merely of 
police regulations, is here aiming to deprive the citizen of his constitutional rights; for we cannot 
shut out of view the fact, within the knowledge of all, that the public health, the public morals, 
and the public safety, may be endangered by the general use of intoxicating drinks; nor the fact, 
established by statistics accessible to everyone, that the idleness, disorder, pauperism, and crime 
existing in the country are, in some degree at least, traceable to this evil.  No one may rightfully 
do that which the law-making power, upon reasonable grounds, declares to be prejudicial to the 
general welfare. 
Undoubtedly the State, when providing, by legislation, for the protection of the public 
health, the public morals, or the public safety, is subject to the paramount authority of the 
Constitution of the United States, and may not violate rights secured or guaranteed by that 
instrument, or interfere with the execution of the powers confided to the general government. 
[I]f we do not misapprehend the position of defendants -- it is [also] contended that, as 
the primary and principal use of beer is as a beverage; as their respective breweries were erected 
when it was lawful to engage in the manufacture of beer for every purpose; as such 
establishments will become of no value as property, or, at least, will be materially diminished in 
value, if not employed in the manufacture of beer for every purpose; the prohibition upon their 
being so employed is, in effect, a taking or property for public use without compensation, and 
depriving the citizen of his property without due process of law.  In other words, although the 
State, in the exercise of her police powers, may lawfully prohibit the manufacture and sale, 
within her limits, of intoxicating liquors to be used as a beverage, legislation having that object 
in view cannot be enforced against those who, at the time, happen to own property, the chief 
value of which consists in its fitness for such manufacturing purposes, unless compensation is 
first made for the diminution in the value of their property, resulting from such prohibitory 
enactments. 
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This interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is inadmissible.  It cannot be supposed 
that the States intended, by adopting that Amendment, to impose restraints upon the exercise of 
their powers for the protection of the safety, health, or morals of the community. 
[T]he present case must be governed by principles that do not involve the power of 
eminent domain, in the exercise of which property may not be taken for public use without 
compensation.  A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by 
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any 
just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit.  Such 
legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful purposes, 
nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use by any one, 
for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests.  Nor can legislation of that 
character come within the Fourteenth Amendment, in any case, unless it is apparent that its real 
object is not to protect the community, or to promote the general well-being, but, under the guise 
of police regulation, to deprive the owner of his liberty and property, without due process of law. 
The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will 
be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not–and, consistently with 
the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be –burdened with the condition that the 
State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason 
of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the 
community.  The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a 
public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes 
depreciated, is very different from taking property for public use, or from depriving a person of 
his property without due process of law.  In the one case, a nuisance only is abated; in the other, 
unoffending property is taken away from an innocent owner. 
For the reasons stated, we are of opinion that the judgments of the Supreme Court of 
Kansas have not denied to Mugler, the plaintiff in error, any right, privilege, or immunity 
secured to him by the Constitution of the United States, and its judgment, in each case, is, 
accordingly, affirmed. 
DISSENT: MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the following separate opinion. 
I dissent from the judgment in the last case, the one coming from the Circuit Court of the 
United States. 
It is plain that great wrong will often be done to manufacturers of liquors, if legislation 
like that embodied in this thirteenth section can be upheld.  The Supreme Court of Kansas admits 
that the legislature of the State, in destroying the values of such kinds of property, may have 
gone to the utmost verge of constitutional authority.  In my opinion it has passed beyond that 
verge, and crossed the line which separates regulation from confiscation.  
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HADACHECK v. SEBASTIAN 
239 U.S. 394 (1915) 
Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court. 
Petitioner was convicted of a misdemeanor for the violation of an ordinance of the City 
of Los Angeles which makes it unlawful for any person to establish or operate a brick yard or 
brick kiln, or any establishment, factory or place for the manufacture or burning of brick within 
described limits in the city.  Sentence was pronounced against him and he was committed to the 
custody of defendant in error as Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles. 
Being so in custody he filed a petition in the Supreme Court of the State for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  The court rendered judgment discharging the writ and remanding petitioner to 
custody.  
The petition sets forth the reason for resorting to habeas corpus and that petitioner is the 
owner of a tract of land within the limits described in the ordinance upon which tract of land 
there is a very valuable bed of clay, of great value for the manufacture of brick of a fine quality, 
worth to him not less than $100,000 per acre or about $800,000 for the entire tract for brick-
making purposes, and not exceeding $60,000 for residential purposes or for any purpose other 
than the manufacture of brick.  That he has made excavations of considerable depth and covering 
a very large area of the property and that on account thereof the land cannot be utilized for 
residential purposes or any purpose other than that for which it is now used.  That he purchased 
the land because of such bed of clay and for the purpose of manufacturing brick; that it was at 
the time of purchase outside of the limits of the city and distant from dwellings and other 
habitations and that he did not expect or believe, nor did other owners of property in the vicinity 
expect or believe, that the territory would be annexed to the city.  That he has erected expensive 
machinery for the manufacture of bricks of fine quality which have been and are being used for 
building purposes in and about the city. 
That if the ordinance be declared valid he will be compelled to entirely abandon his 
business and will be deprived of the use of his property. 
That the manufacture of brick must necessarily be carried on where suitable clay is found 
and the clay cannot be transported to some other location, and, besides, the clay upon his 
property is particularly fine and clay of as good quality cannot be found in any other place within 
the city where the same can be utilized for the manufacture of brick.  That within the prohibited 
district there is one other brick yard besides that of plaintiff in error.   
That there is no reason for the prohibition of the business; that its maintenance cannot be 
and is not in the nature of a nuisance as defined in §3479 of the Civil Code of the State, and 
cannot be dangerous or detrimental to health or the morals or safety or peace or welfare or 
convenience of the people of the district or city. 
That the business is so conducted as not to be in any way or degree a nuisance; no noises 
arise therefrom, and no noxious odors, and that by the use of certain means (which are described) 
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provided and the situation of the brick yard an extremely small amount of smoke is emitted from 
any kiln and what is emitted is so dissipated that it is not a nuisance nor in any manner 
detrimental to health or comfort.  That during the seven years which the brick yard has been 
conducted no complaint has been made of it, and no attempt has ever been made to regulate it. 
That the city embraces 107.62 square miles in area and 75% of it is devoted to residential 
purposes; that the district described in the ordinance includes only about three square miles, is 
sparsely settled and contains large tracts of unsubdivided and unoccupied land; and that the 
boundaries of the district were determined for the sole and specific purpose of prohibiting and 
suppressing the business of petitioner and that of the other brick yard. 
That there are and were at the time of the adoption of the ordinance in other districts of 
the city thickly built up with residences brick yards maintained more detrimental to the 
inhabitants of the city.  That a petition was filed, signed by several hundred persons, representing 
such brick yards to be a nuisance and no ordinance or regulation was passed in regard to such 
petition and the brick yards are operated without hindrance or molestation.  That other brick 
yards are permitted to be maintained without prohibition or regulation. 
That no ordinance or regulation of any kind has been passed at any time regulating or 
attempting to regulate brick yards or inquiry made whether they could be maintained without 
being a nuisance or detrimental to health. 
That the ordinance does not state a public offense and is in violation of the constitution of 
the State and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
That the business of petitioner is a lawful one, none of the materials used in it are 
combustible, the machinery is of the most approved pattern and its conduct will not create a 
nuisance. 
There is an allegation that the ordinance if enforced fosters and will foster a monopoly 
and protects and will protect other persons engaged in the manufacture of brick in the city, and 
discriminates and will discriminate against petitioner in favor of such other persons who are his 
competitors, and will prevent him from entering into competition with them.   
The petition, after almost every paragraph, charges a deprivation of property, the taking 
of property without compensation, and that the ordinance is in consequence invalid. 
We have given this outline of the petition as it presents petitioner’s contentions, with the 
circumstances (which we deem most material) that give color and emphasis to them. 
But there are substantial traverses made by the return to the writ, among others, a denial 
of the charge that the ordinance was arbitrarily directed against the business of petitioner, and it 
is alleged that there is another district in which brick yards are prohibited. 
There was a denial of the allegations that the brick yard was conducted or could be 
conducted sanitarily or was not offensive to health.  And there were affidavits supporting the 
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denials.  In these it was alleged that the fumes, gases, smoke, soot, steam and dust arising from 
petitioner’s brick-making plant have from time to time caused sickness and serious discomfort to 
those living in the vicinity. 
There was no specific denial of the value of the property or that it contained deposits of 
clay or that the latter could not be removed and manufactured into brick elsewhere.  There was, 
however, a general denial that the enforcement of the ordinance would “entirely deprive 
petitioner of his property and the use thereof.”  
How the Supreme Court dealt with the allegations, denials and affidavits we can gather 
from its opinion.  The court said, through Mr. Justice Sloss, 165 California, p. 416: 
“The district to which the prohibition was applied contains about three square 
miles.  The petitioner is the owner of a tract of land, containing eight acres, more 
or less, within the district described in the ordinance.  He acquired his land in 
1902, before the territory to which the ordinance was directed had been annexed 
to the city of Los Angeles.  His land contains valuable deposits of clay suitable for 
the manufacture of brick, and he has, during the entire period of his ownership, 
used the land for brickmaking, and has erected thereon kilns, machinery and 
buildings necessary for such manufacture.  The land, as he alleges, is far more 
valuable for brickmaking than for any other purpose.” 
The court considered the business one which could be regulated and that regulation was 
not precluded by the fact “that the value of investments made in the business prior to any 
legislative action will be greatly diminished,” and that no complaint could be based upon the fact 
that petitioner had been carrying on the trade in that locality for a long period. 
And, considering the allegations of the petition, the denials of the return and the evidence 
of the affidavits, the court said that the latter tended to show that the district created had become 
primarily a residential section and that the occupants of the neighboring dwellings are seriously 
incommoded by the operations of petitioner; and that such evidence, “when taken in connection 
with the presumptions in favor of the propriety of the legislative determination, overcame the 
contention that the prohibition of the ordinance was a mere arbitrary invasion of private right, not 
supported by any tenable belief that the continuance of the business was so detrimental to the 
interests of others as to require suppression.” 
The court, on the evidence, rejected the contention that the ordinance was not in good 
faith enacted as a police measure and that it was intended to discriminate against petitioner or 
that it was actuated by any motive of injuring him as an individual. 
The charge of discrimination between localities was not sustained.  The court expressed 
the view that the determination of prohibition was for the legislature and that the court, without 
regard to the fact shown in the return that there was another district in which brick-making was 
prohibited, could not sustain the claim that the ordinance was not enacted in good faith but was 
designed to discriminate against petitioner and the other brick yard within the district.  “The facts 
before us,” the court finally said, “would certainly not justify the conclusion that the ordinance 
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here in question was designed, in either its adoption or its enforcement, to be anything but what 
it purported to be, viz., a legitimate regulation, operating alike upon all who came within its 
terms.” 
We think the conclusion of the court is justified by the evidence and makes it 
unnecessary to review the many cases cited by petitioner in which it is decided that the police 
power of a state cannot be arbitrarily exercised.  The principle is familiar, but in any given case it 
must plainly appear to apply. It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most 
essential powers of government, one that is the least limitable.  It may, indeed, seem harsh in its 
exercise, usually is on some individual, but the imperative necessity for its existence precludes 
any limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily.  A vested interest cannot be asserted against it 
because of conditions once obtaining.  Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 78.  To 
so hold would preclude development and fix a city forever in its primitive conditions.  There 
must be progress, and if in its march private interests are in the way they must yield to the good 
of the community.  The logical result of petitioner’s contention would seem to be that a city 
could not be formed or enlarged against the resistance of an occupant of the ground and that if it 
grows at all it can only grow as the environment of the occupations that are usually banished to 
the purlieus. 
The police power and to what extent it may be exerted we have recently illustrated in 
Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171.  The circumstances of the case were very much like those 
of the case at bar and give reply to the contentions of petitioner, especially that which asserts that 
a necessary and lawful occupation that is not a nuisance per se cannot be made so by legislative 
declaration.  There was a like investment in property, encouraged by the then conditions; a like 
reduction of value and deprivation of property was asserted against the validity of the ordinance 
there considered; a like assertion of an arbitrary exercise of the power of prohibition.  Against all 
of these contentions, and causing the rejection of them all, was adduced the police power.  There 
was a prohibition of a business, lawful in itself, there as here.  It was a livery stable there; a brick 
yard here.  They differ in particulars, but they are alike in that which cause and justify 
prohibition in defined localities–that is, the effect upon the health and comfort of the community. 
The ordinance passed upon prohibited the conduct of the business within a certain 
defined area in Little Rock, Arkansas.  This court said of it: granting that the business was not a 
nuisance per se, it was clearly within the police power of the State to regulate it, “and to that end 
to declare that in particular circumstances and in particular localities a livery stable shall be 
deemed a nuisance in fact and in law.”  And the only limitation upon the power was stated to be 
that the power could not be exerted arbitrarily or with unjust discrimination.  There was a 
citation of cases.  We think the present case is within the ruling thus declared. 
There is a distinction between Reinman v. Little Rock and the case at bar. There a 
particular business was prohibited which was not affixed to or dependent upon its locality; it 
could be conducted elsewhere.  Here, it is contended, the latter condition does not exist, and it is 
alleged that the manufacture of brick must necessarily be carried on where suitable clay is found 
and that the clay on petitioner’s property cannot be transported to some other locality.  This is 
not urged as a physical impossibility but only, counsel say, that such transportation and the 
transportation of the bricks to places where they could be used in construction work would be 
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prohibitive “from a financial standpoint.”  But upon the evidence the Supreme Court considered 
the case, as we understand its opinion, from the standpoint of the offensive effects of the 
operation of a brick yard and not from the deprivation of the deposits of clay, and distinguished 
Ex parte Kelso, 147 California, 609, wherein the court declared invalid an ordinance absolutely 
prohibiting the maintenance or operation of a rock or stone quarry within a certain portion of the 
city and county of San Francisco.  The court there said that the effect of the ordinance was “to 
absolutely deprive the owners of real property within such limits of a valuable right incident to 
their ownership, viz., the right to extract therefrom such rock and stone as they might find it to 
their advantage to dispose of.”  The court expressed the view that the removal could be regulated 
but that “an absolute prohibition of such removal under the circumstances,” could not be upheld. 
In the present case there is no prohibition of the removal of the brick clay; only a 
prohibition within the designated locality of its manufacture into bricks.  And to this feature of 
the ordinance our opinion is addressed.  Whether other questions would arise if the ordinance 
were broader, and opinion on such questions, we reserve. 
Petitioner invokes the equal protection clause of the Constitution and charges that it is 
violated in that the ordinance (1) “prohibits him from manufacturing brick upon his property 
while his competitors are permitted, without regulation of any kind, to manufacture brick upon 
property situated in all respects similarly to that of plaintiff in error”; and (2) that it “prohibits the 
conduct of his business while it permits the maintenance within the same district of any other 
kind of business, no matter how objectionable the same may be, either in its nature or in the 
manner in which it is conducted.” 
If we should grant that the first specification shows a violation of classification, that is, a 
distinction between businesses which was not within the legislative power, petitioner’s 
contention encounters the objection that it depends upon an inquiry of fact which the record does 
not enable us to determine.  It is alleged in the return to the petition that brickmaking is 
prohibited in one other district and an ordinance is referred to regulating business in other 
districts. To this plaintiff in error replied that the ordinance attempts to prohibit the operation of 
certain businesses having mechanical power and does not prohibit the maintenance of any 
business or the operation of any machine that is operated by animal power.  In other words, 
petitioner makes his contention depend upon disputable considerations of classification and upon 
a comparison of conditions of which there is no means of judicial determination and upon which 
nevertheless we are expected to reverse legislative action exercised upon matters of which the 
city has control. 
To a certain extent the latter comment may be applied to other contentions, and, besides, 
there is no allegation or proof of other objectionable businesses being permitted within the 
district, and a speculation of their establishment or conduct at some future time is too remote. 
In his petition and argument something is made of the ordinance as fostering a monopoly 
and suppressing his competition with other brickmakers. The charge and argument are too 
illusive. It is part of the charge that the ordinance was directed against him.  The charge, we have 
seen, was rejected by the Supreme Court, and we find nothing to justify it. 
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It may be that brick yards in other localities within the city where the same conditions 
exist are not regulated or prohibited, but it does not follow that they will not be. That petitioner’s 
business was first in time to be prohibited does not make its prohibition unlawful. And it may be, 
as said by the Supreme Court of the State, that the conditions justify a distinction. However, the 
inquiries thus suggested are outside of our province. 
There are other and subsidiary contentions which, we think, do not require discussion. 
They are disposed of by what we have said.  It may be that something else than prohibition 
would have satisfied the conditions.  Of this, however, we have no means of determining, and 
besides we cannot declare invalid the exertion of a power which the city undoubtedly has 
because of a charge that it does not exactly accommodate the conditions or that some other 
exercise would have been better or less harsh.  We must accord good faith to the city in the 
absence of a clear showing to the contrary and an honest exercise of judgment upon the 
circumstances which induced its action. 
Judgment affirmed. 
PENNSYLVANIA COAL CO. v. MAHON 
260 U.S. 393 (1922) 
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This is a bill in equity brought by the defendants in error to prevent the Pennsylvania 
Coal Company from mining under their property in such way as to remove the supports and 
cause a subsidence of the surface and of their house.  The bill sets out a deed executed by the 
Coal Company in 1878, under which the plaintiffs claim.  The deed conveys the surface, but in 
express terms reserves the right to remove all the coal under the same, and the grantee takes the 
premises with the risk, and waives all claim for damages that may arise from mining out the coal. 
But the plaintiffs say that whatever may have been the Coal Company’s rights, they were taken 
away by an Act of Pennsylvania, approved May 27, 1921, P.L. 1198, commonly known there as 
the Kohler Act. 
The Supreme Court of the State [determined] . . . that the defendant had contract and 
property rights protected by the Constitution of the United States, but held that the statute was a 
legitimate exercise of the police power and directed a decree for the plaintiffs.  A writ of error 
was granted bringing the case to this Court. 
The statute forbids the mining of anthracite coal in such way as to cause the subsidence 
of, among other things, any structure used as a human habitation, with certain exceptions, 
including among them land where the surface is owned by the owner of the underlying coal and 
is distant more than one hundred and fifty feet from any improved property belonging to any 
other person. As applied to this case the statute is admitted to destroy previously existing rights 
of property and contract.  The question is whether the police power can be stretched so far. 
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.  As long recognized, some 
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values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power.  But 
obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are 
gone.  One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. 
When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of 
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.  So the question depends upon the 
particular facts.  The greatest weight is given to the judgment of the legislature, but it always is 
open to interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its constitutional power. 
This is the case of a single private house.  No doubt there is a public interest even in this, 
as there is in every purchase and sale and in all that happens within the commonwealth.  Some 
existing rights may be modified even in such a case.  Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368.  But 
usually in ordinary private affairs the public interest does not warrant much of this kind of 
interference.  A source of damage to such a house is not a public nuisance even if similar damage 
is inflicted on others in different places.  The damage is not common or public.  Wesson v. 
Washburn Iron Co., 13 Allen, 95, 103.  The extent of the public interest is shown by the statute 
to be limited, since the statute ordinarily does not apply to land when the surface is owned by the 
owner of the coal.  Furthermore, it is not justified as a protection of personal safety.  That could 
be provided for by notice.  Indeed the very foundation of this bill is that the defendant gave 
timely notice of its intent to mine under the house.  On the other hand the extent of the taking is 
great.  It purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land–a very 
valuable estate–and what is declared by the Court below to be a contract hitherto binding the 
plaintiffs.  If we were called upon to deal with the plaintiffs’ position alone, we should think it 
clear that the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a 
destruction of the defendant’s constitutionally protected rights. 
It is our opinion that the act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police power, so far 
as it affects the mining of coal under streets or cities in places where the right to mine such coal 
has been reserved.  As said in a Pennsylvania case, “For practical purposes, the right to coal 
consists in the right to mine it.”  Commonwealth v. Clearview Coal Co., 256 Pa. St. 328, 331. 
What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with profit.  To make it 
commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for 
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.  This we think that we are warranted in 
assuming that the statute does. 
It is true that in Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, it was held competent 
for the legislature to require a pillar of coal to be left along the line of adjoining property, that, 
with the pillar on the other side of the line, would be a barrier sufficient for the safety of the 
employees of either mine in case the other should be abandoned and allowed to fill with water. 
But that was a requirement for the safety of employees invited into the mine, and secured an 
average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a justification of various laws. 
The rights of the public in a street purchased or laid out by eminent domain are those that 
it has paid for.  If in any case its representatives have been so short sighted as to acquire only 
surface rights without the right of support, we see no more authority for supplying the latter 
without compensation than there was for taking the right of way in the first place and refusing to 
pay for it because the public wanted it very much.  The protection of private property in the Fifth 
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Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken 
for such use without compensation.  A similar assumption is made in the decisions upon the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 605. When this 
seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency 
of human nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property 
disappears.  But that cannot be accomplished in this way under the Constitution of the United 
States. 
The general rule is at least that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. It may be doubted how far exceptional 
cases, like the blowing up of a house to stop a conflagration, go–and if they go beyond the 
general rule, whether they do not stand as much upon tradition as upon principle.  Bowditch v. 
Boston, 101 U.S. 16.  In general it is not plain that a man’s misfortunes or necessities will justify 
his shifting the damages to his neighbor’s shoulders.  Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. Co., 172 
Mass. 488, 489.  We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public 
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional 
way of paying for the change.  As we already have said, this is a question of degree–and 
therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions.  But we regard this as going beyond any 
of the cases decided by this Court. 
We assume, of course, that the statute was passed upon the conviction that an exigency 
existed that would warrant it, and we assume that an exigency exists that would warrant the 
exercise of eminent domain.  But the question at bottom is upon whom the loss of the changes 
desired should fall.  So far as private persons or communities have seen fit to take the risk of 
acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk has become a danger 
warrants the giving to them greater rights than they bought. 
Decree reversed. 
Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting. 
The Kohler Act prohibits, under certain conditions, the mining of anthracite coal within 
the limits of a city in such a manner or to such an extent “as to cause the subsidence of any 
dwelling or other structure used as a human habitation, or any factory, store, or other industrial 
or mercantile establishment in which human labor is employed.”  Coal in place is land; and the 
right of the owner to use his land is not absolute.  He may not so use it as to create a public 
nuisance; and uses, once harmless, may, owing to changed conditions, seriously threaten the 
public welfare.  Whenever they do, the legislature has power to prohibit such uses without 
paying compensation; and the power to prohibit extends alike to the manner, the character and 
the purpose of the use.  Are we justified in declaring that the Legislature of Pennsylvania has, in 
restricting the right to mine anthracite, exercised this power so arbitrarily as to violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment”? 
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power 
deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the 
State of rights in property without making compensation.  But restriction imposed to protect the 
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public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking.  The restriction here in 
question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use.  The property so restricted remains in the 
possession of its owner.  The State does not appropriate it or make any use of it.  The State 
merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the 
public.  Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious,–as it may because of further change 
in local or social conditions,–the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be 
free to enjoy his property as heretofore. 
It is said that one fact for consideration in determining whether the limits of the police 
power have been exceeded is the extent of the resulting diminution in value; and that here the 
restriction destroys existing rights of property and contract.  But values are relative.  If we are to 
consider the value of the coal kept in place by the restriction, we should compare it with the 
value of all other parts of the land.  That is, with the value not of the coal alone, but with the 
value of the whole property.  The rights of an owner as against the public are not increased by 
dividing the interests in his property into surface and subsoil. 
[I]t is said that these provisions of the act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police 
power where the right to mine such coal has been reserved.  The conclusion seems to rest upon 
the assumption that in order to justify such exercise of the police power there must be “an 
average reciprocity of advantage” as between the owner of the property restricted and the rest of 
the community; and that here such reciprocity is absent.  But where the police power is 
exercised, not to confer benefits upon property owners, but to protect the public from detriment 
and danger, there is, in my opinion, no room for considering reciprocity of advantage. 
ADKINS v. CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
261 U.S. 525 (1923)  
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented for determination by these appeals is the constitutionality of the 
Act of September 19, 1918, providing for the fixing of minimum wages for women and children 
in the District of Columbia.  40 Stat. 960, c. 174. 
It is declared (§23) that the purposes of the act are "to protect the women and minors of 
the District from conditions detrimental to their health and morals, resulting from wages which 
are inadequate to maintain decent standards of living; and the Act in each of its provisions and in 
its entirety shall be interpreted to effectuate these purposes." 
The appellee in the first case is a corporation maintaining a hospital for children in the 
District.  It employs a large number of women in various capacities, with whom it had agreed 
upon rates of wages and compensation satisfactory to such employees, but which in some 
instances were less than the minimum wage fixed by an order of the board made in pursuance of 
the act.  The women with whom appellee had so contracted were all of full age and under no 
legal disability.  The instant suit was brought by the appellee in the Supreme Court of the District 
to restrain the board from enforcing or attempting to enforce its order on the ground that the 
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same was in contravention of the Constitution, and particularly the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
The judicial duty of passing upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress is one of 
great gravity and delicacy.  The statute here in question has successfully borne the scrutiny of the 
legislative branch of the government, which, by enacting it, has affirmed its validity; and that 
determination must be given great weight.  This Court, by an unbroken line of decisions from 
Chief Justice Marshall to the present day, has steadily adhered to the rule that every possible 
presumption is in favor of the validity of an act of Congress until overcome beyond rational 
doubt.  But if by clear and indubitable demonstration a statute be opposed to the Constitution we 
have no choice but to say so.  The Constitution, by its own terms, is the supreme law of the land, 
emanating from the people, the repository of ultimate sovereignty under our form of government. 
The statute now under consideration is attacked upon the ground that it authorizes an 
unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract included within the guaranties of the 
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.  That the right to contract about one's affairs is a 
part of the liberty of the individual protected by this clause, is settled by the decisions of this 
Court and is no longer open to question.  Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591; New York 
Life Insurance Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 373-374; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 10, 14; 
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45; Butchers' Union Co. v. 
Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421.  Within this liberty are 
contracts of employment of labor.  In making such contracts, generally speaking, the parties have 
an equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they can as the result of private 
bargaining. 
There is, of course, no such thing as absolute freedom of contract.  It is subject to a great 
variety of restraints.  But freedom of contract is, nevertheless, the general rule and restraint the 
exception.... 
It has been said that legislation of the kind now under review is required in the interest of 
social justice, for whose ends freedom of contract may lawfully be subjected to restraint. The 
liberty of the individual to do as he pleases, even in innocent matters, is not absolute.  It must 
frequently yield to the common good, and the line beyond which the power of interference may 
not be pressed is neither definite nor unalterable but may be made to move, within limits not well 
defined, with changing need and circumstance.  Any attempt to fix a rigid boundary would be 
unwise as well as futile.  But, nevertheless, there are limits to the power, and when these have 
been passed, it becomes the plain duty of the courts in the proper exercise of their authority to so 
declare.  To sustain the individual freedom of action contemplated by the Constitution, is not to 
strike down the common good but to exalt it; for surely the good of society as a whole cannot be 
better served than by the preservation against arbitrary restraint of the liberties of its constituent 
members. 
It follows from what has been said that the act in question passes the limit prescribed by 
the Constitution, and, accordingly, the decrees of the court below are 
Affirmed. 
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Session 8. State Regulation of Land Use 
VILLAGE OF EUCLID v. AMBLER REALTY CO. 
272 U.S. 365 (1926) 
Judges:  Taft, Holmes, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland, Butler, 
Sanford, Stone 
Mr. Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Village of Euclid is an Ohio municipal corporation.  It adjoins and practically is a 
suburb of the City of Cleveland.  Its estimated population is between 5,000 and 10,000, and its 
area from twelve to fourteen square miles, the greater part of which is farm lands or unimproved 
acreage.  It lies, roughly, in the form of a parallelogram measuring approximately three and one-
half miles each way.  East and west it is traversed by three principal highways: Euclid Avenue, 
through the southerly border, St. Clair Avenue, through the central portion, and Lake Shore 
Boulevard, through the northerly border in close proximity to the shore of Lake Erie.  The Nickel 
Plate railroad lies from 1,500 to 1,800 feet north of Euclid Avenue, and the Lake Shore railroad 
1,600 feet farther to the north.  The three highways and the two railroads are substantially 
parallel. 
Appellee is the owner of a tract of land containing 68 acres, situated in the westerly end 
of the village, abutting on Euclid Avenue to the south and the Nickel Plate railroad to the north. 
Adjoining this tract, both on the east and on the west, there have been laid out restricted 
residential plats upon which residences have been erected. 
On November 13, 1922, an ordinance was adopted by the Village Council, establishing a 
comprehensive zoning plan for regulating and restricting the location of trades, industries, 
apartment houses, two-family houses, single family houses, etc., the lot area to be built upon, the 
size and height of buildings, etc. 
The entire area of the village is divided by the ordinance into six classes of use districts, 
denominated U-1 to U-6, inclusive; three classes of height districts, denominated H-1 to H-3, 
inclusive; and four classes of area districts, denominated A-1 to A-4, inclusive.  The use districts 
are classified in respect of the buildings which may be erected within their respective limits, as 
follows: U-1 is restricted to single family dwellings, public parks, water towers and reservoirs...; 
U-2 is extended to include two-family dwellings; U-3 is further extended to include apartment 
houses, hotels, churches, schools, public libraries, museums, private clubs, community center 
buildings, hospitals, sanitariums, public playgrounds and recreation buildings, and a city hall and 
courthouse; U-4 is further extended to include banks, offices, studios, telephone exchanges, fire 
and police stations, restaurants, theatres and moving picture shows, retail stores and shops, sales 
offices, sample rooms, wholesale stores for hardware, drugs and groceries, stations for gasoline 
and oil (not exceeding 1,000 gallons storage) and for ice delivery, skating rinks and dance halls, 
electric substations, job and newspaper printing, public garages for motor vehicles, stables and 
wagon sheds (not exceeding five horses, wagons or motor trucks) and distributing stations for 
central store and commercial enterprises; U-5 is further extended to include billboards and 
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advertising signs (if permitted), warehouses, ice and ice cream manufacturing and cold storage 
plants, bottling works, milk bottling and central distribution stations, laundries, carpet cleaning, 
dry cleaning and dyeing establishments,  blacksmith, horseshoeing, wagon and motor vehicle 
repair shops, freight stations, street car barns, stables and wagon sheds (for more than five 
horses, wagons or motor trucks), and wholesale produce markets and salesrooms; U-6 is further 
extended to include plants for sewage disposal and for producing gas, garbage and refuse 
incineration, scrap iron, junk, scrap paper and rag storage, aviation fields, cemeteries, 
crematories, penal and correctional institutions, insane and feeble minded institutions, storage of 
oil and gasoline (not to exceed 25,000 gallons), and manufacturing and industrial operations of 
any kind other than, and any public utility not included in, a class U-1, U-2, U-3, U-4 or U-5 use. 
There is a seventh class of uses which is prohibited altogether. 
Class U-1 is the only district in which buildings are restricted to those enumerated.  In the 
other classes the uses are cumulative; that is to say, uses in class U-2 include those enumerated in 
the preceding class, U-1; class U-3 includes uses enumerated in the preceding classes, U-2 and 
U-1; and so on.  In addition to the enumerated uses, the ordinance provides for accessory uses, 
that is, for uses customarily incident to the principal use, such as private garages.  Many 
regulations are provided in respect of such accessory uses. 
The height districts are classified as follows: In class H-1, buildings are limited to a 
height of two and one-half stories or thirty-five feet; in class H-2, to four stories or fifty feet; in 
class H-3, to eighty feet.  To all of these, certain exceptions are made, as in the case of church 
spires, water tanks, etc. 
The classification of area districts is: In A-1 districts, dwellings or apartment houses to 
accommodate more than one family must have at least 5,000 square feet for interior lots and at 
least 4,000 square feet for corner lots; in A-2 districts, the area must be at least 2,500 square feet 
for interior lots, and 2,000 square feet for corner lots; in A-3 districts, the limits are 1,250 and 
1,000 square feet, respectively; in A-4 districts, the limits are 900 and 700 square feet, 
respectively.  The ordinance contains, in great variety and detail, provisions in respect of width 
of lots, front, side and rear yards, and other matters, including restrictions and regulations as to 
the use of bill boards, sign boards and advertising signs. 
A single family dwelling consists of a basement and not less than three rooms and a 
bathroom.  A two-family dwelling consists of a basement and not less than four living rooms and 
a bathroom for each family; and is further described as a detached dwelling for the occupation of 
two families, one having its principal living rooms on the first floor and the other on the second 
floor. 
Appellee’s tract of land comes under U-2, U-3 and U-6.  The first strip of 620 feet 
immediately north of Euclid Avenue falls in class U-2, the next 130 feet to the north, in U-3, and 
the remainder in U-6.  The uses of the first 620 feet, therefore, do not include apartment houses, 
hotels, churches, schools, or other public and semi-public buildings, or other uses enumerated in 
respect of U-3 to U-6, inclusive.  The uses of the next 130 feet include all of these, but exclude 
industries, theatres, banks, shops, and the various other uses set forth in respect of U-4 to U-6, 
inclusive. 
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The lands lying between the two railroads for the entire length of the village area and 
extending some distance on either side to the north and south, having an average width of about 
1,600 feet, are left open, with slight exceptions, for industrial and all other uses.  This includes 
the larger part of appellee’s tract.  Approximately one-sixth of the area of the entire village is 
included in U-5 and U-6 use districts.  That part of the village lying south of Euclid Avenue is 
principally in U-1 districts.  The lands lying north of Euclid Avenue and bordering on the long 
strip just described are included in U-1, U-2, U-3 and U-4 districts, principally in U-2. 
The ordinance is assailed on the grounds that it is in derogation of §1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution in that it deprives appellee of liberty and property 
without due process of law and denies it the equal protection of the law, and that it offends 
against certain provisions of the Constitution of the State of Ohio.  The prayer of the bill is for an 
injunction restraining the enforcement of the ordinance and all attempts to impose or maintain as 
to appellee’s property any of the restrictions, limitations or conditions.  The court below held the 
ordinance to be unconstitutional and void, and enjoined its enforcement.  297 Fed. 307. 
Before proceeding to a consideration of the case, it is necessary to determine the scope of 
the inquiry.  The bill alleges that the tract of land in question is vacant and has been held for 
years for the purpose of selling and developing it for industrial uses, for which it is especially 
adapted, being immediately in the path of progressive industrial development; that for such uses 
it has a market value of about $10,000 per acre, but if the use be limited to residential purposes 
the market value is not in excess of $2,500 per acre; that the first 200 feet of the parcel back from 
Euclid Avenue, if unrestricted in respect of use, has a value of $150 per front foot, but if limited 
to residential uses, and ordinary mercantile business be excluded therefrom, its value is not in 
excess of $50 per front foot. 
It is specifically averred that the ordinance attempts to restrict and control the lawful uses 
of appellee’s land so as to confiscate and destroy a great part of its value; that it is being enforced 
in accordance with its terms; that prospective buyers of land for industrial, commercial and 
residential uses in the metropolitan district of Cleveland are deterred from buying any part of this 
land because of the existence of the ordinance and the necessity thereby entailed of conducting 
burdensome and expensive litigation in order to vindicate the right to use the land for lawful and 
legitimate purposes; that the ordinance constitutes a cloud upon the land, reduces and destroys its 
value, and has the effect of diverting the normal industrial, commercial and residential 
development thereof to other and less favorable locations. 
The record goes no farther than to show, as the lower court found, that the normal, and 
reasonably to be expected, use and development of that part of appellee’s land adjoining Euclid 
Avenue is for general trade and commercial purposes, particularly retail stores and like 
establishments, and that the normal, and reasonably to be expected, use and development of the 
residue of the land is for industrial and trade purposes.  Whatever injury is inflicted by the mere 
existence and threatened enforcement of the ordinance is due to restrictions in respect of these 
and similar uses; to which perhaps should be added–if not included in the foregoing–restrictions 
in respect of apartment houses. 
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We proceed, then, to a consideration of those provisions of the ordinance to which the 
case as it is made relates, first disposing of a preliminary matter.  A motion was made in the 
court below to dismiss the bill on the ground that, because complainant [appellee] had made no 
effort to obtain a building permit or apply to the zoning board of appeals for relief as it might 
have done under the terms of the ordinance, the suit was premature.  The motion was properly 
overruled.  The effect of the allegations of the bill is that the ordinance of its own force operates 
greatly to reduce the value of appellee’s lands and destroy their marketability for industrial, 
commercial and residential uses; and the attack is directed, not against any specific provision or 
provisions, but against the ordinance as an entirety.  Assuming the premises, the existence and 
maintenance of the ordinance, in effect, constitutes a present invasion of appellee’s property 
rights and a threat to continue it.  Under these circumstances, the equitable jurisdiction is clear. 
Building zone laws are of modern origin.  They began in this country about twenty-five 
years ago.  Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with the great increase 
and concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly are developing, which 
require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation 
of private lands in urban communities.  Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of 
which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a 
century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and 
oppressive.  Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons 
analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the advent of automobiles and 
rapid transit street railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. 
And in this there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never 
varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different 
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation.  In a changing world, 
it is impossible that it should be otherwise.  But although a degree of elasticity is thus imparted, 
not to the meaning, but to the application of constitutional principles, statutes and ordinances, 
which, after giving due weight to the new conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the 
Constitution, of course, must fall. 
The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regulations, must find their 
justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare.  The line which 
in this field separates the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of 
precise delimitation.  It varies with circumstances and conditions.  A regulatory zoning 
ordinance, which would be clearly valid as applied to the great cities, might be clearly invalid as 
applied to rural communities.  In solving doubts, the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, 
which lies at the foundation of so much of the common law of nuisances, ordinarily will furnish 
a fairly helpful clue.  And the law of nuisances, likewise, may be consulted, not for the purpose 
of controlling, but for the helpful aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the scope of, 
the power.  Thus the question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a building of a 
particular kind or for a particular use, like the question whether a particular thing is a nuisance, is 
to be determined, not by an abstract consideration of the building or of the thing considered 
apart, but by considering it in connection with the circumstances and the locality.  Sturgis v. 
Bridgeman, L. R. 11 Ch. 852, 865.  A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place–
like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.  If the validity of the legislative classification for 
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zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.  Radice 
v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294. 
There is no serious difference of opinion in respect of the validity of laws and regulations 
fixing the height of buildings within reasonable limits, the character of materials and methods of 
construction, and the adjoining area which must be left open, in order to minimize the danger of 
fire or collapse, the evils of over-crowding, and the like, and excluding from residential sections 
offensive trades, industries and structures likely to create nuisances.  See Welch v. Swasey, 214 
U.S. 91; Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394; Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171; 
Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 529-530. 
Here, however, the exclusion is in general terms of all industrial establishments, and it 
may thereby happen that not only offensive or dangerous industries will be excluded, but those 
which are neither offensive nor dangerous will share the same fate.  But this is no more than 
happens in respect of many practice-forbidding laws which this Court has upheld although drawn 
in general terms so as to include individual cases that may turn out to be innocuous in 
themselves. The inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure effective enforcement, will not put 
upon a law, otherwise valid, the stamp of invalidity. 
We find no difficulty in sustaining restrictions of the kind thus far reviewed.  The serious 
question in the case arises over the provisions of the ordinance excluding from residential 
districts, apartment houses, business houses, retail stores and shops, and other like 
establishments.  This question involves the validity of what is really the crux of the more recent 
zoning legislation, namely, the creation and maintenance of residential districts, from which 
business and trade of every sort, including hotels and apartment houses, are excluded.  Upon that 
question, this Court has not thus far spoken.  The decisions of the state courts are numerous and 
conflicting; but those which broadly sustain the power greatly outnumber those which deny 
altogether or narrowly limit it; and it is very apparent that there is a constantly increasing 
tendency in the direction of the broader view. 
The decisions agree that the exclusion of buildings devoted to business, trade, etc., from 
residential districts, bears a rational relation to the health and safety of the community. Some of 
the grounds for this conclusion are– promotion of the health and security from injury of children 
and others by separating dwelling houses from territory devoted to trade and industry; 
suppression and prevention of disorder; facilitating the extinguishment of fires, and the 
enforcement of street traffic regulations and other general welfare ordinances; aiding the health 
and safety of the community by excluding from residential areas the confusion and danger of 
fire, contagion and disorder which in  greater or less degree attach to the location of stores, shops 
and factories. Another ground is that the construction and repair of streets may be rendered easier 
and less expensive by confining the greater part of the heavy traffic to the streets where business 
is carried on. 
The matter of zoning has received much attention at the hands of commissions and 
experts, and the results of their investigations have been set forth in comprehensive reports. 
These reports, which bear every evidence of painstaking consideration, concur in the view that 
the segregation of residential, business, and industrial buildings will make it easier to provide fire 
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apparatus suitable for the character and intensity of the development in each section; that it will 
increase the safety and security of home life; greatly tend to prevent street accidents, especially 
to children, by reducing the traffic and resulting confusion in residential sections; decrease noise 
and other conditions which produce or intensify nervous disorders; preserve a more favorable 
environment in which to rear children, etc.  With particular reference to apartment houses, it is 
pointed out that the development of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the coming of 
apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in destroying the entire section for private 
house purposes; that in such sections very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, 
constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by 
the residential character of the district.  Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is 
followed by others, interfering by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and 
monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the smaller homes, and 
bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to increased traffic 
and business, and the occupation, by means of moving and parked automobiles, of larger 
portions of the streets, thus detracting from their safety and depriving children of the privilege of 
quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in more favored localities,–until, finally, the 
residential character of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached residences are 
utterly destroyed.  Under these circumstances, apartment houses, which in a different 
environment would be not only entirely unobjectionable but highly desirable, come very near to 
being nuisances. 
If these reasons, thus summarized, do not demonstrate the wisdom or sound policy in all 
respects of those restrictions which we have indicated as pertinent to the inquiry, at least, the 
reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said before the ordinance 
can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, 
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.  Cusack Co. 
v. City of Chicago, supra, pp. 530-531; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31. 
Decree reversed. 
Mr. Justice Van Devanter, Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler, dissent. 
MILLER v. SCHOENE 
276 U.S. 272 (1928) 
Judges: Taft, Holmes, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland, Butler, 
Sanford, Stone 
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Acting under the Cedar Rust Act of Virginia, Va. Acts 1914, c. 36, as amended by Va. 
Acts 1920, c. 260, now embodied in Va. Code (1924) as §§885 to 893, defendant in error, the 
state entomologist, ordered the plaintiffs in error to cut down a large number of ornamental red 
cedar trees growing on their property, as a means of preventing the communication of a rust or 
plant disease with which they were infected to the apple orchards in the vicinity.  The plaintiffs 
in error appealed from the order to the Circuit Court of Shenandoah county which, after a 
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hearing and a consideration of evidence, affirmed the order and allowed to plaintiffs in error 
$100 to cover the expense of removal of the cedars.  Neither the judgment of the court nor the 
statute as interpreted allows compensation for the value of the standing cedars or the decrease in 
the market value of the realty caused by their destruction whether considered as ornamental trees 
or otherwise.  But they save to plaintiffs in error the privilege of using the trees when felled.  On 
appeal the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the judgment.  Miller v. State 
Entomologist, 146 Va. 175.  Both in the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court of Appeals 
plaintiffs in error challenged the constitutionality of the statute under the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the case is properly here on writ of error.  Jud. Code §237(a). 
The Virginia statute presents a comprehensive scheme for the condemnation and 
destruction of red cedar trees infected by cedar rust.  By §1 it is declared to be unlawful for any 
person to “own, plant or keep alive and standing” on his premises any red cedar tree which is or 
may be the source or “host plant” of the communicable plant disease known as cedar rust, and 
any such tree growing within a certain radius of any apple orchard is declared to be a public 
nuisance, subject to destruction.  Section 2 makes it the duty of the state entomologist, “upon the 
request in writing of ten or more reputable free-holders of any county or magisterial district, to 
make a preliminary investigation of the locality . . . to ascertain if any cedar tree or trees . . . are 
the source of, harbor or constitute the host plant for the said disease . . . and  constitute a menace 
to the health of any apple orchard in said locality, and that said cedar tree or trees exist within a 
radius of two miles of an apple orchard in said locality.”  If affirmative findings are so made, he 
is required to direct the owner in writing to destroy the trees and, in his notice, to furnish a 
statement of the “fact found to exist whereby it is deemed necessary or proper to destroy” the 
trees and to call attention to the law under which it is proposed to  destroy them.  Section 5 
authorizes the state entomologist to destroy the trees if the owner, after being notified, fails to do 
so.  Section 7 furnishes a mode of appealing from the order of the entomologist to the circuit 
court of the county, which is authorized to “hear the objections” and “pass upon all questions 
involved,” the procedure followed in the present case. 
As shown by the evidence and as recognized in other cases involving the validity of this 
statute, Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351; Kelleher v. Schoene, 14 Fed. 2d 
341, cedar rust is an infectious plant disease in the form of a fungoid organism which is 
destructive of the fruit and foliage of the apple, but without effect on the value of the cedar.  Its 
life cycle has two phases which are passed alternately as a growth on red cedar and on apple 
trees.  It is communicated by spores from one to the other over a radius of at least two miles.  It 
appears not to be communicable between trees of the same species but only from one species to 
the other, and other plants seem not to be appreciably affected by it.  The only practicable 
method of controlling the disease and protecting apple trees from its ravages is the destruction of 
all red cedar trees, subject to the infection, located within two miles of apple orchards. 
The red cedar, aside from its ornamental use, has occasional use and value as lumber.  It 
is indigenous to Virginia, is not cultivated or dealt in commercially on any substantial scale, and 
its value throughout the state is shown to be small as compared with that of the apple orchards of 
the state.  Apple growing is one of the principal agricultural pursuits in Virginia.  The apple is 
used there and exported in large quantities.  Many millions of dollars are invested in the 
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orchards, which furnish employment for a large portion of the population, and have induced the 
development of attendant railroad and cold storage facilities. 
On the evidence we may accept the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Appeals that the 
state was under the necessity of making a choice between the preservation of one class of 
property and that of the other wherever both existed in dangerous proximity.  It would have been 
none the less a choice if, instead of enacting the present statute, the state, by doing nothing, had 
permitted serious injury to the apple orchards within its borders to go on unchecked.  When 
forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon the 
destruction of one class of property in order to save another which, in the judgment of the 
legislature, is of greater value to the public.  It will not do to say that the case is merely one of a 
conflict of two private interests and that the misfortune of apple growers may not be shifted to 
cedar owners by ordering the destruction of their property; for it is obvious that there may be, 
and that here there is, a preponderant public concern in the preservation of the one interest over 
the other. And where the public interest is involved preferment of that interest over the property 
interest of the individual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing 
characteristics of every exercise of the police power which affects property.  Mugler v. Kansas, 
123 U.S. 623; Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U.S. 365; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659; Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 
239 U.S. 486; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133; Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52; Reinman v. 
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171. 
We need not weigh with nicety the question whether the infected cedars constitute a 
nuisance according to the common law; or whether they may be so declared by statute.  See 
Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, supra, 411.  For where, as here, the choice is unavoidable, we cannot 
say that its exercise, controlled by considerations of social policy which are not unreasonable, 
involves any denial of due process.  The injury to property here is no more serious, nor the public 
interest  less, than in Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, supra; Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 
supra; Reinman v. Little Rock, supra, or Sligh v. Kirkwood, supra. 
The statute is not, as plaintiffs in error argue, subject to the vice which invalidated the 
ordinance considered by this Court in Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137.  That ordinance 
directed the committee on streets of the city of Richmond to establish a building line, not less 
than five nor more than thirty feet from the street line whenever requested to do so by the owners 
of two-thirds of the property abutting on the street in question.  No property owner might build 
beyond the line so established.  Of this the Court said (p. 143), “It [the ordinance] leaves no 
discretion in the committee on streets as to whether the street [building, semble] line shall or 
shall not be established in a given case.  The action of the committee is determined by two-thirds 
of the property owners.  In other words, part of the property owners fronting on the block 
determine the extent of use that other owners shall make of their lots, and against the restriction 
they are impotent.” 
The function of the property owners there is in no way comparable to that of the “ten or 
more reputable freeholders” in the Cedar Rust Act.  They do not determine the action of the state 
entomologist.  They merely request him to conduct an investigation.  In him is vested the 
discretion to decide, after investigation, whether or not conditions are such that the other 
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provisions of the statute shall be brought into action; and his determination is subject to judicial 
review.  The property of plaintiffs in error is not subjected to the possibly arbitrary and 
irresponsible action of a group of private citizens. 
The objection of plaintiffs in error to the vagueness of the statute is without weight.  The 
state court has held it to be applicable and that is enough when, by the statute, no penalty can be 
incurred or disadvantage suffered in advance of the judicial ascertainment of its applicability. 
Compare Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385. 
Affirmed. 
NECTOW v. CITY OF CAMBRIDGE 
277 U.S. 183 (1928) 
Mr. Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of the Court. 
A zoning ordinance of the City of Cambridge divides the city into three kinds of districts: 
residential, business and unrestricted.  Each of these districts is sub-classified in respect of the 
kind of buildings which may be erected.  The ordinance is an elaborate one, and of the same 
general character as that considered by this Court in Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365. In its 
general scope it is conceded to be constitutional within that decision.  The land of plaintiff was 
put in district R-3, in which are permitted only dwellings, hotels, clubs, churches, schools, 
philanthropic institutions, greenhouses and gardening, with customary incidental accessories. 
The attack upon the ordinance is that, as specifically applied to plaintiff in error, it deprived him 
of his property without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The suit was for a mandatory injunction directing the city and its inspector of buildings to 
pass upon an application of the plaintiff for a permit to erect any lawful buildings upon a tract of 
land without regard to the provisions of the ordinance including such tract within a residential 
district.  The case was referred to a master to make and report findings of fact.  After a view of 
the premises and the surrounding territory, and a hearing, the master made and reported his 
findings.  The case came on to be heard by a justice of the court, who, after confirming the 
master’s report, reported the case for the determination of the full court.  Upon consideration, 
that court sustained the ordinance as applied to plaintiff in error, and dismissed the bill.  260 
Mass. 441. 
A condensed statement of facts, taken from the master’s report, is all that is necessary. 
When the zoning ordinance was enacted, plaintiff was and still is the owner of a tract of land 
containing 140,000 square feet, of which the locus here in question is a part.  The locus contains 
about 29,000 square feet with a frontage on Brookline street . . . . The lands beyond Brookline 
street to the west are within a restricted residential district.  The effect of the zoning is to separate 
from the west end of plaintiff’s tract a strip 100 feet in width.  The Ford Motor Company has a 
large auto assembling factory south of the locus; and a soap factory and the tracks of the Boston 
& Albany Railroad lie near.  Opposite the locus, on Brookline street, there are some residences; 
and in the same district, are other residences.  The locus is now vacant, although it was once 
occupied by a mansion house.  Before the passage of the ordinance in question, plaintiff had 
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outstanding a contract for the sale of the greater part of his entire tract of land for the sum of 
$63,000.  Because of the zoning restrictions, the purchaser refused to comply with the contract. 
Under the ordinance, business and industry of all sorts are excluded from the locus, while the 
remainder of the tract is unrestricted.  It further appears that provision has been made for 
widening Brookline street, the effect of which, if carried out, will be to reduce the depth of the 
locus to 65 feet.  After a statement at length of further facts, the master finds “that no practical 
use can be made of the land in question for residential purposes, because among other reasons 
herein related, there would not be adequate return on the amount of any investment for the 
development of the property.” The last finding of the master is: 
“I am satisfied that the districting of the plaintiff’s land in a residence district 
would not promote the health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the 
inhabitants of that part of the defendant City, taking into account the natural 
development thereof and the character of the district and the resulting benefit to 
accrue to the whole City and I so find.” 
It is made pretty clear that because of the industrial and railroad purposes to which the 
immediately adjoining lands to the south and east have been devoted and for which they are 
zoned, the locus is of comparatively little value for the limited uses permitted by the ordinance. 
We quite agree with the opinion expressed below that a court should not set aside the 
determination of public officers in such a matter unless it is clear that their action “has no 
foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial 
relation to the public health, the public morals, the public safety or the public welfare in its 
proper sense.”  Euclid v. Ambler Co., supra, p. 395. 
An inspection of a plat of the city upon which the zoning districts are outlined, taken in 
connection with the master’s findings, shows with reasonable certainty that the inclusion of the 
locus in question is not indispensable to the general plan.  The boundary line of the residential 
district before reaching the locus runs for some distance along the streets, and to exclude the 
locus from the residential district requires only that such line shall be continued 100 feet further 
along Henry street and thence south along Brookline street.  There does not appear to be any 
reason why this should not be done.  Nevertheless, if that were all, we should not be warranted in 
substituting our judgment for that of the zoning authorities primarily charged with the duty and 
responsibility of determining the question.  Zahn v. Bd. of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328, and 
cases cited.  But that is not all.  The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with 
the general rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and 
other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation 
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.  Euclid v. Ambler Co., supra, p. 395. 
Here, the express finding of the master, already quoted, confirmed by the court below, is that the 
health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants of the part of the city affected 
will not be promoted by the disposition made by the ordinance of the locus in question.  This 
finding of the master, after a hearing and an inspection of the entire area affected, supported, as 
we think it is, by other findings of fact, is determinative of the case.  That the invasion of the 
property of plaintiff in error was serious and highly injurious is clearly established; and, since a 
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necessary basis for the support of that invasion is wanting, the action of the zoning authorities 
comes within the ban of the Fourteenth Amendment and cannot be sustained. 
Judgment reversed. 
GOLDBLATT v. TOWN OF HEMPSTEAD 
369 U.S. 590 (1962) 
Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Town of Hempstead has enacted an ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavating 
on property within its limits.  Appellants, who engaged in such operations prior to the enactment 
of the ordinance, claim that it in effect prevents them from continuing their business and 
therefore takes their property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The trial court held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the town’s police 
power, 19 Misc. 2d 176, 189 N. Y. S. 2d 577, and the Appellate Division affirmed, 9 App.  Div. 
2d 941, 196 N. Y. S. 2d 573.  The New York Court of Appeals in a divided opinion affirmed.  9 
N. Y. 2d 101, 172 N. E. 2d 562.  We noted probable jurisdiction, 366 U.S. 942, and having heard 
argument we now affirm the judgment. 
Appellant Goldblatt owns a 38-acre tract within the Town of Hempstead.  At the time of 
the present litigation appellant Builders Sand and Gravel Corporation was mining sand and 
gravel on this lot, a use to which the lot had been put continuously since 1927.  Before the end of 
the first year the excavation had reached the water table leaving a water-filled crater which has 
been widened and deepened to the point that it is now a 20-acre lake with an average depth of 25 
feet.  The town has expanded around this excavation, and today within a radius of 3,500 feet 
there are more than 2,200 homes and four public schools with a combined enrollment of 4,500 
pupils. 
In 1958 the town amended Ordinance No. 16 to prohibit any excavating below the water 
table and to impose an affirmative duty to refill any excavation presently below that level.  The 
new amendment also made the berm, slope, and fence requirements more onerous. 
In 1959 the town brought the present action to enjoin further mining by the appellants on 
the grounds that they had not complied with the ordinance, as amended, nor acquired a mining 
permit as required by it.  Appellants contended, inter alia, that the ordinance was unconstitutional 
because (1) it was not regulatory of their business but completely prohibitory and confiscated 
their property without compensation, (2) it deprived them of the benefit of the favorable 
judgment arising from the previous zoning litigation, and (3) it constituted ex post facto 
legislation.  However, the trial court did not agree, and the appellants were enjoined from 
conducting further operations on the lot until they had obtained a permit and had complied with 
the new provisions of Ordinance No. 16. 
Concededly the ordinance completely prohibits a beneficial use to which the property has 
previously been devoted.  However, such a characterization does not tell us whether or not the 
ordinance is unconstitutional.  It is an oft-repeated truism that every regulation necessarily 
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speaks as a prohibition.  If this ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town’s police 
powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it 
unconstitutional.  Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 
239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 
623 (1887); see Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358 (1910). As pointed out in 
Mugler v. Kansas, supra, at 668-669: 
“The present case must be governed by principles that do not involve the power of 
eminent domain, in the exercise of which property may not be taken for public 
use without compensation.  A prohibition simply upon the use of property for 
purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, 
morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking 
or an appropriation of property for the public benefit.  Such legislation does not 
disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor 
restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use 
by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests. . . 
.  The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their 
property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, 
is not– and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot 
be –burdened with the condition that the State must compensate such individual 
owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being 
permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the 
community.” 
Nor is it of controlling significance that the “use” prohibited here is of the soil itself as 
opposed to a “use” upon the soil, cf. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 
(1958), or that the use prohibited is arguably not a common-law nuisance, e. g., Reinman v. 
Little Rock, supra. 
This is not to say, however, that governmental action in the form of regulation cannot be 
so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensation.  Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., supra. 
There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins.  Although a 
comparison of values before and after is relevant, see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, it 
is by no means conclusive, see Hadacheck v. Sebastian, supra, where a diminution in value from 
$800,000 to $60,000 was upheld.  How far regulation may go before it becomes a taking we need 
not now decide, for there is no evidence in the present record which even remotely suggests that 
prohibition of further mining will reduce the value of the lot in question. Indulging in the usual 
presumption of constitutionality, infra, p. 596, we find no indication that the prohibitory effect of 
Ordinance No. 16 is sufficient to render it an unconstitutional taking if it is otherwise a valid 
police regulation. 
The question, therefore, narrows to whether the prohibition of further excavation below 
the water table is a valid exercise of the town’s police power.  The term “police power” connotes 
the time-tested conceptional limit of public encroachment upon private interests.  Except for the 
substitution of the familiar standard of “reasonableness,” this Court has generally refrained from 
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announcing any specific criteria.  The classic statement of the rule in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 
133, 137 (1894), is still valid today: 
“To justify the State in . . . interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must 
appear, first, that the interests of the public . . . require such interference; and, 
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the 
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.” 
The ordinance in question was passed as a safety measure, and the town is attempting to 
uphold it on that basis.  To evaluate its reasonableness we therefore need to know such things as 
the nature of the menace against which it will protect, the availability and effectiveness of other 
less drastic protective steps, and the loss which appellants will suffer from the imposition of the 
ordinance. 
A careful examination of the record reveals a dearth of relevant evidence on these points. 
One fair inference arising from the evidence is that since a few holes had been burrowed under 
the fence surrounding the lake it might be attractive and dangerous to children.  But there was no 
indication whether the lake as it stood was an actual danger to the public or whether deepening 
the lake would increase the danger.  In terms of dollars or some other objective standard, there 
was no showing how much, if anything, the imposition of the ordinance would cost the 
appellants.  In short, the evidence produced is clearly indecisive on the reasonableness of 
prohibiting further excavation below the water table. 
Although one could imagine that preventing further deepening of a pond already 25 feet 
deep would have a de minimis effect on public safety, we cannot say that such a conclusion is 
compelled by facts of which we can take notice.  Even if we could draw such a conclusion, we 
would be unable to say the ordinance is unreasonable; for all we know, the ordinance may have a 
de minimis effect on appellants.  Our past cases leave no doubt that appellants had the burden on 
“reasonableness.” E.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959) (exercise of 
police power is presumed to be constitutionally valid); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 553 
(1954) (the presumption of reasonableness is with the State); United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (exercise of police power will be upheld if any state of facts either 
known or which could be reasonably assumed affords support for it).  This burden not having 
been met, the prohibition of excavation on the 20-acre-lake tract must stand as a valid police 
regulation. 
We now turn our attention to the remainder of the lot, the 18 acres surrounding the 
present pit which have not yet been mined or excavated. Appellants themselves contend that this 
area cannot be mined.  They say that this surface space is necessary for the processing operations 
incident to mining and that no other space is obtainable.  This was urged as an important factor 
in their contention that upholding the depth limitation of the ordinance would confiscate the 
entire mining utility of their property.  However, we have upheld the validity of the prohibition 
even on that supposition.  If the depth limitation in relation to deepening the existing pit is valid, 
it follows a fortiori that the limitation is constitutionally permissible as applied to prevent the 
creation of new pits.  We also note that even if appellants were able to obtain suitable processing 
space the geology of the 18-acre tract would prevent any excavation.  The water table, appellants 
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admit, is too close to the ground surface to permit commercial mining in the face of the depth 
restrictions of the ordinance.  The impossibility of further mining makes it unnecessary for us to 
decide to what extent the berm and slope of such excavation could be limited by the ordinance. 
Appellants’ other contentions warrant only a passing word.  The claim that rights 
acquired in previous litigation are being undermined is completely unfounded.  A successful 
defense to the imposition of one regulation does not erect a constitutional barrier to all other 
regulation.  The first suit was brought to enforce a zoning ordinance, while the present one is to 
enforce a safety ordinance.  In fact no relevant issues presented here were decided in the first 
suit.  We therefore do not need to consider to what extent such issues would have come under the 
protective wing of due process. 
Appellants also contend that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it imposes under 
penalty of fine and imprisonment such affirmative duties as refilling the existing excavation and 
the construction of a new fence.  This claim is founded principally on the constitutional 
prohibitions against bills of attainder and ex post facto legislation.  These provisions are 
severable, both in nature and by express declaration, from the prohibition against further 
excavation.  Since enforcement of these provisions was not sought in the present litigation, this 
Court under well-established principles will not at this time undertake to decide their 
constitutionality.  E.g., Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576, 594 (1914); cf. United States v. Raines, 
362 U.S. 17 (1960). That determination must await another day.  We pass only on the provisions 
of the ordinance here invoked, not on probabilities not now before us, and to that extent the 
judgment is 
Affirmed. 
PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION CO. v. CITY OF NEW YORK  
438 U.S. 104 (1978) 
Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether a city may, as part of a comprehensive program to 
preserve historic landmarks and historic districts, place restrictions on the development of 
individual historic landmarks–in addition to those imposed by applicable zoning ordinances–
without affecting a “taking” requiring the payment of “just compensation.”  Specifically, we 
must decide whether the application of New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law to the 
parcel of land occupied by Grand Central Terminal has “taken” its owners’ property in violation 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
I 
A 
Over the past 50 years, all 50 States and over 500 municipalities have enacted laws to 
encourage or require the preservation of buildings and areas with historic or aesthetic 
importance.  These nationwide legislative efforts have been precipitated by two concerns.  The 
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first is recognition that, in recent years, large numbers of historic structures, landmarks, and areas 
have been destroyed without adequate consideration of either the values represented therein or 
the possibility of preserving the destroyed properties for use in economically productive ways. 
The second is a widely shared belief that structures with special historic, cultural, or architectural 
significance enhance the quality of life for all.  Not only do these buildings and their 
workmanship represent the lessons of the past and embody precious features of our heritage, they 
serve as examples of quality for today. 
New York City, responding to similar concerns and acting pursuant to a New York State 
enabling Act, adopted its Landmarks Preservation Law in 1965.  See N.Y.C. Admin. Code, ch. 
8-A, §205-1.0 et seq. (1976).  The city acted from the conviction that “the standing of [New 
York City] as a world-wide tourist center and world capital of business, culture and government” 
would be threatened if legislation were not enacted to protect historic landmarks and 
neighborhoods from precipitate decisions to destroy or fundamentally alter their character. §205-
1.0 (a).  
The New York City law is typical of many urban landmark laws in that its primary 
method of achieving its goals is not by acquisitions of historic properties, but rather by involving 
public entities in land-use decisions affecting these properties and providing services, standards, 
controls, and incentives that will encourage preservation by private owners and users.  While the 
law does place special restrictions on landmark properties as a necessary feature to the 
attainment of its larger objectives, the major theme of the law is to ensure the owners of any such 
properties both a “reasonable return” on their investments and maximum latitude to use their 
parcels for purposes not inconsistent with the preservation goals. 
The operation of the law can be briefly summarized.  The primary responsibility for 
administering the law is vested in the Landmarks Preservation Commission (Commission), a 
broad based, 11-member agency assisted by a technical staff.  The Commission first performs the 
function, critical to any landmark preservation effort, of identifying properties and areas that 
have “a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of the 
development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the city, state or nation.” §207-1.0 (n); see 
§207-1.0 (h).  If the Commission determines, after giving all interested parties an opportunity to 
be heard, that a building or area satisfies the ordinance’s criteria, it will designate a building to 
be a “landmark,” §207-1.0 (n), situated on a particular “landmark site,” §207-1.0 (o), n.10 or will 
designate an area to be a “historic district,” §207-1.0 (h).  After the Commission makes a 
designation, New York City’s Board of Estimate, after considering the relationship of the 
designated property “to the master plan, the zoning resolution, projected public improvements 
and any plans for the renewal of the area involved,” §207-2.0 (g)(1), may modify or disapprove 
the designation, and the owner may seek judicial review of the final designation decision.  Thus 
far, 31 historic districts and over 400 individual landmarks have been finally designated, and the 
process is a continuing one. 
Final designation as a landmark results in restrictions upon the property owner’s options 
concerning use of the landmark site.  First, the law imposes a duty upon the owner to keep the 
exterior features of the building “in good repair” to assure that the law’s objectives not be 
defeated by the landmark’s falling into a state of irremediable disrepair.  See §207-10.0 (a). 
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Second, the Commission must approve in advance any proposal to alter the exterior architectural 
features of the landmark or to construct any exterior improvement on the landmark site, thus 
ensuring that decisions concerning construction on the landmark site are made with due 
consideration of both the public interest in the maintenance of the structure and the landowner’s 
interest in use of the property.  See §§207-4.0 to 207-9.0. 
In the event an owner wishes to alter a landmark site, three separate procedures are 
available through which administrative approval may be obtained.  First, the owner may apply to 
the Commission for a “certificate of no effect on protected architectural features”: that is, for an 
order approving the improvement or alteration on the ground that it will not change or affect any 
architectural feature of the landmark and will be in harmony therewith.  See §207-5.0.  Denial of 
the certificate is subject to judicial review. 
Second, the owner may apply to the Commission for a certificate of “appropriateness.” 
See §207-6.0.  Such certificates will be granted if the Commission concludes–focusing upon 
aesthetic, historical, and architectural values–that the proposed construction on the landmark site 
would not unduly hinder the protection, enhancement, perpetuation, and use of the landmark. 
Again, denial of the certificate is subject to judicial review. 
Moreover, the owner who is denied either a certificate of no exterior effect or a certificate 
of appropriateness may submit an alternative or modified plan for approval.  The final 
procedure–seeking a certificate of appropriateness on the ground of “insufficient return,” see 
§207-8.0–provides special mechanisms, which vary depending on whether or not the landmark 
enjoys a tax exemption,  to ensure that designation does not cause economic hardship. 
Although the designation of a landmark and landmark site restricts the owner’s control 
over the parcel, designation also enhances the economic position of the landmark owner in one 
significant respect.  Under New York City’s zoning laws, owners of real property who have not 
developed their property to the full extent permitted by the applicable zoning laws are allowed to 
transfer development rights to contiguous parcels on the same city block.  See New York City, 
Zoning Resolution Art. I, ch. 2, §12-10 (1978) (definition of “zoning lot”).  A 1968 ordinance 
gave the owners of landmark sites additional opportunities to transfer development rights to 
other parcels.  Subject to a restriction that the floor area of the transferee lot may not be 
increased by more than 20% above its authorized level, the ordinance permitted transfers from a 
landmark parcel to property across the street or across a street intersection.   
B 
This case involves the application of New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law to 
Grand Central Terminal (Terminal).  The Terminal, which is owned by the Penn Central 
Transportation Co. and its affiliates (Penn Central), is one of New York City’s most famous 
buildings.  Opened in 1913, it is regarded not only as providing an ingenious engineering 
solution to the problems presented by urban railroad stations, but also as a magnificent example 
of the French beaux-arts style. 
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The Terminal is located in midtown Manhattan.  Its south facade faces 42d Street and that 
street’s intersection with Park Avenue.  At street level, the Terminal is bounded on the west by 
Vanderbilt Avenue, on the east by the Commodore Hotel, and on the north by the Pan-American 
Building.  Although a 20-story office tower, to have been located above the Terminal, was part 
of the original design, the planned tower was never constructed.  The Terminal itself is an eight-
story structure which Penn Central uses as a railroad station and in which it rents space not 
needed for railroad purposes to a variety of commercial interests.  The Terminal is one of a 
number of properties owned by appellant Penn Central in this area of midtown Manhattan.  The 
others include the Barclay, Biltmore, Commodore, Roosevelt, and Waldorf-Astoria Hotels, the 
Pan-American Building and other office buildings along Park Avenue, and the Yale Club.  At 
least eight of these are eligible to be recipients of development rights afforded the Terminal by 
virtue of landmark designation. 
On August 2, 1967, following a public hearing the Commission designated the Terminal 
a “landmark” and designated the “city tax block” it occupies a “landmark site.”  The Board of 
Estimate confirmed this action on September 21, 1967.  Although appellant Penn Central had 
opposed the designation before the Commission, it did not seek judicial review of the final 
designation. 
On January 22, 1968, appellant Penn Central, to increase its income, entered into a 
renewable 50-year lease and sublease agreement with appellant UGP Properties, Inc. (UGP), a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Union General Properties, Ltd., a United Kingdom corporation. 
Under the terms of the agreement, UGP was to construct a multistory office building above the 
Terminal.  UGP promised to pay Penn Central $1 million annually during construction and at 
least $3 million annually thereafter.  The rentals would be offset in part by a loss of some 
$700,000 to $1 million in net rentals presently received from concessionaires displaced by the 
new building. 
Appellants UGP and Penn Central then applied to the Commission for permission to 
construct an office building atop the Terminal.  Two separate plans, both designed by architect 
Marcel Breuer and both apparently satisfying the terms of the applicable zoning ordinance, were 
submitted to the Commission for approval. The first, Breuer I, provided for the construction of a 
55-story office building, to be cantilevered above the existing facade and to rest on the roof of 
the Terminal.  The second, Breuer II Revised, called for tearing down a portion of the Terminal 
that included the 42d Street facade, stripping off some of the remaining features of the 
Terminal’s facade, and constructing a 53-story office building.  The Commission denied a 
certificate of no exterior effect on September 20, 1968.   Appellants then applied for a certificate 
of “appropriateness” as to both proposals.  After four days of hearings at which over 80 
witnesses testified, the Commission denied this application as to both proposals. 
The Commission’s reasons for rejecting certificates respecting Breuer II . . . stated: 
“[We have] no fixed rule against making additions to designated buildings–it all 
depends on how they are done . . . .  But to balance a 55-story office tower above 
a flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade seems nothing more than an aesthetic joke. Quite 
simply, the tower would overwhelm the Terminal by its sheer mass.  The 
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‘addition’ would be four times as high as the existing structure and would reduce 
the Landmark itself to the status of a curiosity.  Id., at 2251. 
Appellants filed suit in New York Supreme Court, Trial Term, claiming, inter alia, that 
the application of the Landmarks Preservation Law had “taken” their property without just 
compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and arbitrarily deprived them 
of their property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The New York Court of Appeals summarily rejected any claim that the Landmarks Law 
had “taken” property without “just compensation,” id., at 329, 366 N. E. 2d, at 1274, indicating 
that there could be no “taking” since the law had not transferred control of the property to the 
city, but only restricted appellants’ exploitation of it.  In that circumstance, the Court of Appeals 
held that appellants’ attack on the law could prevail only if the law deprived appellants of their 
property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Whether or not 
there was a denial of substantive due process turned on whether the restrictions deprived Penn 
Central of a “reasonable return” on the “privately created and privately managed ingredient” of 
the Terminal.  Id., at 328, 366 N. E. 2d, at 1273. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the Landmarks Law had not effected a denial of due 
process because: (1) the landmark regulation permitted the same use as had been made of the 
Terminal for more than half a century; (2) the appellants had failed to show that they could not 
earn a reasonable return on their investment in the Terminal itself; (3) even if the Terminal 
proper could never operate at a reasonable profit, some of the income from Penn Central’s 
extensive real estate holdings in the area, which include hotels and office buildings, must 
realistically be imputed to the Terminal; and (4) the development rights above the Terminal, 
which had been made transferable to numerous sites in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two 
of which were suitable for the construction of office buildings, were valuable to appellants and 
provided “significant, perhaps ‘fair,’ compensation for the loss of rights above the terminal 
itself.”  Id., at 333-336, 366 N. E. 2d, at 1276-1278. 
We affirm. 
II 
The issues presented by appellants are (1) whether the restrictions imposed by New York 
City’s law upon appellants’ exploitation of the Terminal site effect a “taking” of appellants’ 
property for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, which of course is made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897), and, (2), if so, whether the transferable development rights 
afforded appellants constitute “just compensation” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 
We need only address the question whether a “taking” has occurred.1  
                                                 
1
 As is implicit in our opinion, we do not embrace the proposition that a “taking” can never occur unless government 
has transferred physical control over a portion of a parcel. 
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A 
Before considering appellants’ specific contentions, it will be useful to review the factors 
that have shaped the jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment injunction “nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The question of what constitutes a “taking” 
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty. 
While this Court has recognized that the “Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 
(1960),  this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any “set formula” for determining 
when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused by public action be 
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few 
persons. 
In engaging in … essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court’s decisions have 
identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic impact of the regulation 
on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.  So, too, is the character 
of the governmental action.  A “taking” may more readily be found when the interference with 
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government than when interference 
arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote 
the common good. 
“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not 
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law,” Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922), and this Court has accordingly recognized, in a wide 
variety of contexts, that government may execute laws or programs that adversely affect 
recognized economic values. Exercises of the taxing power are one obvious example.  A second 
are the decisions in which this Court has dismissed “taking” challenges on the ground that, while 
the challenged government action caused economic harm, it did not interfere with interests that 
were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 
“property” for Fifth Amendment purposes. 
More importantly for the present case, in instances in which a state tribunal reasonably 
concluded that “the health, safety, morals, or general welfare” would be promoted by prohibiting 
particular contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld land-use regulations that destroyed or 
adversely affected recognized real property interests.  
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), is the leading case for the 
proposition that a state statute that substantially furthers important public policies may so 
frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a “taking.” There the claimant 
had sold the surface rights to particular parcels of property, but expressly reserved the right to 
remove the coal thereunder. Because the statute made it commercially impracticable to mine the 
coal, id., at 414, and thus had nearly the same effect as the complete destruction of rights 
claimant had reserved from the owners of the surface land, see id., at 414-415, the Court held 
that the statute was invalid as effecting a “taking”  without just compensation.  Finally, 
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government actions that may be characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate 
uniquely public functions have often been held to constitute “takings.”  
B 
In contending that the New York City law has “taken” their property in violation of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, appellants make a series of arguments, which, while tailored 
to the facts of this case, essentially urge that any substantial restriction imposed pursuant to a 
landmark law must be accompanied by just compensation if it is to be constitutional.   They 
accept for present purposes both that the parcel of land occupied by Grand Central Terminal 
must, in its present state, be regarded as capable of earning a reasonable return, and that the 
transferable development rights afforded appellants by virtue of the Terminal’s designation as a 
landmark are valuable, even if not as valuable as the rights to construct above the Terminal.  In 
appellants’ view none of these factors derogate from their claim that New York City’s law has 
effected a “taking.” 
They first observe that the airspace above the Terminal is a valuable property interest… 
They urge that the Landmarks Law has deprived them of any gainful use of their “air rights” 
above the Terminal and that, irrespective of the value of the remainder of their parcel, the city 
has “taken” their right to this superadjacent airspace, thus entitling them to “just compensation” 
measured by the fair market value of these air rights. 
The submission that appellants may establish a “taking” simply by showing that they 
have been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed was 
available for development is quite simply untenable.  “Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a 
single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular 
segment have been entirely abrogated.  In deciding whether a particular governmental action has 
effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature 
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole–here, the city tax block 
designated as the “landmark site.” 
Secondly, appellants, focusing on the character and impact of the New York City law, 
argue that it effects a “taking” because its operation has significantly diminished the value of the 
Terminal site.  Appellants concede that the decisions sustaining other land-use regulations, 
which, like the New York City law, are reasonably related to the promotion of the general 
welfare, uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can 
establish a “taking,”  
Stated baldly, appellants’ position appears to be that the only means of ensuring that 
selected owners are not singled out to endure financial hardship for no reason is to hold that any 
restriction imposed on individual landmarks pursuant to the New York City scheme is a “taking” 
requiring the payment of “just compensation.”  Agreement with this argument would, of course, 
invalidate not just New York City’s law, but all comparable landmark legislation in the Nation. 
We find no merit in it. 
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Contrary to appellants’ suggestions, landmark laws are not like discriminatory, or 
“reverse spot,” zoning: that is, a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel 
for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones.  In contrast to discriminatory 
zoning, which is the antithesis of land-use control as part of some comprehensive plan, the New 
York City law embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic 
interest wherever they might be found in the city, and as noted, over 400 landmarks and 31 
historic districts have been designated pursuant to this plan. 
C 
Rejection of appellants’ broad arguments is not, however, the end of our inquiry, for all 
we thus far have established is that the New York City law is not rendered invalid by its failure 
to provide “just compensation” whenever a landmark owner is restricted in the exploitation of 
property interests, such as air rights, to a greater extent than provided for under applicable zoning 
laws.  That inquiry may be narrowed to the question of the severity of the impact of the law on 
appellants’ parcel, and its resolution in turn requires a careful assessment of the impact of the 
regulation on the Terminal site. 
The New York City law does not interfere in any way with the present uses of the 
Terminal.  Its designation as a landmark not only permits but contemplates that appellants may 
continue to use the property precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years: as a railroad 
terminal containing office space and concessions.  So the law does not interfere with what must 
be regarded as Penn Central’s primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel.  More 
importantly, on this record, we must regard the New York City law as permitting Penn Central 
not only to profit from the Terminal but also to obtain a “reasonable return” on its investment. 
Second, to the extent appellants have been denied the right to build above the Terminal, it 
is not literally accurate to say that they have been denied all use of even those pre-existing air 
rights.  Their ability to use these rights has not been abrogated; they are made transferable to at 
least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of which have been found suitable 
for the construction of new office buildings.  Although appellants and others have argued that 
New York City’s transferable development-rights program is far from ideal, the New York 
courts here supportably found that, at least in the case of the Terminal, the rights afforded are 
valuable.  While these rights may well not have constituted “just compensation” if a “taking” had 
occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has 
imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering the impact 
of regulation. On this record, we conclude that the application of New York City’s Landmarks 
Law has not effected a “taking” of appellants’ property.  The restrictions imposed are 
substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable 
beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not 
only the Terminal site proper but also other properties. 
Affirmed. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Stevens join, 
dissenting. 
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Of the over one million buildings and structures in the city of New York, appellees have 
singled out 400 for designation as official landmarks.  The owner of a building might initially be 
pleased that his property has been chosen by a distinguished committee of architects, historians, 
and city planners for such a singular distinction.  But he may well discover, as appellant Penn 
Central Transportation Co. did here, that the landmark designation imposes upon him a 
substantial cost, with little or no offsetting benefit except for the honor of the designation.  The 
question in this case is whether the cost associated with the city of New York’s desire to preserve 
a limited number of “landmarks” within its borders must be borne by all of its taxpayers or 
whether it can instead be imposed entirely on the owners of the individual properties. 
Appellees do not dispute that valuable property rights have been destroyed. And the 
Court has frequently emphasized that the term “property” as used in the Taking Clause includes 
the entire “group of rights inhering in the citizen’s [ownership].” United States v. General 
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945). The term is not used in the “vulgar and untechnical sense of 
the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law.  [Instead, 
it] . . . [denotes] the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the 
right to possess, use and dispose of it. . . .  The constitutional provision is addressed to every sort 
of interest the citizen may possess.”  Id., at 377-378 (emphasis added). 
While neighboring landowners are free to use their land and “air rights” in any way 
consistent with the broad boundaries of New York zoning, Penn Central, absent the permission 
of appellees, must forever maintain its property in its present state. The property has been thus 
subjected to a nonconsensual servitude not borne by any neighboring or similar properties. 
Appellees have thus destroyed–in a literal sense, “taken”–substantial property rights of 
Penn Central.  While the term “taken” might have been narrowly interpreted to include only 
physical seizures of property rights, “the construction of the phrase has not been so narrow.  The 
courts have held that the deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion of a right or 
interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking.”   
Appellees are not prohibiting a nuisance.  The record is clear that the proposed addition 
to the Grand Central Terminal would be in full compliance with zoning, height limitations, and 
other health and safety requirements.  Instead, appellees are seeking to preserve what they 
believe to be an outstanding example of beaux arts architecture.  Penn Central is prevented from 
further developing its property basically because too good a job was done in designing and 
building it.  The city of New York, because of its unadorned admiration for the design, has 
decided that the owners of the building must preserve it unchanged for the benefit of sightseeing 
New Yorkers and tourists. 
Even where the government prohibits a noninjurious use, the Court has ruled that a taking 
does not take place if the prohibition applies over a broad cross section of land and thereby 
“[secures] an average reciprocity of advantage.”  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S., at 
415. It is for this reason that zoning does not constitute a “taking.”  While zoning at times 
reduces individual property values, the burden is shared relatively evenly and it is reasonable to 
conclude that on the whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect of the zoning will be 
benefited by another. 
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Here, however, a multimillion dollar loss has been imposed on appellants; it is uniquely 
felt and is not offset by any benefits flowing from the preservation of some 400 other 
“landmarks” in New York City.  Appellees have imposed a substantial cost on less than one one-
tenth of one percent of the buildings in New York City for the general benefit of all its people.  It 
is exactly this imposition of general costs on a few individuals at which the “taking” protection is 
directed.   
As Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, “the question at 
bottom” in an eminent domain case “is upon whom the loss of the changes desired should fall.” 
260 U.S., at 416.  The benefits that appellees believe will flow from preservation of the Grand 
Central Terminal will accrue to all the citizens of New York City.  There is no reason to believe 
that appellants will enjoy a substantially greater share of these benefits.  If the cost of preserving 
Grand Central Terminal were spread evenly across the entire population of the city of New York, 
the burden per person would be in cents per year–a minor cost appellees would surely concede 
for the benefit accrued.  Instead, however, appellees would impose the entire cost of several 
million dollars per year on Penn Central.  Appellees in response would argue that a taking only 
occurs where a property owner is denied all reasonable value of his property.  The Court has 
frequently held that, even where a destruction of property rights would not otherwise constitute a 
taking, the inability of the owner to make a reasonable return on his property requires 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment . . . . Difficult conceptual and legal problems are 
posed by a rule that a taking only occurs where the property owner is denied all reasonable return 
on his property.  Not only must the Court define “reasonable return” for a variety of types of 
property (farmlands, residential properties, commercial and industrial areas), but the Court must 
define the particular property unit that should be examined.  For example, in this case, if 
appellees are viewed as having restricted Penn Central’s use of its “air rights,” all return has been 
denied.  See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The Court does little to 
resolve these questions in its opinion. 
Appellees contend that, even if they have “taken” appellants’ property, TDR’s constitute 
“just compensation.”  Appellants, of course, argue that TDR’s are highly imperfect 
compensation.  Because the lower courts held that there was no “taking,” they did not have to 
reach the question of whether or not just compensation has already been awarded.  The New 
York Court of Appeals has noted that TDR’s have an “uncertain and contingent market value” 
and do “not adequately preserve” the value lost when a building is declared to be a landmark. 
French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N. Y. 2d 587, 591, 350 N. E. 2d 381, 383, appeal 
dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). On the other hand, there is evidence in the record that Penn 
Central has been offered substantial amounts for its TDR’s.  Because the record on appeal is 
relatively slim, I would remand to the Court of Appeals for a determination of whether TDR’s 
constitute a “full and perfect equivalent for the property taken.” 
II 
Over 50 years ago, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, warned that the courts 
were “in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not 
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for 
the change.”  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S., at 416.  The Court’s opinion in this 
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case demonstrates that the danger thus foreseen has not abated.  The city of New York is in a 
precarious financial state, and some may believe that the costs of landmark preservation will be 
more easily borne by corporations such as Penn Central than the overburdened individual 
taxpayers of New York.  But these concerns do not allow us to ignore past precedents construing 
the Eminent Domain Clause to the end that the desire to improve the public condition is, indeed, 
achieved by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change. 
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Session 9. Cooperative/Coercive Federalism 
HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING 
452 U.S. 264 (1981) 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
These cases arise out of a pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (Surface Mining Act or Act), 91 Stat. 447, 
30 U. S. C. §1201 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III).   The United States District Court for the Western 
District of Virginia declared several central provisions of the Act unconstitutional and 
permanently enjoined their enforcement.  483 F.Supp. 425 (1980).  In these appeals, we consider 
whether Congress, in adopting the Act, exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution, or transgressed affirmative limitations on the exercise of that power contained in 
the . . . Tenth Amendment.   We conclude that in the context of a facial challenge, the Surface 
Mining Act does not suffer from any of these alleged constitutional defects, and we uphold the 
Act as constitutional.  
I 
A 
The Surface Mining Act is a comprehensive statute designed to "establish a nationwide 
program to protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining 
operations."  §102 (a), 30 U. S. C. §1202 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Section 501 (a) directs the 
Secretary to promulgate regulations establishing an interim regulatory program during which 
mine operators will be required to comply with some of the Act's performance standards 
...governing: (a) restoration of land after mining to its prior condition; (b) restoration of land to 
its approximate original contour; (c) segregation and preservation of topsoil; (d) minimization of 
disturbance to the hydrologic balance; (e) construction of coal mine waste piles used as dams and 
embankments; (f) revegetation of mined areas; and (g) spoil disposal.  The interim regulations 
are currently in effect in most States, including Virginia. 
Under §503, any State wishing to assume permanent regulatory authority over the surface 
coal mining operations within its borders must submit a proposed permanent program to the 
Secretary for his approval.  The proposed program must demonstrate that the state legislature has 
enacted laws implementing the environmental protection standards established by the Act and 
accompanying regulations, and that the State has the administrative and technical ability to 
enforce these standards.  30 U. S. C. §1253 (1976 ed., Supp. III).  In addition, the Secretary must 
develop and implement a federal permanent program for each State that fails to submit or 
enforce a satisfactory state program.  §504, 30 U. S. C. §1254 (1976 ed., Supp. III).
1 
                                                 
1
 With the exception of Alaska, Georgia, and Washington, all States in which surface mining is either conducted or 
is expected to be conducted submitted proposed state programs to the Secretary by March 3, 1980.  The Secretary 
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B 
On October 23, 1978, the Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assoc., Inc., an 
association of coal producers engaged in surface coal mining operations in Virginia, 63 of its 
member coal companies, and 4 individual landowners filed suit in Federal District Court seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief against various provisions of the Act. The Commonwealth of 
Virginia and the town of Wise, Va., intervened as plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' challenge was primarily 
directed at the interim regulatory program. Plaintiffs alleged that these provisions violate the 
Commerce Clause, the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.  
The District Court held a 13-day trial on plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. 
The court subsequently issued an order and opinion declaring several central provisions of the 
Act unconstitutional.  483 F.Supp. 425 (1980).  The court rejected plaintiffs' Commerce Clause, 
equal protection, and substantive due process challenges to the Act.  The court held, however, 
that the Act "operates to 'displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of 
traditional functions,' . . . and, therefore, is in contravention of the Tenth Amendment."  Id., at 
435, quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).  The court also ruled 
that various provisions of the Act effect an uncompensated taking of private property in violation 
of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Finally, the court agreed with 
plaintiffs' due process challenges to some of the Act's enforcement provisions.  The court 
permanently enjoined the Secretary from enforcing various provisions of the Act. 
The Secretary appeals from that portion of the District Court's judgment declaring 
various sections of the Act unconstitutional and permanently enjoining their enforcement.  
Plaintiffs cross-appeal from the District Court's rejection of their Commerce Clause challenge to 
the Act. We shall usually refer to plaintiffs as "appellees." 
II 
Appellees argue that the District Court erred in rejecting their challenge to the Act as 
beyond the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.  They insist that the Act's 
principal goal is regulating the use of private lands within the borders of the States and not, as 
the District Court found, regulating the interstate commerce effects of surface coal mining.  
Consequently, appellees contend that the ultimate issue presented is "whether land as such is 
subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause, i.e., whether land can be regarded as 'in 
commerce.'" Brief for Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., et al. 12 
(emphasis in original).  In urging us to answer "no" to this question, appellees emphasize that the 
Court has recognized that land-use regulation is within the inherent police powers of the States 
                                                                                                                                                             
has made his initial decisions on these programs.  Three programs were approved, 8 were approved on condition that 
the States agree to some modifications, 10 were approved in part and disapproved in part, and 3 were disapproved 
because the state legislatures had failed to enact the necessary implementing statutes. Virginia's program was among 
those approved in part and disapproved in part. See 45 Fed. Reg. 69977 (1980). 
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and their political subdivisions, and argue that Congress may regulate land use only insofar as 
the Property Clause grants it control over federal lands. 
We do not accept either appellees' framing of the question or the answer they would have 
us supply.  The task of a court that is asked to determine whether a particular exercise of 
congressional power is valid under the Commerce Clause is relatively narrow.  The court must 
defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is 
any rational basis for such a finding.  Here, Congress rationally determined that regulation of 
surface coal mining is necessary to protect interstate commerce from adverse effects that may 
result from that activity.  This congressional finding is sufficient to sustain the Act as a valid 
exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. 
In sum, we conclude that the District Court properly rejected appellees' Commerce 
Clause challenge to the Act.  We therefore turn to the court's ruling that the Act contravenes 
affirmative constitutional limitations on congressional exercise of the commerce power. 
III 
The District Court invalidated §§515 (d) and (e) of the Act, which prescribe performance 
standards for surface coal mining on "steep slopes," on the ground that they violate a 
constitutional limitation on the commerce power imposed by the Tenth Amendment. These 
provisions require "steep-slope" operators: (i) to reclaim the mined area by completely covering 
the highwall and returning the site to its "approximate original contour"; (ii) to refrain from 
dumping spoil material on the downslope below the bench or mining cut; and (iii) to refrain from 
disturbing land above the highwall unless permitted to do so by the regulatory authority.  §515 
(d), 30 U. S. C. §1265 (d) (1976 ed., Supp. III).  Under §515 (e), a "steep-slope" operator may 
obtain a variance from the approximate-original-contour requirement by showing that it will 
allow a postreclamation use that is "deemed to constitute an equal or better economic or public 
use" than would otherwise be possible. 30 U. S. C. §1265 (e)(3)(A) (1976 ed., Supp. III). 
The District Court's ruling relied heavily on our decision in National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The District Court viewed the central issue as whether the Act 
governs the activities of private individuals, or whether it instead regulates the governmental 
decisions of the States.  And although the court acknowledged that the Act "ultimately affects the 
coal mine operator," 483 F.Supp., at 432, it concluded that the Act contravenes the Tenth 
Amendment because it interferes with the States' "traditional governmental function" of 
regulating land use.  Id., at 435.  The court held that, as applied to Virginia, the Act's steep-slope 
provisions impermissibly constrict the State's ability to make "essential decisions."   The court 
found the Act accomplishes this result "through forced relinquishment of state control of land 
use planning; through loss of state control of its economy; and through economic harm, from 
expenditure of state funds to implement the act and from destruction of the taxing power of 
certain counties, cities, and towns." Id., at 435.  The court therefore permanently enjoined 
enforcement of §§515 (d) and (e). 
As the District Court itself acknowledged, the steep-slope provisions of the Surface 
Mining Act govern only the activities of coal mine operators who are private individuals and 
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businesses. Moreover, the States are not compelled to enforce the steep-slope standards, to 
expend any state funds, or to participate in the federal regulatory program in any manner 
whatsoever.  If a State does not wish to submit a proposed permanent program that complies 
with the Act and implementing regulations, the full regulatory burden will be borne by the 
Federal Government.  Thus, there can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative 
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory 
program.  The most that can be said is that the Surface Mining Act establishes a program of 
cooperative federalism that allows the States, within limits established by federal minimum 
standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own 
particular needs. 
Appellees argue, however, that the threat of federal usurpation of their regulatory roles 
coerces the States into enforcing the Surface Mining Act. Appellees also contend that the Act 
directly regulates the States as States because it establishes mandatory minimum federal 
standards. In essence, appellees urge us to join the District Court in looking beyond the activities 
actually regulated by the Act to its conceivable effects on the States' freedom to make decisions 
in areas of "integral governmental functions." And appellees emphasize, as did the court below, 
that the Act interferes with the States' ability to exercise their police powers by regulating land 
use. 
The Court long ago rejected the suggestion that Congress invades areas reserved to the 
States by the Tenth Amendment simply because it exercises its authority under the Commerce 
Clause in a manner that displaces the States' exercise of their police powers.  It would therefore 
be a radical departure from long-established precedent for this Court to hold that the Tenth 
Amendment prohibits Congress from displacing state police power laws regulating private 
activity.
2 
V 
The District Court held that two of the Act's provisions violate the Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. First, the court found that the steep-slope provisions discussed 
above effect an uncompensated taking of private property by requiring operators to perform the 
"economically and physically impossible" task of restoring steep-slope surface mines to their 
approximate original contour. The court further held that, even if steep-slope surface mines could 
be restored to their approximate original contour, the value of the mined land after such 
restoration would have "been diminished to practically nothing."  Second, the court found that 
§522 of the Act effects an unconstitutional taking because it expressly prohibits mining in certain 
locations and "clearly [prevents] a person from mining his own land or having it mined." Relying 
on this Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the Court held 
                                                 
2
 The remaining justification asserted by the District Court for its Tenth Amendment ruling, one that appellees urge 
here, is that the steep-slope mining requirements will harm Virginia's economy and destroy the taxing power of 
some towns and counties in the Commonwealth. In Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534-535 (1941), the 
Court rejected the assertion that an adverse impact on state and local economies is a barrier to Congress' exercise of 
its power under the Commerce Clause to regulate private activities affecting interstate commerce.  We are not 
persuaded that there are compelling reasons presented in the instant cases for reversing the Court's position. 
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that both of these provisions are unconstitutional because they "[deprive] [coal mine operators] 
of any use of [their] land, not only the most profitable . . . ."  
We conclude that the District Court's ruling on the "taking" issue suffers from a fatal 
deficiency: neither appellees nor the court identified any property in which appellees have an 
interest that has allegedly been taken by operation of the Act. By proceeding in this fashion, the 
court below ignored this Court's oft-repeated admonition that the constitutionality of statutes 
ought not be decided except in an actual factual setting that makes such a decision necessary. 
The test to be applied in considering this facial challenge is fairly straightforward. A statute 
regulating the uses that can be made of property effects a taking if it "denies an owner 
economically viable use of his land . . . ."  The Surface Mining Act easily survives scrutiny under 
this test.  
VI 
Our examination of appellees' constitutional challenges to the Surface Mining Act 
persuades us that the Act is not vulnerable to their pre-enforcement challenge. . . .  The cases are 
remanded to the District Court with instructions to dissolve the injunction issued against the 
Secretary, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
So ordered. 
NEW YORK v. UNITED STATES 
505 U.S. 144 (1992) 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case implicates one of our Nation's newest problems of public policy and perhaps 
our oldest question of constitutional law. The public policy issue involves the disposal of 
radioactive waste: In this case, we address the constitutionality of three provisions of the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842, 42 
U.S.C. §2021b et seq. The constitutional question is as old as the Constitution: It consists of 
discerning the proper division of authority between the Federal Government and the States. We 
conclude that while Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the 
States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders, the 
Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel the States to do so. We 
therefore find that only two of the Act's three provisions at issue are consistent with the 
Constitution's allocation of power to the Federal Government. 
I 
We live in a world full of low level radioactive waste. Radioactive material is present in 
luminous watch dials, smoke alarms, measurement devices, medical fluids, research materials, 
and the protective gear and construction materials used by workers at nuclear power plants. Low 
level radioactive waste is generated by the Government, by hospitals, by research institutions, 
and by various industries. The waste must be isolated from humans for long periods of time, 
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often for hundreds of years. Millions of cubic feet of low level radioactive waste must be 
disposed of each year. See Berkovitz, “Waste Wars: Did Congress "Nuke" State Sovereignty in 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985?,” 11 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 
437, 439-440 (1987). 
Our Nation's first site for the land disposal of commercial low level radioactive waste 
opened in 1962 in Beatty, Nevada. Five more sites opened in the following decade: Maxey Flats, 
Kentucky (1963), West Valley, New York (1963), Hanford, Washington (1965), Sheffield, 
Illinois (1967), and Barnwell, South Carolina (1971). Between 1975 and 1978, the Illinois site 
closed because it was full, and water management problems caused the closure of the sites in 
Kentucky and New York. As a result, since 1979 only three disposal sites– those in Nevada, 
Washington, and South Carolina –have been in operation. Waste generated in the rest of the 
country must be shipped to one of these three sites for disposal. See Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Regulation 39-40 (M. Burns ed. 1988). 
In 1979, both the Washington and Nevada sites were forced to shut down temporarily, 
leaving South Carolina to shoulder the responsibility of storing low level radioactive waste 
produced in every part of the country. The Governor of South Carolina, understandably 
perturbed, ordered a 50% reduction in the quantity of waste accepted at the Barnwell site. The 
Governors of Washington and Nevada announced plans to shut their sites permanently. 
Faced with the possibility that the Nation would be left with no disposal sites for low 
level radioactive waste, Congress responded by enacting the Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Act, Pub. L. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347. Relying largely on a report submitted by the National 
Governors' Association, Congress declared a federal policy of holding each State "responsible 
for providing for the availability of capacity either within or outside the State for the disposal of 
low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders," and found that such waste could be 
disposed of "most safely and efficiently . . . on a regional basis." §4(a)(1), 94 Stat. 3348. The 
1980 Act authorized States to enter into regional compacts that, once ratified by Congress, would 
have the authority beginning in 1986 to restrict the use of their disposal facilities to waste 
generated within member States. §4(a)(2)(B), 94 Stat. 3348. The 1980 Act included no penalties 
for States that failed to participate in this plan. 
By 1985, only three approved regional compacts had operational disposal facilities; not 
surprisingly, these were the compacts formed around South Carolina, Nevada, and Washington, 
the three sited States. The following year, the 1980 Act would have given these three compacts 
the ability to exclude waste from nonmembers, and the remaining 31 States would have had no 
assured outlet for their low level radioactive waste. With this prospect looming, Congress once 
again took up the issue of waste disposal. The result was the legislation challenged here, the 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. 
The 1985 Act was again based largely on a proposal submitted by the National 
Governors' Association. In broad outline, the Act embodies a compromise among the sited and 
unsited States. The sited States agreed to extend for seven years the period in which they would 
accept low level radioactive waste from other States. In exchange, the unsited States agreed to 
end their reliance on the sited States by 1992. 
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The mechanics of this compromise are intricate. The Act directs: "Each State shall be 
responsible for providing, either by itself or in cooperation with other States, for the disposal of . 
. . low-level radioactive waste generated within the State." The Act authorizes States to "enter 
into such [interstate] compacts as may be necessary to provide for the establishment and 
operation of regional disposal facilities for low-level radioactive waste." For an additional seven 
years beyond the period contemplated by the 1980 Act, from the beginning of 1986 through the 
end of 1992, the three existing disposal sites "shall make disposal capacity available for low-
level radioactive waste generated by any source," with certain exceptions not relevant here. But 
the three States in which the disposal sites are located are permitted to exact a graduated 
surcharge for waste arriving from outside the regional compact - in 1986-1987, $10 per cubic 
foot; in 1988-1989, $20 per cubic foot; and in 1990-1992, $40 per cubic foot. After the seven-
year transition period expires, approved regional compacts may exclude radioactive waste 
generated outside the region.  
The Act provides three types of incentives to encourage the States to comply with their 
statutory obligation to provide for the disposal of waste generated within their borders. 
Monetary incentives. One quarter of the surcharges collected by the sited States must be 
transferred to an escrow account held by the Secretary of Energy. The Secretary then makes 
payments from this account to each State that has complied with a series of deadlines. By July 1, 
1986, each State was to have ratified legislation either joining a regional compact or indicating 
an intent to develop a disposal facility within the State. By January 1, 1988, each unsited 
compact was to have identified the State in which its facility would be located, and each compact 
or stand-alone State was to have developed a siting plan and taken other identified steps. By 
January 1, 1990, each State or compact was to have filed a complete application for a license to 
operate a disposal facility, or the Governor of any State that had not filed an application was to 
have certified that the State would be capable of disposing of all waste generated in the State 
after 1992. The rest of the account is to be paid out to those States or compacts able to dispose of 
all low level radioactive waste generated within their borders by January 1, 1993.  Each State 
that has not met the 1993 deadline must either take title to the waste generated within its borders 
or forfeit to the waste generators the incentive payments it has received.  
Access incentives. The second type of incentive involves the denial of access to disposal 
sites. States that fail to meet the July 1986 deadline may be charged twice the ordinary surcharge 
for the remainder of 1986 and may be denied access to disposal facilities thereafter. States that 
fail to meet the 1988 deadline may be charged double surcharges for the first half of 1988 and 
quadruple surcharges for the second half of 1988, and may be denied access thereafter. States 
that fail to meet the 1990 deadline may be denied access. Finally, States that have not filed 
complete applications by January 1, 1992, for a license to operate a disposal facility, or States 
belonging to compacts that have not filed such applications, may be charged triple surcharges.. 
The take title provision. The third type of incentive is the most severe. The Act provides: 
"If a State (or, where applicable, a compact region) in which low-level radioactive 
waste is generated is unable to provide for the disposal of all such waste generated 
within such State or compact region by January 1, 1996, each State in which such 
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waste is generated, upon the request of the generator or owner of the waste, shall 
take title to the waste, be obligated to take possession of the waste, and shall be 
liable for all damages directly or indirectly incurred by such generator or owner as 
a consequence of the failure of the  State to take possession of the waste as soon 
after January 1, 1996, as the generator or owner notifies the State that the waste is 
available for shipment."  
These three incentives are the focus of petitioners' constitutional challenge. 
In the seven years since the Act took effect, Congress has approved nine regional 
compacts, encompassing 42 of the States. All six unsited compacts and four of the unaffiliated 
States have met the first three statutory milestones. New York, a State whose residents generate a 
relatively large share of the Nation's low level radioactive waste, did not join a regional compact. 
Instead, the State complied with the Act's requirements by enacting legislation providing for the 
siting and financing of a disposal facility in New York. The State has identified five potential 
sites, three in Allegany County and two in Cortland County. Residents of the two counties 
oppose the State's choice of location.. 
Petitioners–the State of New York and the two counties–filed this suit against the United 
States in 1990. They sought a declaratory judgment that the Act is inconsistent with the Tenth 
and Eleventh Amendments to the Constitution, with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, and with the Guarantee Clause of Article IV of the Constitution.  The States of 
Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina intervened as defendants.  The District Court 
dismissed the complaint. 757 F. Supp. 10 (NDNY 1990).  The Court of Appeals affirmed. 942 F. 
2d 114 (CA2 1991). Petitioners have abandoned their Due Process and Eleventh Amendment 
claims on their way up the appellate ladder; as the case stands before us, petitioners claim only 
that the Act is inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause. 
II 
A 
In 1788, in the course of explaining to the citizens of New York why the recently drafted 
Constitution provided for federal courts, Alexander Hamilton observed: "The erection of a new 
government, whatever care or wisdom may distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate 
questions of intricacy and nicety; and these may, in a particular manner, be expected to flow 
from the establishment of a constitution founded upon the total or partial incorporation of a 
number of distinct sovereignties." The Federalist No. 82, p. 491 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).  
Hamilton's prediction has proved quite accurate. While no one disputes the proposition that "the 
Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers," Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.    ,     
(1991); and while the Tenth Amendment makes explicit that "the powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people"; the task of ascertaining the constitutional line between federal and 
state power has given rise to many of the Court's most difficult and celebrated cases. At least as 
far back as Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 324 (1816), the Court has resolved 
questions "of great importance and delicacy" in determining whether particular sovereign powers 
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have been granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government or have been retained by the 
States. 
These questions can be viewed in either of two ways. In some cases the Court has 
inquired whether an Act of Congress is authorized by one of the powers delegated to Congress in 
Article I of the Constitution. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); McCulloch 
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). In other cases the Court has sought to determine whether an 
Act of Congress invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment. 
See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Lane 
County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71 (1869). In a case like this one, involving the division of authority 
between federal and state governments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each other. If a 
power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims 
any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved 
by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on 
Congress. 
It is in this sense that the Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which 
has not been surrendered." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). As Justice Story 
put it, "this amendment is a mere affirmation of what, upon any just reasoning, is a necessary 
rule of interpreting the constitution. Being an instrument of limited and enumerated powers, it 
follows irresistibly, that what is not conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the state authorities." 3 
J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 752 (1833). This has been the 
Court's consistent understanding: "The States unquestionably do retain a significant measure of 
sovereign authority . . . to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original 
powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government." Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, supra, at 549 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Congress exercises its conferred powers subject to the limitations contained in the 
Constitution. Thus, for example, under the Commerce Clause Congress may regulate publishers 
engaged in interstate commerce, but Congress is constrained in the exercise of that power by the 
First Amendment. The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit 
is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have discussed, is 
essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal 
Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States. The 
Tenth Amendment thus directs us to determine, as in this case, whether an incident of state 
sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power. 
This framework has been sufficiently flexible over the past two centuries to allow for 
enormous changes in the nature of government. The Federal Government undertakes activities 
today that would have been unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the 
Framers would not have conceived that any government would conduct such activities; and 
second, because the Framers would not have believed that the Federal Government, rather than 
the States, would assume such responsibilities. Yet the powers conferred upon the Federal 
Government by the Constitution were phrased in language broad enough to allow for the 
expansion of the Federal Government's role. Among the provisions of the Constitution that have 
been particularly important in this regard, three concern us here. 
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First, the Constitution allocates to Congress the power "to regulate Commerce . . . among 
the several States." Art. I, §8, cl. 3. Interstate commerce was an established feature of life in the 
late 18th century. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 42, p. 267 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("The defect of 
power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members [has] 
been clearly pointed out by experience").  The volume of interstate commerce and the range of 
commonly accepted objects of government regulation have, however, expanded considerably in 
the last 200 years, and the regulatory authority of Congress has expanded along with them. As 
interstate commerce has become ubiquitous, activities once considered purely local have come to 
have effects on the national economy, and have accordingly come within the scope of Congress' 
commerce power. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
Second, the Constitution authorizes Congress "to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . 
general Welfare of the United States." Art. I, §8, cl. 1. As conventional notions of the proper 
objects of government spending have changed over the years, so has the ability of Congress to 
"fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal money to the States." Pennhurst State School and 
Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). Compare, e.g., United States v. Butler, supra, at 
72-75 (spending power does not authorize Congress to subsidize farmers), with South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (spending power permits Congress to condition highway funds on 
States' adoption of minimum drinking age). While the spending power is "subject to several 
general restrictions articulated in our cases," id., at 207, these restrictions have not been so severe 
as to prevent the regulatory authority of Congress from generally keeping up with the growth of 
the federal budget. 
The Court's broad construction of Congress' power under the Commerce and Spending 
Clauses has of course been guided, as it has with respect to Congress' power generally, by the 
Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause, which authorizes Congress "to make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers." U.S. Const., 
Art. I., §8, cl. 18. See, e.g., Legal Tender Case (Juilliard v. Greenman), 110 U.S. 421, 449-450 
(1884); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., at 411-421. 
Finally, the Constitution provides that "the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding." U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. As the Federal Government's willingness to 
exercise power within the confines of the Constitution has grown, the authority of the States has 
correspondingly diminished to the extent that federal and state policies have conflicted.  See, 
e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). We have observed that the Supremacy 
Clause gives the Federal Government "a decided advantage in the delicate balance" the 
Constitution strikes between State and Federal power. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S., at     . 
The actual scope of the Federal Government's authority with respect to the States has 
changed over the years, therefore, but the constitutional structure underlying and limiting that 
authority has not. In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference 
whether one views the question at issue in this case as one of ascertaining the limits of the power 
delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions on the Constitution or one 
of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment. Either 
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way, we must determine whether any of the three challenged provisions of the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 oversteps the boundary between federal and 
state authority. 
B 
Petitioners do not contend that Congress lacks the power to regulate the disposal of low 
level radioactive waste. Space in radioactive waste disposal sites is frequently sold by residents 
of one State to residents of another. Regulation of the resulting interstate market in waste 
disposal is therefore well within Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. Cf. 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-623 (1978); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. 
Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 504 U.S.        , (1992) (slip op., at 5). Petitioners likewise 
do not dispute that under the Supremacy Clause Congress could, if it wished, pre-empt state 
radioactive waste regulation. Petitioners contend only that the Tenth Amendment limits the 
power of Congress to regulate in the way it has chosen. Rather than addressing the problem of 
waste disposal by directly regulating the generators and disposers of waste, petitioners argue, 
Congress has impermissibly directed the States to regulate in this field. 
This case concerns the circumstances under which Congress may use the States as 
implements of regulation; that is, whether Congress may direct or otherwise motivate the States 
to regulate in a particular field or a particular way. Our cases have established a few principles 
that guide our resolution of the issue. 
1. As an initial matter, Congress may not simply "commandeer the legislative processes 
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). In 
Hodel, the Court upheld the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 precisely 
because it did not "commandeer" the States into regulating mining. The Court found that "the 
States are not compelled to enforce the steep-slope standards, to expend any state funds, or to 
participate in the federal regulatory program in any manner whatsoever. If a State does not wish 
to submit a proposed permanent program that complies with the Act and implementing 
regulations, the full regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal Government." Ibid. 
While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas 
of intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon 
Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress' instructions. See 
Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911). The Court has been explicit about this distinction. 
"Both the States and the United States existed before the Constitution. The people, through that 
instrument, established a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with 
ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the Confederate government, which acted 
with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the States." Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall., at 76 
(emphasis added).  
Indeed, the question whether the Constitution should permit Congress to employ state 
governments as regulatory agencies was a topic of lively debate among the Framers. In providing 
for a stronger central government the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon 
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Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States. As we have seen, the Court has 
consistently respected this choice. We have always understood that even where Congress has the 
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the 
power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts. E.g., Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S., at 288-289. The allocation of power 
contained in the Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate 
commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of 
interstate commerce. 
2.  This is not to say that Congress lacks the ability to encourage a State to regulate in a 
particular way, or that Congress may not hold out incentives to the States as a method of 
influencing a State's policy choices. Our cases have identified a variety of methods, short of 
outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent 
with federal interests. Two of these methods are of particular relevance here. 
First, under Congress' spending power, "Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of 
federal funds." South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S., at 206. Such conditions must (among other 
requirements) bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending, id., at 207-208, and 
n. 3; otherwise, of course, the spending power could render academic the Constitution's other 
grants and limits of federal authority. Where the recipient of federal funds is a State, as is not 
unusual today, the conditions attached to the funds by Congress may influence a State's 
legislative choices.  
Second, where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the 
Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the choice of regulating 
that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., supra, at 288. This arrangement, 
which has been termed "a program of cooperative federalism," Hodel, supra, at 289, is replicated 
in numerous federal statutory schemes. These include the Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 816, as 
amended, 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989). 
By either of these two methods, as by any other permissible method of encouraging a 
State to conform to federal policy choices, the residents of the State retain the ultimate decision 
as to whether or not the State will comply. If a State's citizens view federal policy as sufficiently 
contrary to local interests, they may elect to decline a federal grant. If state residents would 
prefer their government to devote its attention and resources to problems other than those 
deemed important by Congress, they may choose to have the Federal Government rather than the 
State bear the expense of a federally mandated regulatory program, and they may continue to 
supplement that program to the extent state law is not preempted. Where Congress encourages 
state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local 
electorate's preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people. 
By contrast, where the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability 
of both state and federal officials is diminished. If the citizens of New York, for example, do not 
consider that making provision for the disposal of radioactive waste is in their best interest, they 
may elect state officials who share their view. That view can always be preempted under the 
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Supremacy Clause if is contrary to the national view, but in such a case it is the Federal 
Government that makes the decision in full view of the public, and it will be federal officials that 
suffer the consequences if the decision turns out to be detrimental or unpopular. But where the 
Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the 
brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may 
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus 
diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance 
with the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation. See 
Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev., at 61-62; La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political 
Process - The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 577, 639-
665 (1985). 
With these principles in mind, we turn to the three challenged provisions of the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.  
III 
Construed as a whole, the Act comprises three sets of "incentives" for the States to 
provide for the disposal of low level radioactive waste generated within their borders. We 
consider each in turn. 
A 
The first set of incentives works in three steps. First, Congress has authorized States with 
disposal sites to impose a surcharge on radioactive waste received from other States. Second, the 
Secretary of Energy collects a portion of this surcharge and places the money in an escrow 
account. Third, States achieving a series of milestones receive portions of this fund. 
The first of these steps is an unexceptionable exercise of Congress' power to authorize the 
States to burden interstate commerce. While the Commerce Clause has long been understood to 
limit the States' ability to discriminate against interstate commerce, that limit may be lifted, as it 
has been here, by an expression of the "unambiguous intent" of Congress. Whether or not the 
States would be permitted to burden the interstate transport of low level radioactive waste in the 
absence of Congress' approval, the States can clearly do so with Congress' approval, which is 
what the Act gives them. 
The second step, the Secretary's collection of a percentage of the surcharge, is no more 
than a federal tax on interstate commerce, which petitioners do not claim to be an invalid 
exercise of either Congress' commerce or taxing power. Cf. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 
42, 44-45 (1950); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581-583 (1937). 
The third step is a conditional exercise of Congress' authority under the Spending Clause: 
Congress has placed conditions–the achievement of the milestones–on the receipt of federal 
funds. Petitioners do not contend that Congress has exceeded its authority in any of the four 
respects our cases have identified. See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S., at 207-208. 
The expenditure is for the general welfare, Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-641 (1937); 
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the States are required to use the money they receive for the purpose of assuring the safe disposal 
of radioactive waste. 42 U.S.C. §2021e(d)(2)(E). The conditions imposed are unambiguous, 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S., at 17; the Act informs the States 
exactly what they must do and by when they must do it in order to obtain a share of the escrow 
account. The conditions imposed are reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure, 
Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S., at 461; both the conditions and the payments embody 
Congress' efforts to address the pressing problem of radioactive waste disposal. Finally, 
petitioners do not claim that the conditions imposed by the Act violate any independent 
constitutional prohibition. Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-
270 (1985). 
That the States are able to choose whether they will receive federal funds does not make 
the resulting expenditures any less federal; indeed, the location of such choice in the States is an 
inherent element in any conditional exercise of Congress' spending power. 
The Act's first set of incentives, in which Congress has conditioned grants to the States 
upon the States' attainment of a series of milestones, is thus well within the authority of Congress 
under the Commerce and Spending Clauses. Because the first set of incentives is supported by 
affirmative constitutional grants of power to Congress, it is not inconsistent with the Tenth 
Amendment. 
B 
In the second set of incentives, Congress has authorized States and regional compacts 
with disposal sites gradually to increase the cost of access to the sites, and then to deny access 
altogether, to radioactive waste generated in States that do not meet federal deadlines. As a 
simple regulation, this provision would be within the power of Congress to authorize the States 
to discriminate against interstate commerce. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 
Fed. Reserve System, 472 U.S. 159, 174-175 (1985). Where federal regulation of private activity 
is within the scope of the Commerce Clause, we have recognized the ability of Congress to offer 
states the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law 
pre-empted by federal regulation. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Association, 452 U.S., at 288. 
This is the choice presented to non-sited States by the Act's second set of incentives: 
States may either regulate the disposal of radioactive waste according to federal standards by 
attaining local or regional self-sufficiency, or their residents who produce radioactive waste will 
be subject to federal regulation authorizing sited States and regions to deny access to their 
disposal sites. The affected States are not compelled by Congress to regulate, because any burden 
caused by a State's refusal to regulate will fall on those who generate waste and find no outlet for 
its disposal, rather than on the State as a sovereign. A State whose citizens do not wish it to attain 
the Act's milestones may devote its attention and its resources to issues its citizens deem more 
worthy; the choice remains at all times with the residents of the State, not with Congress. The 
State need not expend any funds, or participate in any federal program, if local residents do not 
view such expenditures or participation as worthwhile. Cf. Hodel, supra, at 288. Nor must the 
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State abandon the field if it does not accede to federal direction; the State may continue to 
regulate the generation and disposal of radioactive waste in any manner its citizens see fit. 
The Act's second set of incentives thus represents a conditional exercise of Congress' 
commerce power, along the lines of those we have held to be within Congress' authority. As a 
result, the second set of incentives does not intrude on the sovereignty reserved to the States by 
the Tenth Amendment.  
C 
The take title provision is of a different character. This third so-called "incentive" offers 
States, as an alternative to regulating pursuant to Congress' direction, the option of taking title to 
and possession of the low level radioactive waste generated within their borders and becoming 
liable for all damages waste generators suffer as a result of the States' failure to do so promptly. 
In this provision, Congress has crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion. 
The take title provision offers state governments a "choice" of either accepting ownership 
of waste or regulating according to the instructions of Congress. Respondents do not claim that 
the Constitution would authorize Congress to impose either option as a freestanding requirement. 
On one hand, the Constitution would not permit Congress simply to transfer radioactive waste 
from generators to state governments. Such a forced transfer, standing alone, would in principle 
be no different than a congressionally compelled subsidy from state governments to radioactive 
waste producers. The same is true of the provision requiring the States to become liable for the 
generators' damages. Standing alone, this provision would be indistinguishable from an Act of 
Congress directing the States to assume the liabilities of certain state residents. Either type of 
federal action would "commandeer" state governments into the service of federal regulatory 
purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority 
between federal and state governments. On the other hand, the second alternative held out to 
state governments–regulating pursuant to Congress' direction–would, standing alone, present a 
simple command to state governments to implement legislation enacted by Congress. As we 
have seen, the Constitution does not empower Congress to subject state governments to this type 
of instruction. 
Because an instruction to state governments to take title to waste, standing alone, would 
be beyond the authority of Congress, and because a direct order to regulate, standing alone, 
would also be beyond the authority of Congress, it follows that Congress lacks the power to offer 
the States a choice between the two. Unlike the first two sets of incentives, the take title 
incentive does not represent the conditional exercise of any congressional power enumerated in 
the Constitution. In this provision, Congress has not held out the threat of exercising its spending 
power or its commerce power; it has instead held out the threat, should the States not regulate 
according to one federal instruction, of simply forcing the States to submit to another federal 
instruction. A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice 
at all. Either way, "the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program," Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., supra, at 288, an outcome that has never been understood to 
lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. 
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The take title provision appears to be unique. No other federal statute has been cited 
which offers a state government no option other than that of implementing legislation enacted by 
Congress. Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside Congress' enumerated 
powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, 
the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established by the 
Constitution. 
VII 
Some truths are so basic that, like the air around us, they are easily overlooked. Much of 
the Constitution is concerned with setting forth the form of our government, and the courts have 
traditionally invalidated measures deviating from that form. The result may appear "formalistic" 
in a given case to partisans of the measure at issue, because such measures are typically the 
product of the era's perceived necessity. But the Constitution protects us from our own best 
intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so 
that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to 
the crisis of the day. The shortage of disposal sites for radioactive waste is a pressing national 
problem, but a judiciary that licensed extra-constitutional government with each issue of 
comparable gravity would, in the long run, be far worse. 
States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States. State governments are 
neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal Government. The positions 
occupied by state officials appear nowhere on the Federal Government's most detailed 
organizational chart. The Constitution instead "leaves to the several States a residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty," The Federalist No. 39, p. 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), reserved explicitly 
to the States by the Tenth Amendment. 
Whatever the outer limits of that sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: The Federal 
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. The 
Constitution permits both the Federal Government and the States to enact legislation regarding 
the disposal of low level radioactive waste. The Constitution enables the Federal Government to 
pre-empt state regulation contrary to federal interests, and it permits the Federal Government to 
hold out incentives to the States as a means of encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory 
schemes. It does not, however, authorize Congress simply to direct the States to provide for the 
disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders. While there may be many 
constitutional methods of achieving regional self-sufficiency in radioactive waste disposal, the 
method Congress has chosen is not one of them. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
accordingly: 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
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SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA v. FLORIDA  
517 U.S. 44 (1996) 
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'CONNOR, SCALIA, 
KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. SOUTER, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., joined. 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.  
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act provides that an Indian tribe may conduct certain 
gaming activities only in conformance with a valid compact between the tribe and the State in 
which the gaming activities are located. 102 Stat. 2475, 25 U.S.C. §2710(d)(1)(C). The Act, 
passed by Congress under the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, §10, cl. 3, imposes 
upon the States a duty to negotiate in good faith with an Indian tribe toward the formation of a 
compact, §2710(d)(3)(A), and authorizes a tribe to bring suit in federal court against a State in 
order to compel performance of that duty, §2710(d)(7). We hold that notwithstanding Congress' 
clear intent to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not 
grant Congress  that power, and therefore §2710(d)(7) cannot grant jurisdiction over a State that 
does not consent to be sued. We further hold that the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 
52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908), may not be used to enforce §2710(d)(3) against a state 
official.
1
 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.[omitted] 
JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG and JUSTICE BREYER join, 
dissenting. 
In holding the State of Florida immune to suit under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 
the Court today holds for the first time since the founding of the Republic that Congress has no 
authority to subject a State to the jurisdiction of a federal court at the behest of an individual 
asserting a federal right. Although the Court invokes the Eleventh Amendment as authority for 
this proposition, the only sense in which that amendment might be claimed as pertinent here was 
tolerantly phrased by JUSTICE STEVENS in his concurring opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union 
Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 23, 105 L. Ed. 2d 1, 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989) (STEVENS, J., concurring). There, 
he explained how it has come about that we have two Eleventh Amendments, the one ratified in 
1795, the other (so-called) invented by the Court nearly a century later in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 
U.S. 1, 33 L. Ed. 842, 10 S. Ct. 504 (1890). JUSTICE STEVENS saw in that second Eleventh 
Amendment no bar to the exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause in 
                                                 
1
 Respondents also contend that the Act mandates state regulation of Indian gaming and therefore violates the Tenth 
Amendment by allowing federal officials to avoid political accountability for those actions for which they are in fact 
responsible. See New York v. United State, 505 U.S. 144, 120 L. Ed. 2d 120, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). This argument 
was not considered below by either the Eleventh Circuit or the District Court, and is not fairly within the question 
presented. Therefore we do not consider it here. 
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providing for suits on a federal question by individuals against a State, and I can only say that 
after my own canvass of the matter I believe he was entirely correct in that view, for reasons 
given below.  
I 
It is useful to separate three questions: (1) whether the States enjoyed sovereign 
immunity if sued in their own courts in the period prior to ratification of the National 
Constitution; (2) if so, whether after ratification the States were entitled to claim some such 
immunity when sued in a federal court exercising jurisdiction either because the suit was 
between a State and a non-state litigant who was not its citizen, or because the issue in the case 
raised a federal question; and (3) whether any state sovereign immunity recognized in federal 
court may be abrogated by Congress. 
The answer to the first question is not clear, although some of the Framers assumed that 
States did enjoy immunity in their own courts. The second question was not debated at the time 
of ratification, except as to citizen-state diversity jurisdiction; there was no unanimity, but in due 
course the Court in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L. Ed. 440 (1793), answered 
that a state defendant enjoyed no such immunity.  
The adoption of the Eleventh Amendment soon changed the result in Chisholm, not by 
mentioning sovereign immunity, but by eliminating citizen-state diversity jurisdiction over cases 
with state defendants. The  Court [in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 33 L. Ed. 842, 10 S. Ct. 504 
(1890)] erroneously assumed that a State could plead sovereign immunity against a noncitizen 
suing under federal question jurisdiction, and for that reason held that a State must enjoy the 
same protection in a suit by one of its citizens. 
The Court's answer today to the third question is likewise at odds with the Founders' view 
that common law, when it was received into the new American legal systems, was always 
subject to legislative amendment. In ignoring the reasons for this pervasive understanding at the 
time of the ratification, and in holding that a non-textual common-law rule limits a clear grant of 
congressional power under Article I, the Court follows a course that has brought it to grief before 
in our history, and promises to do so again.  
We have assumed, without deciding, that congressional power to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity exists even when §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment has an application. A majority of 
this Court was willing to make that assumption in Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income 
Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 101, 106 L. Ed. 2d 76, 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989) (plurality opinion), in 
Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., supra, at 475 (plurality opinion).  The 
Court could not have been unaware that its decision of cases like Hoffman and Welch, on the 
ground that the statutes at issue lacked a plain statement of intent to abrogate, would invite 
Congress to attempt abrogation in statutes like the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 
§2701 et seq. (IGRA). 
American reluctance to import English common law wholesale into the New World is 
traceable to the early colonial period. One scholar of that time has written that "the process 
which we may call the reception of the English common law by the colonies was not so simple 
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as the legal theory would lead us to assume. While their general legal conceptions were 
conditioned by, and their terminology derived from, the common law, the early colonists were 
far from applying it as a technical system, they often ignored it or denied its subsidiary force, and 
they consciously departed from many of its most essential principles." P. Reinsch, English 
Common Law in the Early American Colonies 58 (1899). For a variety of reasons, including the 
absence of trained lawyers and judges, the dearth of law books, the religious and ideological 
commitments of the early settlers, and the novel conditions of the New World, the colonists 
turned to a variety of other sources in addition to principles of common law.  
The Framers and their contemporaries did not agree about the place of common-law state 
sovereign immunity even as to federal jurisdiction resting on the Citizen-State Diversity Clauses. 
On the other hand, James Madison, John Marshall, and Alexander Hamilton all appear to have 
believed that the common-law immunity from suit would survive the ratification so as to be at a 
State's disposal when jurisdiction would depend on diversity. This would have left the States free 
to enjoy a traditional immunity as defendants without barring the exercise of judicial power over 
them if they chose to enter the federal courts as diversity plaintiffs or to waive their immunity as 
diversity defendants.  
Hamilton says that a State is "not . . . amenable to the suit of an individual without its 
consent . . . . unless . . . there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention." The 
Federalist No. 81, at 548-549.  He immediately adds, however, that:   
"As the plan of the Convention aims only at a partial Union or consolidation, the State 
Governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had and which 
were not by that act exclusively delegated to the United States. This exclusive delegation or 
rather this alienation of State sovereignty would only exist in three cases; where the Constitution 
in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an 
authority to the Union and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and 
where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be 
absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant." 
The Federalist No. 32, at 200 (emphasis in original). 
The majority sees in these statements, and chiefly in Hamilton's discussion of sovereign 
immunity in Federalist No. 81, an unequivocal mandate "which would preclude all federal 
jurisdiction over an unconsenting State."  But there is no such mandate to be found.   
The first embarrassment Hamilton's discussion creates for the majority turns on the fact 
that the power to regulate commerce with Indian Tribes has been interpreted as making "Indian 
relations . . . the exclusive province of federal law." County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation 
of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 234, 84 L. Ed. 2d 169, 105 S. Ct. 1245 (1985).
2 
We have accordingly 
                                                 
2
 See also Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561 (1832) ("The Cherokee nation . . . is a distinct community . . . in 
which the laws of Georgia can have no force. . . . The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, 
is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States"). This Court has repeatedly rejected 
state attempts to   assert sovereignty over Indian lands. 
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recognized that "state laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation 
except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply." McClanahan v. 
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-171, 36 L. Ed. 2d 129, 93 S. Ct. 1257 (1973) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789, 89 L. Ed. 1367, 65 
S. Ct. 989 (1945) ("The policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is 
deeply rooted in the Nation's history"). We have specifically held, moreover, that the states have 
no power to regulate gambling on Indian lands. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 
480 U.S. 202, 221-222, 94 L. Ed. 2d 244, 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987). In sum, since the States have 
no sovereignty in the regulation of commerce with the tribes, on Hamilton's view there is no 
source of sovereign immunity to assert in a suit based on congressional regulation of that 
commerce. If Hamilton is good authority, the majority of the Court today is wrong. 
In sum, either the majority reads Hamilton as I do, to say nothing about sovereignty or 
immunity in such a case, or it will have to read him to say something about it that bars any state 
immunity claim. That is the dilemma of the majority's reliance on Hamilton's Federalist No. 81, 
with its reference to No. 32. Either way, he is no authority for the Court's position.  
Thus, the Court's attempt to convert isolated statements by the Framers into answers to 
questions not before them is fundamentally misguided.  The Court's difficulty is far   more 
fundamental however, than inconsistency with a particular quotation, for the Court's position 
runs afoul of the general theory of sovereignty that gave shape to the Framers' enterprise. An 
enquiry into the development of that concept demonstrates that American political thought had 
so revolutionized the concept of sovereignty itself that calling for the immunity of a State as 
against the jurisdiction of the national courts would have been sheer illogic. 
We said in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779, 115 L. Ed. 2d 686, 
111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991) that "the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact," 
but we surely did not mean that they entered that system with the sovereignty they would have 
claimed if each State had assumed independent existence in the community of nations, for even 
the Articles of Confederation allowed for less than that. While there is no need here to calculate 
exactly how close the American States came to sovereignty in the classic sense prior to 
ratification of the Constitution, it is clear that the act of ratification affected their sovereignty in a 
way different from any previous political event in America or anywhere else. For the adoption of 
the Constitution made them members of a novel federal system that sought to balance the States' 
exercise of some sovereign prerogatives delegated from their own people with the principle of a 
limited but centralizing federal supremacy. 
As a matter of political theory, this federal arrangement of dual delegated sovereign 
powers truly was a more revolutionary turn than the late war had been. See, e.g., U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S., (1995) (slip op., at 1) (KENNEDY, J., concurring) 
("Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sovereignty"). 
Before the new federal scheme appeared, 18th-century political theorists had assumed that "there 
must reside somewhere in every political unit a single, undivided, final power, higher in legal 
authority than any other power, subject to no law, a law unto itself." B. Bailyn, The Ideological 
Origins of the American Revolution 198 (1967); see also Wood 345. The American development 
of divided sovereign powers, which "shattered . . . the categories of government that had 
dominated Western thinking for centuries," id., at 385, was made possible only by a recognition 
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that the ultimate sovereignty rests in the people themselves. See id., at 530 (noting that because 
"none of these arguments about 'joint jurisdictions' and 'coequal sovereignties' convincingly 
refuted the Antifederalist doctrine of a supreme and indivisible sovereignty," the Federalists 
could succeed only by emphasizing that the supreme power "'resides in the PEOPLE, as the 
fountain of government'" (citing 1 Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788, p. 302 
(J. McMaster & F. Stone, eds. 1888) (quoting James Wilson). The people possessing this plenary 
bundle of specific powers were free to parcel them out to different governments and different 
branches of the same government as they saw fit.  
Given this metamorphosis of the idea of sovereignty in the years leading up to 1789, the 
question whether the old immunity doctrine might have been received as something suitable for 
the new world of federal question jurisdiction is a crucial one.  The answer is that sovereign 
immunity as it would have been known to the Framers before ratification thereafter became 
inapplicable as a matter of logic in a federal suit raising a federal question. The old doctrine, 
after all, barred the involuntary subjection of a sovereign to the system of justice and law of 
which it was itself the font, since to do otherwise would have struck the common-law mind from 
the Middle Ages onward as both impractical and absurd. But the ratification demonstrated that 
state governments were subject to a superior regime of law in a judicial system established, not 
by the State, but by the people through a specific delegation of their sovereign power to a 
National Government that was paramount within its delegated sphere. When individuals sued 
States to enforce federal rights, the Government that corresponded to the "sovereign" in the 
traditional common-law sense was not the State but the National Government, and any state 
immunity from the jurisdiction of the Nation's courts would have required a grant from the true 
sovereign, the people, in their Constitution, or from the Congress that the Constitution had 
empowered.  
Given the Framers' general concern with curbing abuses by state governments, it would 
be amazing if the scheme of delegated powers embodied in the Constitution had left the National 
Government powerless to render the States judicially accountable for violations of federal rights.  
Today's majority discounts this concern. Without citing a single source to the contrary, 
the Court dismisses the historical evidence regarding the Framers' vision of the relationship 
between national and state sovereignty, and reassures us that "the Nation survived for nearly two 
centuries without the question of the existence of [the abrogation] power ever being presented to 
this Court." Although for reasons of stare decisis I would not today disturb the century-old 
precedent, I surely would not extend its error by placing the common-law immunity it 
mistakenly recognized beyond the power of Congress to abrogate. 
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NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS v. SEBELIUS  
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Medicaid Expansion) 
 
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion  of the court holding the medicaid expansion 
unconstitutional joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,  Breyer and Kagan. Justices 
Ginsburg and Sotomayer dissented. 
Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the Court  
Today we resolve constitutional challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010:  the Medicaid expansion, which gives funds to the States on the condition that they 
provide specified health care to all citizens whose income falls below a certain threshold. We ask 
whether Congress has the power under the Constitution to enact the challenged provision. 
In 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119 
The Act aims to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the 
cost of health care. The Act's 10 titles stretch over 900 pages and contain hundreds of provisions. 
This [portion of the opinion]  concerns constitutional challenge to …. the Medicaid expansion. 
The States contend that the Medicaid expansion exceeds Congress's authority under the 
Spending Clause. They claim that Congress is coercing the States to adopt the changes it wants 
by threatening to withhold all of a State's Medicaid grants, unless the State accepts the new 
expanded funding and complies with the conditions that come with it. This, they argue, violates 
the basic principle that the "Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or 
administer a federal regulatory program." New York v. U.S. , 505 U.S. 144 (1992), at 188. 
There is no doubt that the Act dramatically increases state obligations under Medicaid. 
The current Medicaid program requires States to cover only certain discrete categories of needy 
individuals--pregnant women, children, needy families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled. 
There is no mandatory coverage for most childless adults, and the States typically do not offer 
any such coverage. The States also enjoy considerable flexibility with respect to the coverage 
levels for parents of needy families. On average States cover only those unemployed parents who 
make less than 37 percent of the federal poverty level, and only those employed parents who 
make less than 63 percent of the poverty line.  
The Medicaid provisions of the Affordable Care Act, in contrast, require States to expand 
their Medicaid programs by 2014 to cover all individuals under the age of 65 with incomes 
below 133 percent of the federal poverty line. The Act also establishes a new "[e]ssential health 
benefits" package, which States must provide to all new Medicaid recipients--a level sufficient to 
satisfy a recipient's obligations under the individual mandate. The Affordable Care Act provides 
that the Federal Government will pay 100 percent of the costs of covering these newly eligible 
individuals through 2016. In the following years, the federal payment level gradually decreases, 
to a minimum of 90 percent. In light of the expansion in coverage mandated by the Act, the 
Federal Government estimates that its Medicaid spending will increase by approximately $100 
billion per year, nearly 40 percent above current levels.  
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The Spending Clause grants Congress the power "to pay the Debts and provide for the ... 
general Welfare of the United States." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. We have long recognized 
that Congress may use this power to grant federal funds to the States, and may condition such a 
grant upon the States' "taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take." 
College Savings Bank, 527 U.S., at 686 . Such measures "encourage a State to regulate in a 
particular way, [and] influenc[e] a State's policy choices." New York, supra. The conditions 
imposed by Congress ensure that the funds are used by the States to "provide for the . . . general 
Welfare" in the manner Congress intended. 
At the same time, our cases have recognized limits on Congress's power under the 
Spending Clause to secure state compliance with federal objectives. "We have repeatedly 
characterized . . . Spending Clause legislation as 'much in the nature of a contract.' Barnes v. 
Gorman, (2002).  The legitimacy of Congress's exercise of the spending power "thus rests on 
whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract. Respecting this 
limitation is critical to ensuring that Spending Clause legislation does not undermine the status of 
the States as independent sovereigns in our federal system. For this reason, "the Constitution has 
never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern 
according to Congress' instructions.". Otherwise the two-government system established by the 
Framers would give way to a system that vests power in one central government, and individual 
liberty would suffer. 
That insight has led this Court to strike down federal legislation that commandeers a 
State's legislative or administrative apparatus for federal purposes. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S., at 
933, (striking down federal legislation compelling state law enforcement officers to perform 
federally mandated background checks on handgun purchasers); New York, supra, at 174-175 
(invalidating provisions of an Act that would compel a State to either take title to nuclear waste 
or enact particular state waste regulations). Congress may use its spending power to create 
incentives for States to act in accordance with federal policies. But when "pressure turns into 
compulsion," the legislation runs contrary to our system of federalism. "[T]he Constitution 
simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate." New York, 505 
U.S., at 178, That is true whether Congress directly commands a State to regulate or indirectly 
coerces a State to adopt a federal regulatory system as its own. 
Permitting the Federal Government to force the States to implement a federal program 
would threaten the political accountability key to our federal system. "[W]here the Federal 
Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of 
public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain 
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision." Id., at 169. Spending Clause 
programs do not pose this danger when a State has a legitimate choice whether to accept the 
federal conditions in exchange for federal funds. In such a situation, state officials can fairly be 
held politically accountable for choosing to accept or refuse the federal offer. But when the State 
has no choice, the Federal Government can achieve its objectives without accountability, just as 
in New York. Indeed, this danger is heightened when Congress acts under the Spending Clause, 
because Congress can use that power to implement federal policy it could not impose directly 
under its enumerated powers. 
202 
Congress may attach appropriate conditions to federal taxing and spending programs to 
preserve its control over the use of federal funds. In the typical case we look to the States to 
defend their prerogatives by adopting "the simple expedient of not yielding" to federal 
blandishments when they do not want to embrace the federal policies as their own. 
Massachusetts v. Mellon, (1923). The States are separate and independent sovereigns. 
Sometimes they have to act like it. 
The States, however, argue that the Medicaid expansion is far from the typical case. They 
object that Congress has "crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion," in the 
way it has structured the funding: Instead of simply refusing to grant the new funds to States that 
will not accept the new conditions, Congress has also threatened to withhold those States' 
existing Medicaid funds. The States claim that this threat serves no purpose other than to force 
unwilling States to sign up for the dramatic expansion in health care coverage effected by the 
Act. 
Given the nature of the threat and the programs at issue here, we must agree. We have 
upheld Congress's authority to condition the receipt of funds on the States' complying with 
restrictions on the use of those funds, because that is the means by which Congress ensures that 
the funds are spent according to its view of the "general Welfare." Conditions that do not here 
govern the use of the funds, however, cannot be justified on that basis. When, for example, such 
conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent grants, the 
conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes. 
In South Dakota v. Dole, we considered a challenge to a federal law that threatened to 
withhold five percent of a State's federal highway funds if the State did not raise its drinking age 
to 21.  We asked whether "the financial inducement offered by Congress" was "so coercive as to 
pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.' By "financial inducement" the Court 
meant the threat of losing five percent of highway funds; no new money was offered to the States 
to raise their drinking ages. We found that the inducement was not impermissibly coercive, 
because Congress was offering only "relatively mild encouragement to the States."  
In this case, the financial "inducement" Congress has chosen is much more than 
"relatively mild encouragement"--it is a gun to the head. The Medicaid Act provides that if a 
State's Medicaid plan does not comply with the Act's requirements, the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services may declare that "further payments will not be made to the State." A State that 
opts out of the Affordable Care Act's expansion in health care coverage thus stands to lose not 
merely "a relatively small percentage" of its existing Medicaid funding, but all of it. Medicaid 
spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average State's total budget, with federal funds 
covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs.  The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State's 
overall budget, in contrast, is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but 
to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.  Congress may not simply "conscript state [agencies] 
into the national bureaucratic army," FERC v. Mississippi, (1982).   
The Affordable Care Act is constitutional in part and unconstitutional in part. The 
individual mandate cannot be upheld as an exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce 
Clause. That Clause authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce, not to order 
individuals to engage in it. In this case, however, it is reasonable to construe what Congress has 
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done as increasing taxes on those who have a certain amount of income, but choose to go without 
health insurance. Such legislation is within  Congress's power to tax. 
As for the Medicaid expansion, that portion of the Affordable Care Act violates the 
Constitution by threatening existing Medicaid funding. Congress has no authority to order the 
States to regulate according to its instructions. Congress may offer the States grants and require 
the States to comply with accompanying conditions, but the States must have a genuine choice 
whether to accept the offer. The States are given no such choice in this case: They must either 
accept a basic change in the nature of Medicaid, or risk losing all Medicaid funding. The remedy 
for that constitutional violation is to preclude the Federal Government from imposing such a 
sanction. That remedy does not require striking down other portions of the Affordable Care Act. 
The Framers created a Federal Government of limited powers, and assigned to this Court 
the duty of enforcing those limits. The Court does so today. But the Court does not express any 
opinion on the wisdom of the Affordable Care Act. Under the Constitution, that judgment is 
reserved to the people. 
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Session 10. Fugitive Resources 
McCREADY v. VIRGINIA 
94 U.S. 391 (1877) 
Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court. 
The precise question to be determined in this case is, whether the State of Virginia can 
prohibit the citizens of other States from planting oysters in Ware River, a stream in that State 
where the tide ebbs and flows, when its own citizens have that privilege. 
The principle has long been settled in this court, that each State owns the beds of all tide-
waters within its jurisdiction, unless they have been granted away. In like manner, the States own 
the tide-waters themselves, and the fish in them, so far as they are capable of ownership while 
running.  For this purpose the State represents its people, and the ownership is that of the people 
in their united sovereignty. The title thus held is subject to the paramount right of navigation, the 
regulation of which, in respect to foreign and inter-state commerce, has been granted to the 
United States.  There has been, however, no such grant of power over the fisheries. These remain 
under the exclusive control of the State, which has consequently the right, in its discretion, to 
appropriate its tide-waters and their beds to be used by its people as a common for taking and 
cultivating fish, so far as it may be done without obstructing navigation.  Such an appropriation 
is in effect nothing more than a regulation of the use by the people of their common property. 
The right which the people of the State thus acquire comes not from their citizenship alone, but 
from their citizenship and property combined.  It is, in fact, a property right, and not a mere 
privilege or immunity of citizenship. 
By art. 4, sect. 2, of the Constitution, the citizens of each State are “entitled to all 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.” We think we may safely hold that the 
citizens of one State are not invested by this clause of the Constitution with any interest in the 
common property of the citizens of another State.  If Virginia had by law provided for the sale of 
its once vast public domain, and a division of the proceeds among its own people, no one, we 
venture to say, would contend that the citizens of other States had a constitutional right to the 
enjoyment of this privilege of Virginia citizenship.  Neither if, instead of selling, the State had 
appropriated the same property to be used as a common by its people for the purposes of 
agriculture, could the citizens of other States avail themselves of such a privilege.  And the 
reason is obvious:  the right thus granted is not a privilege or immunity of general but of special 
citizenship.  It does not “belong of right to the citizens of all free governments,” but only to the 
citizens of Virginia, on account of the peculiar circumstances in which they are placed.  They, 
and they alone, owned the property to be sold or used, and they alone had the power to dispose 
of it as they saw fit.  They owned it, not by virtue of citizenship merely, but of citizenship and 
domicile united; that is to say, by virtue of a citizenship confined to that particular locality. 
The planting of oysters in the soil covered by water owned in common by the people of 
the State is not different in principle from that of planting corn upon dry land held in the same 
way. Both are for the purposes of cultivation and profit; and if the State, in the regulation of its 
public domain, can grant to its own citizens the exclusive use of dry lands, we see no reason why 
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it may not do the same thing in respect to such as are covered by water.  And as all concede that 
a State may grant to one of its citizens the exclusive use of a part of the common property, the 
conclusion would seem to follow, that it might by appropriate legislation confine the use of the 
whole to its own people alone. 
We are unable to agree with the counsel for the plaintiff in error in his argument, that the 
right of planting may be enforced as a privilege of inter-state citizenship, even though that of 
taking cannot.  Planting means, in “oysterman’s phraseology,” as counsel say, “depositing with 
the intent that the oysters shall remain until they are fattened.” The object is, therefore, to make 
use of the soil and the water above it for the improvement and growth of that which is planted.  It 
is this use, as has already been seen, that the State has the right, by reason of its ownership, to 
prohibit. 
Judgment affirmed. 
GEER v. CONNECTICUT 
161 U.S. 519 1896 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.  
By the statutes of the State of Connecticut, referred to in the statement of facts, the open 
season for the game birds mentioned therein was from the first day of October to the first day of 
January.  The birds which the defendant was charged with unlawfully having in his possession 
on the 19th of October, for the purpose of unlawful transportation beyond the State, were alleged 
to have been killed within the State after the first day of October.  They were, therefore, killed 
during the open season. There was no charge that they had been unlawfully killed for the purpose 
of being transported outside of the State.  The offence, therefore, charged was the possession of 
game birds, for the purpose of transporting them beyond the State, which birds had been lawfully 
killed within the State.  The court of last resort of the State held, in interpreting the statute 
already cited, by the light afforded by previous enactments, that one of its objects was to forbid 
the killing of birds within the State during the open season for the purpose of transporting them 
beyond the State, and also additionally as a distinct offence to punish the having in possession, 
for the purpose of transportation beyond the State, birds lawfully killed within the State.  The 
court found that the information did not charge the first of these offences, and therefore that the 
sole offence which it covered was the latter.  It then decided that the State had power to make it 
an offence to have in possession, for the purpose of transportation beyond the State, birds which 
had been lawfully killed within the State during the open season, and that the statute in creating 
this offence did not violate the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the United 
States.  The correctness of this latter ruling is the question for review.  In other words, the sole 
issue which the case presents is, was it lawful under the Constitution of the United States 
(section 8, Article I) for the State of Connecticut to allow the killing of birds within the State 
during a designated open season, to allow such birds, when so killed, to be used, to be sold and 
to be bought for use within the State, and yet to forbid their transportation beyond the State? Or, 
to state it otherwise, had the State of Connecticut the power to regulate the killing of game within 
her borders so as to confine its use to the limits of the State and forbid its transmission outside of 
the State?  
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In considering this inquiry we of course accept the interpretation affixed to the state 
statute by the court of last resort of the State.  The solution of the question involves a 
consideration of the nature of the property in game and the authority which the State had a right 
lawfully to exercise in relation thereto.  
From the earliest traditions the right to reduce animals feroe naturoe to possession has 
been subject to the control of the law-giving power.  
Among other subdivisions, things were classified by the Roman law into public and 
common.  The latter embraced animals feroe naturoe, which, having no owner, were considered 
as belonging in common to all the citizens of the State.  After pointing out the foregoing 
subdivision, the Digest says:  
"There are things which we acquire the dominion of, as by the law of nature, 
which the light of natural reason causes every man to see, and others we acquire 
by the civil law, that is to say, by methods which belong to the government.  As 
the law of nature is more ancient, because it took birth with the human race, it is 
proper to speak first of the latter.  1. Thus, all the animals which can be taken 
upon the earth, in the sea, or in the air, that is to say, wild animals, belong to those 
who take them. . . .  Because that which belongs to nobody is acquired by the 
natural law by the person who first possesses it.  We do not distinguish the 
acquisition of these wild beasts and birds by whether one has captured them on 
his own property of on the property of another; but he who wishes to enter into 
the property of another to hunt can be readily prevented if the owner knows his 
purpose to do so." Digest, Book 41, Tit. 1, De Adquir. Rer. Dom.  
No restriction, it would hence seem, was placed by the Roman law upon the power of the 
individual to reduce game, of which he was the owner in common with other citizens, to 
possession, although the Institutes of Justinian recognized the right of an owner of land to forbid 
another from killing game on his property, as indeed this right was impliedly admitted by the 
Digest in the passage just cited. Institutes, Book 2, Tit. 1, s. 12.  
This inhibition was, however, rather a recognition of the right of ownership in land than 
an exercise by the State of its undoubted authority to control the taking and use of that which 
belonged to no one in particular, but was common to all.  In the feudal as well as the ancient law 
of the continent of Europe, in all countries, the right to acquire animals feroe naturoe by 
possession was recognized as being subject to the governmental authority and under its power, 
not only as a matter of regulation, but also of absolute control.   
The common law of England also based property in game upon the principle of common 
ownership, and therefore treated it as subject to governmental authority. The practice of the 
government of England from the earliest time to the present has put into execution the authority 
to control and regulate the taking of game.  
Undoubtedly this attribute of government to control the taking of animals feroe naturoe, 
which was thus recognized and enforced by the common law of England, was vested in the 
colonial governments, where not denied by their charters, or in conflict with grants of the royal 
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prerogative.  It is also certain that the power which the colonies thus possessed passed to the 
States with the separation from the mother country, and remains in them at the present day, in so 
far as its exercise may be not incompatible with, or restrained by, the rights conveyed to the 
Federal government by the Constitution.  Kent, in his Commentaries, states the ownership of 
animals feroe naturoe to be only that of a qualified property.  2 Kent Com. 347.  In most of the 
States laws have been passed for the protection and preservation of game. We have been referred 
to no case where the power to so legislate has been questioned, although the books contain cases 
involving controversies as to the meaning of some of the statutes.  Commonwealth v. Hall, 128 
Mass. 410; Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, 139 Penn. St. 304; People v. O'Neil, 71 Michigan, 325. 
There are also cases where the validity of some particular method of enforcement provided in 
some of the statutes has been drawn in question.  Kansas v. Saunders, 19 Kansas, 127; Territory 
v. Evans, 2 Idaho, 634.  
The adjudicated cases recognizing the right of the States to control and regulate the 
common property in game are numerous.  In McCrady v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 395, the power of the 
State of Virginia to prohibit citizens of other States from planting oysters within the tide waters 
of that State was upheld by this court.  In Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 24, the 
authority of the State of Massachusetts to control and regulate the catching of fish within the 
bays of that State was also maintained.   
Whilst the fundamental principles upon which the common property in game rests have 
undergone no change, the development of free institutions has led to the recognition of the fact 
that the power or control pledged in the State, resulting from this common ownership, is to be 
exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as 
a prerogative for the advantage of the government, as distinct from the people, or for the benefit 
of private individuals as distinguished from the public good.  Therefore, for the purpose of 
exercising this power, the State, as held by this court in Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 410, 
represents its people, and the ownership is that of the people in their united sovereignty.  The 
common ownership, and its resulting responsibility in the State, is thus stated in a well 
considered opinion of the Supreme Court of California:  
"The wild game within a State belongs to the people in their collective sovereign 
capacity.  It is not the subject of private ownership except in so far as the people 
may elect to make it so; and they may, if they see fit, absolutely prohibit the 
taking of it, or traffic and commerce in it, if it is deemed necessary for the 
protection or preservation of the public good." Ex parte Maier, 103 California, 
476.  
The foregoing analysis of the principles upon which alone rests the right of an individual 
to acquire a qualified ownership in game, and the power of the State, deduced therefrom, to 
control such ownership for the common benefit, clearly demonstrates the validity of the statute 
of the State of Connecticut here in controversy.  The sole consequence of the provision 
forbidding the transportation of game, killed within the State, beyond the State, is to confine the 
use of such game to those who own it, the people of that State.  The proposition that the State 
may not forbid carrying it beyond her limits involves, therefore, the contention that a State 
cannot allow its own people the enjoyment of the benefits of the property belonging to them in 
common, without at the same time permitting the citizens of other States to participate in that 
 209 
which they do not own.  It was said in the discussion at bar, although it be conceded that the 
State has an absolute right to control and regulate the killing of game as its judgment deems best 
in the interest of its people, inasmuch as the State has here chosen to allow the people within her 
borders to take game, to dispose of it, and thus cause it to become an object of State commerce, 
as a resulting necessity such property has become the subject of interstate commerce, and is 
hence controlled by the provisions of article 1, section 8, of the Constitution of the United States.  
But the errors which this argument involves are manifest.  It presupposes that where the killing 
of game and its sale within the State is allowed, that it thereby becomes commerce in the legal 
meaning of that word.  In view of the authority of the State to affix conditions to the killing and 
sale of game, predicated as is this power on the peculiar nature of such property and its common 
ownership by all the citizens of the State, it may well be doubted whether commerce is created 
by an authority given by a State to reduce game within its borders to possession, provided such 
game be not taken, when killed, without the jurisdiction of the State.  The common ownership 
imports the right to keep the property, if the sovereign so chooses, always within its jurisdiction 
for every purpose.  The qualification which forbids its removal from the State necessarily entered 
into and formed part of every transaction on the subject, and deprived the mere sale or exchange 
of these articles of that element of freedom of contract and of full ownership which is an 
essential attribute of commerce. Passing, however, as we do, the decision of this question, and 
granting that the dealing in game killed within the State, under the provision in question, created 
internal State commerce, it does not follow that such internal commerce became necessarily the 
subject-matter of interstate commerce, and therefore under the control of the Constitution of the 
United States.   
The fact that internal commerce may be distinct from interstate commerce, destroys the 
whole theory upon which the argument of the plaintiff in error proceeds.  The power of the State 
to control the killing of and ownership in game being admitted, the commerce in game, which 
the state law permitted, was necessarily only internal commerce, since the restriction that it 
should not become the subject of external commerce went along with the grant and was a part of 
it.  All ownership in game killed within the State came under this condition, which the State had 
the lawful authority to impose, and no contracts made in relation to such property were exempt 
from the law of the State consenting that such contracts be made, provided only they were 
confined to internal and did not extend to external commerce. 
So … in Magner v. The People, 97 Illinois, 320, 333, the Supreme Court of Illinois said:  
"So far as we are aware, it has never been judicially denied that the government 
under its police powers may make regulations for the preservation of game and 
fish, restricting their taking and molestation to certain seasons of the year, 
although laws to this effect, it is believed, have been in force in many of the older 
States since the organization of the Federal Government. . . .  The ownership 
being in the people of the State, the repository of the sovereign authority, and no 
individual having any property rights to be affected, it necessarily results that the 
legislature, as the representative of the people of the State, may withhold or grant 
to individuals the right to hunt and kill game or qualify or restrict, as in the 
opinions of its members will best subserve the public welfare.  Stated in other 
language, to hunt and kill game is a boon or privilege, granted either expressly or 
impliedly by the sovereign authority -- not a right inherent in each individual, and 
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consequently nothing is taken away from the individual when  [*534]  he is 
denied the privilege at stated seasons of hunting and killing game. It is, perhaps, 
accurate to say that the ownership of the sovereign authority is in trust for all the 
people of the State, and hence by implication it is the duty of the legislature to 
enact such laws as will best preserve the subject of the trust and secure its 
beneficial use in the future to the people of the State.  But in any view, the 
question of individual enjoyment is one of public policy and not of private right."  
Aside from the authority of the State, derived from the common ownership of game and 
the trust for the benefit of its people which the State exercises in relation thereto, there is another 
view of the power of the State in regard to the property in game, which is equally conclusive.  
The right to preserve game flows from the undoubted existence in the State of a police power to 
that end, which may be none the less efficiently called into play, because by doing so interstate 
commerce may be remotely and indirectly affected.  Indeed, the source of the police power as to 
game birds (like those covered by the statute here called in question) flows from the duty of the 
State to preserve for its people a valuable food supply.  The power of a State to protect by 
adequate police regulation its people against the adulteration of articles of food, (which was in 
that case maintained,) although in doing so commerce might be remotely affected, necessarily 
carries with it the existence of a like power to preserve a food supply which belongs in common 
to all the people of the State, which can only become the subject of ownership in a qualified way, 
and which can never be the object of commerce except with the consent of the State and subject 
to the conditions which it may deem best to impose for the public good.  
Judgment affirmed. 
MR. JUSTICE FIELD dissenting.   
I am unable to agree with the majority of my associates in the affirmance of the judgment 
of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in this case, and I will state, briefly, the grounds 
of my disagreement.  
When any animal, whether living in the waters of the State or in the air above, is lawfully 
killed for the purposes of food or other uses of man, it becomes an article of commerce, and its 
use cannot be limited to the citizens of one State to the exclusion of citizens of another State.  
Although  there are declarations of some courts that the State possesses a property in its wild 
game, and when it authorizes the game to be killed and sold as an article of food it may limit the 
sale only for domestic consumption, and the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in deciding 
the present case appears to have held that doctrine,  I am unable to assent to its soundness, where 
the State has never had the game in its possession or under its control or use. I do not admit that 
in such case there is any specific property held by the State by which, in the exercise of its 
rightful authority, it can lawfully limit the control and use of the animals killed to particular 
classes of persons, or citizens, or to citizens of particular places or States.  But on the contrary, I 
hold that where animals within a State, whether living in its waters or in the air above, are, at the 
time, beyond the reach or control of man, so that they cannot be subjected to his use or that of the 
State in any respect, they are not the property of the State or of any one in a proper sense.  I hold 
that until they are brought into subjection or use by the labor or skill of man, they are not the 
property of any one, and that they only become the property of man according to the extent to 
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which they are subjected by his labor or skill to his use and benefit.  When man by his labor or 
skill brings any such animals under his control and subject to his use, he acquires to that extent a 
right of property in them, and the ownership of others in the animals is limited by the extent and 
right thus acquired.  This is a generally recognized doctrine, acknowledged by all States of 
Christendom.  It is the doctrine of law, both natural and positive.   
I do not doubt the right of the State, by its legislation, to provide for the protection of 
wild game, so far as such protection is necessary for their preservation or for the comfort, health 
or security of its citizens, and does not contravene the power of Congress in the regulation of 
interstate commerce. But I do deny the authority of the State, in its legislation for the protection 
and preservation of game, to interfere in any respect with the paramount control of Congress in 
prescribing the terms by which its transportation to another State, when killed, shall be restricted 
to such conditions as the State may impose.  The absolute control of Congress in the regulation 
of interstate commerce, unimpeded by any state authority, is of much greater consequence than 
any regulation the State may prescribe with reference to the place where its wild game, when 
killed, may be consumed.  
When property, like the game birds in this case, is reduced to possession it becomes an 
article of commerce and may be the subject of sale to the citizens of one State or community, or 
to the citizens of several.  The decision of the court, however, would limit the right of sale of 
such property, however valuable it may become, and whether living or killed, to the directions of 
the State or community in which the property is found, and would convert it from the freedom of 
use which belongs to property in general to the limited use of the persons or communities where 
found, or to a particular class to which only property possessed of special ingredients or qualities 
is limited.  I do not think that it lies within the province of any State to confine the excellencies 
of any articles of food within its borders to its own fortunate inhabitants to the exclusion of 
others, and that it may lawfully require that game killed within its borders shall only be eaten in 
such parts of the country as it may prescribe.  
By the Constitution of the United States it has been adjudged that commerce between the 
States is under the absolute regulation of Congress, and that whenever an article of property 
begins to move from one State to another, commerce between the States has commenced, and 
that with its control or regulation no State can interfere.  Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275; 
Henderson v. New York, 92 U.S. 259; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275; Ward v. Maryland, 
12 Wall. 418; State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 
99.  
I therefore dissent from the conclusion of the majority of my associates in affirming the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.  
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissenting.   
I do not question the power of the State to prescribe a period during which wild game 
within its limits may not be lawfully killed. The State, as we have seen, does not prohibit  the 
killing of game altogether, but permits hunting and killing of woodcock, quail, ruffled grouse 
and gray squirrels between the first day of October and the first day of January.  The game in 
question having been lawfully killed, the person who killed it and took it into his possession 
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became the rightful owner thereof.  This, I take it, will not be questioned.  As such owner he 
could dispose of it, by gift or sale, at his discretion.  So long as it was fit for use as food, the 
State could not interfere with his disposition of it, any more than it could interfere with the 
disposition by the owner of other personal property that was not noxious in its character.  To 
hold that the person receiving personal property from the owner may not receive it with the 
intent to send it out of the State is to recognize an arbitrary power in the government which is 
inconsistent with the liberty belonging to every man, as well as with the rights which inhere in 
the ownership of property.  Such a holding would also be inconsistent with the freedom of 
interstate commerce which has been established by the Constitution of the United States.  If the 
majority had not held differently in the present case, I should have said that discussion was 
unnecessary to show the soundness of the propositions just stated.  But it seems that if the 
citizen, whether residing in Connecticut or elsewhere, finds in the markets of one of the cities or 
towns of that State game, fit for food, that has been lawfully killed, and is lawfully in the 
possession of the keeper of such market, he may, without becoming a criminal, buy such game 
and take it into his possession, provided his intention be to eat it, or to have it eaten, in 
Connecticut.  But he will subject himself to a fine, as well as to imprisonment upon his failing to 
pay such fine, if he buys and take possession of such lawfully killed game, with intent to send it 
to a friend in an adjoining State.  
The Court cites McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 395, in which it was held that 
Virginia could restrict to its own citizens the privilege of planting oysters in the streams of that 
State, the soil under which was owned by it.  But I cannot believe that it would hold that oysters, 
which had been lawfully taken out of such streams, and which had been lawfully planted, could 
not be purchased in Virginia, with the intent to ship them to another State.   
Believing that the statute of Connecticut, in its application to the present case, is not 
consistent with the liberty of the citizen or with the freedom of interstate commerce, I dissent 
from the opinion and judgment of the court. 
MISSOURI v. HOLLAND 
252 U.S. 416 (1920)   
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.  
This is a bill in equity brought by the State of Missouri to prevent a game warden of the 
United States from attempting to enforce the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of  July 3, 1918, c128, 
40 Stat. 755, and the regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture in pursuance of the same.  
The ground of the bill is that the statute is an unconstitutional interference with the rights 
reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment, and that the acts of the defendant done and 
threatened under that authority invade the sovereign right of the State and contravene its will 
manifested in statutes.  The State also alleges a pecuniary interest, as owner of the wild birds 
within its borders and otherwise, admitted by the Government to be sufficient, but it is enough 
that the bill is a reasonable and proper means to assert the alleged quasi sovereign rights of a 
State.  Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 142. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 
237.  Marshall Dental Manufacturing Co. v. Iowa, 226 U.S. 460, 462. A motion to dismiss was 
sustained by the District Court on the ground that the act of Congress is constitutional.  258 Fed. 
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Rep. 479. Acc.  United States v. Thompson, 258 Fed. Rep. 257; United States v. Rockefeller, 
260 Fed. Rep. 346. The State appeals.  
On December 8, 1916, a treaty between the United States and Great Britain was 
proclaimed by the President.  It recited that many species of birds in their annual migrations 
traversed certain parts of the United States and of Canada, that they were of great value as a 
source of food and in destroying insects injurious to vegetation, but were in danger of 
extermination through lack of adequate protection.  It therefore provided for specified close 
seasons and protection in other forms, and agreed that the two powers would take or propose to 
their law-making bodies the necessary measures for carrying the treaty out.  39 Stat. 1702.  The 
above mentioned Act of July 3, 1918, entitled an act to give effect to the convention, prohibited 
the killing, capturing or selling any of the migratory birds included in the terms of the treaty 
except as permitted by regulations compatible with those terms, to be made by  the Secretary of 
Agriculture.  Regulations were proclaimed on July 31, and October 25, 1918.  40 Stat. 1812; 
1863.  It is unnecessary to go into any details, because, as we have said, the question raised is the 
general one whether the treaty and statute are void as an interference with the rights reserved to 
the States.  
To answer this question it is not enough to refer to the Tenth Amendment, reserving the 
powers not delegated to the United States, because by Article II, §2, the power to make treaties is 
delegated expressly, and by Article VI treaties made under the authority of the United States, 
along with the Constitution and laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, are 
declared the supreme law of the land.  If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the 
validity of the statute under Article I, §8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers 
of the Government.  The language of the Constitution as to the supremacy of treaties being 
general, the question before us is narrowed to an inquiry into the ground upon which the present 
supposed exception is placed.  
It is said that a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the Constitution, that there are limits, 
therefore, to the treaty-making power, and that one such limit is that what an act of Congress 
could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a treaty cannot do.  An 
earlier act of Congress that attempted by itself and not in pursuance of a treaty to regulate the 
killing of migratory birds within the States had been held bad in the District Court.  United States 
v. Shauver, 214 Fed. Rep. 154. United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. Rep. 288. Those decisions 
were supported by arguments that migratory birds were owned by the States in their sovereign 
capacity for the benefit of their people, and that under cases like Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 
519, this control was one that Congress had no power to displace.  The same argument is 
supposed to apply now with equal force.  
Whether the two cases cited were decided rightly or not they cannot be accepted as a test 
of the treaty power.  Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in 
pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority 
of the United States.  It is open to question whether the authority of the United States means 
more than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention. We do not mean to imply that there 
are no qualifications to the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way.  
It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being  that 
an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and it is 
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not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, "a power which must belong 
to and somewhere reside in every civilized government" is not to be found.  Andrews v. 
Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33. What was said in that case with regard to the powers of the States 
applies with equal force to the powers of the nation in cases where the States individually are 
incompetent to act.  We are not yet discussing the particular case before us but only are 
considering the validity of the test proposed.  With regard to that we may add that when we are 
dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we 
must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been 
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters.  It was enough for them to realize or to 
hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much 
sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation.  The case before us must be considered in 
the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.  
The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution.  
The only question is whether  it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms 
of the  Tenth Amendment. We must consider what this country has become in deciding what that 
Amendment has reserved.  
The State as we have intimated founds its claim of exclusive authority upon an assertion 
of title to migratory birds, an assertion that is embodied in statute.  No doubt it is true that as 
between a State and its inhabitants the State may regulate the killing and sale of such birds, but it 
does not follow that its authority is exclusive of paramount powers.  To put the claim of the State 
upon title is to lean upon a slender reed.  Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and 
possession is the beginning of ownership.  The whole foundation of the State's rights is the 
presence within their jurisdiction of birds that yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in 
another State and in a week a thousand miles away.  If we are to be accurate we cannot put the 
case of the State upon higher ground than that the treaty deals with creatures that for the moment 
are within the state borders, that it must be carried out by officers of the United States within the 
same territory, and that but for the treaty the State would be free to regulate this subject itself.  
As most of the laws of the United States are carried out within the States and as many of 
them deal with matters which in the silence of such laws the State might regulate, such general 
grounds are not enough to support Missouri's claim.  Valid treaties of course "are as binding 
within the territorial limits of the States as they are elsewhere throughout the dominion of the 
United States." Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 683. No doubt the great body of private 
relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty may override its power.  We do 
not have to invoke the later developments of constitution law for this proposition; it was 
recognized as early as Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch, 454, with regard to statutes  [*435]  of 
limitation, and even earlier, as to confiscation, in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199. It was assumed by 
Chief Justice Marshall with regard to the escheat of land to the State in Chirac v. Chirac, 2 
Wheat. 259, 275. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258. Blythe 
v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 340. So as to a limited jurisdiction of foreign consuls within a State.  
Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1. See Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453. Further illustration seems 
unnecessary, and it only remains to consider the application of established rules to the present 
case.  
Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved.  It can be protected 
only by national action in concert with that of another power.  The subject-matter is only 
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transitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat therein.  But for the treaty and the 
statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with.  We see nothing in the 
Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the 
protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed.  It is not sufficient to rely upon the States.  
The reliance is vain, and were it otherwise, the question is whether the United States is forbidden  
to act.  We are of opinion that the treaty and statute must be upheld.  Carey v. South Dakota, 250 
U.S. 118.  
Decree affirmed.  
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER and MR. JUSTICE PITNEY dissent.   
TOOMER v. WITSELL  
334 U.S. 385 (1948) 
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This is a suit to enjoin as unconstitutional the enforcement of several South Carolina 
statutes governing commercial shrimp fishing in the three-mile maritime belt off the coast of that 
State. Appellants, who initiated the action, are five individual fishermen, all citizens and 
residents of Georgia, and a non-profit fish dealers’ organization incorporated in Florida. 
Appellees are South Carolina officials charged with enforcement of the statutes. 
The three-judge Federal District Court which was convened to hear the case upheld the 
statutes, denied an injunction and dismissed the suit. On direct appeal from that judgment we 
noted probable jurisdiction. 
The fishery which South Carolina attempts to regulate by the statutes in question is part 
of a larger shrimp fishery extending from North Carolina to Florida.  Most of the shrimp in this 
area are of a migratory type, swimming south in the late summer and fall and returning 
northward in the spring.  Since there is no federal regulation of the fishery, the four States most 
intimately concerned have gone their separate ways in devising conservation and other 
regulatory measures. While action by the States has followed somewhat parallel lines, efforts to 
secure uniformity throughout the fishery have by and large been fruitless.  Because of the 
integral nature of the fishery, many commercial shrimpers, including the appellants, would like 
to start trawling off the Carolinas in the summer and then follow the shrimp down the coast to 
Florida.  Each State has been desirous of securing for its residents the opportunity to shrimp in 
this way, but some have apparently been more concerned with channeling to their own residents 
the business derived from local waters.  Restrictions on non-resident fishing in the marginal sea, 
and even prohibitions against it, have now invited retaliation to the point that the fishery is 
effectively partitioned at the state lines; bilateral bargaining on an official level has come to be 
the only method whereby any one of the States can obtain for its citizens the right to shrimp in 
waters adjacent to the other States. 
South Carolina forbids trawling for shrimp in the State’s inland waters, which are the 
habitat of the young shrimp for the first few months of their life.  It also provides for a closed 
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season in the three-mile maritime belt during the spawning season, from March 1 to July 1. The 
validity of these regulations is not questioned. 
The statutes appellants challenge relate to shrimping during the open season in the three-
mile belt:  Section 3300 of the South Carolina Code provides that the waters in that area shall be 
“a common for the people of the State for the taking of fish.” Section 3374 imposes a tax of 1/8 
cent a pound on green, or raw, shrimp taken in those waters.  Section 3379, as amended in 1947, 
requires payment of a license fee of $25 for each shrimp boat owned by a resident, and of $2,500 
for each one owned by a non-resident. Another statute, not integrated in the Code, conditions the 
issuance of non-resident licenses for 1948 and the years thereafter on submission of proof that 
the applicants have paid South Carolina income taxes on all profits from operations in that State 
during the preceding year.  And §3414 requires that all boats licensed to trawl for shrimp in the 
State’s waters dock at a South Carolina port and unload, pack, and stamp their catch “before 
shipping or transporting it to another State or the waters thereof.” Violation of the fishing laws 
entails suspension of the violator’s license as well as a maximum of a $1,000 fine, imprisonment 
for a year, or a combination of a $500 fine and a year’s imprisonment. 
Appellants’ most vigorous attack is directed at §3379 which, as amended in 1947, 
requires non-residents of South Carolina to pay license fees one hundred times as great as those 
which residents must pay.  The purpose and effect of this statute, they contend, is not to conserve 
shrimp, but to exclude non-residents and thereby create a commercial monopoly for South 
Carolina residents.  As such, the statute is said to violate the privileges and immunities clause of 
Art. IV, §2, of the Constitution and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Article IV, §2, so far as relevant, reads as follows: 
“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States.” 
The primary purpose of this clause, like the clauses between which it is located–those 
relating to full faith and credit and to interstate extradition of fugitives from justice–was to help 
fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign States.  It was designed to insure to a 
citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B 
enjoy.  For protection of such equality the citizen of State A was not to be restricted to the 
uncertain remedies afforded by diplomatic processes and official retaliation. “Indeed, without 
some provision of the kind removing from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in 
the other States, and giving them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the Republic 
would have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have constituted the 
Union which now exists.”  Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1868).   
In line with this underlying purpose, it was long ago decided that one of the privileges 
which the clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of doing business in State B on terms of 
substantial equality with the citizens of that State.  
Like many other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities clause is not an 
absolute.  It does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial 
reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.  But it 
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does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where there are perfectly valid 
independent reasons for it.  Thus the inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether such 
reasons do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them. The 
inquiry must also, of course, be conducted with due regard for the principle that the States should 
have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures. 
With these factors in mind, we turn to a consideration of the constitutionality of §3379. 
By that statute South Carolina plainly and frankly discriminates against non-residents, and the 
record leaves little doubt but what the discrimination is so great that its practical effect is 
virtually exclusionary. This the appellees do not seriously dispute.  Nor do they argue that since 
the statute is couched in terms of residence it is outside the scope of the privileges and 
immunities clause, which speaks of citizens.  Such an argument, we agree, would be without 
force in this case. 
As justification for the statute, appellees urge that the State’s obvious purpose was to 
conserve its shrimp supply, and they suggest that it was designed to head off an impending threat 
of excessive trawling.  The record casts some doubt on these statements.  But in any event, 
appellees’ argument assumes that any means adopted to attain valid objectives necessarily 
squares with the privileges and immunities clause.  It overlooks the purpose of that clause, 
which, as indicated above, is to outlaw classifications based on the fact of non-citizenship unless 
there is something to indicate that non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which 
the statute is aimed. 
The reports of the State Board of Fisheries for several years back, while expressing 
solicitude as to the need for conservation measures, reveal equal concern with methods for 
increasing the market for shrimp–by advertising, air shipments, etc.–and contain frequent 
references to the economic importance of the shrimp industry to the State.  The 1945 report, for 
example, said that “The shrimp business in our State is quite an industry, it employs numbers of 
men and boat crews spend large sums of money on repairs, gasoline, oil and food besides the 
money that is spent by the individuals personally.” In connection with the possibility of air 
shipments to large consuming centers such as New York, the same report said that air 
transportation “should increase the consumption of same [i.e., seafoods] in large quantities; it 
will also create a much greater demand for shrimp and seafoods all over the universe, and it will 
place them in sections where they are very seldom consumed with the result that many more 
people will get sold on the idea of eating same.” And the 1946 report’s section on shrimp 
concluded with the statement that “To be able to make this report is certainly a pleasure to the 
State Board of Fisheries as we are able to show that the catch of shrimp this season was nearly 
twice as large as in the previous year.” 
In this connection appellees mention, without further elucidation, the fishing methods 
used by non-residents, the size of their boats, and the allegedly greater cost of enforcing the laws 
against them.  One statement in the appellees’ brief might also be construed to mean that the 
State’s conservation program for shrimp requires expenditure of funds beyond those collected in 
license fees–funds to which residents and not non-residents contribute. Nothing in the record 
indicates that non-residents use larger boats or different fishing methods than residents, that the 
cost of enforcing the laws against them is appreciably greater, or that any substantial amount of 
the State’s general funds is devoted to shrimp conservation.  But assuming such were the facts, 
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they would not necessarily support a remedy so drastic as to be a near equivalent of total 
exclusion.  The State is not without power, for example, to restrict the type of equipment used in 
its fisheries, to graduate license fees according to the size of the boats, or even to charge non-
residents a differential which would merely compensate the State for any added enforcement 
burden they may impose or for any conservation expenditures from taxes which only residents 
pay.  We would be closing our eyes to reality, we believe, if we concluded that there was a 
reasonable relationship between the danger represented by non-citizens, as a class, and the severe 
discrimination practiced upon them. Thus, §3379 must be held unconstitutional unless 
commercial shrimp fishing in the maritime belt falls within some unexpressed exception to the 
privileges and immunities clause. 
Appellees strenuously urge that there is such an exception.  Their argument runs as 
follows:  Ever since Roman times, animals ferae naturae, not having been reduced to individual 
possession and ownership, have been considered as res nullius or part of the “negative 
community of interests” and hence subject to control by the sovereign or other governmental 
authority.  More recently this thought has been expressed by saying that fish and game are the 
common property of all citizens of the governmental unit and that the government, as a sort of 
trustee, exercises this “ownership” for the benefit of its citizens.  In the case of fish, it has also 
been considered that each government “owned” both the beds of its lakes, streams, and 
tidewaters and the waters themselves; hence it must also “own” the fish within those waters. 
Each government may, the argument continues, regulate the corpus of the trust in the way best 
suited to the interests of the beneficial owners, its citizens, and may discriminate as it sees fit 
against persons lacking any beneficial interest.  Finally, it is said that this special property 
interest, which nations and similar governmental bodies have traditionally had, in this country 
vested in the colonial governments and passed to the individual States. 
Language frequently repeated by this Court appears to lend some support to this analysis. 
But in only one case, McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876), has the Court actually upheld 
State action discriminating against commercial fishing or hunting by citizens of other States 
where there were advanced no persuasive independent reasons justifying the discrimination.  In 
that case the Court sanctioned a Virginia statute applied so as to prohibit citizens of other States, 
but not Virginia citizens, from planting oysters in the tidal waters of the Ware River.  The right 
of Virginians in Virginia waters, the Court said, was “a property right, and not a mere privilege 
or immunity of citizenship.”  And an analogy was drawn between planting oysters in a river bed 
and planting corn in state-owned land. 
It will be noted that there are at least two factual distinctions between the present case 
and the McCready case.  First, the McCready case related to fish which would remain in Virginia 
until removed by man.  The present case, on the other hand, deals with free-swimming fish 
which migrate through the waters of several States and are off the coast of South Carolina only 
temporarily. Secondly, the McCready case involved regulation of fishing in inland waters, 
whereas the statute now questioned is directed at regulation of shrimping in the marginal sea. 
Thus we have, on the one hand, a single precedent which might be taken as reading an 
exception into the privileges and immunities clause and, on the other, a case which does not fall 
directly within that exception.  Viewed in this light, the question before us comes down to 
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whether the reasons which evoked the exception call for its extension to a case involving the 
factual distinctions here presented. 
However satisfactorily the ownership theory explains the McCready case, the very factors 
which make the present case distinguishable render that theory but a weak prop for the South 
Carolina statute.  That the shrimp are migratory makes apposite Mr. Justice Holmes’ statement in 
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920), that “To put the claim of the State upon title is to 
lean upon a slender reed.  Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and possession is the 
beginning of ownership.”  The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but 
a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State has power to 
preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource. And there is no necessary 
conflict between that vital policy consideration and the constitutional command that the State 
exercise that power, like its other powers, so as not to discriminate without reason against 
citizens of other States. 
These considerations lead us to the conclusion that the McCready exception to the 
privileges and immunities clause, if such it be, should not be expanded to cover this case. 
Thus we hold that commercial shrimping in the marginal sea, like other common callings, 
is within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause.  And since we have previously 
concluded that the reasons advanced in support of the statute do not bear a reasonable 
relationship to the high degree of discrimination practiced upon citizens of other States, it 
follows that §3379 violates Art. IV, §2, of the Constitution. 
Appellants maintain that by a parity of reasoning the statute also contravenes the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  That may well be true, but we do not pass on 
this argument since it is unnecessary to disposition of the present case. 
Appellants contend that §3414 which requires that owners of shrimp boats fishing in the 
maritime belt off South Carolina dock at a South Carolina port and unload, pack, and stamp their 
catch (with a tax stamp) before “shipping or transporting it to another state,” burdens interstate 
commerce in shrimp in violation of Art. I, §8, of the Constitution. 
The record shows that a high proportion of the shrimp caught in the waters along the 
South Carolina coast, both by appellants and by others, is shipped in interstate commerce.  There 
was also uncontradicted evidence that appellants’ costs would be materially increased by the 
necessity of having their shrimp unloaded and packed in South Carolina ports rather than at their 
home bases in Georgia where they maintain their own docking, warehousing, refrigeration and 
packing facilities.  In addition, an inevitable concomitant of a statute requiring that work be done 
in South Carolina, even though that is economically disadvantageous to the fishermen, is to 
divert to South Carolina employment and business which might otherwise go to Georgia; the 
necessary tendency of the statute is to impose an artificial rigidity on the economic pattern of the 
industry. 
Thus we hold that §3414 violates the commerce clause of Art. I, §8 of the Constitution. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, whom Mr. Justice Jackson joins, concurring: 
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I join the Court’s opinion.  While I agree that South Carolina has exceeded her power to 
control fisheries within her waters, I rest the invalidity of her attempt to do so on the Commerce 
Clause.  The Court reaches this result by what I deem to be a misapplication of the Privileges-
and-Immunities Clause of Art. IV, §2, of the Constitution. 
Like other provisions of the Constitution, the Clause whereby “The Citizens of each State 
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States” must be read 
in conjunction with the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.  This clause presupposes the 
continued retention by the States of powers that historically belonged to the States, and were not 
explicitly given to the central government or withdrawn from the States.  I think it is fair to 
summarize the decisions which have applied Art. IV, §2, by saying that they bar a State from 
penalizing the citizens of other States by subjecting them to heavier taxation merely because they 
are such citizens or by discriminating against citizens of other States in the pursuit of ordinary 
livelihoods in competition with local citizens.  It is not conceivable that the framers of the 
Constitution meant to obliterate all special relations between a State and its citizens.  This Clause 
does not touch the right of a State to conserve or utilize its resources on behalf of its own 
citizens, provided it uses these resources within the State and does not attempt a control of the 
resources as part of a regulation of commerce between the States.  A State may care for its own 
in utilizing the bounties of nature within her borders because it has technical ownership of such 
bounties or, when ownership is in no one, because the State may for the common good exercise 
all the authority that technical ownership ordinarily confers. 
When the Constitution was adopted, such, no doubt, was the common understanding 
regarding the power of States over their fisheries, and it is this common understanding that was 
reflected in McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391. The McCready case is not an isolated decision to 
be looked at askance.  It is the symbol of one of the weightiest doctrines in our law.  It expressed 
the momentum of legal history that preceded it, and around it in turn has clustered a voluminous 
body of rulings.  Not only has a host of State cases applied the McCready doctrine as to the 
power of States to control their game and fisheries for the benefit of their own citizens, but in our 
own day this Court formulated the amplitude of the McCready doctrine by referring to “the 
regulation or distribution of the public domain, or of the common property or resources of the 
people of the State, the enjoyment of which may be limited to its citizens as against both aliens 
and the citizens of other States.”  Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-40. 
HICKLIN v. ORBECK 
437 U.S. 518 (1978) 
Brennan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
In 1972, professedly for the purpose of reducing unemployment in the State, the Alaska 
Legislature passed an Act entitled “Local Hire Under State Leases.” Alaska Stat. Ann. 
§§38.40.010 to 38.40.090 (1977).  The key provision of “Alaska Hire,” as the Act has come to be 
known, is the requirement that “all oil and gas leases, easements or right-of-way permits for oil 
or gas pipeline purposes, unitization agreements, or any renegotiation of any of the preceding to 
which the state is a party” contain a provision “requiring the employment of qualified Alaska 
residents” in preference to nonresidents. Alaska Stat. Ann. §38.40.030 (a) (1977).  This 
employment preference is administered by providing persons meeting the statutory requirements 
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for Alaskan residency with certificates of residence–”resident cards”–that can be presented to an 
employer covered by the Act as proof of residency.  8 Alaska Admin. Code 35.015 (1977). 
Appellants, individuals desirous of securing jobs covered by the Act but unable to qualify for the 
necessary resident cards, challenge Alaska Hire as violative of both the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Art. IV, §2, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
I 
Although enacted in 1972, Alaska Hire was not seriously enforced until 1975, when 
construction on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline was reaching its peak.  At that time, the State 
Department of Labor began issuing residency cards and limiting to resident cardholders the 
dispatchment to oil pipeline jobs.  On March 1, 1976, in response to “numerous complaints 
alleging that persons who are not Alaska residents have been dispatched on pipeline jobs when 
qualified Alaska residents were available to fill the jobs,” Executive Order #76-1, Alaska Dept. 
of Labor (Mar. 1, 1976), Edmund Orbeck, the Commissioner of Labor and one of the appellees 
here, issued a cease-and-desist order to all unions supplying pipeline workers enjoining them “to 
respond to all open job calls by dispatching all qualified Alaska residents before any 
non-residents are dispatched.”  Ibid.  As a result, the appellants, all but one of whom had 
previously worked on the pipeline, were prevented from obtaining pipeline-related work. 
Consequently, on April 28, 1976, appellants filed a complaint in the Superior Court in 
Anchorage seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of Alaska Hire. 
On July 21, 1976, the Superior Court upheld Alaska Hire in its entirety and denied 
appellants all relief.  On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court . . . held that the Act’s general 
preference for Alaska residents was constitutionally permissible. Appellants appealed the State 
Supreme Court’s judgment . . . and we noted probable jurisdiction.  434 U.S. 919 (1977). We 
reverse. 
II 
Appellants’ principal challenge to Alaska Hire is made under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Art. IV, §2:  “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges 
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”  That provision, which “appears in the 
so-called States’ Relations Article, the same Article that embraces the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, the Extradition Clause . . . , the provisions for the admission of new States, the Territory 
and Property Clause, and the Guarantee Clause,” Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm’n, 
436 U.S. 371, 379 (1978), “establishes a norm of comity,” Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 
656, 660 (1975), that is to prevail among the States with respect to their treatment of each other’s 
residents. The purpose of the Clause, as described in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869), is 
“to place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so 
far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned.  It relieves them 
from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them 
by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it 
insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the 
acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them in 
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other States the equal protection of their laws.  It has been justly said that no provision in the 
Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as 
this.” 
Appellants’ appeal to the protection of the Clause is strongly supported by this Court’s 
decisions . . . Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), the leading modern exposition of the 
limitations the Clause places on a State’s power to bias employment opportunities in favor of its 
own residents, invalidated a South Carolina statute that required nonresidents to pay a fee 100 
times greater than that paid by residents for a license to shrimp commercially in the three-mile 
maritime belt off the coast of that State.  The Court reasoned that although the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause “does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where there 
are perfectly valid independent reasons for it,” id., at 396, “[it] does bar discrimination against 
citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the 
mere fact that they are citizens of other States.”  Ibid. 
[A]lthough the statute may not violate the Clause if the State shows “something to 
indicate that noncitizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed,” 
Toomer v. Witsell, supra, at 398, . . . certainly no showing was made on this record that 
nonresidents were “a peculiar source of the evil” Alaska Hire was enacted to remedy, namely, 
Alaska’s “uniquely high unemployment.” Alaska Stat. Ann. §38.40.020 (1977).  What evidence 
the record does contain indicates that the major cause of Alaska’s high unemployment was not 
the influx of nonresidents seeking employment, but rather the fact that a substantial number of 
Alaska’s jobless residents- especially the unemployed Eskimo and Indian residents -were unable 
to secure employment either because of their lack of education and job training or because of 
their geographical remoteness from job opportunities. . . . 
Relying on McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877), however, Alaska contends that 
because the oil and gas that are the subject of Alaska Hire are owned by the State,
1
 this 
ownership, of itself, is sufficient justification for the Act’s discrimination against nonresidents, 
and takes the Act totally without the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  As the State 
sees it “the privileges and immunities clause [does] not apply, and was never meant to apply, to 
decisions by the states as to how they would permit, if at all, the use and distribution of the 
natural resources which they own . . . .” Brief for Appellees 20 n.14.  We do not agree that the 
fact that a State owns a resource, of itself, completely removes a law concerning that resource 
from the prohibitions of the Clause.  Although some courts, including the court below, have read 
McCready as creating an “exception” to the Privileges and Immunities Clause, we have just 
recently confirmed that “[in] more recent years . . . the Court has recognized that the States’ 
interest in regulating and controlling those things they claim to ‘own’ . . . is by no means 
absolute.”  Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm’n, 436 U.S., at 385. Rather than placing a 
                                                 
1
 At the time Alaska was admitted into the Union on January 3, 1959, 99% of all land within Alaska’s borders was 
owned by the Federal Government.  In becoming a State, Alaska was granted and became entitled to select 
approximately 103 million acres of those federal lands.  Alaska Statehood Law, 72 Stat. 340, §6, note preceding 48 
U. S. C. §21.  The selection process is not yet complete, but since 1959 large portions of land have been conveyed to 
the State, in fee, by the Federal Government.  Full title to those lands and to the minerals on and below them is 
vested in the State.  72 Stat. 342, §6 (i), note preceding 48 U. S. C. §21. 
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statute completely beyond the Clause, a State’s ownership of the property with which the statute 
is concerned is a factor- although often the crucial factor -to be considered in evaluating whether 
the statute’s discrimination against noncitizens violates the Clause.  Dispositive though this 
factor may be in many cases in which a State discriminates against nonresidents, it is not 
dispositive here. 
The reason is that Alaska has little or no proprietary interest in much of the activity swept 
within the ambit of Alaska Hire; and the connection of the State’s oil and gas with much of the 
covered activity is sufficiently attenuated so that it cannot justifiably be the basis for requiring 
private employers to discriminate against nonresidents.  Alaska Hire extends to employers who 
have no connection whatsoever with the State’s oil and gas, perform no work on state land, have 
no contractual relationship with the State, and receive no payment from the State. 
In sum, the Act is an attempt to force virtually all businesses that benefit in some way 
from the economic ripple effect of Alaska’s decision to develop its oil and gas resources to bias 
their employment practices in favor of the State’s residents.  We believe that Alaska’s ownership 
of the oil and gas that is the subject matter of Alaska Hire simply constitutes insufficient 
justification for the pervasive discrimination against nonresidents that the Act mandates. 
Although appellants raise no Commerce Clause challenge to the Act, the mutually 
reinforcing relationship between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, §2, and the 
Commerce Clause–a relationship that stems from their . . . shared vision of federalism–renders 
several Commerce Clause decisions appropriate support for our conclusion.  West v. Kansas 
Natural Gas, 221 U.S. 229 (1911), struck down an Oklahoma statutory scheme that completely 
prohibited the out-of-state shipment of natural gas found within the State.  The Court reasoned 
that if a State could so prefer its own economic well-being to that of the Nation as a whole, 
“Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber, [and] the mining States their 
minerals,” so that “embargo may be retaliated by embargo” with the result that “commerce 
[would] be halted at state lines.”  Id., at 255. West was held to be controlling in Pennsylvania v. 
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), where a West Virginia statute that effectively required 
natural gas companies within the State to satisfy all fuel needs of West Virginia residents before 
transporting any natural gas out of the State was held to violate the Commerce Clause.  West and 
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia thus established that the location in a given State of a resource 
bound for interstate commerce is an insufficient basis for preserving the benefits of the resource 
exclusively or even principally for that State’s residents.  Foster Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 
1 (1928), went one step further; it limited the extent to which a State’s purported ownership of 
certain resources could serve as a justification for the State’s economic discrimination in favor of 
residents.  There, in the face of Louisiana’s claim that the State owned all shrimp within state 
waters, the Court invalidated a Louisiana law that required the local processing of shrimp taken 
from Louisiana marshes as a prerequisite to their out-of-state shipment.  The Court observed that 
“by permitting its shrimp to be taken and all the products thereof to be shipped and sold in 
interstate commerce, the State necessarily releases its hold and, as to the shrimp so taken, 
definitely terminates its control.”  Id., at 13. 
West, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, and Foster Packing thus establish that the 
Commerce Clause circumscribes a State’s ability to prefer its own citizens in the utilization of 
natural resources found within its borders, but destined for interstate commerce.  Like 
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Louisiana’s shrimp in Foster Packing, Alaska’s oil and gas here are bound for out-of-state 
consumption. Indeed, the construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, on which project appellants’ 
nonresidency has prevented them from working, was undertaken expressly to accomplish this 
end. 
Alaska Hire cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.  As Mr. Justice Cardozo observed 
in Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935), the Constitution “was framed upon 
the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long 
run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.” 
Reversed.
OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. OREGON 
511 U.S. 93 (1994) 
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Two Terms ago, in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S.  (1992), we 
held that the negative Commerce Clause prohibited Alabama from imposing a higher fee on the 
disposal in Alabama landfills of hazardous waste from other States than on the disposal of 
identical waste from Alabama. In reaching that conclusion, however, we left open the possibility 
that such a differential surcharge might be valid if based on the costs of disposing of waste from 
other States.  Today, we must decide whether Oregon’s purportedly cost-based surcharge on the 
in-state disposal of solid waste generated in other States violates the Commerce Clause. 
I 
Like other States, Oregon comprehensively regulates the disposal of solid wastes within 
its borders.  Respondent Oregon Department of Environmental Quality oversees the State’s 
regulatory scheme by developing and executing plans for the management, reduction, and 
recycling of solid wastes. To fund these and related activities, Oregon levies a wide range of fees 
on landfill operators. See, e. g., Ore. Rev. Stat. §§459.235(3), 459.310 (1991). In 1989, the 
Oregon Legislature imposed an additional fee, called a “surcharge,” on “every person who 
disposes of solid waste generated out-of-state in a disposal site or regional disposal site.” 
§459.297(1) (effective Jan. 1, 1991). The amount of that surcharge was left to respondent 
Environmental Quality Commission (Commission) to determine through rulemaking, but the 
legislature did require that the resulting surcharge “be based on the costs to the State of Oregon 
and its political subdivisions of disposing of solid waste generated out-of-state which are not 
otherwise paid for” under specified statutes. §459.298. At the conclusion of the rulemaking 
process, the Commission set the surcharge on out-of-state waste at $2.25 per ton. Ore. Admin. 
Rule 340-97-120(7) (Sept. 1993). 
In conjunction with the out-of-state surcharge, the legislature imposed a fee on the 
in-state disposal of waste generated within Oregon. See Ore. Rev. Stat. §§459A.110(1), (5) 
(1991). The in-state fee, capped by statute at $0.85 per ton (originally $0.50 per ton), is 
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considerably lower than the fee imposed on waste from other States. §§459A.110(5) and 
459A.115.  
The anticipated court challenge was not long in coming. Petitioners, Oregon Waste 
Systems, Inc. (Oregon Waste) and Columbia Resource Company (CRC), joined by Gilliam 
County, Oregon, sought expedited review of the out-of-state surcharge in the Oregon Court of 
Appeals. Oregon Waste owns and operates a solid waste landfill in Gilliam County, at which it 
accepts for final disposal solid waste generated in Oregon and in other States. CRC, pursuant to a 
20-year contract with Clark County, in neighboring Washington State, transports solid waste via 
barge from Clark County to a landfill in Morrow County, Oregon. Petitioners challenged the 
administrative rule establishing the out-of-state surcharge and its enabling statutes under both 
state law and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Oregon Court of 
Appeals upheld the statutes and rule. Gilliam County v. Department of Environmental Quality, 
114 Ore. App. 369, 837 P.2d 965 (1992). 
The State Supreme Court affirmed. Gilliam County v. Department of Environmental 
Quality of Oregon, 316 Ore. 99, 849 P.2d 500 (1993).  As to the Commerce Clause, the court 
recognized that the Oregon surcharge resembled the Alabama fee invalidated in Chemical Waste 
Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S.     (1992), in that both prescribed higher fees for the disposal 
of waste from other States. Nevertheless, the court viewed the similarity as superficial only. 
Despite the explicit reference in §459.297(1) to out-of-state waste’s geographic origin, the court 
reasoned, the Oregon surcharge is not facially discriminatory “because of [its] express nexus to 
actual costs incurred [by state and local government].” 316 Ore., at 112, 849 P.2d, at 508. That 
nexus distinguished Chemical Waste, supra, by rendering the surcharge a “compensatory fee,” 
which the court viewed as “prima facie reasonable,” that is to say, facially constitutional. Ibid. 
The court read our case law as invalidating compensatory fees only if they are “‘manifestly 
disproportionate to the services rendered. We granted certiorari, 509 U.S.  (1993). 
II 
The Commerce Clause provides that “the Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States.” Art. I, §8, cl. 3. Though phrased as a grant of 
regulatory power to Congress, the Clause has long been understood to have a “negative” aspect 
that denies the States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate flow 
of articles of commerce. The Framers granted Congress plenary authority over interstate 
commerce in “the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the 
tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and 
later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 
325-326 (1979). See generally, The Federalist, No. 42 (J. Madison). “This principle that our 
economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut of powers necessary to control of the 
economy, . . . has as its corollary that the states are not separable economic units.” H. P. Hood & 
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-538 (1949). 
Consistent with these principles, we have held that the first step in analyzing any law 
subject to judicial scrutiny under the negative Commerce Clause is to determine whether it 
“regulates evenhandedly with only ‘incidental’ effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates 
against interstate commerce.” Hughes, supra, at 336.  As we use the term here, “discrimination” 
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simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits 
the former and burdens the latter. If a restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually 
per se invalid.  By contrast, nondiscriminatory regulations that have only incidental effects on 
interstate commerce are valid unless “the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive 
in relation to the putative local benefits.”  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
We deem it obvious here that Oregon’s $2.25 per ton surcharge is discriminatory on its 
face. The surcharge subjects waste from other States to a fee almost three times greater than the 
$0.85 per ton charge imposed on solid in-state waste. The statutory determinant for which fee 
applies to any particular shipment of solid waste to an Oregon landfill is whether or not the waste 
was “generated out-of-state.” Ore. Rev. Stat. §459.297(1) (1991).  
Respondents argue, and the Oregon Supreme Court held, that the statutory nexus between 
the surcharge and “the [otherwise uncompensated] costs to the State of Oregon and its political 
subdivisions of disposing of solid waste generated out-of-state,” Ore. Rev. Stat. §459.298 (1991), 
necessarily precludes a finding that the surcharge is discriminatory. We find respondents’ narrow 
focus on Oregon’s compensatory aim to be foreclosed by our precedents. Even if the surcharge 
merely recoups the costs of disposing of out-of-state waste in Oregon, the fact remains that the 
differential charge favors shippers of Oregon waste over their counterparts handling waste 
generated in other States. In making that geographic distinction, the surcharge patently 
discriminates against interstate commerce. 
Respondents must come forward with other legitimate reasons to subject waste from 
other States to a higher charge than is levied against waste from Oregon.  Respondents offer two 
such reasons, each of which we address below.  
A 
Respondents’ principal defense of the higher surcharge on out-of-state waste is that it is a 
“compensatory tax” necessary to make shippers of such waste pay their “fair share” of the costs 
imposed on Oregon by the disposal of their waste in the State. To justify a charge on interstate 
commerce as a compensatory tax, a State must, as a threshold matter, “identify . . . the [intrastate 
tax] burden for which the State is attempting to compensate.”  Once that burden has been 
identified, the tax on interstate commerce must be shown roughly to approximate–but not 
exceed–the amount of the tax on intrastate commerce.  Finally, the events on which the interstate 
and intrastate taxes are imposed must be “substantially equivalent”; that is, they must be 
sufficiently similar in substance to serve as mutually exclusive “proxies” for each other.1  
                                                 
1
 The Oregon Supreme Court, though terming the out-of-state surcharge a “compensatory fee,” relied for its legal 
standard on our “user fee” cases. See 316 Ore. 99, 112, 849 P.2d 500, 508 (1993). The compensatory tax cases cited 
in the text, rather than the user fee cases, are controlling here, as the latter apply only to “charges imposed by the 
State for the use of state-owned or state-provided transportation or other facilities and services.” Commonwealth 
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 621 (1981). Because it is undisputed that the landfills in question are owned 
by private entities the out-of-state surcharge is plainly not a user fee. Nevertheless, even if the surcharge could 
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Although it is often no mean feat to determine whether a challenged tax is a 
compensatory tax, we have little difficulty concluding that the Oregon surcharge is not such a 
tax. Oregon does not impose a specific charge of at least $2.25 per ton on shippers of waste 
generated in Oregon, for which the out-of-state surcharge might be considered compensatory. In 
fact, the only analogous charge on the disposal of Oregon waste is $0.85 per ton, approximately 
one-third of the amount imposed on waste from other States. See Ore. Rev. Stat. §§459A.110(5), 
459A.115 (1991). Respondents’ failure to identify a specific charge on intrastate commerce 
equal to or exceeding the surcharge is fatal to their claim.  
Respondents argue that, despite the absence of a specific $2.25 per ton charge on in-state 
waste, intrastate commerce does pay its share of the costs underlying the surcharge through 
general taxation.  Whether or not that is true is difficult to determine, as “[general] tax payments 
are received for the general purposes of the [government], and are, upon proper receipt, lost in 
the general revenues.”  Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 128 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Even 
assuming, however, that various other means of general taxation, such as income taxes, could 
serve as an identifiable intrastate burden roughly equivalent to the out-of-state surcharge, 
respondents’ compensatory tax argument fails because the in-state and out-of-state levies are not 
imposed on substantially equivalent events. 
The prototypical example of substantially equivalent taxable events is the sale and use of 
articles of trade.  In fact, use taxes on products purchased out of state are the only taxes we have 
upheld in recent memory under the compensatory tax doctrine.  In our view, earning income and 
disposing of waste at Oregon landfills are even less equivalent than manufacturing and 
wholesaling. Indeed, the very fact that in-state shippers of out-of-state waste, such as Oregon 
Waste, are charged the out-of-state surcharge even though they pay Oregon income taxes refutes 
respondents’ argument that the respective taxable events are substantially equivalent.  We 
conclude that, far from being substantially equivalent, taxes on earning income and utilizing 
Oregon landfills are “entirely different kinds of taxes.”  
B 
Respondents’ final argument is that Oregon has an interest in spreading the costs of the 
in-state disposal of Oregon waste to all Oregonians. That is, because all citizens of Oregon 
benefit from the proper in-state disposal of waste from Oregon, respondents claim it is only 
proper for Oregon to require them to bear more of the costs of disposing of such waste in the 
State through a higher general tax burden. At the same time, however, Oregon citizens should 
not be required to bear the costs of disposing of out-of-state waste, respondents claim. The 
necessary result of that limited cost-shifting is to require shippers of out-of-state waste to bear 
the full costs of in-state disposal, but to permit shippers of Oregon waste to bear less than the full 
cost. 
                                                                                                                                                             
somehow be viewed as a user fee, it could not be sustained as such, given that it discriminates against interstate 
commerce. See Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1880). 
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Respondents counter that if Oregon is engaged in any form of protectionism, it is 
“resource protectionism,” not economic protectionism. It is true that by discouraging the flow of 
out-of-state waste into Oregon landfills, the higher surcharge on waste from other States 
conserves more space in those landfills for waste generated in Oregon. Recharacterizing the 
surcharge as resource protectionism hardly advances respondents’ cause, however.  Even 
assuming that landfill space is a “natural resource,” “a State may not accord its own inhabitants a 
preferred right of access over consumers in other States to natural resources located within its 
borders.” Philadelphia, 437 U.S., at 627. As we held more than a century ago, “if the State, under 
the guise of exerting its police powers, should [impose a burden] . . . applicable solely to articles 
[of commerce] . . . produced or manufactured in other States, the courts would find no difficulty 
in holding such legislation to be in conflict with the Constitution of the United States.” Guy v. 
Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 443 (1880).  
IV 
We recognize that the States have broad discretion to configure their systems of taxation 
as they deem appropriate. See, e. g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 
622-623 (1981); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 336-337 (1977). 
All we intimate here is that their discretion in this regard, as in all others, is bounded by any 
relevant limitations of the Federal Constitution, in this case the negative Commerce Clause. 
Because respondents have offered no legitimate reason to subject waste generated in other States 
to a discriminatory surcharge approximately three times as high as that imposed on waste 
generated in Oregon, the surcharge is facially invalid under the negative Commerce Clause. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court is reversed, and the cases are remanded 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, dissenting. 
Landfill space evaporates as solid waste accumulates. State and local governments 
expend financial and political capital to develop trash control systems that are efficient, lawful, 
and protective of the environment. The State of Oregon responsibly attempted to address its solid 
waste disposal problem through enactment of a comprehensive regulatory scheme for the 
management, disposal, reduction, and recycling of solid waste. For this Oregon should be 
applauded. The regulatory scheme included a fee charged on out-of-state solid waste. The 
Oregon Legislature directed the Commission to determine the appropriate surcharge “based on 
the costs . . . of disposing of solid waste generated out-of-state.” Ore. Rev. Stat. §459.298 (1991). 
The Commission arrived at a surcharge of $2.25 per ton, compared to the $0.85 per ton charged 
on  in-state solid waste. Ore. Admin. Rule 340-97-110(3) (1993).  
Nearly 20 years ago, we held that a State cannot ban all out-of-state waste disposal in 
protecting themselves from hazardous or noxious materials brought across the State’s borders. 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Two Terms ago in Chemical Waste 
Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S.     (1992), in striking down the State of Alabama’s $72 per 
ton fee on the disposal of out-of-state hazardous waste, the Court left open the possibility that 
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such a fee could be valid if based on the costs of disposing of waste from other States. Id., at, n. 9 
(slip op., at 10, n. 9). Once again, however, as in Philadelphia and Chemical Waste Management, 
the Court further cranks the dormant Commerce Clause ratchet against the States by striking 
down such cost-based fees, and by so doing ties the hands of the States in addressing the vexing 
national problem of solid waste disposal. I dissent. 
Americans generated nearly 196 million tons of municipal solid waste in 1990, an 
increase from 128 million tons in 1975. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
Characterization of Municipal Solid Waste in the United States: 1992 Update, p. ES-3. Under 
current projections, Americans will produce 222 million tons of garbage in the year 2000. Ibid. 
Generating solid waste has never been a problem. Finding environmentally safe disposal sites 
has. By 1991, it was estimated that 45 percent of all solid waste landfills in the Nation had 
reached capacity. 56 Fed. Reg. 50980 (1991). Nevertheless, the Court stubbornly refuses to 
acknowledge that a clean and healthy environment, unthreatened by the improper disposal of 
solid waste, is the commodity really at issue in cases such as this. 
Notwithstanding the identified shortage of landfill space in the Nation, the Court notes 
that it has “little difficulty,” concluding that the Oregon surcharge does not operate as a 
compensatory tax, designed to offset the loss of available landfill space in the State caused by the 
influx of out-of-state waste. The Court reaches this nonchalant conclusion because the State has 
failed “to identify a specific charge on intrastate commerce equal to or exceeding the surcharge.” 
The Court’s myopic focus on “differential fees” ignores the fact that in-state producers of solid 
waste support the Oregon regulatory program through state income taxes and by paying, 
indirectly, the numerous fees imposed on landfill operators and the dumping fee on in-state 
waste. Ore. Rev. Stat. §459.005 et seq. (1991).  
A State may enact a comprehensive regulatory system to address an environmental 
problem or a threat to natural resources within the confines of the Commerce Clause. Where a 
State imposes restrictions on the ability of its own citizens to dispose of solid waste in an effort 
to promote a “clean and safe environment,” it is not discriminating against interstate commerce 
by preventing the uncontrolled transfer of out-of-state solid waste into the State.  
The availability of safe landfill disposal sites in Oregon did not occur by chance. Through 
its regulatory scheme, the State of Oregon inspects landfill sites, monitors waste streams, 
promotes recycling, and imposes an $0.85 per ton disposal fee on in-state waste, Ore. Rev. Stat. 
459.005 et seq. (1991), all in an effort to curb the threat that its residents will harm the 
environment and create health and safety problems through excessive and unmonitored solid 
waste disposal. Depletion of a clean and safe environment will follow if Oregon must accept 
out-of-state waste at its landfills without a sharing of the disposal costs. The Commerce Clause 
does not require a State to abide this outcome where the “natural resource has some indicia of a 
good publicly produced and owned in which a State may favor its own citizens in times of 
shortage.”  A shortage of available landfill space is upon us, 56 Fed. Reg. 50980 (1991), and 
with it comes the accompanying health and safety hazards flowing from the improper disposal of 
solid wastes. We have long acknowledged a distinction between economic protectionism and 
health and safety regulation promulgated by Oregon. See H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 
336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949). 
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Far from neutralizing the economic situation for Oregon producers and out-of-state 
producers, the Court’s analysis turns the Commerce Clause on its head. Oregon’s neighbors will 
operate under a competitive advantage against their Oregon counterparts as they can now 
produce solid waste with reckless abandon and avoid paying concomitant state taxes to develop 
new landfills and clean up retired landfill sites. While I understand that solid waste is an article 
of commerce, it is not a commodity sold in the marketplace; rather it is disposed of at a cost to 
the State. Petitioners do not buy garbage to put in their landfills; solid waste producers pay 
petitioners to take their waste. Oregon solid waste producers do not compete with out-of-state 
businesses in the sale of solid waste. Thus, the fees do not alter the price of a product that is 
competing with other products for common purchasers. If anything, striking down the fees works 
to the disadvantage of Oregon businesses. They alone will have to pay the “nondisposal” fees 
associated with solid waste: landfill siting, landfill clean-up, insurance to cover environmental 
accidents, and transportation improvement costs associated with out-of-state waste being shipped 
into the State. While we once recognized that “‘the collection and disposal of solid wastes should 
continue to be primarily the function of State, regional, and local agencies,’” id., at 621, n. 4, 
quoting 42 U.S.C. §6901 (a) (4) (1976 ed.), the Court today leaves States with only two options: 
become a dumper and ship as much waste as possible to a less populated State, or become a 
dumpee, and stoically accept waste from more densely populated States. 
In its sweeping ruling, the Court makes no distinction between publicly and privately 
owned landfills. It rejects the argument that our “user fee” cases apply in this context since the 
landfills owned by the petitioners are private and our user fee analysis applies only to “charges 
imposed by the State for the use of a state-owned or state-provided transportation or other 
facilities and services.”  Rather than stopping there, however, the majority goes on to note that 
even if the Oregon surcharge could be viewed as a user fee, “it could not be sustained as such, 
given that it discriminates against interstate commerce.” There is no need to make this dubious 
assertion. We specifically left unanswered the question whether a state or local government 
could regulate disposal of out-of-state solid waste at landfills owned by the government.  
We will undoubtedly be faced with this question directly in the future as roughly 80 
percent of landfills receiving municipal solid waste in the United States are state or locally 
owned. We noted in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 
(1984), “if a State is acting as a market participant, rather than as a market regulator, the dormant 
Commerce Clause places no limitation on its activities.” See also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 
U.S.     Similarly, if the State owned and operated a park or recreational facility, it would be 
allowed to charge differential fees for in-state and out-of-state users of the resource. See, e.g., 
Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm’n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (upholding Montana’s 
higher nonresident elk hunting license fees to compensate the State for conservation expenditures 
from taxes which only residents pay). 
I think that the $2.25 per ton fee that Oregon imposes on out-of-state waste works out to a 
similar “fair approximation” of the privilege to use its landfills. Even the Court concedes that our 
precedents do not demand anything beyond “substantial equivalency” between the fees charged 
on in-state and out-of-state waste. 
The State of Oregon is not prohibiting the export of solid waste from neighboring States; 
it is only asking that those neighbors pay their fair share for the use of Oregon landfill sites. I see 
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nothing in the Commerce Clause that compels less densely populated States to serve as the low-
cost dumping grounds for their neighbors, suffering the attendant risks that solid waste landfills 
present. The Court, deciding otherwise, further limits the dwindling options available to States as 
they contend with the environmental, health, safety, and political challenges posed by the 
problem of solid waste disposal in modern society. 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS: 
Why are most dumping grounds located in close proximity to poor communities? Is this 
“environmental injustice” the result of market forces or racial prejudice? 
How can West Virginia cheaply dispose of solid waste from home-grown industries 
while discouraging the importation of solid waste from out of state? 
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PART IV. EMINENT DOMAIN 
"The right to take private property for public use, or eminent domain, is reserved 
right attached to every man‘s land, and paramount to his right of ownership." 
Todd v. Austin, 34 Connecticut 78 (1867). 
Session 11. Public Use 
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY CO. v. NEBRASKA 
164 U.S. 403 (1896) 
Mr. Justice Gray, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. 
The arguments in this case have taken a wider range than is required for its decision. The 
material facts, as assumed by the court below, are as follows: 
The Missouri Pacific Railway Company, a corporation of the State of Nebraska, was the 
owner of the right of way and depot grounds, within which were its main and side tracks, its 
station-houses, and other shipping facilities, at Elmwood in that State; and had permitted two 
elevators to be erected and operated by private firms on the side track at that station. 
John W. Hollenbeck and others, apparently not a corporation, but a voluntary association 
of persons owning farms and leaseholds in the neighborhood of Elmwood, upon which they 
raised corn, wheat, oats and other cereals, large quantities of which were ready for market, made 
an application in writing to the railway company to grant them "a location on the right of way at 
Elmwood station aforesaid, for the erection of an elevator of sufficient capacity to store from 
time to time the cereal products of the farms and leaseholds of" the applicants, "as well as the 
products of other neighboring farms." That application was refused by the railway company. 
The applicants then made a complaint to the Board of Transportation of the State of 
Nebraska, alleging that the two elevators already built on the right of way of the railway 
company at Elmwood station were "during certain seasons of the year wholly insufficient in 
affording a market for the cereals of the complainants and others desirous of marketing their 
grain"; and that the refusal of the railway company to grant to the complainants a location for an 
elevator was in violation of the Nebraska statute of 1887, c. 60, in that such refusal was an unjust 
discrimination, and that the railway company, by such refusal, was subjecting the complainants 
to an undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage, in respect to traffic facilities, over 
other localities, and was giving an undue and unreasonable preference and advantage to the 
owners and operators of the two elevators already built at that station. 
The board of transportation, after notice to the railway company, and hearing evidence 
and arguments, found that the two existing elevators were insufficient to handle the grain 
shipped at Elmwood station, and the owners and operators of those elevators had entered into a 
combination to fix the prices of grain and to prevent competition in the price thereof, and there 
were not sufficient facilities for the handling and shipping of grain at that station; that it was 
necessary for the convenience of the public that another elevator should be erected and operated 
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there; that, by reason of the side track being placed within the right of way and depot grounds, 
the complainants could not ship grain without building their elevator upon the grounds of the 
railway company; that there was room upon those grounds for another elevator without 
materially interfering with the operation of the railroad, and the building of an elevator thereon 
by the complainants would not materially affect the railway company in the use of its grounds, or 
be an unreasonable burden to it; and that the granting by the railway company of the right and 
privilege to the owners of the two elevators now standing, and refusing to grant the like right and 
privilege to the complainants, was an unjust and unreasonable discrimination against the 
complainants, and unlawfully gave a preference and advantage to the owners of the two existing 
elevators. 
The board of transportation thereupon ordered that the railway company, within ten days, 
grant to the complainants, on like terms and conditions as granted to the owners of the two 
existing elevators, the right and privilege of erecting an elevator upon its grounds, and adjacent 
to its track, at a point specified in the order, or at some other suitable and convenient place if the 
parties could agree; and grant to the complainants all and equal facilities for the handling and 
shipping of grain at that station, which it granted to other shippers of grain there, and cease from 
all discrimination or preference to and of shippers and operators of elevators at that station. 
The railway company not having complied with the order, the Supreme Court of the 
State, upon a petition in the name of the State, at the relation of the board of transportation, for a 
mandamus, and an answer thereto and hearing thereon, found the issues in favor of the realtors, 
and adjudged that, unless the railway company, within forty days, complied with order of the 
board of transportation, a writ of mandamus should issue to compel compliance with that order 
according to its terms. 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has construed this statute as authorizing the board of 
transportation to make the order questioned in this case, which required the railroad company to 
grant to the realtors the right to erect an elevator upon its right of way at Elmwood station, on the 
same terms and conditions on which it had already granted to other persons rights to erect two 
elevators thereon.  The construction so given to the statute by the highest court of the State must 
be accepted by this court in judging whether the statute conforms to the Constitution of the 
United States.  Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 456. 
A railroad corporation doubtless holds its station grounds, tracks and right of way as its 
private property, but for the public use for which it was incorporated; and may, in its discretion, 
permit them to be occupied by other parties with structures convenient for the receipt and 
delivery of freight upon its railroad, so long as a free and safe passage is left for the carriage of 
freight and passengers.  Grand Trunk Railroad v. Richardson, 91 U.S. 454.  But how far the 
railroad company can be compelled to do so, against its will, is a wholly different question. 
Upon the admitted facts of the case at bar, the railroad company had granted to two 
private firms the privilege of erecting elevators upon its right of way at Elmwood station; and 
had refused an application of other private persons, farmers in the neighborhood, for the 
privilege of erecting on that right of way a third elevator of sufficient capacity to store from time 
to time the grain produced upon their farms and upon those of their neighbors; and has been 
 235 
ordered by the board of transportation, and by the Supreme Court of the State, to grant to the 
applicants a location upon its right of way for the purpose of erecting thereon such an elevator, 
upon the like terms and conditions as in its grants to the owners of the two existing elevators. 
The only particular alleged in the complaint, and the only one, therefore, presented for 
our consideration in this case, in which the railroad company is supposed to have made an unjust 
discrimination against the complainants, or to have subjected them to an undue and unreasonable 
prejudice and disadvantage, in respect to traffic facilities, over other locations, or to have given 
an undue and unreasonable preference to other persons, is the refusal of the railroad company to 
grant to the complainants a location upon its right of way for the purpose of erecting an elevator 
thereon, upon the terms and conditions upon which it had previously granted to other persons 
similar privileges to erect two other elevators. 
The record does not show what were the terms and conditions of the contracts between 
the railroad company and the owners of those elevators; nor present any question as to the 
validity of those contracts. 
Nor does it present any question as to the power of the  legislature to compel the railroad 
company itself to erect and maintain an elevator for the use of the public; or to compel it to 
permit to all persons equal facilities of access from their own lands to its tracks, and of the use, 
from time to time, of those tracks, for the purpose of shipping or receiving grain or other freight, 
as in Rhodes v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 34 Minnesota, 87, in Chicago & Northwestern 
Railway v. People, 56 Illinois, 365, and in Hoyt v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, 93 
Illinois, 601. 
Nor does this case show any such exercise of the legislative power to regulate the 
conduct of the business, or the rate of tolls, fees or charges, either of railroad corporations or of 
the proprietors of elevators, as has been upheld by this court in previous cases. Munn v. Illinois, 
94 U.S. 113; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 155; Dow v. 
Beidelman, 125 U.S. 680; Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517; Brass v. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391; 
Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 213, 214; Louisville & Nashville 
Railroad v. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 696. 
The order in question was not limited to temporary use of tracks, nor to the conduct of the 
business of the railway company.  But it required the railway company to grant to the petitioners 
the right to build and maintain a permanent structure upon its right of way. 
The order in question was not, and was not claimed to be, either in the opinion of the 
court below or in the argument for the defendant in error in this court, a taking of private 
property for a public use under the right of eminent domain.  The petitioners were merely private 
individuals, voluntarily associated together for their own benefit.  They do not appear to have 
been incorporated by the State for any public purpose whatever; or to have themselves intended 
to establish an elevator for the use of the public.  On the contrary, their own application to the 
railroad company, as recited in their complaint to the board of transportation, was only "for a 
location, on the right of way at Elmwood station aforesaid, for the erection of an elevator of 
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sufficient capacity to store from time to time the cereal products of the farms and leaseholds of 
complainants aforesaid, as well as the products of other neighboring farms." 
To require the railroad company to grant to the petitioners a location on its right of way, 
for the erection of an elevator for the specified purpose of storing from time to time the grain of 
the petitioners and of neighboring farmers, is to compel the railroad company, against its will, to 
transfer an estate in part of the land which it owns and holds, under its charter, as its private 
property and for a public use, to an association of private individuals, for the purpose of erecting 
and maintaining a building thereon for storing grain for their own benefit, without reserving any 
control of the use of such land, or of the building to be erected thereon, to the railroad company 
for the accommodation of its own business, or for the convenience of the public. 
This court, confining itself to what is necessary for the decision of the case before it, is 
unanimously of opinion, that the order in question, so far as it required the railroad corporation to 
surrender a part of its land to the petitioners, for the purpose of building and maintaining their 
elevator upon it, was, in essence and effect, a taking of private property of the railroad 
corporation, for the private use of the petitioners.  The taking by a State of the private property of 
one person or corporation, without the owner's consent, for the private use of another, is not due 
process of law, and is a violation of the Fourteenth Article of Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States. Wilkinson v. Leland, 2. Pet. 627, 658; Murray v. Hoboken Co., 18 How. 272, 
276; Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102; 
Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1; Fallbrook District v. Bradley, ante, 112, 158, 161; State v. 
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway, 36 Minnesota, 402. 
Judgment reversed, and case remanded to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska, 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
BERMAN v. PARKER 
348 U.S. 26 (1954) 
Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This is an appeal (28 U.S.C. §1253) from the judgment of a three-judge District Court 
which dismissed a complaint seeking to enjoin the condemnation of appellants' property under 
the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, 60 Stat. 790, D. C. Code, 1951, §§5-701--
719.  The challenge was to the constitutionality of the Act, particularly as applied to the taking of 
appellants' property.  The District Court sustained the constitutionality of the Act.  117 F.Supp. 
705. 
By §2 of the Act, Congress made a "legislative determination" that "owing to 
technological and sociological changes, obsolete layout, and other factors, conditions existing in 
the District of Columbia with respect to substandard housing and blighted areas, including the 
use of buildings in alleys as dwellings for human habitation, are injurious to the public health, 
safety, morals, and welfare; and it is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to 
protect and promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the seat of the Government by eliminating 
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all such injurious conditions by employing all means necessary and appropriate for the 
purpose."
1
 
Section 2 goes on to declare that acquisition of property is necessary to eliminate these 
housing conditions. 
Congress further finds in §2 that these ends cannot be attained "by the ordinary 
operations of private enterprise alone without public participation"; that "the sound replanning 
and redevelopment of an obsolescent or obsolescing portion" of the District "cannot be 
accomplished unless it be done in the light of comprehensive and coordinated planning of the 
whole of the territory of the District of Columbia and its environs"; and that "the acquisition and 
the assembly of real property and the leasing or sale thereof for redevelopment pursuant to a 
project area redevelopment plan . . . is hereby declared to be a public use." 
Section 4 creates the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency (hereinafter 
called the  Agency), composed of five members, which is granted power by §5 (a) to acquire and 
assemble, by eminent domain and otherwise, real property for "the redevelopment of blighted 
territory in the District of Columbia and the prevention, reduction, or elimination of blighting 
factors or causes of blight." 
Section 6 (a) of the Act directs the National Capital Planning Commission (hereinafter 
called the Planning Commission) to make and develop "a comprehensive or general plan" of the 
District, including "a land-use plan" which designates land for use for "housing, business, 
industry, recreation, education, public buildings, public reservations, and other general categories 
of public and private uses of the land." Section 6 (b) authorizes the Planning Commission to 
adopt redevelopment plans for specific project areas.  These plans are subject to the approval of 
the District Commissioners after a public hearing; and they prescribe the various public and 
private land uses for the respective areas, the "standards of population density and building 
intensity," and "the amount or character or class of any low-rent housing." §6 (b).  
Once the Planning Commission adopts a plan and that plan is approved by the 
Commissioners, the Planning Commission certifies it to the Agency.  §6 (d).  At that point, the 
Agency is authorized to acquire and assemble the real property in the area.  Id. 
After the real estate has been assembled, the Agency is authorized to transfer to public 
agencies the land to be devoted to such public purposes as streets, utilities, recreational facilities, 
and schools, §7 (a), and to lease or sell the remainder as an entirety or in parts to a 
redevelopment company, individual, or partnership.  §7 (b), (f). The leases or sales must provide 
                                                 
1
 The Act does not define either "slums" or "blighted areas." Section 3 (r), however, states: 
"Substandard housing conditions' means the conditions obtaining in connection with the existence of any dwelling, 
or dwellings, or housing accommodations for human beings, which because of lack of sanitary facilities, ventilation, 
or light, or because of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty interior arrangement, or any combination of these factors, 
is in the opinion of the Commissioners detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the inhabitants of the 
District of Columbia." 
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that the lessees or purchasers will carry out the redevelopment plan and that "no use shall be 
made of any land or real property included in the lease or sale nor any building or structure 
erected thereon" which does not conform to the plan, §§7 (d), 11.  Preference is to be given to 
private enterprise over public agencies in executing the redevelopment plan.  §7 (g). 
The first project undertaken under the Act relates to Project Area B in Southwest 
Washington, D. C.  In 1950 the Planning Commission prepared and published a comprehensive 
plan for the District.  Surveys revealed that in Area B, 64.3% of the dwellings were beyond 
repair, 18.4% needed major repairs, only 17.3% were satisfactory; 57.8% of the dwellings had 
outside toilets, 60.3% had no baths, 29.3% lacked electricity, 82.2% had no wash basins or 
laundry tubs, 83.8% lacked central heating.  In the judgment of the District's Director of Health it 
was necessary to redevelop Area B in the interests of public health.  The population of Area B 
amounted to 5,012 persons, of whom 97.5% were Negroes. 
The plan for Area B specifies the boundaries and allocates the use of the land for various 
purposes.  It makes detailed provisions for types of dwelling units and provides that at least one-
third of them are to be low-rent housing with a maximum rental of $17 per room per month. 
After a public hearing, the Commissioners approved the plan and the Planning 
Commission certified it to the Agency for execution.  The Agency undertook the preliminary 
steps for redevelopment of the area when this suit was brought.  
Appellants own property in Area B at 712 Fourth Street, S.W.  It is not used as a dwelling 
or place of habitation.  A department store is located on it. Appellants object to the appropriation 
of this property for the purposes of the project.  They claim that their property may not be taken 
constitutionally for this project.  It is commercial, not residential property; it is not slum housing; 
it will be put into the project under the management of a private, not a public, agency and 
redeveloped for private, not public, use.  That is the argument; and the contention is that 
appellants' private property is being taken contrary to two mandates of the Fifth Amendment--(1) 
"No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . property, without due process of law"; (2) "nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." To take for the purpose of 
ridding the area of slums is one thing; it is quite another, the argument goes, to take a man's 
property merely to develop a better balanced, more attractive community.  The District Court, 
while agreeing in general with that argument, saved the Act by construing it to mean that the 
Agency could condemn property only for the reasonable necessities of slum clearance and 
prevention, its concept of "slum" being the existence of conditions "injurious to the public health, 
safety, morals and welfare." 117 F.Supp. 705, 724-725. 
The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers 
which a state may exercise over its affairs.  See District of Columbia v. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 
100, 108. We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as the police power. 
An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its 
own facts.  The definition is essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the 
purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete 
definition. Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the 
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.  In such cases the legislature, not 
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the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation, whether 
it be Congress legislating concerning the District of Columbia (see Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135) 
or the States legislating concerning local affairs.  See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236; Lincoln 
Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525; California State Association v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 
105. This principle admits of no exception merely because the power of eminent domain is 
involved.  The role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for a 
public purpose is an extremely narrow one.  See Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 
55, 66; United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552.  
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order— these are some of 
the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal 
affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it. See Noble State 
Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111. Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more 
than spread disease and crime and immorality.  They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing 
the people who live there to the status of cattle.  They may indeed make living an almost 
insufferable burden.  They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community which robs it of 
charm, which makes it a place from which men turn.  The misery of housing may despoil a 
community as an open sewer may ruin a river. 
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable. The 
concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.  See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 
342 U.S. 421, 424. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as 
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be 
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully 
patrolled.  In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made 
determinations that take into account a wide variety of values.  It is not for us to reappraise them. 
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful 
as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. 
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the 
exercise of eminent domain is clear.  For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to 
the end. See Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529-530; United States v. 
Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 679. Once the object is within the authority of 
Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine.  Here one of 
the means chosen is the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of the area. Appellants argue 
that this makes the project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of another 
businessman.  But the means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to 
determine, once the public purpose has been established.  See Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 
supra; cf. Highland v. Russell Car Co., 279 U.S. 253. The public end may be as well or better 
served through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of government- or so 
the Congress might conclude.  We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of 
promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.  What we have said also 
disposes of any contention concerning the fact that certain property owners in the area may be 
permitted to repurchase their properties for redevelopment in harmony with the over-all plan.  
That, too, is a legitimate means which Congress and its agencies may adopt, if they choose. 
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In the present case, Congress and its authorized agencies attack the problem of the 
blighted parts of the community on an area rather than on a structure-by-structure basis. That, 
too, is opposed by appellants.  They maintain that since their building does not imperil health or 
safety nor contribute to the making of a slum or a blighted area, it cannot be swept into a 
redevelopment plan by the mere dictum of the Planning Commission or the Commissioners.  The 
particular uses to be made of the land in the project were determined with regard to the needs of 
the particular community.  The experts concluded that if the community were to be healthy, if it 
were not to revert again to a blighted or slum area, as though possessed of a congenital disease, 
the area must be planned as a whole.  It was not enough, they believed, to remove existing 
buildings that were unsanitary or unsightly.  It was important to redesign the whole area so as to 
eliminate the conditions that cause slums–the overcrowding of dwellings, the lack of parks, the 
lack of adequate streets and alleys, the absence of recreational areas, the lack of light and air, the 
presence of outmoded street patterns.  It was believed that the piecemeal approach, the removal 
of individual structures that were offensive, would be only a palliative.  The entire area needed 
redesigning so that a balanced, integrated plan could be developed for the region, including not 
only new homes but also schools, churches, parks, streets, and shopping centers.  In this way it 
was hoped that the cycle of decay of the area could be controlled and the birth of future slums 
prevented.  Cf. Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 141-144, 104 A. 2d 365, 368-370; 
Hunter v. Redevelopment Authority, 195 Va. 326, 338-339, 78 S. E. 2d 893, 900-901. Such 
diversification in future use is plainly relevant to the maintenance of the desired housing 
standards and therefore within congressional power. 
The District Court below suggested that, if such a broad scope were intended for the 
statute, the standards contained in the Act would not be sufficiently definite to sustain the 
delegation of authority.  117 F.Supp. 705, 721. We do not agree.  We think the standards 
prescribed were adequate for executing the plan to eliminate not only slums as narrowly defined 
by the District Court but also the blighted areas that tend to produce slums. Property may of 
course be taken for this redevelopment which, standing by itself, is innocuous and unoffending.  
But we have said enough to indicate that it is the need of the area as a whole which Congress and 
its agencies are evaluating.  If owner after owner were permitted to resist these redevelopment 
programs on the ground that his particular property was not being used against the public 
interest, integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer greatly.  The argument pressed on us is, 
indeed, a plea to substitute the landowner's standard of the public need for the standard 
prescribed by Congress. But as we have already stated, community redevelopment programs 
need not, by force of the Constitution, be on a piecemeal basis–lot by lot, building by building.  
It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary line nor to sit in review on 
the size of a particular project area.  Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, 
the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to 
complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.  See Shoemaker v. 
United States, 147 U.S. 282, 298; United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Welch, supra, 554; United 
States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 247.  
The District Court indicated grave doubts concerning the Agency's right to take full title 
to the land as distinguished from the objectionable buildings located on it.  117 F.Supp. 705, 
715-719. We do not share those doubts.  If the Agency considers it necessary in carrying out the 
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redevelopment project to take full title to the real property involved, it may do so.  It is not for 
the courts to determine whether it is necessary for successful consummation of the project that 
unsafe, unsightly, or unsanitary buildings alone be taken or whether title to the land be included, 
any more than it is the function of the courts to sort and choose among the various parcels 
selected for condemnation. 
The rights of these property owners are satisfied when they receive that just 
compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the taking.  
The judgment of the District Court, as modified by this opinion, is Affirmed. 
HAWAII HOUSING AUTHORITY v. MIDKIFF 
467 U.S. 229 (1984) 
O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that 
"private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." These cases 
present the question whether the Public Use Clause of that Amendment, made applicable to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the State of Hawaii from taking, with just 
compensation, title in real property from lessors and transferring it to lessees in order to reduce 
the concentration of ownership of fees simple in the State.  We conclude that it does not. 
I 
A 
The Hawaiian Islands were originally settled by Polynesian immigrants from the western 
Pacific.  These settlers developed an economy around a feudal land tenure system in which one 
island high chief, the ali'i nui, controlled the land and assigned it for development to certain 
subchiefs.  The subchiefs would then reassign the land to other lower ranking chiefs, who would 
administer the land and govern the farmers and other tenants working it.  All land was held at the 
will of the ali'i nui and eventually had to be returned to his trust.  There was no private 
ownership of land.  See generally Brief for Office of Hawaiian Affairs as Amicus Curiae 3-5. 
Beginning in the early 1800's, Hawaiian leaders and American settlers repeatedly 
attempted to divide the lands of the kingdom among the crown, the chiefs, and the common 
people.  These efforts proved largely unsuccessful, however, and the land remained in the hands 
of a few.  In the mid-1960's, after extensive hearings, the Hawaii Legislature discovered that, 
while the State and Federal Governments owned almost 49% of the State's land, another 47% 
was in the hands of only 72 private landowners.  See Brief for the Hou Hawaiians and Maui Loa, 
Chief of the Hou Hawaiians, as Amici Curiae 32.  The legislature further found that 18 
landholders, with tracts of 21,000 acres or more, owned more than 40% of this land and that on 
Oahu, the most urbanized of the islands, 22 landowners owned 72.5% of the fee simple titles.  
Id., at 32-33.  The legislature concluded that concentrated land ownership was responsible for 
242 
skewing the State's residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public 
tranquility and welfare. 
To redress these problems, the legislature decided to compel the large landowners to 
break up their estates.  The legislature considered requiring large landowners to sell lands which 
they were leasing to homeowners.  However, the landowners strongly resisted this scheme, 
pointing out the significant federal tax liabilities they would incur.  Indeed, the landowners 
claimed that the federal tax laws were the primary reason they previously had chosen to lease, 
and not sell, their lands. Therefore, to accommodate the needs of both lessors and lessees, the 
Hawaii Legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967 (Act), Haw. Rev. Stat., ch. 516, which 
created a mechanism for condemning residential tracts and for transferring ownership of the  
condemned fees simple to existing lessees.  By condemning the land in question, the Hawaii 
Legislature intended to make the land sales involuntary, thereby making the federal tax 
consequences less severe while still facilitating the redistribution of fees simple.   
Under the Act's condemnation scheme, tenants living on single-family residential lots 
within developmental tracts at least five acres in size are entitled to ask the Hawaii Housing 
Authority (HHA) to condemn the property on which they live.  Haw. Rev. Stat. §§516-1(2), (11), 
516-22 (1977).  When 25 eligible tenants, or tenants on half the lots in the tract, whichever is 
less, file appropriate applications, the Act authorizes HHA to hold a public hearing to determine 
whether acquisition by the State of all or part of the tract will "effectuate the public purposes" of 
the Act. §516-22.  If HHA finds that these public purposes will be served, it is authorized to 
designate some or all of the lots in the tract for acquisition.  It then acquires, at prices set either 
by condemnation trial or by negotiation between lessors and lessees, the former fee owners' full 
"right, title, and interest" in the land.   
After compensation has been set, HHA may sell the land titles to tenants who have 
applied for fee simple ownership.  HHA is authorized to lend these tenants up to 90% of the 
purchase price, and it may condition final transfer on a right of first refusal for the first 10 years 
following sale. §§516-30, 516-34, 516-35.  If HHA does not sell the lot to the tenant residing 
there, it may lease the lot or sell it to someone else, provided that public notice has been given.  
§516-28. However, HHA may not sell to any one purchaser, or lease to any one tenant, more 
than one lot, and it may not operate for profit. §§516-28, 516-32.  In practice, funds to satisfy the 
condemnation awards have been supplied entirely by lessees.  See App. 164.  While the Act 
authorizes HHA to issue bonds and appropriate funds for acquisition, no bonds have issued and 
HHA has not supplied any funds for condemned lots.   
B 
In April 1977, HHA held a public hearing concerning the proposed acquisition of some 
of appellees' lands.  HHA made the statutorily required finding that acquisition of appellees' 
lands would effectuate the public purposes of the Act.  Then, in October 1978, it directed 
appellees to negotiate with certain lessees concerning the sale of the designated properties.  
Those negotiations failed, and HHA subsequently ordered appellees to submit to compulsory 
arbitration. 
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Rather than comply with the compulsory arbitration order, appellees filed suit, in 
February 1979, in United States District Court, asking that the Act be declared unconstitutional 
and that its enforcement be enjoined.  The District Court temporarily restrained the State from 
proceeding against appellees' estates.  Three months later, while declaring the compulsory 
arbitration and compensation formulae provisions of the Act unconstitutional, the District Court 
refused preliminarily to enjoin appellants from conducting the statutory designation and 
condemnation proceedings.  Finally, in December 1979, it granted partial summary judgment to 
appellants, holding the remaining portion of the Act constitutional under the Public Use Clause.  
See 483 F.Supp. 62 (Haw. 1979).  The District Court found that the Act's goals were within the 
bounds of the State's police powers and that the means the legislature had chosen to serve those 
goals were not arbitrary, capricious, or selected in bad faith. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.  702 F.2d 788 (1983).  The court 
further determined that the public purposes offered by the Hawaii Legislature were not deserving 
of judicial deference.  The court concluded that the Act was simply "a naked attempt on the part 
of the state of Hawaii to take the private property of A and transfer it to B solely for B's private 
use and benefit." Id., at 798.  One judge dissented. 
On applications of HHA and certain private appellants who had intervened below, this 
Court noted probable jurisdiction.  We now reverse. 
III 
The majority of the Court of Appeals . . . determined that the Act violates the "public 
use" requirement of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  On this argument, however, we find 
ourselves in agreement with the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals. 
A 
The starting point for our analysis of the Act's constitutionality is the Court's decision in 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).  In Berman, the Court held constitutional the District of 
Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945.  That Act provided both for the comprehensive use of the 
eminent domain power to redevelop slum areas and for the possible sale or lease of the 
condemned lands to private interests.  In discussing whether the takings authorized by that Act 
were for a "public use," id., at 31, the Court stated: 
"We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as the police 
power.  An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each 
case must turn on its own facts.  The definition is essentially the product of 
legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of government, purposes 
neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition. Subject to 
specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public 
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.  In such cases the 
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served 
by social legislation, whether it be Congress legislating concerning the District of 
Columbia . . . or the States legislating concerning local affairs. . . .  This principle 
244 
admits of no exception merely because the power of eminent domain is involved. 
. . ." Id., at 32 (citations omitted). 
The Court explicitly recognized the breadth of the principle it was announcing, noting: 
"Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through 
the exercise of eminent domain is clear.  For the power of eminent domain is 
merely the means to the end. . . .  Once the object is within the authority of 
Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to 
determine.  Here one of the means chosen is the use of private enterprise for 
redevelopment of the area.  Appellants argue that this makes the project a taking 
from one businessman for the benefit of another businessman.  But the means of 
executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the 
public purpose has been established." Id., at 33. 
The "public use" requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police 
powers. 
There is, of course, a role for courts to play in reviewing a legislature's judgment of what 
constitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain power is equated with the police power.  
But the Court in Berman made clear that it is "an extremely narrow" one. Id., at 32.  The Court in 
Berman cited with approval the Court's decision in Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 
55, 66 (1925), which held that deference to the legislature's "public use" determination is 
required "until it is shown to involve an impossibility."  The Berman Court also cited to United 
States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946), which emphasized that "[any] departure 
from this judicial restraint would result in courts deciding on what is and is not a governmental 
function and in their invalidating legislation on the basis of their view on that question at the 
moment of decision, a practice which has proved impracticable in other fields."  In short, the 
Court has made clear that it will not substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to 
what constitutes a public use "unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation." United 
States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896). 
To be sure, the Court's cases have repeatedly stated that "one person's property may not 
be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose, even 
though compensation be paid."  Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937).  
Thus, in Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896), where the "order in question 
was not, and was not claimed to be, . . . a taking of private property for a public use under the 
right of eminent domain," id., at 416 (emphasis added), the Court invalidated a compensated 
taking of property for lack of a justifying public purpose.   But where the exercise of the eminent 
domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a 
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.  See Berman v. Parker, supra; 
Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); cf. 
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., supra (invalidating an uncompensated taking). 
 245 
On this basis, we have no trouble concluding that the Hawaii Act is constitutional. The 
people of Hawaii have attempted, much as the settlers of the original 13 Colonies did,
1
 to reduce 
the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly traceable to their monarchs.  The 
land oligopoly has, according to the Hawaii Legislature, created artificial deterrents to the 
normal functioning of the State's residential land market and forced thousands of individual 
homeowners to lease, rather than buy, the land underneath their homes.  Regulating oligopoly 
and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State's police powers.  We cannot 
disapprove of Hawaii's exercise of this power. 
Nor can we condemn as irrational the Act's approach to correcting the land oligopoly 
problem.  The Act presumes that when a sufficiently large number of persons declare that they 
are willing but unable to buy lots at fair prices the land market is malfunctioning. When such a 
malfunction is signaled, the Act authorizes HHA to condemn lots in the relevant tract.  The Act 
limits the number of lots any one tenant can purchase and authorizes HHA to use public funds to 
ensure that the market dilution goals will be achieved.  This is a comprehensive and rational 
approach to identifying and correcting market failure. 
Of course, this Act, like any other, may not be successful in achieving its intended goals.  
But "whether in fact the provision will accomplish its objectives is not the question: the 
[constitutional requirement] is satisfied if . . . the . . . [state] Legislature rationally could have 
believed that the [Act] would promote its objective."  Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State 
Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671-672 (1981); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery 
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 112 (1979).  When the 
legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear that 
empirical debates over the wisdom of takings–no less than debates over the wisdom of other 
kinds of socioeconomic legislation–are not to be carried out in the federal courts.  Redistribution 
of fees simple to correct deficiencies in the market determined by the state legislature to be 
attributable to land oligopoly is a rational exercise of the eminent domain power. Therefore, the 
Hawaii statute must pass the scrutiny of the Public Use Clause.
2
 
IV 
The State of Hawaii has never denied that the Constitution forbids even a compensated 
taking of property when executed for no reason other than to confer a private benefit on a 
particular private party.  A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public 
use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void. 
                                                 
1
 After the American Revolution, the colonists in several States took steps to eradicate the feudal incidents with 
which large proprietors had encumbered land in the Colonies.  See, e. g., Act of May 1779, 10 Henning's Statutes At 
Large 64, ch. 13, §6 (1822) (Virginia statute); Divesting Act of 1779, 1775-1781 Pa. Acts 258, ch. 139 (1782) 
(Pennsylvania statute).  Courts have never doubted that such statutes served a public purpose.  See, e. g., Wilson, 67 
U.S. 229, 242 (1902); Stewart v. Gorter, 70 Md., 244-245, 16 A. 644, 645 (1889). 
2
 It is worth noting that the Fourteenth Amendment does not itself contain an independent "public use" requirement.  
Rather, that requirement is made binding on the States only by incorporation of the Fifth Amendment's Eminent 
Domain Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 
166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
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But no purely private taking is involved in these cases.  The Hawaii Legislature enacted its Land 
Reform Act not to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals but to attack certain 
perceived evils of concentrated property ownership in Hawaii–a legitimate public purpose.  Use 
of the condemnation power to achieve this purpose is not irrational.  Since we assume for 
purposes of these appeals that the weighty demand of just compensation has been met, the 
requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have been satisfied. Accordingly, we 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand these cases for further proceedings in 
conformity with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
KELO v. CITY OF NEW LONDON 
545 U.S. 469 (2005) 
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, SOUTER, 
GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. KENNEDY. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined.  
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In 2000, the city of New London approved a development plan that, in the words of the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut, was "projected to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax 
and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city, including its downtown and 
waterfront areas." 268 Conn. 1, 5, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (2004). In assembling the land needed for 
this project, the city's development agent has purchased property from willing sellers and 
proposes to use the power of eminent domain to acquire the remainder of the property from 
unwilling owners in exchange for just compensation. The question presented is whether the city's 
proposed disposition of this property qualifies as a "public use" within the meaning of the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
1
 
I 
The city of New London (hereinafter City) sits at the junction of the Thames River and 
the Long Island Sound in southeastern Connecticut. Decades of economic decline led a state 
agency in 1990 to designate the City a "distressed municipality." In 1996, the Federal 
Government closed the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had been located in the Fort 
Trumbull area of the City and had employed over 1,500 people. In 1998, the City's 
unemployment rate was nearly double that of the State, and its population of just under 24,000 
residents was at its lowest since 1920. 
                                                 
1
 "Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const., Amdt. 5. That Clause 
is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 
226 (1897). 
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These conditions prompted state and local officials to target New London, and 
particularly its Fort Trumbull area, for economic revitalization. To this end, respondent New 
London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private nonprofit entity established some years 
earlier to assist the City in planning economic development, was reactivated. In January 1998, 
the State authorized a $5.35 million bond issue to support the NLDC's planning activities and a 
$10 million bond issue toward the creation of a Fort Trumbull State Park. In February, the 
pharmaceutical company Pfizer Inc. announced that it would build a $300 million research 
facility on a site immediately adjacent to Fort Trumbull; local planners hoped that Pfizer would 
draw new business to the area, thereby serving as a catalyst to the area's rejuvenation. After 
receiving initial approval from the city council, the NLDC continued its planning activities and 
held a series of neighborhood meetings to educate the public]  about the process. In May, the city 
council authorized the NLDC to formally submit its plans to the relevant state agencies for 
review. Upon obtaining state-level approval, the NLDC finalized an integrated development plan 
focused on 90 acres of the Fort Trumbull area. 
The Fort Trumbull area is situated on a peninsula that juts into the Thames River. The 
area comprises approximately 115 privately owned properties, as well as the 32 acres of land 
formerly occupied by the naval facility (Trumbull State Park now occupies 18 of those 32 acres). 
The development plan encompasses seven parcels. Parcel 1 is designated for a waterfront 
conference hotel at the center of a "small urban village" that will include restaurants and 
shopping. This parcel will also have marinas for both recreational and commercial uses. A 
pedestrian "riverwalk" will originate here and continue down the coast, connecting the waterfront 
areas of the development. Parcel 2 will be the site of approximately 80 new residences organized 
into an urban neighborhood and linked by public walkway to the remainder of the development, 
including the state park. This parcel also includes space reserved for a new U.S. Coast Guard 
Museum. Parcel 3, which is located immediately north of the Pfizer facility, will contain at least 
90,000 square feet of research and development office space. Parcel 4A is a 2.4-acre site that will 
be used either to support the adjacent state park, by providing parking or retail services for 
visitors, or to support the nearby marina. Parcel 4B will include a renovated marina, as well as 
the final stretch of the riverwalk. Parcels 5, 6, and 7 will provide land for office and retail space, 
parking, and water-dependent commercial uses. 1 App. 109-113. 
The NLDC intended the development plan to capitalize on the arrival of the Pfizer 
facility and the new commerce it was expected to attract. In addition to creating jobs, generating 
tax revenue, and helping to "build momentum for the revitalization of downtown New London," 
id., at 92, the plan was also designed to make the City more attractive and to create leisure and 
recreational opportunities on the waterfront and in the park. 
The city council approved the plan in January 2000, and designated the NLDC as its 
development agent in charge of implementation. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-188 (2005). The city 
council also authorized the NLDC to purchase property or to acquire property by exercising 
eminent domain in the City's name. §8-193. The NLDC successfully negotiated the purchase of 
most of the real estate in the 90-acre area, but its negotiations with petitioners failed. As a 
consequence, in November 2000, the NLDC initiated the condemnation proceedings that gave 
rise to this case.   
248 
II 
Petitioner Susette Kelo has lived in the Fort Trumbull area since 1997. She has made 
extensive improvements to her house, which she prizes for its water view. Petitioner Wilhelmina 
Dery was born in her Fort Trumbull house in 1918 and has lived there her entire life. Her 
husband Charles (also a petitioner) has lived in the house since they married some 60 years ago. 
In all, the nine petitioners own 15 properties in Fort Trumbull -- 4 in parcel 3 of the development 
plan and 11 in parcel 4A. Ten of the parcels are occupied by the owner or a family member; the 
other five are held as investment properties. There is no allegation that any of these properties is 
blighted or otherwise in poor condition; rather, they were condemned only because they happen 
to be located in the development area. 
In December 2000, petitioners brought this action in the New London Superior Court. 
They claimed, among other things, that the taking of their properties would violate the "public 
use" restriction in the Fifth Amendment. After a 7-day bench trial, the Superior Court granted a 
permanent restraining order prohibiting the taking of the properties located in parcel 4A (park or 
marina support). It, however, denied petitioners relief as to the properties located in parcel 3 
(office space).  
After the Superior Court ruled, both sides took appeals to the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut. That court held, over a dissent, that all of the City's proposed takings were valid. It 
began by upholding the lower court's determination that the takings were authorized by chapter 
132, the State's municipal development statute. See Conn. Gen. Stat.  §8-186 et seq. (2005). That 
statute expresses a legislative determination that the taking of land, even developed land, as part 
of an economic development project is a "public use" and in the "public interest." 268 Conn., at 
18-28, 843 A. 2d, at 515-521. Next, relying on cases such as Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), and Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), the court held that 
such economic development qualified as a valid public use under both the Federal and State 
Constitutions. 268 Conn., at 40, 843 A. 2d, at 527. 
Finally, adhering to its precedents, the court went on to determine, first, whether the 
takings of the particular properties at issue were "reasonably necessary" to achieving the City's 
intended public use, id., at 82, 843 A. 2d, at 552-553, and, second, whether the takings were for 
"reasonably foreseeable needs," id., at 93, 843 A. 2d, at 558-559. The court upheld the trial 
court's factual findings as to parcel 3, but reversed the trial court as to parcel 4A, agreeing with 
the City that the intended use of this land was sufficiently definite and had been given 
"reasonable attention" during the planning process. Id., at 120-121, 843 A. 2d, at 574. 
The three dissenting justices would have imposed a "heightened" standard of judicial 
review for takings justified by economic development. Although they agreed that the plan was 
intended to serve a valid public use, they would have found all the takings unconstitutional 
because the City had failed to adduce "clear and convincing evidence" that the economic benefits 
of the plan would in fact come to pass. Id., at 144, 146, 843 A. 2d, at 587, 588 (Zarella, J., joined 
by Sullivan, C. J., and Katz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 249 
We granted certiorari to determine whether a city's decision to take property for the 
purpose of economic development satisfies the "public use" requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment.  
III 
Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long been accepted 
that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another 
private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is equally clear 
that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future "use by the public" 
is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a railroad with common-carrier duties 
is a familiar example. Neither of these propositions, however, determines the disposition of this 
case. 
As for the first proposition, the City would no doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners' 
land for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party. See Midkiff, 467 
U.S., at 245 ("A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use 
requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void"); 
Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
2
 Nor would the City be allowed to 
take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow 
a private benefit. The takings before us, however, would be executed pursuant to a "carefully 
considered" development plan. 268 Conn., at 54, 843 A. 2d, at 536. The trial judge and all the 
members of the Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed that there was no evidence of an 
illegitimate purpose in this case. Therefore, as was true of the statute challenged in Midkiff, 467 
U.S., at 245, the City's development plan was not adopted "to benefit a particular class of 
identifiable individuals." 
On the other hand, this is not a case in which the City is planning to open the condemned 
land – at least not in its entirety – to use by the general public. Nor will the private lessees of the 
land in any sense be required to operate like common carriers, making their services available to 
all comers. But although such a projected use would be sufficient to satisfy the public use 
requirement, this "Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be 
put into use for the general public." Indeed, while many state courts in the mid-19th century 
endorsed "use by the public" as the proper definition of public use, that narrow view steadily 
eroded over time. Not only was the "use by the public" test difficult to administer (e.g., what 
proportion of the public need have access to the property? at what price?), but it proved to be 
impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of society. We have repeatedly and 
consistently rejected that narrow test ever since.  
                                                 
2
 See also Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388 (1798) ("An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to 
the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority . . . . 
A few instances will suffice to explain what I mean . . . [A] law that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is 
against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be 
presumed that they have done it. The genius, the nature, and the spirit, of our State Governments, amount to a 
prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the general principles of law and reason forbid them" (emphasis deleted)). 
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The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question whether the City's 
development plan serves a "public purpose." Without exception, our cases have defined that 
concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this 
field. 
In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), this Court upheld a redevelopment plan 
targeting a blighted area of Washington, D. C., in which most of the housing for the area's 5,000 
inhabitants was beyond repair. Under the plan, the area would be condemned and part of it 
utilized for the construction of streets, schools, and other public facilities. The remainder of the 
land would be leased or sold to private parties for the purpose of redevelopment, including the 
construction of low-cost housing. 
The owner of a department store located in the area challenged the condemnation, 
pointing out that his store was not itself blighted and arguing that the creation of a "better 
balanced, more attractive community" was not a valid public use. Writing for a unanimous 
Court, Justice Douglas refused to evaluate this claim in isolation, deferring instead to the 
legislative and agency judgment that the area "must be planned as a whole" for the plan to be 
successful. The Court explained that "community redevelopment programs need not, by force of 
the Constitution, be on a piecemeal basis -- lot by lot, building by building." The public use 
underlying the taking was unequivocally affirmed 
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), the Court considered a 
Hawaii statute whereby fee title was taken from lessors and transferred to lessees (for just 
compensation) in order to reduce the concentration of land ownership. We unanimously upheld 
the statute and rejected the Ninth Circuit's view that it was "a naked attempt on the part of the 
state of Hawaii to take the property of A and transfer it to B solely for B's private use and 
benefit." Id., at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted). Reaffirming Berman's deferential 
approach to legislative judgments in this field, we concluded that the State's purpose of 
eliminating the "social and economic evils of a land oligopoly" qualified as a valid public use. 
467 U.S., at 241-242. Our opinion also rejected the contention that the mere fact that the State 
immediately transferred the properties to private individuals upon condemnation somehow 
diminished the public character of the taking. "It is only the taking's purpose, and not its 
mechanics," we explained, that matters in determining public use. Id., at 244. 
Viewed as a whole, our jurisprudence has recognized that the needs of society have 
varied between different parts of the Nation, just as they have evolved over time in response to 
changed circumstances. For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely 
eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in 
determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power. 
IV 
Those who govern the City were not confronted with the need to remove blight in the 
Fort Trumbull area, but their determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a 
program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference. The City has carefully formulated 
an economic development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the 
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community, including -- but by no means limited to -- new jobs and increased tax revenue. As 
with other exercises in urban planning and development, the City is endeavoring to coordinate a 
variety of commercial, residential, and recreational uses of land, with the hope that they will 
form a whole greater than the sum of its parts. To effectuate this plan, the City has invoked a 
state statute that specifically authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote economic 
development. Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that 
preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of our review, it is appropriate for us, as it was in 
Berman, to resolve the challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather 
in light of the entire plan. Because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings 
challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 
To avoid this result, petitioners urge us to adopt a new bright-line rule that economic 
development does not qualify as a public use. Putting aside the unpersuasive suggestion that the 
City's plan will provide only purely economic benefits, neither precedent nor logic supports 
petitioners' proposal. Promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted 
function of government. There is, moreover, no principled way of distinguishing economic 
development from the other public purposes that we have recognized. In our cases upholding 
takings that facilitated agriculture and mining, for example, we emphasized the importance of 
those industries to the welfare of the States in question, see, e.g., Strickley, 200 U.S. 527; in 
Berman, we endorsed the purpose of transforming a blighted area into a "well-balanced" 
community through redevelopment, 348 U.S., at 33; in Midkiff, we upheld the interest in 
breaking up a land oligopoly that "created artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the 
State's residential land market," 467 U.S.  It would be incongruous to hold that the City's interest 
in the economic benefits to be derived from the development of the Fort Trumbull area has less 
of a public character than any of those other interests. Clearly, there is no basis for exempting 
economic development from our traditionally broad understanding of public purpose. 
Petitioners contend that using eminent domain for economic development impermissibly 
blurs the boundary between public and private takings. Again, our cases foreclose this objection. 
Quite simply, the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private 
parties. For example, in Midkiff, the forced transfer of property conferred a direct and significant 
benefit on those lessees who were previously unable to purchase their homes. The owner of the 
department store in Berman objected to "taking from one businessman for the benefit of another 
businessman," 348 U.S., at 33, referring to the fact that under the redevelopment plan land would 
be leased or sold to private developers for redevelopment. Our rejection of that contention has 
particular relevance to the instant case: "The public end may be as well or better served through 
an agency of private enterprise than through a department of government – or so the Congress 
might conclude. We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public 
purposes of community redevelopment projects."
3
  
                                                 
3
 Nor do our cases support JUSTICE O’CONNOR’S novel theory that the government may only take property and 
transfer it to private parties when the initial taking eliminates some "harmful property use." There was nothing 
"harmful" about the nonblighted department store at issue in Berman, 348 U.S. 26; see also n. 13, supra.  The public 
purpose we upheld depended on a private party's future use of the concededly nonharmful property that was taken. 
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It is further argued that without a bright-line rule nothing would stop a city from 
transferring citizen A's property to citizen B for the sole reason that citizen B will put the 
property to a more productive use and thus pay more taxes. Such a one-to-one transfer of 
property, executed outside the confines of an integrated development plan, is not presented in 
this case. While such an unusual exercise of government power would certainly raise a suspicion 
that a private purpose was afoot, the hypothetical cases posited by petitioners can be confronted 
if and when they arise. They do not warrant the crafting of an artificial restriction on the concept 
of public use.  
Alternatively, petitioners maintain that for takings of this kind we should require a 
"reasonable certainty" that the expected public benefits will actually accrue. Such a rule, 
however, would represent an even greater departure from our precedent. "When the legislature's 
purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates 
over the wisdom of takings – no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of 
socioeconomic legislation – are not to be carried out in the federal courts." Midkiff, 467 U.S., at 
242.  
Just as we decline to second-guess the City's considered judgments about the efficacy of 
its development plan, we also decline to second-guess the City's determinations as to what lands 
it needs to acquire in order to effectuate the project. "It is not for the courts to oversee the choice 
of the boundary line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project area. Once the question 
of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the 
project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of 
the legislative branch." Berman, 348 U.S., at 35-36. 
In affirming the City's authority to take petitioners' properties, we do not minimize the 
hardship that condemnations may entail, notwithstanding the payment of just compensation.  We 
emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its 
exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many States already impose "public use" requirements that 
are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of these requirements have been established as a 
matter of state constitutional law,
4
 while others are expressed in state eminent domain statutes 
that carefully limit the grounds upon which takings may be exercised. As the submissions of the 
parties and their amici make clear, the necessity and wisdom of using eminent domain to 
promote economic development are certainly matters of legitimate public debate. This Court's 
authority, however, extends only to determining whether the City's proposed condemnations are 
for a "public use" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 
Because over a century of our case law interpreting that provision dictates an affirmative answer 
to that question, we may not grant petitioners the relief that they seek.  
JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring.[omitted] 
                                                                                                                                                             
By focusing on a property's future use, as opposed to its past use, our cases are faithful to the text of the Takings 
Clause. See U.S. Const., Amdt. 5. ("Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation"). 
4
 See, e.g., County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 471 Mich. 445, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004). 
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I join the opinion for the Court and add these further observations. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SCALIA, and 
JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting. 
Over two centuries ago, just after the Bill of Rights was ratified, Justice Chase wrote: 
"An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first 
principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of 
legislative authority . . . . A few instances will suffice to explain what I mean . . . . 
[A] law that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and 
justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it 
cannot be presumed that they have done it." Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388 
(1798) (emphasis deleted). 
Today the Court abandons this long-held, basic limitation on government power. Under 
the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and 
transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded -- i.e., given to an owner 
who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public -- in the process. 
To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits resulting from the subsequent 
ordinary use of private property render economic development takings "for public use" is to 
wash out any distinction between private and public use of property -- and thereby effectively to 
delete the words "for public use" from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly 
I respectfully dissent. 
I 
Petitioners are nine resident or investment owners of 15 homes in the Fort Trumbull 
neighborhood of New London, Connecticut. Petitioner Wilhelmina Dery, for example, lives in a 
house on Walbach Street that has been in her family for over 100 years. She was born in the 
house in 1918; her husband, petitioner Charles Dery, moved into the house when they married in 
1946. Their son lives next door with his family in the house he received as a wedding gift, and 
joins his parents in this suit. Two petitioners keep rental properties in the neighborhood. 
 In February 1998, Pfizer Inc., the pharmaceuticals manufacturer, announced that it 
would build a global research facility near the Fort Trumbull neighborhood. Two months later, 
New London's city council gave initial approval for the New London Development Corporation 
(NLDC) to prepare the development plan at issue here. The NLDC is a private, nonprofit 
corporation whose mission is to assist the city council in economic development planning. It is 
not elected by popular vote, and its directors and employees are privately appointed. Consistent 
with its mandate, the NLDC generated an ambitious plan for redeveloping 90 acres of Fort 
Trumbull in order to "complement the facility that Pfizer was planning to build, create jobs, 
increase tax and other revenues, encourage public access to and use of the city's waterfront, and 
eventually 'build momentum' for the revitalization of the rest of the city." 
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To save their homes, petitioners sued New London and the NLDC, to whom New 
London has delegated eminent domain power. Petitioners maintain that the Fifth Amendment 
prohibits the NLDC from condemning their properties for the sake of an economic development 
plan. Petitioners are not hold-outs; they do not seek increased compensation, and none is 
opposed to new development in the area. Theirs is an objection in principle: They claim that the 
NLDC's proposed use for their confiscated property is not a "public" one for purposes of the 
Fifth Amendment. While the government may take their homes to build a road or a railroad or to 
eliminate a property use that harms the public, say petitioners, it cannot take their property for 
the private use of other owners simply because the new owners may make more productive use 
of the property. 
II 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, made applicable to the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." When interpreting the Constitution, we begin with the unremarkable 
presumption that every word in the document has independent meaning, "that no word was 
unnecessarily used, or needlessly added." Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938). In 
keeping with that presumption, we have read the Fifth Amendment's language to impose two 
distinct conditions on the exercise of eminent domain: "the taking must be for a 'public use' and 
'just compensation' must be paid to the owner." Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash., 538 U.S. 
216, 231-232 (2003). 
Where is the line between "public" and "private" property use? We give considerable 
deference to legislatures' determinations about what governmental activities will advantage the 
public. But were the political branches the sole arbiters of the public-private distinction, the 
Public Use Clause would amount to little more than hortatory fluff. An external, judicial check 
on how the public use requirement is interpreted, however limited, is necessary if this constraint 
on government power is to retain any meaning. See Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 
(1930) ("It is well established that . . . the question [of] what is a public use is a judicial one"). 
Our cases have generally identified three categories of takings that comply with the 
public use requirement, though it is in the nature of things that the boundaries between these 
categories are not always firm. Two are relatively straightforward and uncontroversial. First, the 
sovereign may transfer private property to public ownership -- such as for a road, a hospital, or a 
military base. Second, the sovereign may transfer private property to private parties, often 
common carriers, who make the property available for the public's use -- such as with a railroad, 
a public utility, or a stadium. But "public ownership" and "use-by-the-public" are sometimes too 
constricting and impractical ways to define the scope of the Public Use Clause. Thus we have 
allowed that, in certain circumstances and to meet certain exigencies, takings that serve a public 
purpose also satisfy the Constitution even if the property is destined for subsequent private use. 
See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 
229 (1984). 
This case returns us for the first time in over 20 years to the hard question of when a 
purportedly "public purpose" taking meets the public use requirement. It presents an issue of first 
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impression: Are economic development takings constitutional? I would hold that they are not. 
We are guided by two precedents about the taking of real property by eminent domain. In 
Berman, we upheld takings within a blighted neighborhood of Washington, D. C. Mr. Berman's 
department store was not itself blighted. Having approved of Congress' decision to eliminate the 
harm to the public emanating from the blighted neighborhood, however, we did not second-guess 
its decision to treat the neighborhood as a whole rather than lot-by-lot.  
 In Midkiff, we upheld a land condemnation scheme in Hawaii whereby title in real 
property was taken from lessors and transferred to lessees. At that time, the State and Federal 
Governments owned nearly 49% of the State's land, and another 47% was in the hands of only 
72 private landowners. Concentration of land ownership was so dramatic that on the State's most 
urbanized island, Oahu, 22 landowners owned 72.5% of the fee simple titles. Id., at 232. The 
Hawaii Legislature had concluded that the oligopoly in land ownership was "skewing the State's 
residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and 
welfare," and therefore enacted a condemnation scheme for redistributing title. Ibid. 
In those decisions, we emphasized the importance of deferring to legislative judgments 
about public purpose. Yet for all the emphasis on deference, Berman and Midkiff hewed to a 
bedrock principle without which our public use jurisprudence would collapse: "A purely private 
taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no 
legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void." Midkiff, 467 U.S., at 245.To protect 
that principle, those decisions reserved "a role for courts to play in reviewing a legislature's 
judgment of what constitutes a public use . . . [though] the Court in Berman made clear that it is 
'an extremely narrow' one." Midkiff, supra, at 240 (quoting Berman, supra, at 32). 
The Court's holdings in Berman and Midkiff were true to the principle underlying the 
Public Use Clause. In both those cases, the extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted 
property inflicted affirmative harm on society – in Berman through blight resulting from extreme 
poverty and in Midkiff through oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth. And in both cases, the 
relevant legislative body had found that eliminating the existing property use was necessary to 
remedy the harm. Berman, supra, at 28-29; Midkiff, supra, at 232. Thus a public purpose was 
realized when the harmful use was eliminated. Because each taking directly achieved a public 
benefit, it did not matter that the property was turned over to private use. Here, in contrast, New 
London does not claim that Susette Kelo's and Wilhelmina Dery's well-maintained homes are the 
source of any social harm. Indeed, it could not so claim without adopting the absurd argument 
that any single-family home that might be razed to make way for an apartment building, or any 
church that might be replaced with a retail store, or any small business that might be more 
lucrative if it were instead part of a national franchise, is inherently harmful to society and thus 
within the government's power to condemn. 
In moving away from our decisions sanctioning the condemnation of harmful property 
use, the Court today significantly expands the meaning of public use. It holds that the sovereign 
may take private property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary 
private use, so long as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the public 
– such as increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even aesthetic pleasure. But nearly any lawful 
use of real private property can be said to generate some incidental benefit to the public. Thus, if 
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predicted (or even guaranteed) positive side-effects are enough to render transfer from one 
private party to another constitutional, then the words "for public use" do not realistically 
exclude any takings, and thus do not exert any constraint on the eminent domain power. 
There is a sense in which this troubling result follows from errant language in Berman 
and Midkiff. In discussing whether takings within a blighted neighborhood were for a public use, 
Berman began by observing: "We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known 
as the police power." 348 U.S., at 32. From there it declared that "once the object is within the 
authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear." Id., 
at 33. Following up, we said in Midkiff that "the 'public use' requirement is coterminous with the 
scope of a sovereign's police powers." 467 U.S., at 240. This language was unnecessary to the 
specific holdings of those decisions. Berman and Midkiff simply did not put such language to the 
constitutional test, because the takings in those cases were within the police power but also for 
"public use" for the reasons I have described. The case before us now demonstrates why, when 
deciding if a taking's purpose is constitutional, the police power and "public use" cannot always 
be equated.  
Even if there were a practical way to isolate the motives behind a given taking, the 
gesture toward a purpose test is theoretically flawed. If it is true that incidental public benefits 
from new private use are enough to ensure the "public purpose" in a taking, why should it matter, 
as far as the Fifth Amendment is concerned, what inspired the taking in the first place? How 
much the government does or does not desire to benefit a favored private party has no bearing on 
whether an economic development taking will or will not generate secondary benefit for the 
public. And whatever the reason for a given condemnation, the effect is the same from the 
constitutional perspective -- private property is forcibly relinquished to new private ownership. 
A second proposed limitation is implicit in the Court's opinion. The logic of today's 
decision is that eminent domain may only be used to upgrade -- not downgrade -- property. The 
Court rightfully admits, however, that the judiciary cannot get bogged down in predictive 
judgments about whether the public will actually be better off after a property transfer. In any 
event, this constraint has no realistic import. For who among us can say she already makes the 
most productive or attractive possible use of her property? The specter of condemnation hangs 
over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, 
any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory. Cf. 99 Cents Only Stores v. 
Lancaster Redevelopment Authority, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (CD Cal. 2001) (attempted taking of 
99 Cents store to replace with a Costco); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 
616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) (taking a working-class, immigrant community in Detroit and 
giving it to a General Motors assembly plant), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 471 
Mich. 415, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004).  
It was possible after Berman and Midkiff to imagine unconstitutional transfers from A to 
B. Those decisions endorsed government intervention when private property use had veered to 
such an extreme that the public was suffering as a consequence. Today nearly all real property is 
susceptible to condemnation on the Court's theory.  
 257 
Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private party, but the fallout 
from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with 
disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and 
development firms. As for the victims, the government now has license to transfer property from 
those with fewer resources to those with more. The Founders cannot have intended this perverse 
result. "That alone is a just government," wrote James Madison, "which impartially secures to 
every man, whatever is his own." For the National Gazette, Property, (Mar. 29, 1792), reprinted 
in 14 Papers of James Madison 266 (R. Rutland et al. eds. 1983). 
I would hold that the takings are unconstitutional, reverse the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut, and remand for further proceedings. 
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.  
I would revisit our Public Use Clause cases and consider returning to the original 
meaning of the Public Use Clause: that the government may take property only if it actually uses 
or gives the public a legal right to use the property. 
The consequences of today's decision are not difficult to predict, and promise to be 
harmful. So-called "urban renewal" programs provide some compensation for the properties they 
take, but no compensation is possible for the subjective value of these lands to the individuals 
displaced and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes. Allowing the 
government to take property solely for public purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept 
of public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses 
will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not only systematically 
less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but are also the least politically 
powerful. If ever there were justification for intrusive judicial review of constitutional provisions 
that protect "discrete and insular minorities," United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 152, (1938), surely that principle would apply with great force to the powerless groups and 
individuals the Public Use Clause protects. The deferential standard this Court has adopted for 
the Public Use Clause is therefore deeply perverse. It encourages "those citizens with 
disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and 
development firms" to victimize the weak.   
Those incentives have made the legacy of this Court's "public purpose" test an unhappy 
one. In the 1950's, no doubt emboldened in part by the expansive understanding of "public use" 
this Court adopted in Berman, cities "rushed to draw plans" for downtown development. B. 
Frieden & L. Sagalayn, Downtown, Inc. How America Rebuilds Cities 17 (1989). "Of all the 
families displaced by urban renewal from 1949 through 1963, 63 percent of those whose race 
was known were nonwhite, and of these families, 56 percent of nonwhites and 38 percent of 
whites had incomes low enough to qualify for public housing, which, however, was seldom 
available to them." Id., at 28. Public works projects in the 1950's and 1960's destroyed 
predominantly minority communities in St. Paul, Minnesota, and Baltimore, Maryland. Id., at 
28-29. In 1981, urban planners in Detroit, Michigan, uprooted the largely "lower-income and 
elderly" Poletown neighborhood for the benefit of the General Motors Corporation. J. Wylie, 
Poletown: Community Betrayed 58 (1989). Urban renewal projects have long been associated 
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with the displacement of blacks; "in cities across the country, urban renewal came to be known 
as 'Negro removal.'" Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private 
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 1, 47 (2003). Over 97 percent of the 
individuals forcibly removed from their homes by the "slum-clearance" project upheld by this 
Court in Berman were black. 348 U.S., at 30. Regrettably, the predictable consequence of the 
Court's decision will be to exacerbate these effects. 
* * * 
The Court relies almost exclusively on this Court's prior cases to derive today's far-
reaching, and dangerous, result. But the principles this Court should employ to dispose of this 
case are found in the Public Use Clause itself. When faced with a clash of constitutional 
principle and a line of unreasoned cases wholly divorced from the text, history, and structure of 
our founding document, we should not hesitate to resolve the tension in favor of the 
Constitution's original meaning. For the reasons I have given, and for the reasons given in 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S dissent, the conflict of principle raised by this boundless use of the 
eminent domain power should be resolved in petitioners' favor. I would reverse the judgment of 
the Connecticut Supreme Court. 
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Session 12. Just Compensation 
MARYLAND CONSTITUTION 
Art. 3, §40 [Eminent Domain] (1867) 
The General Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing private property, to be taken for 
public use, without just compensation, as agreed upon between the parties, or awarded by a Jury, 
being first paid or tendered to the party entitled to such compensation. 
CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO. v. CITY OF CHICAGO 
166 U.S. 226 (1897) 
Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court. 
The questions presented on this writ of error relate to certain rulings of the state court 
which, it is alleged, were in disregard of that part of the Fourteenth Amendment declaring that no 
State shall deprive any person of his property without due process of law, or deny the equal 
protection of the laws to any person within its jurisdiction. 
The constitution of Illinois provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." Art. 2, §2.  It also provides: "Private property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.  Such compensation, when not made 
by the State, shall be ascertained by a jury, as shall be prescribed by law.  The fee of land taken 
for railroad tracks, without consent of the owners thereof, shall remain in such owners, subject to 
the use for which it is taken." Art. 2, §13. 
By the fifth article of the general statute of Illinois, approved April 10, 1872, and relating 
to the incorporation of cities and villages, it was provided that "the city council shall have power, 
by condemnation or otherwise, to extend any street, alley or highway over or across, or to 
construct any sewer under or through any railroad track, right of way or land of any railroad 
company." 
The ninth article of the same statute declared that the corporate authorities of a city 
should file in its name a petition in some court of record of the county praying "that the just 
compensation to be made for private property to be taken or damaged" for the improvement or 
purpose specified in the ordinance be ascertained by a jury. 
By an ordinance of the city council of Chicago approved October 9, 1880, it was 
ordained that Rockwell Street in that city be opened and widened from West 18th Street to West 
19th Street by condemning therefore, in accordance with the above act of April 10, 1872, certain 
parcels of land owned by individuals, and also certain parts of the right of way in that city of the 
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company, a corporation of Illinois. 
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In execution of that ordinance a petition was filed by the city, November 12, 1890, in the 
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, for the condemnation of the lots, pieces or parcels of land 
and property proposed to be taken or damaged for the proposed improvement, and praying that 
the just compensation required for private property taken or damaged be ascertained by a jury. 
In their verdict the jury fixed the just compensation to be paid to the respective individual 
owners of the lots, pieces and parcels of land and property sought to be taken or damaged by the 
proposed improvements, and fixed one dollar as just compensation to the railroad company in 
respect of those parts of its right of way described in the city's petition as necessary to be used 
for the purposes of the proposed street. 
Thereupon the railroad company moved for a new trial.  The motion was overruled, and a 
final judgment was rendered in execution of the award by the jury.  That judgment was affirmed 
by the Supreme Court of the State. 149 Illinois, 457. 
The general contentions of the railroad company are–  
That the judgment of the state court whereby a public street is opened across its 
land used for railroad purposes, and whereby compensation to the extent of one 
dollar only is awarded, deprives it of its property without due process of law 
contrary to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment; and, 
That the railroad company was entitled by reason of the opening of the street to 
recover as compensation a sum equal to the difference between the value of the 
fee of the land sought to be crossed, without any restrictions on its right to use the 
land for any lawful purpose, and the value of the land burdened with a perpetual 
right in the public to use it for the purpose of a street subject to the right of the 
company, or those acquiring title under it, to use it only for railroad tracks or any 
purpose for which the same could be used without interfering with its use by the 
public. 
It is . . . necessary to inquire at the outset whether "due process of law" requires 
compensation to be made or secured to the owner of private property taken for public use . . . . In 
determining what is due process of law regard must be had to substance, not to form.  This court, 
referring to the Fourteenth Amendment, has said: "Can a State make anything due process of law 
which, by its own legislation, it chooses to declare such?  To affirm this is to hold that the 
prohibition to the States is of no avail, or has no application where the invasion of private rights 
is effected under the forms of state legislation."  If compensation for private property taken for 
public use is an essential element of due process of law as ordained by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, then the final judgment of a state court, under the authority of which the property is 
in fact taken, is to be deemed the act of the State within the meaning of that amendment. 
It is proper now to inquire whether the due process of law enjoined by the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires compensation to be made or adequately secured to the owner of private 
property taken for public use under the authority of a State. 
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The legislature may prescribe a form of procedure to be observed in the taking of private 
property for public use, but it is not due process of law if provision be not made for 
compensation.  Notice to the owner to appear in some judicial tribunal and show cause why his 
property shall not be taken for public use without compensation would be a mockery of justice. 
Due process of law as applied to judicial proceedings instituted for the taking of private property 
for public use means, therefore, such process as recognizes the right of the owner to be 
compensated if his property be wrested from him and transferred to the public.  The mere form 
of the proceeding instituted against the owner, even if he be admitted to defend, cannot convert 
the process used into due process of law, if the necessary result be to deprive him of his property 
without compensation. 
In our opinion, a judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by statute, whereby 
private property is taken for the State or under its direction for public use, without compensation 
made or secured to the owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting in the due process of law 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and the 
affirmance of such judgment by the highest court of the State is a denial by that State of a right 
secured to the owner by that instrument. 
It remains to inquire whether the necessary effect of the proceedings in the court below 
was to appropriate to the public use any property right of the railroad company without 
compensation being made or secured to the owner. 
The contention of the railroad company is that the verdict and judgment for one dollar as 
the amount to be paid to it was, in effect, an appropriation of its property rights without any 
compensation whatever; that the judgment should be read as if in form as well as in fact it made 
no provision whatever for compensation for the property so appropriated. 
Undoubtedly the verdict may not unreasonably be taken as meaning that, in the judgment 
of the jury, the company's property, proposed to be taken, was not materially damaged; that is, 
looking at the nature of the property and the purposes for which it was obtained and was being 
used, that which was taken from the company was not, in the judgment of the jury, of any 
substantial value in money.  The owner of private property taken under the right of eminent 
domain obtains just compensation if he is awarded such sum as, under all the circumstances, is a 
fair and full equivalent for the thing taken from him by the public. If the opening of the street 
across the railroad tracks did not unduly interfere with the company's use of the right of way for 
legitimate railroad purposes, then its compensation would be nominal. 
The principal point of dispute between the parties was whether the railroad company, by 
reason of the opening of the street, was entitled to recover a sum equal to the difference between 
the value of the land in question as land, without any restriction on its right to use it for any 
lawful purpose, and the value of the land when burdened with the right of the public to use it for 
the purposes of a street crossing. 
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The plaintiff in error took its charter subject to the power of the State to provide for the 
safety of the public, in so far as the safety of the lives and persons of the people were involved in 
the operation of the railroad.  The company laid its tracks subject to the condition necessarily 
implied that their use could be so regulated by competent authority as to insure the public safety. 
And as all property, whether owned by private persons or by corporations, is held subject to the 
authority of the State to regulate its use in such manner as not to unnecessarily endanger the lives 
and the personal safety of the people, it is not a condition of the exercise of that authority that the 
State shall indemnify the owners of property for the damage or injury resulting from its exercise. 
Property thus damaged or injured is not, within the meaning of the Constitution, taken for public 
use, nor is the owner deprived of it without due process of law.  The requirement that 
compensation be made for private property taken for public use imposes no restriction upon the 
inherent power of the State by reasonable regulations to protect the lives and secure the safety of 
the people. 
The expenses that will be incurred by the railroad company in erecting gates, planking 
the crossing, and maintaining flagmen, in order that its road may be safely operated -if all that 
should be required- necessarily result from the maintenance of a public highway, under 
legislative sanction, and must be deemed to have been taken by the company into account when 
it accepted the privileges and franchises granted by the State.  Such expenses must be regarded 
as incidental to the exercise of the police powers of the State. 
What was obtained, and all that was obtained, by the condemnation proceedings for the 
public was the right to open a street across land within the crossing that was used, and was 
always likely to be used, for railroad tracks.  While the city was bound to make compensation for 
that which was actually taken, it cannot be required to compensate the defendant for obeying 
lawful regulations enacted for the safety of the lives and property of the people.  And the value to 
the railroad company of that which was taken from it is, as we have said, the difference between 
the value of the right to the exclusive use of the land in question for the purposes for which it 
was being used, and for which it was always likely to be used, and that value after the city 
acquired the privilege of participating in such use by the opening of a street across it, leaving the 
railroad tracks untouched.  Upon that theory the case was considered by the jury, and the court 
did not err in placing it before them upon that basis as to compensation. 
We have examined all the questions of law arising on the record of which this court may 
take cognizance, and which, in our opinion, are of sufficient importance to require notice at our 
hands, and finding no error, the judgment is 
Affirmed. 
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UNITED STATES v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP. 
323 U.S. 373 (1945) 
Mr. Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case is one of first impression in this court.  It presents a question on which the 
decisions of federal courts are in conflict. The problem involved is the ascertainment of the just 
compensation required by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, where, in the exercise of the 
power of eminent domain, temporary occupancy of a portion of a leased building is taken from a 
tenant who holds under a long-term lease. 
Section 201 of Title II of the Second War Powers Act of March 27, 1942, provides, in 
part, that the Secretary of War may cause proceedings to be instituted, in any court having 
jurisdiction, to acquire, by condemnation, any real property, temporary use thereof, or other 
interest therein which shall be deemed necessary for military or other war purposes.  The Act 
provides further that, on or after the filing of the condemnation petition, immediate possession 
may be taken and the property may be occupied, used, or improved.  
In 1928 the respondent leased a one-story warehouse building in Chicago for a term of 
twenty years, for the storage and distribution of automobile parts, and fitted the premises for this 
use.  In 1942 the United States became subtenants of a portion of the floor space in the building.  
There remained in the possession of the respondent some 93,000 square feet. In the spring of 
1942 the Secretary of War requested the Attorney General to institute proceedings for 
condemnation of the occupancy of the remaining space for a term ending June 30, 1943. 
Pursuant to the request, the United States, on June 8, 1942, filed a petition in the District Court 
for an order condemning such temporary use and granting the Government the right of 
immediate possession, use, and improvement for military purposes.  On the same day the court 
entered an order declaring the property condemned for a term ending June 30, 1943, and granting 
the United States the right of immediate possession.  The order was served on the respondent and 
shortly thereafter it began removing its personal property from the area and dismantling and 
demolishing bins and fixtures, so that the space was available for government use by June 19. 
At the trial for the ascertainment of the compensation due the respondent, the attorney for 
the Government, after proving the authority for the taking, called a real estate expert who gave 
his opinion that the fair rental value of the space was 35 cents per year per square foot.  The 
Government then rested. 
The respondent called expert witnesses who testified that, in their opinion, the fair rental 
value was 43 cents per square foot, and a witness was permitted to testify that the rent paid by 
the respondent to its landlord had varied during the years 1940 to 1942, inclusive, from 41.9 to 
43.24 cents.  
The respondent then offered to prove various items of cost caused by removal of the 
contents.  These consisted, inter alia, of salaries of employees engaged in the work, 
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compensation due employees put out of work by the removal, wages of janitors and watchmen 
for the protection of the building during the moving, the cost of shipping the contents of the 
building to other points, compensation to executives and employees whose time was required in 
connection  with the moving of the property, freight and haulage charges, rental of storage space 
for articles moved out, the value of the bin equipment destroyed and the estimated original cost 
of the installation of fixed equipment completely lost as a result of the dismantling of the area. 
The court sustained an objection to the offer.  The jury awarded compensation in a lump sum at a 
rate of approximately 40 cents per square foot for the term of one year.  
The respondent appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, assigning as error the refusal of 
its offer of proof.  That court might have sustained the District Court's ruling on the ground that 
respondent was not entitled to prove certain of the expenditures and losses in question as 
independent items of damages additional to the value of the interest taken by condemnation.  The 
court, however, considering substance rather than form, by a vote of 2 to 1, reversed the 
judgment, holding that items of actual loss which were the direct and necessary result of the 
respondent's exclusion from the leased area might be proved, not as independent items but as 
elements to be considered in arriving at the sum which would be just compensation for the 
interest which the Government condemned. The cause was remanded for trial in accordance with 
the ruling of the Circuit Court of Appeals.  We think we should review that ruling inasmuch as it 
is fundamental to the further conduct of the case.  The correctness of the decision of the court 
below depends upon the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision: "nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation," which conditions the otherwise 
unrestrained power of the sovereign to expropriate, without compensation, whatever it needs. 
The critical terms are "property," "taken" and "just compensation." It is conceivable that 
the first was used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which 
the citizen exercises rights recognized by law.  On the other hand, it may have been employed in 
a more accurate sense to denote the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the 
physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.  In point of fact, the construction 
given the phrase has been the latter. When the sovereign exercises the power of eminent domain 
it substitutes itself in relation to the physical thing in question in place of him who formerly bore 
the relation to that thing, which we denominate ownership.  In other words, it deals with what 
lawyers term the individual's "interest" in the thing in question. That interest may comprise the 
group of rights for which the shorthand term is "a fee simple" or it may be the interest known as 
an "estate or tenancy for years," as in the present instance.  The constitutional provision is 
addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess. 
In its primary meaning, the term "taken" would seem to signify something more than 
destruction, for it might well be claimed that one does not take what he destroys.  But the 
construction of the phrase has not been so narrow.  The courts have held that the deprivation of 
the former owner rather than the accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign constitutes the 
taking.  Governmental action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its 
effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter, 
to amount to a taking. 
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But it is to be observed that whether the sovereign substitutes itself as occupant in place 
of the former owner, or destroys all his existing rights in the subject matter, the Fifth 
Amendment concerns itself solely with the "property," i.e., with the owner's relation as such to 
the physical thing and not with other collateral interests which may be incident to his ownership. 
In the light of these principles it has been held that the compensation to be paid is the 
value of the interest taken.  Only in the sense that he is to receive such value is it true that the 
owner must be put in as good position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken.  In the 
ordinary case, for want of a better standard, market value, so called, is the criterion of that value. 
In some cases this criterion cannot be used either because the interest condemned has no market 
value or because, in the circumstances, market value furnishes an inappropriate measure of 
actual value. 
In the trial of this case the parties presented evidence of the market value of the 
occupancy of bare floor space for the term taken.  The respondent's offer to prove additional 
items for which it claimed compensation was overruled.  The award was therefore limited to the 
market value of the occupancy of a vacant building.  The question is whether any other element 
of value inhered in the interest taken. 
The sovereign ordinarily takes the fee.  The rule in such a case is that compensation for 
that interest does not include future loss of profits, the expense of moving removable fixtures and 
personal property from the premises, the loss of good-will which inheres in the location of the 
land, or other like consequential losses which would ensue the sale of the property to someone 
other than the sovereign.  No doubt all these elements would be considered by an owner in 
determining whether, and at what price, to sell.  No doubt, therefore, if the owner is to be made 
whole for the loss consequent on the sovereign's seizure of his property, these elements should 
properly be considered.  But the courts have generally held that they are not to be reckoned as 
part of the compensation for the fee taken by the Government. We are not to be taken as 
departing from the rule they have laid down, which we think sound.  Even where state 
constitutions command that compensation be made for property "taken or damaged" for public 
use, as many do, it has generally been held that that which is taken or damaged is the group of 
rights which the so-called owner exercises in his dominion of the physical thing, and that damage 
to those rights of ownership does not include losses to his business or other consequential 
damage. 
The question posed in this case then is, shall a different measure of compensation apply 
where that which is taken is a right of temporary occupancy of a building equipped for the 
condemnee's business, filled with his commodities, and presumably to be reoccupied and used, 
as before, to the end of the lease term on the termination of the Government's use? The right to 
occupy, for a day, a month, a year, or a series of years, in and of itself and without reference to 
the actual use, needs, or collateral arrangements of the occupier, has a value.  The value of that 
interest is affected, of course, by the kind of building to be occupied, by its location, by its 
susceptibility to various uses, by its conveniences, or the reverse, and by many other factors 
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which go to set the value of the occupancy.  These were taken into consideration in fixing the 
market value of the floor space taken, as if that space were bare and in the market for rent. 
While, as has been said, the Government's power to take for a short period, and to 
demand possession of the space taken freed of all equipment or personal property therein, cannot 
be denied, three questions emerge which are not presented when what is taken is a fee interest  in 
land.  They are: 1. Is the long-term rental value the sole measure of the value of such short-term 
occupancy carved out of the long term?  2. If the taking necessitates the removal of personal 
property stored in the building in conformity to the normal use of such a building, is the 
necessary expense of the removal to be considered in computing compensation?  3. If a tenant's 
equipment and fixtures are taken or destroyed, or reduced in value, by the Government's action, 
must it compensate for the value thus taken or destroyed in addition to paying the rental value of 
the occupancy? 
1. If the Government need only pay the long-term rental of an empty 
building for a temporary taking from the long-term tenant a way will have been 
found to defeat the Fifth Amendment's mandate for just compensation in all 
condemnations except those in which the contemplated public use requires the 
taking of the fee simple title.  In any case where the Government may need 
private property, it can devise its condemnation so as to specify a term of a day, a 
month, or a year, with optional contingent renewal for indefinite periods, and with 
the certainty that it need pay the owner only the long-term rental rate of an 
unoccupied building for the short term period, if the premises are already under 
lease or, if not, then a market rental for whatever minimum term it may choose to 
select, fixed according to the usual modes of arriving at rental rates.  And this, 
though the owner may be damaged by the ouster ten, a score, or perhaps a 
hundred times the amount found due him as "fair rental value." In the present case 
the respondent offered to prove that the actual expense of moving its property 
exceeded $46,000, and the loss due to destruction and removal of fixtures and 
fixed equipment exceeded $31,000, in addition to its continuing liability to pay 
rent for the year of approximately $40,000; whereas the award was $38,597.86.  If 
such a result be sustained we can see no limit to utilization of such a device; and, 
if there is none, the Amendment's guaranty becomes, not one of just 
compensation for what is taken, but an instrument of confiscation fictionalizing 
"just compensation" into some such concept as the common law idea of a 
peppercorn in the law of seizing or the later one of "value received" in that of 
contractual consideration.  If the value to be paid in a case like the present is 
confined, as matter of law, to the long-term rental of bare space, the owner will 
not be secure, either in his rights of property, or in his right to just compensation 
as a substitute for it, when the Government takes it for the use and benefit of all.  
Here the use of a warehouse for a short time was taken.  The property might have 
been the General Motors factory.  Or several plants.  Or a modest store or home. 
Whatever of property the citizen has the Government may take. When it takes the 
property, that is, the fee, the lease, whatever he may own, terminating altogether 
his interest, under the established law it must pay him for what is taken, not more; 
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and he must stand whatever indirect or remote injuries are properly 
comprehended within the meaning of "consequential damage" as that conception 
has been defined in such cases.  Even so the consequences often are harsh.  For 
these whatever remedy may exist lies with Congress.  
It is altogether another matter when the Government does not take his 
entire interest, but by the form of its proceeding chops it into bits, of which it 
takes only what it wants, however few or minute, and leaves him holding the 
remainder, which may then be altogether useless to him, refusing to pay more 
than the "market rental value" for the use of the chips so cut off.  This is neither 
the "taking" nor the "just compensation" the Fifth Amendment contemplates.  The 
value of such an occupancy is to be ascertained, not by treating what is taken as 
an empty warehouse to be leased for a long term, but what would be the market 
rental value of such a building on a lease by the long-term tenant to the temporary 
occupier.  The case should be retried on this principle. In so ruling we do not 
suggest that the long-term rental value may not be shown as bearing on the market 
rental value of the temporary occupancy taken.  It may be evidence of the value of 
what is taken but it is not the criterion of value in such a case as this. 
2. Some of the elements which would certainly and directly affect the market 
price agreed upon by a tenant and a sublessee in such an extraordinary and 
unusual transaction would be the reasonable cost of moving out the property 
stored and preparing the space for occupancy by the subtenant.  That cost would 
include labor, materials, and transportation.  And it might also include the storage 
of goods against their sale or the cost of their return to the leased premises. Such 
items may be proved, not as independent items of damage but to aid in the 
determination of what would be the usual–the market–price which would be 
asked and paid for such temporary occupancy of the building then in use under a 
long-term lease. The respondent offered detailed proof of amounts actually and 
necessarily paid for these purposes.  We think that the proof should have been 
received for the purpose and with the limitation indicated.  Proof of such costs as 
affecting market value is to be distinguished from proof of value peculiar to the 
respondent, or the value of good-will or of injury to the business of the respondent 
which, in this case, as in the case of the condemnation of a fee, must be excluded 
from the reckoning. 
3. For fixtures and permanent equipment destroyed or depreciated in value 
by the taking, the respondent is entitled to compensation.  An owner's rights in 
these are no less property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment than his 
rights in land and the structures thereon erected. And it matters not whether they 
were taken over by the Government or destroyed, since, as has been said, 
destruction is tantamount to taking. This is true whether the fixtures and 
equipment would be considered such as between vendor and vendee, or as a 
tenant's trade fixtures. In respect of them, the tenant whose occupancy is taken is 
entitled to compensation for destruction, damage or depreciation in value.  And 
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since they are property distinct from the right of occupancy such compensation 
should be awarded not as part of but in addition to the value of the occupancy as 
such. 
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, as modified by this opinion, is Affirmed. 
KIRBY FOREST INDUSTRIES, INC. v. UNITED STATES 
467 U.S. 1 (1984) 
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.   
Title 40 U. S. C. §257, in conjunction with Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, prescribes a procedure pursuant to which the United States may appropriate privately 
owned land by eminent domain.  The central issue in this case is whether the manner in which 
the value of the land is determined and paid to its owner under that procedure comports with the 
requirement, embodied in the Fifth Amendment, that private property not be taken for public use 
without just compensation.  
A 
The United States customarily employs one of three methods when it appropriates private 
land for a public purpose.  The most frequently used is the so-called "straight-condemnation" 
procedure prescribed in 40 U. S. C. §257. Under that statute, an "officer of the Government" who 
is "authorized to procure real estate for the erection of a public building or for other public 
uses".
1
 makes an application to the Attorney General who, within 30 days, must initiate 
condemnation proceedings. The form of those proceedings is governed by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure  71A.
2
 In brief, Rule 71A requires the filing in federal district court of a "complaint in 
condemnation," identifying the property and the interest therein that the United States wishes to 
take, followed by a trial–before a jury, judge, or specially appointed commission–of the question 
of how much compensation is due the owner of the land.  The practical effect of final judgment 
on the issue of just compensation is to give the Government an option to buy the property at the 
adjudicated price.  Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284 (1939). If the Government 
wishes to exercise that option, it tenders payment to the private owner, whereupon title and right 
to possession vest in the United States.  If the Government decides not to exercise its option, it 
can move for dismissal of the condemnation action. Ibid.; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 71A(i)(3). 
                                                 
1
 Such authorization generally is derived from some independent statute that vests the officer with the power of 
eminent domain but does not prescribe the manner in which that power should be exercised. See, e. g., 16 U. S. C. 
§404c-11. 
2
 Suits under §257 originally were required to "conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, forms and 
proceedings existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State" in which the suits were instituted.  
Act of Aug. 1, 1888, ch. 728, §2, 25 Stat. 357.  The adoption in 1951 of Rule 71A capped an effort to establish a 
uniform set of procedures governing all federal condemnation actions.  See Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 
71A, Original Report, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 644. 
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A more expeditious procedure is prescribed by 40 U. S. C. §258a.
3
 That statute empowers 
the Government, "at any time before judgment" in a condemnation suit, to file "a declaration of 
taking signed by the authority empowered by law to acquire the lands [in question], declaring 
that said lands are thereby taken for the use of the United States." The Government is obliged, at 
the time of the filing, to deposit in the court, "to the use of the persons entitled thereto," an 
amount of money equal to the estimated value of the land. Title and right to possession 
thereupon vest immediately in the United States.  In subsequent judicial proceedings, the exact 
value of the land (on the date the declaration of taking was filed) is determined, and the owner is 
awarded the difference (if any) between the adjudicated value of the land and the amount already 
received by the owner, plus interest on that difference. 
Finally, Congress occasionally exercises the power of eminent domain directly.  For 
example, when Congress thinks that a tract of land that it wishes to preserve inviolate is 
threatened with imminent alteration, it sometimes enacts a statute appropriating the property 
immediately by "legislative taking" and setting up a special procedure for ascertaining, after the 
appropriation, the compensation due to the owners.
4
 
In addition to these three statutory methods, the United States is capable of acquiring 
privately owned land summarily, by physically entering into possession and ousting the owner. 
E. g., United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 747-749 (1947).  In such a case, the owner has a 
right to bring an "inverse condemnation" suit to recover the value of the land on the date of the 
intrusion by the Government.  United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1958).
5
 
The Government's selection amongst and implementation of these various methods of 
acquiring property is governed,  to some extent, by the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real 
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U. S. C. §4601 et seq.  That statute enjoins federal 
agencies, inter alia, to attempt to acquire property by negotiation rather than condemnation, and 
whenever possible not to take land by physical appropriation.  §§4651(1), (4), (8).  In addition, 
the statute requires a court with jurisdiction over a condemnation action that is dismissed or 
abandoned by the Government to award the landowner an amount that will reimburse him for 
"his reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses" incurred in contesting the suit.  §4654(a).
6
 
The statute does not, however, regulate decisions by the Government whether to employ the 
                                                 
3
 Section 258a was enacted in 1931, for the principal purpose of enabling the United States, when it wished, 
peremptorily to appropriate property on which public buildings were to be constructed, making it possible for the 
Government to begin improving the land, thereby stimulating employment during the Great Depression.  See H. R. 
Rep. No. 2086, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1930). 
4
 See, e. g., 16 U. S. C. §79c(b) (vesting in the United States "all right, title, and interest" in the land encompassed by 
the Redwood National Park as of the date of the enactment of the statute). 
5
 Such a suit is "inverse" because it is brought by the affected owner, not by the condemnor.  United States v. Clarke, 
445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980). The owner's right to bring such a suit derives from "'the self-executing character of the 
constitutional provision with respect to condemnation. . . .'" Ibid. (quoting 6 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain §25.41 (3d 
rev. ed. 1972)). 
6
 We have held that the last-mentioned provision for the reimbursement of costs is a matter of legislative grace, not 
constitutional entitlement.  United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 204 (1979) (per curiam). 
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"straight-condemnation" procedure prescribed in §257 or the "declaration of taking" procedure 
embodied in §258a. 
B 
Petitioner, a manufacturer of forest products, owns substantial tracts of timberland in 
Texas. This case arises out of a protracted effort by the United States to appropriate 2,175.86 
acres of that land.  
In the mid-1960's, several studies were made of the desirability of establishing a national 
park or preserve to protect an area of relatively untrammeled wilderness in eastern Texas.  One 
of those studies, conducted in 1967 by the National Park Service, recommended the creation of a 
35,500-acre Big Thicket National Park.  The Texas Forestry Association, of which petitioner is a 
member, endorsed that proposal and declared a voluntary moratorium on logging in the 
designated area.  Since 1967, petitioner has observed that moratorium and has not cut any trees 
on its property lying within the area demarked by the Park Service.
7
 After seven years of 
desultory consideration of the matter, Congress rejected the Park Service proposal and enacted 
legislation creating a much larger Big Thicket National Preserve.  Act of Oct. 11, 1974, Pub. L. 
93-439, 88 Stat. 1254, 16 U. S. C. §698 et seq.  The statute directed the Secretary of the Interior 
to acquire the land within the boundaries of the Preserve.  16 U. S. C. §698(c).  The Senate 
Report made clear that, though the Secretary had the authority to acquire individual tracts by 
declaration of taking, pursuant to 40 U. S. C. §258a, such a peremptory procedure should be 
employed only when necessary to protect a parcel from destruction.  S. Rep. No. 93-875, p. 5 
(1974).  It was understood that, in the absence of such an emergency, the Secretary would 
purchase the land using the straight-condemnation method prescribed in 40 U. S. C. §257. 
The Government initially attempted to acquire the acreage owned by petitioner through a 
negotiated purchase.  On August 21, 1978, after those negotiations had broken down, the United 
States filed a complaint in condemnation in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. 
Shortly thereafter, the Government filed a notice of lis pendens, notifying the public of the 
institution of the condemnation proceeding.   The District Court referred the matter to a special 
commission to ascertain the compensation due petitioner.  Trial before the commission began on 
March 6, 1979.  On that day, the parties stipulated that "today is the date of taking." After 
hearing competing testimony pertaining to the fair market value of petitioner's land, the 
commission entered a report recommending compensation in the amount of $2,331,202. 
Both parties filed objections to the report in the District Court.  On August 13, 1981, after 
holding a hearing to consider those objections, the District Court entered judgment awarding 
petitioner compensation in the amount recommended by the commission, plus interest at a rate of 
                                                 
7
 Testimony at trial by one of petitioner's officers suggested that, regardless of the existence of the moratorium, 
petitioner would not have cut any trees on that land, which it had held as a "reserve logging area" since the 1950's. 
For the purpose of our decision, we place no weight on that testimony; we assume that petitioner voluntarily forwent 
an opportunity to make profitable use of its land. 
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six percent for the period from August 21, 1978 (the date the complaint had been filed), to the 
date the Government deposited the adjudicated value of the land with the court.  United States v. 
2,175.86 Acres of Land, 520 F.Supp. 75, 81 (1981).  The court justified its award of interest on 
the ground that the institution of condemnation proceedings had "effectively denied [petitioner] 
economically viable use and enjoyment of its property" and therefore had constituted a taking. 
Id., at 80. On March 26, 1982, the United States deposited the total amount of the judgment in 
the registry of the District Court.  On the same date, the Government acquired title to the land. 
Both parties appealed.  A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit unanimously 
ruled that the commission's report failed to meet the standards enunciated in United States v. 
Merz, 376 U.S. 192 (1964), and remanded the case for further findings regarding the value of 
petitioner's land.  United States v. 2,175.86 Acres of Land, 696 F.2d 351, 358 (1983). More 
importantly for present purposes, the Court of Appeals, by a vote of two to one, reversed the 
District Court's award of interest to petitioner.  Reasoning that "the mere commencement of 
straight condemnation proceedings, where the government does not enter into possession . . . , 
does not constitute a taking," id., at 355, the court held that, in this case, the date of the taking 
should be deemed the date on which the compensation award was paid.  Consequently, no 
interest was due on that award.
8
 
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits regarding the date on which the 
taking, in a "straight-condemnation" proceeding, should be deemed to occur and the 
constitutional obligation of the United States to pay interest on the adjudicated value of the 
property.
9
 464 U.S. 913 (1983). We now affirm. 
II 
The United States has the authority to take private property for public use by eminent 
domain, Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1876), but is obliged by the Fifth Amendment 
to provide "just compensation" to the owner thereof.  "Just compensation," we have held, means 
in most cases the fair market value of the property on the date it is appropriated. United States v. 
564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511-513 (1979).  "Under this standard, the owner is entitled 
                                                 
8
 Judge Jolly dissented on this issue, arguing that the owner of unimproved land subject to condemnation 
proceedings under 40 U. S. C. §257 is entitled to interest on the award at least for the period beginning with entry of 
judgment by the district court, because during that period the owner is "shackled from making economically viable 
use of his property." 696 F.2d, at 358-359. 
9
 In two cases, panels of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have rejected the position taken by the Fifth 
Circuit in this case, holding that, when the United States condemns unimproved property using the method 
prescribed in 40 U. S. C. §257, it must award interest to the owner for some period prior to the date the award is paid 
and title passes.  United States v. 15.65 Acres of Land, 689 F.2d 1329 (1982), cert. denied sub nom. Marin 
Ridgeland Co. v. United States, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983); United States v. 156.81 Acres of Land, 671 F.2d 336, cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982). Similar confusion exists in the District Courts.  See, e. g., United States v. 59.29 
Acres of Land, 495 F.Supp. 212 (ED Tex. 1980) (date of taking is date of announcement of the award by the 
commission). 
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to receive 'what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller' at the time of the taking." 
Id., at 511 (quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943)).
10
 
If the Government pays the owner before or at the time the property is taken, no interest 
is due on the award.  See Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S., at 284. Such a mode of 
compensation is not constitutionally mandated; the Fifth Amendment does not forbid the 
Government to take land and pay for it later.  Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 400-403 (1895). 
But if disbursement of the award is delayed, the owner is entitled to interest thereon sufficient to 
ensure that he is placed in as good a position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if the 
payment had coincided with the appropriation. Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 344 
(1927); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 (1923).
11
 
From the foregoing it should be apparent that identification of the time a taking of a tract 
of land occurs is crucial to determination of the amount of compensation to which the owner is 
constitutionally entitled.  The Government contends that, in straight-condemnation proceedings 
like that at issue here, the date of taking must be deemed the date the United States tenders 
payment to the owner of the land.  The Government's position is amply supported by prior 
decisions by this Court and by indications of congressional intent derivable from the structure of 
the pertinent statutory scheme and the governing procedural rule. 
In Danforth v. United States, supra, we were called upon to determine the date on which 
the Government, in an exercise of its eminent domain power under the Flood Control Act of 
1928, ch. 569, 45 Stat. 534, as amended, 33 U. S. C. §702a et seq., appropriated the petitioner's 
property.  We held that, "[unless] a taking has occurred previously in actuality or by a statutory 
provision . . . , we are of the view that the taking in a condemnation suit under this statute takes 
place upon the payment of the money award by the condemnor."  308 U.S., at 284. In response to 
the contention that such a procedure was unfair, we observed, "'[the] owner is protected by the 
rule that title does not pass until compensation has been ascertained and paid. . . .'" Id., at 284-
285 (quoting Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581, 587 (1923)). 
That all straight-condemnation proceedings under §257 should operate in the fashion 
described in Danforth is strongly suggested by the structure of Rule 71A, which now governs the 
administration of the statute.  Rule 71A(i) permits the United States to dismiss a condemnation 
                                                 
10
 We have acknowledged that, in some cases, this standard fails fully to indemnify the owner for his loss.  
Particularly when property has some special value to its owner because of its adaptability to his particular use, the 
fair-market-value measure does not make the owner whole.  United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 
511-512 (1979). We are willing to tolerate such occasional inequity because of the difficulty of assessing the value 
an individual places upon a particular piece of property and because of the need for a clear, easily administrable rule 
governing the measure of "just compensation." Ibid. 
11
 The last-mentioned principle underlies the provision in 40 U. S. C. §258a for the payment of interest on any 
difference between the estimated value of land appropriated through a declaration of taking and its subsequently 
adjudicated actual value as of that date.  See supra, at 5.  The principle also underlies several decisions by Courts of 
Appeals, holding that the six percent rate of interest prescribed by §258a is not a ceiling on the amount that can and 
must be paid by the Government.  See, e. g., United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 704 F.2d 800, 812, and n. 18 
(CA5 1983) (en banc).  The United States has acquiesced in those decisions.  Brief for United States 14, n. 13. 
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suit at any time before "compensation has been determined and paid," unless the Government 
previously has "acquired the title or a lesser interest . . . or taken possession." The Government's 
capacity to withdraw from the proceeding in this fashion would be difficult to explain if a taking 
were effectuated prior to tendering of payment. 
Finally, Congress' understanding that a taking does not occur until the termination of 
condemnation proceedings brought under §257 is reflected in its adoption of §258a for the 
purpose of affording the Government the option of peremptorily appropriating land prior to final 
judgment, thereby permitting immediate occupancy and improvement of the property. Such an 
option would have been superfluous if, as petitioner contends, a taking occurred upon the filing 
of the complaint in a §257 suit.  
Petitioner's principal objection to the position advocated by the Government is that such a 
reading of §257 and Rule 71A is precluded by the Fifth Amendment. Petitioner contends that, at 
least when the subject of a straight-condemnation proceeding is unimproved land, the owner is 
effectively deprived of all of the significant interests associated with ownership long before the 
Government tenders payment.  The filing of a complaint in condemnation and a notice of lis 
pendens, petitioner contends, has the effect of preventing the owner of unimproved land 
thereafter from making any profitable use of it, or of selling it to another private party.  At the 
same time, the owner remains liable for property taxes.
12
 Such a thoroughgoing abrogation of the 
owner's rights, petitioner submits, surely constitutes a taking as soon as the abrogation is 
effective, regardless of when the land is officially appropriated under the terms of the statute. 
If petitioner's depiction of the impairment of its beneficial interests during the pendency 
of the condemnation suit were accurate, we would find its constitutional argument compelling. 
We have frequently recognized that a radical curtailment of a landowner's freedom to make use 
of or ability to derive income from his land may give rise to a taking within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment, even if the Government has not physically intruded upon the premises or 
acquired a legal interest in the property. The principle that underlies this doctrine is that, while 
most burdens consequent upon government action undertaken in the public interest must be 
borne by individual landowners as concomitants of "'the advantage of living and doing business 
in a civilized community,'"
13
 some are so substantial and unforeseeable, and can so easily be 
identified and redistributed, that "justice and fairness" require that they be borne by the public as 
a whole.
14
 These considerations are as applicable to the problem of determining when in a 
                                                 
12
 Cf. United States v. 15.65 Acres of Land, 689 F.2d, at 1334 (arguing that the initiation of a condemnation action 
leaves "[the] owner of unimproved land . . . with the liabilities which follow title but none of the benefits, save the 
right ultimately to be paid for the taking"). 
13
 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
14
 See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-262 (1980); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 123-128 (1978); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
supra, at 413, 415-416; Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just 
Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1214-1224 (1967). 
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condemnation proceeding the taking occurs as they are to the problem of ascertaining whether a 
taking has been effected by a putative exercise of the police power. 
However, we do not find, prior to the payment of the condemnation award in this case, an 
interference with petitioner's property interests severe enough to give rise to a taking under the 
foregoing theory.  Until title passed to the United States, petitioner was free to make whatever 
use it pleased of its property.  The Government never forbade petitioner to cut the trees on the 
land or to develop the tract in some other way.  Indeed, petitioner is unable to point to any 
statutory provision that would have authorized the Government to restrict petitioner's usage of 
the property prior to payment of the award.  
Nor did the Government abridge petitioner's right to sell the land if it wished.  It is 
certainly possible, as petitioner contends, that the initiation of condemnation proceedings, 
publicized by the filing of a notice of lis pendens, reduced the price that the land would have 
fetched, but impairment of the market value of real property incident to otherwise legitimate 
government action ordinarily does not result in a taking.  At least in the absence of an 
interference with an owner's legal right to dispose of his land, even a substantial reduction of the 
attractiveness of the property to potential purchasers does not entitle the owner to compensation 
under the Fifth Amendment. 
It is true that any effort by petitioner to develop the land probably would have prompted 
the Government to exercise its authority, under 40 U. S. C. §258a, to file a declaration of  taking 
and thereby peremptorily to appropriate the tract in order to protect it from alteration.  But the 
likelihood that the United States would have responded in that fashion to an attempt by petitioner 
to make productive use of the land weakens rather than strengthens petitioner's position, because 
it suggests that petitioner had the option, at any time, to precipitate an immediate taking of the 
land and to obtain compensation therefore as of that date, merely by informing the Government 
of its intention to cut down the trees.  
We conclude, in sum, that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that its interests were 
impaired in any constitutionally significant way before the Government tendered payment and 
acquired title in the usual course. Accordingly, we approve the finding of the Court of Appeals 
that the taking of petitioner's land occurred on March 26, 1982. Because the award was paid on 
that date, no interest was due thereon. 
III 
The foregoing conclusion does not dispose of this case.  We still must determine whether 
the award itself satisfied the strictures of the Fifth Amendment. As indicated above, petitioner is 
constitutionally entitled to the fair market value of its property on the date of the taking. 
Petitioner points out that $2,331,202 represents the commission's best estimate of the value of 
the land on March 6, 1979.  To the extent that that figure is less than the value of the land on 
March 26, 1982, the date of the taking, petitioner contends, it has been denied just compensation. 
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The Government attempts to meet this objection by emphasizing the pragmatic 
constraints on determination of the value of real property.  The Government contends that it is 
imperative that the trier of fact in a condemnation action be given a fixed date as of which the 
value of the land is to be assessed.  At the time of trial, no one knows when the United States 
will exercise its option to purchase the property, so adoption of the date of payment as the date of 
valuation is infeasible.  Moreover, prediction of the value of land at a future time is notoriously 
difficult. Under these circumstances, courts and commissions understandably have adopted the 
convention of using the date of the commencement of the trial as the date of the valuation.  
The Government's argument provides a plausible explanation for the valuation procedure 
used in this case and other cases, but it does not meet petitioner's constitutional claim.  However 
reasonable it may be to designate the date of trial as the date of valuation, if the result of that 
approach is to provide the owner substantially less than the fair market value of his property on 
the date the United States tenders payment, it violates the Fifth Amendment. 
We are left with the problem of prescribing a solution to this difficulty.  Petitioner 
suggests that we mandate an award of interest, at least for the period from the date of valuation 
to the date of the taking, as a rough proxy for the increase in the value of the land during that 
period.  We decline the invitation.  Change in the market value of particular tracts of land over 
time bears only a tenuous relationship to the market rate of interest.  Some parcels appreciate at 
rates far in excess of the interest rate; others decline in value.
15
 Thus, to require the Government 
to pay interest on the basis proposed by petitioner would only sometimes improve the fit between 
the value of condemned land on the date of its appropriation and the amount paid to the owner of 
such land. 
Solution of the problem highlighted by petitioner requires, not a rule compelling payment 
of interest by the Government, but rather a procedure for modifying a condemnation award when 
there is a substantial delay between the date of valuation and the date the judgment is paid, 
during which time the value of the land changes materially. In the case before us, such a 
procedure is readily available.  In view of the inadequacy of the commission's explanation for its 
valuation of petitioner's land, the Court of Appeals remanded for reconsideration of the value of 
the property.  On remand, the District Court can easily adduce evidence pertaining to alteration 
in the value of petitioner's tract between March 6, 1979, and March 26, 1982.  In our view, such 
a reassessment is both necessary and sufficient to provide petitioner just compensation. 
In other cases, such an option may not be available.  However, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure contain a procedural device that could do tolerable service in this cause. Rule 60(b) 
empowers a federal court, upon motion of a party, to withdraw or amend a final order for "any . . 
. reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." This provision seems to us 
                                                 
15
 For example, it appears that the market value of timberland of the sort owned by petitioner was much higher in 
March 1979 than in March 1982.  See Vardaman's Green Sheet, Index of Pine Sawtimber Stumpage and Timberland 
Prices (Jan. 15, 1983). 
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expansive enough to encompass a motion, by the owner of condemned land, to amend a 
condemnation award. The evidence adduced in consideration of such a motion would be very 
limited.  The parties would not be permitted to question the adjudicated value of the tract as of 
the date of its original valuation; they would be limited to the presentation of evidence and 
arguments on the issue of how the market value of the property altered between that date and the 
date on which the judgment was paid by the Government.  So focused, the consideration of such 
a motion would be expeditious and relatively inexpensive for the parties involved. Further 
refinement of this procedural option we leave to the courts called upon to administer it. 
IV 
For the reasons set forth above, we agree with the Court of Appeals that no interest was 
due on the condemnation award paid to petitioner.  Petitioner's meritorious contention that it is 
constitutionally entitled to the value of its land on the date of the taking, not on the date of the 
valuation, can be accommodated by allowing petitioner, on remand, to present evidence 
pertaining to change in the market value of the tract during the period between those two dates. 
On the understanding that petitioner will be afforded that opportunity, the judgment is Affirmed. 
UNITED STATES v. 50 ACRES OF LAND 
469 U.S. 24 (1984) 
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
The Fifth Amendment requires that the United States pay "just compensation" --normally 
measured by fair market value- whenever it takes private property for public use.  This case 
involves the condemnation of property owned by a municipality.  The question is whether a 
public condemnee is entitled to compensation measured by the cost of acquiring a substitute 
facility if it has a duty to replace the condemned facility.  We hold that this measure of 
compensation is not required when the market value of the condemned property is ascertainable. 
I 
In 1978, as part of a flood control project, the United States condemned approximately 50 
acres of land owned by the city of Duncanville, Texas.  The site had been used since 1969 as a 
sanitary landfill.  In order to replace the condemned landfill, the city acquired a 113.7-acre site 
and developed it into a larger and better facility.  In the condemnation proceedings, the city 
claimed that it was entitled to recover all of the costs incurred in acquiring the substitute site and 
developing it as a landfill, an amount in excess of $1,276,000.  The United States, however, 
contended that just compensation should be determined by the fair market value of the 
condemned facility and deposited $199,950 in the registry of the court as its estimation of the 
amount due. 
Before trial the Government filed a motion in limine to exclude any evidence of the cost 
of the substitute facility, arguing that it was not relevant to the calculation of fair market value. 
Record, Doc. No. 62.  The District Court denied the motion, noting that this Court had left open 
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the question of the proper measure of compensation for the condemnation of public property. See 
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 509, n.3 (1979) (Lutheran Synod). The 
court concluded that "a complete factual record should be developed from which an independent 
determination of the appropriate measure of compensation can be made."  Record, Doc. No. 111. 
At trial, both parties submitted evidence on the fair market value of the condemned 
property and on the cost of the substitute landfill facility. Responding to special interrogatories, 
the jury found that the fair market value of the condemned property was $225,000, and that the 
reasonable cost of a substitute facility was $723,624.01.  Record, Doc. Nos. 199, 200.  The 
District Court entered judgment for the lower amount plus interest on the difference between that 
amount and the sum already paid.  529 F.Supp. 220 (N.D. Tex. 1981).  The court found no basis 
for departing from the market value standard in this case, and reasoned that the application of the 
substitute- facilities measure of compensation would necessarily provide the city with a 
"windfall." 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings.  706 F.2d 1356 
(CA5 1983).  It reasoned that the city's loss attributable to the condemnation was "the amount of 
money reasonably spent . . . to create a functionally equivalent facility."  Id., at 1360.  If the city 
was required, either as a matter of law or as a matter of practical necessity, to replace the old 
landfill facility, the Court of Appeals believed that it would receive no windfall.  We granted the 
Government's petition for certiorari, 465 U.S. 1098 (1984), and we now reverse with instructions 
to direct the District Court to enter judgment based on the jury's finding of fair market value. 
II 
The Court has repeatedly held that just compensation normally is to be measured by "the 
market value of the property at the time of the taking contemporaneously paid in money."  Olson 
v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). "Considerations that may not reasonably be held to 
affect market value are excluded." Id., at 256. Deviation from this measure of just compensation 
has been required only "when market value has been too difficult to find, or when its application 
would result in manifest injustice to owner or public."  United States v. Commodities Trading 
Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950); Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10, n. 
14 (1984). 
The city contends that in this case an award of compensation measured by market value 
is fundamentally inconsistent with the basic principles of indemnity embodied in the Just 
Compensation Clause.  If the city were a private party rather than a public entity, however, the 
possibility that the cost of a substitute facility exceeds the market value of the condemned parcel 
would not justify a departure from the market value measure.  The question . . . is whether a 
substitute-facilities measure of compensation is mandated by the Constitution when the 
condemnee is a local governmental entity that has a duty to replace the condemned facility. 
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III 
The text of the Fifth Amendment certainly does not mandate a more favorable rule of 
compensation for public condemnees than for private parties.  To the contrary, the language of 
the Amendment only refers to compensation for "private property," and one might argue that the 
Framers intended to provide greater protection for the interests of private parties than for public 
condemnees.  That argument would be supported by the observation that many public 
condemnees have the power of eminent domain, and thus, unlike private parties, need not rely on 
the availability of property on the market in acquiring substitute facilities. 
When the United States condemns a local public facility, the loss to the public entity, to 
the persons served by it, and to the local taxpayers may be no less acute than the loss in a taking 
of private property.  Therefore, it is most reasonable to construe the reference to "private 
property" in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment as encompassing the property of state 
and local governments when it is condemned by the United States.  Under this construction, the 
same principles of just compensation presumptively apply to both private and public 
condemnees. 
V 
In this case, as in most, the market measure of compensation achieves a fair "balance 
between the public's need and the claimant's loss."  United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & 
Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949).  This view is consistent with our holding in 
Lutheran Synod that fair market value constitutes "just compensation" for those private citizens 
who must replace their condemned property with more expensive substitutes and with our prior 
holdings that the Fifth Amendment does not require any award for consequential damages 
arising from a condemnation. 
The city argues that its responsibility for municipal garbage disposal justifies a departure 
from the market value measure in this case.  This responsibility compelled the city to arrange for 
a suitable replacement facility or substitute garbage disposal services.  This obligation to replace 
a condemned facility, however, is no more compelling than the obligations assumed by private 
citizens.  Even though most private condemnees are not legally obligated to replace property 
taken by the Government, economic circumstances often force them to do so.  When a home is 
condemned, for example, its owner must find another place to live.  The city's legal obligation to 
maintain public services that are interrupted by a federal condemnation does not justify a 
distinction between public and private condemnees for the purpose of measuring "just 
compensation." 
Finally, the substitute-facilities doctrine, as applied in this case, diverges from the 
principle that just compensation must be measured by an objective standard that disregards 
subjective values which are only of significance to an individual owner.  As the Court wrote in 
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949): 
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"The value of property springs from subjective needs and attitudes; its value to the 
owner may therefore differ widely from its value to the taker.   Most things, 
however, have a general demand which gives them a value transferable from one 
owner to another.  As opposed to such personal and variant standards as value to 
the particular owner whose property has been taken, this transferable value has an 
external validity which makes it a fair measure of public obligation to compensate 
the loss incurred by an owner as a result of the taking of his property for public 
use.  In view, however, of the liability of all property to condemnation for the 
common good, loss to the owner of nontransferable values deriving from his 
unique need for property or idiosyncratic attachment to it, like loss due to an 
exercise of the police power, is properly treated as part of the burden of common 
citizenship." 
The subjective elements in the formula for determining the cost of reasonable substitute 
facilities would enhance the risk of error and prejudice.  Since the condemnation contest is 
between the local community and a National Government that may be thought to have unlimited 
resources, the open-ended character of the substitute-facilities standard increases the likelihood 
that the city would actually derive the windfall that concerned both the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals. "Particularly is this true where these issues are to be left for jury 
determination, for juries should not be given sophistical and abstruse formulas as the basis for 
their findings nor be left to apply even sensible formulas to factors that are too elusive." Id., at 
20. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
BALTIMORE v. VALSAMAKI 
397 Md. 222 (2007) 
Opinion by Cathell, J. 
This case arises from a "quick-take" condemnation 
1
 by the Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore ("the City"), appellant, of a property located at 1924 N. Charles Street ("the Property") 
in Baltimore, Maryland. The Property consists of a three story building which houses a bar and 
package goods store known as the Magnet. On March 9, 2006, the City filed a petition for 
                                                 
1
 A quick-take condemnation involves "[t]he immediate taking of possession of private property for public use, 
whereby the estimated compensation is deposited in court or paid to the condemnee until the actual amount of 
compensation can be established." Black's Law Dictionary 310 (8th ed. 2004). See Bern-Shaw Ltd. P'ship v. Mayor 
and City Council of Baltimore, 377 Md. 277, 281 n.1, 833 A.2d 502, 504 n.1 (2003); King v. State Roads Comm'n, 
298 Md. 80, 85-86, 467 A.2d 1032, 1035 (1983) (Quick-take condemnation occurs where "the condemning authority 
takes possession of the property prior to trial upon payment into court of its estimate of the value of the property 
taken."). 
280 
condemnation and a petition for immediate possession and title with the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City. On March 15, 2006, prior to the property owner being served with any papers, 
the Circuit Court granted the City's petitions, ordering that the City "be vested with possession of 
the fee simple interest in that property known as 1924 N. Charles Street . . . as of the 15th day of 
March, 2006 . . . ." Pursuant to the court's order, title in the Property would vest in the City ten 
days after personal service of the relevant order on the owner of the Property, George Valsamaki, 
appellee, unless he filed an answer to the City's petitions within the ten day period "alleging that 
the City does not have the right or power to condemn title to the property . . . ." 
Mr. Valsamaki filed an answer within the requisite time period and a hearing was 
scheduled and held on April 18, 2006. On May 19, 2006, the Circuit Court issued a 
memorandum opinion denying the City's petitions for condemnation and immediate possession 
and title to the Property. On August 8; 2006, after a motion to reconsider had been denied, the 
City noted a direct appeal to this Court. 
The City presents one question for our review: "Does the City have the burden to prove 
'necessity' to proceed with a quick take condemnation?"  
We answer this question in the affirmative, holding that under the Code of Public Local 
Laws of Baltimore City, § 21-16(a),
2
 the City must demonstrate the reason or reasons why it is 
necessary for it to have immediate possession and immediate title to a particular property via the 
exercise of a quick-take condemnation. 
It is clear from the emphasized language of the statute that when the Legislature 
conferred quick-take powers on Baltimore City it did so with the limitation that such powers 
should be exercised only when the necessity was "immediate." We have found no prior Maryland 
case that addresses the "immediate" language of the enabling statute. 
I. Facts 
This case has its genesis in Baltimore City's urban renewal efforts. On October 25, 1982, 
the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore adopted Ordinance No. 82-799, which established the 
Charles North Urban Renewal Plan for the Charles North Revitalization Area.  Ordinance No. 
82-799 sets forth the goals and objectives of the Charles North Urban Renewal Plan as follows:  
                                                 
2
 The Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City, § 21-16, is titled "Quick-take condemnation -- in general," and 
states in subsection (a), titled "Petition for Immediate Taking," that:  
   "Whenever any proceedings are instituted under Title 12 of the Real Property Article of Public General Laws of 
the State of Maryland or by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore for the acquisition of any property for any 
public purpose whatsoever, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, simultaneously with the filing of said 
proceedings or at any time thereafter, may file a Petition under oath stating that it is necessary for the City to have 
immediate possession of, or immediate title to and possession of, said property, and the reasons therefore." § 21-
16(a)  
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"The basic goal of this Urban Renewal Plan is the revitalization of the 
Charles/North area in order to create a unique mixed-use neighborhood with enhanced 
viability, stability, attractiveness, and convenience for residents of the surrounding area 
and of the City as a whole.  
The Property is located within the boundaries of the Charles North Revitalization Area. 
In June 2004, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore amended the Charles North Urban 
Renewal Plan by Baltimore City Ordinance No. 04-695, which specifically authorized the 
acquisition of the subject Property "by purchase or by condemnation, for urban renewal purposes 
. . . ." 
The issue before us arose on March 9, 2006, when the City acted on Ordinance No. 04-
695 and filed a petition for condemnation and a petition for immediate possession of and title to 
the Property in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The petition for immediate possession and 
title stated in pertinent part: "That it is necessary for [the City] to acquire immediate possession 
and title to the said property interest [because] ‘the  property must be in possession of the Mayor 
and City Council of Baltimore at the earliest possible time in order to assist in a business 
expansion in the area." [Emphasis added].’” There was no attempt to specify the immediacy of 
the necessity other than a general statement that it was needed "at the earliest possible time" "to 
assist in a business expansion." There was no discussion of "why."  In essence, the City appears 
to have been using its quick-take power to "stockpile" or assemble properties. 
On March 15, 2006, the Circuit Court granted the City's petitions. Mr. Valsamaki, the 
owner of the Property, timely filed an answer challenging the City's power to condemn title to 
the Property and a hearing was set for April 18, 2006. 
Prior to the April 18, 2006, hearing, Mr.Valsamaki attempted to obtain discovery by 
serving interrogatories and notices of depositions on various city officials involved. Due to the 
abbreviated time period in which quick-take condemnation proceedings generally take place, the 
City would not have to respond under the normal discovery time line before the April 18, 2006, 
hearing. Mr. Valsamaki was forced to litigate without the aid of discovery practices, practices 
that would have been available in a regular condemnation action. 
On April 18, 2006, the hearing took place. On cross examination by Mr. Valsamaki's 
counsel, the following colloquy occurred:  
"Q Is there any plan for the development of this property? 
… 
A  We wanted mixed use development, but we had no specific plans because they 
 follow on with the proposals. They come in as part of a proposal. 
. . . 
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Q But you really, at this point in time, and at the time you adopted the amendment, 
you really didn't have any plan for this property; did you? 
A  We are seeking mixed use development for that assemblage of properties. 
Q I'm trying to understand this. This mixed-use concept then is just a 
conglomeration of different uses; is that right? 
A It's exactly as it says, 'a mixed use,' mixed uses, yes. 
Q  Was there any particular business that was referred to, you had in mind? 
A  No. 
Q So as I understand what you're saying then, you really didn't have any specific 
plan for this property or for the plan when you adopted the Urban Renewal areas? 
A Not a specific plan. We would choose that when proposals came in." 
3
  
Mr. Valsamaki's counsel continued, asking Mr. Dombrowski specifically about the City's 
need for immediate possession of the Property:  
   "Q Is there any reason that it's necessary to have immediate possession? 
A Well, immediate possession to us means getting something going after 20-some 
years of non investment in the area or 30 years. It's a matter of trying to assemble the site, 
given the fact that we know it takes time to go through this kind of procedure with 
appraisals, et cetera, and relocation assistance in Mr. Valsamaki's case. So we  are 
looking for the most expeditious way to get development going and we deferred to the Law 
Department to tell us how to do that. 
Q I don't understand. If you haven't even started the RFP process, why it's 
necessary to have immediate possession, why you could [not] go the normal route and just 
have an ordinary condemnation in say six, nine months, something like that. I'm missing -- 
A We will have an RFP done in a matter of weeks if we know that we can move 
ahead on the property. 
Q You don't really know whether anybody's going to respond to the RFP, do you? 
                                                 
3
 Under these circumstances, an owner of a property who is resisting condemnation has no knowledge as to what use 
his or her property will be put. In fact, not only is a property owner lacking of this knowledge, but the City is 
ignorant of specific proposals as well. The parties will only know what the use will be when proposals are received 
and one is chosen. 
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A No, we never know that in advance."  
On May 19, 2006, the Honorable John Philip Miller issued a memorandum opinion and 
order for the Circuit Court:  
   "In considering the arguments and the evidence presented by the parties, this 
Court finds that [the City] fails to demonstrate sufficient grounds which warrant the 
findings of necessity requisite for the immediate taking. The [City] has failed to submit a 
focused development plan as it pertains to the Property in Interest, or even a Request for 
Proposal . . . supporting its contentions and establishing necessity required under § 21-16."  
In support of its conclusion, the trial court cited to the recent controversial United States 
Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S. Ct. 
2655, 162 L. Ed. 2d 439 (2005). The trial court acknowledged that under Kelo, "not only will 
economic development qualify as 'public use' for the purposes of eminent domain, but that also 
given 'a carefully considered development plan,' a plan that is comprehensive in nature and one 
that was preceded by thorough deliberation, a city's taking of private property will comport with 
the demands of the Fifth Amendment." After applying the Kelo holding to the matter at hand, 
however, the trial court found that it was "not satisfied that the [City] ha[d] demonstrated the 
necessity of the taking pursuant to any specifically outlined plan or contract, or as called for by § 
21-16 of the Public Local Laws of  Baltimore City." 
II. Discussion  
The City argued in the Circuit Court, and argues now on appeal, that it does not have the 
burden to prove necessity in order to proceed with a quick-take condemnation proceeding for 
immediate possession and title to a property. In  opposition, Mr. Valsamaki argues that § 21-16 
of the Public Local Laws of Baltimore City statutorily establishes a requirement that the City 
show why it is necessary for it to take immediate possession and title to property, and that in so 
doing the City must also show that any taking is for a public use consistent with Article XI-B of 
the Maryland Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution. 
Condemnation is a function of the State's power of eminent domain. Eminent domain is 
defined as "[t]he inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property, esp. 
land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking." Black's 
Law Dictionary 562 (8th ed. 2004). "[T]he power of eminent domain adheres to sovereignty and 
requires no constitutional authority for its existence." Lore v. Board of Public Works, 277 Md. 
356, 358, 354 A.2d 812, 814 (1976) (citing Riden v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co., 182 Md. 336, 
339, 35 A.2d 99, 100 (1943)). The power of eminent domain, however, is limited by both the 
Constitution of Maryland and the United States Constitution. The right to private property, and 
the protection of that right, is a bedrock principle of our constitutional republic. This is explicit in 
the federal constitution. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 states that, "No person shall . . . be 
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deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V  
As Justice Chase wrote for the Supreme Court in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 3 U.S. 386, 
1 L. Ed. 648 (1798):  
"An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first 
principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative 
authority. . . . A few instances will suffice to explain what I mean. . . . [A] law that takes 
property from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to 
entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they 
have done it. The genius, the nature, and the spirit, of our State Government, amount to a 
prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the general principles of law and reason forbid 
them. The Legislature . . . cannot . . . violate . . . the right of private property. To maintain 
that our Federal, or State, Legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been 
expressly restrained; would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether inadmissible in 
our free republican governments." 3 Dall. at 388-89 (emphasis deleted). 
Thus, it is evident that government, through its federal and various state legislatures, does 
not have the authority to take a private individual's property and convey it to another private 
individual for a purely private purpose.  
The State of Maryland's jurisprudence in this instance is very similar to that of the federal 
government. The Maryland Constitution provides that: "The General Assembly shall enact no 
Law authorizing private property, to be taken for public use, without just compensation, as 
agreed upon between the parties, or awarded by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to the party 
entitled to such compensation." Md. Const. art. III, § 40;  The Maryland Constitution, Article XI-
B, § 1, does, however, constitutionally provide specific authority for condemnation actions in 
Baltimore City:  
"The General Assembly of Maryland, by public local law, may authorize and 
empower the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore: 
(a) To acquire, within the boundary lines of Baltimore City, land and property of 
every kind, and any right, interest, franchise, easement or privilege therein, by purchase, 
lease, gift, condemnation or any other legal means, for development or redevelopment, 
including, but not limited to, the comprehensive renovation or rehabilitation thereof; and 
. . . 
All land or property needed, or taken by the exercise of the power of eminent 
domain, by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore for any of the aforementioned 
purposes or in connection with the exercise of any of the powers which may be granted to 
the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore pursuant to this Article is hereby declared to be 
needed or taken for public use." 14  
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The constitutional provisions in regard to quick-take condemnation actions in Baltimore 
City are effectuated, in a limited manner, by Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City, § 21-
16. Chapter 420 of the Acts of 1972. Section 21-16 provides the Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore with the authority to institute quick-take condemnation actions by filing "a Petition 
under oath stating that it is necessary for the City to have immediate possession of, or immediate 
title to and possession of, said property, and the reasons therefore." § 21-16(a) (emphasis 
added). The court may then grant immediate possession "[i]f it appears from a Petition for 
Immediate Possession, with or without supporting affidavits or sworn  testimony, that the public 
interest requires the City to have immediate possession of said property . . . ." § 21-16(d) . 
By requiring the City to establish under oath the immediacy of the need for quick-take 
condemnation (as opposed to regular condemnation), the Legislature has imposed the burden of 
proof upon the City to establish that immediate need -- not imposed a burden on the property 
owner to prove the contrary. Quick-take condemnation, as established by § 21-16, is to be 
utilized by the City only when the public interest demands that it is necessary for property to be 
immediately taken. It is not a power to be utilized for regular condemnation purposes. 
4
 
An "Immediate" Necessity  
The City asserts that "[t]his Court has held that the burden of proving lack of necessity in 
a quick take condemnation suit rests upon the party who objects to the proceeding. . . ." This 
argument, however, does not acknowledge the plain language of § 21-16 of the Public Local 
Laws  
In the case of regular condemnation, once the City establishes at least a minimal level of 
public use or purpose, judicial review may be thereafter limited to determining that the agency's 
decision is not so oppressive, arbitrary or unreasonable as to suggest bad faith; that, however, is 
not the case in assessing immediacy in a quick-take condemnation action in Baltimore City under 
§ 21-16. Rather, the court must also determine whether there is a necessity to justify an 
immediate taking and, in that determination, must be able to assess the reasons for the 
immediacy. Section 21-16 expressly requires the City to state reasons relating to immediacy, 
                                                 
4
 There is some indication from the record that the City, generally, may be misusing its quick-take condemnation 
power. Discussing when quick-take is used, the City's attorney stated at oral argument that: "We make a decision to 
take it by quick-take because we feel that the owner has been afforded every opportunity based upon the process we 
have in place." Additionally, at the hearing before the Circuit Court, the City's counsel made several statements 
concerning when it thought quick take was appropriate. The City stated: "I think that when negotiation has taken 
place over a few years, then quick take becomes the appropriate measure to take to acquire a property" and "I think 
that 21-16 [the quick-take statute] was actually set up so that when there was a glitch in the system to acquire 
property, that there would be another tool for acquisition..." 
Quick-take is not to be used simply because negotiations to purchase the property have failed. If the negotiation 
process has not resulted in the sale of a property, the City has the ability to initiate regular condemnation 
proceedings which provide all of the procedural due process protections that are absent from a quick-take 
condemnation proceeding. As indicated above, there is a distinction to be made between the two types of 
condemnation addressed in our case history: regular condemnation and quick-take condemnation.  
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thus the City has the burden not only to present a prima facie case of public use, but, 
additionally, in a quick-take action, the burden to establish the necessity for an immediate taking. 
In the case sub judice, the City did not satisfy the basic statutory mandate of § 21-16(a) of the 
Public Local Laws of Baltimore City.  
The trial court found, based upon these petitions, as well as from the testimony and 
exhibits introduced at the April 18, 2006, hearing, that the City failed "to demonstrate sufficient 
grounds which warrant the findings of necessity requisite for the immediate taking" of the 
Property. We agree with Judge Miller. 
It is important to note that the opportunities to challenge a condemnation are shortened 
and truncated when quick-take condemnation is used as opposed to regular condemnation. The 
court processes available to an owner under the quick-take are severely curtailed, as is well 
exhibited in the present case. The property owner was ordered out of possession of his property 
just six days from the time of the filing of the action and only learned that he was dispossessed 
when the order was served upon him. Then the time for him to respond was so short that he was 
not afforded time to conduct – or really to begin – discovery procedures in order to be able to 
address the issues of public use, necessity, or immediacy. Yet, the City did not at that time have 
present plans for the utilization of the Property and would only know what was to be done with 
the Property when private developers submitted proposals to it – which might be in an 
indeterminant future.  
The desire for the general assemblage of properties for urban renewal might be sufficient 
to justify the use of regular condemnation proceedings, but absent more specific and compelling 
evidence than was presented here, does not satisfy the immediacy and necessity requirements 
under quick-take condemnation. As quick-take is used in this instance by the City, it lends itself 
to the view that quick-take may be used primarily for the purpose of severely limiting the ability 
of property owners to resist condemnation. Such a use would violate the rights of property 
owners, fundamental rights that are protected by the Federal and State Constitutions. 
It is useful to understand some other important differences and effects between quick-
take condemnation and regular condemnation, especially as they relate to the exercise of eminent 
domain in respect to the taking of commercial or business properties. In regular condemnation, a 
taking authority files suit in court to condemn the property and, while the months (or years) long 
process goes on, the property owner maintains possession of his residence or business, operates it 
in the case of a business (albeit that the pendency of condemnation proceedings can adversely 
affect  that business, i.e., the ability to obtain financing, the ability to have credit extended to the 
business, and the like), or resides in it if a residence and, if ultimately, the property owner 
prevails on his or her lack of public use (or purpose) argument, his or her residence or business 
continues. 
When quick-take procedures are used, the taking entity obtains almost immediate 
possession of the property and in the process the business being conducted on the property, for 
all intents and purposes, is destroyed. Then, the quick-take process seriously circumscribes the 
procedural due process available in regular condemnation cases, a process in regular 
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condemnation that contemplates that a property owner have a full opportunity to at least mount 
an effective challenge to the public nature of the use or purpose behind the taking. Instead of 
having a full opportunity to challenge the justification of the condemning authority, in quick-take 
condemnations the property is taken and he or she is left to argue, primarily, only about 
compensation as the property is already gone. Even if down the road, six months, a year, 
whatever period of time, the property owner is able to meet the burden of challenging the 
intended public use of the property, the business itself is gone. The viable business, that he or she 
may have spent the better part of a lifetime building up, is gone. In many instances, an owner of 
a family (or other) business may be unable to simply start-up where he or she was before the 
condemning authority, via the quick-take process, destroyed the business. 
Even when residential properties are taken by quick-take condemnation, it will often be 
impossible to place the property owner in the pre-condemnation condition if the property owner 
ultimately were to prevail. By that time the owner's home may have been destroyed. It is 
impossible to put him or her back in a pre-quick-take position. 
In essence, quick-take procedures can be used inappropriately to destroy altogether the 
right of the property owner to challenge the public use prong of eminent domain which, although 
greatly circumscribed by various state and federal cases, remains as a viable aspect of the use of 
eminent domain powers, or otherwise the courts would be writing language out of the 
constitution by judicial fiat. 
The purpose of the quick-take power is for it to be used when the need for the public use 
is immediate. It was not conferred for the purpose of allowing a condemning authority to run 
"roughshod" over the owners of private property.  When that happens, or begins to happen, the 
property owner's recourse is to the courts. 
III. Conclusion  
For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that, pursuant to § 21-16 of the Public Local 
Laws of Baltimore City, the City failed to provide sufficient reasons for its immediate possession 
of and title to the subject Property. § 21-16(a). Without evidence that the continuing existence of 
a particular building or property is immediately injurious to the health and safety of the public, or 
is otherwise immediately needed for public use, there is no way to justify the need for immediate 
possession of the Property via quick-take condemnation proceedings. § 21-16(d). This is as 
opposed to offering a property owner the full process to which he or she is constitutionally due, 
via the exercise of the regular condemnation power. Therefore, we affirm the Circuit Court's 
denial of the City's petition for condemnation and petition for immediate possession and title. 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED. 
COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLANT. 
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UNITED STATES v. 0.073 ACRES OF LAND  
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 1902 (5
th
 Cir.) 
Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and KING and OWEN, Circuit Judges. 
PER CURIAM: 
In this eminent domain case, Appellant Mariner's Cove Townhomes Association appeals 
the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings for the United States. The district court 
held that the Association was not entitled to just compensation for the diminution of its 
assessment base resulting from the government's condemnation of fourteen properties in the 
Mariner's Cove Development. The question before us is whether the loss of the Association's 
right to collect assessments on those properties requires just compensation under the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. For the following reasons, we hold that this right was not 
compensable, and AFFIRM the district court's judgment. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
Mariner's Cove Development ("Mariner's Cove") is a residential community consisting of 
fifty-eight townhomes located near Lake Pontchartrain and the 17th Street Canal. The Mariner's 
Cove Townhomes Association ("MCTA") is a homeowner's association and non-profit 
corporation that provides residential services to the townhouses in Mariner's Cove. In exchange 
for the services provided, MCTA periodically collects assessments from each of the fifty-eight 
property owners pursuant to the "Declaration of Servitudes, Conditions and Restrictions of 
Mariner's Cove Townhomes Association, Inc." ("Declarations"), which was recorded on July 28, 
1977, and created servitudes and covenants, as well as other conditions and obligations that run 
with the land. The Declarations provide that each owner of a lot in Mariner's Cove pays a 
proportionate 1/58 share of the expense of maintenance, repair, replacement, administration, and 
operation of the properties in Mariner's Cove. 
Mariner's Cove suffered substantial damage from Hurricane Katrina. After Katrina, the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") began to repair and rehabilitate the levee 
adjacent to Mariner's Cove, and began to construct an improved pumping station at the 17th 
Street Canal. The Corps later determined that it needed to acquire fourteen of the fifty-eight units 
in Mariner's Cove to facilitate its access to the pumping station. 
While the government was negotiating the acquisition of those properties with their 
owners, MCTA claimed that it had an interest in those properties based upon the rights and 
obligations conferred by the Declarations. Specifically, MCTA claimed that it was entitled to just 
compensation for the loss of its right to collect assessments on the properties, as set forth in the 
Declarations. The government reached agreements with each of the landowners for the purchase 
of the fourteen properties, but did not resolve MCTA's claim. 
In June 2009, the government filed condemnation actions against each of the fourteen 
properties. The government named MCTA as a purported owner in each proceeding based on 
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MCTA's claimed interest. The district court issued an order in each proceeding granting the 
United States possession of the fourteen properties. It later consolidated the condemnation 
actions. 
After the government took possession of the properties, MCTA filed an answer to the 
government's complaints in condemnation.
 
 MCTA claimed that the government was obligated to 
pay the yearly assessments arising from the Declarations since the Corps's  occupation in 
September 2005, and for the reasonable lifetime of a townhomes association such as Mariner's 
Cove, as compensation for the diminution of its assessment base. In the alternative, MCTA 
claimed that it is entitled to a lump sum payment which, if invested conservatively and adjusted 
for inflation, is a principal amount capable of generating annual interest sufficient to make up the 
shortfall in funds owed. 
In response to the MCTA's answer, the government filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, arguing that MCTA had no continuing right to levy assessments on the condemned 
properties because the United States acquired perfect title to them under eminent domain. The 
government also argued that the losses MCTA claimed were not compensable under the Fifth 
Amendment because the losses were merely incidental to the taking, as MCTA had no ownership 
interest in the fourteen properties themselves. MCTA opposed and moved for partial summary 
judgment, requesting that the district court recognize MCTA's property rights and the obligation 
of the government to provide just compensation for the taking of these rights. 
The district court granted the government's motion, and consequently it dismissed 
MCTA's motion as moot. The district court found that "once the declaration of taking and the 
deposit for just compensation are filed, the property vests in the United States under the 
Declarations of Takings Act," and all existing possessory and ownership interests not specifically 
excepted are extinguished. Because the interests alleged by MCTA were not excepted, the 
district court found that MCTA had no present possessory interest in the condemned properties. 
The district court then turned to the question whether MCTA's interest in the assessments prior to 
the governmental taking was compensable under the Takings Clause. 
Observing that this circuit has not ruled whether the diminution of an assessment base is 
a compensable loss under  the Takings Clause, the district court considered the case upon which 
MCTA chiefly relies: Adaman Mutual Water Co. v. United States, 278 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1960). 
The district court ruled that MCTA failed to show that its interest was compensable because 
Adaman was inapposite, and because MCTA did not cite any case adopting the Adaman holding 
other than one factually similar to Adaman. Finally, the district court gave two reasons why 
Louisiana state law does not disturb the court's ruling that MCTA's interest was not 
compensable: (1) Louisiana courts have not "addressed whether building restrictions that require 
affirmative action, or building restrictions in general, are a compensable property interest," and 
(2) "federal law controls on the issue of compensability." 
The district court entered its judgment on November 18, 2011, and MCTA timely filed a 
notice of appeal. 
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
We review de novo a grant of judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(c). We look only to the pleadings and accept all allegations contained therein as 
true. The nonmovant, "must plead 'enough facts  to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.'" Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) "The central issue is whether, in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief."  
III. DISCUSSION  
This case presents a question of first impression in this circuit: whether the federal 
government must provide just compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
when it condemns property burdened by a plaintiff's right to collect assessments and thereby 
diminishes the plaintiff's assessment base. In granting the government's motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, the district court held that MCTA was not entitled to just compensation for the 
loss of its assessment base that resulted from the government's condemnation of properties in 
Mariner's Cove. We hold that MCTA's right to collect assessments is not a compensable property 
interest under the Constitution, and affirm the district court's judgment. 
A. Takings Clause Principles  
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be 
taken for public use without just compensation. "The critical terms are 'property,' 'taken' and 'just 
compensation.'" United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377, 65 S. Ct. 357, 89 L. Ed. 
311 (1945). 
Discussing the Constitution's use of the term "property," the General Motors Court 
stated: 
When the sovereign exercises the power of eminent domain it substitutes itself in 
relation to the physical thing in question in place of him who formerly bore the 
relation to that thing, which we denominate ownership. In other words, it deals 
with what lawyers term the individual's "interest" in the thing in question. . . . The 
constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may 
possess.  
"Though the meaning of 'property' . . . in the Fifth Amendment is a federal question, it 
will normally obtain its content by reference to local law." United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley 
Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943); ("[W]e are mindful of the basic axiom that '[p]roperty 
interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state 
law.'" (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161, 101 S. Ct. 
446, 66 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1980) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted))). Thus, Louisiana 
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law governs whether MCTA's right to collect assessments is a property interest. See United 
States v. 131.68 Acres of Land, 695 F.2d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 1983). 
The General Motors Court also expounded on the meaning of the term "taken" as it 
appears in the Takings Clause: 
In its primary meaning, the term "taken" would seem to signify something more 
than destruction, for it might well be claimed that one does not take what he 
destroys. But the construction of the phrase has not been so narrow. The courts 
have held that the deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion of a 
right or interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking. Governmental action short 
of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its effects are so complete as 
to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter, to amount 
to a taking.  
Contrary to the government's assertion at oral argument, we understand takings analysis 
to be centered on the deprivation of a former owner's property interest, and not on the accretion 
of that interest to the government. The Supreme Court in General Motors emphasized that a 
constitutional taking only occurs with respect to property, and not with collateral, non-property 
interests: 
whether the sovereign substitutes itself as occupant in place of the former owner, 
or destroys all his existing rights in the subject matter, the Fifth Amendment 
concerns itself solely with the "property," i.e., with the owner's relation as such to 
the physical thing and not with other collateral interests which may be incident to 
his ownership. 
In short, the government is required to provide just compensation if the interest for which 
compensation is sought is a property interest or right, and that interest has actually been taken.
1
  
B. MCTA's Right To Collect Assessments  
This case turns on whether MCTA's right to collect assessments is a compensable 
property right under the Takings Clause. This question has two parts: whether the right to collect 
assessments is a property right, and if so, whether it is compensable under the Takings Clause. 
 
                                                 
1
  The General Motors Court understood "just compensation" in ordinary cases to be the fair market value of the 
interest taken. 323 U.S. at 379 ("In the ordinary case, for want of a better standard, market value, so-called, is the 
criterion of that value."). 
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1. Intangible Property  
We begin by addressing whether MCTA's right to collect assessments is property. The 
district court, in its ruling, did not find that this right was not property, and the government has 
not argued to the contrary. Indeed, there is good reason to find that MCTA's right to collect 
assessments is property. 
Louisiana law suggests that this right is called a building restriction. First, it is necessary 
to explain what "building restriction" means in the language of Louisiana's civil law system. 
Under Louisiana law, building restrictions are "incorporeal immovables." La. Civ. Code art. 777. 
By logical inference from the definitions at hand, an intangible right that applies to a tract of land 
is an incorporeal immovable. 
In Tri-State Sand & Gravel, L.L.C. v. Cox, a Louisiana appeals court confirmed that 
under Louisiana law, one duty that building restrictions may impose on owners of real property 
is the affirmative duty to pay assessments. Thus, the right to collect assessments is a building 
restriction under Louisiana law, and by extension, an intangible (incorporeal) right. 
In common law terminology, building restrictions are real covenants.
2
  Thus, we find that 
MCTA's right is best understood as a building restriction, but more generally may be viewed—in 
terms of its common law analogue—as a real covenant. 
2. Compensability  
Having found that MCTA's right to collect assessments is a property interest, we now 
turn to the question whether it is compensable. One of the government's main arguments on 
appeal is that the loss of MCTA's assessment base was incidental to the condemnation, and thus 
barred by the consequential loss rule. We agree, and affirm the district court's judgment on this 
basis. 
a. The Consequential Loss Rule  
In General Motors, the Supreme Court explained the consequential loss rule as follows: 
The sovereign ordinarily takes the fee. The rule in such a case is that 
compensation for that interest does not include future loss of profits, the expense 
of moving removable fixtures and personal property from the premises, the loss of 
good-will which inheres in the location of the land, or other like consequential 
losses which would ensue the sale of the property to someone other than the 
                                                 
2
  The record indicates that MCTA's right to collect assessments was made appurtenant to the properties in Mariner's 
Cove through the Declarations. Thus, like real covenants generally, MCTA's right to collect assessments runs with 
the land.  
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sovereign. . . . [T]he courts have generally held that [such losses] are not to be 
reckoned as part of the compensation for the fee taken by the Government. . . . 
Even where state constitutions command that compensation be made for property 
"taken or damaged" for public use, as many do, it has generally been held that that 
which is taken or damaged is the group of rights which the so-called owner 
exercises in his dominion of the physical thing, and that damage to those rights of 
ownership does not include losses to his business or other consequential damage. 
The General Motors Court contrasted compensable losses of property ("rights of 
ownership") with noncompensable losses of interests other than property. In Adaman, the Ninth 
Circuit briefly described this rule as requiring that "the Government . . . pay for all tangible 
interests actually condemned and for intangible interests directly connected with the physical 
substance of the thing taken." Adaman, 278 F.2d at 845. 
We recognize that the cases the government cites in support of its argument do not 
concern losses of property. They concern business losses and frustration of contracts. See 
Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 343, 45 S. Ct. 293, 69 L. Ed. 644, 61 Ct. Cl. 1020 (1925) 
(destruction of a business growing and canning a variety of corn that grew on condemned land 
was not a compensable loss); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508-09, 43 
S. Ct. 437, 67 L. Ed. 773, 58 Ct. Cl. 707 (1923) (impairment of a commercial steel contract was 
not compensable); Bothwell v. United States, 254 U.S. 231, 232, 41 S. Ct. 74, 65 L. Ed. 238, 56 
Ct. Cl. 467 (1920) (loss resulting from a sale of cattle below fair market value after the 
construction of a government dam flooded farmland was not compensable); Hooten v. United 
States, 405 F.2d 1167, 1168 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (frustration of rent collection contracts 
resulting from condemnation of tenement properties was not compensable). Nevertheless, we 
find that the consequential loss rule applies because MCTA's right to collect assessments is a real 
covenant that functions like a contract and, in the words of the Adaman court, is not "directly 
connected with the physical substance of the [land]." 278 F.2d at 845. 
Neither this court nor Louisiana courts have ruled whether the right to collect 
assessments, or real covenants generally, are compensable under the Takings Clause. Nor is there 
relevant statutory law. Moreover, the decisions in other states addressing this question are legion 
and conflicting.. 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 5.07, p. 5-366-72 (3d ed. 2012). "The majority 
view holds that a restrictive covenant or equitable servitude constitutes property in the 
constitutional sense and must be compensated for if taken."  However, there is a strong minority 
view that these interests are not compensable. Several theories grounded in public policy 
concerns support the minority view.
8
 One such theory is rooted in the concern that private 
covenants might unduly burden the government's ability to exercise its power of eminent 
domain. Another theory is that real covenants are akin to contracts; that no contract of private 
persons can make acts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not directly 
encroaching upon private property, a taking; and that "contracts purporting to do this are void, as 
against public policy." United States v. Certain Lands (In re Newlin), 112 F. 622, aff'd, 153 F. 
876 (C.C.R.I. 1907). We share these concerns, and view the right to collect assessments, and 
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similar real covenants, as fundamentally different in the takings context from other compensable 
intangible property, such as easements. 
MCTA's right to collect assessments is an affirmative real covenant: the Declarations 
provide that landowners in Mariner's Cove must pay assessment fees, which MCTA is entitled to 
collect. These assessments enable MCTA to maintain Mariner's Cove. But MCTA's right is 
unlike recognized forms of compensable intangible property, such as easements, in that it is not 
directly connected with the physical substance of the properties on which the assessments are 
made. The nature of the covenant between MCTA and the landowners in Mariner's Cove is 
functionally contractual. But for its inclusion in the Declarations, the real covenant for which 
MCTA seeks compensation would amount to nothing more than a service contract between the 
landowners in Mariner's Cove and MCTA, with periodic assessments paid in exchange for the 
maintenance of communal property. Viewed in this way, this case mirrors the situations in the 
consequential loss cases cited by the government. 
We believe that recognizing MCTA's right as compensable under the Takings Clause 
would allow parties to recover from the government for condemnations that eliminate interests 
that do not stem from the physical substance of the land. This would unjustifiably burden the 
government's eminent domain power. In addition, if we were to recognize MCTA's right as 
compensable, we would give special status under the Takings Clause to what essentially is a 
contract, merely because it appears in a title document. Such a formality alone cannot justify 
requiring the government to compensate MCTA for the loss of its ability to collect assessments 
on the condemned properties. In the absence of apposite federal and state law, these concerns 
guide our decision. Thus, we hold that MCTA's right to collect assessments is not a compensable 
interest under the Takings Clause, and that MCTA was not entitled to compensation for the loss 
of its assessment base. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment. 
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Session 13. Inverse Condemnation 
PUMPELLY v. GREEN BAY CO. 
80 U.S. 166 (1871) 
Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court. 
[The] . . . plea . . . alleges that the legislature of Wisconsin, after it became a State, projected 
a system of improving the navigation of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers, which adopted the dam of 
Reid and Doty, then in process of construction, as part of that system; and that, under that act, a 
board of public works was established, which made such arrangements with Reid and Doty that 
they continued and completed the dam; and that, by subsequent legislation, changing the 
organization under which the work was carried on, the defendants finally became the owners of the 
dam, with such powers concerning the improvement of the navigation of the river as the legislature 
could confer in that regard.  But it does not appear that any statute made provision for compensation 
to the plaintiff, or those similarly injured, for damages to their lands.  So that the plea, as thus 
considered, presents substantially the defence that the State of Wisconsin, having, in the progress of 
its system of improving the navigation of the Fox River, authorized the erection of the dam as it 
now stands, without any provision for compensating the plaintiff for the injury which it does him, 
the defendant asserts the right, under legislative authority, to build and continue the dam without 
legal responsibility for those injuries. 
And counsel for the defendant, with becoming candor, argue that the damages of which the 
plaintiff complains are such as the State had a right to inflict in improving the navigation of the Fox 
River, without making any compensation for them. 
This requires a construction of the Constitution of Wisconsin; for though the Constitution of 
the United States provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation, it is well settled that this is a limitation on the power of the Federal government, and 
not on the States.  The Constitution of Wisconsin, however, has a provision almost identical in 
language, viz.: that “the property of no person shall be taken for public use without just 
compensation therefore.”  Indeed this limitation on the exercise of the right of eminent domain is so 
essentially a part of American constitutional law that it is believed that no State is now without it, 
and the only question that we are to consider is whether the injury to plaintiff’s property, as set forth 
in his declaration, is within its protection. 
The declaration states that, by reason of the dam, the water of the lake was so raised as to 
cause it to overflow all his land, and that the overflow remained continuously from the completion 
of the dam, in the year 1861, to the commencement of the suit in the year 1867, and the nature of 
the injuries set out in the declaration are such as show that it worked an almost complete destruction 
of the value of the land. 
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The argument of the defendant is that there is no taking of the land within the meaning of 
the constitutional provision, and that the damage is a consequential result of such use of a navigable 
stream as the government had a right to for the improvement of its navigation. 
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing a provision of 
constitutional law, always understood to have been adopted for protection and security to the rights 
of the individual as against the government, and which has received the commendation of jurists, 
statesmen, and commentators as placing the just principles of the common law on that subject 
beyond the power of ordinary legislation to change or control them, it shall be held that if the 
government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public it can 
destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect, 
subject it to total destruction without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of 
that word, it is not taken for the public use.  Such a construction would pervert the constitutional 
provisions into a restriction upon the rights of the citizen, as those rights stood at the common law, 
instead of the government, and make it an authority for invasion of private right under the pretext of 
the public good, which had no warrant in the laws or practices of our ancestors. 
In the case of Sinnickson v. Johnson, 2 Harrison, New Jersey, 129, the defendant had been 
authorized by an act of the legislature to shorten the navigation of Salem Creek by cutting a canal, 
and by building a dam across the stream.  The canal was well built, but the dam caused the water to 
overflow the plaintiff’s land, for which he brought suit.  Although the State of New Jersey then had 
no such provision in her constitution as the one cited from Wisconsin, the Supreme Court held the 
statute to be no protection to the action for damages.  Dayton, J., said “that this power to take 
private property reaches back of all constitutional provisions; and it seems to have been a settled 
principle of universal law that the right to compensation is an incident to the exercise of that power; 
that the one is inseparably connected with the other; that they may be said to exist, not as separate 
and distinct principles, but as parts of one and the same principle.”  For this proposition he cites 
numerous authorities, but the case is mainly valuable here as showing that overflowing land by 
backing the water on it was considered as “taking” it within the meaning of the principle. 
In the case of Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johnson’s Chancery, 162, Chancellor Kent granted 
an injunction to prevent the trustees of Newburgh from diverting the water of a certain stream 
flowing over plaintiff’s land from its usual course, because the act of the legislature which 
authorized it had made no provision for compensating the plaintiff for the injury thus done to his 
land.  And he did this though there was no provision in the Constitution of New York such as we 
have mentioned, and though he recognized that the water was taken for a public use.  After citing 
several continental jurists on this right of eminent domain, he says that while they admit that private 
property may be taken for public uses when public necessity or utility requires, they all lay it down 
as a clear principle of natural equity that the individual whose property is thus sacrificed must be 
indemnified.  And he adds that the principles and practice of the English government are equally 
explicit on this point.  It will be seen in this case that it was the diversion of the water from the 
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plaintiff’s land, which was considered as taking private property for public use, but which, under 
the argument of the defendant’s counsel, would, like overflowing the land, be called only a 
consequential injury. 
If these be correct statements of the limitations upon the exercise of the right of eminent 
domain, as the doctrine was understood before it had the benefit of constitutional sanction, by the 
construction now sought to be placed upon the Constitution it would become an instrument of 
oppression rather than protection to individual rights. 
We are not unaware of the numerous cases in the State courts in which the doctrine has been 
successfully invoked that for a consequential injury to the property of the individual arising from 
the prosecution of improvements of roads, streets, rivers, and other highways, for the public good, 
there is no redress; and we do not deny that the principle is a sound one, in its proper application, to 
many injuries to property so originating.  And when, in the exercise of our duties here, we shall be 
called upon to construe other State constitutions, we shall not be unmindful of the weight due to the 
decisions of the courts of those States.  But we are of opinion that the decisions referred to have 
gone to the uttermost limit of sound judicial construction in favor of this principle, and, in some 
cases, beyond it, and that it remains true that where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced 
additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so 
as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the 
Constitution, and that this proposition is not in conflict with the weight of judicial authority in this 
country, and certainly not with sound principle.  Beyond this we do not go, and this case calls us to 
go no further. 
We are, therefore, of opinion that the plea set up no valid defense, and that the demurrer to it 
should have been sustained. 
UNITED STATES v. CAUSBY 
328 U.S. 256 (1946) 
Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This is a case of first impression.  The problem presented is whether respondents’ property 
was taken, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, by frequent and regular flights of army and 
navy aircraft over respondents’ land at low altitudes.  The Court of Claims held that there was a 
taking and entered judgment for respondents, one judge dissenting.  104 Ct. Cls. 342, 60 F.Supp. 
751.  The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the 
importance of the question presented.  
Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina.  It has on 
it a dwelling house, and also various outbuildings which were mainly used for raising chickens. The 
end of the airport’s northwest-southeast runway is 2,220 feet from respondents’ barn and 2,275 feet 
from their house.  The path of glide to this runway passes directly over the property-- which is 100 
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feet wide and 1,200 feet long.  The 30 to 1 safe glide angle
1
 approved by the Civil Aeronautics 
Authority
2
 passes over this property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the 
barn and 18 feet above the highest tree.
3
 The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a 
lease executed in May, 1942, for a term commencing June 1, 1942 and ending June 30, 1942, with a 
provision for renewals until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national emergency, 
whichever is the earlier. 
Various aircraft of the United States use this airport–bombers, transports and fighters. The 
direction of the prevailing wind determines when a particular runway is used.  The northwest-
southeast runway in question is used about four per cent of the time in taking off and about seven 
per cent of the time in landing.  Since the United States began operations in May, 1942, its four-
motored heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier type, and its fighter planes have frequently 
passed over respondents’ land and buildings in considerable numbers and rather close together.  
They come close enough at times to appear barely to miss the tops of the trees and at times so close 
to the tops of the trees as to blow the old leaves off.  The noise is startling. And at night the glare 
from the planes brightly lights up the place.  As a result of the noise, respondents had to give up 
their chicken business.  As many as six to ten of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into 
the walls from fright.  The total chickens lost in that manner was about 150.  Production also fell 
off.  The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial chicken farm.  
Respondents are frequently deprived of their sleep and the family has become nervous and 
frightened.  Although there have been no airplane accidents on respondents’ property, there have 
been several accidents near the airport and close to respondents’ place. These are the essential facts 
found by the Court of Claims.  On the basis of these facts, it found that respondents’ property had 
depreciated in value.  It held that the United States had taken an easement over the property on June 
1, 1942, and that the value of the property destroyed and the easement taken was $2,000. 
I 
The United States relies on the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568, 49 U.S.C. §171, as 
amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, 49 U. S. C. §401.  Under those statutes 
the United States has “complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space” over this 
country.  49 U. S. C. §176 (a).  They grant any citizen of the United States “a public right of 
freedom of transit in air commerce through the navigable air space of the United States.”  49 U. S. 
C. §403.  And “navigable air space” is defined as “airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of 
flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.”  49 U.S.C. §180.  And it is provided that 
“such navigable airspace shall be subject to a public right of freedom of interstate and foreign air 
                                                 
1
 A 30 to 1 glide angle means one foot of elevation or descent for every 30 feet of horizontal distance. 
2
 Military planes are subject to the rules of the Civil Aeronautics Board where, as in the present case, there are no Army 
or Navy regulations to the contrary.  Cameron v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 140 F.2d 482. 
3
 The house is approximately 16 feet high, the barn 20 feet, and the tallest tree 65 feet. 
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navigation.” Id.  It is, therefore, argued that since these flights were within the minimum safe 
altitudes of flight which had been prescribed, they were an exercise of the declared right of travel 
through the airspace.  The United States concludes that when flights are made within the navigable 
airspace without any physical invasion of the property of the landowners, there has been no taking 
of property.  It says that at most there was merely incidental damage occurring as a consequence of 
authorized air navigation.  It also argues that the landowner does not own superadjacent airspace 
which he has not subjected to possession by the erection of structures or other occupancy.  
Moreover, it is argued that even if the United States took airspace owned by respondents, no 
compensable damage was shown.  Any damages are said to be merely consequential for which no 
compensation may be obtained under the Fifth Amendment. 
It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land extended to the periphery of 
the universe–Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum. But that doctrine has no place in the modern 
world.  The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared.  Were that not true, every 
transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. 
Common sense revolts at the idea.  To recognize such private airspace would clog these 
highways, seriously interfere with their control and development in the public interest, and transfer 
into private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim. 
But that general principle does not control the present case.  For the United States conceded 
on oral argument that if the flights over respondents’ property rendered it uninhabitable, there 
would be a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment.  It is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s 
gain, which is the measure of the value of the property taken. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369. 
Market value fairly determined is the normal measure of the recovery. Id.  And that value may 
reflect the use to which the land could readily be converted, as well as the existing use.  United 
States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 275, and cases cited.  If, by reason of the frequency and altitude 
of the flights, respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. It 
would be as complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken 
exclusive possession of it. 
We agree that in those circumstances there would be a taking.  Though it would be only an 
easement of flight which was taken, that easement, if permanent and not merely temporary, 
normally would be the equivalent of a fee interest.  It would be a definite exercise of complete 
dominion and control over the surface of the land.  The fact that the planes never touched the 
surface would be as irrelevant as the absence in this day of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer 
of real estate.  The owner’s right to possess and exploit the land–that is to say, his beneficial 
ownership of it–would be destroyed.  In the supposed case, the line of flight is over the land.  And 
the land is appropriated as directly and completely as if it was used for the runways themselves. 
There is no material difference between the supposed case and the present one, except that 
here enjoyment and use of the land are not completely destroyed.  But that does not seem to us to be 
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controlling.  The path of glide for airplanes might reduce a valuable factory site to grazing land, an 
orchard to a vegetable patch, a residential section to a wheat field.  Some value would remain.  But 
the use of the airspace immediately above the land would limit the utility of the land and cause a 
diminution in its value. 
The fact that the path of glide taken by the planes was that approved by the Civil 
Aeronautics Authority does not change the result.  The navigable airspace which Congress has 
placed in the public domain is “airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by 
the Civil Aeronautics Authority.”  49 U.S.C. §180.  If that agency prescribed 83 feet as the 
minimum safe altitude, then we would have presented the question of the validity of the regulation.  
But nothing of the sort has been done.  The path of glide governs the method of operating-- of 
landing or taking off.  The altitude required for that operation is not the minimum safe altitude of 
flight which is the downward reach of the navigable airspace.  The minimum prescribed by the 
Authority is 500 feet during the day and 1,000 feet at night for air carriers (Civil Air Regulations, 
Pt. 61, §§61.7400, 61.7401, Code Fed. Reg. Cum. Supp., Title 14, ch. 1), and from 300 feet to 1,000 
feet for other aircraft, depending on the type of plane and the character of the terrain.  Id., Pt. 60, 
§§60.350-60.3505, Fed. Reg. Cum. Supp., supra.  Hence, the flights in question were not within the 
navigable airspace which Congress placed within the public domain.  If any airspace needed for 
landing or taking off were included, flights which were so close to the land as to render it 
uninhabitable would be immune.  But the United States concedes, as we have said, that in that event 
there would be a taking. Thus, it is apparent that the path of glide is not the minimum safe altitude 
of flight within the meaning of the statute.  The Civil Aeronautics Authority has, of course, the 
power to prescribe air traffic rules.  But Congress has defined navigable airspace only in terms of 
one of them–the minimum safe altitudes of flight. 
We have said that the airspace is a public highway.  Yet it is obvious that if the landowner is 
to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the 
enveloping atmosphere.  Otherwise buildings could not be erected, trees could not be planted, and 
even fences could not be run.  The principle is recognized when the law gives a remedy in case 
overhanging structures are erected on adjoining land.  The landowner owns at least as much of the 
space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land. See Hinman v. Pacific 
Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755. The fact that he does not occupy it in a physical sense–by the erection 
of buildings and the like–is not material.  As we have said, the flight of airplanes, which skim the 
surface but do not touch it, is as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional 
entry upon it.  We would not doubt that, if the United States erected an elevated railway over 
respondents’ land at the precise altitude where its planes now fly, there would be a partial taking, 
even though none of the supports of the structure rested on the land. The reason is that there would 
be an intrusion so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner’s full enjoyment of the 
property and to limit his exploitation of it.  While the owner does not in any physical manner 
occupy that stratum of airspace or make use of it in the conventional sense, he does use it in 
somewhat the same sense that space left between buildings for the purpose of light and air is used.  
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The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land that continuous invasions of it 
affect the use of the surface of the land itself.  We think that the landowner, as an incident to his 
ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions of it are in the same category as invasions of the 
surface. 
We said in United States v. Powelson, supra, p. 279, that while the meaning of “property” as 
used in the Fifth Amendment was a federal question, “it will normally obtain its content by 
reference to local law.” If we look to North Carolina law, we reach the same result.  Sovereignty in 
the airspace rests in the State “except where granted to and assumed by the United States.” N.C. 
Gen. Stats 1943, §63-11. The flight of aircraft is lawful “unless at such a low altitude as to interfere 
with the then existing use to which the land or water, or the space over the land or water, is put by 
the owner, or unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on 
the land or water beneath.”  Id., §63-13.  Subject to that right of flight, “ownership of the space 
above the lands and waters of this State is declared to be vested in the several owners of the surface 
beneath . . .”  Id., §63-12.  Our holding that there was an invasion of respondents’ property is thus 
not inconsistent with the local law governing a landowner’s claim to the immediate reaches of the 
superadjacent airspace. 
The airplane is part of the modern environment of life, and the inconveniences which it 
causes are normally not compensable under the Fifth Amendment.  The airspace, apart from the 
immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain.  We need not determine at this time 
what those precise limits are.  Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and 
so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.  We 
need not speculate on that phase of the present case.  For the findings of the Court of Claims plainly 
establish that there was a diminution in value of the property and that the frequent, low-level flights 
were the direct and immediate cause.  We agree with the Court of Claims that a servitude has been 
imposed upon the land. 
III 
The Court of Claims held, as we have noted, that an easement was taken.  But the findings 
of fact contain no precise description as to its nature.  It is not described in terms of frequency of 
flight, permissible altitude, or type of airplane.  Nor is there a finding as to whether the easement 
taken was temporary or permanent.  Yet an accurate description of the property taken is essential, 
since that interest vests in the United States. United States v. Cress, supra, 328-329 and cases cited. 
Since on this record it is not clear whether the easement taken is a permanent or a temporary 
one, it would be premature for us to consider whether the amount of the award made by the Court of 
Claims was proper. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of Claims so that it may 
make the necessary findings in conformity with this opinion. 
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Reversed. 
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting. 
The Fifth Amendment provides that “private property” shall not “be taken for public use 
without just compensation.” The Court holds today that the Government has “taken” respondents’ 
property by repeatedly flying Army bombers directly above respondents’ land at a height of 
eighty-three feet where the light and noise from these planes caused respondents to lose sleep and 
their chickens to be killed.  Since the effect of the Court’s decision is to limit, by the imposition of 
relatively absolute constitutional barriers, possible future adjustments through legislation and 
regulation which might become necessary with the growth of air transportation, and since in my 
view the Constitution does not contain such barriers, I dissent. 
Mr. Justice Burton joins in this dissent. 
UNITED STATES v. CLARKE  
445 U.S. 253 (1980) 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. 
There are important legal and practical differences between an inverse condemnation suit 
and a condemnation proceeding.  Although a landowner’s action to recover just compensation for a 
taking by physical intrusion has come to be referred to as “inverse” or “reverse” condemnation, the 
simple terms “condemn” and “condemnation” are not commonly used to describe such an action.  
Rather, a “condemnation” proceeding is commonly understood to be an action brought by a 
condemning authority such as the Government in the exercise of its power of eminent domain.  In 
United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903), for example, which held that the Federal 
Government’s permanent flooding of the plaintiff’s land constituted a compensable “taking” under 
the Fifth Amendment, this Court consistently made separate reference to condemnation proceedings 
and to the landowner’s cause of action to recover damages for the taking.  Id., at 462, 467, 468. 
More recent decisions of this Court reaffirm this well-established distinction between 
condemnation actions and physical takings by governmental bodies that may entitle a landowner to 
sue for compensation.  Thus, in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 291 (1958), 
when discussing the acquisition by the Government of property rights necessary to carry out a 
reclamation project, this Court stated that such rights must be acquired by “paying just 
compensation therefore, either through condemnation or, if already taken, through action of the 
owners in the courts.”  And in United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749 (1947), this Court 
referred to the Government’s choice “not to condemn land but to bring about a taking by a 
continuous process of physical events.” See also id., at 747-748; Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 619 
(1963). 
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The phrase “inverse condemnation” appears to be one that was coined simply as a shorthand 
description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his 
property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted.  As defined by one land use 
planning expert, “[inverse] condemnation is ‘a cause of action against a governmental defendant to 
recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even 
though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking 
agency.’”  D. Hagman, Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law 328 (1971) (emphasis 
added).   A landowner is entitled to bring such an action as a result of “the self-executing character 
of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation . . . .”  See 6 P. Nichols, Eminent 
Domain §25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972).  A condemnation proceeding, by contrast, typically involves an 
action by the condemnor to effect a taking and acquire title.  The phrase “inverse condemnation,” as 
a common understanding of that phrase would suggest, simply describes an action that is the 
“inverse” or “reverse” of a condemnation proceeding. 
There are also important practical differences between condemnation proceedings and 
actions by landowners to recover compensation for “inverse condemnation.”  Condemnation 
proceedings, depending on the applicable statute, require various affirmative action on the part of 
the condemning authority.  To accomplish a taking by seizure, on the other hand, a condemning 
authority need only occupy the land in question.  Such a taking thus shifts to the landowner the 
burden to discover the encroachment and to take affirmative action to recover just compensation. 
And in the case of Indian trust lands, which present the Government “‘with an almost staggering 
problem in attempting to discharge its trust obligations with respect to thousands upon thousands of 
scattered Indian allotments,’” Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 374 (1968), the United 
States may be placed at a significant disadvantage by this shifting of the initiative from the 
condemning authority to the condemnee. 
Likewise, the choice of the condemning authority to take property by physical invasion 
rather than by a formal condemnation action may also have important monetary consequences. The 
value of property taken by a governmental body is to be ascertained as of the date of taking. United 
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).  In a condemnation proceeding, the taking generally 
occurs sometime during the course of the proceeding, and thus compensation is based on a 
relatively current valuation of the land.  See 1 L. Orgel, Valuation in Eminent Domain §21, n. 29 
(2d ed. 1953).  When a taking occurs by physical invasion, on the other hand, the usual rule is that 
the time of the invasion constitutes the act of taking, and “[it] is that event which gives rise to the 
claim for compensation and fixes the date as of which the land is to be valued . . . .” United States v. 
Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 22 (1958). 
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LORETTO v. TELEPROMPTER MANHATTAN CATV CORP. 
458 U.S. 419 (1982) 
Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C.J., and Powell, 
Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined.  Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
Brennan and White, JJ., joined. 
Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a minor but permanent physical occupation of an 
owner’s property authorized by government constitutes a “taking” of property for which just 
compensation is due under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.  New York 
law provides that a landlord must permit a cable television company to install its cable facilities 
upon his property.  In this case, the cable installation occupied portions of appellant’s roof and the 
side of her building.  The New York Court of Appeals ruled that this appropriation does not amount 
to a taking.  53 N. Y. 2d 124, 423 N. E. 2d 320 (1981).  Because we conclude that such a physical 
occupation of property is a taking, we reverse. 
I 
Appellant Jean Loretto purchased a five-story apartment building located at 303 West 105th 
Street, New York City, in 1971.  The previous owner had granted appellees Teleprompter Corp. and 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV (collectively Teleprompter) permission to install a cable on the 
building and the exclusive privilege of furnishing cable television (CATV) services to the tenants.  
The New York Court of Appeals described the installation as follows: 
“On June 1, 1970 TelePrompter installed a cable slightly less than one-half inch in 
diameter and of approximately 30 feet in length along the length of the building 
about 18 inches above the roof top, and directional taps, approximately 4 inches by 4 
inches by 4 inches, on the front and rear of the roof.  By June 8, 1970 the cable had 
been extended another 4 to 6 feet and cable had been run from the directional taps to 
the adjoining building at 305 West 105th Street.”  Id. at 135, 423 N. E. 2d, at 324. 
Teleprompter also installed two large silver boxes along the roof cables.  The cables are 
attached by screws or nails penetrating the masonry at approximately two-foot intervals, and other 
equipment is installed by bolts. 
Initially, Teleprompter’s roof cables did not service appellant’s building.  They were part of 
what could be described as a cable “highway” circumnavigating the city block, with service cables 
periodically dropped over the front or back of a building in which a tenant desired service. Crucial 
to such a network is the use of so-called “crossovers”- cable lines extending from one building to 
another in order to reach a new group of tenants.  Two years after appellant purchased the building, 
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Teleprompter connected a “noncrossover” line– i.e., one that provided CATV service to appellant’s 
own tenants– by dropping a line to the first floor down the front of appellant’s building. 
To facilitate tenant access to CATV, the State of New York enacted §828 of the Executive 
Law, effective January 1, 1973.  Section 828 provides that a landlord may not “interfere with the 
installation of cable television facilities upon his property or premises,” and may not demand 
payment from any tenant for permitting CATV, or demand payment from any CATV company” in 
excess of any amount which the [State Commission on Cable Television] shall, by regulation, 
determine to be reasonable.”  The landlord may, however, require the CATV company or the tenant 
to bear the cost of installation and to indemnify for any damage caused by the installation. Pursuant 
to §828(1)(b), the State Commission has ruled that a one-time $1 payment is the normal fee to 
which a landlord is entitled.  The Commission ruled that this nominal fee, which the Commission 
concluded was equivalent to what the landlord would receive if the property were condemned 
pursuant to New York’s Transportation Corporations Law, satisfied constitutional requirements “in 
the absence of a special showing of greater damages attributable to the taking.”  Statement of 
General Policy, App. 52. 
Appellant did not discover the existence of the cable until after she had purchased the 
building.  She brought a class action against Teleprompter in 1976 on behalf of all owners of real 
property in the State on which Teleprompter has placed CATV components, alleging that 
Teleprompter’s installation was a trespass and, insofar as it relied on §828, a taking without just 
compensation.  She requested damages and injunctive relief.  The Court of Appeals, over dissent, 
upheld the statute.  53 N.Y. 2d 124, 423 N. E. 2d 320 (1981).  The court then ruled that the law 
serves a legitimate police power purpose–eliminating landlord fees and conditions that inhibit the 
development of CATV, which has important educational and community benefits.  Rejecting the 
argument that a physical occupation authorized by government is necessarily a taking, the court 
stated that the regulation does not have an excessive economic impact upon appellant when 
measured against her aggregate property rights, and that it does not interfere with any reasonable 
investment-backed expectations.  Accordingly, the court held that §828 does not work a taking of 
appellant’s property. 
In light of its holding, the Court of Appeals had no occasion to determine whether the $1 fee 
ordinarily awarded for a non-crossover installation was adequate compensation for the taking. We 
noted probable jurisdiction. 454 U.S. 938 (1981). 
II 
The Court of Appeals determined that §828 serves the legitimate public purpose of “rapid 
development of and maximum penetration by a means of communication which has important 
educational and community aspects,” 53 N. Y. 2d, at 143-144, 423 N. E. 2d, at 329, and thus is 
within the State’s police power.  We have no reason to question that determination.  It is a separate 
question, however, whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights that 
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compensation must be paid.  See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 
127-128. We conclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking 
without regard to the public interests that it may serve.  Our constitutional history confirms the rule, 
recent cases do not question it, and the purposes of the Takings Clause compel its retention. 
A 
When faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupation of real 
property, this Court has invariably found a taking.  This Court has consistently distinguished 
between flooding cases involving a permanent physical occupation, on the one hand, and cases 
involving a more temporary invasion, or government action outside the owner’s property that 
causes consequential damages within, on the other.  A taking has always been found only in the 
former situation.  See United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 468-470 (1903). More recent cases 
confirm the distinction between a permanent physical occupation, a physical invasion short of an 
occupation, and a regulation that merely restricts the use of property.  In United States v. Causby, 
328 U.S. 256 (1946), the Court ruled that frequent flights immediately above a landowner’s 
property constituted a taking. 
Although this Court’s most recent cases have not addressed the precise issue before us, they 
have emphasized that physical invasion cases are special and have not repudiated the rule that any 
permanent physical occupation is a taking.  The cases state or imply that a physical invasion is 
subject to a balancing process, but they do not suggest that a permanent physical occupation would 
ever be exempt from the Takings Clause. 
In short, when the “character of the governmental action,” is a permanent physical 
occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, 
without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal 
economic impact on the owner. 
B 
The historical rule that a permanent physical occupation of another’s property is a taking has 
more than tradition to commend it.  Such an appropriation is perhaps the most serious form of 
invasion of an owner’s property interests.  To borrow a metaphor, . . . the government does not 
simply take a single “strand” from the “bundle” of property rights: it chops through the bundle, 
taking a slice of every strand. 
Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights “to possess, use and 
dispose of it.”  United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). To the extent that 
the government permanently occupies physical property, it effectively destroys each of these rights.  
First, the owner has no right to possess the occupied space himself, and also has no power to 
exclude the occupier from possession and use of the space.  The power to exclude has traditionally 
been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.  See 
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Restatement of Property §7 (1936).  Second, the permanent physical occupation of property forever 
denies the owner any power to control the use of the property; he not only cannot exclude others, 
but can make no non-possessory use of the property.  Finally, even though the owner may retain the 
bare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer or sale, the permanent occupation of 
that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the right of any value, since the purchaser will also be 
unable to make any use of the property. 
Finally, whether a permanent physical occupation has occurred presents relatively few 
problems of proof.  The placement of a fixed structure on land or real property is an obvious fact 
that will rarely be subject to dispute.  Once the fact of occupation is shown, of course, a court 
should consider the extent of the occupation as one relevant factor in determining the compensation 
due.  For that reason, moreover, there is less need to consider the extent of the occupation in 
determining whether there is a taking in the first instance. 
C 
Teleprompter’s cable installation on appellant’s building constitutes a taking under the 
traditional test.  The installation involved a direct physical attachment of plates, boxes, wires, bolts, 
and screws to the building, completely occupying space immediately above and upon the roof and 
along the building’s exterior wall.  Finally, we do not agree with appellees that application of the 
physical occupation rule will have dire consequences for the government’s power to adjust 
landlord-tenant relationships.  This Court has consistently affirmed that States have broad power to 
regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant relationship in particular without 
paying compensation for all economic injuries that such regulation entails. Consequently, our 
holding today in no way alters the analysis governing the State’s power to require landlords to 
comply with building codes and provide utility connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire 
extinguishers, and the like in the common area of a building. 
III 
Our holding today is very narrow.  We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent physical 
occupation of property is a taking.  In such a case, the property owner entertains a historically 
rooted expectation of compensation, and the character of the invasion is qualitatively more intrusive 
than perhaps any other category of property regulation.  We do not, however, question the equally 
substantial authority upholding a State’s broad power to impose appropriate restrictions upon an 
owner’s use of his property. 
Furthermore, our conclusion that §828 works a taking of a portion of appellant’s property 
does not presuppose that the fee which many landlords had obtained from Teleprompter prior to the 
law’s enactment is a proper measure of the value of the property taken.  The issue of the amount of 
compensation that is due, on which we express no opinion, is a matter for the state courts to 
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consider on remand.  The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan and Justice White join, dissenting. 
If the Court’s decisions construing the Takings Clause state anything clearly, it is that 
“[there] is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins.”  Goldblatt v. 
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). 
In a curiously anachronistic decision, the Court today acknowledges its historical disavowal 
of set formulae in almost the same breath as it constructs a rigid per se takings rule: “a permanent 
physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that 
it may serve.”  To sustain its rule against our recent precedents, the Court erects a strained and 
untenable distinction between “temporary physical invasions,” whose constitutionality concededly 
“is subject to a balancing process,” and “permanent physical occupations,” which are “[takings] 
without regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily examine.” 
In my view, the Court’s approach “reduces the constitutional issue to a formalistic quibble” 
over whether property has been “permanently occupied” or “temporarily invaded.” Sax, Takings 
and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 37 (1964).  The Court’s application of its formula to the facts 
of this case vividly illustrates that its approach is potentially dangerous as well as misguided.  I 
therefore respectfully dissent. 
RIDGE LINE, INC v. UNITED STATES 
346 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
JUDGES: Before MICHEL, CLEVENGER, and BRYSON, Circuit Judges. 
MICHEL, Circuit Judge. 
Ridge Line, Inc. appeals from a judgment following trial by the United States Court of 
Federal Claims, Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 2002 U.S. Claims LEXIS 240, No. 98-CV-929 
(Fed. Cl. Sept. 4, 2002), holding that increased storm drainage caused by the construction of a 
Postal Service facility and associated parking lots and driveways did not constitute a taking of any 
real property interest of Ridge Line that would justify compensation under the Takings Clause of 
the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. V. The trial court found that the affected portion 
of Ridge Line's land, a ravine known as South Hollow, was not effectually destroyed nor suffered a 
permanent and exclusive occupation by the increased runoff from the federal land uphill from Ridge 
Line's property and that in any event Ridge Line failed to demonstrate quantified damages for any 
erosion injury to South Hollow or diminished resale value thereof. Because the trial court failed to 
address whether the increased storm drainage constituted a taking of a flowage easement by inverse 
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condemnation as expressly argued by Ridge Line we vacate the trial court's judgment and remand 
for further analysis and decision consistent with this opinion. 
BACKGROUND  
West Virginia is so mountainous that land development often leads to greatly increased flow 
and velocity of storm water runoff due to the reduced capacity of water absorption by the developed 
property. Ridge Line owns land on which is located Southridge Centre, the largest shopping center 
and mixed-use commercial development in West Virginia. In 1991, the government purchased a 
piece of property adjacent to and uphill from the shopping center to build a United States Postal 
Service facility. Storm water from both the Postal Service property and Southridge Centre drains 
into South Hollow, which lies between the Postal Service property and the shopping center. At the 
time the Postal Service developed its property, Ridge Line owned only a portion of South Hollow. 
In the years following the construction of the Postal Service facility, other portions of South Hollow 
were also acquired by Ridge Line. 
When the Postal Service facility was completed in late 1993, storm water runoff into South 
Hollow sharply increased due to the construction of impervious surfaces on much of the 
government land. Evidence was offered that the development increased the storm runoff by 70-
150%. According to Ridge Line's evidence, approximately 80% of post-development runoff into 
South Hollow in 1993 was coming from the Postal Service property as opposed to Ridge Line's 
property. Although the Postal Service facility included a drainage swale and drains and the Postal 
Service constructed a check dam on Ridge Line's property in South Hollow to control runoff, Ridge 
Line notes that storm water runoff into South Hollow became so extreme that it began to receive 
complaints of flooding from downstream neighbors, including a homeowner along Davis Creek 
which is fed by the effluent from South Hollow. 
In 1993, Ridge Line built a storm water detention pond in South Hollow. Ridge Line claims 
that it was forced to construct the water detention facilities much earlier and on a larger scale than 
would have been required without the increased runoff caused by the government development. It 
asked the Postal Service to share in the cost of constructing the detention facilities. However, 
negotiation failed over the issue of the amount of the government's contribution. In the end, the 
government refused to pay anything. Ridge Line then sued the government in the Court of Federal 
Claims on December 19, 1998 claiming that the additional water flow caused by the development of 
the Postal Service facility constituted a taking by the government of a flowage easement entitling it 
to compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. The taking was alleged 
to have occurred in 1993. Ridge Line sought the costs it has incurred to deal with the government's 
runoff and reasonably projected costs to be incurred in the future. 
Between 1994 and 2000, Ridge Line expanded the shopping center with more recreational 
facilities. It also built new, larger storm water management facilities in South Hollow. Even more 
recently, Ridge Line added additional landfill to South Hollow, covering the original storm water 
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detention pond and most or all of the portions of South Hollow that it claims were damaged by the 
erosion caused by storm water discharge from the Postal Service property. 
The trial court, after a site inspection in 2002 and a two-and-a-half-day trial, found that the 
Postal Service development created at least a 70% increase in storm drainage onto Ridge Line's 
property. However, the trial court found that while the water might have "invaded" Ridge Line's 
property from time to time, the invasion was not sufficient to establish government "possession." 
The court found also that Ridge Line did not suffer a permanent and exclusive occupation by the 
government that destroyed its possession, use, or disposal of its property.  After the trial court 
entered judgment for the government, Ridge Line timely appealed to this court.  
DISCUSSION 
A determination of whether a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment has occurred 
is a question of law based on factual underpinnings. Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1456 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, we review the trial court's legal analysis and conclusion de novo and its fact-
findings for clear error. Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 133 F.3d 893, 895 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
I 
Despite Ridge Line's contention that the taking in this case was the appropriation of a 
flowage easement by inverse condemnation, the trial court confined its analysis of liability to 
whether the government's actions constituted a "permanent and exclusive occupation." A permanent 
and exclusive physical occupation of private land by or on the authority of the government is one 
incontestable case for compensation under the Takings Clause. However, a permanent occupation 
need not exclude the property owner to be compensable as a taking. See, e.g., Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436-38, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868, 102 S. Ct. 3164 
(1982) (holding that a compulsory installation of cables on apartment buildings pursuant to a state 
statute constituted a taking). Nor must the occupation be continuous.  
It is well established that the government may not take an easement without just 
compensation. United States v. Dickinson (1947).  Similarly, government actions may not impose 
upon a private landowner a flowage easement without just compensation. In Dickinson, the 
government, in building a dam, raised the water level of a river, causing permanent flooding, 
erosion, and intermittent flooding of abutting landowners.  Before the trial court, whose decision 
was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the Dickinson 
landowners recovered judgments for the value of easements taken by the government to 
permanently flood parts of their lands, damages for erosion of the residues of their lands adjoining 
the flooded portions based on the cost of protective measures the landowners might have taken to 
prevent the erosion loss, and the value of easements for intermittent flooding of still other parts of 
their lands. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and affirmed all of the damages awarded to the 
landowners. Dickinson.  
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Three points made by the Supreme Court in Dickinson are particularly relevant to the 
present case. First, the Court affirmed the judgment and the value assessed for the government's 
taking of an easement by inverse condemnation for intermittent flooding of land.  Second, the Court 
held that a landowner's reclaiming his land did not disentitle him to be compensated for the original 
taking committed by the government.  Third, regarding the compensation awarded for land erosion, 
the Court held that "if the resulting erosion which, as a practical matter, constituted part of the 
taking was in fact preventable by prudent measures, the cost of that prevention is a proper basis for 
determining the damage, as the courts below held."  
In the present case, the trial court referred to Dickinson, but only in the context of rejecting 
the government's argument that Ridge Line's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial 
court acknowledged that Dickinson involved a takings claim for "damages caused by intermittent 
flooding due to a dam's being built" and that "erosion caused by flooding [was] the cause of action." 
It apparently recognized that Dickinson involved inverse condemnation.  However, the trial court 
failed to discuss the relevance of Dickinson to the merits – not just the timeliness – of Ridge Line's 
claim for the taking of a flowage easement.  
II 
Turning to the present case, Ridge Line claims that the increased storm water runoff caused 
by the Postal Service development constituted the government's taking of a water flowage easement 
in 1993 and just compensation for the taking is a proportional share of the cost in building, 
expanding and maintaining the flood control system in South Hollow. The trial court failed to 
address Ridge Line's claim for inverse condemnation of a flowage easement even though it was so 
presented. This was error.  
The trial court thus erred in requiring that to recover Ridge Line must show that its property 
was "'effectually destroyed'" or suffered a "'permanent and exclusive occupation by the government 
that destroyed the owner's right to possession.'" Ridge Line, (quoting Loretto). Dickinson, in 
holding that intermittent flooding of private land can constitute a taking of an easement, clearly 
established that permanent destruction or exclusive occupation by government runoff is not always 
required for a successful takings claim. Further, the trial court erred in stating that Ridge Line 
suffered no loss of use, possession, or value of its property because most of the area complained of 
as eroded by government runoff was later filled and altered. As Dickinson held, a landowner's 
reclaiming his land does not disentitle him to be compensated for the original taking by the 
government. Thus, although the trial court seems to have properly determined that no taking 
occurred due to permanent and exclusive physical occupation by the government,  it failed to 
address Ridge Line's principal contention: whether the increased water runoff constituted a taking of 
a flowage easement by inverse condemnation. We therefore vacate and remand for analysis of the 
evidence in accordance with the taking of a flowage easement by inverse condemnation. 
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III 
Ridge Line's assertion of a claim for inverse condemnation invokes a two-part analysis. 
First, Ridge Line must establish that treatment under takings law, as opposed to tort law, is 
appropriate under the circumstances. See Barnes v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. 467, 538 F.2d 865, 
870 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (distinguishing between torts and takings; noting that "Government-induced 
flooding not proved to be inevitably recurring occupies the category of mere consequential injury, 
or tort"). The tort-taking inquiry in turn requires consideration of whether the effects Ridge Line 
experienced were the predictable result of the government's action, and whether the government's 
actions were sufficiently substantial to justify a takings remedy. If these inquiries reveal that a 
takings remedy is potentially available, Ridge Line must show that it possessed a protectable 
property interest in what it alleges the government has taken.  
IV 
A 
"Inverse condemnation law is tied to, and parallels, tort law." 9 PATRICK J. ROHAN & 
MELVIN A. RESKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §  34.03[1] (3d ed. 1980 & Supp. 
2002). Thus, not every "invasion" of private property resulting from government activity amounts to 
an appropriation. Id. The line distinguishing potential physical takings from possible torts is drawn 
by a two-part inquiry. First, a property loss compensable as a taking only results when the 
government intends to invade a protected property interest or the asserted invasion is the "direct, 
natural, or probable result of an authorized activity and not the incidental or consequential injury 
inflicted by the action." Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 445, 132 F. Supp. 
707, 709 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (holding that a claim for the loss of fruit trees resulting from the 
contamination of a spring resulting from the combination of the government's discharge of water 
into a nearby lake and unprecedented rainfall was compensable, if at all, as a tort, not a taking); 
Owen v. United States, 851 F.2d 1404, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (remanding for a 
determination of whether the claimant's property loss flowed from "an intention to do an act the 
natural consequence of which was to take [the] property" or "was such an indirect consequence of 
[the government's action] as not to be a compensable taking"). Second, the nature and magnitude of 
the government action must be considered. Even where the effects of the government action are 
predictable, to constitute a taking, an invasion must appropriate a benefit to the government at the 
expense of the property owner, or at least preempt the owner's right to enjoy his property for an 
extended period of time, rather than merely inflict an injury that reduces its value.  
Here, since Ridge Line does not allege that the government intentionally appropriated its 
property, on remand the court must first determine whether Ridge Line proved that the increased 
storm runoff was the "direct, natural, or probable result" of the Postal Service development, rather 
than merely an incidental or consequential injury, perhaps compensable as a tort, caused, for 
example, by improvident conduct on the part of the government in managing its property. 
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Specifically, the court must determine whether the increased runoff on the claimant's property was 
the predictable result of the government action.  
B 
The second prong of the taking-tort inquiry in this case requires the court to consider 
whether the government's interference with any property rights of Ridge Line was substantial and 
frequent enough to rise to the level of a taking. In this regard, "isolated invasions, such as one or 
two floodings . . ., do not make a taking . . ., but repeated invasions of the same type have often 
been held to result in an involuntary servitude." Eyherabide v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 598, 345 
F.2d 565, 569 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (citations omitted) 
V 
If the court concludes that treatment of the government's conduct as a potential taking, as 
opposed to a tort, is appropriate, it must then consider whether the government appropriated from 
Ridge Line a legally protectable easement interest, a determination made in this case according to 
West Virginia's "reasonable use" rule. In deciding whether one who alters his land is liable to his 
neighbor for flooding caused by the alterations, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 
decided to "approach  each case on its individual facts with a view toward finding if a reasonable 
use was being made of the property." Morris Assocs., Inc. v. Priddy, 181 W. Va. 588, 383 S.E.2d 
770, 774 (W. Va. 1989). 
Here, the government effectively shifted some of its storm water control costs to Ridge Line. 
By covering much of its land with impervious surfaces but failing to build water retention facilities, 
the government, according to Ridge Line's evidence, forced Ridge Line to build larger, more 
expensive control facilities in South Hollow than would otherwise have been necessary. 
There was also evidence that the government aggravated the consequences that would 
otherwise have befallen Ridge Line as a result of the Postal Service development by gathering and 
concentrating much of the storm water that fell on its property into five discharge points directed 
onto Ridge Line's property. This multiplied its erosive power, rather than restraining it. 
Furthermore, Ridge Line offered evidence that the government failed to maintain the check dam it 
built (with consent) on Ridge Line's property, despite the request of the West Virginia Division of 
Environmental Protection that the dam although intended to be temporary remain permanently and 
be maintained. On remand, the trial court must consider this and other evidence bearing on the 
reasonableness of the government's actions (and inaction) in order to decide whether Ridge Line has 
been deprived of a cognizable property interest. 
VI 
To summarize, in the present case, as noted above, the trial court did not address Ridge 
Line's inverse condemnation contention, and, therefore, did not evaluate whether the government's 
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construction led predictably to Ridge Line's economic injury and was sufficiently substantial. On 
remand, it must do so. If the court concludes that consideration as a potential taking is proper, it 
must then address whether the steps taken by the government in storm water retention and the 
amount that nevertheless invaded South Hollow were reasonable under West Virginia law, 
including an assessment of the relative advantage to the Postal Service and disadvantage to Ridge 
Line in view of the increased storm water runoff and the relative social utility of the Postal Service 
facility. The trial court found that storm water runoff into Ridge Line's property increased at least 
70% due to the Postal Service development. However, it did not determine whether causing such an 
increase was reasonable, or weigh the other evidence bearing on reasonableness. 
We thus vacate the trial court's judgment that no taking occurred. We hold that Ridge Line's 
property need not suffer an effectual destruction or a permanent and exclusive occupation by 
government runoff for a taking claim based on a flowage easement. However, whether there is a 
compensable taking in this case depends first on whether its loss may properly be analyzed under 
takings law as opposed to tort law, and then on whether Ridge Line has a protectable property 
interest under West Virginia property law that has been violated by government action. 
In the event that the court determines on remand that Ridge Line has a protectable property 
interest and that the increased storm water flowage onto Ridge Line's property constituted a taking 
of an easement in violation of that property interest, damages may be assessed based on Ridge 
Line's cost in constructing prudent flood control measures. Alternatively, the court may determine 
damages based on the price the government has paid for flowage easements in comparable 
situations.  
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we vacate the trial court's judgment for the government and 
remand for further analysis consistent with this opinion. On remand, the trial court need not reopen 
the record, unless necessary to address the issues raised above. Accordingly, the judgment of the 
trial court is 
VACATED AND REMANDED. 
ARKANSAS GAME AND FISH COMMISSION v. UNITED STATES  
2012 U.S. LEXIS 9409 
 
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, 
except KAGAN, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Periodically from 1993 until 2000, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) authorized 
flooding that extended into the peak growing season for timber on forest land owned and managed 
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by petitioner, Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (Commission). Cumulative in effect, the 
repeated flooding damaged or destroyed more than 18 million board feet of timber and disrupted 
the ordinary use and enjoyment of the Commission's property. The Commission sought 
compensation from the United States pursuant to the Fifth Amendment's instruction: "[N]or shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." The question presented is 
whether a taking may occur, within the meaning of the Takings Clause, when government-induced 
flood invasions, although repetitive, are temporary. 
Ordinarily, this Court's decisions confirm, if government action would qualify as a taking 
when permanently continued, temporary actions of the same character may also qualify as a taking. 
In the instant case, the parties and the courts below divided on the appropriate classification of 
temporary flooding. Reversing the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims, which awarded 
compensation to the Commission, the Federal Circuit held, 2 to 1, that compensation may be sought 
only when flooding is "a permanent or inevitably recurring condition, rather than an inherently 
temporary situation." We disagree and conclude that recurrent floodings, even if of finite duration, 
are not categorically exempt from Takings Clause liability. 
I 
A 
The Commission owns the Dave Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area 
(Management Area or Area), which comprises 23,000 acres along both banks of the Black River in 
northeast Arkansas. The Management Area is forested with multiple hardwood timber species that 
support a variety of wildlife habitats. The Commission operates the Management Area as a wildlife 
and hunting preserve, and also uses it as a timber resource, conducting regular harvests of timber as 
part of its forest-management efforts. Three types of hardwood oak species—nuttall, overcup, and 
willow—account for 80 percent of the trees in the Management Area. The presence of these 
hardwood oaks is essential to the Area's character as a habitat for migratory birds and as a venue for 
recreation and hunting. 
The Clearwater Dam (Dam) is located 115 miles upstream from the Management Area. The 
Corps constructed the Dam in 1948, and shortly thereafter adopted a plan known as the Water 
Control Manual (Manual) to determine the rates at which water would be released from the Dam. 
The Manual sets seasonally varying release rates, but permits planned deviations from the 
prescribed rates for agricultural, recreational, and other purposes. 
In 1993, the Corps approved a planned deviation in response to requests from farmers. From 
September to December 1993, the Corps released water from the Dam at a slower rate than usual, 
providing downstream farmers with a longer harvest time. As a result, more water than usual 
accumulated in Clearwater Lake behind the Dam. To reduce the accumulation, the Corps extended 
the period in which a high amount of water would be released. The Commission maintained this 
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extension yielded downstream flooding in the Management Area, above historical norms, during 
the tree-growing season, which runs from April to October. If the Corps had released the water 
more rapidly in the fall of 1993, in accordance with the Manual and with past practice, there would 
have been short-term waves of flooding which would have receded quickly. The lower rate of 
release in the fall, however, extended the period of flooding well into the following spring and 
summer. While the deviation benefited farmers, it interfered with the Management Area's tree-
growing season. 
The Corps adopted similar deviations each year from 1994 through 2000. The record 
indicates that the decision to deviate from the Manual was made independently in each year and 
that the amount of deviation varied over the span of years. Nevertheless, the result was an unbroken 
string of annual deviations from the Manual. Each deviation lowered the rate at which water was 
released during the fall, which necessitated extension of the release period into the following spring 
and summer. During this span of years the Corps proposed Manual revisions that would have made 
its temporary deviations part of the permanent water-release plan. On multiple occasions between 
1993 and 2000, the Commission objected to the temporary deviations and opposed any permanent 
revision to the Manual, on the ground that the departures from the traditional water-release plan 
adversely impacted the Management Area. Ultimately, the Corps tested the effect of the deviations 
on the Management Area. It thereupon abandoned the proposal to permanently revise the Manual 
and, in 2001, ceased its temporary deviations. 
B 
In 2005, the Commission filed the instant lawsuit against the United States, claiming that the 
temporary deviations from the Manual constituted a taking of property that entitled the Commission 
to compensation. The Commission maintained that the deviations caused sustained flooding of its 
land during the tree-growing season. The cumulative impact of this flooding over a six-year period 
between 1993 and 1999, the Commission alleged, resulted in the destruction of timber in the 
Management Area and a substantial change in the character of the terrain, which necessitated costly 
reclamation measures. Following a trial, the Court of Federal Claims ruled in favor of the 
Commission and issued an opinion and order containing detailed findings of fact.  
The Court of Federal Claims found that the forests in the Management Area were healthy 
and flourishing before the flooding that occurred in the 1990's, and that the forests had been 
sustainably managed for decades under the water-release plan contained in the Manual. It further 
found that the Commission repeatedly objected to the deviations from the Manual and alerted the 
Corps to the detrimental effect the longer period of flooding would have on the hardwood timber in 
the Management Area.  
As found by the Court of Federal Claims, the flooding caused by the deviations contrasted 
markedly with historical flooding patterns. Between 1949 and 1992, the river level near the 
Management Area reached six feet an average of 64.7 days per year during the growing season; the 
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number of such days had been even lower on average before the Clearwater Dam was built. 
Between 1993 and 1999, however, the river reached the same level an average of 91.14 days per 
year, an increase of more than 40 percent over the historic average. Although the Management Area 
lies in a floodplain, in no previously recorded time span did comparable flooding patterns occur. 
Evidence at trial indicated that half of the nuttall oaks in the Management Area were saturated with 
water when the river level was at six feet, the evidence further indicated that the saturation of the 
soil around the trees' root systems could persist for weeks even after the flooding had receded.  
The court concluded that the Corps' deviations caused six consecutive years of substantially 
increased flooding, which constituted an appropriation of the Commission's property, albeit a 
temporary rather than a permanent one. Important to this conclusion, the court emphasized the 
deviations' cumulative effect. The trees were subject to prolonged periods of flooding year after 
year, which reduced the oxygen level in the soil and considerably weakened the trees' root systems. 
The repeated annual flooding for six years altered the character of the property to a much greater 
extent than would have been shown if the harm caused by one year of flooding were simply 
multiplied by six. When a moderate drought occurred in 1999 and 2000, the trees did not have the 
root systems necessary to sustain themselves; the result, in the court's words, was "catastrophic 
mortality.". More than 18 million board feet of timber were destroyed or degraded. 
This damage altered the character of the Management Area. The destruction of the trees led 
to the invasion of undesirable plant species, making natural regeneration of the forests improbable 
in the absence of reclamation efforts. To determine the measure of just compensation, the Court of 
Federal Claims calculated the value of the lost timber and the projected cost of the reclamation and 
awarded the Commission $5.7 million. 
The Federal Circuit reversed. It acknowledged that in general, temporary government action 
may give rise to a takings claim if permanent action of the same character would constitute a taking. 
But it held that "cases involving flooding and [flowage] easements are different." Government-
induced flooding can give rise to a taking claim, the Federal Circuit concluded, only if the flooding 
is "permanent or inevitably recurring." We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether 
government actions that cause repeated floodings must be permanent or inevitably recurring to 
constitute a taking of property.  
II 
The Takings Clause is "designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S. Ct. 1563, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1554 (1960). And "[w]hen 
the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it 
has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner." Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2002) 
These guides are fundamental in our Takings Clause jurisprudence. We have recognized, however, 
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that no magic formula enables a court to judge, in every case, whether a given government 
interference with property is a taking. In view of the nearly infinite variety of ways in which 
government actions or regulations can affect property interests, the Court has recognized few 
invariable rules in this area.  
True, we have drawn some bright lines, notably, the rule that a permanent physical 
occupation of property authorized by government is a taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., (1982). But aside from the cases attended by rules of this order, most takings claims 
turn on situation-specific factual inquiries. See Penn Central (1978). With this in mind, we turn to 
the question presented here--whether temporary flooding can ever give rise to a takings claim.  
The Court first ruled that government-induced flooding can constitute a taking in Pumpelly 
v. Green Bay Co. The Wisconsin Legislature had authorized the defendant to build a dam which led 
to the creation of a lake, permanently submerging the plaintiff's land. The defendant argued that the 
land had not been taken because the government did not exercise the right of eminent domain to 
acquire title to the affected property. Moreover, the defendant urged, the damage was merely "a 
consequential result" of the dam's construction near the plaintiff's property. Rejecting that crabbed 
reading of the Takings Clause, the Court held that "where real estate is actually invaded by 
superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material ... so as to effectually destroy or 
impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution.” 
Furthermore, our decisions confirm that takings temporary in duration can be compensable. 
This principle was solidly established in the World War II era, when "[c]ondemnation for indefinite 
periods of occupancy [took hold as] a practical response to the uncertainties of the Government's 
needs in wartime." United States v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. (1950). In support of the war 
effort, the Government took temporary possession of many properties. These exercises of 
government authority, the Court recognized, qualified as compensable temporary takings. See 
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945). Notably in relation to the question 
before us, the takings claims approved in these cases were not confined to instances in which the 
Government took outright physical possession of the property involved. A temporary takings claim 
could be maintained as well when government action occurring outside the property gave rise to "a 
direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land." United States v. Causby, 
(1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the 
property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm). 
Because government-induced flooding can constitute a taking of property, and because a 
taking need not be permanent to be compensable, our precedent indicates that government-induced 
flooding of limited duration may be compensable. No decision of this Court authorizes a blanket 
temporary-flooding exception to our Takings Clause jurisprudence, and we decline to create such 
an exception in this case. 
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III 
In advocating a temporary-flooding exception, the Government relies primarily on 
Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. 146, 44 S. Ct. 264, 68 L. Ed. 608, 59 Ct. Cl. 955. That case involved a canal 
constructed by the Government connecting a slough and a river. The claimant's land was positioned 
between the slough and the river above the canal. The year after the canal's construction, a "flood of 
unprecedented severity" caused the canal to overflow onto the claimant's land; less severe flooding 
and overflow occurred in later years.  
The Court held there was no taking on these facts. This outcome rested on settled principles 
of foreseeability and causation. The Court emphasized that the Government did not intend to flood 
the land or have "any reason to expect that such [a] result would follow" from construction of the 
canal. Moreover, the property was subject to seasonal flooding prior to the construction of the 
canal, and the landowner failed to show a causal connection between the canal and the increased 
flooding, which may well have been occasioned by changes in weather patterns. These case-specific 
features were more than sufficient to dispose of the property owner's claim. 
In the course of the Sanguinetti decision, however, the Court summarized prior flooding 
cases as standing for the proposition that "in order to create an enforceable liability against the 
Government, it is, at least, necessary that the overflow be the direct result of the structure, and 
constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land." The Government would have us extract from 
this statement a definitive rule that there can be no temporary taking caused by floods.  
We do not read so much into the word "permanent" as it appears in a nondispositive 
sentence in Sanguinetti. That case, we note, was decided in 1924, well before the World War II-era 
cases in which the Court first homed in on the matter of compensation for temporary takings. That 
time factor, we think, renders understandable the Court's passing reference to permanence. If the 
Court indeed meant to express a general limitation on the Takings Clause, that limitation has been 
superseded by subsequent developments in our jurisprudence.  
There is thus no solid grounding in precedent for setting flooding apart from all other 
government intrusions on property. To reject a categorical bar to temporary-flooding takings 
claims,  however, is scarcely to credit all, or even many, such claims. It is of course incumbent on 
courts to weigh carefully the relevant factors and circumstances in each case, as instructed by our 
decisions.  
Time and again in Takings Clause cases, the Court has heard the prophecy that recognizing 
a just compensation claim would unduly impede the government's ability to act in the public 
interest. Causby (Black, J., dissenting);  Loretto, (Blackmun, J., dissenting). We have rejected this 
argument when deployed to urge blanket exemptions from the Fifth Amendment's instruction. 
While we recognize the importance of the public interests the Government advances in this case, we 
do not see them as categorically different from the interests at stake in myriad other Takings Clause 
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cases. The sky did not fall after Causby, and today's modest decision augurs no deluge of takings 
liability. 
The Government sensibly acknowledges that a taking might be found where there is a 
"sufficiently prolonged series of nominally temporary but substantively identical deviations." 
Flooding cases, like other takings cases, should be assessed with reference to the "particular 
circumstances of each case," Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, (1922).  
We rule today, simply and only, that government-induced flooding temporary in duration 
gains no automatic exemption from Takings Clause inspection. When regulation or temporary 
physical invasion by government interferes with private property, our decisions recognize, time is 
indeed a factor in determining the existence vel non of a compensable taking. See Loretto 
(temporary physical invasions should be assessed by case-specific factual inquiry); National Bd. of 
YMCA v. United States,(1969) ("temporary, unplanned occupation" of building by troops under 
exigent circumstances is not a taking).  
Also relevant to the takings inquiry is the degree to which the invasion is intended or is the 
foreseeable result of authorized government action. So, too, are the character of the land at issue 
and the owner's "reasonable investment-backed expectations" regarding the land's use. For example, 
the Management Area lies in a floodplain below a dam, and had experienced flooding in the past. 
But the trial court found the Area had not been exposed to flooding comparable to the 1990's 
accumulations in any other time span either prior to or after the construction of the Dam.  
The Court of Federal Claims found that the flooding the Commission assails was 
foreseeable. In this regard, the court noted the Commission's repeated complaints to the Corps about 
the destructive impact of the successive planned deviations from the Water Control Manual. 
Further, the court determined that the interference with the Commission's property was severe: The 
Commission had been deprived of the customary use of the Management Area as a forest and 
wildlife preserve, as the bottomland hardwood forest turned, over time, into a "headwater swamp."  
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
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Session 14. Navigation Servitude 
GIBSON v. UNITED STATES 
166 U.S. 269 (1897) 
This was a petition to recover damages because of the construction of a dike by the 
United States in the Ohio River at a point off Neville Island, about nine miles west of the city of 
Pittsburgh.  The Court of Claims made the following findings of fact: 
"I.   In the year 1885, and before, the claimant was the owner in her own right and 
in possession of a tract of land containing about 20 acres, situate on Neville 
Island, in the Ohio River, 9 miles below the city of Pittsburgh, in the county of 
Allegheny and State of Pennsylvania. 
"II.  The claimant's land, at the time of the alleged grievance, was in a high state 
of cultivation, well improved with a good dwelling house, barn and other 
outbuildings.  The claimant was in the year 1885, and is now, engaged in market 
gardening, cultivating and shipping strawberries, raspberries, potatoes, melons, 
apples, peaches, etc., to the cities of Pittsburgh and Allegheny, Pa., for sale. 
"III. The claimant's farm has a frontage of 1000 feet on the north, or main 
navigable, channel of the Ohio River, where the claimant has a landing, which 
was used in shipping the products from, and the supplies to, her said farm; that the 
said farm extends across the said Neville Island in a southwesterly direction to the 
south channel of said Ohio River, which is not navigable; that the said landing is 
the only one on claimant's farm from which she can ship the products from, and 
supplies to, her farm. 
"IV.  Congress, by the river and harbor acts of July 5, 1884, 23 Stat. 133, 147, and 
August 5, 1886, 24 Stat. 310, 327, authorized and directed the improvement of the 
said Ohio River as follows: 
Improving the Ohio River: Continuing improvement, six hundred thousand 
dollars . . . (act 1884). 
Improving the Ohio River: Continuing improvement, three hundred and seventy-
five thousand ($375,000) dollars . . . (act 1886). 
"Under said authority Lieut. Col. William E. Merrill, of the engineer corps of the 
U.S. Army, by the direction of the chief of engineers of the U.S. Army, and the 
Secretary of War, commenced, June 17, 1885, the construction of a dike 2200 feet 
in length to concentrate the water-flow in the main channel of the Ohio River, 
beginning at a point on said Neville Island 400 feet east of the claimant's farm and 
running in a northwesterly direction with the main or navigable channel of the 
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said Ohio River to the outer point of a bar in said river known as Merriman's bar, 
contiguous to and extending into the said river from the northwest point of 
claimant's farm; that the said dike has been completed to, and beyond, the 
northeastern point of said Merriman's bar. 
"V.   The construction of said dike by the United States for the purposes aforesaid 
has substantially destroyed the landing of the claimant, by preventing the free 
egress and ingress to and from said landing on and in front of the claimant's farm, 
to the main or navigable channel of said river. 
"The claimant is unable to use her landing for the shipment of products from, and 
supplies to, her farm for the greater part of the gardening season on account of 
said dike obstructing the passage of the boats; that she can only use the said 
landing at a high stage of water.  That during the ordinary stage of water, the 
claimant cannot get the products off, or the supplies to, her farm, without going 
over the farms of her neighbors to reach another landing. 
"VI.  The claimant's land was worth $600 per acre before the construction of the 
said dike; that it is now greatly reduced in value (from $150 to $200 per acre) by 
the obstruction caused by said dike; that the damage to the claimant's farm 
exceeds the sum of $3000. 
"VII.  Claimant's access to the navigable portion of the stream was not entirely cut 
off; at a 9-foot stage of the water, which frequently occurs during November, 
December, March, April and May, she could get into her dock in any manner; that 
from a 3-foot stage she could communicate with the navigable channel through 
the chute; that at any time she could haul out to the channel by wagon. 
"VIII. There was no water thrown back on claimant's land by the building of said 
dike, and that said dike has not itself come into physical contact with claimant's 
land and has not been the cause of any such physical contact in any other way.  In 
making the improvement the defendants did not recognize any right of property in 
the claimant, in and to the right alleged to be affected, did not attempt or assume 
to take private property in and by the construction of the dike, but proceeded in 
the exercise of a claimed right to improve the navigation of the river." 
And upon these findings the court held, as a conclusion of law, that the claimant was not 
entitled to recover, and dismissed the petition.] 
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court.   
All navigable waters are under the control of the United States for the purpose of 
regulating and improving navigation, and although the title to the shore and submerged soil is in 
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the various States and individual owners under them, it is always subject to the servitude in 
respect of navigation created in favor of the Federal government by the Constitution.  South 
Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1; Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 
452. 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that private 
property shall not "be taken for public use without just compensation."  Here, however, the 
damage of which Mrs. Gibson complained was not the result of the taking of any part of her 
property, whether upland or submerged, or a direct invasion thereof, but the incidental 
consequence of the lawful and proper exercise of a governmental power. 
Riparian ownership is subject to the obligation to suffer the consequences of the 
improvement of navigation in the exercise of the dominant right of the Government in that 
regard.  The legislative authority for these works consisted simply in an appropriation for their 
construction, but this was an assertion of a right belonging to the Government, to which riparian 
property was subject, and not of a right to appropriate private property, not burdened with such 
servitude, to public purposes. 
In short, the damage resulting from the prosecution of this improvement of a navigable 
highway, for the public good, was not the result of a taking of appellant's property, and was 
merely incidental to the exercise of a servitude to which her property had always been subject. 
Judgment affirmed. 
LEWIS BLUE POINT OYSTER CULTIVATION CO. v. BRIGGS 
229 U.S. 82 (1913) 
Mr. Justice Lurton delivered the opinion of the court. 
This was an action to restrain the defendant from dredging upon certain lands under the 
waters of Great South Bay in the State of New York.  The defense was that the lands upon which 
he was engaged in dredging were under the navigable waters of the bay, which was a navigable 
area of the sea, over which enrolled and registered vessels passed in interstate commerce; that 
Congress had provided for the dredging of a channel some 2,000 feet long and 200 feet wide 
across said Bay, and that defendant was engaged as a contractor with the United States in 
dredging the channel so authorized.  The plaintiff averred that this channel would pass 
diagonally across submerged land in said bay which it held as lessee under the owner of the fee 
in the bed of the bay.  The land so held under lease had been planted with oysters and had been 
long used for the cultivation of that variety of oyster known as the "Blue Point."  The claim was 
that the dredging of such a channel would destroy the oysters of the plaintiff, not only along the 
line of excavation, but for some distance on either side, and greatly impair the value of his 
leasehold for oyster cultivation. 
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The New York Court of Appeals held that the title of every owner of lands beneath 
navigable waters was a qualified one, and subject to the right of Congress to deepen the channel 
in the interest of navigation, and such a "taking" was not a "taking" of private property for which 
compensation could be required.  The judgment of the courts below discharging the injunction 
and dismissing the action was therefore affirmed. 
The case comes here upon the claim that the dredging of such a channel, although in the 
interest of navigation, is a taking of private property without just compensation, forbidden by the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
The foundation of the title to a large portion of the soil lying under the water of Great 
South Bay is found in certain royal patents made when the State of New York was a colonial 
dependency of Great Britain.  Through the patents referred to and certain mesne conveyances, 
the lessors of the oyster company have been adjudged to be seized of the legal title to a large part 
of the land which lies at the bottom of that bay.  That determination of title under the local law is 
not complained of, and must, of course, be accepted and followed by this court.  The single 
question, therefore, is, whether the deepening of the channel across the bay in the interest of 
navigation with the incidental consequence to the oyster plantation of the lessee company is a 
taking of private property which may be enjoined unless provision for compensation has been 
made. 
The cultivation of oysters upon the beds of the shallow waters of bays and inlets of the 
sea and of the rivers affected by the tides, has become an industry of great importance.  In many 
localities the business is regulated by the laws of the States in which such waters are situated, 
and the beds of such waters are parceled out among those owning the bottom or holding licenses 
from the State, and marked off by stakes indicating the boundaries of each cultivator.  The 
contention is that whether title to such an area at the bottom of navigable salt waters comes from 
the State, or, as in the case here, from royal patents antedating the State's right, such actual 
interest is thereby acquired that when such area so planted and cultivated is invaded for the 
purpose of deepening the water in aid of navigation, private property is taken.  For this, counsel 
cite the cases of Brown v. United States, 81 Fed. Rep. 55, decided by Circuit Court Judge 
Simonton; and Richardson v. United States, 100 Fed. Rep. 714, also decided by the same 
eminent judge.  They also cite and rely upon Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 
U.S. 312.  In the Brown Case, Judge Simonton, while recognizing that the navigable waters of 
the United States were within the jurisdiction of the United States which has control over their 
improvement for navigation, was of opinion, that so long as the owner of the bed of such bodies 
of water did not use it "for the erection of structures impeding or obstructing navigation," his 
ownership of the bottom and his right to put it to such use as did not obstruct navigation, was a 
property right, which could not be destroyed or taken without compensation.  From these 
considerations he held (p. 57) that "when the Government, for the purpose of adding to the 
navigability of a stream, changes its natural channel, and, in doing so, occupies and assumes 
exclusive possession of the land of a citizen, it takes private property."  In that case the 
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Government had, in the exercise of its power of improving navigation, erected a dyke on the 
oyster beds of the complainant in the shallow salt water of York River, for the purpose of 
directing the current of the river and maintaining the channel.  The effect of this was to destroy 
the property of the owner or lessee of the bed of the river at that point for the purpose to which it 
was devoted.  This the learned judge ruled was a "taking" which was not lawful without 
compensation. 
That case and the later one cited fail to recognize the qualified nature of the title which a 
private owner may have in the lands lying under navigable waters.  If the public right of 
navigation is the dominant right and if, as must be the case, the title of the owner of the bed of 
navigable waters holds subject absolutely to the public right of navigation, this dominant right 
must include the right to use the bed of the water for every purpose which is in aid of navigation. 
This right to control, improve and regulate the navigation of such waters is one of the greatest of 
the powers delegated to the United States by the power to regulate commerce.  Whatever power 
the several States had before the Union was formed, over the navigable waters within their 
several jurisdictions, has been delegated to the Congress, in which, therefore, is centered all of 
the governmental power over the subject, restricted only by such limitations as are found in other 
clauses of the Constitution. 
By necessary implication from the dominant right of navigation, title to such submerged 
lands is acquired and held subject to the power of Congress to deepen the water over such lands 
or to use them for any structure which the interest of navigation, in its judgment, may require. 
The plaintiff has, therefore, no such private property right which, when taken, or incidentally 
destroyed by the dredging of a deep water channel across it, entitles him to demand 
compensation as a condition. 
The whole subject of the nature and character of the interest of the owner of such a title 
and the scope of the control of the Congress over navigable rivers has been fully considered by 
this court in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., just decided. 
The conclusion we reach, is that the court below did not err in dismissing the action of 
the plaintiff in error, and the judgment is accordingly Affirmed. 
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UNITED STATES v. RANDS 
389 U.S. 121 (1967) 
Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case the Court is asked to decide whether the compensation which the United 
States is constitutionally required to pay when it condemns riparian land includes the land's value 
as a port site.  Respondents owned land along the Columbia River in the State of Oregon.  They 
leased the land to the State with an option to purchase, it apparently being contemplated that the 
State would use the land as an industrial park, part of which would function as a port.  The 
option was never exercised, for the land was taken by the United States in connection with the 
John Day Lock and Dam Project, authorized by Congress as part of a comprehensive plan for the 
development of the Columbia River.  Pursuant to statute the United States then conveyed the 
land to the State of Oregon at a price considerably less than the option price at which 
respondents had hoped to sell.  In the condemnation action, the trial judge determined that the 
compensable value of the land taken was limited to its value for sand, gravel, and agricultural 
purposes and that its special value as a port site could not be considered.  The ultimate award 
was about one-fifth the claimed value of the land if used as a port.  The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed, apparently holding that the Government had taken from respondents a 
compensable right of access to navigable waters and concluding that "port site value should be 
compensable under the Fifth Amendment." 367 F.2d 186, 191 (1966).  We granted certiorari, 
386 U.S. 989, because of a seeming conflict between the decision below and United States v. 
Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956). We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
because the principles underlying Twin City govern this case and the Court of Appeals erred in 
failing to follow them. 
The Commerce Clause confers a unique position upon the Government in connection 
with navigable waters.  "The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that 
purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States . . . .  For 
this purpose they are the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation 
by Congress."  Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 724-725 (1866).  This power to regulate 
navigation confers upon the United States a "dominant servitude," FPC v. Niagara Mohawk 
Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249 (1954), which extends to the entire stream and the stream bed 
below ordinary high-water mark.  The proper exercise of this power is not an invasion of any 
private property rights in the stream or the lands underlying it, for the damage sustained does not 
result from taking property from riparian owners within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment but 
from the lawful exercise of a power to which the interests of riparian owners have always been 
subject.  United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 596-597 (1941);  Gibson 
v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 275-276 (1897). Thus, without being constitutionally obligated to 
pay compensation, the United States may change the course of a navigable stream, South 
Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876), or otherwise impair or destroy a riparian owner's access to 
navigable waters, Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 
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141 (1900); United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945), even though the 
market value of the riparian owner's land is substantially diminished. 
The navigational servitude of the United States does not extend beyond the high-water 
mark. Consequently, when fast lands are taken by the Government, just compensation must be 
paid. But "just as the navigational privilege permits the Government to reduce the value of 
riparian lands by denying the riparian owner access to the stream without compensation for his 
loss, . . . it also permits the Government to disregard the value arising from this same fact of 
riparian location in compensating the owner when fast lands are appropriated." United States v. 
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 629 (1961). Specifically, the Court has held that the 
Government is not required to give compensation for "water power" when it takes the riparian 
lands of a private power company using the stream to generate power.  United States v. 
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 73-74 (1913).  Nor must it compensate the 
company for the value of its uplands as a power plant site.  Id., at 76.  Such value does not 
"inhere in these parcels as upland," but depends on use of the water to which the company has no 
right as against the United States: "The Government had dominion over the water power of the 
rapids and falls and cannot be required to pay any hypothetical additional value to a riparian 
owner who had no right to appropriate the current to his own commercial use."  Ibid. 
All this was made unmistakably clear in United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 
222 (1956). The United States condemned a promising site for a hydroelectric power plant and 
was held to be under no obligation to pay for any special value which the fast lands had for 
power generating purposes.  The value of the land attributable to its location on the stream was 
"due to the flow of the stream; and if the United States were required to pay the judgments 
below, it would be compensating the landowner for the increment of value added to the fast 
lands if the flow of the stream were taken into account."  350 U.S., at 226. 
We are asked to distinguish between the value of land as a power site and its value as a 
port site.  In the power cases, the stream is used as a source of power to generate electricity.  In 
this case, for the property to have value as a port, vessels must be able to arrive and depart by 
water, meanwhile using the waterside facilities of the port.  In both cases, special value arises 
from access to, and use of, navigable waters.  With regard to the constitutional duty to 
compensate a riparian owner, no distinction can be drawn.  It is irrelevant that the licensing 
authority presently being exercised over hydroelectric projects may be different from, or even 
more stringent than, the licensing of port sites.  We are dealing with the constitutional power of 
Congress completely to regulate navigable streams to the total exclusion of private power 
companies or port owners. As was true in Twin City, if the owner of the fast lands can demand 
port site value as part of his compensation, "he gets the value of a right that the Government in 
the exercise of its dominant servitude can grant or withhold as it chooses. . . .  To require the 
United States to pay for this . . . value would be to create private claims in the public domain." 
350 U.S., at 228. 
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Respondents and the Court of Appeals alike have found Twin City inconsistent with the 
holding in United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926). In that case, the 
Government took waterfront property to widen and improve the navigable channel of the Rouge 
River.  By reason of the improvements, other portions of the riparian owner's property became 
more valuable because they were afforded direct access to the stream for the building of docks 
and other purposes related to navigation.  Pursuant to §6 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1918, 
the compensation award for the part of the property taken by the Government was reduced by the 
value of the special and direct benefits to the remainder of the land.  The argument here seems to 
be that if the enhancement in value flowing from a riparian location is real enough to reduce the 
award for another part of the same owner's property, consistency demands that these same values 
be recognized in the award when any riparian property is taken by the Government.  There is no 
inconsistency.  Twin City and its predecessors do not deny that access to navigable waters may 
enhance the market value of riparian property.  See United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 
U.S., at 388, 390.  And, in River Rouge, it was recognized that state law may give the riparian 
owner valuable rights of access to navigable waters good against other riparian owners or against 
the State itself.  269 U.S., at 418-419.  But under Twin City and like cases, these rights and 
values are not assertable against the superior rights of the United States, are not property within 
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, and need not be paid for when appropriated by the United 
States.  Thus, when only part of the property is taken and the market value of the remainder is 
enhanced by reason of the improvement to navigable waters, reducing the award by the amount 
of the increase in value simply applies in another context the principle that special values arising 
from access to a navigable stream are allocable to the public, and not to private interest. 
Otherwise the private owner would receive a windfall to which he is not entitled. 
Our attention is also directed to Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 
312 (1893), where it was held that the Government had to pay the going-concern value of a toll 
lock and dam built at the implied invitation of the Government, and to the portion of the opinion 
in Chandler-Dunbar approving an award requiring the Government to pay for the value of fast 
lands as a site for a canal and lock to bypass the falls and rapids of the river.  Monongahela is not 
in point, however, for the Court has since read it as resting "primarily upon the doctrine of 
estoppel . . . ."  Omnia Commercial Co., Inc. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 513-514 (1923). 
The portion of Chandler-Dunbar relied on by respondents was duly noted and dealt with in Twin 
City itself, 350 U.S. 222, 226, n. (1956).  That aspect of the decision has been confined to its 
special facts, and, in any event, if it is at all inconsistent with Twin City, it is only the latter 
which survives. 
Finally, respondents urge that the Government's position subverts the policy of the 
Submerged Lands Act, which confirmed and vested in the States title to the lands beneath 
navigable waters within their boundaries and to natural resources within such lands and waters, 
together with the right and power to manage, develop, and use such lands and natural resources. 
However, reliance on that Act is misplaced, for it expressly recognized that the United States 
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retained "all its navigational servitude and rights in and powers of regulation and control of said 
lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national 
defense, and international affairs, all of which shall be paramount to, but shall not be deemed to 
include, proprietary rights of ownership . . . . Nothing in the Act was to be construed as the 
release or relinquishment of any rights of the United States arising under the constitutional 
authority of Congress to regulate or improve navigation, or to provide for flood control, or the 
production of power." 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case 
remanded with direction to reinstate the judgment of the District Court. 
Reversed and remanded. 
KAISER AETNA v. UNITED STATES 
444 U.S. 164 (1979) 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.  
The Hawaii Kai Marina was developed by the dredging and filling of Kuapa Pond, which 
was a shallow lagoon separated from Maunalua Bay and the Pacific Ocean by a barrier beach. 
Although under Hawaii law Kuapa Pond was private property, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that when petitioners converted the pond into a marina and thereby connected 
it to the bay, it became subject to the "navigational servitude" of the Federal Government.  Thus, 
the public acquired a right of access to what was once petitioners' private pond.  We granted 
certiorari because of the importance of the issue and a conflict concerning the scope and nature 
of the servitude. 
Kuapa Pond was apparently created in the late Pleistocene Period, near the end of the ice 
age, when the rising sea level caused the shoreline to retreat, and partial erosion of the headlands 
adjacent to the bay formed sediment that accreted to form a barrier beach at the mouth of the 
pond, creating a lagoon.  It covered 523 acres on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, and extended 
approximately two miles inland from Maunalua Bay and the Pacific Ocean.  The pond was 
contiguous to the bay, which is a navigable waterway of the United States, but was separated 
from it by the barrier beach. 
Early Hawaiians used the lagoon as a fishpond and reinforced the natural sandbar with 
stone walls.  Prior to the annexation of Hawaii, there were two openings from the pond to 
Maunalua Bay.  The fishpond's managers placed removable sluice gates in the stone walls across 
these openings.  Water from the bay and ocean entered the pond through the gates during high 
tide, and during low tide the current flow reversed toward the ocean.  The Hawaiians used the 
tidal action to raise and catch fish such as mullet. 
Kuapa Pond, and other Hawaiian fishponds, have always been considered to be private 
property by landowners and by the Hawaiian government.  Such ponds were once an integral 
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part of the Hawaiian feudal system.  And in 1848 they were allotted as parts of large land units, 
known as "ahupuaas," by King Kamehameha III during the Great Mahele or royal land division. 
Titles to the fishponds were recognized to the same extent and in the same manner as rights in 
more orthodox fast land.  Kuapa Pond was part of an ahupuaa that eventually vested in Bernice 
Pauahi Bishop and on her death formed a part of the trust corpus of petitioner Bishop Estate, the 
present owner. 
In 1961, Bishop Estate leased a 6,000 acre area, which included Kuapa Pond, to 
petitioner Kaiser Aetna for subdivision development.  The development is now known as 
"Hawaii Kai."  Kaiser Aetna dredged and filled parts of Kuapa Pond, erected retaining walls, and 
built bridges within the development to create the Hawaii Kai Marina.  Kaiser Aetna increased 
the average depth of the channel from two to six feet.  It also created accommodations for 
pleasure boats and eliminated the sluice gates. 
When petitioners notified the Army Corps of Engineers of their plans in 1961, the Corps 
advised them they were not required to obtain permits for the development of and operations in 
Kuapa Pond.  Kaiser Aetna subsequently informed the Corps that it planned to dredge an 
8-foot-deep channel connecting Kuapa Pond to Manunalua Bay and the Pacific Ocean, and to 
increase the clearance of a bridge of the Kalanianaole Highway - which had been constructed 
during the early 1900's along the barrier beach separating Kuapa Pond from the bay and ocean–
to a maximum of 13.5 feet over the mean sea level.  These improvements were made in order to 
allow boats from the marina to enter into and return from the bay, as well as to provide better 
waters.  The Corps acquiesced in the proposals, its chief of construction commenting only that 
the "deepening of the channel may cause erosion of the beach." 
At the time of trial, a marina-style community of approximately 22,000 persons 
surrounded Kuapa Pond.  It included approximately 1,500 marina waterfront lot lessees.  The 
water-front lot lessees, along with at least 86 non-marina lot lessees from Hawaii Kai and 56 
boat owners who are not residents of Hawaii Kai, pay fees for maintenance of the pond and for 
patrol boats that remove floating debris, enforce boating regulations, and maintain the privacy 
and security of the pond.  Kaiser Aetna controls access to and use of the marina.  It has generally 
not permitted commercial use, except for a small vessel, the Marina Queen, which could carry 25 
passengers and was used for about five years to promote sales of marina lots and for a brief 
period by main a shopping center merchants to attract people to their shopping facilities. 
In 1972, a dispute arose between petitioners and the Corps concerning whether (1) 
petitioners were required to obtain authorization from the Corps, in accordance with §10 of the 
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §403, for future construction, 
excavation, or filling in the marina, and (2) petitioners were precluded from denying the public 
access to the pond because, as a result of the improvements, it had become a navigable water of 
the United States.  The dispute foreseeably ripened into a lawsuit by the United States 
Government against petitioners in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii. 
 331 
In examining the scope of Congress' regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause, 
the District Court held that the pond was "navigable water of the United States" and thus subject 
to regulation by the Corps under §10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act.  408 F.Supp. 
42, 53 (1976).  It further held, however, that the Government lacked the authority to open the 
now dredged pond to the public without payment of compensation to the owner.  Id., at 54.  In 
reaching this holding, the District Court reasoned that although the pond was navigable for the 
purpose of delimiting Congress' regulatory power, it was not navigable for the purpose of 
defining the scope of the federal "navigational servitude" imposed by the Commerce Clause. 
Ibid.  Thus, the District Court denied the Corps' request for an injunction to require petitioners to 
allow public access and to notify the public of the fact of the pond's accessibility. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's conclusion that the pond fell within 
the scope of Congress' regulatory authority, but reversed the District Court's holding that the 
navigational servitude did not require petitioners to grant the public access to the pond.  584 F. 
2d 378 (1978).  The Court of Appeals reasoned that the "federal regulatory authority over 
navigable waters... and the right of public use cannot consistently be separated.  It is the public 
right of navigational use that renders regulatory control necessary in the public interest." Id., at 
383. 
The question before us is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners' 
improvements to Kuapa Pond caused its original character to be so altered that it became subject 
to an overriding federal navigational servitude, thus converting into a public aquatic park that 
which petitioners had invested millions of dollars in improving on the assumption that it was a 
privately owned pond leased to Kaiser Aetna. 
The Government contends that petitioners may not exclude members of the public from 
the Hawaii Kai Marina because "[t]he public enjoys a federally protected right of navigation over 
the navigable waters of the United States."  Brief for United States 13.  It claims the issue in 
dispute is whether Kuapa Pond is presently a "navigable water of the United States."  Ibid. When 
petitioners dredged and improved Kuapa Pond, the Government continues, the pond–although it 
may once have qualified as fast land–became navigable water of the United States. The public 
thereby acquired a right to use Kuapa Pond as a continuous highway for navigation, and the 
Corps of Engineers may consequently obtain an injunction to prevent petitioners from attempting 
to reserve the waterway to themselves. 
The position advanced by the Government, and adopted by the Court of Appeals below, 
presumes that the concept of "navigable waters of the United States" has a fixed meaning that 
remains unchanged in whatever context it is being applied.  While we do not fully agree with the 
reasoning of the District Court, we do agree with its conclusion that all of this Court's cases 
dealing with the authority of Congress to regulate navigation and the so-called "navigational 
servitude" cannot simply be lumped into one basket.  408 F. Supp., at 48-49.  As the District 
Court aptly stated, "any reliance upon judicial precedent must be predicated upon careful 
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appraisal of the purpose for which the concept of 'navigability' was invoked in a particular case." 
Id., at 49. 
It is true that Kuapa Pond may fit within definitions of "navigability" articulated in past 
decisions of this Court.  But it must be recognized that the concept of navigability in these 
decisions was used for purposes other than to delimit the boundaries of the navigational 
servitude: for example, to define the scope of Congress' regulatory authority under the Interstate 
Commerce Clause, see, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); 
South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876); The Montello, 20 Wall. 430 (1874); The Daniel 
Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (1871), to determine the extent of the authority of the Corps of Engineers 
under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, and to establish the limits of the 
jurisdiction of federal courts conferred by Art. III, §2, of the United States Constitution over 
admiralty and maritime [law]. 
Although the Government is clearly correct in maintaining that the now dredged Kuapa 
Pond falls within the definition of "navigable waters" as this Court has used that term in 
delimiting the boundaries of Congress' regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause, see, 
e.g., The Daniel Ball, supra, at 563; The Montello, supra, at 441-442; United States v. 
Appalachian Power Co., supra, at 407-408, this Court has never held that the navigational 
servitude creates a blanket exception to the Takings Clause whenever Congress exercises its 
Commerce Clause authority to promote navigation.  Thus, while Kuapa Pond may be subject to 
regulation by the Corps of Engineers, acting under the authority delegated it by Congress in the 
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, it does not follow that the pond is also subject to a public 
right of access. 
In light of its expansive authority under the Commerce Clause, there is no question but 
that Congress could assure the public a free right of access to the Hawaii Kai Marina if it so 
chose. Whether a statute or regulation that went so far amounted to a "taking," however, is an 
entirely separate question.  This Court has generally "been unable to develop any 'set formula' for 
determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be 
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few 
persons." [Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 at 124 (1978)]. 
Rather, it has examined the "taking" question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries. 
. . .  When the "taking" question has involved the exercise of the public right of navigation over 
interstate waters that constitute highways for commerce, however, this Court has held in many 
cases that compensation may not be required as a result of the federal navigational servitude. 
See, e.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913). 
The navigational servitude is an expression of the notion that the determination whether a 
taking has occurred must take into consideration the important public interest in the flow of 
interstate waters that in their natural condition are in fact capable of supporting public 
navigation. 
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For over a century, a long line of cases decided by this Court involving Government 
condemnation of "fast lands" delineated the elements of compensable damages that the 
Government was required to pay because the lands were riparian to navigable streams.  The 
Court was often deeply divided, and the results frequently turned on what could fairly be 
described as quite narrow distinctions.  But this is not a case in which the Government 
recognizes any obligation whatever to condemn "fast lands" and pay just compensation under the 
Eminent Domain Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is instead a 
case in which the owner of what was once a private pond, separated from concededly navigable 
water by a barrier beach and used for aquatic agriculture, has invested substantial amounts of 
money in making improvements.  The Government contends that as a result of one of these 
improvements, the pond's connection to the navigable water in a manner approved by the Corps 
of Engineers, the owner has somehow lost one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights 
that are commonly characterized as property–the right to exclude others. 
The navigational servitude, which exists by virtue of the Commerce Clause in navigable 
streams, gives rise to an authority in the Government to assure that such streams retain their 
capacity to serve as continuous highways for the purpose of navigation in interstate commerce. 
Thus, when the Government acquires fast lands to improve navigation, it is not required under 
the Eminent Domain Clause to compensate landowners for certain elements of damage 
attributable to riparian location, such as the land's value as a hydroelectric site, Twin City Power 
Co., supra, or a port site, United States v. Rands, supra. But none of these cases ever doubted that 
when the Government wished to acquire fast lands, it was required by the Eminent Domain 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to condemn and pay fair value for that interest 
Here, the Government's attempt to create a public right of access to the improved pond 
goes so far beyond ordinary regulation or improvement for navigation as to amount to a taking 
under the logic of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
We have not the slightest doubt that the Government could have refused to allow such 
dredging on the ground that it would have impaired navigation in the bay, or could have 
conditioned its approval of the dredging on petitioners' agreement to comply with various 
measures that it deemed appropriate for the promotion of navigation.  But what petitioners now 
have is a body of water that was private property under Hawaiian law, linked to navigable water 
by a channel dredged by them with the consent of the Government.  While the consent of 
individual officials representing the United States cannot "estop" the United States, see Montana 
v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-315 (1961); INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973), it can lead to the 
fruition of a number of expectancies embodied in the concept of "property"–expectancies that, if 
sufficiently important, the Government must condemn and pay for before it takes over the 
management of the landowner's property.  In this case, we hold that the "right to exclude," so 
universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of 
interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.  This is not a case in which the 
Government is exercising its regulatory power in a manner that will cause an insubstantial 
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devaluation of petitioners' private property; rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude in 
this context will result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina.  Thus, if the 
Government wishes to make what was formerly Kuapa Pond into a public aquatic park after 
petitioners have proceeded as far as they have here, it may not, without invoking its eminent 
domain power and paying just compensation, require them to allow free access to the dredged 
pond while petitioners' agreement with their customers calls for an annual $72 regular fee. 
Accordingly the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. 
The Court holds today that, absent compensation, the public may be denied a right of 
access to "navigable waters of the United States" that have been created or enhanced by private 
means. I find that conclusion neither supported in precedent nor wise in judicial policy, and I 
dissent. 
My disagreement with the Court lies in four areas.  First, I believe the Court errs by 
implicitly rejecting the old and long-established "ebb and flow" test of navigability as a source 
for the navigational servitude the Government claims.  Second, I cannot accept the notion, which 
I believe to be without foundation in precedent, that the federal "navigational servitude" does not 
extend to all "navigable waters of the United States."  Third, I reach a different balance of 
interests on the question whether the exercise of the servitude in favor of public access requires 
compensation to private interests where private efforts are responsible for creating "navigability 
in fact."  And finally, I differ on the bearing that state property law has on the questions before us 
today. 
Nor does it advance analysis to suggest that we might decide to call certain waters 
"navigable" for some purposes, but "nonnavigable" for purposes of the navigational servitude. 
See ante, at 170-171.  To my knowledge, no case has ever so held.  In any event, to say that 
Kuapa Pond is somehow "nonnavigable" for present purposes, and that it is not subject to the 
navigational servitude for this reason, is merely to substitute one conclusion for another.  To 
sustain its holding today, I believe that the Court must prove the more difficult contention that 
the navigational servitude does not extend to waters that are clearly navigable and fully subject 
to use as a highway for interstate commerce. 
The Court, of course, concludes that there is no navigational servitude and, accordingly, 
that assertion of public access constitutes a compensable taking.  Because I do not agree with the 
premise, I cannot conclude that the right to compensation for opening the pond to the public is a 
necessary result.  Nevertheless, I think this question requires a balancing of private and public 
interests. 
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Application of this principle to the present case should lead to the conclusion that the 
developers of Kuapa Pond have acted at their own risk and are not entitled to compensation for 
the public access the Government now asserts.  See Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 
at 400. The chief value of the pond in its present state obviously is a value of access to navigable 
water.  Development was undertaken to improve and enhance this value, not to improve the 
value of the pond as some aquatic. 
I come, finally, to the question whether Kuapa Pond's status under state law ought to alter 
this conclusion drawn from federal law.  The Court assumes, without much discussion, that 
Kuapa Pond is the equivalent of "fast land" for purposes of Hawaii property law.  There is, to be 
sure, support for this assumption, and for present purposes I am prepared to follow the Court in 
making it.  Nonetheless, I think it clear that local law concerns rights of title and use between 
citizen and citizen, or between citizen and state, but does not affect the scope or effect of the 
federal navigational servitude. 
The rights in Kuapa fisheries that have been part of Hawaii law since the Great Mahele 
are not unlike the right to the use of the floor of a bay that was at issue in Lewis Blue Point 
Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913). There the Court found no entitlement to compensation 
for destruction of an oysterbed in the course of dredging a channel.  The Court reasoned: "If the 
public right of navigation is the dominant right and if, as must be the case, the title of the owner 
of the bed or navigable. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was correct.  I 
therefore dissent. 
DELTONA CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES 
57 F.2d 1184; 228 Ct. Cl. 476 (1981) 
Before FRIEDMAN, Chief Judge, SKELTON, Senior Judge, and KUNZIG, Judge. 
KUNZIG, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: 
In this case, plaintiff contends that it has suffered an uncompensated taking as the 
consequence of federal regulation affecting its development of a planned subdivision along the 
Gulf coast of Florida.  The statutes in question - §10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation 
Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §403, and §404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments 
of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §1344 - and implementing regulations thereunder, prohibit, inter alia, 
dredging and filling in navigable waters without the authorization of the Department of the 
Army.  The latter, stressing environmental factors, has thus far steadfastly refused to grant 
plaintiff the permits it needs to finish its project.  We hold that while plaintiff may indeed have 
sustained an economic loss, the loss is not such as to constitute a Fifth Amendment taking under 
the circumstances herein. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A.  Applicable Statutes and Regulations: A Pattern of Stiffening Requirements. 
Until 1968, the Corps administered the Rivers and Harbors Act solely in the interest of 
navigation and the navigable capacity of the nation's waters.  However, on December 18, 1968, 
in response to a growing national concern for environmental values and related federal 
legislation, the Corps revised its regulations to implement a new type of review termed "public 
interest review."  Besides navigation, the Corps would consider the following additional factors 
in reviewing permit applications: fish and wildlife, conservation, pollution, aesthetics, ecology, 
the the general public interest.
1
  
On April 4, 1974, the Corps published further revised regulations so as to: 
incorporate new permit programs under Section 404 of the FWPCA; 
incorporate the requirements of new federal legislation by adding to the factors to be 
weighed in the public interest review, including: economics; historic values; flood damage 
prevention; land-use classification; recreation; water supply and water quality; 
adopt further criteria to be considered in the evaluation of each permit application, 
including the desirability of using appropriate alternatives; the extent and permanence of the 
beneficial and/or detrimental effects of the proposed activity; and the cumulative effect of the 
activity when considered in relation to other activities in the same general area; 
institute a full-fledged wetlands policy to protect wetlands subject to the Corps' 
jurisdiction from unnecessary destruction. 
The inauguration of the wetlands policy should especially be noted, as it plays a leading 
role in the forthcoming scenario. 
B. Facts. 
In 1964, plaintiffs, Deltona, purchased for $7,500,000 a 10,000 acre parcel on the Florida 
Gulf coast with the intention of developing a water-oriented residential community, Marco 
                                                 
1
 The "public interest review" received its first judicial test in Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971), in which the court upheld the denial by the Corps of a landfill permit for fish and 
wildlife reasons (and not reasons related to navigation).  In reaching its decision, the court reaffirmed the 
Department of the Army's position that it was "acting under a Congressional mandate to collaborate and consider all 
of these factors" when it reached its decision.  The court stated: 
Governmental agencies in executing a particular statutory responsibility ordinarily are required to take heed of, 
sometimes effectuate and other times not thwart other valid statutory governmental policies.  And here the 
government- wide policy of environmental conservation is spectacularly revealed in at least two statutes, The Fish 
and Wildlife Coordination Act and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.[Id . at 209.] 
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Island.  The property, then completely undeveloped, lay astride the mean high water mark and 
contained large areas of dense mangrove vegetation, including wetlands.  Deltona's master plan 
called for more than 12,000 single family tracts, numerous multifamily sites, school and park 
areas, shopping districts, marinas, beaches and regular utilities.  Structurally, the project revolved 
about the "finger-fill" or "landfinger" concept and would necessitate considerable dredging and 
filling as well as the permanent destruction of much of the natural mangrove vegetation. 
Deltona divided Marco Island into five construction or permit areas to be built 
consecutively.  These five areas, in order of scheduled completion, were Marco River, Roberts 
Bay, Collier Bay, Barfield Bay and Big Key.  Each separate stage would take three to four years 
to complete.  While partitioned for these limited purposes, in operation, the Marco Island 
community would be a thoroughly integrated, unified whole. 
Because Deltona's proposed dredge and fill activities were to take place in "navigable 
waters of the United States" as that term is used in the Rivers and Harbors Act, it was required to 
obtain the proper permit from the Army Corps of Engineers before any of the work could legally 
get underway in 1964.  Also, because its proposed dredge and fill activities were to take place in 
"navigable waters" as used in the FWPCA, Deltona was required after 1972 to obtain a permit 
from the Army Corps under that statutory scheme as well.  Deltona's problems which culminated 
in the instant lawsuit stem from its inability to obtain all the permits which it needs to complete 
its project. 
When in 1964 Deltona applied for a dredge and fill permit for the Marco River area, the 
Corps' policy was merely to consider the likely adverse impact which issuance would have upon 
navigation.  In this case, the Corps routinely granted the necessary permit on October 27, 1964. 
The second construction area was Roberts Bay.  Deltona obtained its dredge and fill 
permit on December 18, 1969, this time pursuant to the so-called "public interest review" which 
had been adopted by the Corps a year earlier.  The permit, however, was issued subject to the 
following express conditions: first, Deltona's "understand[ing] that all permit applications are 
independent of each other and that the granting of this permit does not necessarily mean that 
future applications for a permit of permits in the general area of the proposed work by Marco 
Island Development Corporation or others will be similarly granted;" second, its "agree[ment]... 
not [to] advertise or offer for sale as suitable building lots parcels of land which (1) are in whole 
or in part seaward of the mean high water line and which (2) could not be made suitable for the 
erection of residences or other structures in the absence of a Department of the Army fill permit 
that has not yet been issued." 
Deltona applied for Corps of Engineers dredge and fill permits for the Collier Bay, 
Barfield Bay, and Big Key construction areas on April 9, 1973.  By this time, the permit 
requirement imposed by §404 of the FWPCA had been added to that already imposed by §10 of 
the Rivers and Harbors Act.  In a written decision dated April 15, 1976, the Chief of Engineers 
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denied Deltona's application to dredge and fill in Barfield Bay and Big Key, while granting its 
application for Collier Bay. 
The permit denials were premised upon "overriding national factors of the public 
interest." The decision indicated that "Corps regulation[s]... identify certain types of wetlands 
considered to perform functions important to the public interest." 
These include wetlands that serve important natural biological functions (including food 
chain production, general habitat, and nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites for aquatic or 
land species); wetlands set aside as sanctuaries or refuges; wetlands which are significant in 
shielding other areas from wave action, erosion, or storm damage (including barrier beaches); 
and wetlands that serve as valuable storage areas for storm and flood waters. The decision 
continued: "A review of the permit file clearly indicates that the mangrove wetlands involved in 
these permit applications fulfill each of these functions in a most significant way." Consequently, 
under governing regulations, denial of the permits was mandated unless it could be shown that 
"the benefits of the proposed alteration... outweigh[ed] the damage to the wetlands resource, and 
that the proposed alteration [was] necessary to realize those benefits." The Chief of Engineers 
concluded that Deltona had failed to make the requisite factual showing as to both elements. 
By contrast, "[t]he permit file reveal[ed] that a significant amount of destruction ha[d] 
already occurred to the mangrove wetlands associated with the Collier Bay application" and that 
a "considerable amount of dredging and filling" had taken place, resulting in the creation of a 
large number of lots and approximately forty homes.  The Chief of Engineers wrote: "It is my 
position, therefore, that this area has been already so dedicated to development that it would no 
longer be in the public interest to preclude completion of that development." 
Deltona notes with much vigor that prior to the adverse decision by the Corps of 
Engineers, it had obtained all the necessary county and state permits to go forward with the 
development of Barfield Bay and Big Key and had entered into contracts of sale covering 
approximately 90% of the lots in those two areas.  As a practical matter, however, it cannot 
consummate its plans without the federal permits.  The question before this court is whether 
plaintiff has suffered an uncompensated taking as the consequence of federal regulation.  Under 
the specific facts and circumstances of this case, and the tests enunciated by the courts, we 
conclude that plaintiff has not. 
II.ANALYSIS 
A. Basic Constitutional Principles. 
It is well established as a matter of law that government regulation can effect a Fifth 
Amendment taking. While, "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law," 
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Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922), the principle generally applied is 
that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking," id . at 415. 
B. The Crucial Factor Herein and the Parties' Positions. 
The crucial factor in this case is that since the late 1960's the regulatory jurisdiction of the 
Army Corps of Engineers has substantially expanded pursuant to §404 of the FWPCA and - 
under the spur of steadily evolving legislation - the Corps has greatly added to the substantive 
criteria governing the issuance of dredge and fill permits within its jurisdiction.  When Deltona 
initially purchased the Marco Island property in 1964, the regulatory jurisdiction of the Corps 
was limited to "navigable waters of the United States" and the lone substantive criterion for the 
issuance of Corps dredge and fill permits was the likely adverse impact upon navigation.  
Pursuant to this relatively undemanding standard, Deltona routinely succeeded in 1964 in 
obtaining the first permit for which it applied.  By 1976, when the Barfield Bay and Big Key 
applications were denied, the situation had been radically transformed. 
The Corps' jurisdiction now extended to all "navigable waters" and the substantive 
criteria for granting permits had been significantly stiffened.  Deltona's particular stumbling 
block, as we have seen, was its inability to satisfy the Corps' recently inaugurated wetlands 
protection policy. The impact is self-evident.  As the result of an unforeseen change in the law, 
Deltona is no longer able to capitalize upon a reasonable investment-backed expectation which it 
had every justification to rely upon until the law began to change. 
Deltona's position in this litigation is as follows.  First, it claims that it has been deprived 
of all economically viable use of its land.  Second, it argues that even if this factual assertion is 
rejected, it has undeniably been deprived of the highest and best economic use of its land and 
that this constitutes a taking. 
The Government's position is quite the opposite.  It maintains that Deltona has not been 
denied all economically viable use of its land and that Deltona's argument respecting "highest 
and best use" has no basis in the law.  The Government generally asserts that whatever 
detrimental impact Deltona may have suffered, the injury falls well short of what is necessary to 
constitute a taking. 
C. Tests for Determining Whether Regulation Effects a Taking. 
While "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the 
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of 
course, relevant considerations," Penn Central Transp. Co.  v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978), the decisions of the Supreme Court "uniformly react the proposition that diminution in 
property value, standing alone, can establish a 'taking.'" Id. at 131, citing, Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co ., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% diminution in value caused by zoning law); Hadachek v. 
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87.5% diminution in value).  Similarly, the Court has branded as 
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fallacious the "contention that a 'taking' must be found to have occurred whenever the land-use 
restriction may be characterized as imposing a 'servitude' on the claimant's parcel."  Penn Central 
Transp. Co., supra, at 130 n.27. Instead, "the 'taking' issue in these contexts is resolved by 
focusing on the uses the regulations permit." Id. at 131.   In applying the foregoing 
considerations, it is important to bear in mind the Supreme Court's admonition: 
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and 
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely 
abrogated.  In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a 
taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the 
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.... Penn 
Central Transp. Co., supra, at 130-131  
D.  Application of These Tests to the Case at Bar. 
In this case, we take as given that the revisions in the implementing regulations of the 
Army Corps of Engineers, and the entire body of federal navigational and environmental laws to 
which they give effect, substantially advance legitimate and important federal interests.  We have 
every reason to believe that the Corps has been enforcing these new regulations on a uniform 
basis nationwide.  Deltona will therefore share with other landowners both the benefits and 
burdens of the Government's exercise of its Commerce Clause powers. 
Although we have accepted that the expansion of the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction and 
the stiffening of its requirements for granting permits have substantially frustrated Deltona's 
reasonable investment-backed expectation with respect to Barfield Bay and Big Key, this 
development neither "extinguish[es] a fundamental attribute of ownership," [Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, at 262], nor prevents Deltona from deriving many other economically 
viable uses from its parcel – however delineated.  Indeed, the residual economic value of the land 
is enormous, both proportionately and absolutely.  A few statistics will suffice.  In the aggregate, 
Barfield Bay and Big Key contain only 20% of the total acreage of Deltona's original purchase in 
1964 and 33% of the developable lots.  All the necessary federal permits for the development of 
the remainder of Marco Island – Marco River, Roberts Bay, and Collier Bay – have been 
granted.  If we focus solely upon the three construction areas which became subject to the new 
federal restrictions promulgated during the early 1970's – Collier Bay, Barfield Bay, and Big 
Key – the salient fact emerges that while Deltona has been blocked from going forward at 
Barfield Bay and Big Key, it has obtained all the necessary clearances for Collier Bay, a tract 
approximately 25% of the three areas together.  Most striking, even within Barfield Bay and Big 
Key, there are located 111 acres of uplands which can be developed without obtaining a Corps 
 341 
permit and whose total market value is approximately $2.5 million.  Deltona only paid $1.24 
million for all of Barfield Bay and Big Key in 1964.
2
 
Therefore, the statutes and regulations at issue in this case substantially advance 
legitimate and important governmental interests and do not deprive Deltona of the economically 
viable use of its land.  Instead, Deltona's remaining land uses are plentiful and its residual 
economic position very great. 
Moreover, when Deltona acquired the property in 1964, it knew that the development it 
contemplated could take place only if it obtained the necessary permits from the Corps of 
Engineers.  Although at that time Deltona had every reason to believe that those permits would 
be forthcoming when it subsequently sought them, it also must have been aware that the 
standards and conditions governing the issuance of permits could change.  Deltona had no 
assurance that the permits would issue, but only an expectation.  Indeed, five years after Deltona 
acquired the property, it was given notice that its expectancy might never come to fruition when 
it was told, in connection with the issuance of the permit for Roberts Bay, that "the granting of 
this permit does not necessarily mean that future applications for permit or permits in the general 
area of the proposed work by Marco Island Development Corporation or others will be similarly 
granted." 
In Penn Central Transp. Co., the Supreme Court rejected as "quite simply untenable" the 
contention that property owners "may establish a 'taking' simply by showing that they have been 
denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed was available 
for development...." Supra, at 130.  That is precisely this case.  Deltona has been denied the 
ability to exploit its property by constructing a project that it theretofore had believed "was 
available for development." 
While plaintiff may very well be correct in its alternative assertion that it has been denied 
the highest and best economic use for its property, it is obvious from the Supreme Court tests we 
have cited that such an occurrence does not form a sufficient predicate for a taking.  In effect, the 
"highest and best use" argument is merely another way of saying that there has been some 
diminution in value, rather than the complete destruction of all economically viable uses of the 
property.  The Court, however, clearly rejects the notion that diminution in value, by itself, can 
establish a taking.  Notwithstanding the changed phraseology, plaintiff's alternative argument 
fails as a matter of law. 
We are not insensitive to the fact that the permit denials have placed Deltona in a highly 
difficult situation, legally and financially.  The Fifth Amendment, however, does not provide a 
                                                 
2
 Deltona also possesses Transferable Development Rights (TDR's) granted by the county.  According to the Penn 
Central case, supra, at 137, such rights "mitigate whatever financial burdens the law... impose[s]... and, for that 
reason are to be taken into account in considering the impact of regulation."    
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solution.  In addition, Deltona certainly bears a great deal of responsibility for its current plight 
by having rushed into many land sale contracts before having obtained all the necessary federal 
permits which would enable it to meet its obligations.  Note that Deltona had been specifically 
warned against this when it obtained its Roberts Bay permit in 1969.
3
 
In sum, we have rejected plaintiff's argument that the denial of highest and best use can 
constitute a taking.  We have found that subsequent to Deltona's purchase of the land in question, 
a significant change occurred in the statutes and regulations affecting its land-use, and that this 
development did have a significant impact upon the values incident to Deltona's Marco Island 
property.  However, in view of the many remaining economically viable uses for plaintiff's 
property, and the substantial public benefits which the new statutes and regulations serve to bring 
about, we have concluded that no taking occurred. 
III. CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The court concludes as a matter of law that plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and the 
petition is dismissed. 
                                                 
3
 Because of our ultimate disposition of this cause, it is unnecessary to consider the impact of the federal 
navigational servitude upon the issues herein.  See generally Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
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PART V. THE TAXING POWER 
“The power of taxing the people and their property is essential to the very 
existence of government and may be legitimately exercised on the objects to 
which it is applicable to the utmost extent to which the government may choose to 
carry it.” CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 
(1819). 
Session 15. Federal Taxes 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 
Article I (1789) 
Section 8, Clause 1: 
The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, 
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United 
States. 
Section 9, Clause 4: 
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in 
proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to 
be taken 
 
POLLOCK v. FARMERS' LOAN AND TRUST COMPANY 
157 U.S. 429 (1895) 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the case as above reported, delivered the 
opinion of the court:  
The contention of the complainant is:  
First.  That the law in question, in imposing a tax on the income or rents of real estate, 
imposes a tax upon the real estate itself; and in imposing a tax on the interest or other income of 
bonds or other personal property held for the purposes of income or ordinarily yielding income, 
imposes a tax upon the personal estate itself; that such tax is a direct tax, and void because 
imposed without regard to the rule of apportionment; and that by reason thereof the whole law is 
invalidated.  
Second.  That the law is invalid, because imposing indirect taxes in violation of the 
constitutional requirement of uniformity; and therein also in violation of the implied limitation 
upon taxation that all tax laws must apply equally, impartially, and uniformly to all similarly 
situated.   
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The Constitution provides that representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned 
among the several States according to numbers, and that no direct tax shall be laid except 
according to the enumeration provided for; and also that all duties, imposts and excises shall be 
uniform throughout the United States.  
The States were about, for all national purposes embraced in the Constitution, to become 
one, united under the same sovereign authority, and governed by the same laws.  But as they still 
retained their jurisdiction over all persons and things within their territorial limits, except where 
surrendered to the general government or restrained by the Constitution, they were careful to see 
to it that taxation and representation should go together, so that the sovereignty reserved should 
not be impaired, and that when Congress, and especially the House of Representatives, where it 
was specifically provided that all revenue bills must originate, voted a tax upon property, it 
should be with the consciousness, and under the responsibility, that in so doing the tax so voted 
would proportionately fall upon the immediate constituents of those who imposed it.  
More than this, by the Constitution the States not only gave to the Nation the concurrent 
power to tax persons and property directly, but they surrendered their own power to levy taxes 
on imports and to regulate commerce.  All the thirteen were seaboard States, but they varied in 
maritime importance, and differences existed between them in population, in wealth, in the 
character of property and of business interests.  Moreover, they looked forward to the coming of 
new States from the great West into the vast empire of their anticipations.  So when the wealthier 
States as between themselves and their less favored associates, and all as between themselves 
and their less favored associates, and all as between themselves and those who were to come, 
gave up for the common good the great sources of revenue derived through commerce, they did 
so in reliance on the protection afforded by restrictions on the grant of power.  
Thus, in the matter of taxation, the Constitution recognizes the two great classes of direct 
and indirect taxes, and lays down two rules by which their imposition must be governed, namely: 
The rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule of uniformity as to duties, imposts and 
excises.  
The rule of uniformity was not prescribed to the exercise of the power granted by the first 
paragraph of section eight, to lay and collect taxes, because the rule of apportionment as to taxes 
had already been laid down in the third paragraph of the second section.  
And this view was expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Chase in The License Tax Cases, 5 
Wall. 462, 471, when he said: "It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive 
power.  It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications.  
Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and 
indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and 
may be exercised at discretion."  
The first question to be considered is whether a tax on the rents or income of real estate is 
a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution.  Ordinarily all taxes paid primarily by 
persons who can shift the burden upon someone else, or who are under no legal compulsion to 
pay them, are considered indirect taxes; but a tax upon property holders in respect of their 
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estates, whether real or personal, or of the income yielded by such estates, and the payment of 
which cannot be avoided, are direct taxes.  Nevertheless, it may be admitted that although this 
definition of direct taxes is prima facie correct, and to be applied in the consideration of the 
question before us, yet that the Constitution may bear a different meaning, and that such different 
meaning must be recognized.  But in arriving at any conclusion upon this point, we are at liberty 
to refer to the historical circumstances attending the framing and adoption of the Constitution as 
well as the entire frame and scheme of the instrument, and the consequences naturally attendant 
upon the one construction or the other.  
We inquire, therefore, what, at the time the Constitution was framed and adopted, were 
recognized as direct taxes? What did those who framed and adopted it understand the terms to 
designate and include?  
Congress under the articles of confederation had no actual operative power of taxation. It 
could call upon the States for their respective contributions or quotas as previously determined 
on; but in case of the failure or omission of the States to furnish such contribution, there were no 
means of  compulsion, as Congress had no power whatever to lay any tax upon individuals.  This 
imperatively demanded a remedy; but the opposition to granting the power of direct taxation in 
addition to the substantially exclusive power of laying imposts and duties was so strong that it 
required the convention, in securing effective powers of taxation to the Federal government, to 
use the utmost care and skill to so harmonize conflicting interests that the ratification of the 
instrument could be obtained.  
The people, through that instrument, established a more perfect union by substituting a 
national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the 
confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the States.  But 
in many articles of the Constitution the necessary existence of the States, and within their proper 
spheres, the independent authority of the States, is distinctly recognized.   
It is apparent that the original expectation was that the power of direct taxation would be 
exercised only in extraordinary exigencies, and down to August 15, 1894, this expectation has 
been realized.  The act of that date was passed in a time of profound peace, and if we assume that 
no special exigency called for unusual legislation, and that resort to this mode of taxation is to 
become an ordinary and usual means of supply, that fact furnishes an additional reason for 
circumspection and care in disposing of the case.  
It is conceded in all these cases that taxes on land are direct taxes. [And] we admit that it 
may not unreasonably be said that logically, if taxes on the rents, issues and profits of real estate 
are equivalent to taxes on real estate, and are therefore direct taxes, taxes on the income of 
personal property as such are equivalent to taxes on such property, and therefore direct taxes.    
We are of opinion that the law in question, so far as it levies a tax on the rents or income 
of real estate, is in violation of the Constitution, and is invalid.  
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.  
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The decisions of this court hold that the collection of a tax levied by the government of 
the United States, will not be restrained by its courts.  Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85; 
Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189. See also Elliott v. The same authorities have established the rule 
that the proper course, in a case of illegal taxation, is to pay the tax under protest or with notice 
of suit, and then bring an action against the officer who collected it.  The statute law of the 
United States, in express terms, gives a party who has paid a tax under protest the right to sue for 
its recovery.  Rev. Stat. § 3226.  
The act of 1867 forbids the maintenance of any suit "for the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax." The provisions of this act are now found in Rev. Stat. § 
3224.  
The complainant is seeking to do the very thing which, according to the statute and the 
decisions above referred to, may not be done.  If the corporator cannot have the collection of the 
tax enjoined it seems obvious that he cannot have the corporation enjoined from paying it, and 
thus do by indirection what he cannot do directly.  
The rule which forbids the granting of an injunction to restrain the collection of a tax is 
founded on broad reasons of public policy and should not be ignored. While a free course of 
remonstrance and appeal is allowed within the departments before the money is finally exacted, 
the general government has wisely made the payment of the tax claimed, whether of customs or 
of internal revenue, a condition precedent to a resort to the courts by the party against whom the 
tax is assessed.   
This brings me to the consideration of the merits of the cause.  
The constitutional provisions respecting Federal taxation vest in the United States plenary 
powers of taxation, that is, all the powers which belong to a government ….  In deciding, then, 
the question of whether the income tax violates the Constitution, we have to determine not the 
existence of a power in Congress, but whether an admittedly unlimited power to tax has been 
used according to the restrictions as to methods for its exercise, found in the Constitution.  I can 
discover no[ne].    
Mr. Justice Harlan authorizes me to say that he concurs in the views herein expressed.  
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN further dissenting.   
I concur so entirely in the general views expressed by Mr. Justice White in reference to 
the questions disposed of by the opinion and judgment of the majority, that I will do no more 
than indicate, without argument, the conclusions reached by me after much consideration.  Those 
conclusions are:  
1. Giving due effect to the statutory provision that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court," Rev. Stat. § 3224, 
the decree below dismissing the bill should be affirmed. As the Farmers' Loan and Trust 
Company could not itself maintain a suit to restrain either the assessment or collection of 
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the tax imposed by the act of Congress, the maintenance of a suit by a stockholder to 
restrain that corporation and its directors from voluntarily paying such tax would tend to 
defeat the manifest object of the statute, and be an evasion of its provisions.  Congress 
intended to forbid the issuing of any process that would interfere in anywise with the 
prompt collection of the taxes imposed.  The present suits are mere devices to strike 
down a general revenue law by decrees, to which neither the government nor any officer 
of the United States could be rightfully made parties of record.  
2. Upon principle, and under the doctrines announced by this court in numerous cases, a 
duty upon the gains, profits, and income derived from the rents of land is not a "direct" 
tax on such land within the meaning of the constitutional provisions requiring capitation 
or other direct taxes to be apportioned among the several States, according to their 
respective numbers determined in the mode prescribed by that instrument.  Such a duty 
may be imposed by Congress without apportioning the same among the States according 
to population.  
U.S. CONSTITUTION 
Amendment 16 (1913) 
 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever 
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any 
census or enumeration. 
 
BRUSHABER v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 
240 U.S. 1 (1916) 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.  
As a stockholder of the Union Pacific Railroad Company the appellant filed his bill to 
enjoin the corporation from complying with the Income Tax provisions of the Tariff Act of 
October 3, 1913, Because of constitutional questions duly arising the case is here on direct 
appeal from a decree sustaining a motion to dismiss because no ground for relief was stated.  
The right to prevent the corporation from returning and paying the tax was based upon 
many averments as to the repugnancy of the statute to the Constitution of the United States. To 
put out of the way a question of jurisdiction we at once say that in view of these averments and 
the ruling in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., sustaining the right of a stockholder to sue to 
restrain a corporation under proper averments from voluntarily paying a tax charged to be 
unconstitutional on the ground that to permit such a suit did not violate the prohibitions of § 
3224, Rev. Stat.,  against enjoining the enforcement of taxes, we are of opinion that the 
contention here made that there was no jurisdiction of the cause since to entertain it would 
violate the provisions of the Revised Statutes referred to is without merit.  Before coming to 
dispose of the case on the merits, however, we observe that the defendant corporation having 
called the attention of the Government to the pendency of the cause and the nature of the 
controversy and its unwillingness to voluntarily refuse to comply with the act assailed, the 
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United States as amicus curiae has at bar been heard both orally and by brief for the purpose of 
sustaining the decree.  
The [Petitioners’] grounds charge a repugnancy of the statute to the Sixteenth 
Amendment under the more immediate sanction of which the statute was adopted.  [They are] 
made clear by generalizing the many contentions advanced in argument to support it, as follows: 
(a) The Amendment authorizes only a particular character of direct tax without apportionment, 
and therefore if a tax is levied under its assumed authority which does not partake of the 
characteristics exacted by the Amendment, it is outside of the Amendment and is void as a direct 
tax in the general constitutional sense because not apportioned.  (b) As the Amendment 
authorizes a tax only upon incomes "from whatever source derived," the exclusion from taxation 
of some income of designated persons and classes is not authorized and hence the 
constitutionality of the law must be tested by the general provisions of the Constitution as to 
taxation, and thus again the tax is void for want of apportionment. (c) As the right to tax 
"incomes from whatever source derived" for which the Amendment provides must be considered 
as exacting intrinsic uniformity, therefore no tax comes under the authority of the Amendment 
not conforming to such standard, and hence all the provisions of the assailed statute must once 
more be tested solely under the general and preexisting provisions of the Constitution, causing 
the statute again to be void in the absence of apportionment. (d) As the power conferred by the 
Amendment is new and prospective, the attempt in the statute to make its provisions 
retroactively apply is void because so far as the retroactive period is concerned, it is governed by 
the preexisting constitutional requirement as to apportionment.  
But … the proposition and the contentions, if acceded to, would cause one provision of 
the Constitution to destroy another; that is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the 
Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into irreconcilable conflict with the 
general requirement that all direct taxes be apportioned.  Moreover, the tax authorized by the 
Amendment, being direct, would not come under the rule of uniformity applicable under the 
Constitution to other than direct taxes, and thus it would come to pass that the result of the 
Amendment would be to authorize a particular direct tax not subject either to apportionment or 
to the rule of geographical uniformity, thus giving power to impose a different tax in one State or 
States than was levied in another State or States.  This result instead of simplifying the situation 
and making clear the limitations on the taxing power, which obviously the Amendment must 
have been intended to accomplish, would create radical and destructive changes in our 
constitutional system and multiply confusion.  
That the authority conferred upon Congress by § 8 of Article I "to lay and collect taxes, 
duties, imposts and excises" is exhaustive and embraces every conceivable power of taxation has 
never been questioned.  [As] thus aptly stated by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Pollock v. Farmers' 
Loan & Trust Company: "In the matter of taxation, the Constitution recognizes the two great 
classes of direct and indirect taxes, and lays down two rules by which their imposition must be 
governed, namely: The rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule of uniformity as to 
duties, imposts and excises." 
In the whole history of the Government down to the time of the adoption of the Sixteenth 
Amendment, no question has been anywhere made as to the correctness of these propositions.   
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This is the text of the Amendment:  
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment 
among the several States, and without regard to any census or 
enumeration."  
It is clear on the face of this text that it does not purport to confer power to levy income 
taxes in a generic sense -- an authority already possessed and never questioned -- or to limit and 
distinguish between one kind of income taxes and another, but that the whole purpose of the 
Amendment was to relieve all income taxes when imposed from apportionment from a 
consideration of the source whence the income was derived.   
We come then to ascertain the merits of the many contentions made in the light of the 
Constitution as it now stands, that is to say, including within its terms the provisions of the 
Sixteenth Amendment as correctly interpreted.  We first dispose of two propositions assailing the 
validity of the statute on the one hand because of its repugnancy to the Constitution in other 
respects, and especially because its enactment was not authorized by the Sixteenth Amendment.  
So far as the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is relied upon, it suffices to say 
that there is no basis for such reliance since it is equally well settled that such clause is not a 
limitation upon the taxing power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution; in other words, 
that the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring upon the one hand a taxing power 
and taking the same power away on the other by the limitations of the due process clause. And 
no change in the situation here would arise even if it be conceded, as we think it must be, that 
this doctrine would have no application in a case where although there was a seeming exercise of 
the taxing power, the act complained of was so arbitrary as to constrain to the conclusion that it 
was not the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of property, that is, a taking of the same in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment, or, what is equivalent thereto, was so wanting in basis for 
classification as to produce such a gross and patent inequality as to inevitably lead to the same 
conclusion.  We say this because none of the propositions relied upon in the remotest degree 
present such questions.  It is true that it is elaborately insisted that although there be no express 
constitutional provision prohibiting it, the progressive feature of the tax causes it to transcend the 
conception of all taxation and to be a mere arbitrary abuse of power which must be treated as 
wanting in due process.  But the proposition disregards the fact that in the very early history of 
the Government a progressive tax was imposed by Congress and that such authority was exerted 
in some if not all of the various income taxes enacted prior to 1894 to which we have previously 
adverted.   
And over and above all this the contention but disregards the further fact that its absolute 
want of foundation in reason was plainly pointed out in Knowlton v. Moore, supra, and the right 
to urge it was necessarily foreclosed by the ruling in that case made.  In this situation it is of 
course superfluous to say that arguments as to the expediency of levying such taxes or of the 
economic mistake or wrong involved in their imposition are beyond judicial cognizance. Besides 
this demonstration of the want of merit in the contention based upon the progressive feature of 
the tax, the error in the others is equally well established either by prior decisions or by the 
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adequate bases for classification which are apparent on the face of the assailed provisions, that is, 
the distinction between individuals and corporations, the difference between various kinds of 
corporations, etc., etc.   
In fact, comprehensively surveying all the contentions  relied upon, aside from the 
erroneous construction of the Amendment which we have previously disposed of, we cannot 
escape the conclusion that they all rest upon the mistaken theory that although there be 
differences between the subjects taxed, to differently tax them transcends the limit of taxation 
and amounts to a want of due process, and that where a tax levied is believed by one who resists 
its enforcement to be wanting in wisdom and to operate injustice, from that fact in the nature of 
things there arises a want of due process of law and a resulting authority in the judiciary to 
exceed its powers and correct what is assumed to be mistaken or unwise exertions by the 
legislative authority of its lawful powers, even although there be no semblance of warrant in the 
Constitution for so doing.  
We have not referred to a contention that because certain administrative powers to enforce the 
act were conferred by the statute upon the Secretary of the Treasury, therefore it was void as 
unwarrantedly delegating legislative authority, because we think to state the proposition is to 
answer it.  Affirmed. 
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NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS v. SEBELIUS 
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) [Taxing Power] 
Today we resolve [a] constitutional challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act of 2010: the individual mandate, which requires individuals to purchase a health 
insurance policy. providing a minimum level of coverage; and the Medicaid expansion, which 
ives funds to the We do not consider whether the Act embodies sound policies. That judgment is 
entrusted to the Nation's elected leaders. We ask only whether Congress has the power under the 
Constitution to enact the challenged provisions. 
* 
* 
* 
[Opinion by Chief Justices Roberts joined by Justices  Ginsburg,  Breyer, Sotomayer and Kagan  
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito dissent] 
Congress may "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and  general Welfare of the United States." U.S. Const., Art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 1. Put simply, Congress may tax and spend. This grant gives the Federal Government 
considerable influence even in areas where it cannot directly regulate. The Federal Government 
may enact a tax on an activity that it cannot authorize, forbid, or otherwise control.  The reach of 
the Federal Government's enumerated powers is broader  still because the Constitution 
authorizes Congress to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution  the foregoing Powers." Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. We have long read this provision to give 
Congress great latitude in exercising its powers. 
Our permissive reading is explained in part by a general reticence to invalidate the acts of 
the Nation's elected leaders. Members of this Court are vested with the authority to interpret the 
law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments. Those 
decisions are entrusted to our Nation's elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the 
people disagree with them. It is not our job to protect the people from the consequences of their 
political choices. 
The questions before us must be considered against the background of these basic 
principles. 
* 
* 
* 
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Before turning to the merits, we need to be sure we have the authority to do so. The Anti-
Injunction Act provides that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection 
of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the 
person against whom such tax was assessed." 26 U.S.C. §7421(a).  This statute protects the 
Government's ability to collect a consistent stream of revenue, by barring litigation to enjoin or 
otherwise obstruct  the collection of taxes. Because of the Anti-Injunction Act, taxes can 
ordinarily be challenged only after they are paid, by suing for a refund.  
The penalty for not complying with the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate first 
becomes enforceable in 2014. The present challenge to the mandate thus seeks to restrain the 
penalty's future collection. Amicus contends that the Internal Revenue Code treats the penalty as 
a tax, and that the Anti-Injunction Act therefore bars this suit. 
The text of the pertinent statutes suggests otherwise.  The Anti-Injunction Act applies to 
suits "for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax." §7421(a) (emphasis 
added). Congress, however, chose to describe the "[s]hared responsibility payment" imposed on 
those who forgo health insurance not as a "tax," but as a "penalty." There is no immediate reason 
to think that a statute applying to "any tax" would apply to a "penalty." 
Amicus argues that even though Congress did not label the shared responsibility payment 
a tax, we should treat it as such under the Anti-Injunction Act because it functions like a tax.  It 
is true that Congress cannot change whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty for constitutional 
purposes simply by describing it as one or the other.  
The Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act, however, are creatures of 
Congress's own creation. How they relate to each other is up to Congress, and the best evidence 
of Congress's intent is the statutory text. Congress can, of course, describe something as a 
penalty but direct that it nonetheless be treated as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. 
[But] the Government argues that [the Affordable Care Act ] does not direct courts to apply the 
Anti-Injunction Act, because [it ] only [directs] Secretary of the Treasury to use the same " 
'methodology and procedures' " to collect the penalty that he uses to collect taxes.  
We think the Government has the better reading. The Affordable Care Act does not 
require that the penalty for failing to comply with the individual mandate be treated as a tax for 
purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. The Anti-Injunction Act therefore does not apply to this 
suit, and we may proceed to the merits. 
III 
According to the Government, the only effect of the individual mandate is to raise taxes 
on those who do not do so, and thus the law may be upheld as a tax.The Government's argument  
[is]  that the mandate may be upheld as within Congress's enumerated power to "lay and collect 
Taxes." Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Government asks us to read the mandate not as ordering individuals 
to buy insurance, but rather as imposing a tax on those who do not buy that product. 
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The text of a statute can sometimes have more than one possible meaning. To take a 
familiar example, a law that reads "no vehicles in the park" might, or might not, ban bicycles in 
the park. And it is well established that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which 
violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so. Justice Story said 
that 180 years ago: "No court ought, unless the terms of an act rendered it unavoidable, to give a 
construction to it which should involve a violation, however unintentional, of the constitution." 
Parsons v. Bedford, (1830).  Justice Holmes made the same point a century later: "[T]he rule is 
settled  that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be 
unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act." 
Blodgett v. Holden (1927) (concurring opinion). 
The most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to 
purchase insurance. After all, it states that individuals "shall" maintain health insurance. 
Congress thought it could enact such a command under the Commerce Clause, and the 
Government primarily defended the law on that basis. But, for the reasons explained above, the 
Commerce Clause does not give Congress that power. Under our precedent, it is therefore 
necessary to ask whether the Government's alternative reading of the statute--that it only imposes 
a tax on those without insurance--is a reasonable one. 
Under the mandate, if an individual does not maintain health insurance, the only 
consequence is that he must make an additional payment to the IRS when he pays his taxes. 
That, according to the Government, means the mandate can be regarded as establishing a 
condition--not owning health insurance--that triggers a tax--the required payment to the IRS. 
Under that theory, the mandate is not a legal command to buy insurance. Rather, it makes going 
without insurance just another thing the Government taxes, like buying gasoline or earning 
income. And if the mandate is in effect just a tax hike on certain taxpayers who do not have 
health insurance, it may be within Congress's constitutional power to tax. 
The question is not whether that is the most natural interpretation of the mandate, but 
only whether it is a "fairly possible" one. As we have explained, "every reasonable construction 
must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality." Hooper v. California 
(1895). The Government asks us to interpret the mandate as imposing a tax, if it would otherwise 
violate the Constitution. Granting the Act the full measure of deference owed to federal statutes, 
it can be so read, for the reasons set forth below. 
The exaction the Affordable Care Act imposes on those without health insurance looks 
like a tax in many respects. The "[s]hared responsibility payment," as the statute entitles it, is 
paid into the Treasury by "taxpayer[s]" when they file their tax returns. It does not apply to 
individuals who do not pay federal income taxes because their household income is less than the 
filing threshold in the Internal Revenue Code. For taxpayers who do owe the payment, its 
amount is determined by such familiar factors as taxable income, number of dependents, and 
joint filing status. The requirement to pay is found in the Internal Revenue Code and enforced by 
the IRS, which--as we previously explained--must assess and collect it "in the same manner as 
taxes." This process yields the essential feature of any tax: it produces at least some revenue for 
the Government. Indeed, the payment is expected to raise about $4 billion per year by 2017.  
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It is of course true that the Act describes the payment as a "penalty," not a "tax." But 
while that label is fatal to the application of the Anti-Injunction Act it does not determine 
whether the payment may be viewed as an exercise of Congress's taxing power.  It is up to 
Congress whether to apply the Anti-Injunction Act to any particular statute, so it makes sense to 
be guided by Congress's choice of label on that question. That choice does not, however, control 
whether an exaction is within Congress's constitutional power to tax. 
Our precedent reflects this: In 1922, we decided two challenges to the "Child Labor Tax" 
on the same day. In the first, we held that a suit to enjoin collection of the so-called tax was 
barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. Congress knew that suits to obstruct taxes had to await 
payment under the Anti-Injunction Act; Congress called the child labor tax a tax; Congress 
therefore intended the Anti-Injunction Act to apply. In the second case, however, we held that 
the same exaction, although labeled a tax, was not in fact authorized by Congress's  taxing 
power. Drexel Furniture. That constitutional question was not controlled by Congress's choice of 
label. 
We have similarly held that exactions not labeled taxes nonetheless were authorized by 
Congress's power to tax. In the License Tax Cases, for example, we held that federal licenses to 
sell liquor and lottery tickets--for which the licensee had to pay a fee--could be sustained as 
exercises of the taxing power. 5 Wall., And in New York v. United States we upheld as a tax a 
"surcharge" on out-of-state nuclear waste shipments, a portion of which was paid to the Federal 
Treasury. We thus ask whether the shared responsibility payment falls within Congress's taxing 
power, "[d]isregarding the designation of the exaction, and viewing its substance and 
application." United States v. Constantine (1935). 
Our cases confirm this functional approach. The analysis here suggests that the shared 
responsibility payment may for constitutional purposes be considered a tax, not a penalty: First, 
for most Americans the amount due will be far less than the  price of insurance, and, by statute,  
it can never be more. It may often be a reasonable financial decision to make the payment rather 
than purchase insurance.  Second, the individual mandate contains no scienter requirement. 
Third, the payment is collected solely by the IRS through the normal means of taxation--except 
that the Service is not allowed to use those means most suggestive of a punitive sanction, such as 
criminal prosecution.  
None of this is to say that the payment is not intended to affect individual conduct. 
Although the payment will raise considerable revenue, it is plainly designed to expand health 
insurance coverage. But taxes that seek to influence conduct are nothing new. Some of our 
earliest federal taxes sought to deter the purchase of imported manufactured goods in order to 
foster the growth of domestic industry. Today, federal and state taxes can compose more than 
half the retail price of cigarettes, not just to raise more money, but to encourage people to quit 
smoking. And we have upheld such obviously regulatory measures as taxes on selling marijuana 
and sawed-off shotguns. Indeed,  "[e]very tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it 
interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed." 
That §5000A seeks to shape decisions about whether to buy health insurance does not mean that 
it cannot be a valid exercise of the taxing power. 
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In distinguishing penalties from taxes, this Court has explained that "if the concept of 
penalty means anything, it means punishment for an unlawful act or omission." United States 
v.Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (1996). While the individual mandate clearly 
aims to induce the purchase of health insurance, it need not be read to declare that failing to do 
so is unlawful. Neither the Act nor any other law attaches negative legal consequences to not 
buying health insurance, beyond requiring a payment to the IRS. The Government agrees with 
that reading, confirming that if someone chooses to pay rather than obtain health insurance, they 
have fully complied with the law.  
Indeed, it is estimated that four million people each year will choose to pay the IRS rather 
than buy insurance. We would expect Congress to be troubled by that prospect if such conduct 
were unlawful. That Congress apparently regards such extensive failure to comply with the 
mandate as tolerable suggests that Congress did not think it was creating four million outlaws. It 
suggests instead that the shared responsibility payment merely imposes a tax citizens may 
lawfully choose to pay in lieu of buying health insurance. 
The plaintiffs contend that Congress's choice of language--stating that individuals "shall" 
obtain insurance or pay a "penalty"--requires reading §5000A as punishing unlawful conduct, 
even if that interpretation would render the law unconstitutional. We have rejected a similar 
argument before. In New York v. United States we examined a statute providing that " '[e]ach 
State shall be responsible for providing . . . for the disposal of . . . low-level radioactive waste.'  
A State that shipped its waste to another State was exposed to surcharges by the receiving State, 
a portion of which would be paid over to the Federal Government. And a State that did not 
adhere to the statutory scheme faced "[p]enalties for failure to comply," including increases in 
the surcharge. New York urged us to read the statute as a federal command that the state 
legislature enact legislation to dispose of its waste, which would have violated the Constitution. 
To avoid that outcome, we interpreted the statute to impose only "a series of incentives" for the 
State to take responsibility for its waste. We then sustained the charge paid to the Federal 
Government as an exercise of the taxing power. We see no insurmountable obstacle to a similar 
approach here.
10
 
The joint dissenters argue that we cannot uphold §5000A as a tax because Congress did 
not "frame" it as such. In effect, they contend that even if the Constitution permits Congress to 
do exactly what we interpret this statute to do, the law must be struck down because Congress 
used the wrong labels. Our precedent demonstrates that Congress had the power to impose the 
exaction in §5000A under the taxing power, and that §5000A need not be read to do more than 
impose a tax. That is sufficient to sustain it.   
Even if the taxing power enables Congress to impose a tax on not obtaining health 
insurance, any tax must still comply with other requirements in the Constitution. Plaintiffs argue 
that the shared responsibility payment does not do so, citing  Article I, § 9, clause 4. That clause 
provides: "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or 
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken." This requirement means that any "direct Tax" 
must be apportioned so that each State pays in proportion to its population. According to the 
plaintiffs, if the individual mandate imposes a tax, it is a direct tax, and it is unconstitutional 
because Congress made no effort to apportion it among the States. 
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Even when the Direct Tax Clause was written it was unclear what else, other than a 
capitation (also known as a "head tax" or a "poll tax"), might be a direct tax. Soon after the 
framing, Congress passed a tax on ownership of carriages, over James Madison's objection that it 
was an unapportioned direct tax. This Court upheld the tax, in part reasoning that apportioning 
such a tax would make little sense, because it would have required taxing carriage owners at 
dramatically different rates depending on how many carriages were in their home State. See 
Hylton v. United States, (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.). The Court was unanimous, and those 
Justices who wrote opinions either directly asserted or strongly suggested that only two forms of 
taxation were direct: capitations and land taxes.  
That narrow view of what a direct tax might be persisted for a century.  In 1895, we 
expanded our interpretation to include taxes on personal property and income from personal 
property, in the course of striking down aspects of the federal income tax. Pollock v. Farmers' 
Loan & Trust Co., (1895). That result was overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment, although we 
continued to consider taxes on personal property to be direct taxes.  
A tax on going without health insurance does not fall within any recognized category of 
direct  tax. It is not a capitation. Capitations are taxes paid by every person, "without regard to 
property, profession, or any other circumstance." The whole point of the shared responsibility 
payment is that it is triggered by specific circumstances--earning a certain amount of income but 
not obtaining health insurance. The payment is also plainly not a tax on the ownership of land or 
personal property. The shared responsibility payment is thus not a direct tax that must be 
apportioned among the several States. 
There may, however, be a more fundamental objection to a tax on those who lack health 
insurance. Even if only a tax, the payment under §5000A (b) remains a burden that the Federal 
Government imposes for an omission, not an act. If it is troubling to interpret the Commerce 
Clause as authorizing Congress to regulate those who abstain from commerce, perhaps it should 
be similarly troubling to permit Congress to impose a tax for not doing something. 
Three considerations allay this concern. First, and most importantly, it is abundantly clear 
the Constitution does not guarantee that individuals may avoid taxation through inactivity. A 
capitation, after all, is a tax that everyone must pay simply for existing, and capitations are 
expressly contemplated by the Constitution. The Court today holds that our Constitution protects 
us from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause so long as we abstain from the regulated 
activity. But from its creation, the Constitution has made no such promise with respect to taxes. 
See Letter from Benjamin Franklin to M. Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789) ("Our new Constitution is now 
established . . . but in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes"). 
Whether the mandate can be upheld under the Commerce Clause is a question about the 
scope of federal authority. Its answer depends on whether Congress can exercise what all 
acknowledge to be the novel course of directing individuals to purchase insurance. Congress's 
use of the Taxing Clause to encourage buying something is, by contrast, not new. Tax incentives 
already promote, for example, purchasing homes and professional educations. Sustaining the 
mandate as a tax depends only on whether Congress has properly exercised its taxing power to 
encourage purchasing health insurance, not whether it can. Upholding the individual mandate 
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under the Taxing Clause thus does not recognize any new federal power. It determines that 
Congress has used an existing one. 
Second, Congress's ability to use its taxing power to influence conduct is not without 
limits. A few of our cases policed these limits aggressively, invalidating punitive exactions 
obviously designed to regulate behavior otherwise regarded at the time as beyond federal 
authority. More often and more recently we have declined to closely examine the regulatory 
motive or effect of revenue-raising measures. We have nonetheless maintained that " 'there 
comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its 
character as such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and 
punishment.'  
We have already explained that the shared responsibility payment's practical 
characteristics pass muster as a tax under our narrowest interpretations of the taxing power. 
Because the tax at hand is within even those strict limits, we need not here decide the precise 
point at which an exaction becomes so punitive that the taxing power does not authorize it.  It 
remains true, however, that the " 'power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.' 
Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
Third, although the breadth of Congress's power to tax is greater than its power to 
regulate commerce, the taxing power does not give Congress the same degree of control over 
individual behavior. Once we recognize that Congress may regulate a particular decision under 
the Commerce Clause, the Federal Government can bring its full weight to bear. Congress may 
simply command individuals to do as it directs. An individual who disobeys may be subjected to 
criminal sanctions.  Those sanctions can include not only fines and imprisonment, but all the 
attendant consequences of being branded a criminal: deprivation of otherwise protected civil 
rights, such as the right to bear arms or vote in elections; loss of employment opportunities; 
social stigma; and severe disabilities in other controversies, such as custody or immigration 
disputes. 
By contrast, Congress's authority under the taxing power is limited to requiring an 
individual to pay money into the Federal Treasury, no more. If a tax is properly paid, the 
Government has no power to compel or punish individuals subject to it. We do not make light of 
the severe burden that taxation--especially taxation motivated by a regulatory purpose--can 
impose. But  imposition of a tax nonetheless leaves an individual with a lawful choice to do or 
not do a  certain act, so long as he is willing to pay a tax levied on that choice. 
The Affordable Care Act's requirement that certain individuals pay a financial penalty for 
not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be characterized as a tax. Because the 
Constitution permits such a tax, it is not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or 
fairness. 
The Federal Government does not have the power to order people to buy health 
insurance. [The individual mandate] would therefore be unconstitutional if read as a command. 
The Federal Government does have the power to impose a tax on those without health insurance. 
[The individual mandate]is therefore constitutional, because it can reasonably be read as a tax. 
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[Dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito] 
Congress has set out to remedy the problem that the best health care is beyond the reach 
of many Americans who cannot afford it. It can assuredly do that, by exercising the powers 
accorded to it under the Constitution. The question in this case, however, is whether the complex 
structures and provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act 
or ACA) go beyond those powers. We conclude that they do. 
This case is in one respect difficult: it presents two questions of first impression. The first 
of those is whether failure to engage in economic activity (the purchase of health insurance) is 
subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause. Failure to act does result in an effect on 
commerce, and hence might be said to come under this Court's "affecting commerce" criterion of 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. But in none of its decisions has this Court extended the Clause 
that far.  
The second question is whether the congressional power to tax and spend, U.S. Const., 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, permits the conditioning of a State's continued receipt of all funds under a 
massive state-administered federal welfare program upon its acceptance of an expansion to that 
program.  
* 
* 
* 
The Act before us here exceeds federal power both in mandating the purchase of health 
insurance and in denying nonconsenting States all Medicaid funding. These parts of the Act are 
central to its design and operation, and all the Act's other provisions would not have been 
enacted without them. In our view it must follow that the entire statute is inoperative. 
The Taxing Power 
As far as §5000A is concerned, we would stop there. Congress has attempted to regulate 
beyond the scope of its Commerce Clause authority, and §5000A is therefore invalid. The 
Government contends, however, that "THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION IS 
INDEPENDENTLY AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS'S TAXING POWER."  The phrase 
"independently authorized" suggests the existence of a creature never hitherto seen in the United 
States Reports: A penalty for constitutional purposes that is also a tax for constitutional 
purposes. In all our cases the two are mutually exclusive. The provision challenged under the 
Constitution is either a penalty or else a tax. Of course in many cases what was a regulatory 
mandate enforced by a penalty could have been imposed as a tax upon permissible action; or 
what was imposed as a tax upon permissible action could have been a regulatory mandate 
enforced by a penalty. But we know of no case, and the Government cites none, in which the 
imposition was, for constitutional purposes, both. The two are mutually exclusive. It is important 
to bear this in mind in evaluating the tax argument of the Government and of those who support 
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it: The issue is not whether Congress had the power to frame the minimum-coverage provision as 
a tax, but whether it did so. 
In answering that question we must, if "fairly possible," Crowell v. Benson, (1932), 
construe the provision to be a tax rather than a mandate-with-penalty, since that would render it 
constitutional rather than unconstitutional (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). But we cannot 
rewrite the statute to be what it is not.” In this case, there is simply no way, "without doing 
violence to the fair meaning of the words used," to escape what Congress enacted: a mandate that 
individuals maintain minimum essential coverage, enforced by a penalty. 
Our cases establish a clear line between a tax and a penalty: “[A] tax is an enforced 
contribution to provide for the support of government; a penalty . . . is an exaction imposed by 
statute as punishment for an unlawful act.” United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of 
Utah, Inc., (1996).  In a few cases, this Court has held that a "tax" imposed upon private conduct 
was so onerous as to be in effect a penalty. But we have never held--never--that a penalty 
imposed for violation of the law was so trivial as to be in effect a tax. We have never held that 
any exaction imposed for violation of the law is an exercise of Congress' taxing power--even 
when the statute calls it a tax, much less when (as here) the statute repeatedly calls it a penalty. 
When an act "adopt[s] the criteria of wrongdoing" and then imposes a monetary penalty as the 
"principal consequence on those who transgress its standard," it creates a regulatory penalty, not 
a tax. Child Labor Tax Case (1922). 
So the question is, quite simply, whether the exaction here is imposed for violation of the law. It 
unquestionably is. The minimum-coverage provision is found in 26 U.S.C. §5000A, entitled 
"Requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage." (Emphasis added.) It commands that 
every "applicable individual shall . . . ensure that the individual . . . is covered under minimum 
essential coverage." Ibid. (emphasis added). And the immediately following provision states that, 
"[i]f . . . an applicable individual . . . fails to meet the requirement of subsection (a) . . . there is 
hereby imposed . . . a penalty." §5000A(b) (emphasis added).  
We never have classified as a tax an exaction imposed for violation of the law, and so 
too, we never have classified as a tax an exaction described in the legislation itself as a penalty. 
We have never — never — treated as a tax an exaction which faces up to the critical difference 
between a tax and a penalty, and explicitly denominates the exaction a "penalty." What counts is 
what the statute says, and that is entirely clear. To say that the Individual Mandate merely 
imposes a tax is not to interpret the statute but to rewrite it. 
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Session 16. Special Assessments 
Historically municipal corporations financed road, sidewalk, and sewer extensions by 
specially assessing abutting owners. Today “smart growth” advocates seek to strategically 
finance and design new infrastructures so as to shape growth. Meanwhile state and local 
governments are on the lookout for new revenue sources which they can call something other 
than “taxes.” The proliferation of special assessments, exactions, fees, user- charges and excises 
raises legal questions of uniformity, equality and fairness.  
NORWOOD v. BAKER 
172 U.S. 269 (1898) 
Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court. 
This case arises out of the condemnation of certain lands for the purpose of opening a 
street in the Village of Norwood, a municipal corporation in Hamilton County, Ohio. The 
particular question presented for consideration involves the validity of an ordinance of that 
Village, assessing upon the appellee’s land abutting on each side of the new street an amount 
covering not simply a sum equal to that paid for the land taken for the street, but, in addition, the 
costs and expenses connected with the condemnation proceedings. By the final decree of the 
Circuit Court of the United States it was adjudged that the assessment complained of was in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States forbidding any 
State from depriving a person of property without due process of law; and the Village was 
perpetually enjoined from enforcing the assessment.  74 Fed. Rep. 997. 
The present appeal was prosecuted directly to this court, because the case involved the 
construction and application of the Constitution of the United States. 
By an ordinance approved October 19, 1891, the Village declared its intention to 
condemn and appropriate, and by that ordinance condemned and appropriated, the lands or 
grounds in question for the purpose of opening and extending Ivenhoe Avenue: and in order to 
make such appropriation effectual, the ordinance directed the institution of the necessary 
proceedings in court for an inquiry and assessment of the compensation to be paid for the 
property to be condemned. 
The Ordinance provided that the cost and expense of the condemnation of the property, 
including the compensation paid to the owners, the cost of the condemnation proceedings, the 
cost of advertising and all other costs and the interest on bonds issued, if any, should be assessed 
“per front foot upon the property bounding and abutting on that part of Ivenhoe Avenue, as 
condemned and appropriated herein”- the assessments payable in ten annual installments if 
deferred, and the same collected as prescribed by law and in the assessing ordinance thereafter to 
be passed. 
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Under that ordinance, application was made by the Village to the probate court of 
Hamilton County for the empanelling of a jury to assess the compensation to be paid for the 
property to be taken.  A jury was accordingly empanelled, and it assessed the plaintiff’s 
compensation at $2000, declaring that they made the “assessment irrespective of any benefit to 
the owner from any improvement proposed by said corporation.” 
The assessment was confirmed by the court, the amount assessed was paid to the owner, 
and it was ordered that the Village have immediate possession and ownership of the premises for 
the uses and purposes specified in the ordinance. 
After the finding of the jury the Village council passed an ordinance levying and 
assessing “on each front foot of the several lots of land bounding and abutting on Ivenhoe 
Avenue, from Williams Avenue to a point 300 feet north,” certain sums for each of the years 
1892 to 1901 inclusive, “to pay the cost and expense of condemning property for the extension 
of said Ivenhoe Avenue between the points aforesaid [from Williams Avenue to a point 300 feet 
north], together with the interest on the bonds issued to provide a fund to pay for said 
condemnation.” 
By the same ordinance provision was made for issuing bonds to provide for the payment 
of the cost and expense of the condemnation, which included the amount found by the jury as 
compensation for the property taken, the costs in the condemnation proceedings, solicitor and 
expert witness fees, advertising, etc.; in all, $2218.58. 
The present suit was brought to obtain a decree restraining the Village from enforcing the 
assessment in question against the abutting property of the plaintiff. It was conceded that the 
defendant assessed back upon the plaintiff’s 300 feet of land upon either side of the strip taken 
(making 600 feet in all of frontage upon the strip condemned) the above sum of $2218.58, 
payable in installments, with interest at six per cent. 
But the Village alleged that the appropriation proceedings and consequent assessment 
were all in strict conformity with the laws and statutes of the State of Ohio and in pursuance of 
due process of law;  that the opening and extension of Ivenhoe Avenue constituted a public 
improvement for which the abutting property was liable to assessment under the laws of Ohio; 
that the counsel fees, witness fees and costs included in such total assessment were a part of the 
legitimate expenses of such improvement; and that in any event an expense had been incurred by 
the municipal corporation in opening the street “equal to the full amount of the said assessment, 
which is a proper charge against the complainant’s abutting property.” 
The plaintiff’s suit proceeded upon the ground, distinctly stated, that the assessment in 
question was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment providing that no State shall deprive any 
person of property without due process of law nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws, as well as of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of Ohio. 
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The taking of the plaintiff’s land for the street was under the power of eminent domain--a 
power which this court has said was the offspring of political necessity, and inseparable from 
sovereignty unless denied to it by the fundamental law.  Searl v. Lake County School District, 
133 U.S. 553.  But the assessment of the abutting property for the cost and expense incurred by 
the Village was an exercise of the power of taxation.  Except for the provision of the constitution 
of Ohio, the State could have authorized benefits to be deducted from the actual value of the land 
taken, without violating the constitutional injunction that compensation be made for private 
property taken for public use; for the benefits received could be properly regarded as 
compensation pro tanto for the property appropriated to public use.  But does the exclusion of 
benefits from the estimate of compensation to be made for the property actually taken for public 
use authorize the public to charge upon the abutting property the sum paid for it, together with 
the entire costs incurred in the condemnation proceedings, irrespective of the question whether 
the property was benefited by the opening of the street? 
Undoubtedly abutting owners may be subjected to special assessments to meet the 
expenses of opening public highways in front of their property–such assessments, according to 
well-established principles, resting upon the ground that special burdens may be imposed for 
special or peculiar benefits accruing from public improvements.  And according to the weight of 
judicial authority, the legislature has a large discretion in defining the territory to be deemed 
specially benefited by a public improvement, and which may be subjected to special assessment 
to meet the cost of such improvements. In Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 311, where the 
only question, as this court stated, was as to the power of the legislature to cast the burden of a 
public improvement upon certain towns, which had been judicially determined to be towns 
benefited by such improvement, it was said: “Neither can it be doubted that, if the state 
constitution does not prohibit, the legislature, speaking generally, may create a new taxing 
district, determine what territory shall belong to such district and what property shall be 
considered as benefited by a proposed improvement.” 
But the power of the legislature in these matters is not unlimited.  There is a point beyond 
which the legislative department, even when exerting the power of taxation, may not go 
consistently with the citizen’s right of property.  As already indicated, the principle underlying 
special assessments to meet the cost of public improvements is that the property upon which they 
are imposed is peculiarly benefited, and therefore the owners do not, in fact, pay anything in 
excess of what they receive by reason of such improvement.  But the guaranties for the 
protection of private property would be seriously impaired, if it were established as a rule of 
constitutional law, that the imposition by the legislature upon particular private property of the 
entire cost of a public improvement, irrespective of any peculiar benefits accruing to the owner 
from such improvement, could not be questioned by him in the courts of the country. It is one 
thing for the legislature to prescribe it as a general rule that property abutting on a street opened 
by the public shall be deemed to have been specially benefited by such improvement, and 
therefore should specially contribute to the cost incurred by the public.  It is quite a different 
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thing to lay it down as an absolute rule that such property, whether it is in fact benefited or not 
by the opening of the street, may be assessed by the front foot for a fixed sum representing the 
whole cost of the improvement, and without any right in the property owner to show, when an 
assessment of that kind is made or is about to be made, that the sum so fixed is in excess of the 
benefits received. 
In our judgment, the exaction from the owner of private property of the cost of a public 
improvement in substantial excess of the special benefits accruing to him is, to the extent of such 
excess, a taking, under the guise of taxation, of private property for public use without 
compensation.  We say “substantial excess,” because exact equality of taxation is not always 
attainable, and for that reason the excess of cost over special benefits, unless it be of a material 
character, ought not to be regarded by a court of equity when its aid is invoked to restrain the 
enforcement of a special assessment. 
In Cooley on Taxation (2d ed. c. xx), the author, in considering the subject of taxation by 
special assessment, and of estimating benefits conferred upon property by a public improvement, 
says that, while a general levy of taxes rests upon the ground that the citizen may be required to 
make contribution in that mode in return for the general benefits of government, special 
assessments are a peculiar species of taxation, and are made upon the assumption that “a portion 
of the community is to be specially and peculiarly benefited, in the enhancement of the value of 
property peculiarly situated as regards a contemplated expenditure of public funds; and, in 
addition to the general levy, they demand that special contributions, in consideration of the 
special benefit, shall be made by the persons receiving it.  The justice of demanding the special 
contribution is supposed to be evident in the fact that the persons who are to make it, while they 
are made to bear the cost of a public work, are at the same time to suffer no pecuniary loss 
thereby; their property being increased in value by the expenditure to an amount at least equal to 
the sum they are required to pay.” Again, the author says: “There can be no justification for any 
proceeding which charges the land with an assessment greater than the benefits; it is a plain case 
of appropriating private property to public uses without compensation.” 
We have considered the question presented for our determination with reference only to 
the provisions of the National Constitution.  But we are also of opinion that, under any view of 
that question different from the one taken in this opinion, the requirement of the constitution of 
Ohio that compensation be made for private property taken for public use, and that such 
compensation must be assessed “without deduction for benefits to any property of the owner,” 
would be of little practical value if, upon the opening of a public street through private property, 
the abutting property of the owner, whose land was taken for the street, can, under legislative 
authority, be assessed not only for such amount as will be equal to the benefits received, but for 
such additional amount as will meet the excess of expense over benefits. 
The judgment of the Circuit Court must be affirmed, upon the ground that the assessment 
against the plaintiff’s abutting property was under a rule which excluded any inquiry as to 
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special benefits, and the necessary operation of which was, to the extent of the excess of the cost 
of opening the street in question over any special benefits accruing to the abutting property 
therefrom, to take private property for public use without compensation; and it is so ordered. 
FRENCH v. BARBER ASPHALT PAVING COMPANY 
181 U.S. 324 (1901)  
MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.  
In its opinion in this case the Supreme Court of Missouri said that "the method adopted in 
the charter and ordinance of Kansas City of charging the cost of paving Forest avenue against the 
adjoining lots according to their frontage had been repeatedly authorized by the legislature of 
Missouri, and such laws had received the sanction of this court in many decisions.."  
Accordingly the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the assessment in question was valid, and 
the tax imposed collectible.  And, in so far as the constitution and laws of Missouri are 
concerned, this court is, of course, bound by that decision.  
But that court also held, against the contention of the lot owners, that the provisions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States were not applicable in the 
case; and our jurisdiction enables us to inquire whether the Supreme Court of Missouri were in 
error in so holding.  
We do not deem it necessary to extend this opinion by referring to the many cases in the 
state courts, in which the principles of the foregoing cases have been approved and applied.  It 
will be sufficient to state the conclusions reached, after a review of the state decisions, by two 
text-writers of high authority for learning and accuracy:  
"The major part of the cost of a local work is sometimes collected by general tax, 
while a smaller portion is levied upon the estates specially benefited.  
"The major part is sometimes assessed on estates benefited, while the general 
public is taxed a smaller portion in consideration of a smaller participation in the 
benefits.  
"The whole cost in other cases is levied on lands in the immediate vicinity if the 
work.  
"In a constitutional point of view, either of these methods is admissible, and one 
may sometimes be just and another at other times.  In other cases it may be 
deemed reasonable to make the whole cost a general charge, and levy no special 
assessment whatever.  The question is legislative, and, like all legislative 
questions, may be decided erroneously; but it is reasonable to expect that, with 
such latitude of choice, the tax will be more just and equal than it would be were 
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the legislature required to levy it by one inflexible and arbitrary rule." Cooley on 
Taxation, 447.  
"The courts are very generally agreed that the authority to require the property 
specially benefited to bear the expense of local improvements is a branch of the 
taxing power, or included within it. . . .  Whether the expense of making such 
improvements shall be paid out of the general treasury, or be assessed upon the 
abutting or other property specially benefited, and, if in the latter mode, whether 
the assessment shall be upon all property found to be benefited, or alone upon the 
abutters, according to frontage or according to the area of their lots, is according 
to the present weight of authority considered to be a  question of legislative 
expediency." Dillon's Municipal Corporations, vol. 2, §752, 4th ed.  
This array of authority was confronted, in the courts below, with the decision of this court 
in the case of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, which was claimed to overrule our previous 
cases, and to establish the principle that the cost of a local improvement cannot be assessed 
against abutting property according to frontage, unless the law, under which the improvement is 
made, provides for a preliminary hearing as to the benefits to be derived by the property to be 
assessed.  
But we agree with the Supreme Court of Missouri in its view that such is not the 
necessary legal import of the decision in Norwood v. Baker. That was a case where by a village 
ordinance, apparently aimed at a single person, a portion of whose property was condemned for a 
street, the entire cost of opening the street, including not only the full amount paid for the strip 
condemned, but the costs and expenses of the condemnation proceedings, was thrown upon the 
abutting property of the person whose land was condemned.  This appeared, both to the court 
below and to a majority of the judges of this court, to be an abuse of the law, an act of 
confiscation, and not a valid exercise of the taxing power.  This court, however, did not affirm 
the decree of the trial court awarding a perpetual injunction against the making and collection of 
any special assessments upon Mrs. Baker's property, but said:  
"It should be observed that the decree did not relieve the abutting property from 
liability for such amount as could be properly assessed against it.  Its legal effect, 
as we now adjudge, was only to prevent the enforcement of the particular 
assessment in question.  It left the village, in its discretion, to take such steps as 
were within its power to take, either under existing statutes or under any authority 
that might thereafter be conferred upon it, to make a new assessment upon the 
plaintiff's abutting property for so much of the expense of the opening of the 
street as was found upon due and proper inquiry to be equal to the special benefits 
accruing to the property.  By the decree rendered the court avoided the 
performance of functions appertaining to an assessing tribunal or body, and left 
the subject under the control of the local authorities designated by the State."  
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That this decision did not go to the extent claimed by the plaintiff in error in this case is 
evident, because in the opinion of the majority it is expressly said that the decision was not 
inconsistent with our decisions in Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U.S. 45, 56, and in 
Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345, 357.  
It may be conceded that courts of equity are always open to afford a remedy where there 
is an attempt, under the guise of legal proceedings, to deprive a person of his life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. And such, in the opinion of a majority of the judges of this 
court, was the nature and effect of the proceedings in the case of Norwood v. Baker.  
But there is no such a state of facts in the present case.  Those facts are thus stated by the 
court of Missouri:  
"The work done consisted of paving with asphaltum the roadway of Forest avenue 
in Kansas City, thirty-six feet in width, from Independence avenue to Twelfth 
street,  a distance of one half a mile.  Forest avenue is one of the oldest and best 
improved residence streets in the city, and all of the lots abutting thereon front the 
street and extend back therefrom uniformly to the depth of an ordinary city lot to 
an alley. The lots are all improved and used for residence purposes, and all of the 
lots are substantially on the grade of the street as improved, and are similarly 
situated with respect to the asphalt pavement.  The structure of the pavement 
along its entire extent is uniform in distance and quality.  There is no showing that 
there is any difference in the value of any of the lots abutting on the 
improvement."  
What was complained of was an orderly procedure under a scheme of local 
improvements prescribed by the legislature and approved by the courts of the State as consistent 
with constitutional principles.  
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri is  
Affirmed. 
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, (with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. 
JUSTICE McKENNA,) dissenting.  
Does the court intend in this case to overrule the principles announced in Norwood v. 
Baker? Does it intend to reject as unsound the doctrine that "the principle underlying special 
assessments to meet the cost of public improvements is that the property upon which they are 
imposed is peculiarly benefited, and therefore the owners do not, in fact, pay anything in excess 
of what they receive by reason of such improvement?" Is it the purpose of the court, in this case, 
to overrule the doctrine that taxation of abutting property to meet the cost of a public 
improvement -- such taxation being for an amount in substantial excess of the special benefits 
received -- "will, to the extent of such excess, be a taking of private property for public use 
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without compensation?" The opinion of the majority is so worded that I am not able to answer 
these questions with absolute confidence.  It is difficult to tell just how far the court intends to 
go.  But I am quite sure, from the intimations contained in the opinion, that it will be cited by 
some as resting upon the broad ground that a legislative determination as to the extent to which 
land abutting on a public street may be specially assessed for the cost of paving such street is 
conclusive upon the owner, and that he will not be heard, in a judicial tribunal or elsewhere, to 
complain even if, under the rule prescribed, the cost is in substantial excess of any special 
benefits accruing to his property, or even if such cost equals or exceeds the value of the property 
specially taxed.  The reasons which, in my judgment, condemn such a doctrine as inconsistent 
with the Constitution are set forth in Norwood v. Baker, and need not be repeated.   
In my opinion the judgment in the present  case should be reversed upon the ground that 
the assessment in question was made under a statutory rule excluding all inquiry as to special 
benefits and requiring the property abutting on the avenue in question to meet the entire cost of 
paving it, even if such cost was in substantial excess of the special benefits accruing to it; leaving 
Kansas City to obtain authority to make a new assessment upon the abutting property for so 
much of the cost of paving as may be found upon due inquiry to be not in excess of the special 
benefits accruing to such property.  Any other judgment will, I think, involve a grave departure 
from the principles that protect private property against arbitrary legislative power exerted under 
the guise of taxation. 
WEBB’S FABULOUS PHARMACIES v. BECKWITH 
449 U.S. 155 (1980) 
Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the issue whether it is constitutional for a county to take as its own, 
under the authority of a state statute, the interest accruing on an interpleader fund deposited in 
the registry of the county court, when a fee, prescribed by another statute, is also charged for the 
clerk’s services in receiving the fund into the registry.  The statute which is the object of the 
constitutional challenge here is Fla. Stat. §28.33 (1977).
1
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 “The clerk of the circuit court in each county shall make an estimate of his projected financial needs for the county 
and shall invest any funds in designated depository banks in interest-bearing certificates or in any direct obligations 
of the United States in compliance with federal laws relating to receipt of and withdrawal of deposits . . .  Moneys 
deposited in the registry of the court shall be deposited in interest-bearing certificates at the discretion of the clerk, 
subject to the above guidelines . . . .  All interest accruing from moneys deposited shall be deemed income of the 
office of the clerk of the circuit court investing such moneys and shall be deposited in the same accounts as are other 
fees and commissions of the clerk’s office.  Each clerk shall, as soon as is practicable after the end of the fiscal year, 
report to the county governing authority the total interest earned on all investments during the preceding year.” 
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I 
On February 12, 1976, appellant Eckerd’s of College Park, Inc., entered into an 
agreement to purchase for $1,812,145.77 substantially all the assets of Webb’s Fabulous 
Pharmacies, Inc. Both Eckerd’s and Webb’s are Florida corporations.  At the closing, Webb’s 
debts appeared to be greater than the purchase price.  Accordingly, in order to protect itself and 
as permitted by the Florida Bulk Transfers Act, Fla. Stat. §676.106 (4) (1977),  Eckerd’s filed a 
complaint of interpleader in the Circuit Court of Seminole County, Fla., interpleading as 
defendants both Webb’s and Webb’s creditors (almost 200 in number) and tendering the 
purchase price to the court. 
Pursuant to §676.106 (4), the Circuit Court thereupon ordered that the amount tendered 
be paid to the court’s clerk and that the clerk deposit it “in an assignable interest-bearing account 
at the highest interest.”  App. 4a.  The court specifically reserved decision on the issue of 
entitlement, as between the clerk and Webb’s creditors, to the interest earned on the fund while 
so deposited, stating that the transfer to the clerk was without prejudice to the creditors’ claims to 
that interest.  Id., at 4a-5a.  Eckerd’s tendered the sum to the clerk on July 13, 1976, id., at 6a, 
and that official proceeded to make the required investment. 
The clerk deducted from the interpleader fund so deposited the sum of $9,228.74 as his 
fee, prescribed by Fla. Stat. §28.24 (14) (1977), “for services rendered” for “receiving money 
into the registry of court.”  The fee, as the statute directed, was calculated upon the amount 
placed in the registry, that is, 1% of the first $500, and 1/2% of the remainder. 
On July 5, 1977, almost a year after the tender and payment, the Circuit Court upon its 
own motion appointed a receiver for Webb’s.  Among the receiver’s stated duties were the 
determination of the number and amount of claims filed against the interpleader fund and the 
preparation and filing with the court of a list of those claims.  The receiver filed a motion for an 
order directing the clerk to deliver the fund to him.  The motion was granted, id., at 14a, and the 
principal of the fund, reduced by the $9,228.74 statutory fee and by $40,200 that had been paid 
out pursuant to court order, was paid to the receiver on July 21.  The interest earned on the 
interpleader fund while it was held by the clerk, but which was not turned over to the receiver, 
then exceeded $90,000.  Interest earned thereafter on the amount so retained brought the total to 
more than $100,000.  It is this aggregate interest that is the subject matter of the present 
litigation.  Appellants make no objection to the clerk’s statutory fee of $9,228.74 taken pursuant 
to §28.24 (14).   
The receiver then moved that the court direct the clerk to pay the accumulated interest to 
the receiver. The Circuit Court ruled favorably to the receiver, holding that the clerk “is not 
entitled to any interest earned, accrued or received on monies deposited in the registry of this 
Court pursuant to the Court’s order . . . ; the creditors herein are the rightful parties entitled to all 
such interest earned on the interpleader fund while it is held by the Clerk of this Court.”  
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Seminole County and the clerk appealed to the Florida District Court of Appeal.  That 
court transferred the cause to the Supreme Court of Florida.  The Supreme Court, in a per curiam 
opinion with one justice dissenting in part, ruled that §28.33 was “constitutional” and reversed 
the judgment of the Circuit Court.  374 So. 2d 951 (1979).  The stated rationale was that a fund 
so deposited is “considered ‘public money’” from the date of deposit until it leaves the account: 
that “the statute takes only what it creates”; and that “[there] is no unconstitutional taking 
because interest earned on the clerk of the circuit court’s registry account is not private 
property.”   
Because it had been held elsewhere that a county’s appropriation of the interest earned on 
private funds deposited in court in an interpleader action is an unconstitutional taking, Sellers v. 
Harris County, 483 S. W. 2d 242 (Tex. 1972); see McMillan v. Robeson County, 262 N. C. 413, 
137 S. E. 2d 105 (1964), we noted probable jurisdiction.  445 U.S. 925 (1980). 
II 
It is at once apparent that Florida’s statutes would allow respondent Seminole County to 
exact two tolls while the interpleader fund was held by the clerk of the court.  The first was the 
statutory fee of $9,228.74 “for services rendered,” as §28.24 recites, by the clerk’s office for 
“receiving money into the registry of court.” That fee was determined by the amount of the 
principal deposited. 
The second would be the retention of the amount, in excess of $100,000, consisting of 
“[all] interest accruing from moneys deposited.” This toll would be exacted because of §28.33’s 
provision that the interest “shall be deemed income of the office of the clerk of the circuit court.” 
An initial reading of §28.33 might prompt one to conclude that, so far as it concerns 
entitlement to interest, the statute applies only to interest on funds clearly owned by the county 
(such as charges for certifications) and that it does not apply to interest on private funds 
deposited under the direction of another statute.  The Florida Supreme Court, however, has read 
§28.33 otherwise and has ruled that it applies to interest earned on deposited private funds.  That 
reading of the State’s statute is within the Florida court’s competency, and we must take the 
statute as so read and interpreted. 
III 
The pertinent words of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States are 
the familiar ones: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 
That prohibition, of course, applies against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897); Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978). Our task is to determine whether the second 
exaction by Seminole County amounted to a “taking”–it was obviously uncompensated–within 
the Amendment’s proscription. 
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The principal sum deposited in the registry of the court plainly was private property, and 
was not the property of Seminole County.  We do not understand that the appellees contend 
otherwise so far as the fund’s principal is concerned. 
Appellees submit,–and we accept the proposition–that, apart from statute, Florida law 
does not require that interest be earned on a registry deposit.  See 374 So. 2d, at 953.  We, of 
course, also accept the further proposition, pressed upon us by the appellees, that “[property] 
interests . . . are not created by the Constitution.  Rather, they are created and their dimensions 
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as 
state law . . . .” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).  But a mere unilateral 
expectation or an abstract need is not a property interest entitled to protection.  See, for example, 
Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 274 U.S. 651 (1927); United States v. Willow River 
Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945). See also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 
supra; Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). 
Webb’s creditors, however, had more than a unilateral expectation.  The deposited fund 
was the amount received as the purchase price for Webb’s assets. It was property held only for 
the ultimate benefit of Webb’s creditors, not for the benefit of the court and not for the benefit of 
the county.  And it was held only for the purpose of making a fair distribution among those 
creditors. Eventually, and inevitably, that fund, less proper charges authorized by the court, 
would be distributed among the creditors as their claims were recognized by the court.  The 
creditors thus had a state-created property right to their respective portions of the fund. 
It is true, of course, that none of the creditor claimants had any right to the deposited fund 
until their claims were recognized and distribution was ordered.  See Aron v. Snyder, 90 U. S. 
App. D. C. 325, 327, 196 F.2d 38, 40, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 854 (1952).  That lack of immediate 
right, however, does not automatically bar a claimant ultimately determined to be entitled to all 
or a share of the fund from claiming a proper share of the interest, the fruit of the fund’s use, that 
is realized in the interim.  To be sure, §28.33 establishes as a matter of Florida law that interest is 
to be earned on deposited funds.  But the State’s having mandated the accrual of interest does not 
mean the State or its designate is entitled to assume ownership of the interest. 
We therefore turn to the interest issue.  What would justify the county’s retention of that 
interest?  It is obvious that the interest was not a fee for services, for any services obligation to 
the county was paid for and satisfied by the substantial fee charged pursuant to §28.24 and 
described specifically in that statute as a fee “for services” by the clerk’s office.  Section 28.33, 
in contrast, in no way relates the interest of which it speaks to “services rendered.”  Indeed, if the 
county were entitled to the interest, its officials would feel an inherent pressure and possess a 
natural inclination to defer distribution, for that interest return would be greater the longer the 
fund is held; there would be, therefore, a built-in disincentive against distributing the principal to 
those entitled to it. 
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The usual and general rule is that any interest on an interpleaded and deposited fund 
follows the principal and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to be the owners of that 
principal.
2
 
The Florida Supreme Court, in ruling contrary to this long established general rule, relied 
on the words of §28.33 and then proceeded on the theory that without the statute the clerk would 
have no authority to invest money held in the registry, that in some way the fund assumes 
temporarily the status of “public money” from the time it is deposited until it leaves the account, 
and that the statute “takes only what it creates.”  Then follows the conclusion that the interest “is 
not private property.” 374 So. 2d, at 952-953. 
This Court has been permissive in upholding governmental action that may deny the 
property owner of some beneficial use of his property or that may restrict the owner’s full 
exploitation of the property, if such public action is justified as promoting the general welfare.  
See, e. g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S., at 64-68; Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S., at 125-129. 
Here, however, Seminole County has not merely “[adjusted] the benefits and burdens of 
economic life to promote the common good.”  Id., at 124.  Rather, the exaction is a forced 
contribution to general governmental revenues, and it is not reasonably related to the costs of 
using the courts.  Indeed, “[the] Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . was designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 
(1960). 
No police power justification is offered for the deprivation.  Neither the statute nor 
appellees suggest any reasonable basis to sustain the taking of the interest earned by the 
interpleader fund. The county’s appropriation of the beneficial use of the fund is analogous to the 
appropriation of the use of private property in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
There the Court found a “taking” in the Government’s use of air space above the claimant’s land 
as part of the flight pattern for military aircraft, thus destroying the use of the land as a chicken 
farm.  “Causby emphasized that Government had not merely destroyed property [but was] using 
a part of it for the flight of its planes.’” Penn Central, 438 U.S., at 128, quoting from Causby, 328 
U.S., at 262-263, n.7. 
Neither the Florida Legislature by statute, nor the Florida courts by judicial decree, may 
accomplish the result the county seeks simply by recharacterizing the principal as “public 
money” because it is held temporarily by the court.  The earnings of a fund are incidents of 
ownership of the fund itself and are property just as the fund itself is property.  The state statute 
                                                 
2
 The appellees at oral argument conceded that if coupon bonds, rather than cash, had been deposited in the registry, 
the coupons would follow the principal and could not be claimed by the county under §28.33.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. 
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has the practical effect of appropriating for the county the value of the use of the fund for the 
period in which it is held in the registry.  To put it another way: a State, by ipse dixit, may not 
transform private property into public property without compensation, even for the limited 
duration of the deposit in court. This is the very kind of thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment was meant to prevent. That Clause stands as a shield against the arbitrary use of 
governmental power. 
IV 
We hold that under the narrow circumstances of this case–where there is a separate and 
distinct state statute authorizing a clerk’s fee “for services rendered” based upon the amount of 
principal deposited; where the deposited fund itself concededly is private; and where the deposit 
in the court’s registry is required by state statute in order for the depositor to avail itself of 
statutory protection from claims of creditors and others–Seminole County’s taking unto itself, 
under §28.33 and 1973 Fla. Laws, ch. 73-282, the interest earned on the interpleader fund while 
it was in the registry of the court was a taking violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
We express no view as to the constitutionality of a statute that prescribes a county’s retention of 
interest earned, where the interest would be the only return to the county for services it renders. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is reversed. It is so ordered. 
UNITED STATES v. SPERRY CORPORATION 
493 U.S. 52 (1989) 
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy.   
Section 502 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 
1987requires the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to deduct and pay into the United States 
Treasury a percentage of any award made by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in favor of 
an American claimant before remitting the award to the claimant. We are asked to consider in 
this case whether §502 violates the Just Compensation Clause or Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment
1
 or the Origination Clause of Article I, §7.
2
 
I 
Appellees Sperry Corporation and Sperry World Trade, Inc. (hereinafter Sperry), are 
American corporations that  entered into contracts with the Government of Iran prior to the 
                                                 
1
 "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const., Amdt. 5 
2
 "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or 
concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. Const., Art. I, §7, cl. 1. 
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seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979.  The details of the seizure 
of the Embassy and diplomatic personnel and the ensuing diplomatic crisis want no repetition 
here.  We need address only the means eventually established by the Governments of the United 
States and Iran to resolve claims by American companies against Iran. 
As part of the resolution of the diplomatic crisis, the United States and Iran entered into 
an agreement embodied in two declarations of the Government of Algeria commonly referred to 
as the Algiers Accords (hereinafter the Accords).  The Accords provided for the establishment in 
The Hague of an international arbitral tribunal, known as the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
(hereinafter the Tribunal), to hear claims brought by Americans against the Government of Iran. 
The establishment of the Tribunal was to preclude litigation by Americans against Iran in 
American courts, so the United States undertook to terminate such legal proceedings, unblock 
Iranian assets in the United States, and nullify all attachments against those assets.  To 
implement the Accords, President Carter issued a series of Executive Orders on January 19, 
1981, revoking all licenses permitting the exercise of "any right, power, or privilege" with 
respect to Iranian funds and annulling all non-Iranian interests in Iranian assets acquired after the 
blocking order. Exec. Orders Nos. 12276-12285, 3 CFR 104-118 (1981).  On February 24, 1981, 
President Reagan issued an Executive Order suspending all claims that "may be presented to the 
. . . Tribunal" and providing that such claims "shall have no legal effect in any action now 
pending in any court of the United States." Exec. Order No. 12294, 3 CFR 139 (1981).  This 
Court upheld the revocation of the licenses and the suspension of the claims in Dames & Moore 
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). Prior to the Accords, Sperry had filed suit against Iran in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia and had obtained a prejudgment 
attachment of blocked Iranian assets, but the Executive Orders sustained in Dames & Moore 
invalidated that attachment and prohibited Sperry from further pursuing its claims against Iran in 
any American courts.  Sperry therefore filed a claim against Iran with the Tribunal and also 
began settlement negotiations with Iran.  In February 1982, Sperry and Iran reached an 
agreement requiring the payment by Iran to Sperry of $2.8 million.  The Government of Iran 
gave the settlement final approval on July 8, 1982. 
Sperry and Iran then filed a joint application with the Tribunal, which was granted, to 
have the settlement entered as an "Award on Agreed Terms." The entry of the settlement 
provided Sperry with a significant benefit, for it gave the settlement agreement the status of an 
award by the Tribunal, and under the Accords, all awards of the Tribunal are "final and binding" 
and are "enforceable . . . in the courts of any nation in accordance with its laws."  The entry of 
the settlement also enabled Sperry to make use of the mechanism established by the Accords and 
the implementing Executive Orders for the payment of arbitral awards.  As part of the Accords, 
$1 billion of the unblocked Iranian assets had been placed in a Security Account in the Bank of 
England for the payment of awards.  Awards made by the Tribunal in favor of American 
claimants are paid from the Security Account to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which 
then pays the awards to the claimants. See 47 Fed. Reg. 25243 (1982). 
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We come now to the heart of this dispute.  The Accords provided that "the expenses of 
the Tribunal shall be borne equally by the two governments." On June 7, 1982, the Department 
of the Treasury issued a "Directive License" requiring the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to 
deduct 2% from each award certified by the Tribunal and to pay the deducted amount into the 
Treasury "to reimburse the United States Government for costs incurred for the benefit of U.S. 
nationals who have claims against Iran." When the Federal Reserve Bank of New York received 
Sperry's award, it deducted the 2% charge over Sperry's protest, deposited the charge in the 
Treasury, and paid Sperry the balance of its award. 
Sperry filed suit in the United States Claims Court, contending that the 2% charge was 
unconstitutional and was not (as the United States argued) authorized by the Independent Offices 
Appropriation Act, 1952 (IOAA), 65 Stat. 290, 31 U.S.C. §483a  (1976 ed.). The Claims Court 
held in an oral ruling on May 1, 1985, that the Directive License violated IOAA.  Congress 
reacted swiftly by enacting §502, which specifically requires the assessment of a charge against 
successful American  claimants before the Tribunal and directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York to deduct from Tribunal awards paid out of the Security Account an amount equal to 1 
1/2% of the first $5 million and 1% of any amount over $5 million.  Section 502(a) states that 
these charges are to be deducted "as reimbursement to the United States Government for 
expenses incurred in connection with the arbitration of claims of United States claimants against 
Iran before [the] Tribunal and the maintenance of the Security Account established pursuant to 
the [Accords]." Congress made §502 effective retroactive to June 7, 1982, the date on which the 
Treasury had issued the Directive License struck down by the Claims Court.  See §502(d). 
Sperry renewed its challenge to the deduction in the Claims Court, arguing that the 1 
1/2% deduction authorized by §502 was unconstitutional.  The Claims Court rejected the 
constitutional claims and dismissed Sperry's suit.  12 Cl. Ct. 736 (1987). The Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit reversed and held that §502 was unconstitutional as it caused a taking of 
Sperry's private property without just compensation.  853 F.2d 904 (1988). The Court of Appeals 
likened the 1 1/2% deduction by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to the permanent 
physical occupation by the Government of private property which, this Court held in Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982),  is always a "taking" requiring 
just compensation.  The Court of Appeals was unmoved by the United States' argument that 
there was no taking given the benefits that Sperry had obtained from the Tribunal: "We do not 
see the benefit of the Tribunal to Sperry when prior to the Accords it had secured the attachment 
of Iranian assets sufficient to cover its eventual award and, had the President not suspended 
American claims, would have had no need for the Tribunal." 853 F.2d, at 908.  
II 
Sperry argues that the deduction is a part of Congress' scheme to shift to American 
claimants against Iran those costs of settling the diplomatic crisis that should have been borne by 
the Nation as a whole.  As we see it, however, Sperry has not identified any of its property that 
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was taken without just compensation.  To the extent the Court of Appeals' decision may be read 
as concluding that Sperry suffered a taking of its property because its prejudgment attachment 
against Iranian assets was nullified by the Executive Orders implementing the Accords, see 853 
F.2d, at 907, that conclusion is incorrect; we held in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S., at 674, 
n. 6, that American litigants against Iran had no property interest in such attachments. Nor did 
Sperry suffer the deprivation of its claim against Iran.  Sperry presented its claim to the Tribunal 
and settled the claim for a substantial sum. And we note that Sperry makes no claim that the 
gross amount of the award was less than what would have been recovered in ordinary litigation 
and that being forced to take the lesser amount was an unconstitutional taking of property.  The 
case thus turns only on the constitutionality of the deduction. 
As for the deduction itself, the United States urges that it is not a taking at all but is a 
reasonable "user fee" assessed against claimants before the Tribunal and intended to reimburse 
the United States for its costs in connection with the Tribunal. Sperry responds that the §502 
charge cannot be upheld as a user fee because there has been no showing that the amount of the 
deduction approximates the cost of the Tribunal to the United States or bears any relationship to 
Sperry's use of the Tribunal or the value of the Tribunal's services to Sperry.  None of Sperry's 
submissions is persuasive. 
Section 502(a) specifically states that the deductions are made as "reimbursement to the 
United States Government for expenses incurred in connection with the arbitration of claims of 
United States claimants against Iran before [the] Tribunal and the maintenance of the Security 
Account . . . ." Given especially this specific declaration by Congress that the deductions are 
intended to reimburse costs incurred by the United States, the burden must lie with Sperry to 
demonstrate that the reality of §502 belies its express language before we conclude that the 
deductions are actually takings.  That burden has not been met.  
This Court has never held that the amount of a user fee must be precisely calibrated to the 
use that a party makes of Government services.  Nor does the Government need to record 
invoices and billable hours to justify the cost of its services.  All that we have required is that the 
user fee be a "fair approximation of the cost of benefits supplied." Massachusetts v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 444, 463, n. 19 (1978). In that case, the Court upheld a flat registration fee 
assessed by the Federal Government on civil aircraft, including aircraft owned by the States, 
against a challenge that the fee violated the principle of intergovernmental tax immunity.  In 
holding that the registration charge could be upheld because it was a user fee rather than a tax, 
the Court rejected Massachusetts' argument that the "amount of the tax is a flat annual fee and 
hence is not directly related to the degree of use of the airways." The Court recognized that when 
the Federal Government applies user charges to a large number of parties, it probably will charge 
a user more or less than it would under a perfect user-fee system, but we declined to impose a 
requirement that the Government "give weight to every factor affecting appropriate 
compensation for airport and airway use," id., at 468.  
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The deductions authorized by §502 are not so clearly excessive as to belie their purported 
character as user fees.  This is not a situation where the Government has appropriated all, or 
most, of the award to itself and labeled the booty as a user fee.  Cf.  FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 
480 U.S. 245, 253 (1987); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
3
 
We need not state what percentage of the award would be too great a take to qualify as a user 
fee, for we are convinced that on the facts of this case, 1 1/2% does not qualify as a "taking" by 
any standard of excessiveness.  This was obviously the judgment of Congress and we abide by 
it.
4
  
Sperry complains that the United States has taken its property by charging it for the use 
of procedures that it has been forced to use, or at least that it would rather not have used.  But as 
we have explained a reasonable user fee is not a taking if it is imposed for the reimbursement of 
the cost of government services.  "A governmental body has an obvious interest in making those 
who specifically benefit from its services pay the cost . . . ." Massachusetts v. United States, 435 
U.S., at 462 (plurality opinion).  Though we may accept Sperry's word that it would have 
preferred to pursue its action against Iran in the familiar and proximate federal district courts, we 
cannot accept its contention that it did not benefit in any way from the procedures established by 
the Accords.  The fact is that Sperry did benefit directly from the existence and functions of the 
Tribunal. The Accords that established the Tribunal and the Executive Orders that implemented 
the Accords assured Sperry that any award made to it, whether as the result of a settlement or 
otherwise, could be enforced in the courts of any nation and actually paid in this country.  Had 
the President not agreed to the establishment of the Tribunal and the Security Account, Sperry 
would have had no assurance that it could have pursued its action against Iran to judgment or 
that a judgment would have been readily collectible.  As it was, Sperry filed its claim with the 
Tribunal, arrived at a settlement with Iran, and had the settlement entered as a formal award by 
the Tribunal, which was paid in full except for the deduction at issue in this case.  
It is not at all dispositive that the award to Sperry was more the result of private 
negotiations between Sperry and Iran than the Tribunal procedures placed at Sperry's disposal. 
Sperry filed its claim with the Tribunal and had a formal award entered.  Furthermore, Sperry 
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 In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, we expressed "no view as to the constitutionality of a statute 
that prescribes a county's retention of interest earned, where the interest would be the only return to the county for 
services it renders," a situation more analogous to the case at bar. 
4
 Sperry argues, however, that we should not even consider the amount deducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York because the deduction was akin to a "permanent physical occupation" of its property and therefore was a 
per se taking requiring just compensation, regardless of the extent of the occupation or its economic impact.  See 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982). The Court of Appeals agreed with 
Sperry.  853 F.2d 904, 906-907 (CA Fed. 1988). It is artificial to view deductions of a percentage of a monetary 
award as physical appropriations of property. Unlike real or personal property, money is fungible.  No special 
constitutional importance attaches to the fact that the Government deducted its charge directly from the award rather 
than requiring Sperry to pay it separately.  If the deduction in this case were a physical occupation requiring just 
compensation, so would be any fee for services, including a filing fee that must be paid in advance.  Such a rule 
would be an extravagant extension of Loretto. 
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may be required to pay a charge for the availability of the Tribunal even if it never actually used 
the Tribunal; Sperry received the "benefit from [the Tribunal] in the sense that the services are 
available for [its] use." Massachusetts v. United States, supra, at 468. Had Sperry's negotiations 
with Iran failed, it would have then had the opportunity to use the hearing rooms, translation 
facilities, and facilities for service of documents made available through the Tribunal and the 
State Department.  The Tribunal made available to claimants such as Sperry sufficient benefits to 
justify the imposition of a reasonable user fee. 
III 
We turn next to Sperry's due process claims.  Sperry urges that §502 violates the Due 
Process Clause because the deductions apply to awards, such as Sperry's, made by the Tribunal 
prior to the enactment of the statute.  Our standard of review is settled:  
"Retroactive legislation does have to meet a burden not faced by legislation that has only 
future effects.  'It does not follow . . . that what Congress can legislate prospectively it can 
legislate retrospectively.  The retroactive aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective 
aspects, must meet the test of due process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for 
the former.' But that burden is met simply by showing that the retroactive application of the 
legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose." Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984)  (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn 
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976)) (citation omitted).  
We agree with the United States that the retroactive application of §502 is justified by a 
rational legislative purpose. Retroactive application of §502 ensures that all successful claimants 
before the Tribunal are treated alike in that all have to contribute toward the costs of the 
Tribunal. If Congress had made the application of §502 prospective only, the costs of the 
Tribunal would have fallen disproportionately on the claimants whose awards, for whatever 
reason, were delayed, and Congress might have had to increase the percentage charge on those 
claimants to recoup a sufficient portion of the Federal Government's costs.  Claimants who were 
fortunate enough to obtain awards prior to the enactment of the statute would have obtained a 
windfall by avoiding contribution.  It is surely proper for Congress to legislate retrospectively to 
ensure that costs of a program are borne by the entire class of persons that Congress rationally 
believes should bear them.   
Nor does §502 violate the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause because 
it assesses  a user fee only against claimants who have actually received an award from the 
Tribunal and not against all claimants before the Tribunal. The classification implicitly made by 
§502 neither burdens fundamental constitutional rights nor creates suspect classifications, so 
again our standard of review is that of rationality.  See United States Railroad Retirement Board 
v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-175 (1980). Congress could have rationally concluded that only those 
who are successful before the Tribunal realize a benefit therefrom sufficient to justify assessment 
of a fee. Congress could also have determined that assessing a user fee against all claimants 
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would undesirably deter those whose claims were small or uncertain of success from presenting 
them to the Tribunal. This case is wholly unlike Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), where 
the Court was unable to discern any legitimate interest that was served by a requirement that the 
State be reimbursed for the cost of criminal trial transcripts by incarcerated prisoners 
unsuccessful in their appeals but not by other indigent appellants, even other unsuccessful ones 
who had not been incarcerated.  Here the costs are imposed on only the successful claimants, not, 
as in Rinaldi, only the unsuccessful ones, a situation presenting entirely different considerations. 
Moreover, as discussed a sensible distinction may be made between successful claimants who 
have completed the Tribunal proceedings and all other claimants. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered.   
BROWN v. LEGAL FOUNDATION OF WASHINGTON 
538 U.S. 216 (2003) 
JUDGES: STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'CONNOR, 
SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which REHNQUIST, C. J., and KENNEDY and THOMAS, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion.   
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The State of Washington, like every other State in the Union, uses interest on lawyers' 
trust accounts (IOLTA) to pay for legal services provided to the needy. Some IOLTA programs 
were created by statute, but in Washington, as in most other States, the IOLTA program was 
established by the State Supreme Court pursuant to its authority to regulate the practice of law. 
In Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998), a case involving the Texas 
IOLTA program, we held "that the interest income generated by funds held in IOLTA accounts 
is the 'private property' of the owner of the principal." We did not, however, express any opinion 
on the question whether the income had been "taken" by the State or "as to the amount of 'just 
compensation,' if any, due respondents." We now confront those questions. 
I 
As we explained in Phillips, in the course of their legal practice, attorneys are frequently 
required to hold clients' funds for various lengths of time. It has long been recognized that they 
have a professional and fiduciary obligation to avoid commingling their clients' money with their 
own, but it is not unethical to pool several clients' funds in a single trust account. Before 1980 
client funds were typically held in non-interest-bearing federally insured checking accounts. 
Because federal banking regulations in effect since the Great Depression prohibited banks from 
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paying interest on checking accounts, the value of the use of the clients' money in such accounts 
inured to the banking institutions. 
In 1980, Congress authorized federally insured banks to pay interest on a limited category 
of demand deposits referred to as "NOW accounts." See 87 Stat. 342, 12 U.S.C. §1832. This 
category includes deposits made by individuals and charitable organizations, but does not 
include those made by for-profit corporations or partnerships unless the deposits are made 
pursuant to a program under which charitable organizations have "the exclusive right to the 
interest."  
In response to the change in federal law, Florida adopted the first IOLTA program in 
1981 authorizing the use of NOW accounts for the deposit of client funds, and providing that all 
of the interest on such accounts be used for charitable purposes. Every State in the Nation and 
the District of Columbia have followed Florida's lead and adopted an IOLTA program, either 
through their legislatures or their highest courts. The result is that, whereas before 1980 the 
banks retained the value of the use of the money deposited in non-interest-bearing client trust 
accounts, today, because of the adoption of IOLTA programs, that value is transferred to 
charitable entities providing legal services for the poor. The aggregate value of those 
contributions in 2001 apparently exceeded $200 million.  
In 1984, the Washington Supreme Court established its IOLTA program by amending its 
Rules of Professional Conduct. IOLTA Adoption Order, 102 Wn. 2d 1101. The amendments 
were adopted after over two years of deliberation, during which the court received hundreds of 
public comments and heard oral argument from the Seattle-King County Bar Association, 
designated to represent the proponents of the Rule, and the Walla Walla County Bar Association, 
designated to represent the opponents of the Rule. 
In its opinion explaining the order, the court noted that earlier Rules had required 
attorneys to hold client trust funds "in accounts separate from their own funds," and had 
prohibited the use of such funds for the lawyer's own pecuniary advantage, but did not address 
the question whether or how such funds should be invested. Commenting on then-prevalent 
practice the court observed: 
"In conformity with trust law, however, lawyers usually invest client trust funds 
in separate interest-bearing accounts and pay the interest to the clients whenever 
the trust funds are large enough in amount or to be held for a long enough period 
of time to make such investments economically feasible, that is, when the amount 
of interest earned exceeds the bank charges and costs of setting up the account. 
However, when trust funds are so nominal in amount or to be held for so short a 
period that the amount of interest that could be earned would not justify the cost 
of creating separate accounts, most attorneys simply deposit the funds in a single 
noninterest-bearing trust checking account containing all such trust funds from all 
their clients. The funds in such accounts earn no interest for either the client or the 
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attorney. The banks, in contrast, have received the interest-free use of client 
money."  
The court then described the four essential features of its IOLTA program: (a) the 
requirement that all client funds be deposited in interest-bearing trust accounts, (b) the 
requirement that funds that cannot earn net interest for the client be deposited in an IOLTA 
account, (c) the requirement that the lawyers direct the banks to pay the net interest on the 
IOLTA accounts to the Legal Foundation of Washington (Foundation), and (d) the requirement 
that the Foundation must use all funds received from IOLTA accounts for tax-exempt law-
related charitable and educational purposes.  
In its opinion the court responded to three objections that are relevant to our inquiry in 
this case. First, it rejected the contention that the new program "constitutes an unconstitutional 
taking of property without due process or just compensation." Id., at 1104. Like other State 
Supreme Courts that had considered the question, it distinguished our decision in Webb's 
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), on the ground that the new 
"'program creates income where there had been none before, and the income thus created would 
never benefit the client under any set of circumstances.'" 102 Wash. 2d, at 1108 (quoting In re 
Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 395 (Fla. 1981)). 
Second, it rejected the argument that it was unethical for lawyers to rely on any factor 
other than the client's best interests when deciding whether to deposit funds in an IOLTA 
account rather than an account that would generate interest for the client. The court endorsed, 
and added emphasis, to the response to that argument set forth in the proponents' reply brief: 
"'Although the proposed amendments list several factors an attorney should 
consider in deciding how to invest his clients' trust funds, . . . all of these factors 
are really facets of a single question: Can the client's money be invested so that it 
will produce a net benefit for the client? If so, the attorney must invest it to earn 
interest for the client. Only if the money cannot earn net interest for the client is 
the money to go into an IOLTA account.' 
This is a correct statement of an attorney's duty under trust law, as well as a 
proper interpretation of the proposed rule as published for public comment. 
However, in order to make it even clearer that IOLTA funds are only those funds 
that cannot, under any circumstances, earn net interest (after deducting transaction 
and administrative costs and bank fees) for the client, we have amended the 
proposed rule accordingly. See new CPR DR 9-102(C)(3). The new rule makes it 
absolutely clear that the enumerated factors are merely facets of the ultimate 
question of whether client funds could be invested profitably for the benefit of 
clients. If they can, then investment for the client is mandatory." 102 Wash. 2d, at 
1113-1114. 
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The court also rejected the argument that it had failed to consider the significance of 
advances in computer technology that, in time, may convert IOLTA participation into an 
unconstitutional taking of property that could have been distributed to the client. It pointed to the 
fact that the Rule expressly requires attorneys to give consideration to the capability of financial 
institutions to calculate and pay interest on individual accounts, and added: "Thus, as cost 
effective sub-accounting services become available, making it possible to earn net interest for 
clients on increasingly smaller amounts held for increasingly shorter periods of time, more trust 
money will have to be invested for the clients' benefit under the new rule. The rule is therefore 
self-adjusting and is adequately designed to accommodate changes in banking technology 
without running afoul of the state or federal constitutions." Id., at 1114. 
Given the court's explanation of its Rule, it seems apparent that a lawyer who mistakenly 
uses an IOLTA account as a depositary for money that could earn interest for the client would 
violate the Rule. Hence, the lawyer will be liable to the client for any lost interest, however 
minuscule the amount might be. 
In 1995, the Washington Supreme Court amended its IOLTA Rules to make them 
applicable to Limited Practice Officers (LPOs) as well as lawyers. LPOs are non-lawyers who 
are licensed to act as escrowees in the closing of real estate transactions. Like lawyers, LPOs 
often temporarily control the funds of clients. 
II 
This action was commenced by a public interest law firm and four citizens to enjoin state 
officials from continuing to require LPOs to deposit trust funds into IOLTA accounts. Because 
the Court of Appeals held that the firm do[es] not have standing, Washington Legal Foundation 
v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 271 F.3d 835, 848-850 (CA9 2001), and since that holding 
was not challenged in this Court, we limit our discussion to the claims asserted by petitioners 
Allen Brown and Greg Hayes. The defendants, respondents in this Court, are the justices of the 
Washington Supreme Court, the Foundation, which receives and redistributes the interest on 
IOLTA accounts, and the president of the Foundation. 
In their amended complaint, Brown and Hayes describe the IOLTA program, with 
particular reference to its application to LPOs and to some of the activities of Recipient 
Organizations that have received funds from the Foundation. Brown and Hayes also both allege 
that they regularly purchase and sell real estate and in the course of such transactions they deliver 
funds to LPOs who are required to deposit them in IOLTA accounts. They object to having the 
interest on those funds "used to finance the Recipient Organizations" and "to anyone other than 
themselves receiving the interest derived from those funds.". The first count of their complaint 
alleges that "being forced to associate with the Recipient Organizations" violates their First 
Amendment rights, the second count alleges that the "taking" of the interest earned on their funds 
in the IOLTA accounts violates the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and the 
third count alleges that the requirement that client funds be placed in IOLTA accounts is "an 
 383 
illegal taking of the beneficial use of those funds." The prayer for relief sought a refund of 
interest earned on the plaintiffs' money that had been placed in IOLTA accounts, a declaration 
that the IOLTA Rules are unconstitutional, and an injunction against their enforcement against 
LPOs.  
After discovery, the District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
As a factual matter the court concluded "that in no event can the client-depositors make any net 
returns on the interest accrued in these accounts. Indeed, if the funds were able to make any net 
return, they would not be subject to the IOLTA program." Washington Legal Foundation v. 
Legal Foundation of Washington, No. C97-0146C (WD Wash., Jan. 30, 1998), App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 94a. As a legal matter, the court concluded that the constitutional issue focused on what an 
owner has lost, not what the "'taker'" has gained, and that petitioners Hayes and Brown had "lost 
nothing."  
While the case was on appeal, we decided Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 
U. S 156 (1998). Relying on our opinion in that case, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit 
decided that the IOLTA program caused a taking of petitioners' property and that further 
proceedings were necessary to determine whether they are entitled to just compensation. The 
panel concluded: "In sum, we hold that the interest generated by IOLTA pooled trust accounts is 
property of the clients and customers whose money is deposited into trust, and that a government 
appropriation of that interest for public purposes is a taking entitling them to just compensation 
under the Fifth Amendment. But just compensation for the takings may be less than the amount 
of the interest taken, or nothing, depending on the circumstances, so determining the remedy 
requires a remand." Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 236 F.3d 
1097, 1115 (2001). 
The Court of Appeals then reconsidered the case en banc. 271 F.3d 835 (CA9 2001). The 
en banc majority affirmed the judgment of the District Court, reasoning that there was no taking 
because petitioners had suffered neither an actual loss nor an interference with any investment-
backed expectations, and that the regulation of the use of their property was permissible. 
Moreover, in the majority's view, even if there were a taking, the just compensation due was 
zero. 
We granted certiorari. 536 U.S. 903 (2002). 
III 
While it confirms the state's authority to confiscate private property, the text of the Fifth 
Amendment imposes two conditions on the exercise of such authority: the taking must be for a 
"public use" and "just compensation" must be paid to the owner. In this case, the first condition 
is unquestionably satisfied. If the State had imposed a special tax, or perhaps a system of user 
fees, to generate the funds to finance the legal services supported by the Foundation, there would 
be no question as to the legitimacy of the use of the public's money. The fact that public funds 
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might pay the legal fees of a lawyer representing a tenant in a dispute with a landlord who was 
compelled to contribute to the program would not undermine the public character of the "use" of 
the funds. Provided that she receives just compensation for the taking of her property, a 
conscientious pacifist has no standing to object to the government's decision to use the property 
she formerly owned for the production of munitions. Even if there may be occasional misuses of 
IOLTA funds, the overall, dramatic success of these programs in serving the compelling interest 
in providing legal services to literally millions of needy Americans certainly qualifies the 
Foundation's distribution of these funds as a "public use" within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment.   
Before moving on to the second condition, the "just compensation" requirement, we must 
address the type of taking, if any, that this case involves. As we made clear just last term: 
"The text of the Fifth Amendment itself provides a basis for drawing a distinction 
between physical takings and regulatory takings. Its plain language requires the 
payment of compensation whenever the government acquires private property for 
a public purpose, whether the acquisition is the result of a condemnation 
proceeding or a physical appropriation. But the Constitution contains no 
comparable reference to regulations that prohibit a property owner from making 
certain uses of her private property. Our jurisprudence involving condemnations 
and physical takings is as old as the Republic and, for the most part, involves the 
straightforward application of per se rules. Our regulatory takings jurisprudence, 
in contrast, is of more recent vintage and is characterized by 'essentially ad hoc, 
factual inquiries,' Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978), designed to allow 'careful examination and weighing of all the relevant 
circumstances.' Palazzolo v. Rhode Island], 533 U.S. [606,] 636 [2001] 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). 
We agree that a per se approach is more consistent with the reasoning in our Phillips 
opinion than Penn Central's ad hoc analysis. As was made clear in Phillips, the interest earned in 
the IOLTA accounts "is the 'private property' of the owner of the principal." 524 U.S., at 172. If 
this is so, the transfer of the interest to the Foundation here seems more akin to the occupation of 
a small amount of rooftop space in Loretto. 
We therefore assume that Brown and Hayes retained the beneficial ownership of at least a 
portion of their escrow deposits until the funds were disbursed at the closings, that those funds 
generated some interest in the IOLTA accounts, and that their interest was taken for a public use 
when it was ultimately turned over to the Foundation. As the dissenters in the Ninth Circuit 
explained, though, this does not end our inquiry. Instead, we must determine whether any "just 
compensation" is due. 
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IV 
All of the Circuit Judges and District Judges who have confronted the compensation 
question, both in this case and in Phillips, have agreed that the "just compensation" required by 
the Fifth Amendment is measured by the property owner's loss rather than the government's gain. 
This conclusion is supported by consistent and unambiguous holdings in our cases. 
Applying the teaching of these cases to the question before us, it is clear that neither 
Brown nor Hayes is entitled to any compensation for the nonpecuniary consequences of the 
taking of the interest on his deposited funds, and that any pecuniary compensation must be 
measured by his net losses rather than the value of the public's gain. For that reason, both the 
majority and the dissenters on the Court of Appeals agreed that if petitioners' net loss was zero, 
the compensation that is due is also zero. 
VI 
To recapitulate: It is neither unethical nor illegal for lawyers to deposit their clients' funds 
in a single bank account. A state law that requires client funds that could not otherwise generate 
net earnings for the client to be deposited in an IOLTA account is not a "regulatory taking." A 
law that requires that the interest on those funds be transferred to a different owner for a 
legitimate public use, however, could be a per se taking requiring the payment of "just 
compensation" to the client. Because that compensation is measured by the owner's pecuniary 
loss -- which is zero whenever the Washington law is obeyed -- there has been no violation of the 
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment in this case. It is therefore unnecessary to 
discuss the remedial question presented in the certiorari petition. Accordingly, the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
It is so ordered.   
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE KENNEDY, and 
JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting. 
The Court today concludes that the State of Washington may seize private property, 
without paying compensation, on the ground that the former owners suffered no "net loss" 
because their confiscated property was created by the beneficence of a state regulatory program. 
In so holding the Court creates a novel exception to our oft-repeated rule that the just 
compensation owed to former owners of confiscated property is the fair market value of the 
property taken. What is more, the Court embraces a line of reasoning that we explicitly rejected 
in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998). Our precedents compel the 
conclusion that petitioners are entitled to the fair market value of the interest generated by their 
funds held in interest on lawyers' trust accounts (IOLTA). I dissent from the Court's judgment to 
the contrary. 
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I 
The Court assumes, arguendo, that the appropriation of petitioners' interest constitutes a 
"taking," but holds that just compensation is zero because without the mandatory pooling 
arrangements (step one) of IOLTA, petitioners' funds could not have generated any interest in the 
first place.
1
 This holding contravenes our decision in Phillips -- effectively refusing to treat the 
interest as the property of petitioners we held it to be -- and brushes aside 80 years of precedent 
on determining just compensation.  
II 
When a State has taken private property for a public use, the Fifth Amendment requires 
compensation in the amount of the market value of the property on the date it is appropriated. 
See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (holding that just compensation is 
"'market value of the property at the time of the taking'" (emphasis added)) (quoting Olson v. 
United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (As we explained in United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 
372, 377 (1946), "just compensation . . . is not the value to the owner for his particular purposes 
or to the condemnor for some special use but a so-called 'market value.'"  
In holding that any just compensation that might be owed is zero, the Court [does not ] 
pretend to ascertain the market value of the confiscated property.  Instead, the Court proclaims 
that just compensation is to be determined by the former property owner's "net loss." The Court 
is .. both…[in]consistent with Phillips [and] our precedents that equate just compensation with 
the fair market value of the property taken. 
A 
Consider the implications of the Court's approach for a case such as Webb's Fabulous 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), which involved a Florida statute that allowed 
the clerk of a court, in his discretion, to invest interpleader funds deposited with that court in 
interest-bearing certificates, the interest earned to be deemed "'income of the office of the clerk 
of the circuit court.'" The appellant in Webb's had tendered nearly $2 million to a state court after 
filing an interpleader action, and we held that the state court's retention of the more than 
$100,000 in interest generated by those funds was an uncompensated taking of private property.  
But what would have been just compensation for the taking in Webb's under today's 
analysis? It would consist not of the amount of interest actually earned by the principal, but 
rather of the amount that would have been earned had the State not provided for the clerk of 
                                                 
1
 The Court's ruminations on whether the State's IOLTA program satisfies the Fifth Amendment's "public use" 
requirement, come as a surprise, inasmuch as they address a non-jurisdictional constitutional issue raised by neither 
the parties nor their amici. Petitioners' sole contention in this Court is that the State's IOLTA program violates the 
just compensation requirement of the Takings Clause. 
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court to generate the interest in the first place. That amount would have been zero since, as we 
noted in Webb's, Florida law did not require that interest be earned on a registry deposit Section 
28.33's authorization for the clerk of court to invest the interpleader funds, like the Washington 
Supreme Court's IOLTA scheme, was a state-created opportunity to generate interest on monies 
that would otherwise lie fallow. As the Florida Supreme Court observed, "interest accrues only 
because of section 28.33. In this sense the statute takes only what it creates." Beckwith v. Webb's 
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., 374 So. 2d 951, 953 (1979) (emphasis added). 
In Webb's this Court unanimously rejected the contention that a state regulatory scheme's 
generation of interest that would otherwise not have come into existence gave license for the 
State to claim the interest for itself. What can possibly explain the contrary holding today? 
Surely it cannot be that the Justices look more favorably upon a nationally emulated 
uncompensated taking of clients' funds to support (hurrah!) legal services to the indigent than 
they do upon a more local uncompensated taking of clients' funds to support nothing more 
inspiring than the Florida circuit courts. That were surely an unprincipled distinction. But the 
real, principled basis for the distinction remains to be disclosed. And until it is disclosed, today's 
endorsement of the proposition that there is no taking when "the State giveth, and the State 
taketh away," has potentially far-reaching consequences. May the government now seize welfare 
benefits, without paying compensation, on the ground that there was no "net loss," to the 
recipient? Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).  
B 
The Court's rival theory for explaining why just compensation is zero fares no better. 
Contrary to its aforementioned description of petitioners' "net loss" as the amount their funds 
would have earned in non-IOLTA accounts, the Court declares that just compensation is "the net 
value of the interest that was actually earned by petitioners," -- net value consisting of the value 
of the funds, less "transaction and administrative costs and bank fees" that would be expended in 
extracting the funds from the IOLTA accounts. In this case, however, there is no difference 
between the two. Petitioners have lost the interest that Phillips says rightfully belongs to them -- 
which is precisely what the government has gained. The Court's apparent fear that following the 
Constitution in this case will provide petitioners a "windfall" in the amount of transaction costs 
saved is based on the unfounded assumption that the State must return the interest directly to 
petitioners. The State could satisfy its obligation to pay just compensation by simply returning 
petitioners' money to the IOLTA account from which it was seized, leaving others to incur the 
accounting costs in the event petitioners seek to extract their interest from the account. 
In any event, our cases that have distinguished the "property owner's loss" from the 
"government's gain" say nothing whatever about reducing this value to some "net" amount. But 
the irrationality of this aspect of the Court's opinion does not end with its blatant contradiction of 
a precedent (Phillips) promulgated by a Court consisting of the same Justices who sit today. 
Even if "net value" (rather than "market value") were the appropriate measure of just 
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compensation, the Court has no basis whatsoever for pronouncing the "net value" of petitioners' 
interest to be zero. While the Court is correct that under the State's IOLTA rules, petitioners' 
funds could not have earned net interest in separate, non-IOLTA accounts,  that has no bearing 
on the transaction costs that petitioners would sustain in removing their earned interest from the 
IOLTA accounts. The Court today arbitrarily forecloses clients from recovering the "net interest" 
to which (even under the Court's definition of just compensation) they are entitled. What is more, 
there is no reason to believe that petitioners themselves do not fall within the class of clients 
whose funds, though unable to earn interest in non-IOLTA accounts, nevertheless generate "net 
interest" in IOLTA accounts.  
* * * 
Perhaps we are witnessing today the emergence of a whole new concept in Compensation 
Clause jurisprudence: the Robin Hood Taking, in which the government's extraction of wealth 
from those who own it is so cleverly achieved, and the object of the government's larcenous 
beneficence is so highly favored by the courts (taking from the rich to give to indigent 
defendants) that the normal rules of the Constitution protecting private property are suspended. 
One must hope that that is the case. For to extend to the entire run of Compensation Clause cases 
the rationale supporting today's judgment -- what the government hath given, the government 
may freely take away -- would be disastrous. 
The Court's judgment that petitioners are not entitled to the market value of their 
confiscated property has no basis in law. I respectfully dissent. 
JUSTICE KENNEDY, dissenting. 
The principal dissenting opinion, authored by JUSTICE SCALIA, sets forth a precise, 
complete, and convincing case for rejecting the holding and analysis of the Court. I join the 
dissent in full. 
It does seem appropriate to add this further observation. By mandating that the interest 
from these accounts serve causes the justices of the Washington Supreme Court prefer, the State 
not only takes property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States but also grants to itself a monopoly which might then be used for the forced 
support of certain viewpoints. Had the State, with the help of Congress, not acted in violation of 
its constitutional responsibilities by taking for itself property which all concede to be that of the 
client the free market might have created various and diverse funds for pooling small interest 
amounts. These funds would have allowed the true owners of the property the option to express 
views and policies of their own choosing. Instead, as these programs stand today, the true owner 
cannot even opt out of the State's monopoly. 
The First Amendment consequences of the State's action have not been addressed in this 
case, but the potential for a serious violation is there. Today's holding, then, is doubly 
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unfortunate. One constitutional violation (the taking of property) likely will lead to another 
(compelled speech). These matters may have to come before the Court in due course.   
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:  
When a local government “leverages the police power” and exacts a fee from a developer 
as a condition to issuance of a building permit, is the maximum amount of the fee the marginal 
cost of development to the community or the special benefit conferred on the developer? May it 
be either?  
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Session 17. General Assessments 
Historically “ad valorem” property taxes served as the primary source of local revenues. 
The legitimacy of taxes based upon a general assessment of the “highest and best use” value of 
the property raises questions of fairness, and the courts have taken it upon themselves to 
constitutionally second-guess some of the legislative answers.  
SERRANO v. PRIEST 
5 Cal. 3d 584 (1971) 
SULLIVAN, J.  We are called upon to determine whether the California public school 
financing system, with its substantial dependence on local property taxes and resultant wide 
disparities in school revenue, violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
We have determined that this funding scheme invidiously discriminates against the poor because 
it makes the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors.  
Recognizing as we must that the right to an education in our public schools is a fundamental 
interest which cannot be conditioned on wealth, we can discern no compelling state purpose 
necessitating the present method of financing.  We have concluded, therefore, that such a system 
cannot withstand constitutional challenge and must fall before the equal protection clause. 
Plaintiffs, who are Los Angeles County public school children and their parents, brought 
this class action for declaratory and injunctive relief against certain state and county officials 
charged with administering the financing of the California public school system.  Plaintiff 
children claim to represent a class consisting of all public school pupils in California, "except 
children in that school district, the identity of which is presently unknown, which school district 
affords the greatest educational opportunity of all school districts within California."  Plaintiff 
parents purport to represent a class of all parents who have children in the school system and 
who pay real property taxes in the county of their residence. 
Defendants are the Treasurer, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Controller 
of the State of California, as well as the Tax Collector and Treasurer, and the Superintendent of 
Schools of the County of Los Angeles.  The county officials are sued both in their local 
capacities and as representatives of a class composed of the school superintendent, tax collector 
and treasurer of each of the other counties in the state. 
The complaint sets forth three causes of action.  The first cause alleges in substance as 
follows: Plaintiff children attend public elementary and secondary schools located in specified 
school districts in Los Angeles County.  This public school system is maintained throughout 
California by a financing plan or scheme which relies heavily on local property taxes and causes 
substantial disparities among individual school districts in the amount of revenue available per 
pupil for the districts' educational programs.  Consequently, districts with smaller tax bases are 
not able to spend as much money per child for education as districts with larger assessed 
valuations. 
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It is alleged that "As a direct result of the financing scheme ... substantial disparities in 
the quality and extent of availability of educational opportunities exist and are perpetuated 
among the several school districts of the State.  ... [Par.] The educational opportunities made 
available to children attending public schools in the Districts, including plaintiff children, are 
substantially inferior to the educational opportunities made available to children attending public 
schools in many other districts of the State...."  The financing scheme thus fails to meet the 
requirements of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and the California Constitution in several specified respects. 
In the second cause of action, plaintiff parents, after incorporating by reference all the 
allegations of the first cause, allege that as a direct result of the financing scheme they are 
required to pay a higher tax rate than taxpayers in many other school districts in order to obtain 
for their children the same or lesser educational opportunities afforded children in those other 
districts. 
In the third cause of action, after incorporating by reference all the allegations of the first 
two causes, all plaintiffs allege that an actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the 
parties as to the validity and constitutionality of the financing scheme under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and under the California Constitution. 
Plaintiffs pray for: (1) a declaration that the present financing system is unconstitutional; 
(2) an order directing defendants to reallocate school funds in order to remedy this invalidity; 
and (3) an adjudication that the trial court retain jurisdiction of the action so that it may 
restructure the system if defendants and the state Legislature fail to act within a reasonable time. 
I 
We begin our task by examining the California public school financing system which is 
the focal point of the complaint's allegations.  At the threshold we find a fundamental statistic - 
over 90 percent of our public school funds derive from two basic sources: (a) local district taxes 
on real property and (b) aid from the State School Fund. 
By far the major source of school revenue is the local real property tax.  Pursuant to 
article IX, section 6 of the California Constitution, the Legislature has authorized the governing 
body of each county, and city and county, to levy taxes on the real property within a school 
district at a rate necessary to meet the district's annual education budget.  (Ed. Code, §20701 et 
seq.)  The amount of revenue which a district can raise in this manner thus depends largely on its 
tax base - i.e., the assessed valuation of real property within its borders.  Tax bases vary widely 
throughout the state; in 1969-1970, for example, the assessed valuation per unit of average daily 
attendance of elementary school children ranged from a low of $103 to a peak of $952,156 - a 
ratio of nearly 1 to 10,000.  (Legislative Analyst, Public School Finance, Part V, Current Issues 
in Educational Finance (1971) p. 7.) 
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The other factor determining local school revenue is the rate of taxation within the 
district.  Although the Legislature has placed ceilings on permissible district tax rates ( §20751 et 
seq.), these statutory maxima may be surpassed in a "tax override" election if a majority of the 
district's voters approve a higher rate.( §20803 et seq.) Nearly all districts have voted to override 
the statutory limits.  Thus the locally raised funds which constitute the largest portion of school 
revenue are primarily a function of the value of the realty within a particular school district, 
coupled with the willingness of the district's residents to tax themselves for education. 
Most of the remaining school revenue comes from the State School Fund pursuant to the 
"foundation program," through which the state undertakes to supplement local taxes in order to 
provide a "minimum amount of guaranteed support to all districts ...." (§17300.) With certain 
minor exceptions, the foundation program ensures that each school district will receive annually, 
from state or local funds, $355 for each elementary school pupil ( §§17656, 17660) and $488 for 
each high school student.  (§17665.) 
Although equalization aid and supplemental aid temper the disparities which result from 
the vast variations in real property assessed valuation, wide differentials remain in the revenue 
available to individual districts and, consequently, in the level of educational expenditures.  For 
example, in Los Angeles County, where plaintiff children attend school, the Baldwin Park 
Unified School District expended only $577.49 to educate each of its pupils in 1968-1969; 
during the same year the Pasadena Unified School District spent $840.19 on every student; and 
the Beverly Hills Unified School District paid out $1,231.72 per child.  (Cal. Dept. of Ed., Cal. 
Public Schools, Selected Statistics 1968-1969 (1970) Table IV-11, pp. 90-91.) The source of 
these disparities is unmistakable: in Baldwin Park the assessed valuation per child totaled only 
$3,706; in Pasadena, assessed valuation was $13,706; while in Beverly Hills, the corresponding 
figure was $50,885 - a ratio of 1 to 4 to 13.(Id.) Thus, the state grants are inadequate to offset the 
inequalities inherent in a financing system based on widely varying local tax bases. 
Similar spending disparities have been noted throughout the country, particularly when 
suburban communities and urban ghettos are compared.  (See, e.g., Report of the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Bantam ed. 1968) pp. 434-436; U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools (1967) pp. 25-31; Conant, Slums and 
Suburbs (1961) pp. 2-3; Levi, The University, The Professions, and the Law (1968) 56 
Cal.L.Rev. 251, 258-259.) 
III 
We take up the chief contention underlying plaintiffs' complaint, namely that the 
California public school financing scheme violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
As recent decisions of this court have pointed out, the United States Supreme Court has 
employed a two-level test for measuring legislative classifications against the equal protection 
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clause.  "In the area of economic regulation, the high court has exercised restraint, investing 
legislation with a presumption of constitutionality and requiring merely that distinctions drawn 
by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose.  
[Citations.] 
"On the other hand, in cases involving 'suspect classifications' or touching on 
'fundamental interests,' [fns. omitted] the court has adopted an attitude of active 
and critical analysis, subjecting the classification to strict scrutiny. [Citations.] 
Under the strict standard applied in such cases, the state bears the burden of 
establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but 
that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose." 
(Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 784-785 [87 Cal.Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 
487], vacated on other grounds (1971) 403 U.S. 915 [29 L.Ed.2d 692, 91 S.Ct. 
2224] 
A. Wealth as a Suspect Classification 
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has demonstrated a marked antipathy 
toward legislative classifications which discriminate on the basis of certain "suspect" personal 
characteristics.  One factor which has repeatedly come under the close scrutiny of the high court 
is wealth.  "Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race [citation], are 
traditionally disfavored." (Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections (1966) 383 U.S. 663, 668 [16 
L.Ed.2d 169, u73, 86 S.Ct. 1079].) Invalidating the Virginia poll tax in Harper, the court stated: 
"To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce a 
capricious or irrelevant factor." (Id.)  [A] careful examination on our part is especially warranted 
where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth ... [a] factor which would independently render a 
classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny. [Citations.]" 
Plaintiffs contend that the school financing system classifies on the basis of wealth.  We 
find this proposition irrefutable.  As we have already discussed, over half of all educational 
revenue is raised locally by levying taxes on real property in the individual school districts.  
Above the foundation program minimum ($355 per elementary student and $488 per high school 
student), the wealth of a school district, as measured by its assessed valuation, is the major 
determinant of educational expenditures.  Although the amount of money raised locally is also a 
function of the rate at which the residents of a district are willing to tax themselves, as a practical 
matter districts with small tax bases simply cannot levy taxes at a rate sufficient to produce the 
revenue that more affluent districts reap with minimal tax efforts. 
Defendants vigorously dispute the proposition that the financing scheme discriminates on 
the basis of wealth.  Their first argument is essentially this: through basic aid, the state distributes 
school funds equally to all pupils; through equalization aid, it distributes funds in a manner 
beneficial to the poor districts.  However, state funds constitute only one part of the entire school 
fiscal system. The foundation program partially alleviates the great disparities in local sources of 
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revenue, but the system as a whole generates school revenue in proportion to the wealth of the 
individual district. 
Defendants also argue that neither assessed valuation per pupil nor expenditure per pupil 
is a reliable index of the wealth of a district or of its residents.  The former figure is 
untrustworthy, they assert, because a district with a low total assessed valuation but a minuscule 
number of students will have a high per pupil tax base and thus appear "wealthy." Defendants 
imply that the proper index of a district's wealth is the total assessed valuation of its property.  
We think defendants' contention misses the point.  The only meaningful measure of a district's 
wealth in the present context is not the absolute value of its property, but the ratio of its resources 
to pupils, because it is the latter figure which determines how much the district can devote to 
educating each of its students. 
But, say defendants, the expenditure per child does not accurately reflect a district's 
wealth because that expenditure is partly determined by the district's tax rate.  Thus, a district 
with a high total assessed valuation might levy a low school tax, and end up spending the same 
amount per pupil as a poorer district whose residents opt to pay higher taxes.  This argument is 
also meritless.  Obviously, the richer district is favored when it can provide the same educational 
quality for its children with less tax effort.  Furthermore, as a statistical matter, the poorer 
districts are financially unable to raise their taxes high enough to match the educational offerings 
of wealthier districts.  (Legislative Analyst, Part V, supra, pp. 8-9.) Thus, affluent districts can 
have their cake and eat it too: they can provide a high quality education for their children while 
paying lower taxes. Poor districts, by contrast, have no cake at all. 
Defendants, assuming for the sake of argument that the financing system does classify by 
wealth, nevertheless claim that no constitutional infirmity is involved because the complaint 
contains no allegation of purposeful or intentional discrimination.  (Cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot 
(1960) 364 U.S. 339 [5 L.Ed.2d 110, 81 S.Ct. 125].) Thus, defendants contend, any unequal 
treatment is only de facto, not de jure.  Since the United States Supreme Court has not held de 
facto school segregation on the basis of race to be unconstitutional, so the argument goes, de 
facto classifications on the basis of wealth are presumptively valid. 
We think that the whole structure of this argument must fall for want of a solid 
foundation in law and logic.  First, none of the wealth classifications previously invalidated by 
the United States Supreme Court or this court has been the product of purposeful discrimination.  
Instead, these prior decisions have involved "unintentional" classifications whose impact simply 
fell more heavily on the poor. 
For example, several cases have held that where important rights are at stake, the state 
has an affirmative obligation to relieve an indigent of the burden of his own poverty by 
supplying without charge certain goods or services for which others must pay.  In Griffin v. 
Illinois, supra, 351 U.S. 12, the high court ruled that Illinois was required to provide a poor 
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defendant with a free transcript on appeal. Douglas v. California, supra, 372 U.S. 353 held that 
an indigent person has a right to court-appointed counsel on appeal. 
Other cases dealing with the factor of wealth have held that a state may not impose on an 
indigent certain payments which, although neutral on their face, may have a discriminatory 
effect. In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra, 383 U.S. 663, the high court struck down a 
$1.50 poll tax, not because its purpose was to deter indigents from voting, but because its result 
might be such.  (Id. at p. 666, fn. 3 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 172].) We held in In re Antazo, supra, 3 
Cal.3d 100 that a poor defendant was denied equal protection of the law if he was imprisoned 
simply because he could not afford to pay a fine.  (Accord, Tate v. Short, supra, 401 U.S. 395; 
Williams v. Illinois, supra, 399 U.S. 235; n18 see Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 401 U.S. 371 [28 
L.Ed.2d 113, 91 S.Ct. 780], discussed fn. 21 infra.) In summary, prior decisions have invalidated 
classifications based on wealth even in the absence of a discriminatory motivation. 
We turn now to defendants' related contention that the instant case involves at most de 
facto discrimination.  We disagree.  Indeed, we find the case unusual in the extent to which 
governmental action is the cause of the wealth classifications.  The school funding scheme is 
mandated in every detail by the California Constitution and statutes.  Although private residential 
and commercial patterns may be partly responsible for the distribution of assessed valuation 
throughout the state, such patterns are shaped and hardened by zoning ordinances and other 
governmental landuse controls which promote economic exclusivity.  (Cf. San Francisco Unified 
School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 937, 956 [92 Cal.Rptr 309, 479 P.2d 669].) 
Governmental action drew the school district boundary lines, thus determining how much local 
wealth each district would contain.  (Cal. Const., art. IX, §14; Ed. Code, §1601 et seq.; 
Worthington S. Dist. v. Eureka S. Dist. (1916) 173 Cal. 154, 156 [159 P. 437]; Hughes v. Ewing 
(1892) 93 Cal. 414, 417 [28 P. 1067]; Mountain View Sch. Dist. v. City Council (1959) 168 
Cal.App.2d 89, 97 [335 P.2d 957].) 
Finally, even assuming arguendo that defendants are correct in their contention that the 
instant discrimination based on wealth is merely de facto, and not de jure, such discrimination 
cannot be justified by analogy to de facto racial segregation.  Although the United States 
Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of de facto racial segregation, this court 
eight years ago held such segregation invalid, and declared that school boards should take 
affirmative steps to alleviate racial imbalance, however created.  (Jackson v. Pasadena City 
School Dist. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 876, 881 [31 Cal.Rptr. 606, 382 P.2d 878]; San Francisco Unified 
School Dist. v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.3d 937.) Consequently, any discrimination based on wealth 
can hardly be vindicated by reference to de facto racial segregation, which we have already 
condemned.  In sum, we are of the view that the school financing system discriminates on the 
basis of the wealth of a district and its residents. 
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B. Education as a Fundamental Interest 
But plaintiffs' equal protection attack on the fiscal system has an additional dimension.  
They assert that the system not only draws lines on the basis of wealth but that it "touches upon," 
indeed has a direct and significant impact upon, a "fundamental interest," namely education.  It is 
urged that these two grounds, particularly in combination, establish a demonstrable denial of 
equal protection of the laws.  To this phase of the argument we now turn our attention. 
Until the present time wealth classifications have been invalidated only in conjunction 
with a limited number of fundamental interests - rights of defendants in criminal cases and 
voting rights. Plaintiffs' contention - that education is a fundamental interest which may not be 
conditioned on wealth - is not supported by any direct authority. 
We, therefore, begin by examining the indispensable role which education plays in the 
modern industrial state.  This role, we believe, has two significant aspects: first, education is a 
major determinant of an individual's chances for economic and social success in our competitive 
society; second, education is a unique influence on a child's development as a citizen and his 
participation in political and community life.  "[The] pivotal position of education to success in 
American society and its essential role in opening up to the individual the central experiences of 
our culture lend it an importance that is undeniable."  (Note, Development in the Law - Equal 
Protection (1969) 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1129.) Thus, education is the lifeline of both the 
individual and society. 
The fundamental importance of education has been recognized in other contexts by the 
United States Supreme Court and by this court.  These decisions - while not legally controlling 
on the exact issue before us - are persuasive in their accurate factual description of the 
significance of learning. 
The classic expression of this position came in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 347 
U.S. 483 [98 L.Ed. 873, 74 S.Ct. 686, 38 A.L.R.2d 1180], which invalidated de jure segregation 
by race in public schools.  The high court declared: "Today, education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments.  Compulsory school attendance laws and the 
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education 
to our democratic society.  It is required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.  It is the very foundation of good citizenship.  
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for 
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.  In these 
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied 
the opportunity of an education.  Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide 
it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms." (Id. at p. 493 [98 L.Ed. at p. 
880].) 
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It is illuminating to compare in importance the right to an education with the rights of 
defendants in criminal cases and the right to vote - two "fundamental interests" which the 
Supreme Court has already protected against discrimination based on wealth.  Although an 
individual's interest in his freedom is unique, we think that from a larger perspective, education 
may have far greater social significance than a free transcript or a court-appointed lawyer.  
"[Education] not only affects directly a vastly greater number of persons than the criminal law, 
but it affects them in ways which - to the state - have an enormous and much more varied 
significance.  Aside from reducing the crime rate (the inverse relation is strong), education also 
supports each and every other value of a democratic society - participation, communication, and 
social mobility, to name but a few." (Fn. omitted.) (Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra, 57 
Cal.L.Rev. 305, 362-363.) 
The need for an educated populace assumes greater importance as the problems of our 
diverse society become increasingly complex.  The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly 
recognized the role of public education as a unifying social force and the basic tool for shaping 
democratic values.  The public school has been termed "the most powerful agency for promoting 
cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people ... at once the symbol of our democracy and 
the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny." (McCollum v. Board of 
Education (1948) 333 U.S. 203, 216, 231 [92 L.Ed. 649, 661, 669, 68 S.Ct. 461, 2 A.L.R.2d 
1338] (Frankfurter, J., concurring).) In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp (1963) 374 U.S. 203 
[10 L.Ed.2d 844, 83 S.Ct. 1560], it was said that "Americans regard public schools as a most 
vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government." (Id. at p. 230 
[10 L.Ed.2d at p. 863] (Brennan, J., concurring).) 
We are convinced that the distinctive and priceless function of education in our society 
warrants, indeed compels, our treating it as a "fundamental interest." 
First, education is essential in maintaining what several commentators have termed "free 
enterprise democracy" - that is, preserving an individual's opportunity to compete successfully in 
the economic marketplace, despite a disadvantaged background.  Accordingly, the public schools 
of this state are the bright hope for entry of the poor and oppressed into the mainstream of 
American society. 
Second, education is universally relevant.  "Not every person finds it necessary to call 
upon the fire department or even the police in an entire lifetime.  Relatively few are on welfare.  
Every person, however, benefits from education ...." (Fn. omitted.) (Coons, Clune & Sugarman, 
supra, 57 Cal.L.Rev. at p. 388.) 
Third, public education continues over a lengthy period of life - between 10 and 13 years.  
Few other government services have such sustained, intensive contact with the recipient. 
Fourth, education is unmatched in the extent to which it molds the personality of the 
youth of society.  While police and fire protection, garbage collection and street lights are 
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essentially neutral in their effect on the individual psyche, public education actively attempts to 
shape a child's personal development in a manner chosen not by the child or his parents but by 
the state.  (Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Supra, 57 Cal.L.Rev. at p. 389.)  "[The] influence of the 
school is not confined to how well it can teach the disadvantaged child; it also has a significant 
role to pay in shaping the student's emotional and psychological make-up." (Hobson v. Hansen, 
supra, 269 F.Supp. 401, 483.) 
Finally, education is so important that the state has made it compulsory - not only in the 
requirement of attendance but also by assignment to a particular district and school.  Although a 
child of wealthy parents has the opportunity to attend a private school, this freedom is seldom 
available to the indigent.  In this context, it has been suggested that "a child of the poor assigned 
willy-nilly to an inferior state school takes on the complexion of a prisoner, complete with a 
minimum sentence of 12 years." (Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra, 57 Cal.L.Rev. at p. 388.) 
C.  The Financing System Is Not Necessary to Accomplish a Compelling State Interest 
We now reach the final step in the application of the "strict scrutiny" equal protection 
standard - the determination of whether the California school financing system, as presently 
structured, is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. 
The state interest which defendants advance in support of the current fiscal scheme is 
California's policy "to strengthen and encourage local responsibility for control of public 
education." (Ed. Code, §17300.)  We treat separately the two possible aspects of this goal: first, 
the granting to local districts of effective decision-making power over the administration of their 
schools; and second, the promotion of local fiscal control over the amount of money to be spent 
on education. 
The individual district may well be in the best position to decide whom to hire, how to 
schedule its educational offerings, and a host of other matters which are either of significant local 
impact or of such a detailed nature as to require decentralized determination.  But even assuming 
arguendo that local administrative control may be a compelling state interest, the present 
financial system cannot be considered necessary to further this interest.  No matter how the state 
decides to finance its system of public education, it can still leave this decision-making power in 
the hands of local districts. 
In summary, so long as the assessed valuation within a district's boundaries is a major 
determinant of how much it can spend for its schools, only a district with a large tax base will be 
truly able to decide how much it really cares about education.  The poor district cannot freely 
choose to tax itself into an excellence which its tax rolls cannot provide.  Far from being 
necessary to promote local fiscal choice, the present financing system actually deprives the less 
wealthy districts of that option. 
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We, therefore, arrive at these conclusions.  The California Public school financing 
system, as presented to us by plaintiffs' complaint supplemented by matters judicially noticed, 
since it deals intimately with education, obviously touches upon a fundamental interest.  For the 
reasons we have explained in detail, this system conditions the full entitlement to such interest on 
wealth, classifies its recipients on the basis of their collective affluence and makes the quality of 
a child's education depend upon the resources of his school district and ultimately upon the 
pocketbook of his parents.  We find that such financing system as presently constituted is not 
necessary to the attainment of any compelling state interest.  Since it does not withstand the 
requisite "strict scrutiny," it denies to the plaintiffs and others similarly situated the equal 
protection of the laws.  If the allegations of the complaint are sustained, the financial system 
must fall and the statutes comprising it must be found unconstitutional. 
In sum, we find the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint legally sufficient and we return the 
cause to the trial court for further proceedings.  We emphasize, that our decision is not a final 
judgment on the merits.  We deem it appropriate to point out for the benefit of the trial court on 
remand (see Code Civ. Proc., §43) that if, after further proceedings, that court should enter final 
judgment determining that the existing system of public school financing is unconstitutional and 
invalidating said system in whole or in part, it may properly provide for the enforcement of the 
judgment in such a way as to permit an orderly transition from an unconstitutional to a 
constitutional system of school financing.  As in the cases of school desegregation (see Brown v. 
Board of Education (1955) 349 U.S. 294 [99 L.Ed. 1083, 75 S.Ct. 753]) and legislative 
reapportionment  (see Silver v. Brown (1965) 63 Cal.2d 270, 281 [46 Cal.Rptr. 308, 405 P.2d 
132]), a determination that an existing plan of governmental operation denies equal protection 
does not necessarily require invalidation of past acts undertaken pursuant to that plan or an 
immediate implementation of a constitutionally valid substitute.  Obviously, any judgment 
invalidating the existing system of public school financing should make clear that the existing 
system is to remain operable until an appropriate new system, which is not violative of equal 
protection of the laws, can be put into effect. 
By our holding today we further the cherished idea of American education that in a 
democratic society free public schools shall make available to all children equally the abundant 
gifts of learning.  This was the credo of Horace Mann, which has been the heritage and the 
inspiration of this country.  "I believe," he wrote, "in the existence of a great, immortal 
immutable principle of natural law, or natural ethics, - a principle antecedent to all human 
institutions, and incapable of being abrogated by any ordinance of man ... which proves the 
absolute right to an education of every human being that comes into the world, and which, of 
course, proves the correlative duty of every government to see that the means of that education 
are provided for all.  ..." (Original italics.) (Old South Leaflets V, No. 109 (1846) pp. 177-180 
(Tenth Annual Report to Mass. State Bd. of Ed.), quoted in Readings in American Education 
(1963 Lucio ed.) p. 336.) 
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The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to 
overrule the demurrers and to allow defendants a reasonable time within which to answer. 
SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ 
411 U.S. 1 (1972) 
Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This suit attacking the Texas system of financing public education was initiated by 
Mexican-American parents whose children attend the elementary and secondary schools in the 
Edgewood Independent School District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas. They 
brought a class action on behalf of school children throughout the State who are members of 
minority groups or who are poor and reside in school districts having a low property tax base. 
Named as defendants were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner of Education, the 
State Attorney General, and the Bexar County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees.  The complaint 
was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge court was impaneled in January 1969.  In 
December 1971 the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion holding the Texas 
school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The State appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching 
constitutional questions presented.  406 U.S. 966 (1972). For the reasons stated in this opinion, 
we reverse the decision of the District Court. 
I 
The first Texas State Constitution, promulgated upon Texas’ entry into the Union in 
1845, provided for the establishment of a system of free schools.  Early in its history, Texas 
adopted a dual approach to the financing of its schools, relying on mutual participation by the 
local school districts and the State.  As early as 1883, the state constitution was amended to 
provide for the creation of local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem taxes with the 
consent of local taxpayers for the “erection . . . of school buildings” and for the “further 
maintenance of public free schools.”  Such local funds as were raised were supplemented by 
funds distributed to each district from the State’s Permanent and Available School Funds.  
Until recent times, Texas was a predominantly rural State and its population and property 
wealth were spread relatively evenly across the State. Sizable differences in the value of 
assessable property between local school districts became increasingly evident as the State 
became more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population shifts became more pronounced. 
The location of commercial and industrial property began to play a significant role in 
determining the amount of tax resources available to each school district. These growing 
disparities in population and taxable property between districts were responsible in part for 
increasingly notable differences in levels of local expenditure for education. 
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The school district in which appellees reside, the Edgewood Independent School District, 
has been compared throughout this litigation with the Alamo Heights Independent School 
District. This comparison between the least and most affluent districts in the San Antonio area 
serves to illustrate the manner in which the dual system of finance operates and to indicate the 
extent to which substantial disparities exist despite the State’s impressive progress in recent 
years. Edgewood is one of seven public school districts in the metropolitan area.  Approximately 
22,000 students are enrolled in its 25 elementary and secondary schools.  The district is situated 
in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little commercial or 
industrial property.  The residents are predominantly of Mexican-American descent: 
approximately 90% of the student population is Mexican-American and over 6% is Negro.  The 
average assessed property value per pupil is $5,960–the lowest in the metropolitan area--and the 
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest.  At an equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of 
assessed property-the highest in the metropolitan area–the district contributed $26 to the 
education of each child for the 1967-1968 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for the 
Minimum Foundation Program.  The Foundation Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-
local total of $248.  Federal funds added another $108 for a total of $356 per pupil.  
Alamo Heights is the most affluent school district in San Antonio.  Its six schools, 
housing approximately 5,000 students, are situated in a residential community quite unlike the 
Edgewood District. The school population is predominantly “Anglo,” having only 18% 
Mexican-Americans and less than 1% Negroes.  The assessed property value per pupil exceeds 
$49,000, and the median family income is $8,001.  In 1967-1968 the local tax rate of $.85 per 
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over $225 provided from that Program, the district was 
able to supply $558 per student.  Supplemented by a $36 per-pupil grant from federal sources, 
Alamo Heights spent $594 per pupil. 
Substantial interdistrict disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to 
prevail in San Antonio and in varying degrees throughout the State still exist.  And it was these 
disparities, largely attributable to differences in the amounts of money collected through local 
property taxation, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas’ dual system of public school 
financing violated the Equal Protection Clause.  The District Court held that the Texas system 
discriminates on the basis of wealth in the manner in which education is provided for its people. 
337 F. Supp., at 282. Finding that wealth is a “suspect” classification and that education is a 
“fundamental” interest, the District Court held that the Texas system could be sustained only if 
the State could show that it was premised upon some compelling state interest.  On this issue the 
court concluded that “[n]ot only are defendants unable to demonstrate compelling state interests . 
. . they fail even to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications.”  Id., at 284. 
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted dual system of financing education 
could not withstand the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found appropriate in reviewing 
legislative judgments that interfere with fundamental constitutional rights or that involve suspect 
classifications. If, as  previous decisions have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State’s 
 403 
system is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, that the State rather than the 
complainants must carry a “heavy burden of justification,” that the State must demonstrate that 
its educational system has been structured with “precision,” and is “tailored” narrowly to serve 
legitimate objectives and that it has selected the “less drastic means” for effectuating its 
objectives, the Texas financing system and its counterpart in virtually every other State will not 
pass muster. The State candidly admits that “[n]o one familiar with the Texas system would 
contend that it has yet achieved perfection.” Apart from its concession that educational financing 
in Texas has “defects” and “imperfections,” the State defends the system’s rationality with vigor 
and disputes the District Court’s finding that it lacks a “reasonable basis.”  
This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis.  We must decide, first, whether the 
Texas system of financing public education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or 
impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby 
requiring strict judicial scrutiny.  If so, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.  If 
not, the Texas scheme must still be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some 
legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
II 
A 
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District Court in this case, and by several 
other courts that have recently struck down school-financing laws in other States, is quite unlike 
any of the forms of wealth discrimination heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather than 
focusing on the unique features of the alleged discrimination, the courts in these cases have 
virtually assumed their findings of a suspect classification through a simplistic process of 
analysis: since, under the traditional systems of financing public schools, some poorer people 
receive less expensive educations than other more affluent people, these systems discriminate on 
the basis of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard threshold questions, including 
whether it makes a difference for purposes of consideration under the Constitution that the class 
of disadvantaged “poor” cannot be identified or defined in customary equal protection terms, and 
whether the relative–rather than absolute–nature of the asserted deprivation is of significant 
consequence. Before a State’s laws and the justifications for the classifications they create are 
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must be analyzed 
more closely than they were in the court below. 
The case comes to us with no definitive description of the classifying facts or delineation 
of the disfavored class.  Examination of the District Court’s opinion and of appellees’ complaint, 
briefs, and contentions at oral argument suggests, however, at least three ways in which the 
discrimination claimed here might be described.  The Texas system of school financing might be 
regarded as discriminating (1) against “poor” persons whose incomes fall below some 
identifiable level of poverty or who might be characterized as functionally “indigent,” or 
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(2) against those who are relatively poorer than others, or (3) against all those who, irrespective 
of their personal incomes, happen to reside in relatively poorer school districts.  Our task must be 
to ascertain whether, in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discriminate on any of these 
possible bases and, if so, whether the resulting classification may be regarded as suspect. 
The precedents of this Court provide the proper starting point.  The individuals, or groups 
of individuals, who constituted the class discriminated against in our prior cases shared two 
distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay 
for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a 
meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.  
Only appellees’ first possible basis for describing the class disadvantaged by the Texas 
school-financing system–discrimination against a class of definably “poor” persons–might 
arguably meet the criteria established in these prior cases.  Even a cursory examination, however, 
demonstrates that neither of the two distinguishing characteristics of wealth classifications can be 
found here.  First, in support of their charge that the system discriminates against the “poor,” 
appellees have made no effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar disadvantage of any 
class fairly definable as indigent, or as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any 
designated poverty level.  Indeed, there is reason to believe that the poorest families are not 
necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts.  A recent and exhaustive study of school 
districts in Connecticut concluded that “[i]t is clearly incorrect . . . to contend that the ‛poor’ live 
in ‛poor’ districts . . .  Thus, the major factual assumption that the educational financing system 
discriminates against the ‘poor’- is simply false in Connecticut.” Note, A Statistical Analysis of 
the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L.J. 1303, 
1328-1329 (1972).  
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court addressed the fact that lack of personal 
resources has not occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit.  The argument here 
is not that the children in districts having relatively low assessable property values are receiving 
no public education; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer quality education than that 
available to children in districts having more assessable wealth.  Apart from the unsettled and 
disputed question whether the quality  of education may be determined by the amount of money 
expended for it, a sufficient answer to appellees’ argument is that, at least where wealth is 
involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal 
advantages.  Nor, indeed, in view of the infinite variables affecting the educational process, can 
any system assure equal quality of education except in the most relative sense. 
For these two reasons–the absence of any evidence that the financing system 
discriminates against any definable category of “poor” people or that it results in the absolute 
deprivation of education- the disadvantaged class is not susceptible of identification in traditional 
terms. 
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[It] is clear that appellees’ suit asks this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to 
review a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, diverse, and amorphous class, 
unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable 
wealth than other districts. The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have 
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or 
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of 
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process.   
We thus conclude that the Texas system does not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of 
any suspect class.  But in recognition of the fact that this Court has never heretofore held that 
wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny, appellees 
have not relied solely on this contention.  They also assert that the State’s system impermissibly 
interferes with the exercise of a “fundamental” right and that accordingly the prior decisions of 
this Court require the application of the strict standard of judicial review.  Graham v. Richardson, 
403 U.S. 365, 375-376 (1971); Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).  It is this question–whether education is a fundamental right, in 
the sense that it is among the rights and liberties protected by the Constitution–which has so 
consumed the attention of courts and commentators in recent years.  
B 
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), a unanimous Court recognized 
that “education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.”  Id., at 
493. What was said there in the context of racial discrimination has lost none of its vitality with 
the passage of time:   
“Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education 
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society.  It is required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.  It is the very foundation of 
good citizenship.  Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to 
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him 
to adjust normally to his environment.  In these days, it is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education.  Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.” Ibid. 
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital role of education in a free society, 
may be found in numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing both before and after Brown 
was decided.  Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts from our historic dedication to 
public education.  We are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the three-judge panel 
below that “the grave significance of education both to the individual and to our society” cannot 
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be doubted. But the importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it 
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting from the Court’s application of strict scrutiny to a law impinging 
upon the right of interstate travel, admonished that “[v]irtually every state statute affects 
important rights.”  Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S., at 655, 661. In his view, if the degree of 
judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated depending on a majority’s view of the importance 
of the interest affected, we would have gone “far toward making this Court a ‘super-legislature.’” 
Ibid. We would, indeed, then be assuming a legislative role and one for which the Court lacks 
both authority and competence.  
The lesson of these cases in addressing the question now before the Court is plain.  It is 
not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of 
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education is 
“fundamental” is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education 
as opposed to subsistence or housing.  Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as 
important as the right to travel.  Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to 
education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.   
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our 
Federal Constitution.  Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.  As we 
have said, the undisputed importance of education will not alone cause this Court to depart from 
the usual standard for reviewing a State’s social and economic legislation.  It is appellees’ 
contention, however, that education is distinguishable from other services and benefits provided 
by the State because it bears a peculiarly close relationship to other rights and liberties accorded 
protection under the Constitution.  Specifically, they insist that education is itself a fundamental 
personal right because it is essential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and 
to intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In asserting a nexus between speech and education, 
appellees urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating 
his thoughts intelligently and persuasively.  The “marketplace of ideas” is an empty forum for 
those lacking basic communicative tools.  Likewise, they argue that the corollary right to receive 
information becomes little more than a hollow privilege when the recipient has not been taught 
to read, assimilate, and utilize available knowledge. 
We need not dispute any of these propositions.  The Court has long afforded zealous 
protection against unjustifiable governmental interference with the individual’s rights to speak 
and to vote.  Yet we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to 
guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice.   That 
these may be desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and of a representative form 
of government is not to be doubted. These are indeed goals to be pursued by a people whose 
thoughts and beliefs are freed from governmental interference.  But they are not values to be 
implemented by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities. 
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Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally 
protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that the 
present levels of educational expenditure in Texas provide an education that falls short. 
Whatever merit appellees’ argument might have if a State’s financing system occasioned an 
absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no 
basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative differences in 
spending levels are involved and where–as is true in the present case–no charge fairly could be 
made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal 
skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political 
process. 
Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees’ nexus theory are difficult to perceive. 
How, for instance, is education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the 
basics of decent food and shelter? Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that 
the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among the most ineffective participants in the political 
process, and that they derive the least enjoyment from the benefits of the First Amendment. 
We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive of the District Court’s 
finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have found those arguments 
unpersuasive. 
It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in accord with the prior decisions of 
this Court, that this is not a case in which the challenged state action must be subjected to the 
searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws that create suspect classifications or impinge upon 
constitutionally protected rights. 
We need not rest our decision, however, solely on the inappropriateness of the strict-
scrutiny test.  A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause 
affirmatively supports the application of the traditional standard of review, which requires only 
that the State’s system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes. 
This case represents far more than a challenge to the manner in which Texas provides for the 
education of its children.  We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the way in which 
Texas has chosen to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues.  We are asked to condemn 
the State’s judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to 
supply revenues for local interests.  In so doing, appellees would have the Court intrude in an 
area in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures.  This Court has often admonished 
against such interferences with the State’s fiscal policies under the Equal Protection Clause.  
Thus, we stand on familiar ground when we continue to acknowledge that the Justices of 
this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the 
making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues.  Yet, we 
are urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the present system or to throw out the 
property tax altogether in favor of some other form of taxation.  No scheme of taxation, whether 
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the tax is imposed on property, income, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been devised 
which is free of all discriminatory impact.  In such a complex arena in which no perfect 
alternatives exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest all 
local fiscal schemes become subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause.  
It must be remembered, also, that every claim arising under the Equal Protection Clause 
has implications for the relationship between national and state power under our federal system. 
Questions of federalism are always inherent in the process of determining whether a State’s laws 
are to be accorded the traditional presumption of constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead 
to rigorous judicial scrutiny.  While “[t]he maintenance of the principles of federalism is a 
foremost consideration in interpreting any of the pertinent constitutional provisions under which 
this Court examines state action,” it would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater 
potential impact on our federal system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to 
abrogate systems of financing public education presently in existence in virtually every State. 
The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion that Texas’ system of public school 
finance is an inappropriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny.  These same considerations are 
relevant to the determination whether that system, with its conceded imperfections, nevertheless 
bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.  It is to this question that we next 
turn our attention. 
III 
While it is no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation for school revenues 
provides less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for some districts than for others, 
the existence of “some inequality” in the manner in which the State’s rationale is achieved is not 
alone a sufficient basis for striking down the entire system.  It may not be condemned simply 
because it imperfectly effectuates the State’s goals.  Nor must the financing system fail because, 
as appellees suggest, other methods of satisfying the State’s interest, which occasion “less 
drastic” disparities in expenditures, might be conceived.  Only where state action impinges on 
the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or liberties must it be found to have chosen the 
least restrictive alternative.  It is also well to remember that even those districts that have reduced 
ability to make free decisions with respect to how much they spend on education still retain 
under the present system a large measure of authority as to how available funds will be allocated. 
They further enjoy the power to make numerous other decisions with respect to the operation of 
the schools.  The people of Texas may be justified in believing that other systems of school 
financing, which place more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the State, will result in 
a comparable lessening of desired local autonomy.  That is, they may believe that along with 
increased control of the purse strings at the state level will go increased control over local 
policies.  
Appellees further urge that the Texas system is unconstitutionally arbitrary because it 
allows the availability of local taxable resources to turn on “happenstance.” They see no 
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justification for a system that allows, as they contend, the quality of education to fluctuate on the 
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines of political subdivisions and the location 
of valuable commercial and industrial property.  But any scheme of local taxation–indeed the 
very existence of identifiable local governmental units–requires the establishment of 
jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary.  It is equally inevitable that some localities 
are going to be blessed with more taxable assets than others. Nor is local wealth a static quantity. 
Changes in the level of taxable wealth within any district may result from any number of events, 
some of which local residents can and do influence. For instance, commercial and industrial 
enterprises may be encouraged to locate within a district by various actions–public and private.   
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditures were an unconstitutional method of 
providing for education then it might be an equally impermissible means of providing other 
necessary services customarily financed largely from local property taxes, including local police 
and fire protection, public health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds.  We 
perceive no justification for such a severe denigration of local property taxation and control as 
would follow from appellees’ contentions.  It has simply never been within the constitutional 
prerogative of this Court to nullify statewide measures for financing public services merely 
because the burdens or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the 
political subdivisions in which citizens live. 
In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school financing results in unequal 
expenditures between children who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say that 
such disparities are the product of a system that is so irrational as to be invidiously 
discriminatory.  One also must remember that the system here challenged is not peculiar to Texas 
or to any other State.  In its essential characteristics, the Texas plan for financing public 
education reflects what many educators for a half century have thought was an enlightened 
approach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution.  We are unwilling to assume for 
ourselves a level of wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars, and educational authorities in 
50 States, especially where the alternatives proposed are only recently conceived and nowhere 
yet tested.  The constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause is whether the 
challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest.  McGinnis v. 
Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973). We hold that the Texas plan abundantly satisfies this 
standard. 
Reversed. 
Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Douglas Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall 
dissent  
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ALLEGHENY PITTSBURGH COAL CO. v. COUNTY COMMISSION OF WEBSTER 
COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA 
488 U.S. 336 (1989) 
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The West Virginia Constitution guarantees to its citizens that, with certain exceptions, 
“taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State, and all property, both real and 
personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value . . . .”  W. Va. Const., Art. X, §1.  The Webster 
County tax assessor valued petitioners’ real property on the basis of its recent purchase price, but 
made only minor modifications in the assessments of land which had not been recently sold. This 
practice resulted in gross disparities in the assessed value of generally comparable property, and 
we hold that it denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to them by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Between 1975 and 1986, the tax assessor for Webster County, West Virginia, fixed 
yearly assessments for property within the County at 50% of appraised value.  She fixed the 
appraised value at the declared consideration at which the property last sold.  Some adjustments 
were made in the assessments of properties that had not been recently sold, although they 
amounted to, at most, 10% increases in 1976, 1981, and 1983 respectively.
1
 
In 1974, for example, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company (Allegheny) purchased fee, 
surface, and mineral interests in certain properties for a stated price somewhat in excess of $24 
million, and during the tax years 1976 through 1983 its property was assessed annually at half of 
this figure.  In 1982, Allegheny sold the property to East Kentucky Energy Corp. (Kentucky 
Energy) for a figure of nearly $30 million, and the property thereafter was annually assessed at a 
valuation just below $15 million.  Oneida Coal Company and Shamrock Coal Company 
participated in similar transactions in Webster County, and the property they purchased or sold 
was assessed in a similar manner. 
Each year, petitioners pursued relief before the County Commission of Webster County 
sitting as review board.  They argued that the assessment policy of the Webster County assessor 
systematically resulted in appraisals for their property that were excessive compared to the 
appraised value of similar parcels that had not been recently conveyed.  Each year the county 
commission affirmed the assessments, and each year petitioners appealed to the State Circuit 
                                                 
1
 Petitioners contend that the adjustments to the assessments for property not recently transferred were uneven at 
best.  According to petitioners, a study of the assessed value of all coal tracts in Webster County from 1983 to 1984 
was introduced at trial and demonstrated that the assessment of 35% of the tracts was unchanged during that period.  
The courts below do not appear to have made specific factual findings accepting or rejecting this study or 
petitioners’ conclusions drawn from it.  For the purposes of argument, we will accept the county’s figures since we 
find that, even accepting those figures, the adjustments do not dispel the constitutional flaw in the assessment 
system. 
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Court.  A group of these appeals from Allegheny and its successor in interest, Kentucky Energy, 
were consolidated by the West Virginia Circuit Court and finally decided in 1985.  App. to Pet. 
for Cert. in No. 87-1303, p. 15a.  Another group of appeals from Shamrock and Oneida were 
consolidated and decided by the West Virginia Circuit Court early the next year.  App. to Pet. for 
Cert. in No. 87-1310, p. 49a.
2
 
The judge in both of these cases concluded that the system of real property assessment 
used by the Webster County assessor systematically and intentionally discriminated against 
Petitioners in violation of the West Virginia Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.  He ordered the county commission to reduce the assessments on petitioner’s 
property to the levels recommended by the state tax commissioner in his valuation guidelines 
published for use by local assessors.  Underlying the judge’s conclusions were findings that 
petitioners’ tax assessments over the years were dramatically in excess of those for comparable 
property in the county.  He found that “the assessor did not compare the various features of the 
real estate to which the high assessment was applied with the various features of land assessed at 
a much lower rate.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 87-1303, p. 29a; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 
87-1310, p. 59a.  “The questioned assessments were not based upon the presence of 
economically mineable or removable coal, oil, gas or harvestable timber in or upon petitioners’ 
real estate, as compared to an absence of the same in or upon [neighboring] properties.”  Ibid. 
Rather, “the sole basis of the assessment of petitioners’ real estate was, according to the assessor, 
the consideration declared in petitioners’ deeds.”  Ibid.3  
                                                 
2
 After each of these primary decisions adjudicating the validity of the assessments to the lands in question, 
petitioners obtained a number of other orders applying the findings in the primary decisions to their specific cases 
and to other appeals not consolidated in the primary decisions.  See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 87-1310, pp. 79a, 
83a, and 86a. 
3
 Respondents argue in this Court that petitioners’ land was not truly comparable to that of the surrounding 
properties.  They point to the fact that one of the parcels held by Allegheny, and then by Kentucky Energy, 
comprising 4,287 acres, allegedly contains 32 million tons of low-sulfur coal recoverable by strip mining.  This 
unusually valuable parcel skews the average value of all the properties, as well as serving as a basis for higher 
valuation of this parcel than those surrounding it. 
Petitioners make a number of answers: First, they rely on respondent’s stipulations that “the properties surrounding 
the property owned by . . . Petitioner, . . . are comparable properties in that they are substantially the same 
geologically as the properties of the Petitioner. . . .”  Record 1319-1320, 1085. Next, they point to the factual 
findings of the West Virginia Circuit Court, never rejected by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, that 
“although the real estate of each of these petitioners is not identical to that of all other real estate in Webster County, 
it appears that petitioners’ real estate is substantially similar to the real estate of the others in topography, location, 
access, development, mineral content and forestation, and that the petitioners’ real estate is substantially similar to 
adjacent and contiguous tracts and parcels of real estate owned by others.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 87-1303, p. 
16a; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 87-1310, p. 50a.  Finally, they note that the court’s finding were founded on the 
testimony of Kentucky Energy’s expert witness, the one who testified to the estimated 32 million tons of Kentucky 
Energy’s land, that the surrounding properties were equally promising.  On direct examination he said: 
“As far as comparing this area with the surrounding property, geologically, these same seams are present on all the 
other properties [suggested as comparable].  The same coal seams are present there. . . . The coal is there and I know 
that the chances of them being mineable are just as good there as they are on the [Kentucky Energy] properties. 
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This approach systematically produced dramatic differences in valuation between 
petitioners’ recently transferred property and otherwise comparable surrounding land.  For the 
years 1976 through 1982, Allegheny was assessed and taxed at approximately 35 times the rate 
applied to owners of comparable properties.  After purchasing that land, Kentucky Energy was 
assessed and taxed at approximately 33 times the rate of similar parcels. From 1981 through 
1985, the county assessed and taxed the Shamrock-Oneida property at roughly 8 to 20 times that 
of comparable neighboring coal tracts. These disparities existed notwithstanding the adjustments 
made to the assessments of land not recently conveyed.  In the case of the property held by 
Allegheny and Kentucky Energy, the county’s adjustment policy would have required more than 
500 years to equalize the assessments. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed.  It found that the 
record did not support the trial court’s ruling that the actions of the assessor and board of review 
constituted “intentional and systematic” discrimination.  It held that “assessments based upon the 
price paid for the property in arm’s length transactions are an appropriate measure of the true and 
actual value’ of . . . property.”  In re 1975 Tax Assessments against Oneida Coal Co., 178 W. Va. 
485, 360 S. E. 2d 560, 564 (1987). That other properties might be undervalued relative to 
petitioners’ did not require that petitioners’ assessments be reduced: “‘Instead, they should seek 
to have the assessments of other taxpayers raised to market value.’”  Id., at ___, 360 S. E. 2d, at 
565 (quoting Killen v. Logan County Comm’n, 170 W. Va. 602, 295 S. E. 2d 689, 709 (1982)). 
We granted certiorari to decide whether these Webster County tax assessments denied petitioners 
the equal protection of the law and, if so, whether petitioners could constitutionally be limited to 
the remedy of seeking to raise the assessments of others.  485 U.S. 976 (1988). 
We agree with the import of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia that petitioners have no constitutional complaint simply because their property is 
assessed for real property tax purposes at a figure equal to 50% of the price paid for it at a recent 
arm’s-length transaction.  But their complaint is a comparative one:  while their property is 
assessed at 50% of what is roughly its current value, neighboring comparable property which has 
not been recently sold is assessed at only a minor fraction of that figure.  We do not understand 
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to have disputed this fact.  We read its opinion as 
saying that even if there is a constitutional violation on these facts, the only remedy available to 
petitioners was an effort to have the assessments on the neighboring properties raised by an 
appropriate amount. We hold that the assessments on petitioners’ property in this case violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
“. . . There may be some variations, depending on which individual seam is mineable from one property to the other, 
but in the long run they are similar properties located within the same area and there is no geological reason that 
they should not be comparable.”  Brief in Opposition in No. 87-1303, p. 10a-11a. 
We think that petitioners’ submissions justify the conclusion on the record presented to us that their properties were, 
in aspects relevant to valuation and assessment, comparable to surrounding property valued and assessed at 
markedly lower amounts. 
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that petitioners may not be remitted to the remedy specified by the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia. 
The county argues that its assessment scheme is rationally related to its purpose of 
assessing properties at true current value: when available, it makes use of exceedingly accurate 
information about the market value of a property–the price at which it was recently purchased. 
As those data grow stale, it periodically adjusts the assessment based on some perception of the 
general change in area property values.  We do not intend to cast doubt upon the theoretical basis 
of such a scheme.  That two methods are used to assess property in the same class is, without 
more, of no constitutional moment. The Equal Protection Clause “applies only to taxation which 
in fact bears unequally on persons or property of the same class.”  Charleston Fed. Savings & 
Loan Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 190 (1945) (collecting cases).  The use of a general 
adjustment as a transitional substitute for an individual reappraisal violates no constitutional 
command.  As long as general adjustments are accurate enough over a short period of time to 
equalize the differences in proportion between the assessments of a class of property holders, the 
Equal Protection Clause is satisfied.  Just as that Clause tolerates occasional errors of state law or 
mistakes in judgment when valuing property for tax purposes, see Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. 
Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 353 (1918); Coulter v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 196 U.S. 599 
(1905), it does not require immediate general adjustment on the basis of the latest market 
developments.  In each case, the constitutional requirement is the seasonable attainment of a 
rough equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property owners.  Allied Stores of Ohio v. 
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-527 (1959), and cases there cited; cf. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 
320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) (noting, in the ratemaking context, that “it is not theory, but the impact 
.  .  .  that counts”). 
But the present action is not an example of transitional delay in adjustment of assessed 
value resulting in inequalities in assessments of comparable property.  Petitioners’ property has 
been assessed at roughly 8 to 35 times more than comparable neighboring property, and these 
discrepancies have continued for more than 10 years with little change.  The county’s 
adjustments to the assessments of property not recently sold are too small to seasonably dissipate 
the remaining disparity between these assessments and the assessments based on a recent 
purchase price. 
The States, of course, have broad powers to impose and collect taxes. A State may divide 
different kinds of property into classes and assign to each class a different tax burden so long as 
those divisions and burdens are reasonable. Allied Stores, supra, at 526-527 (“The State may 
impose different specific taxes upon different trades and professions and may vary the rate of 
excise upon various products”). It might, for example, decide to tax property held by 
corporations, including petitioners, at a different rate than property held by individuals. See 
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973) (Illinois ad valorem tax on 
personality of corporations). In each case, “if the selection or classification is neither capricious 
or arbitrary, and rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no 
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denial of the equal protection of the law.” Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 573 
(1910).
4
 
But West Virginia has not drawn such a distinction.  Its Constitution and laws provide 
that all property of the kind held by petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform throughout the 
State according to its estimated market value.  There is no suggestion in the opinion of the 
Supreme Court of West Virginia, or from any other authoritative source, that the State may have 
adopted a different system in practice from that specified by statute; we have held that such a 
system may be valid so long as the implicit policy is applied evenhandedly to all similarly 
situated property within the State.  Nashville C. & S. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 
368-369 (1940).  We are not advised of any West Virginia statute or practice which authorizes 
individual counties of the State to fashion their own substantive assessment policies 
independently of state statute.  See Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954). The Webster 
County assessor has, apparently on her own initiative, applied the tax laws of West Virginia in 
the manner heretofore described, with the resulting disparity in assessed value of similar 
property.  Indeed, her practice seems contrary to that of the guide published by the West Virginia 
Tax Commission as an aid to local assessors in the assessment of real property. 
“Intentional systematic undervaluation by state officials of other taxable property in the 
same class contravenes the constitutional right of one taxed upon the full value of his property.” 
Sunday Lake Iron Co., supra, at 352-353; Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 
441, 445-446 (1923); Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision of Tax Assessments in Greene 
County, Pa., 284 U.S. 23, 28-29 (1931). “The equal protection clause . . . protects the individual 
from state action which selects him out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting him to taxes 
not imposed on others of the same class.”  Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946). 
We have no doubt that petitioners have suffered from such “intentional systematic 
undervaluation by state officials” of comparable property in Webster County.  Viewed in 
isolation, the assessments for petitioners’ property may fully comply with West Virginia law. 
But the fairness of one’s allocable share of the total property tax burden can only be 
meaningfully evaluated by comparison with the share of others similarly situated relative to their 
property holdings.  The relative undervaluation of comparable property in Webster County over 
time therefore denies petitioners the equal protection of the law. 
                                                 
4
 We need not and do not decide today whether the Webster County assessment method would stand on a different 
footing if it were the law of a State, generally applied, instead of the aberrational enforcement policy it appears to 
be.  The State of California has adopted a similar policy as Article XIIIA of its Constitution, popularly known as 
“Proposition 13.” Proposition 13 generally provides that property will be assessed at its 1975-1976 value, and 
reassessed only when transferred or constructed upon, or in a limited manner for inflation. Cal. Const., Art. XIIIA, 
§2 (limiting inflation adjustments to 2% per year). The system is grounded on the belief that taxes should be based 
on the original cost of property and should not tax unrealized paper gains in the value of the property. 
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A taxpayer in this situation may not be remitted by the State to the remedy of seeking to 
have the assessments of the undervalued property raised.  “The [Equal Protection Clause] is not 
satisfied if a State does not itself remove the discrimination, but imposes on him against whom 
the discrimination has been directed the burden of seeking an upward revision of the taxes of 
other members of the class.”  Hillsborough, supra, at 623, citing Sioux City Bridge Co., supra, 
445-447; Iowa-Des Moines Nat’l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931); Cumberland Coal 
Co., supra, at 28-29.  The judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia is 
accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion.  It is so ordered. 
NORDLINGER v. HAHN 
505 U.S. 1 (1992) 
Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined, and in which Thomas, J., joined as to Part II-
A. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion. 
In 1978, California voters staged what has been described as a property tax revolt by 
approving a statewide ballot initiative known as Proposition 13.  The adoption of Proposition 13 
served to amend the California Constitution to impose strict limits on the rate at which real 
property is taxed and on the rate at which real property assessments are increased from year to 
year.  In this litigation, we consider a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the manner in which real property now is assessed under the 
California Constitution. 
I 
A 
Proposition 13 followed many years of rapidly rising real property taxes in California. 
From fiscal years 1967-1968 to 1971-1972, revenues from these taxes increased on an average of 
11.5 percent per year.  See Report of the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and 
Revenue to the California State Senate 23 (1991).  In response, the California Legislature 
enacted several property tax relief measures, including a cap on tax rates in 1972.  Id., at 23-24. 
The boom in the State’s real estate market persevered, however, and the median price of an 
existing home doubled from $31,530 in 1973 to $62,430 in 1977.  As a result, tax levies 
continued to rise because of sharply increasing assessment values.  Id., at 23.  Some homeowners 
saw their tax bills double or triple during this period, well outpacing any growth in their income 
and ability to pay.  Id., at 25.  See also Oakland, Proposition 13–Genesis and Consequences, 32 
Nat. Tax J. 387, 392 (Supp. June 1979). 
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By 1978, property tax relief had emerged as a major political issue in California.  In only 
one month’s time, tax relief advocates collected over 1.2 million signatures to qualify 
Proposition 13 for the June 1978 ballot.  See Lefcoe & Allison, The Legal Aspects of Proposition 
13: The Amador Valley Case, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 173, 174 (1978).  On election day, Proposition 
13 received a favorable vote of 64.8 percent and carried 55 of the State’s 58 counties.  California 
Secretary of State, Statement of Vote and Supplement, Primary Election, June 6, 1978, p. 39. 
California thus had a novel constitutional amendment that led to a property tax cut of 
approximately $7 billion in the first year.  Senate Commission Report, at 28.  A California 
homeowner with a $50,000 home enjoyed an immediate reduction of about $750 per year in 
property taxes.  Id., at 26. 
As enacted by Proposition 13, Article XIIIA of the California Constitution caps real 
property taxes at 1% of a property’s “full cash value.”  §1(a).  “Full cash value” is defined as the 
assessed valuation as of the 1975-1976 tax year or, “thereafter, the appraised value of real 
property when purchased, newly constructed, or a change in ownership has occurred after the 
1975 assessment.” §2(a).  The assessment “may reflect from year to year the inflationary rate not 
to exceed 2 percent for any given year.”  §2(b). 
Article XIIIA also contains several exemptions from this reassessment provision.  One 
exemption authorizes the legislature to allow homeowners over the age of 55 who sell their 
principal residences to carry their previous base-year assessments with them to replacement 
residences of equal or lesser value. §2(a).  A second exemption applies to transfers of a principal 
residence (and up to $1 million of other real property) between parents and children. §2(h). 
In short, Article XIIIA combines a 1% ceiling on the property tax rate with a 2% cap on 
annual increases in assessed valuations.  The assessment limitation, however, is subject to the 
exception that new construction or a change of ownership triggers a reassessment up to current 
appraised value.  Thus, the assessment provisions of Article XIIIA essentially embody an 
“acquisition value” system of taxation rather than the more commonplace “current value” 
taxation.  Real property is assessed at values related to the value of the property at the time it is 
acquired by the taxpayer rather than to the value it has in the current real estate market. 
Over time, this acquisition-value system has created dramatic disparities in the taxes paid 
by persons owning similar pieces of property.  Property values in California have inflated far in 
excess of the allowed 2% cap on increases in assessments for property that is not newly 
constructed or that has not changed hands.  See Senate Commission Report, at 31-32.  As a 
result, longer-term property owners pay lower property taxes reflecting historic property values, 
while newer owners pay higher property taxes reflecting more recent values.  For that reason, 
Proposition 13 has been labeled by some as a “welcome stranger” system–the newcomer to an 
established community is “welcome” in anticipation that he will contribute a larger percentage of 
support for local government than his settled neighbor who owns a comparable home.  Indeed, in 
dollar terms, the differences in tax burdens are staggering.  By 1989, the 44% of California home 
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owners who have owned their homes since enactment of Proposition 13 in 1978 shouldered only 
25% of the more than $4 billion in residential property taxes paid by homeowners statewide.  Id., 
at 33.  If property values continue to rise more than the annual 2% inflationary cap, this disparity 
will continue to grow. 
B 
According to her amended complaint, petitioner Stephanie Nordlinger in November 1988 
purchased a house in the Baldwin Hills neighborhood of Los Angeles County for $170,000.  
App. 5. The prior owners bought the home just two years before for $121,500.  Id., at 6.  Before 
her purchase, petitioner had lived in a rented apartment in Los Angeles and had not owned any 
real property in California.  Id., at 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 12. 
In early 1989, petitioner received a notice from the Los Angeles County Tax Assessor, 
who is a respondent here, informing her that her home had been reassessed upward to $170,100 
on account of its change in ownership.  App. 7.  She learned that the reassessment resulted in a 
property tax increase of $453.60, up 36% to $1,701, for the 1988-1989 fiscal year.  Ibid. 
Petitioner later discovered she was paying about five times more in taxes than some of 
her neighbors who owned comparable homes since 1975 within the same residential 
development. For example, one block away, a house of identical size on a lot slightly larger than 
petitioner’s was subject to a general tax levy of only $358.20 (based on an assessed valuation of 
$35,820, which reflected the home’s value in 1975 plus the up-to-2% per year inflation factor). 
Id., at 9-10.  According to petitioner, her total property taxes over the first 10 years in her home 
will approach $19,000, while any neighbor who bought a comparable home in 1975 stands to 
pay just $4,100.  Brief for Petitioner 3.  The general tax levied against her modest home is only a 
few dollars short of that paid by a pre-1976 owner of a $2.1 million Malibu beachfront home. 
App. 24. 
After exhausting administrative remedies, petitioner brought suit against respondents in 
Los Angeles County Superior Court. She sought a tax refund and a declaration that her tax was 
unconstitutional.  In her amended complaint, she alleged: “Article XIIIA has created an arbitrary 
system which assigns disparate real property tax burdens on owners of generally comparable and 
similarly situated properties without regard to the use of the real property taxed, the burden the 
property places on government, the actual value of the property or the financial capability of the 
property owner.”  Id., at 12. Respondents demurred.  Id., at 14.  By minute order, the Superior 
Court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.  App. to Pet. 
for Cert. D2. 
The California Court of Appeal affirmed.  Nordlinger v. Lynch, 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 
275 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1990).  It noted that the Supreme Court of California already had rejected a 
constitutional challenge to the disparities in taxation resulting from Article XIIIA.  See Amador 
Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281 
418 
(1978).  Characterizing Article XIIIA as an “acquisition value” system, the Court of Appeal 
found it survived equal protection review, because it was supported by at least two rational 
bases: first, it prevented property taxes from reflecting unduly inflated and unforeseen current 
values, and, second, it allowed property owners to estimate future liability with substantial 
certainty.  225 Cal.App.3d, at 1273, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 691-692 (citing Amador, 22 Cal.3d, at 
235, 583 P.2d, at 1293). 
The Court of Appeal also concluded that this Court’s more recent decision in Allegheny 
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989), did not warrant a different result. 
At issue in Allegheny Pittsburgh was the practice of a West Virginia county tax assessor of 
assessing recently purchased property on the basis of its purchase price, while making only 
minor modifications in the assessments of property that had not recently been sold.  Properties 
that had been sold recently were reassessed and taxed at values between 8 and 35 times that of 
properties that had not been sold.  Id., at 341. This Court determined that the unequal assessment 
practice violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
The Court of Appeal distinguished Allegheny Pittsburgh on grounds that “California has 
opted for an assessment method based on each individual owner’s acquisition cost,” while, “in 
marked contrast, the West Virginia Constitution requires property to be taxed at a uniform rate 
statewide according to its estimated current market value” (emphasis in original).  225 
Cal.App.3d, at 1277-1278, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 695.  Thus, the Court of Appeal found: “Allegheny 
does not prohibit the states from adopting an acquisition value assessment method.  That 
decision merely prohibits the arbitrary enforcement of a current value assessment method” 
(emphasis omitted).  Id., at 1265, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 686. 
The Court of Appeal also rejected petitioner’s argument that the effect of Article XIIIA 
on the constitutional right to travel warranted heightened equal protection review.  The court 
determined that the right to travel was not infringed, because Article XIIIA “bases each property 
owner’s assessment on acquisition value, irrespective of the owner’s status as a California 
resident or the owner’s length of residence in the state.”  Id., at 1281, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 697.  Any 
benefit to longtime California residents was deemed “incidental” to an acquisition-value 
approach.  Finally, the Court of Appeal found its conclusion was unchanged by the exemptions 
in Article XIIIA.  Ibid., 275 Cal. Rptr., at 697. 
The Supreme Court of California denied review.  App. to Pet. for Cert. B1.  We granted 
certiorari.  ___ U.S. ___ (1991). 
II 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, §1, commands that no State 
shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  Of course, 
most laws differentiate in some fashion between classes of persons. The Equal Protection Clause 
does not forbid classifications.  It simply keeps governmental decision-makers from treating 
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differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). 
As a general rule, “legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional 
power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.”  McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 (1961).  Accordingly, this Court’s cases are clear that, unless a 
classification warrants some form of heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a 
fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal 
Protection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state interest. 
See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-441 (1985); New Orleans 
v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). 
B 
The appropriate standard of review is whether the difference in treatment between newer 
and older owners rationally furthers a legitimate state interest.  In general, the Equal Protection 
Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, see United 
States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174, 179 (1980), the legislative facts on 
which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by 
the governmental decision-maker, see Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 
464 (1981), and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render 
the distinction arbitrary or irrational, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S., at 
446. This standard is especially deferential in the context of classifications made by complex tax 
laws. “In structuring internal taxation schemes the States have large leeway in making 
classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of 
taxation.”  Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 22 (1985), quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore 
Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973).  See also Regan v. Taxation with Representation of 
Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983) (“Legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating 
classifications and distinctions in tax statutes”). 
As between newer and older owners, Article XIIIA does not discriminate with respect to 
either the tax rate or the annual rate of adjustment in assessments.  Newer and older owners alike 
benefit in both the short and long run from the protections of a 1% tax rate ceiling and no more 
than a 2% increase in assessment value per year.  New owners and old owners are treated 
differently with respect to one factor only–the basis on which their property is initially assessed. 
Petitioner’s true complaint is that the State has denied her–a new owner–the benefit of the same 
assessment value that her neighbors–older owners–enjoy. 
We have no difficulty in ascertaining at least two rational or reasonable considerations of 
difference or policy that justify denying petitioner the benefits of her neighbors’ lower 
assessments.  First, the State has a legitimate interest in local neighborhood preservation, 
continuity, and stability.  Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).  The State therefore 
legitimately can decide to structure its tax system to discourage rapid turnover in ownership of 
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homes and businesses, for example, in order to inhibit displacement of lower income families by 
the forces of gentrification or of established, “mom-and-pop” businesses by newer chain 
operations.  By permitting older owners to pay progressively less in taxes than new owners of 
comparable property, the Article XIIIA assessment scheme rationally furthers this interest. 
Second, the State legitimately can conclude that a new owner at the time of acquiring his 
property does not have the same reliance interest warranting protection against higher taxes as 
does an existing owner.  The State may deny a new owner at the point of purchase the right to 
“lock in” to the same assessed value as is enjoyed by an existing owner of comparable property, 
because an existing owner rationally may be thought to have vested expectations in his property 
or home that are more deserving of protection than the anticipatory expectations of a new owner 
at the point of purchase.  A new owner has full information about the scope of future tax liability 
before acquiring the property, and if he thinks the future tax burden is too demanding, he can 
decide not to complete the purchase at all. By contrast, the existing owner, already saddled with 
his purchase, does not have the option of deciding not to buy his home if taxes become 
prohibitively high.  To meet his tax obligations, he might be forced to sell his home or to divert 
his income away from the purchase of food, clothing, and other necessities.  In short, the State 
may decide that it is worse to have owned and lost, than never to have owned at all. 
This Court previously has acknowledged that classifications serving to protect legitimate 
expectation and reliance interests do not deny equal protection of the laws.  “The protection of 
reasonable reliance interests is not only a legitimate governmental objective: it provides an 
exceedingly persuasive justification. . . .” (internal quotations omitted).  Heckler v. Mathews, 
465 U.S. 728, 746 (1984).  For example, in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450 
(1988), the Court determined that a prohibition on user fees for bus service in “reorganized” 
school districts but not in “nonreorganized” school districts does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause, because “the legislature could conceivably have believed that such a policy would serve 
the legitimate purpose of fulfilling the reasonable expectations of those residing in districts with 
free busing arrangements imposed by reorganization plans.”  Id., at 465.  Similarly, in United 
States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, the Court determined that a denial of dual 
“windfall” retirement benefits to some railroad workers but not others did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause, because “Congress could properly conclude that persons who had actually 
acquired statutory entitlement to windfall benefits while still employed in the railroad industry 
had a greater equitable claim to those benefits than the members of appellee’s class who were no 
longer in railroad employment when they became eligible for dual benefits.”  449 U.S., at 178. 
Finally, in New Orleans v. Dukes, supra, the Court determined that an ordinance banning certain 
street-vendor operations, but grandfathering existing vendors who had been in operation for 
more than eight years, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the “city could 
reasonably decide that newer businesses were less likely to have built up substantial reliance 
interests in continued operation.” 427 U.S., at 305. 
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Petitioner argues that Article XIIIA cannot be distinguished from the tax assessment 
practice found to violate the Equal Protection Clause in Allegheny Pittsburgh.  Like Article 
XIIIA, the practice at issue in Allegheny Pittsburgh resulted in dramatic disparities in taxation of 
properties of comparable value.  But an obvious and critical factual difference between this case 
and Allegheny Pittsburgh is the absence of any indication in Allegheny Pittsburgh that the 
policies underlying an acquisition-value taxation scheme could conceivably have been the 
purpose for the Webster County tax assessor’s unequal assessment scheme.  In the first place, 
Webster County argued that “its assessment scheme is rationally related to its purpose of 
assessing properties at true current value” (emphasis added).  Id., at 488 U.S., at 343.  Moreover, 
the West Virginia “Constitution and laws provide that all property of the kind held by petitioners 
shall be taxed at a rate uniform throughout the State according to its estimated market value,” 
and the Court found “no suggestion” that “the State may have adopted a different system in 
practice from that specified by statute.”  Id., at 345. 
To be sure, the Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis 
review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose 
or rationale supporting its classification.  United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 
U.S., at 179.  See also McDonald v. Board of Election Comm’rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 809 
(1969) (legitimate state purpose may be ascertained even when the legislative or administrative 
history is silent).  Nevertheless, this Court’s review does require that a purpose may conceivably 
or “may reasonably have been the purpose and policy” of the relevant governmental 
decisionmaker.  Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528-529 (1959).  See also 
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981) (classificatory scheme must “rationally advance 
a reasonable and identifiable governmental objective” (emphasis added)). Allegheny Pittsburgh 
was the rare case where the facts precluded any plausible inference that the reason for the 
unequal assessment practice was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax scheme. By 
contrast, Article XIIIA was enacted precisely to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value 
system.  Allegheny Pittsburgh is not controlling here. 
III 
Petitioner and amici argue with some appeal that Article XIIIA frustrates the “American 
dream” of home ownership for many younger and poorer California families.  They argue that 
Article XIIIA places start-up businesses that depend on ownership of property at a severe 
disadvantage in competing with established businesses.  They argue that Article XIIIA dampens 
demand for and construction of new housing and buildings.  And they argue that Article XIIIA 
constricts local tax revenues at the expense of public education and vital services. 
Time and again, however, this Court has made clear in the rational-basis context that the 
“Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions 
will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally 
unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted” (footnote 
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omitted).  Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).  Certainly, California’s grand experiment 
appears to vest benefits in a broad, powerful, and entrenched segment of society, and, as the 
Court of Appeal surmised, ordinary democratic processes may be unlikely to prompt its 
reconsideration or repeal.  See 225 Cal. App. 3d, at 1282, n.11, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 698, n. 11.  Yet 
many wise and well-intentioned laws suffer from the same malady. Article XIIIA is not palpably 
arbitrary, and we must decline petitioner’s request to upset the will of the people of California. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Thomas, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.  
In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County, 488 U.S. 
336 (1989), this Court struck down an assessment method used in Webster County, West 
Virginia, that operated precisely the same way as the California scheme being challenged today. 
I agree with the Court that Proposition 13 is constitutional.  But I also agree with Justice Stevens 
that Allegheny Pittsburgh cannot be distinguished, see post, at 5. To me Allegheny Pittsburgh 
represents a “needlessly intrusive judicial infringement on the State’s legislative powers,” New 
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976) (per curiam). 
Justice Stevens, dissenting. 
During the two past decades, California property owners have enjoyed extraordinary 
prosperity.  As the State’s population has mushroomed, so has the value of its real estate. 
Between 1976 and 1986 alone, the total assessed value of California property subject to property 
taxation increased tenfold.
1  
Simply put, those who invested in California real estate in the 1970s 
are among the most fortunate capitalists in the world. 
Proposition 13 has provided these successful investors with a tremendous windfall and, in 
doing so, has created severe inequities in California’s property tax scheme.  These property 
owners (hereinafter “the Squires”) are guaranteed that, so long as they retain their property and 
do not improve it, their taxes will not increase more than 2% in any given year.  As a direct result 
of this windfall for the Squires, later purchasers must pay far more than their fair share of 
property taxes. 
The specific disparity that prompted petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of 
Proposition 13 is the fact that her annual property tax bill is almost 5 times as large as that of her 
                                                 
1
 Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 261, 270, n.49 (1990). “For the same period, 
[property values in] Hawaii rose approximately 450%; Washington, D.C. approximately 350%; and New York 
approximately 125%.” Ibid. (citing 2 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Taxable Property Values 86-111, 
Table 12 (1987); 2 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Taxable Property Values and Assessment/Sales 
Price Ratios 42, Table 2 (1977)). 
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neighbors who own comparable homes:  While her neighbors’ 1989 taxes averaged less than 
$400, petitioner was taxed $1,700.  App. 18-20.  This disparity is not unusual under Proposition 
13.  Indeed, some homeowners pay 17 times as much in taxes as their neighbors with comparable 
property.  See id., at 76-77.  For vacant land, the disparities may be as great as 500 to 1.  App. to 
Pet. for Cert. A7.  Moreover, as Proposition 13 controls the taxation of commercial property as 
well as residential property, the regime greatly favors the commercial enterprises of the Squires, 
placing new businesses at a substantial disadvantage. 
As a result of Proposition 13, the Squires, who own 44% of the owner-occupied 
residences, paid only 25% of the total taxes collected from homeowners in 1989.  Report of 
Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue to the California State Senate 33 
(1991) (Commission Report).  These disparities are aggravated by §2 of Proposition 13, which 
exempts from reappraisal a property owner’s home and up to $1 million of other real property 
when that property is transferred to a child of the owner.  This exemption can be invoked 
repeatedly and indefinitely, allowing the Proposition 13 windfall to be passed from generation to 
generation.  As the California Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue 
observed: 
“The inequity is clear.  One young family buys a new home and is assessed at full market 
value.  Another young family inherits its home, but pays taxes based on their parents’ date of 
acquisition even though both homes are of identical value. Not only does this constitutional 
provision offend a policy of equal tax treatment for taxpayers in similar situations, it appears to 
favor the housing needs of children with homeowner-parents over children with non-
homeowner-parents. With the repeal of the state’s gift and inheritance tax in 1982, the rationale 
for this exemption is negligible.”  Commission Report, at 9-10. 
The Commission was too generous.  To my mind, the rationale for such disparity is not 
merely “negligible,” it is nonexistent. Such a law establishes a privilege of a medieval character: 
Two families with equal needs and equal resources are treated differently solely because of their 
different heritage. 
In my opinion, such disparate treatment of similarly situated taxpayers is arbitrary and 
unreasonable.  Although the Court today recognizes these gross inequities, . . . , its analysis of 
the justification for those inequities consists largely of a restatement of the benefits that accrue to 
long-time property owners. That a law benefits those it benefits cannot be an adequate 
justification for severe inequalities such as those created by Proposition 13. 
Just three Terms ago, this Court unanimously invalidated Webster County, West 
Virginia’s assessment scheme under rational-basis scrutiny.  Webster County employed a de 
facto Proposition 13 assessment system: The County assessed recently purchased property on the 
basis of its purchase price but made only occasional adjustments (averaging 3-4% per year) to 
the assessments of other properties.  Just as in this case, “this approach systematically produced 
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dramatic differences in valuation between . . . recently transferred property and otherwise 
comparable surrounding land.”  Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U.S., at 341. 
The “‘intentional systematic undervaluation,’” id., at 345, found constitutionally infirm in 
Allegheny Pittsburgh has been codified in California by Proposition 13. That the discrimination 
in Allegheny Pittsburgh was de facto and the discrimination in this case de jure makes little 
difference.  “The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to 
secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary 
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution 
through duly constituted agents.”  Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352-353 
(1918) (emphasis added).  If anything, the inequality created by Proposition 13 is constitutionally 
more problematic because it is the product of a state-wide policy rather than the result of an 
individual assessor’s mal-administration. 
Thus, if our unanimous holding in Allegheny Pittsburgh was sound–and I remain 
convinced that it was–it follows inexorably that Proposition 13, like Webster County’s 
assessment scheme, violates the Equal Protection Clause.  Indeed, in my opinion, state-wide 
discrimination is far more invidious than a local aberration that creates a tax dis-parity. 
In my opinion, it is irrational to treat similarly situated persons differently on the basis of 
the date they joined the class of property owners.  Until today, I would have thought this 
proposition far from controversial. In Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), we ruled that 
Alaska’s program of distributing cash dividends on the basis of the recipient’s years of residency 
in the State violated the Equal Protection Clause.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
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PART VI. SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
“The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law 
of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States…” CHIEF 
JUSTICE MARSHALL in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 
Session 18. Vested Rights 
Central to the historic notion of the police power was the government’s interest in 
protecting public health, safety and morality. Legislative abatement of nuisances was among the 
earliest exercises of this power. Since the sixteenth century the power (and indeed the duty) of 
city officials to keep hogs off the street, and to suppress other nuisances has been recognized. 
The coming of Industrial Revolution expanded the definition of nuisance to include pollution 
controls; the advent of the Social Gospel legitimized its use to regulate alcohol, gambling and 
prostitution. Article I, section 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from impairing the 
obligation of contracts.  Can then the legislature “bargain away its police power” and thereby be 
constitutionally constrained from changing its mind? 
FLETCHER v. PECK 
10 U.S. 87 (1810) 
Marshall, C. J. delivered the opinion of the court as follows: 
The suit was instituted on several covenants contained in a deed made by John Peck, the 
defendant in error, conveying to Robert Fletcher, the plaintiff in error, certain lands which were 
part of a large purchase made by James Gunn and others, in the year 1795, from the state of 
Georgia, the contract for which was made in the form of a bill passed by the legislature of that 
state. 
The first count in the declaration set forth a breach in the second covenant contained in 
the deed.  The covenant is, “that the legislature of the state of Georgia, at the time of passing the 
act of sale aforesaid, had good right to sell and dispose of the same in manner pointed out by the 
said act.”  The breach assigned is that the legislature had no power to sell. 
The plea in bar sets forth the constitution of the state of Georgia, and avers that the lands 
sold by the defendant to the plaintiff, were within that state.  It then sets forth the granting act, 
and avers the power of the legislature to sell and dispose of the premises as pointed out by the 
act. 
That the legislature of Georgia, unless restrained by its own constitution, possesses the 
power of disposing of the unappropriated lands within its own limits, in such manner as its own 
judgment shall dictate, is a proposition not to be controverted.  The only question, then, 
presented for the consideration of the court, is this, did the then constitution of the state of 
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Georgia prohibit the legislature to dispose of the lands, which were the subject of this contract, in 
the manner stipulated by the contract? 
The question, whether a law be void for its repugnancy to the constitution, is, at all times, 
a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative, in a 
doubtful case.  The court, when impelled by duty to render such a judgment, would be unworthy 
of its station, could it be unmindful of the solemn obligations which that station imposes.  But it 
is not on slight implication and vague conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have 
transcended its powers, and its acts to be considered as void.  The opposition between the 
constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their 
incompatibility with each other. 
In this case the court can perceive no such opposition.  In the constitution of Georgia, 
adopted in the year 1789, the court can perceive no restriction on the legislative power, which 
inhibits the passage of the act of 1795.  The court cannot say that, in passing that act, the 
legislature has transcended its powers, and violated the constitution. 
The 3d covenant is, that all the title which the state of Georgia ever had in the premises 
had been legally conveyed to John Peck, the grantor.  The 2d count assigns, in substance, as a 
breach of this covenant, that the original grantees from the state of Georgia promised and assured 
divers members of the legislature, then sitting in general assembly, that if the said members 
would assent to, and vote for, the passing of the act, and if the said bill should pass, such 
members should have a share of, and be interested in, all the lands purchased from the said state 
by virtue of such law.  And that divers of the said members, to whom the said promises were 
made, were unduly influenced thereby, and, under such influence, did vote for the passing of the 
said bill; by reason whereof the said law was a nullity, &c. and so the title of the state of Georgia 
did not pass to the said Peck, &c. 
The plea to this count, after protesting that the promises it alleges were not made, avers, 
that until after the purchase made from the original grantees by James Greenleaf, under whom 
the said Peck claims, neither the said James Greenleaf, nor the said Peck, nor any of the mesne 
vendors between the said Greenleaf and Peck, had any notice or knowledge that any such 
promises or assurances were made by the said original grantees, or either of them, to any of the 
members of the legislature of the state of Georgia. 
That corruption should find its way into the governments of our infant republics, and 
contaminate the very source of legislation, or that impure motives should contribute to the 
passage of a law, or the formation of a legislative contract, are circumstances most deeply to be 
deplored.  How far a court of justice would, in any case, be competent, on proceedings instituted 
by the state itself, to vacate a contract thus formed, and to annul rights acquired, under that 
contract, by third persons having no notice of the improper means by which it was obtained, is a 
question which the court would approach with much circumspection.  It may well be doubted 
how far the validity of a law depends upon the motives of its framers, and how far the particular 
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inducements, operating on members of the supreme sovereign power of a state, to the formation 
of a contract by that power, are examinable in a court of justice.  If the principle be conceded, 
that an act of the supreme sovereign power might be declared null by a court, in consequence of 
the means which procured it, still would there be much difficulty in saying to what extent those 
means must be applied to produce this effect.  Must it be direct corruption, or would interest or 
undue influence of any kind be sufficient?  Must the vitiating cause operate on a majority, or on 
what number of the members?  Would the act be null, whatever might be the wish of the nation, 
or would its obligation or nullity depend upon the public sentiment?   
If the majority of the legislature be corrupted, it may well be doubted, whether it be 
within the province of the judiciary to control their conduct, and, if less than a majority act from 
impure motives, the principle by which judicial interference would be regulated, is not clearly 
discerned. 
Whatever difficulties this subject might present, when viewed under aspects of which it 
may be susceptible, this court can perceive none in the particular pleadings now under 
consideration. 
This is not a bill brought by the state of Georgia, to annul the contract, nor does it appear 
to the court, by this count, that the state of Georgia is dissatisfied with the sale that has been 
made. The case, as made out in the pleadings, is simply this.  One individual who holds lands in 
the state of Georgia, under a deed covenanting that the title of Georgia was in the grantor, brings 
an action of covenant upon this deed, and assigns, as a breach, that some of the members of the 
legislature were induced to vote in favour of the law, which constituted the contract, by being 
promised an interest in it, and that therefore the act is a mere nullity. 
This solemn question cannot be brought thus collaterally and incidentally before the 
court.  It would be indecent, in the extreme, upon a private contract, between two individuals, to 
enter into an inquiry respecting the corruption of the sovereign power of a state.  If the title be 
plainly deduced from a legislative act, which the legislature might constitutionally pass, if the act 
be clothed with all the requisite forms of a law, a court, sitting as a court of law, cannot sustain a 
suit brought by one individual against another founded on the allegation that the act is a nullity, 
in consequence of the impure motives which influenced certain members of the legislature. 
The third count recites the undue means practiced on certain members of the legislature, 
as stated in the second count, and then alleges that, in consequence of these practices, and of 
other causes, a subsequent legislature passed an act annulling and rescinding the law under 
which the conveyance to the original grantees was made, declaring that conveyance void, and 
asserting the title of the state to the lands it contained.  The count proceeds to recite at large, this 
rescinding act, and concludes with averring that, by reason of this act, the title of the said Peck in 
the premises was constitutionally and legally impaired, and rendered null and void. 
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After protesting, as before, that no such promises were made as stated in this count, the 
defendant again pleads that himself and the first purchaser under the original grantees, and all 
intermediate holders of the property, were purchasers without notice. 
The importance and the difficulty of the questions, presented by these pleadings, are 
deeply felt by the court. 
The lands in controversy vested absolutely in James Gunn and others, the original 
grantees, by the conveyance of the governor, made in pursuance of an act of assembly to which 
the legislature was fully competent.  Being thus in full possession of the legal estate, they, for a 
valuable consideration, conveyed portions of the land to those who were willing to purchase. If 
the original transaction was infected with fraud, these purchasers did not participate in it, and had 
no notice of it.  They were innocent.  Yet the legislature of Georgia has involved them in the fate 
of the first parties to the transaction, and, if the act be valid, has annihilated their rights also. 
The legislature of Georgia was a party to this transaction; and for a party to pronounce its 
own deed invalid, whatever cause may be assigned for its invalidity, must be considered as a 
mere act of power which must find its vindication in a train of reasoning not often heard in courts 
of justice. 
But the real party, it is said, are the people, and when their agents are unfaithful, the acts 
of those agents cease to be obligatory. 
It is, however, to be recollected that the people can act only by these agents, and that, 
while within the powers conferred on them, their acts must be considered as the acts of the 
people.  If the agents be corrupt, others may be chosen, and, if their contracts be examinable, the 
common sentiment, as well as common usage of mankind, points out a mode by which this 
examination may be made, and their validity determined. 
If the legislature of Georgia was not bound to submit its pretensions to those tribunals 
which are established for the security of property, and to decide on human rights, if it might 
claim to itself the power of judging in its own case, yet there are certain great principles of 
justice, whose authority is universally acknowledged, that ought not to be entirely disregarded. 
If the legislature be its own judge in its own case, it would seem equitable that its 
decision should be regulated by those rules which would have regulated the decision of a judicial 
tribunal. The question was, in its nature, a question of title, and the tribunal which decided it was 
either acting in the character of a court of justice, and performing a duty usually assigned to a 
court, or it was exerting a mere act of power in which it was controlled only by its own will. 
If a suit be brought to set aside a conveyance obtained by fraud, and the fraud be clearly 
proved, the conveyance will be set aside, as between the parties; but the rights of third persons, 
who are purchasers without notice, for a valuable consideration, cannot be disregarded.  Titles, 
which, according to every legal test, are perfect, are acquired with that confidence which is 
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inspired by the opinion that the purchaser is safe.  If there be any concealed defect, arising from 
the conduct of those who had held the property long before he acquired it, of which he had no 
notice, that concealed defect cannot be set up against him.  He has paid his money for a title 
good at law, he is innocent, whatever may be the guilt of others, and equity will not subject him 
to the penalties attached to that guilt.  All titles would be insecure, and the intercourse between 
man and man would be very seriously obstructed, if this principle be overturned. 
A court of chancery, therefore, had a bill been brought to set aside the conveyance made 
to James Gunn and others, as being obtained by improper practices with the legislature, whatever 
might have been its decision as respected the original grantees, would have been bound, by its 
own rules, and by the clearest principles of equity, to leave unmolested those who were 
purchasers, without notice, for a valuable consideration. 
If the legislature felt itself absolved from those rules of property which are common to all 
the citizens of the United States, and from those principles of equity which are acknowledged in 
all our courts, its act is to be supported by its power alone, and the same power may divest any 
other individual of his lands, if it shall be the will of the legislature so to exert it. 
It is not intended to speak with disrespect of the legislature of Georgia, or of its acts.  Far 
from it.  The question is a general question, and is treated as one.  For although such powerful 
objections to a legislative grant, as are alleged against this, may not again exist, yet the principle, 
on which alone this rescinding act is to be supported, may be applied to every case to which it 
shall be the will of any legislature to apply it.  The principle is this; that a legislature may, by its 
own act, devest the vested estate of any man whatever, for reasons which shall, by itself, be 
deemed sufficient. 
In this case the legislature may have had ample proof that the original grant was obtained 
by practices which can never be too much reprobated, and which would have justified its 
abrogation so far as respected those to whom crime was imputable.  But the grant, when issued, 
conveyed an estate in fee-simple to the grantee, clothed with all the solemnities which law can 
bestow.  This estate was transferrable; and those who purchased parts of it were not stained by 
that guilt which infected the original transaction.  Their case is not distinguishable from the 
ordinary case of purchasers of a legal estate without knowledge of any secret fraud which might 
have led to the emanation of the original grant.  According to the well known course of equity, 
their rights could not be affected by such fraud.  Their situation was the same, their title was the 
same, with that of every other member of the community who holds land by regular conveyances 
from the original patentee. 
Is the power of the legislature competent to the annihilation of such title, and to a 
resumption of the property thus held? 
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The principle asserted is, that one legislature is competent to repeal any act which a 
former legislature was competent to pass; and that one legislature cannot abridge the powers of a 
succeeding legislature. 
The correctness of this principle, so far as respects general legislation, can never be 
controverted.  But, if an act be done under a law, a succeeding legislature cannot undo it.  The 
past cannot be recalled by the most absolute power.  Conveyances have been made, those 
conveyances have vested legal estates, and, if those estates may be seized by the sovereign 
authority, still, that they originally vested is a fact, and cannot cease to be a fact. 
When, then, a law is in its nature a contract, when absolute rights have vested under that 
contract, a repeal of the law cannot devest those rights; and the act of annulling them, if 
legitimate, is rendered so by a power applicable to the case of every individual in the community. 
It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government does not 
prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and, if any be prescribed, where are they to be 
found, if the property of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without 
compensation. 
To the legislature all legislative power is granted; but the question, whether the act of 
transferring the property of an individual to the public, be in the nature of the legislative power, 
is well worthy of serious reflection. 
It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government 
of society; the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of 
other departments.  How far the power of giving the law may involve every other power, in cases 
where the constitution is silent, never has been, and perhaps never can be, definitely stated. 
The validity of this rescinding act, then, might well be doubted, were Georgia a single 
sovereign power.  But Georgia cannot be viewed as a single, unconnected, sovereign power, on 
whose legislature no other restrictions are imposed than may be found in its own constitution. 
She is a part of a large empire; she is a member of the American union; and that union has a 
constitution the supremacy of which all acknowledge, and which imposes limits to the 
legislatures of the several states, which none claim a right to pass.  The constitution of the United 
States declares that no state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing 
the obligation of contracts. 
Does the case now under consideration come within this prohibitory section of the 
constitution? 
In considering this very interesting question, we immediately ask ourselves what is a 
contract?  Is a grant a contract? 
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A contract is a compact between two or more parties, and is either executory or executed. 
An executory contract is one in which a party binds himself to do, or not to do, a particular thing; 
such was the law under which the conveyance was made by the governor.  A contract executed is 
one in which the object of contract is performed; and this, says Blackstone, differs in nothing 
from a grant.  The contract between Georgia and the purchasers was executed by the grant.  A 
contract executed, as well as one which is executory, contains obligations binding on the parties. 
A grant, in its own nature, amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the grantor, and implies a 
contract not to reassert that right.  A party is, therefore, always estopped by his own grant. 
Since, then, in fact, a grant is a contract executed, the obligation of which still continues, 
and since the constitution uses the general term contract, without distinguishing between those 
which are executory and those which are executed, it must be construed to comprehend the latter 
as well as the former. A law annulling conveyances between individuals, and declaring that the 
grantors should stand seised of their former estates, notwithstanding those grants, would be as 
repugnant to the constitution as a law discharging the vendors of property from the obligation of 
executing their contracts by conveyances.  It would be strange if a contract to convey was 
secured by the constitution, while an absolute conveyance remained unprotected. 
If, under a fair construction the constitution, grants are comprehended under the term 
contracts, is a grant from the state excluded from the operation of the provision?  Is the clause to 
be considered as inhibiting the state from impairing the obligation of contracts between two 
individuals, but as excluding from that inhibition contracts made with itself? 
The words themselves contain no such distinction.  They are general, and are applicable 
to contracts of every description.  If contracts made with the state are to be exempted from their 
operation, the exception must arise from the character of the contracting party, not from the 
words which are employed. 
Whatever respect might have been felt for the state sovereignties, it is not to be disguised 
that the framers of the constitution viewed, with some apprehension, the violent acts which might 
grow out of the feelings of the moment; and that the people of the United States, in adopting that 
instrument, have manifested a determination to shield themselves and their property from the 
effects of those sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed.  The restrictions on the 
legislative power of the states are obviously founded in this sentiment; and the constitution of the 
United States contains what may be deemed a bill of rights for the people of each state. 
It is, then, the unanimous opinion of the court, that, in this case, the estate having passed 
into the hands of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice, the state of Georgia 
was restrained, either by general principles which are common to our free institutions, or by the 
particular provisions of the constitution of the United States, from passing a law whereby the 
estate of the plaintiff in the premises so purchased could be constitutionally and legally impaired 
and rendered null and void. 
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STONE v. MISSISSIPPI 
101 U.S. 814 (1879) 
Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court. 
It is now too late to contend that any contract which a State actually enters into when 
granting a charter to a private corporation is not within the protection of the clause in the 
Constitution of the United States that prohibits States from passing laws impairing the obligation 
of contracts.  Art. 1, sect. 10.  The doctrines of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 
Wheat. 518), announced by this court more than sixty years ago, have become so imbedded in 
the jurisprudence of the United States as to make them to all intents and purposes a part of the 
Constitution itself.  In this connection, however, it is to be kept in mind that it is not the charter 
which is protected, but only any contract the charter may contain.  If there is no contract, there is 
nothing in the grant on which the Constitution can act.  Consequently, the first inquiry in this 
class of cases always is, whether a contract has in fact been entered into, and if so, what its 
obligations are. 
In the present case the question is whether the State of Mississippi, in its sovereign 
capacity, did by the charter now under consideration bind itself irrevocably by a contract to 
permit “the Mississippi Agricultural, Educational, and Manufacturing Aid Society,” for twenty-
five years, “to receive subscriptions, and sell and dispose of certificates of subscription which 
shall entitle the holders thereof to” “any lands, books, paintings, antiques, scientific instruments 
or apparatus, or any other property or thing that may be ornamental, valuable, or useful,” 
“awarded to them” “by the casting of lots, or by lot, chance, or otherwise.”  There can be no 
dispute but that under this form of words the legislature of the State chartered a lottery company, 
having all the powers incident to such a corporation, for twenty-five years, and that in 
consideration thereof the company paid into the State treasury $5,000 for the use of a university, 
and agreed to pay, and until the commencement of this suit did pay, an annual tax of $1,000 and 
“one-half of one per cent on the amount of receipts derived from the sale of certificates of 
tickets.”  If the legislature that granted this charter had the power to bind the people of the State 
and all succeeding legislatures to allow the corporation to continue its corporate business during 
the whole term of its authorized existence, there is no doubt about the sufficiency of the language 
employed to effect that object, although there was an evident purpose to conceal the vice of the 
transaction by the phrases that were used.  Whether the alleged contract exists, therefore, or not, 
depends on the authority of the legislature to bind the State and the people of the State in that 
way. 
All agree that the legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a State. 
“Irrevocable grants of property and franchises may be made if they do not impair the supreme 
authority to make laws for the right government of the State; but no legislature can curtail the 
power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of police.” 
Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N.Y. 657; Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U.S. 645.  Many 
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attempts have been made in this court and elsewhere to define the police power, but never with 
entire success. It is always easier to determine whether a particular case comes within the general 
scope of the power, than to give an abstract definition of the power itself which will be in all 
respect accurate. No one denies, however, that it extends to all matters affecting the public health 
or the public morals.  Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97 id. 25; Patterson v. Kentucky, id. 501.  
Neither can it be denied that lotteries are proper subjects for the exercise of this power. We are 
aware that formerly, when the sources of public revenue were fewer than now, they were used in 
some or all of the States, and even in the District of Columbia, to raise money for the erection of 
public buildings, making public improvements, and not infrequently for educational and 
religious purposes; but this court said, more than thirty years ago, speaking through Mr. Justice 
Grier, in Phalen v. Virginia (8 How. 163, 168), that “experience has shown that the common 
forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the wide-spread 
pestilence of lotteries.  The former are confined to a few persons and places, but the latter infests 
the whole community; it enters every dwelling; it reaches every class; it preys upon the hard 
earnings of the poor; and it plunders the ignorant and simple.”  Happily, under the influence of 
restrictive legislation, the evils are not so apparent now; but we very much fear that with the 
same opportunities of indulgence the same results would be manifested. 
If lotteries are to be tolerated at all, it is no doubt better that they should be regulated by 
law, so that the people may be protected as far as possible against the inherent vices of the 
system; but that they are demoralizing in their effects, no matter how carefully regulated, cannot 
admit of a doubt.  When the government is untrammelled by any claim of vested rights or 
chartered privileges, no one has ever supposed that lotteries could not lawfully be suppressed, 
and those who manage them punished severely as violators of the rules of social morality.  From 
1822 to 1867, without any constitutional requirement, they were prohibited by law in 
Mississippi, and those who conducted them punished as a kind of gambler.  During the 
provisional government of that State, in 1867, at the close of the late civil war, the present act of 
incorporation, with more of like character, was passed.  The next year, 1868, the people, in 
adopting a new constitution with a view to the resumption of their political rights as one of the 
United States, provided that “the legislature shall never authorize any lottery, nor shall the sale of 
lottery-tickets be allowed, nor shall any lottery heretofore authorized be permitted to be drawn, 
or tickets therein to be sold.” Art. 12, sect. 15.  There is now scarcely a State in the Union where 
lotteries are tolerated, and Congress has enacted a special statute, the object of which is to close 
the mails against them. Rev. Stat., sect. 3894; 19 Stat. 90, sect. 2. 
The question is therefore directly presented, whether, in view of these facts, the 
legislature of a State can, by the charter of a lottery company, defeat the will of the people, 
authoritatively expressed, in relation to the further continuance of such business in their midst. 
We think it cannot.  No legislature can bargain away the public health or the public morals.  The 
people themselves cannot do it, much less their servants.  The supervision of both these subjects 
of governmental power is continuing in its nature, and they are to be dealt with as the special 
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exigencies of the moment may require. Government is organized with a view to their 
preservation, and cannot divest itself of the power to provide for them.  For this purpose the 
largest legislative discretion is allowed, and the discretion cannot be parted with any more than 
the power itself.  Beer Company v. Massachusetts, supra. 
In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518), it was argued that the 
contract clause of the Constitution, if given the effect contended for in respect to corporate 
franchises, “would be an unprofitable and vexatious interference with the internal concerns of a 
State, would unnecessarily and unwisely embarrass its legislation, and render immutable those 
civil institutions which are established for the purpose of internal government, and which, to 
subserve those purposes, ought  to vary with varying circumstances” (p. 628); but Mr. Chief 
Justice Marshall, when he announced the opinion of the court, was careful to say (p. 629), “that 
the framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain States in the regulation of their civil 
institutions, adopted for internal government, and that the instrument they have given us is not to 
be so construed.”  The present case, we think, comes within this limitation.  We have held, not, 
however, without strong opposition at times, that this clause protected a corporation in its charter 
exemptions from taxation.  While taxation is in general necessary for the support of government, 
it is not part of the government itself.  Government was not organized for the purposes of 
taxation, but taxation may be necessary for the purposes of government.  As such, taxation 
becomes an incident to the exercise of the legitimate functions of government, but nothing more. 
No government dependent on taxation for support can bargain away its whole power of taxation, 
for that would be substantially abdication.  All that has been determined thus far is, that for a 
consideration it may, in the exercise of a reasonable discretion, and for the public good, 
surrender a part of its powers in this particular. 
But the power of governing is a trust committed by the people to the government, no part 
of which can be granted away.  The people, in their sovereign capacity, have established their 
agencies for the preservation of the public health and the public morals, and the protection of 
public and private rights.  These several agencies can govern according to their discretion, if 
within the scope of their general authority, while in power; but they cannot give away nor sell the 
discretion of those that are to come after them, in respect to matters the government of which, 
from the very nature of things, must “vary with varying circumstances.” They may create 
corporations, and give them, so to speak, a limited citizenship; but as citizens, limited in their 
privileges, or otherwise, these creatures of the government creation are subject to such rules and 
regulations as may from time to time be ordained and established for the preservation of health 
and morality. 
The contracts which the Constitution protects are those that relate to property rights, not 
governmental.  It is not always easy to tell on which side of the line which separates 
governmental from property rights a particular case is to be put; but in respect to lotteries there 
can be no difficulty.  They are not, in the legal acceptation of the term, mala in se, but, as we 
have just seen, may properly be made mala prohibita.  They are a species of gambling, and 
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wrong in their influences.  They disturb the checks and balances of a well-ordered community. 
Society built on such a foundation would almost of necessity bring forth a population of 
speculators and gamblers, living on the expectation of what, “by the casting of lots, or by lot, 
chance, or otherwise,” might be “awarded” to them from the accumulations of others.  Certainly 
the right to suppress them is governmental, to be exercised at all times by those in power, at their 
discretion.  Any one, therefore, who accepts a lottery charter does so with the implied 
understanding that the people, in their sovereign capacity, and through their properly constituted 
agencies, may resume it at any time when the public good shall require, whether it be paid for or 
not.  All that one can get by such a charter is a suspension of certain governmental rights in his 
favor, subject to withdrawal at will.  He has in legal effect nothing more than a license to enjoy 
the privilege on the terms named for the specified time, unless it be sooner abrogated by the 
sovereign power of the State.  It is a permit, good as against existing laws, but subject to further 
legislative and constitutional control or withdrawal. 
On the whole, we find no error in the record. 
Judgment affirmed. 
HOME BUILDING & LOAN ASSOCIATION v. BLAISDELL 
290 U.S. 398 (1934) 
Judges:  Hughes, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland, Butler, Stone, 
Roberts, Cardozo 
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the Court.   
Appellant contests the validity of Chapter 339 of the Laws of Minnesota of 1933, p. 514, 
approved April 18, 1933, called the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, as being repugnant to 
the contract clause (Art. I, §10) . . . The statute was sustained by the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota, 189 Minn. 422, 448; 249 N. W. 334, 893, and the case comes here on appeal. 
The Act provides that, during the emergency declared to exist, relief may be had through 
authorized judicial proceedings with respect to foreclosures of mortgages, and execution sales, of 
real estate; that sales may be postponed and periods of redemption may be extended. 
Invoking the relevant provision of the statute, appellees applied to the District Court of 
Hennepin County for an order extending the period of redemption from a foreclosure sale.  Their 
petition stated that they owned a lot in Minneapolis which they had mortgaged to appellant; that 
the mortgage contained a valid power of sale by advertisement and that by reason of their default 
the mortgage had been foreclosed and sold to appellant on May 2, 1932, for $3700.98; that 
appellant was the holder of the sheriff’s certificate of sale; that because of the economic 
depression appellees had been unable to obtain a new loan or to redeem, and that unless the 
period of redemption were extended the property would be irretrievably lost; and that the 
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reasonable value of the property greatly exceeded the amount due on the mortgage including all 
liens, costs and expenses. 
On the hearing, appellant objected to the introduction of evidence upon the ground that 
the statute was invalid under the federal and state constitutions, and moved that the petition be 
dismissed. 
The court entered its judgment extending the period of redemption to May 1, 1935, 
subject to the condition that the appellees should pay to the appellant $40 a month through the 
extended period from May 2, 1933, that is, that in each of the months of August, September, and 
October, 1933, the payments should be $80, in two installments, and thereafter $40 a month, all 
these amounts to go to the payment of taxes, insurance, interest, and mortgage indebtedness. It is 
this judgment, sustained by the Supreme Court of the State on the authority of its former opinion, 
which is here under review.  189 Minn. 448; 249 N. W. 893. 
The state court upheld the statute as an emergency measure.  Although conceding that the 
obligations of the mortgage contract were impaired, the court decided that what it thus described 
as an impairment was, notwithstanding the contract clause of the Federal Constitution, within the 
police power of the State as that power was called into exercise by the public economic 
emergency which the legislature had found to exist. 
The statute does not impair the integrity of the mortgage indebtedness.  The obligation 
for interest remains.  The statute does not affect the validity of the sale or the right of a 
mortgagee-purchaser to title in fee, or his right to obtain a deficiency judgment, if the mortgagor 
fails to redeem within the prescribed period. 
In determining whether the provision for this temporary and conditional relief exceeds 
the power of the State by reason of the clause in the Federal Constitution prohibiting impairment 
of the obligations of contracts, we must consider the relation of emergency to constitutional 
power, the historical setting of the contract clause, the development of the jurisprudence of this 
Court in the construction of that clause, and the principles of construction which we may 
consider to be established. 
Emergency does not create power.  Emergency does not increase granted power or 
remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved.  The Constitution 
was adopted in a period of grave emergency.  Its grants of power to the Federal Government and 
its limitations of the power of the States were determined in the light of emergency and they are 
not altered by emergency.  What power was thus granted and what limitations were thus imposed 
are questions which have always been, and always will be, the subject of close examination 
under our constitutional system. 
In the construction of the contract clause, the debates in the Constitutional Convention 
are of little aid.  But the reasons which led to the adoption of that clause, and of the other 
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prohibitions of Section 10 of Article I, are not left in doubt and have frequently been described 
with eloquent emphasis.  The widespread distress following the revolutionary period, and the 
plight of debtors, had called forth in the States an ignoble array of legislative schemes for the 
defeat of creditors and the invasion of contractual obligations.  Legislative interferences had been 
so numerous and extreme that the confidence essential to prosperous trade had been undermined 
and the utter destruction of credit was threatened.  “The sober people of America” were 
convinced that some “thorough reform” was needed which would “inspire a general prudence 
and industry, and give a regular course to the business of society.”  The Federalist, No. 44.  It 
was necessary to interpose the restraining power of a central authority in order to secure the 
foundations even of “private faith.”  The occasion and general purpose of  the contract clause are 
summed up in the terse statement of Chief Justice Marshall in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. pp. 
213, 354, 355: 
“The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor, of interfering 
with contracts, a power which comes home to every man, touches the interest of 
all, and controls the conduct of every individual in those things which he supposes 
to be proper for his own exclusive management, had been used to such an excess 
by the state legislatures, as to break in upon the ordinary intercourse of society, 
and destroy all confidence between man and man.  This mischief had become so 
great, so alarming, as not only to impair commercial intercourse, and threaten the 
existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the people, and destroy the sanctity of 
private faith.  To guard against the continuance of the evil was an object of deep 
interest with all the truly wise, as well as the virtuous, of this great community, 
and was one of the important benefits expected from a reform of the government.” 
But full recognition of the occasion and general purpose of the clause does not suffice to 
fix its precise scope.  Nor does an examination of the details of prior legislation in the States 
yield criteria which can be considered controlling.  To ascertain the scope of the constitutional 
prohibition we examine the course of judicial decisions in its application.  These put it beyond 
question that the prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like 
a mathematical formula. 
The inescapable problems of construction have been: What is a contract?  What are the 
obligations of contracts?  What constitutes impairment of these obligations?  What residuum of 
power is there still in the States in relation to the operation of contracts, to protect the vital 
interests of the community? Questions of this character, “of no small nicety and intricacy, have 
vexed the legislative halls, as well as the judicial tribunals, with an uncounted variety and 
frequency of litigation and speculation.”  Story on the Constitution, §1375. 
The State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people.  It 
does not matter that legislation appropriate to that end “has the result of modifying or abrogating 
contracts already in effect.”  Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 276.  Not only are existing 
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laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of 
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. 
The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a 
government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile,–a government which retains 
adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society.  This principle of harmonizing 
the constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of state power has had progressive 
recognition in the decisions of this Court. 
The legislature cannot “bargain away the public health or the public morals.” Thus, the 
constitutional provision against the impairment of contracts was held not to be violated by an 
amendment of the state constitution which put an end to a lottery theretofore authorized by the 
legislature.  Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819.  See also, Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 
488, 497-499; compare New Orleans v. Houston, 119 U.S. 265, 275.  The lottery was a valid 
enterprise when established under express state authority, but the legislature in the public interest 
could put a stop to it.  A similar rule has been applied to the control by the State of the sale of 
intoxicating liquors.  Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 32, 33; see Mugler v. Kansas, 123 
U.S. 623, 664, 665.  The States retain adequate power to protect the public health against the 
maintenance of nuisances despite insistence upon existing contracts.  Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde 
Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667; Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 750. 
Legislation to protect the public safety comes within the same category of reserved power. 
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U.S. 57, 70, 74; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Miller, 221 
U.S. 408, 414; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558. 
The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and 
dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts.  In Manigault  v. 
Springs, 199 U.S. 473, riparian owners in South Carolina had made a contract for a clear passage 
through a creek by the removal of existing obstructions.  Later, the legislature of the State, by 
virtue of its broad authority to make public improvements, and in order to increase the taxable 
value of the lowlands which would be drained, authorized the construction of a dam across the 
creek.  The Court sustained the statute upon the ground that the private interests were subservient 
to the public right.  The Court said (id., p. 480): “It is the settled law of this court that the 
interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from 
exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common wealth, or are 
necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between 
individuals may thereby be affected.  This power, which in its various ramifications is known as 
the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, 
health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under 
contracts between individuals.” 
It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a century ago, or to insist 
that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the 
vision of our time.  If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its 
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adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be 
confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, 
would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation.  It was to guard against 
such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning–”We must 
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding” (McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 
407)–”a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the 
various crises of human affairs.” Id., p. 415. 
With a growing recognition of public needs and the relation of individual right to public 
security, the court has sought to prevent the perversion of the clause through its use as an 
instrument to throttle the capacity of the States to protect their fundamental interests. 
We are of the opinion that the Minnesota statute as here applied does not violate the 
contract clause of the Federal Constitution.  Whether the legislation is wise or unwise as a matter 
of policy is a question with which we are not concerned. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota is affirmed.    
Judgment affirmed. 
Mr. Justice Sutherland, dissenting. 
Few questions of greater moment than that just decided have been submitted for judicial 
inquiry during this generation.  The effect of the Minnesota legislation, though serious enough in 
itself, is of trivial significance compared with the far more serious and dangerous inroads upon 
the limitations of the Constitution which are almost certain to ensue as a consequence naturally 
following any step beyond the boundaries fixed by that instrument.  And those of us who are thus 
apprehensive of the effect of this decision would, in a matter so important, be neglectful of our 
duty should we fail to spread upon the permanent records of the court the reasons which move us 
to the opposite view. 
A provision of the Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two 
distinctly opposite interpretations.  It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely 
different thing at another time.  If the contract impairment clause, when framed and adopted, 
meant that the terms of a contract for the payment of money could not be altered in invitum by a 
state statute enacted for the relief of hardly pressed debtors to the end and with the effect of 
postponing payment or enforcement during and because of an economic or financial emergency, 
it is but to state the obvious to say that it means the same now.  This view, at once so rational in 
its application to the written word, and so necessary to the stability of constitutional principles, 
though from time to time challenged, has never, unless recently, been put within the realm of 
doubt by the decisions of this court. 
Following the Revolution, and prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the American 
people found themselves in a greatly impoverished condition.  Their commerce had been well-
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nigh annihilated.  They were not only without luxuries, but in great degree were destitute of the 
ordinary comforts and necessities of life.  In these circumstances they incurred indebtedness in 
the purchase of imported goods and otherwise, far beyond their capacity to pay.  From this 
situation there arose a divided sentiment.  On the one hand, an exact observance of public and 
private engagements was insistently urged.  A violation of the faith of the nation or the pledges 
of the private individual, it was insisted, was equally forbidden by the principles of moral justice 
and of sound policy. Individual distress, it was urged, should be alleviated only by industry and 
frugality, not by relaxation of law or by a sacrifice of the rights of others.  Indiscretion or 
imprudence was not to be relieved by legislation, but restrained by the conviction that a full 
compliance with contracts would be exacted.  On the other hand, it was insisted that the case of 
the debtor should be viewed with tenderness; and efforts were constantly directed toward 
relieving him from an exact compliance with his contract.  As a result of the latter view, state 
laws were passed suspending the collection of debts, remitting or suspending the collection of 
taxes, providing for the emission of paper money, delaying legal proceedings, etc.  There 
followed, as there must always follow from such a course, a long trail of ills, one of the direct 
consequences being a loss of confidence in the government and in the good faith of the people. 
Bonds of men whose ability to pay their debts was unquestionable could not be negotiated except 
at a discount of thirty, forty, or fifty per cent.  Real property could be sold only at a ruinous loss. 
Debtors, instead of seeking to meet their obligations by painful effort, by industry and economy, 
began to rest their hopes entirely upon legislative interference.  The impossibility of payment of 
public or private debts was widely asserted, and in some instances threats were made of 
suspending the administration of justice by violence.  The circulation of depreciated currency 
became common.  Resentment against lawyers and courts was freely manifested, and in many 
instances the course of the law was arrested and judges restrained from proceeding in the 
execution of their duty by popular and tumultuous assemblages.  This state of things alarmed all 
thoughtful men, and led them to seek some effective remedy.  Marshall, Life of Washington 
(1807), Vol. 5, pp. 88-131. 
In the midst of this confused, gloomy, and seriously exigent condition of affairs, the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 met at Philadelphia.  The defects of the Articles of 
Confederation were so great as to be beyond all hope of amendment, and the Convention, acting 
in technical excess of its authority, proceeded to frame for submission to the people of the 
several states an entirely new Constitution. 
If it be possible by resort to the testimony of history to put any question of constitutional 
intent beyond the domain of uncertainty, the foregoing leaves no reasonable ground upon which 
to base a denial that the clause of the Constitution now under consideration was meant to 
foreclose state action impairing the obligation of contracts primarily and especially in respect of 
such action aimed at giving relief to debtors in time of emergency. 
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The emergency was quite as serious as that which the country has faced during the past 
three years.  Indeed, it was so great that in one instance, at least, a state repudiated a portion of its 
public debt, and others were strongly tempted to do so. 
The present exigency is nothing new.  From the beginning of our existence as a nation, 
periods of depression, of industrial failure, of financial distress, of unpaid and unpayable 
indebtedness, have alternated with years of plenty.  The vital lesson that expenditure beyond 
income begets poverty, that public or private extravagance, financed by promises to pay, either 
must end in complete or partial repudiation or the promises be fulfilled by self-denial and painful 
effort, though constantly taught by bitter experience, seems never to be learned; and the attempt 
by legislative devices to shift the misfortune of the debtor to the shoulders of the creditor without 
coming into conflict with the contract impairment clause has been persistent and oft-repeated. 
The defense of the Minnesota law is made upon grounds which were discountenanced by 
the makers of the Constitution and have many times been rejected by this court.  That defense 
should not now succeed, because it constitutes an effort to overthrow the constitutional provision 
by an appeal to facts and circumstances identical with those which brought it into existence. 
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Van DeVanter, Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. 
Justice Butler concur in this opinion. 
UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK v. NEW JERSEY 
431 U.S. 1 (1976) 
Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents a challenge to a New Jersey statute, 1974 N.J. Laws, c. 25, as violative 
of the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution.  That statute, together with a concurrent 
and parallel New York statute, 1974 N. Y. Laws, c. 993, repealed a statutory covenant made by 
the two States in 1962 that had limited the ability of The Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey to subsidize rail passenger transportation from revenues and reserves. 
The suit, one for declaratory relief, was instituted by appellant United States Trust 
Company of New York in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County. 
Named as defendants were the State of New Jersey, its Governor, and its Attorney General. 
Plaintiff-appellant sued as trustee for two series of Port Authority Consolidated Bonds, as a 
holder of Port Authority Consolidated Bonds, and on behalf of all holders of such bonds. 
After a trial, the Superior Court ruled that the statutory repeal was a reasonable exercise 
of New Jersey’s police power, and declared that it was not prohibited by the Contract Clause or 
by its counterpart in the New Jersey Constitution, Art. IV, §7, P3.  Accordingly, appellant’s 
complaint was dismissed.  134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A. 2d 833 (1975).  The Supreme Court of 
New Jersey, on direct appeal and by per curiam opinion, affirmed “substantially for the reasons 
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set forth in the [trial court’s] opinion.”  69 N.J. 253, 256, 353 A. 2d 514, 515 (1976). We noted 
probable jurisdiction.  427 U.S. 903 (1976). 
I 
BACKGROUND 
A.  Establishment of the Port Authority. 
The Port Authority was established in 1921 by a bistate compact to effectuate “a better 
co-ordination of the terminal, transportation and other facilities of commerce in, about and 
through the port of New York.”  The compact, as the Constitution requires, Art. I, §10, cl. 3, 
received congressional consent.  42 Stat. 174. 
The compact granted the Port Authority enumerated powers and, by its Art. III, “such 
other and additional powers as shall be conferred upon it by the Legislature of either State 
concurred in by the Legislature of the other, or by Act or Acts of Congress.”  The powers are 
enumerated in Art. VI.  Among them is “full power and authority to purchase, construct, lease 
and/or operate any terminal or transportation facility within said district.” “Transportation 
facility” is defined, in Art. XXII, to include “railroads, steam or electric, . . . for use for the 
transportation or carriage of persons or property.” 
The Port Authority was conceived as a financially independent entity, with funds 
primarily derived from private investors.  The preamble to the compact speaks of the 
“encouragement of the investment of capital,” and the Port Authority was given power to 
mortgage its facilities and to pledge its revenues to secure the payment of bonds issued to private 
investors. 
B. Initial Policy Regarding Mass Transit. 
In 1927 the New Jersey Legislature, in an Act approved by the Governor, directed the 
Port Authority to make plans “supplementary to or amendatory of the comprehensive plan . . . as 
will provide adequate interstate and suburban transportation facilities for passengers.” 1927 
Laws, c. 277.  The New York Legislature followed suit in 1928, but its bill encountered 
executive veto. The trial court observed that this veto “to all intents and purposes ended any 
legislative effort to involve the Port Authority in an active role in commuter transit for the next 
30 years.”  134 N.J. Super., at 149, 338 A. 2d, at 846. 
C.  Port Authority Fiscal Policy. 
Four bridges for motor vehicles were constructed by the Port Authority.  A separate 
series of revenue bonds was issued for each bridge.  Revenue initially was below expectations, 
but the bridges ultimately accounted for much of the Port Authority’s financial strength.  The 
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legislatures transferred the operation and revenues of the successful Holland Tunnel to the Port 
Authority, and this more than made up for the early bridge deficits. 
In 1952, the Port Authority abandoned the practice of earmarking specific facility 
revenues as security for bonds of that facility.  The Port Authority’s Consolidated Bond 
Resolution established the present method of financing its activities; under this method its bonds 
are secured by a pledge of the general reserve fund. 
D.  Renewed Interest in Mass Transit. 
Meanwhile, the two States struggled with the passenger transportation problem.  Many 
studies were made.  The situation was recognized as critical, great costs were envisioned, and 
substantial deficits were predicted for any mass transit operation.  The Port Authority itself 
financed a study conducted by the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission which the States had 
established in 1954. 
E.  The 1962 Statutory Covenant. 
In 1960 the takeover of the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad by the Port Authority was 
proposed.  This was a privately owned interstate electric commuter system then linking 
Manhattan, Newark, and Hoboken through the Hudson tubes.  It had been in reorganization for 
many years, and in 1959 the Bankruptcy Court and the United States District Court had approved 
a plan that left it with cash sufficient to continue operations for two years but with no funds for 
capital expenditures.  In re Hudson & Manhattan R. Co., 174 F. Supp. 148 (SDNY 1959), aff’d 
sub nom. Spitzer v. Stichman, 278 F. 2d 402 (CA2 1960). 
A special committee of the New Jersey Senate was formed to determine whether the Port 
Authority was “fulfilling its statutory duties and obligations,” App. 605a.  The committee 
concluded that the solution to bondholder concern was “[l]imiting by a constitutionally protected 
statutory covenant with Port Authority bondholders the extent to which the Port Authority 
revenues and reserves pledged to such bondholders can in the future be applied to the deficits of 
possible future Port Authority passenger railroad facilities beyond the original Hudson & 
Manhattan Railroad system.”  Id., at 656a.  And the trial court found that the 1962 New Jersey 
Legislature “concluded it was necessary to place a limitation on mass transit deficit operations to 
be undertaken by the Authority in the future so as to promote continued investor confidence in 
the Authority.” 134 N.J. Super., at 178, 338 A. 2d, at 863-864. 
The statutory covenant of 1962 was the result.  The covenant itself was part of the bistate 
legislation authorizing the Port Authority to acquire, construct, and operate the Hudson & 
Manhattan Railroad and the World Trade Center.  The statute in relevant part read: 
“The 2 States covenant and agree with each other and with the holders of any 
affected bonds, as hereinafter defined, that so long as any of such bonds remain 
outstanding and unpaid and the holders thereof shall not have given their consent 
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as provided in their contract with the port authority, (a) . . . and (b) neither the 
States nor the port authority nor any subsidiary corporation incorporated for any 
of the purposes of this act will apply any of the rentals, tolls, fares, fees, charges, 
revenues or reserves, which have been or shall be pledged in whole or in part as 
security for such bonds, for any railroad purposes whatsoever other than permitted 
purposes hereinafter set forth.”  1962 N.J. Laws, c. 8, §6; 1962 N.Y. Laws, c. 209, 
§6. 
The “permitted purposes” were defined to include (i) the Hudson & Manhattan as then 
existing, (ii) railroad freight facilities, (iii) tracks and related facilities on Port Authority 
vehicular bridges, and (iv) a passenger railroad facility if the Port Authority certified that it was 
“self-supporting” or, if not, that at the end of the preceding calendar year the general reserve 
fund contained the prescribed statutory amount, and that all the Port Authority’s passenger 
revenues, including the Hudson & Manhattan, would not produce deficits in excess of “permitted 
deficits.” 
The terms of the covenant were self-evident.  Within its conditions the covenant 
permitted, and perhaps even contemplated, additional Port Authority involvement in deficit rail 
mass transit as its financial position strengthened, since the limitation of the covenant was linked 
to, and would expand with, the general reserve fund. 
With the legislation embracing the covenant thus effective, the Port Authority on 
September 1, 1962, assumed the ownership and operating responsibilities of the Hudson & 
Manhattan through a wholly owned subsidiary, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation 
(PATH).  Funds necessary for this were realized by the successful sale of bonds to private 
investors accompanied by the certification required by §7 of the Consolidated Bond Resolution 
that the operation would not materially impair the credit standing of the Port Authority, the 
investment status of the Consolidated Bonds, or the ability of the Port Authority to fulfill its 
commitments to bondholders. 
The PATH fare in 1962 was 30 cents and has remained at that figure despite 
recommendations for increase.  App. 684a-686a.  As a result of the continuation of the low fare, 
PATH deficits have far exceeded the initial projection.  Thus, although the general reserve fund 
had grown to $173 million by 1973, substantially increasing the level of permitted deficits to 
about $17 million, the PATH deficit had grown to $24.9 million.  In accordance with a 
stipulation of the parties, id., at 682a-683a, the trial court found that the PATH deficit so 
exceeded the covenant’s level of permitted deficits that the Port Authority was unable to issue 
bonds for any new passenger railroad facility that was not self-supporting.  134 N.J. Super., at 
163 n. 26, 338 A. 2d, at 855 n. 26. 
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F. Prospective Repeal of the Covenant. 
Governor Cahill of New Jersey and Governor Rockefeller of New York in April 1970 
jointly sought increased Port Authority participation in mass transit.  In November 1972 they 
agreed upon a plan for expansion of the PATH system.  This included the initiation of direct rail 
service to Kennedy Airport and the construction of a line to Plainfield, N.J., by way of Newark 
Airport. The plan anticipated a Port Authority investment of something less than $300 million 
out of a projected total cost of $650 million, with the difference to be supplied by federal and 
state grants.  It also proposed to make the covenant inapplicable with respect to bonds issued 
after the legislation went into effect.  This program was enacted, effective May 10, 1973, and the 
1962 covenant was thereby rendered inapplicable, or in effect repealed, with respect to bonds 
issued subsequent to the effective date of the new legislation. 1972 N.J. Laws, c. 208; 1972 N.Y. 
Laws, c. 1003, as amended by 1973 N.Y. Laws, c. 318. 
G. Retroactive Repeal of the Covenant.  
It soon developed that the proposed PATH expansion would not take place as 
contemplated in the Governors’ 1972 plan.  New Jersey was unwilling to increase its financial 
commitment in response to a sharp increase in the projected cost of constructing the Plainfield 
extension. 
In early 1974, when bills were pending in the two States’ legislatures to repeal the 
covenant retroactively, a national energy crisis was developing.  On November 27, 1973, 
Congress had enacted the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, 87 Stat. 627, as amended, 15 
U.S.C.  §751 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V).  In that Act Congress found that the hardships caused 
by the oil shortage “jeopardize the normal flow of commerce and constitute a national energy 
crisis which is a threat to the public health, safety, and welfare.” 87 Stat. 628, 15 U.S.C. §751 
(a)(3).  This time, proposals for retroactive repeal of the 1962 covenant were passed by the 
legislature  and signed by the Governor of each State.  1974 N.J. Laws, c. 25; 1974 N.Y. Laws, c. 
993. 
II 
At the time the Constitution was adopted, and for nearly a century thereafter, the Contract 
Clause was one of the few express limitations on state power.  The many decisions of this Court 
involving the Contract Clause are evidence of its important place in our constitutional 
jurisprudence.  Over the last century, however, the Fourteenth Amendment has assumed a far 
larger place in constitutional adjudication concerning the States.  We feel that the present role of 
the Contract Clause is largely illuminated by two of this Court’s decisions.  In each, legislation 
was sustained despite a claim that it had impaired the obligations of contracts. 
Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), is regarded as the 
leading case in the modern era of Contract Clause interpretation.  At issue was the Minnesota 
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Mortgage Moratorium Law, enacted in 1933, during the depth of the Depression and when that 
State was under severe economic stress, and appeared to have no effective alternative.  The 
statute was a temporary measure that allowed judicial extension of the time for redemption; a 
mortgagor who remained in possession during the extension period was required to pay a 
reasonable income or rental value to the mortgagee.  A closely divided Court, in an opinion by 
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, observed that “emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of 
power” and that the “constitutional question presented in the light of an emergency is whether 
the power possessed embraces the particular exercise of it in response to particular conditions.”  
Id., at 426. It noted that the debates in the Constitutional Convention were of little aid in the 
construction of the Contract Clause, but that the general purpose of the Clause was clear: to 
encourage trade and credit by promoting confidence in the stability of contractual obligations.  
Id., at 427-428. Nevertheless, a State “continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital 
interests of its people . . . .  This principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the 
necessary residuum of state power has had progressive recognition in the decisions of this 
Court.”  Id., at 434-435.  The great clauses of the Constitution are to be considered in the light of 
our whole experience, and not merely as they would be interpreted by its Framers in the 
conditions and with the outlook of their time.  Id., at 443. 
We therefore must attempt to apply that constitutional provision to the instant case with 
due respect for its purpose and the prior decisions of this Court.  
III 
We first examine appellant’s general claim that repeal of the 1962 covenant impaired the 
obligation of the States’ contract with the bondholders.  It long has been established that the 
Contract Clause limits the power of the States to modify their own contracts as well as to 
regulate those between private parties.  Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 137-139 (1810); 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (1819).  Yet the Contract Clause does not 
prohibit the States from repealing or amending statutes generally, or from enacting legislation 
with retroactive effects. Thus, as a preliminary matter, appellant’s claim requires a determination 
that the repeal has the effect of impairing a contractual obligation. 
In this case the obligation was itself created by a statute, the 1962 legislative covenant.  It 
is unnecessary, however, to dwell on the criteria for determining whether state legislation gives 
rise to a contractual obligation.  The trial court found, 134 N.J. Super., at 183 n. 38, 338 A. 2d, at 
866 n. 38, and appellees do not deny, that the 1962 covenant constituted a contract between the 
two States and the holders of the Consolidated Bonds issued between 1962 and the 1973 
prospective repeal.  The intent to make a contract is clear from the statutory language: “The 2 
States covenant and agree with each other and with the holders of any affected bonds....”  1962 
N.J. Laws, c. 8, §6; 1962 N. Y. Laws, c. 209, §6.  Moreover, as the chronology set forth above 
reveals, the purpose of the covenant was to invoke the constitutional protection of the Contract 
Clause as security against repeal.  In return for their promise, the States received the benefit they 
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bargained for: public marketability of Port Authority bonds to finance construction of the World 
Trade Center and acquisition of the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad.  We therefore have no doubt 
that the 1962 covenant has been properly characterized as a contractual obligation of the two 
States. 
The parties sharply disagree about the value of the 1962 covenant to the bondholders. 
Appellant claims that after repeal the secondary market for affected bonds became “thin” and the 
price fell in relation to other formerly comparable bonds.  This claim is supported by the trial 
court’s finding that “immediately following repeal and for a number of months thereafter the 
market price for Port Authority bonds was adversely affected.”  134 N.J. Super., at 180, 338 A. 
2d, at 865. Appellees respond that the bonds nevertheless retained an “A” rating from the leading 
evaluating services and that after an initial adverse effect they regained a comparable price 
position in the market.  Findings of the trial court support these claims as well.  Id., at 179-182, 
338 A.2d, at 864-866.  The fact is that no one can be sure precisely how much financial loss the 
bondholders suffered.  Factors unrelated to repeal may have influenced price.  In addition, the 
market may not have reacted fully, even as yet, to the covernant’s repeal, because of the pending 
litigation and the possibility that the repeal would be nullified by the courts. 
In any event, the question of valuation need not be resolved in the instant case because 
the State has made no effort to compensate the bondholders for any loss sustained by the repeal. 
As a security provision, the covenant was not superfluous; it limited the Port Authority’s deficits 
and thus protected the general reserve fund from depletion.  Nor was the covenant merely 
modified or replaced by an arguably comparable security provision.  Its outright repeal totally 
eliminated an important security provision and thus impaired the obligation of the States’ 
contract.  See Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U.S. 124, 
128-129 (1937). 
The trial court recognized that there was an impairment in this case: “To the extent that 
the repeal of the covenant authorizes the Authority to assume greater deficits for such purposes, 
it permits a diminution of the pleadged revenues and reserves and may be said to constitute an 
impairment of the states’ contract with the bondholders.”  134 N.J. Super., at 183, 338 A. 2d, at 
866. 
Having thus established that the repeal impaired a contractual obligation of the States, we 
turn to the question whether that impairment violated the Contract Clause. 
IV 
Although the Contract Clause appears literally to proscribe “any” impairment, this Court 
observed in Blaisdell that “the prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal 
exactness like a mathematical formula.”  290 U.S., at 428.  Thus, a finding that there has been a 
technical impairment is merely a preliminary step in resolving the more difficult question 
whether that impairment is permitted under the Constitution.  In the instant case, as in Blaisdell, 
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we must attempt to reconcile the strictures of the Contract Clause with the “essential attributes of 
sovereign power,” id., at 435, necessarily reserved by the States to safeguard the welfare of their 
citizens.  Id., at 434-440. 
The trial court concluded that repeal of the 1962 covenant was a valid exercise of New 
Jersey’s police power because repeal served important public interests in mass transportation, 
energy conservation, and environmental protection.  134 N.J. Super., at 194-195, 338 A. 2d, at 
873. Yet the Contract Clause limits otherwise legitimate exercises of state legislative authority, 
and the existence of an important public interest is not always sufficient to overcome that 
limitation.  “Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be consistent with the fair 
intent of the constitutional limitation of that power.”  Blaisdell, 290 U.S., at 439.  Moreover, the 
scope of the State’s reserved power depends on the nature of the contractual relationship with 
which the challenged law conflicts. 
The States must possess broad power to adopt general regulatory measures without being 
concerned that private contracts will be impaired, or even destroyed, as a result.  Otherwise, one 
would be able to obtain immunity from state regulation by making private contractual 
arrangements.  This principle is summarized in Mr. Justice Holmes’ well-known dictum: “One 
whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the 
power of the State by making a contract about them.”  Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 
349, 357 (1908). 
Yet private contracts are not subject to unlimited modification under the police power.  
The Court in Blaisdell recognized that laws intended to regulate existing contractual 
relationships must serve a legitimate public purpose.  290 U.S., at 444-445.  A State could not 
“adopt as its policy the repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of means 
to enforce them.”  Id., at 439.  Legislation adjusting the rights and responsibilities of contracting 
parties must be upon reasonable conditions and of a character appropriate to the public purpose 
justifying its adoption.  Id., at 445-447.  As is customary in reviewing economic and social 
regulation, however, courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and 
reasonableness of a particular measure.  East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 
(1945). 
When a State impairs the obligation of its own contract, the reserved-powers doctrine has 
a different basis.  The initial inquiry concerns the ability of the State to enter into an agreement 
that limits its power to act in the future.  As early as Fletcher v. Peck, the Court considered the 
argument that “one legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.”  6 Cranch, 
at 135.  It is often stated that “the legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a State.” 
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1880).  This doctrine requires a determination of the 
State’s power to create irrevocable contract rights in the first place, rather than an inquiry into 
the purpose or reasonableness of the subsequent impairment.  In short, the Contract Clause does 
not require a State to adhere to a contract that surrenders an essential attribute of its sovereignty. 
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The Contract Clause is not an absolute bar to subsequent modification of a State’s own 
financial obligations.  As with laws impairing the obligations of private contracts, an impairment 
may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.  In 
applying this standard, however, complete deference to a legislative assessment of 
reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State’s self-interest is at stake.  A 
governmental entity can always find a use for extra money, especially when taxes do not have to 
be raised.  If a State could reduce its financial obligations whenever it wanted to spend the 
money for what it regarded as an important public purpose, the Contract Clause would provide 
no protection at all. 
We therefore conclude that repeal of the 1962 covenant cannot be sustained on the basis 
of this Court’s prior [decisions]. 
V 
Mass transportation, energy conservation, and environmental protection are goals that are 
important and of legitimate public concern.  Appellees contend that these goals are so important 
that any harm to bondholders from repeal of the 1962 covenant is greatly outweighed by the 
public benefit.  We do not accept this invitation to engage in a utilitarian comparison of public 
benefit and private loss.  Contrary to Mr. Justice Black’s fear, expressed in sole dissent in El 
Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S., at 517, the Court has not “balanced away” the limitation on state 
action imposed by the Contract Clause.  Thus a State cannot refuse to meet its legitimate 
financial obligations simply because it would prefer to spend the money to promote the public 
good rather than the private welfare of its creditors.  We can only sustain the repeal of the 1962 
covenant if that impairment was both reasonable and necessary to serve the admittedly important 
purposes claimed by the State. 
The more specific justification offered for the repeal of the 1962 covenant was the States’ 
plan for encouraging users of private automobiles to shift to public transportation.  The States 
intended to discourage private automobile use by raising bridge and tunnel tolls and to use the 
extra revenue from those tolls to subsidize improved commuter railroad service.  Appellees 
contend that repeal of the 1962 covenant was necessary to implement this plan because the new 
mass transit facilities could not possibly be self-supporting and the covenant’s “permitted 
deficits” level had already been exceeded.  We reject this justification because the repeal was 
neither necessary to achievement of the plan nor reasonable in light of the circumstances. 
[W]ithout modifying the covenant at all, the States could have adopted alternative means 
of achieving their twin goals of discouraging automobile use and improving mass transit.  We 
also cannot conclude that repeal of the covenant was reasonable in light of the surrounding 
circumstances.  In this regard a comparison with El Paso v. Simmons, supra, again is instructive. 
There a 19th century statute had effects that were unforeseen and unintended by the legislature 
when originally adopted.  As a result speculators were placed in a position to obtain windfall 
benefits.  The Court held that adoption of a statute of limitation was a reasonable means to 
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“restrict a party to those gains reasonably to be expected from the contract” when it was adopted. 
379 U.S., at 515. 
By contrast, in the instant case the need for mass transportation in the New York 
metropolitan area was not a new development, and the likelihood that publicly owned commuter 
railroads would produce substantial deficits was well known.  As early as 1922, over a half 
century ago, there were pressures to involve the Port Authority in mass transit.  It was with full 
knowledge of these concerns that the 1962 covenant was adopted.  Indeed, the covenant was 
specifically intended to protect the pledged revenues and reserves against the possibility that 
such concerns would lead the Port Authority into greater involvement in deficit mass transit. 
During the 12-year period between adoption of the covenant and its repeal, public 
perception of the importance of mass transit undoubtedly grew because of increased general 
concern with environmental protection and energy conservation.  But these concerns were not 
unknown in 1962, and the subsequent changes were of degree and not of kind.  We cannot say 
that these changes caused the covenant to have a substantially different impact in 1974 than 
when it was adopted in 1962.  And we cannot conclude that the repeal was reasonable in the light 
of changed circumstances. 
We therefore hold that the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits the 
retroactive repeal of the 1962 covenant.  The judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is 
reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Marshall join, 
dissenting. 
Decisions of this Court for at least a century have construed the Contract Clause largely 
to be powerless in binding a State to contracts limiting the authority of successor legislatures to 
enact laws in furtherance of the health, safety, and similar collective interests of the polity.  In 
short, those decisions established the principle that lawful exercises of a State’s police powers 
stand paramount to private rights held under contract.  Today’s decision, in invalidating the New 
Jersey Legislature’s 1974 repeal of its predecessor’s 1962 covenant, rejects this previous 
understanding and remolds the Contract Clause into a potent instrument for overseeing important 
policy determinations of the state legislature.  At the same time, by creating a constitutional safe 
haven for property rights embodied in a contract, the decision substantially distorts modern 
constitutional jurisprudence governing regulation of private economic interests.  I might 
understand, though I could not accept, this revival of the Contract Clause were it in accordance 
with some coherent and constructive view of public policy.  But elevation of the Clause to the 
status of regulator of the municipal bond market at the heavy price of frustration of sound 
legislative policymaking is as demonstrably unwise as it is unnecessary.  The justification for 
today’s decision, therefore, remains a mystery to me, and I respectfully dissent. 
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LIPSCOMB v. COLUMBUS MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
269 F.3d 494 (5thCir. 2001) 
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge: 
This case requires us to examine a collision between the Contract Clause of the United 
States Constitution and Mississippi’s effort to escape rent and renewal terms of leases of 
sixteenth section land in Columbus, Mississippi dating back to the early nineteenth century. The 
Secretary of State of Mississippi and the State maintain that the rental and renewal terms are 
invalid because their perpetuation of rents that are now nominal violate a provision of the 1890 
Mississippi Constitution forbidding the donation of public property to private parties. Lipscomb 
sues for a declaration that the efforts of the Secretary of State to invalidate these leases violates 
the Contract Clause. The district court held that invalidating the leases would violate the 
Contract Clause. We affirm. 
Before Mississippi became a state, the United States Congress set aside the sixteenth 
section of every township in the Mississippi Territory to be used for the benefit of schools. 
Congress then authorized the leasing of the sixteenth section land to raise funds to finance public 
schools in the Mississippi Territory. Upon granting statehood to Mississippi in 1817, Congress 
gave the sixteenth section land to the new state for the benefit of its schools. Thereafter, the 
Mississippi legislature authorized the leasing of the school lands, the proceeds of which would 
finance public schools. 
During the nineteenth century, various persons leased sixteenth section land from the 
school board of Columbus, Mississippi. These leases were to last 99 years from February 10, 
1821, or thereabouts (regardless of when actually made), and contained “renewable forever” 
provisions authorized by an 1830 Mississippi statute. Many of the leases–often after being 
assigned or subdivided–were renewed in 1920 under their renewable forever provisions. The 
rental rates paid on the Columbus leases have remained unchanged for 180 years. Leaseholders 
of lots of property in downtown Columbus pay pennies in rent per year, a small fraction of their 
fair market rent.  
In 1890, Mississippi ratified its current constitution. Section 95 of the 1890 constitution 
prohibits the donation of state lands to private parties.  Mississippi courts subsequently 
interpreted section 95 to prohibit leases or sales of land for grossly inadequate consideration. A 
lease that violates section 95 is voidable. Following these rulings, the State and individual school 
boards began asserting that sixteenth section leases for nominal consideration were void and 
renegotiating the leases. 
J. Randolph Lipscomb brought a declaratory judgment action in federal court seeking a 
declaration that the State’s threatened action to void the leases and renegotiate would violate the 
Contract Clause. 
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A 
The 1890 Mississippi Constitution, section 95, states, “Lands belonging to, or under the 
control of the state, shall never be donated directly or indirectly, to private corporations or 
individuals, or to railroad companies.”   Mississippi courts have consistently construed this to 
forbid transactions for consideration so inadequate that they are the equivalent of donations. The 
Mississippi Supreme Court held that a sale or lease of sixteenth section land that violates section 
95 is voidable.  However, the Mississippi Supreme Court, in interpreting section 95 to make 
certain sixteenth section land leases voidable, invoked equity and held that, even when a lease is 
voided, the leaseholder retains the right of first refusal after the land is appraised for fair rental 
value. 
In sum, the Secretary of State has sought, under section 95, the invalidation of leases of 
sixteenth section lands throughout Mississippi. The sixteenth section land leases in Columbus, 
Mississippi, however, are renewals of leases signed before the ratification of section 95 of the 
1890 Mississippi Constitution. Thus, Lipscomb argues for a declaration that this effort to 
invalidate the leases in Columbus violates the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution. 
B 
Article I, section 10 of the Constitution states, “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts....”   The Supreme Court has emphasized, however, that 
the absolute language of the Contract Clause does not create an absolute prohibition; a State 
must be given some accommodation in passing laws “to safeguard the vital interests of its 
people.” The Supreme Court has developed a three-part test to balance the State’s obligation not 
to impair contracts with the State’s interest in public welfare. This test is applied against the 
backdrop of legislative power to exercise eminent domain. That a state legislature has by statute 
given assurance that it would not do so does not mean that the legislature cannot later take the 
property by eminent domain or paying just compensation. That is, we address a claim of police 
power to regulate–without compensation. And while impairment of contract analysis has an air 
of due process about it, our analysis is distinct. 
In sum, the court must first determine whether the impairment of the contract is 
substantial and the degree of that impairment. If the impairment is not substantial, there is no 
claim under the Contract Clause. The court must next assess the strength of the State’s 
justification for the impairment. The justification must identify a public purpose that is 
significant and legitimate. If the State fails to provide such a justification, the impairment 
violates the Contract Clause. Finally, the court must compare the impairment and the 
justification to determine whether the impairment is “reasonable and necessary.” The degree of 
deference shown the legislature’s judgment on this question depends on whether the government 
has impaired contracts to which it is a party. 
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C 
We begin by asking whether section 95 substantially impairs the contractual rights of the 
leaseholders. To determine the effect of a law on a contract, we must identify which contractual 
rights are being affected by the law, and then consider the extent to which the law has 
contravened the reasonable expectations of the parties. Section 95 affects the renewal rent term. 
As read by the Mississippi Supreme Court section 95 makes voidable the current lease price, 
allowing the State to seek a fair market rate, but giving the current leaseholder the right of first 
refusal. The actual impairment to the leases is the invalidation of the “renewable forever” clauses 
that guaranteed a continuation of the original price term to the present day. Section 95 thus 
impairs the contract term that freezes the rents at prices that the State contends have become 
grossly inadequate with the passage of time. 
Given that section 95 affects the renewal price term, we must ask what the reasonable 
expectations of the contracting parties were with respect to that contract term. The renewable 
forever clauses are authorized by state statute. Additionally, the leases were made in furtherance 
of the State’s duty to preserve the value of the school trust lands. The leases in this case were 
signed in the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s, against a backdrop of the State’s binding trust 
obligations. 
D 
Since its earliest days, Mississippi has held sixteenth section lands in trust for the benefit 
of the schools of the State. Although courts often refer to “the” trust, there are in fact two trusts–
one state, one federal–in which Mississippi holds its sixteenth section lands. Detailing this 
duality is necessary to understanding Mississippi’s trust obligation. We turn first to the federal 
trust.  
Beginning with the Northwest Territory in 1785, Congress set aside public lands in most 
of the territories of the United States to be used for the benefit of territorial schools. The lands set 
aside were composed of the sixteenth section of each township; in later years, additional sections 
were set aside as well. As states were formed out of territories, Congress,  in the enabling act of 
each new state, granted the school lands to the state.  These grants contain language that the land 
is being given to the state for the benefit of its schools. This is the source of the claim that the 
states hold the school lands in a federally created trust.  
In defining the character of any federal trust, we then first turn to the language of the 
statute granting the sixteenth section lands to the State and their interpretation. Earlier grants of 
sixteenth section land did not contain any language creating specific obligations on the part of 
the states. The Supreme Court long ago held that such grants gave the sixteenth section lands to 
the states in fee simple; the federal trust was purely honorary. 
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The grant of sixteenth section land to Mississippi was one of the earliest trusts created, 
and contained no language establishing a binding trust. We remain convinced then that the 
federal trust in which Mississippi holds its sixteenth section lands is purely honorary and that 
Mississippi holds absolute title to the land without federal restriction. We now turn to the matter 
of trust obligations imposed by the law of Mississippi. 
“An overwhelming body of law” in Mississippi holds that the lands are held in a binding 
trust. The Mississippi Supreme Court has said the trust dates back to the creation of the state. 
Although the source of this trust obligation is obscure, the Mississippi Supreme Court has 
declared its existence as a matter of state law, and that is the end of the matter. 
The State holds title to the land for the benefit of its schools; the common law rules 
applicable to private trusts apply to the trust in which Mississippi holds its school lands and any 
action taken by the State in violation of this trust is voidable.  The Mississippi Supreme Court 
has stated that the State’s trust obligations are the equivalent of its police powers, and cannot be 
contracted away. The exact requirements of the trust have been narrowed at times by statute and 
state constitution, but the binding nature of the obligation has existed since 1817.  
When the leases were signed more than 100 years ago, the parties did not have the benefit 
of the body of law on school lands trusts that we have today. The relevant inquiry here is into the 
trust obligations that were the backdrop to the execution of the leases. We must repair then to the 
understanding of the trust at that time in order to assess what the parties to the original leases 
reasonably expected the State’s duties and powers with respect to the land were. While the 
parties would undoubtedly have understood that the leases were being signed subject to some 
sort of a binding trust obligation, the source of the trust obligations was far less clear then than 
now. 
With increasing state regulation, regulated private parties’ expectations of being freed 
from future regulations by contract with the state becomes less reasonable. The Mississippi 
statutes of the nineteenth century, however, acted to facilitate the transfer of state land to private 
parties, not to limit the activities of private parties. The statute authorizing the renewable forever 
leases in Columbus reflects the State’s interest in encouraging the development of land in that 
township - as we will explain, not in derogation of trust obligations but in their discharge. 
E 
In discharging its obligations to administer the lands for the benefit of education, 
Mississippi faced certain realities.  Unsettled land generates no revenue for the State; yields no 
agricultural bounty; supports no population; and generates no commerce.  Both sales and long-
term leases at low rates encourage settlement and private investment in new lands.  
But a lease that is renewable forever is here superior to a land sale. By retaining title to 
the land, the State protects itself against default. A lease ensures a perpetual stream of income, 
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however small, that guarantees that misfortune or mismanagement of sales proceeds cannot 
completely dissipate the income from the lease. Selling land for a lump-sum risks such a loss. 
Such a judgment is born out in Mississippi’s history. In 1856, Mississippi sold land and invested 
the proceeds in 8 percent loans to Mississippi’s railroads. Within ten years, this entire investment 
was rendered worthless when Mississippi’s railroads were destroyed during the Civil War. 
Thus, to this day Mississippi continues to receive its bargained-for benefit from these 
leases, just as the leaseholders reap the benefit of (now) extremely favorable rental rates. The 
leases have generated a constant stream of revenue that is secured by the State’s continuing 
ownership in the land. For the first 50 years or so this rental income sustained the schools. The 
guarantee of perpetual low lease rates attracted settlement in Columbus, and the leaseholders 
improved the land they held, increasing the general wealth of the community and enlarging the 
tax base for later property taxes to support schools. Upsetting this balance by invalidating the 
renewal lease rates would substantially impair the contracts. 
The State identifies a significant, legitimate, public interest in the leased sixteenth section 
lands. The Mississippi courts have stated that preservation of the trust lands for the benefit of the 
schools is a central governmental power and duty, comparable to the police powers. As we have 
explained, Mississippi case law has repeatedly emphasized the significance of the State’s interest 
in preserving the value of the sixteenth section lands. 
Of course, this interest in protecting the school lands trust is a valid reason for the State’s 
action. Funding schools and avoiding the dissipation of state assets are classic police functions, 
and section 95 of the Mississippi Constitution is a law of “broad and general” application that 
does not single out any subset of leaseholders. All this is a given–but it does not respond to the 
reality that the original structure of the leases has not frustrated the state’s obligation. To the 
contrary, it has rather done the opposite. 
We now turn to the final step of the analysis. The State is a party to the contracts, so we 
cannot defer in the manner of due process to the State’s judgment of the reasonableness of its 
threatened action. Instead, we first ask whether the contracts surrender “an essential attribute of 
[the State’s] sovereignty.” If not, we judge the reasonableness and necessity of the impairment. 
The leases do not surrender any essential attribute of the State’s sovereignty. The leases 
do not limit the ability of the State to exercise its jurisdiction or police powers over the land. 
Mississippi courts have stated that the State’s duty to the school lands trust is like a police power 
that cannot be contracted away. But the State has not contracted away its stewardship over the 
school lands. As we explained, the leases themselves represent the State’s fulfillment of its 
obligation to ensure the funding of schools. 
The leases exercise the State’s power to serve the trust, they do not limit that power. The 
State seeks to escape a purely financial obligation–its agreement to accept fixed rent terms for 
the Columbus school lands while reaping the benefits of the land’s development - an 
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arrangement that proved to be a hedge against inflationary erosions of rental income, inevitably 
attended by increasing land “values.” 
In sum, invalidating the renewal rental rates of the leases is not reasonable and necessary 
to protect the State’s interest in its school lands. Mississippi might have followed the familiar 
path of granting fee title to land in exchange for its development–a common practice in the 
American West and the Mississippi Territory. It is fair to ask whether in such circumstances the 
state could now exercise its police power to alter an incident of fee ownership to charge market 
rents in addition to school taxes without compensating the landowner. In actual fact, the state 
constructed a hedge. 
As we have explained, in this case the leasing arrangements guaranteed Mississippi a 
steady stream of income, which in fact supported the public school in Columbus for many years. 
The renewable forever provisions created incentives for substantial investment in the 
development of leased lands and a growing tax base to further sustain the schools. Moreover, the 
state was left with remedies should the lessee default. The state got exactly what it needed, and 
the purpose of the contract was fulfilled, not frustrated. 
To summarize: The current leases are renewals of the original leases executed before the 
ratification of the 1890 Constitution. Thus, section 95 of the 1890 Constitution impairs the 
renewal terms of the lease contracts. Because voiding the current lease rates on the school lands 
substantially impairs the contract rights of the leaseholders, and the State’s threatened action is 
not reasonable and necessary, we affirm the entry of summary judgment against the Secretary 
declaring that voiding the Columbus school land leases would violate the Contract Clause, a 
declaration that may be enforced by injunctive relief. 
We AFFIRM and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings including any 
necessary resolution of disputes over the entitlement to the relief declared by the district court 
and today affirmed by this court. We do not suggest that there will be such disputes. 
AFFIRMED and REMANDED. 
DISCUSSION QUESTION: 
The Maryland General Assembly has legalized  slot machines. Assume that the Cordish 
Company builds a slots parlor spending $10,000,000. What steps can Cordish take to protect 
itself against subsequent repeal of the legalization legislation? 
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Session 19. Invidious Discrimination 
    The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment directs that all persons 
similarly situated should be treated alike. Most exercises of land use regulations discriminate in 
one way or another. Hence the question arises as to when and whether land-use classifications 
deny equal protection. 
YICK WO v. HOPKINS 
118 U.S. 356 (1886) 
Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court. 
In the case of the petitioner, brought here by writ of error to the Supreme Court of 
California, our jurisdiction is limited to the question, whether the plaintiff in error has been 
denied a right in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 
We are consequently constrained, at the outset, to differ from the Supreme Court of 
California upon the real meaning of the ordinances in question.  That court considered these 
ordinances as vesting in the board of supervisors a not unusual discretion in granting or 
withholding their assent to the use of wooden buildings as laundries, to be exercised in reference 
to the circumstances of each case, with a view to the protection of the public against the dangers 
of fire.  We are not able to concur in that interpretation of the power conferred upon the 
supervisors. 
There is nothing in the ordinances which points to such a regulation of the business of 
keeping and conducting laundries.  They seem intended to confer, and actually do confer, not a 
discretion to be exercised upon a consideration of the circumstances of each case, but a naked 
and arbitrary power to give or withhold consent, not only as to places, but as to persons. So that, 
if an applicant for such consent, being in every way a competent and qualified person, and 
having complied with every reasonable condition demanded by any public interest, should, 
failing to obtain the requisite consent of the supervisors to the prosecution of his business, apply 
for redress by the judicial process of mandamus, to require the supervisors to consider and act 
upon his case, it would be a sufficient answer for them to say that the law had conferred upon 
them authority to withhold their assent, without reason and without responsibility.  The power 
given to them is not confided to their discretion in the legal sense of that term, but is granted to 
their mere will.  It is purely arbitrary, and acknowledges neither guidance nor restraint. 
The ordinance drawn in question in the present case does not prescribe a rule and 
conditions for the regulation of the use of property for laundry purposes, to which all similarly 
situated may conform.  It allows without restriction the use for such purposes of buildings of 
brick or stone; but, as to wooden buildings, constituting nearly all those in previous use, it 
divides the owners or occupiers into two classes, not having respect to their personal character 
and qualifications for the business, nor the situation and nature and adaptation of the buildings 
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themselves, but merely by an arbitrary line, on one side of which are those who are permitted to 
pursue their industry by the mere will and consent of the supervisors, and on the other those from 
whom that consent is withheld, at their mere will and pleasure.  And both classes are alike only 
in this, that they are tenants at will, under the supervisors, of their means of living.  The 
ordinance, therefore, also differs from the not unusual case, where discretion is lodged by law in 
public officers or bodies to grant or withhold licenses to keep taverns, or places for the sale of 
spirituous liquors, and the like, when one of the conditions is that the applicant shall be a fit 
person for the exercise of the privilege, because in such cases the fact of fitness is submitted to 
the judgment of the officer, and calls for the exercise of a discretion of a judicial nature. 
The rights of the petitioners, as affected by the proceedings of which they complain, are 
not less, because they are aliens and subjects of the Emperor of China.  By the third article of the 
treaty between this Government and that of China, concluded November 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 827, 
it is stipulated: “If Chinese laborers, or Chinese of any other class, now either permanently or 
temporarily residing in the territory of the United States, meet with ill treatment at the hands any 
other persons, the Government of the United States will exert all its powers to devise measures 
for their protection, and to secure to them the same rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions 
as may be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, and to which they are 
entitled by treaty.” 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of 
citizens. It says: “Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial 
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal 
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.  It is accordingly enacted by 
§1977 of the Revised Statutes, that “all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens and shall be subject to like punishment, 
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.” The questions we 
have to consider and decide in these cases, therefore, are to be treated as involving the rights of 
every citizen of the United States equally with those of the strangers and aliens who now invoke 
the jurisdiction of the court. 
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the 
principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we 
are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely 
personal and arbitrary power.  Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the 
author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the 
agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all 
government exists and acts.  And the law is the definition and limitation of power.  It is, indeed, 
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quite true, that there must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the 
authority of final decision; and in many cases of mere administration the responsibility is purely 
political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment, exercised either 
in the pressure of opinion or by means of the suffrage.  But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims 
of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in 
securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the 
famous language of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the government of the commonwealth 
“may be a government of laws and not of men.” 
There are many illustrations that might be given of this truth, which would make manifest 
that it was self-evident in the light of our system of jurisprudence.  And a similar question, very 
pertinent to the one in the present cases, was decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in the 
cases of the City of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Maryland, 217.  In that case the defendant had 
erected and used a steam engine, in the prosecution of his business as a carpenter and box-maker 
in the city of Baltimore, under a permit from the mayor and city council, which contained a 
condition that the engine was “to be removed after six months’ notice to that effect from the 
mayor.”  After such notice and refusal to conform to it, a suit was instituted to recover the 
penalty provided by the ordinance, to restrain the prosecution of which a bill in equity was filed. 
The court holding the opinion that “there may be a case in which an ordinance, passed under 
grants of power like those we have cited, is so clearly unreasonable, so arbitrary, oppressive, or 
partial, as to raise the presumption that the legislature never intended to confer the power to pass 
it, and to justify the courts in interfering and setting it aside as a plain abuse of authority,” it 
proceeds to speak, with regard to the ordinance in question, in relation to the use of steam 
engines, as follows:  
“It does not profess to prescribe regulations for their construction, location, or 
use, nor require such precautions and safeguards to be provided by those who own 
and use them as are best calculated to render them less dangerous to life and 
property, nor does it restrain their use in box factories and other similar 
establishments within certain defined limits, nor in any other way attempt to 
promote their safety and security without destroying their usefulness. But it 
commits to the unrestrained will of a single public officer the power to notify 
every person who now employs a steam engine in the prosecution of any business 
in the city of Baltimore, to cease to do so.  And, when we remember that this 
action or non-action may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or 
animosity, from favoritism and other improper influences and motives easy of 
concealment and difficult to be detected and exposed, it becomes unnecessary to 
suggest or to comment upon the injustice capable of being brought under cover of 
such a power, for that becomes apparent to everyone who gives to the subject a 
moment’s consideration.  In fact, an ordinance which clothes a single individual 
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with such power hardly falls within the domain of law, and we are constrained to 
pronounce it inoperative and void.”   
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied 
and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to 
make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to 
their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. 
The present cases, as shown by the facts disclosed in the record, are within this class.  It 
appears that both petitioners have complied with every requisite, deemed by the law or by the 
public officers charged with its administration, necessary for the protection of neighboring 
property from fire, or as a precaution against injury to the public health.  No reason whatever, 
except the will of the supervisors, is assigned why they should not be permitted to carry on, in 
the accustomed manner, their harmless and useful occupation, on which they depend for a 
livelihood.  And while this consent of the supervisors is withheld from them and from two 
hundred others who have also petitioned, all of whom happen to be Chinese subjects, eighty 
others, not Chinese subjects, are permitted to carry on the same business under similar 
conditions.  The fact of this discrimination is admitted.  No reason for it is shown, and the 
conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and 
nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is not justified.  The 
discrimination is, therefore, illegal, and the public administration which enforces it is a denial of 
the equal protection of the laws and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution.  The imprisonment of the petitioners is, therefore, illegal, and they must be 
discharged.  To this end, the judgment of the Supreme Court of California in the case of Yick 
Wo is . . . reversed, and the cases remanded, each to the proper court, with directions to 
discharge the petitioners from custody and imprisonment. 
BUCHANAN v. WARLEY 
245 U.S. 60 (1917) 
JUDGES:  White, McKenna, Holmes, Day, Van Devanter, Pitney, McReynolds, 
Brandeis, Clarke 
Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court. 
Buchanan, plaintiff in error, brought an action in the Chancery Branch of Jefferson 
Circuit Court of Kentucky for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of certain real 
estate situated in the City of Louisville at the corner of 37th Street and Pflanz Avenue.  The offer 
in writing to purchase the property contained a proviso: 
“It is understood that I am purchasing the above property for the purpose of 
having erected thereon a house which I propose to make my residence, and it is a 
distinct part of this agreement that I shall not be required to accept a deed to the 
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above property or to pay for said property unless I have the right under the laws of 
the State of Kentucky and the City of Louisville to occupy said property as a 
residence.”   
This offer was accepted by the plaintiff.  
To the action for specific performance the defendant by way of answer set up the 
condition above set forth, that he is a colored person, and that on the block of which the lot in 
controversy is a part there are ten residences, eight of which at the time of the making of the 
contract were occupied by white people, and only two (those nearest the lot in question) were 
occupied by colored people, and that under and by virtue of the ordinance of the City of 
Louisville, approved May 11, 1914, he would not be allowed to occupy the lot as a place of 
residence. 
In reply to this answer the plaintiff set up, among other things, that the ordinance was in 
conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and hence no 
defense to the action for specific performance of the contract. 
In the court of original jurisdiction in Kentucky, and in the Court of Appeals of that State, 
the case was made to turn upon the constitutional validity of the ordinance.  The Court of 
Appeals of Kentucky, 165 Kentucky, 559, held the ordinance valid and of itself a complete 
defense to the action. 
The title of the ordinance is: “An ordinance to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between the 
white and colored races in the City of Louisville, and to preserve the public peace and promote 
the general welfare by making reasonable provisions requiring, as far as practicable, the use of 
separate blocks for residences, places of abode and places of assembly by white and colored 
people respectively.” 
By the first section of the ordinance it is made unlawful for any colored person to move 
into and occupy as a residence, place of abode, or to establish and maintain as a place of public 
assembly any house upon any block upon which a greater number of houses are occupied as 
residences, places of abode, or places of public assembly by white people than are occupied as 
residences, places of abode, or places of public assembly by colored people. 
Section 2 provides that it shall be unlawful for any white person to move into and occupy 
as a residence, place of abode, or to establish and maintain as a place of public assembly any 
house upon any block upon which a greater number of houses are occupied as residences, places 
of abode or places of public assembly by colored people than are occupied as residences, places 
of abode or places of public assembly by white people. 
The ordinance contains other sections and a violation of its provisions in made an 
offense. 
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The assignments of error in this court attack the ordinance upon the ground that it 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that it abridges 
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States to acquire and enjoy property, takes 
property without due process of law, and denies equal protection of the laws. 
The objection is made that this writ of error should be dismissed because the alleged 
denial of constitutional rights involves only the rights of colored persons, and the plaintiff in 
error is a white person.  This court has frequently held that while an unconstitutional act is no 
law, attacks upon the validity of laws can only be entertained when made by those whose rights 
are directly affected by the law or ordinance in question.  Only such persons, it has been settled, 
can be heard to attack the constitutionality of the law or ordinance.  But this case does not run 
counter to that principle. 
The property here involved was sold by the plaintiff in error, a white man, on the terms 
stated, to a colored man; the action for specific performance was entertained in the court below, 
and in both courts the plaintiff’s right to have the contract enforced was denied solely because of 
the effect of the ordinance making it illegal for a colored person to occupy the lot sold.  But for 
the ordinance the state courts would have enforced the contract, and the defendant would have 
been compelled to pay the purchase price and take a conveyance of the premises.  The right of 
the plaintiff in error to sell his property was directly involved and necessarily impaired because it 
was held in effect that he could not sell the lot to a person of color who was willing and ready to 
acquire the property, and had obligated himself to take it.  This case does not come within the 
class wherein this court has held that where one seeks to avoid the enforcement of a law or 
ordinance he must present a grievance of his own, and not rest the attack upon the alleged 
violation of another’s rights.  In this case the property rights of the plaintiff in error are directly 
and necessarily involved.  See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38. 
We pass then to a consideration of the case upon its merits.  This ordinance prevents the 
occupancy of a lot in the City of Louisville by a person of color in a block where the greater 
number of residences are occupied by white persons; where such a majority exists colored 
persons are excluded.  This interdiction is based wholly upon color; simply that and nothing 
more.  In effect, premises situated as are those in question in the so-called white block are 
effectively debarred from sale to persons of color, because if sold they cannot be occupied by the 
purchaser nor by him sold to another of the same color. 
This drastic measure is sought to be justified under the authority of the State in the 
exercise of the police power.  It is said such legislation tends to promote the public peace by 
preventing racial conflicts; that it tends to maintain racial purity; that it prevents the deterioration 
of property owned and occupied by white people, which deterioration, it is contended, is sure to 
follow the occupancy of adjacent premises by persons of color. 
The authority of the State to pass laws in the exercise of the police power, having for 
their object the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare is very broad as has been 
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affirmed in numerous and recent decisions of this court.  Furthermore, the exercise of this power, 
embracing nearly all legislation of a local character, is not to be interfered with by the courts 
where it is within the scope of legislative authority and the means adopted reasonably tend to 
accomplish a lawful purpose.  But it is equally well established that the police power, broad as it 
is, cannot justify the passage of a law or ordinance which runs counter to the limitations of the 
Federal Constitution; that principle has been so frequently affirmed in this court that we need not 
stop to cite the cases. 
The Federal Constitution and laws passed within its authority are by the express terms of 
that instrument made the supreme law of the land. The Fourteenth Amendment protects life, 
liberty, and property from invasion by the States without due process of law.  Property is more 
than the mere thing which a person owns.  It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, 
use, and dispose of it.  The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property.  Holden v. 
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391.  Property consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a 
person’s acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of the land.  1 Blackstone’s 
Commentaries (Cooley’s Ed.), 127. 
True it is that dominion over property springing from ownership is not absolute and 
unqualified.  The disposition and use of property may be controlled in the exercise of the police 
power in the interest of the public health, convenience, or welfare.  Harmful occupations may be 
controlled and regulated.  Legitimate business may also be regulated in the interest of the public. 
Certain uses of property may be confined to portions of the municipality other than the resident 
district, such as livery stables, brickyards and the like, because of the impairment of the health 
and comfort of the occupants of neighboring property.  Many illustrations might be given from 
the decisions of this court, and other courts, of this principle, but these cases do not touch the one 
at bar. 
The concrete question here is: May the occupancy, and, necessarily, the purchase and sale 
of property of which occupancy is an incident, be inhibited by the States, or by one of its 
municipalities, solely because of the color of the proposed occupant of the premises?  That one 
may dispose of his property, subject only to the control of lawful enactments curtailing that right 
in the public interest, must be conceded.  The question now presented makes it pertinent to 
enquire into the constitutional right of the white man to sell his property to a colored man, having 
in view the legal status of the purchaser and occupant. 
Following the Civil War certain amendments to the Federal Constitution were adopted, 
which have become an integral part of that instrument, equally binding upon all the States and 
fixing certain fundamental rights which all are bound to respect.  The Thirteenth Amendment 
abolished slavery in the United States and in all places subject to their jurisdiction, and gave 
Congress power to enforce the Amendment by appropriate legislation.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment made all persons born or naturalized in the United States citizens of the United 
States and of the States in which they reside, and provided that no State shall make or enforce 
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any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, and that 
no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor 
deny to any person the equal protection of the laws. 
The effect of these Amendments was first dealt with by this court in The Slaughter House 
Cases, 16 Wall. 36.  The reasons for the adoption of the Amendments were elaborately 
considered by a court familiar with the times in which the necessity for the Amendments arose 
and with the circumstances which impelled their adoption.  In that case Mr. Justice Miller, who 
spoke for the majority, pointed out that the colored race, having been freed from slavery by the 
Thirteenth Amendment, was raised to the dignity of citizenship and equality of civil rights by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the States were prohibited from abridging the privileges and 
immunities of such citizens, or depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law.  While a principal purpose of the latter Amendment was to protect persons of 
color, the broad language used was deemed sufficient to protect all persons, white or black, 
against discriminatory legislation by the States.  This is now the settled law.  In many of the 
cases since arising the question of color has not been involved and the cases have been decided 
upon alleged violations of civil or property rights irrespective of the race or color of the 
complainant.  In The Slaughter House Cases it was recognized that the chief inducement to the 
passage of the Amendment was the desire to extend federal protection to the recently 
emancipated race from unfriendly and discriminating legislation by the States. 
In giving legislative aid to these constitutional provisions Congress enacted in 1866, c. 
31, §1, 14 Stat. 27, [Rev. Stats., §1978] that: 
“All citizens of the United States shall have the same right in every State and 
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold, and convey real and personal property.” 
And in 1870, by c. 114, §16, 16 Stat. 144 [Rev. Stats., §1977] that: 
“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right 
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions of every 
kind, and no other.” 
In the face of these constitutional and statutory provisions, can a white man be denied, 
consistently with due process of law, the right to dispose of his property to a purchaser by 
prohibiting the occupation of it for the sole reason that the purchaser is a person of color 
intending to occupy the premises as a place of residence? 
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The defendant in error insists that Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, is controlling in 
principle in favor of the judgment of the court below. In that case this court held that a provision 
of a statute of Louisiana requiring railway companies carrying passengers to provide in their 
coaches equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races did not run counter 
to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It is to be observed that in that case there was 
no attempt to deprive persons of color of transportation in the coaches of the public carrier, and 
the express requirements were for equal though separate accommodations for the white and 
colored races.  In Plessy v. Ferguson, classification of accommodation was permitted upon the 
basis of equality for both races. 
As we have seen, this court has held laws valid which separated the races on the basis of 
equal accommodations in public conveyances, and courts of high authority have held enactments 
lawful which provide for separation in the public schools of white and colored pupils where 
equal privileges are given.  But in view of the rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution such legislation must have its limitations, and cannot be sustained where 
the exercise of authority exceeds the restraints of the Constitution.  We think these limitations are 
exceeded in laws and ordinances of the character now before us.  The right which the ordinance 
annulled was the civil right of a white man to dispose of his property if he saw fit to do so to a 
person of color and of a colored person to make such disposition to a white person. 
We think this attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in question to a person of 
color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State, and is in direct violation of 
the fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution preventing state 
interference with property rights except by due process of law.  That being the case the ordinance 
cannot stand. 
Reaching this conclusion it follows that the judgment of the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
must be reversed, and the cause remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
Reversed. 
SHELLEY v. KRAEMER 
334 U.S. 1 (1948) 
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion of the Court. 
These cases present for our consideration questions relating to the validity of court 
enforcement of private agreements, generally described as restrictive covenants, which have as 
their purpose the exclusion of persons of designated race or color from the ownership or 
occupancy of real property. Basic constitutional issues of obvious importance have been raised. 
The first of these cases comes to this Court on certiorari to the Supreme Court of 
Missouri. On February 16, 1911, thirty out of a total of thirty-nine owners of property fronting 
466 
both sides of Labadie Avenue between Taylor Avenue and Cora Avenue in the city of St. Louis, 
signed an agreement, which was subsequently recorded, providing in part: 
“. . . the said property is hereby restricted to the use and occupancy for the term of 
Fifty (50) years from this date, so that it shall be a condition all the time and 
whether recited and referred to as [sic] not in subsequent conveyances and shall 
attach to the land as a condition precedent to the sale of the same, that hereafter 
no part of said property or any portion thereof shall be, for said term of 
Fifty-years, occupied by any person not of the Caucasian race, it being intended 
hereby to restrict the use of said property for said period of time against the 
occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said property for resident or 
other purpose by people of the Negro or Mongolian Race.” 
The entire district described in the agreement included fifty-seven parcels of land.  The 
thirty owners who signed the agreement held title to forty-seven parcels, including the particular 
parcel involved in this case.  At the time the agreement was signed, five of the parcels in the 
district were owned by Negroes.  One of those had been occupied by Negro families since 1882, 
nearly thirty years before the restrictive agreement was executed.  The trial court found that 
owners of seven out of nine homes on the south side of Labadie Avenue, within the restricted 
district and “in the immediate vicinity” of the premises in question, had failed to sign the 
restrictive agreement in 1911.  At the time this action was brought, four of the premises were 
occupied by Negroes, and had been so occupied for periods ranging from twenty-three to 
sixty-three years.  A fifth parcel had been occupied by Negroes until a year before this suit was 
instituted. 
On August 11, 1945, pursuant to a contract of sale, petitioners Shelley, who are Negroes, 
for valuable consideration received from one Fitzgerald a warranty deed to the parcel in 
question.
1
 The trial court found that petitioners had no actual knowledge of the restrictive 
agreement at the time of the purchase. 
On October 9, 1945, respondents, as owners of other property subject to the terms of the 
restrictive covenant, brought suit in the Circuit Court of the city of St. Louis praying that 
petitioners Shelley be restrained from taking possession of the property and that judgment be 
entered divesting title out of petitioners Shelley and revesting title in the immediate grantor or in 
such other person as the court should direct.  The trial court denied the requested relief on the 
ground that the restrictive agreement, upon which respondents based their action, had never 
become final and complete because it was the intention of the parties to that agreement that it 
was not to become effective until signed by all property owners in the district, and signatures of 
all the owners had never been obtained. 
                                                 
1
 The trial court found that title to the property which petitioners Shelley sought to purchase was held by one Bishop, 
a real estate dealer, who placed the property in the name of Josephine Fitzgerald.  Bishop, who acted as agent for 
petitioners in the purchase, concealed the fact of his ownership. 
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The Supreme Court of Missouri sitting en banc reversed and directed the trial court to 
grant the relief for which respondents had prayed.  That court held the agreement effective and 
concluded that enforcement of its provisions violated no rights guaranteed to petitioners by the 
Federal Constitution. At the time the court rendered its decision, petitioners were occupying the 
property in question. 
Petitioners have placed primary reliance on their contentions, first raised in the state 
courts, that judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases has violated rights 
guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Acts of 
Congress passed pursuant to that Amendment.
2
 Specifically, petitioners urge that they have been 
denied the equal protection of the laws, deprived of property without due process of law, and 
have been denied privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.  We pass to a 
consideration of those issues. 
I 
Whether the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment inhibits judicial 
enforcement by state courts of restrictive covenants based on race or color is a question which 
this Court has not heretofore been called upon to consider. 
It is well, at the outset, to scrutinize the terms of the restrictive agreements involved in 
these cases.  In the Missouri case, the covenant declares that no part of the affected property shall 
be “occupied by any person not of the Caucasian race, it being intended hereby to restrict the use 
of said property . . . against the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said property 
for resident or other purpose by people of the Negro or Mongolian Race.”  Not only does the 
restriction seek to proscribe use and occupancy of the affected properties by members of the 
excluded class, but as construed by the Missouri courts, the agreement requires that title of any 
person who uses his property in violation of the restriction shall be divested. 
It should be observed that these covenants do not seek to proscribe any particular use of 
the affected properties.  Use of the properties for residential occupancy, as such, is not forbidden. 
The restrictions of these agreements, rather, are directed toward a designated class of persons and 
seek to determine who may and who may not own or make use of the properties for residential 
purposes.  The excluded class is defined wholly in terms of race or color; “simply that and 
nothing more.”3 
It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be protected from 
discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own 
and dispose of property.  Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the 
                                                 
2
 The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
3
 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 73 (1917). 
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framers of that Amendment as an essential pre-condition to the realization of other basic civil 
rights and liberties which the Amendment was intended to guarantee. Thus, §1978 of the Revised 
Statutes, derived from §1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which was enacted by Congress while 
the Fourteenth Amendment was also under consideration, provides: 
“All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and 
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold, and convey real and personal property.”  
This Court has given specific recognition to the same principle.  Buchanan v. Warley, 
245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
It is likewise clear that restrictions on the right of occupancy of the sort sought to be 
created by the private agreements in these cases could not be squared with the requirements of 
the Fourteenth Amendment if imposed by state statute or local ordinance. 
But the present cases do not involve action by state legislatures or city councils.  Here the 
particular patterns of discrimination and the areas in which the restrictions are to operate, are 
determined, in the first instance, by the terms of agreements among private individuals. 
Participation of the State consists in the enforcement of the restrictions so defined.  The crucial 
issue with which we are here confronted is whether this distinction removes these cases from the 
operation of the prohibitory provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the principle 
has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first 
section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the 
States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory 
or wrongful. 
We conclude, therefore, that the restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded 
as violative of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment.  So long as the 
purposes of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would 
appear clear that there has been no action by the State and the provisions of the Amendment have 
not been violated.  
But here there was more.  These are cases in which the purposes of the agreements were 
secured only by judicial enforcement by state courts of the restrictive terms of the agreements. 
The respondents urge that judicial enforcement of private agreements does not amount to state 
action; or, in any event, the participation of the State is so attenuated in character as not to 
amount to state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Finally, it is 
suggested, even if the States in these cases may be deemed to have acted in the constitutional 
sense, their action did not deprive petitioners of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
We move to a consideration of these matters. 
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III 
We are called upon to consider whether enforcement by state courts of the restrictive 
agreements in these cases may be deemed to be the acts of those States; and, if so, whether that 
action has denied these petitioners the equal protection of the laws which the Amendment was 
intended to insure. 
We have no doubt that there has been state action in these cases in the full and complete 
sense of the phrase.  The undisputed facts disclose that petitioners were willing purchasers of 
properties upon which they desired to establish homes.  The owners of the properties were 
willing sellers; and contracts of sale were accordingly consummated.  It is clear that but for the 
active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners 
would have been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint. 
We hold that in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, 
the States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws and that, therefore, the action 
of the state courts cannot stand. 
VILLAGE OF BELLE TERRE v. BORAAS 
416 U.S. 1 (1974) 
Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Belle Terre is a village on Long Island’s north shore of about 220 homes inhabited by 
700 people.  Its total land area is less than one square mile.  It has restricted and use to one-
family dwellings excluding lodging houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, or multiple-
dwelling houses.  The word “family” as used in the ordinance means, “one or more persons 
related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping 
unit, exclusive of household servants.  A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and 
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or 
marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family.” 
Appellees, the Dickmans are owners of a house in the village and leased it in December 
1971 for a term of 18 months to Michael Truman.  Later Bruce Boraas became a co-lessee.  Then 
Anne Parish moved into the house along with three others.  These six are students at nearby State 
University at Stony Brook and none is related to the other by blood, adoption, or marriage. When 
the village served the Dickmans with an “Order to Remedy Violations” of the ordinance, the 
owners plus three tenants thereupon brought this action under 42 U. S. C. §1983 for an 
injunction and a judgment declaring the ordinance unconstitutional.  The District Court held the 
ordinance constitutional, 367 F.Supp. 136, and the Court of Appeals reversed, one judge 
dissenting, 476 F.2d 806. The case is here by appeal, 28 U. S. C. §1254 (2); and we noted 
probable jurisdiction, 414 U.S. 907. 
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The present ordinance is challenged on several grounds: that it interferes with a person’s 
right to travel; that it interferes with the right to migrate to and settle within a State; that it bars 
people who are uncongenial to the present residents; that it expresses the social preferences of 
the residents for groups that will be congenial to them; that social homogeneity is not a 
legitimate interest of government; that the restriction of those whom the neighbors do not like 
trenches on the newcomers’ rights of privacy; that it is of no rightful concern to villagers whether 
the residents are married or unmarried; that the ordinance is antithetical to the Nation’s 
experience, ideology, and self-perception as an open, egalitarian, and integrated society. 
We find none of these reasons in the record before us.  It is not aimed at transients.  Cf. 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618. It involves no procedural disparity inflicted on some but not 
on others such as was presented by Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12. It involves no “fundamental” 
right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as voting, Harper v. Virginia Board, 383 U.S. 663; the 
right of association, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449; the right of access to the courts, 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415; or any rights of privacy, cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-454.  We deal with economic and social legislation 
where legislatures have historically drawn lines which we respect against the charge of violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause if the law be “‘reasonable, not arbitrary’” (quoting Royster Guano 
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415) and bears “a rational relationship to a [permissible] state 
objective.” Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76. 
It is said, however, that if two unmarried people can constitute a “family,” there is no 
reason why three or four may not.  But every line drawn by a legislature leaves some out that 
might well have been included.  That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a 
judicial, function. 
It is said that the Belle Terre ordinance reeks with an animosity to unmarried couples 
who live together.  There is no evidence to support it; and the provision of the ordinance bringing 
within the definition of a “family” two unmarried people belies the charge.  The ordinance places 
no ban on other forms of association, for a “family” may, so far as the ordinance is concerned, 
entertain whomever it likes.  The regimes of boarding houses, fraternity houses, and the like 
present urban problems.  More people occupy a given space; more cars rather continuously pass 
by; more cars are parked; noise travels with crowds. 
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are 
legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs.  This goal is a permissible 
one . . . .  The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. 
It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet 
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people. 
Reversed. 
Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting. 
This case draws into question the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance of the 
incorporated village of Belle Terre, New York, which prohibits groups of more than two 
unrelated persons, as distinguished from groups consisting of any number of persons related by 
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blood, adoption, or marriage, from occupying a residence within the confines of the township. 
Lessor-appellees, the two owners of a Belle Terre residence, and three unrelated student tenants 
challenged the ordinance on the ground that it establishes a classification between households of 
related and unrelated individuals, which deprives them of equal protection of the laws.  In my 
view, the disputed classification burdens the students’ fundamental rights of association and 
privacy guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  Because the application of strict 
equal protection scrutiny is therefore required, I am at odds with my Brethren’s conclusion that 
the ordinance may be sustained on a showing that it bears a rational relationship to the 
accomplishment of legitimate governmental objectives. 
My disagreement with the Court today is based upon my view that the ordinance in this 
case unnecessarily burdens appellees’ First Amendment freedom of association and their 
constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.  Our decisions establish that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments protect the freedom to choose one’s associates.  NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
430 (1963).  Constitutional protection is extended, not only to modes of association that are 
political in the usual sense, but also to those that pertain to the social and economic benefit of the 
members.  Id., at 430-431; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1 
(1964).  See United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); Mine 
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217 (1967).  The selection of one’s living 
companions involves similar choices as to the emotional, social, or economic benefits to be 
derived from alternative living arrangements. 
The freedom of association is often inextricably entwined with the constitutionally 
guaranteed right of privacy.   The right to “establish a home” is an essential part of the liberty 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).  And the 
Constitution secures to an individual a freedom “to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in 
the privacy of his own home.”  Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969); see Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1973).  Constitutionally protected privacy is, in Mr. 
Justice Brandeis’ words, “as against the Government, the right to be let alone . . . the right most 
valued by civilized man.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting 
opinion).  The choice of household companions–of whether a person’s “intellectual and 
emotional needs” are best met by living with family, friends, professional associates, or others–
involves deeply personal considerations as to the kind and quality of intimate relationships 
within the home.  That decision surely falls within the ambit of the right to privacy protected by 
the Constitution.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 
453 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, supra, at 564-565; Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, at 483, 486; 
Olmstead v. United States, supra, at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Moreno v. Department of 
Agriculture, 345 F.Supp. 310, 315 (DC 1972), aff’d, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
The instant ordinance discriminates on the basis of just such a personal lifestyle choice as 
to household companions.  It permits any number of persons related by blood or marriage, be it 
two or twenty, to live in a single household, but it limits to two the number of unrelated persons 
bound by profession, love, friendship, religious or political affiliation, or mere economics who 
can occupy a single home.  Belle Terre imposes upon those who deviate from the community 
norm in their choice of living companions significantly greater restrictions than are applied to 
residential groups who are related by blood or marriage, and compose the established order 
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within the community.  The village has, in effect, acted to fence out those individuals whose 
choice of lifestyle differs from that of its current residents. 
I respectfully dissent. 
MOORE v. CITY OF EAST CLEVELAND 
431 U.S. 494 (1977) 
Mr. Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered an opinion in 
which Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Blackmun joined. 
East Cleveland’s housing ordinance, like many throughout the country, limits occupancy 
of a dwelling unit to members of a single family.  But the ordinance contains an unusual and 
complicated definitional section that recognizes as a “family” only a few categories of related 
individuals.  Because her family, living together in her home, fits none of those categories, 
appellant stands convicted of a criminal offense.  The question in this case is whether the 
ordinance violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I 
Appellant, Mrs. Inez Moore, lives in her East Cleveland home together with her son, Dale 
Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons, Dale, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. The two boys are first cousins 
rather than brothers; we are told that John came to live with his grandmother and with the elder 
and younger Dale Moores after his mother’s death. 
In early 1973, Mrs. Moore received a notice of violation from the city, stating that John 
was an “illegal occupant” and directing her to comply with the ordinance.  When she failed to 
remove him from her home, the city filed a criminal charge.  Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss, 
claiming that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face.  Her motion was overruled, 
and upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine.  The Ohio Court of 
Appeals affirmed after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims, and the Ohio 
Supreme Court denied review.  We noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal, 425 U.S. 949 
(1976). 
II 
The city argues that our decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), 
requires us to sustain the ordinance attacked here.  Belle Terre, like East Cleveland, imposed 
limits on the types of groups that could occupy a single dwelling unit.  Applying the 
constitutional standard announced in this Court’s leading land-use case, Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926),  we sustained the Belle Terre ordinance on the ground that it bore a 
rational relationship to permissible state objectives. 
But one overriding factor sets this case apart from Belle Terre.  The ordinance there 
affected only unrelated individuals.  It expressly allowed all who were related by “blood, 
adoption, or marriage” to live together, and in sustaining the ordinance we were careful to note 
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that it promoted “family needs” and “family values.”  416 U.S., at 9. East Cleveland, in contrast, 
has chosen to regulate the occupancy of its housing by slicing deeply into the family itself.  This 
is no mere incidental result of the ordinance.  On its face it selects certain categories of relatives 
who may live together and declares that others may not.  In particular, it makes a crime of a 
grandmother’s choice to live with her grandson in circumstances like those presented here.  
When a city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family, neither Belle Terre nor 
Euclid governs; the usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate.  “This Court has 
long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of 
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Cleveland 
Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414  U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974).  A host of cases, tracing their 
lineage to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925), have consistently acknowledged a “private realm of family life 
which the state cannot enter.” 
Of course, the family is not beyond regulation.  But when the government intrudes on 
choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the 
importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by 
the challenged regulation. 
When thus examined, this ordinance cannot survive.  The city seeks to justify it as a 
means of preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an 
undue financial burden on East Cleveland’s school system.  Although these are legitimate goals, 
the ordinance before us serves them marginally, at best.  For example, the ordinance permits any 
family consisting only of husband, wife, and unmarried children to live together, even if the 
family contains a half dozen licensed drivers, each with his or her own car.  At the same time it 
forbids an adult brother and sister to share a household, even if both faithfully use public 
transportation.  The ordinance would permit a grandmother to live with a single dependent son 
and children, even if his school-age children number a dozen, yet it forces Mrs. Moore to find 
another dwelling for her grandson John, simply because of the presence of his uncle and cousin 
in the same household.  We need not labor the point.  Section 1341.08 has but a tenuous relation 
to alleviation of the conditions mentioned by the city. 
Mr. Justice Harlan described [this Court’s function under the Due Process Clause] 
eloquently: 
“Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be 
determined by reference to any code.  The best that can be said is that through the 
course of this Court’s decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, 
built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck 
between that liberty and the demands of organized society.  If the supplying of 
content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it 
certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided 
speculation might take them.  The balance of which I speak is the balance struck 
by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from 
which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.  That tradition is 
a living thing.  A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not 
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long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be 
sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and 
restraint. 
The full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or 
limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. 
This ‘liberty’ is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the 
freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on.  It is a rational continuum which, broadly 
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless 
restraints, . . . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that 
certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their 
abridgment.”  Poe v. Ullman, supra, at 542-543 (dissenting opinion). 
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this Court.  There are 
risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without 
the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.  As the history of the Lochner 
era demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention 
become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court.  That 
history counsels caution and restraint.  But it does not counsel abandonment, nor does it require 
what the city urges here:  cutting off any protection of family rights at the first convenient, if 
arbitrary boundary– the boundary of the nuclear family. 
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of 
the nuclear family.  The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a 
household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of 
constitutional recognition.  Over the years millions of our citizens have grown up in just such an 
environment, and most, surely, have profited from it.  Even if conditions of modern society have 
brought about a decline in extended family households, they have not erased the accumulated 
wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and honored throughout our history, that 
supports a larger conception of the family.  Out of choice, necessity, or a sense of family 
responsibility, it has been common for close relatives to draw together and participate in the 
duties and the satisfactions of a common home . . . .  Especially in times of adversity, such as the 
death of a spouse or economic need, the broader family has tended to come together for mutual 
sustenance and to maintain or rebuild a secure home life.  This is apparently what happened here. 
Whether or not such a household is established because of personal tragedy, the choice of 
relatives in this degree of kinship to live together may not lightly be denied by the State.  Pierce 
struck down on Oregon law requiring all children to attend the State’s public schools, holding 
that the Constitution “excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by 
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.” 268 U.S., at 535.  By the same 
token the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its children–and its adults–by 
forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns. 
Reversed. 
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CITY OF CLEBURNE  v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER 
473 U.S. 432 (1985) 
Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. 
A Texas city denied a special use permit for the operation of a group home for the 
mentally retarded, acting pursuant to a municipal zoning ordinance requiring permits for such 
homes.  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that mental retardation is a “quasi-
suspect” classification and that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it did 
not substantially further an important governmental purpose.  We hold that a lesser standard of 
scrutiny is appropriate, but conclude that under that standard the ordinance is invalid as applied 
in this case. 
I 
In July 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street in 
the city of Cleburne, Texas, with the intention of leasing it to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 
(CLC), for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded.  It was anticipated that the 
home would house 13 retarded men and women, who would be under the constant supervision of 
CLC staff members.  The house had four bedrooms and two baths, with a half bath to be added.  
CLC planned to comply with all applicable state and federal regulations.  
The city informed CLC that a special use permit would be required for the operation of a 
group home at the site, and CLC accordingly submitted a permit application.  In response to a 
subsequent inquiry from CLC, the city explained that under the zoning regulations applicable to 
the site, a special use permit, renewable annually, was required for the construction of 
“[hospitals] for the insane or feeble-minded, or alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts, or penal or 
correctional institutions.”  The city had determined that the proposed group home should be 
classified as a “hospital for the feeble-minded.”  After holding a public hearing on CLC’s 
application, the City Council voted 3 to 1 to deny a special use permit. 
CLC then filed suit in Federal District Court against the city and a number of its officials, 
alleging, inter alia, that the zoning ordinance was invalid on its face and as applied because it 
discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the equal protection rights of CLC and 
its potential residents. The District Court found that “[if] the potential residents of the 
Featherston Street home were not mentally retarded, but the home was the same in all other 
respects, its use would be permitted under the city’s zoning ordinance,” and that the City 
Council’s decision “was motivated primarily by the fact that the residents of the home would be 
persons who are mentally retarded.” App. 93, 94.  Even so, the District Court held the ordinance 
and its application constitutional.  Concluding that no fundamental right was implicated and that 
mental retardation was neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect classification, the court employed 
the minimum level of judicial scrutiny applicable to equal protection claims.  The court deemed 
the ordinance, as written and applied, to be rationally related to the city’s legitimate interests in 
“the legal responsibility of CLC and its residents,  . . . the safety and fears of residents in the 
adjoining neighborhood,” and the number of people to be housed in the home.  Id., at 103. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, determining that mental retardation 
was a quasi-suspect classification and that it should assess the validity of the ordinance under 
intermediate-level scrutiny.  726 F.2d 191 (1984).  Because mental retardation was in fact 
relevant to many legislative actions, strict scrutiny was not appropriate.  But in light of the 
history of “unfair and often grotesque mistreatment” of the retarded, discrimination against them 
was “likely to reflect deep-seated prejudice.”  Id., at 197. In addition, the mentally retarded 
lacked political power, and their condition was immutable.  The court considered heightened 
scrutiny to be particularly appropriate in this case, because the city’s ordinance withheld a 
benefit which, although not fundamental, was very important to the mentally retarded.  Without 
group homes, the court stated, the retarded could never hope to integrate themselves into the 
community.  Applying the test that it considered appropriate, the court held that the ordinance 
was invalid on its face because it did not substantially further any important governmental 
interests.  The Court of Appeals went on to hold that the ordinance was also invalid as applied. 
Rehearing en banc was denied with six judges dissenting in an opinion urging en banc 
consideration of the panel’s adoption of a heightened standard of review.  We granted certiorari, 
469 U.S. 1016 (1984). 
II 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” which is essentially 
a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202, 216 (1982).  Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to enforce this mandate, but 
absent controlling congressional direction, the courts have themselves devised standards for 
determining the validity of state legislation or other official action that is challenged as denying 
equal protection.  The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be 
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest.  Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); United States Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-175 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); New 
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).  When social or economic legislation is at issue, the 
Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude, United States Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Fritz, supra, at 174; New Orleans v. Dukes, supra, at 303, and the Constitution 
presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic 
processes. 
The general rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or 
national origin.  These factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state 
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy–
a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others.  For these 
reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, 
these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored 
to serve a compelling state interest.  McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Graham 
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). Similar oversight by the courts is due when state laws 
impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution.  Kramer v. Union Free School District 
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma 
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
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Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a heightened standard of review. 
That factor generally provides no sensible ground for differential treatment.  “[What] 
differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability . . . is that 
the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.” 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion).  Rather than resting on 
meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in 
different ways very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and 
women.  A gender classification fails unless it is substantially related to a sufficiently important 
governmental interest.  Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).  Because illegitimacy is beyond the individual’s control and bears 
“no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and contribute to society,” Mathews v. 
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976), official discriminations resting on that characteristic are also 
subject to somewhat heightened review.  Those restrictions “will survive equal protection 
scrutiny to the extent they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest.” Mills v. 
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982). 
We have declined, however, to extend heightened review to differential treatment based 
on age: 
“While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly free of 
discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discriminated 
against on the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a ‘history of 
purposeful unequal treatment’ or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis 
of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.”  
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976). 
The lesson of Murgia is that where individuals in the group affected by a law have 
distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement, the 
courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our respect for 
the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what 
extent those interests should be pursued.  In such cases, the Equal Protection Clause requires 
only a rational means to serve a legitimate end. 
III 
Against this background, we conclude for several reasons that the Court of Appeals erred 
in holding mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard 
of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social legislation. 
Doubtless, there have been and there will continue to be instances of discrimination 
against the retarded that are in fact invidious, and that are properly subject to judicial correction 
under constitutional norms. But the appropriate method of reaching such instances is not to 
create a new quasi-suspect classification and subject all governmental action based on that 
classification to more searching evaluation.  Rather, we should look to the likelihood that 
governmental action premised on a particular classification is valid as a general matter, not 
merely to the specifics of the case before us.  Because mental retardation is a characteristic that 
the government may legitimately take into account in a wide range of decisions, and because 
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both State and Federal Governments have recently committed themselves to assisting the 
retarded, we will not presume that any given legislative action, even one that disadvantages 
retarded individuals, is rooted in considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate. 
Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect class does not leave them entirely 
unprotected from invidious discrimination.  To withstand equal protection review, legislation 
that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental purpose.  This standard, we believe, affords government the latitude 
necessary both to pursue policies designed to assist the retarded in realizing their full potential, 
and to freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the retarded in what is essentially an 
incidental manner.  The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted 
goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.  See Zobel v. Williams, 
457 U.S. 55, 61-63 (1982); United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 
(1973). Furthermore, some objectives–such as “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group,” id., at 534–are not legitimate state interests.  See also Zobel, supra, at 63.  Beyond that, 
the mentally retarded, like others, have and retain their substantive constitutional rights in 
addition to the right to be treated equally by the law. 
IV 
We turn to the issue of the validity of the zoning ordinance insofar as it requires a special 
use permit for homes for the mentally retarded.  We inquire first whether requiring a special use 
permit for the Featherston home in the circumstances here deprives respondents of the equal 
protection of the laws.  If it does, there will be no occasion to decide whether the special use 
permit provision is facially invalid where the mentally retarded are involved, or to put it another 
way, whether the city may never insist on a special use permit for a home for the mentally 
retarded in an R-3 zone.  This is the preferred course of adjudication since it enables courts to 
avoid making unnecessarily broad constitutional judgments.  Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 
472 U.S. 491, 501-502 (1985); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
The constitutional issue is clearly posed.  The city does not require a special use permit in 
an R-3 zone for apartment houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fraternity or 
sorority houses, dormitories, apartment hotels, hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes for 
convalescents or the aged (other than for the insane or feebleminded or alcoholics or drug 
addicts), private clubs or fraternal orders, and other specified uses.  It does, however, insist on a 
special permit for the Featherston home, and it does so, as the District Court found, because it 
would be a facility for the mentally retarded.  May the city require the permit for this facility 
when other care and multiple-dwelling facilities are freely permitted? 
It is true, as already pointed out, that the mentally retarded as a group are indeed different 
from others not sharing their misfortune, and in this respect they may be different from those 
who would occupy other facilities that would be permitted in an R-3 zone without a special 
permit.  But this difference is largely irrelevant unless the Featherston home and those who 
would occupy it would threaten legitimate interests of the city in a way that other permitted uses 
such as boarding houses and hospitals would not.  Because in our view the record does not reveal 
any rational basis for believing that the Featherston home would pose any special threat to the 
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city’s legitimate interests, we affirm the judgment below insofar as it holds the ordinance invalid 
as applied in this case. 
The District Court found that the City Council’s insistence on the permit rested on several 
factors.  First, the Council was concerned with the negative attitude of the majority of property 
owners located within 200 feet of the Featherston facility, as well as with the fears of elderly 
residents of the neighborhood.  But mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors 
which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a 
home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the 
like.  It is plain that the electorate as a whole, whether by referendum or otherwise, could not 
order city action violative of the Equal Protection Clause, Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General 
Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 736-737 (1964), and the city may not avoid the strictures 
of that Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of the body politic. 
“Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, 
give them effect.”  Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 
Second, the Council had two objections to the location of the facility.  It was concerned 
that the facility was across the street from a junior high school, and it feared that the students 
might harass the occupants of the Featherston home.  But the school itself is attended by about 
30 mentally retarded students, and denying a permit based on such vague, undifferentiated fears 
is again permitting some portion of the community to validate what would otherwise be an equal 
protection violation.  The other objection to the home’s location was that it was located on “a 
five hundred year flood plain.”  This concern with the possibility of a flood, however, can hardly 
be based on a distinction between the Featherston home and, for example, nursing homes, homes 
for convalescents or the aged, or sanitariums or hospitals, any of which could be located on the 
Featherston site without obtaining a special use permit.  The same may be said of another 
concern of the Council–doubts about the legal responsibility for actions which the mentally 
retarded might take.  If there is no concern about legal responsibility with respect to other uses 
that would be permitted in the area, such as boarding and fraternity houses, it is difficult to 
believe that the groups of mildly or moderately mentally retarded individuals who would live at 
201 Featherston would present any different or special hazard. 
Fourth, the Council was concerned with the size of the home and the number of people 
that would occupy it.  The District Court found, and the Court of Appeals repeated, that “[if] the 
potential residents of the Featherston Street home were not mentally retarded, but the home was 
the same in all other respects, its use would be permitted under the city’s zoning ordinance.” 
App. 93; 726 F.2d, at 200.  Given this finding, there would be no restrictions on the number of 
people who could occupy this home as a boarding house, nursing home, family dwelling, 
fraternity house, or dormitory.  The question is whether it is rational to treat the mentally 
retarded differently.  It is true that they suffer disability not shared by others; but why this 
difference warrants a density regulation that others need not observe is not at all apparent.  At 
least this record does not clarify how, in this connection, the characteristics of the intended 
occupants of the Featherston  home rationally justify denying to those occupants what would be 
permitted to groups occupying the same site for different purposes.  Those who would live in the 
Featherston home are the type of individuals who, with supporting staff, satisfy federal and state 
standards for group housing in the community; and there is no dispute that the home would meet 
the federal square-footage-per-resident requirement for facilities of this type.  See 42 CFR 
480 
§442.447 (1984).  In the words of the Court of Appeals, “[the] City never justifies its apparent 
view that other people can live under such ‘crowded’ conditions when mentally retarded persons 
cannot.”  726 F.2d, at 202. 
In the courts below the city also urged that the ordinance is aimed at avoiding 
concentration of population and at lessening congestion of the streets.  These concerns obviously 
fail to explain why apartment houses, fraternity and sorority houses, hospitals and the like, may 
freely locate in the area without a permit.  So, too, the expressed worry about fire hazards, the 
serenity of the neighborhood, and the avoidance of danger to other residents fail rationally to 
justify singling out a home such as 201 Featherston for the special use permit, yet imposing no 
such restrictions on the many other uses freely permitted in the neighborhood. 
The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational 
prejudice against the mentally retarded, including those who would occupy the Featherston 
facility and who would live under the closely supervised and highly regulated conditions 
expressly provided for by state and federal law. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar as it invalidates the zoning 
ordinance as applied to the Featherston home.  The judgment is otherwise vacated, and the case 
is remanded. 
It is so ordered. 
DISCUSSION QUESTION: 
Legislative classifications based on race, alienage, or national origin, or those impinging 
upon fundamental rights are categorically presumed to be unconstitutional. The reasonableness 
of other legislative choices is considered on an ad hoc basis. From a legal process point of view 
what are the respective advantages and disadvantages of per se rules and ad hoc choices? 
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Session 20. Plebiscites & Quasi-Judicial Actions 
“Specialists in the practice of zoning law are unhappily familiar with the potential 
for abuse which exists when inadequate procedural safeguards apply to the 
dispensation of special grants.” Mr. Justice Stevens dissenting in City of Eastlake 
v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) 
JAMES v. VALTIERRA 
402 U.S. 137 (1971) 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. 
These cases raise but a single issue.  It grows out of the United States Housing Act of 
1937, 50 Stat. 888, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1401 et seq., which established a federal housing 
agency authorized to make loans and grants to state agencies for slum clearance and low-rent 
housing projects.  In response, the California Legislature created in each county and city a public 
housing authority to take advantage of the financing made available by the federal Housing Act.  
See Cal. Health & Safety Code §34240.   
At the time the federal legislation was passed the California Constitution had for many 
years reserved to the State's people the power to initiate legislation and to reject or approve by 
referendum any Act passed by the state legislature.  Cal. Const., Art. IV, §1.  The same section 
reserved to the electors of counties and cities the power of initiative and referendum over acts of 
local government bodies.  In 1950, however, the State Supreme Court held that local authorities' 
decisions on seeking federal aid for public housing projects were "executive" and 
"administrative," not "legislative," and therefore the state constitution's referendum provisions 
did not apply to these actions.  Within six months of that decision the California voters adopted 
Article XXXIV of the state constitution to bring public housing decisions under the State's 
referendum policy.  The Article provided that no low-rent housing project should be developed, 
constructed, or acquired in any manner by a state public body until the project was approved by a 
majority of those voting at a community election.  
The present suits were brought by citizens of San Jose, California, and San Mateo 
County, localities where housing authorities could not apply for federal funds because low-cost 
housing proposals had been defeated in referendums.  The   plaintiffs, who are eligible for low-
cost public housing, sought a declaration that Article XXXIV was unconstitutional because its 
referendum requirement violated: (1) the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution; 
(2) the Privileges and Immunities Clause; and (3) the Equal Protection Clause.  A three-judge 
court held that Article XXXIV denied the plaintiff’s equal protection of the laws and it enjoined 
its enforcement.  313 F.Supp. 1 (ND Cal. 1970)..... For the reasons that follow, we reverse.  The 
three-judge court found the Supremacy Clause argument unpersuasive, and we agree.  By the 
Housing Act of 1937 the Federal Government has offered aid to state   and local governments for 
the creation of low-rent public housing.  However, the federal legislation does not purport to 
require that local governments accept this or to outlaw local referendums on whether the aid 
should be accepted.  We also find the privileges and immunities argument without merit. 
482 
While the District Court cited several cases of this Court, its chief reliance plainly rested 
on Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). The first paragraph in the District Court's decision 
stated simply: "We hold Article XXXIV to be unconstitutional.  See Hunter v. Erickson . . . ." 
The court below erred in relying on Hunter to invalidate Article XXXIV.  Unlike the case before 
us, Hunter rested on the conclusion that Akron's referendum law denied equal protection by 
placing "special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process." Id., at 391. In 
Hunter the citizens of Akron had amended the city charter to require that any ordinance 
regulating real estate on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin could not take effect 
without approval by a majority of those voting in a city election.  The Court held that the 
amendment created a classification based upon race because it required that laws dealing with 
racial housing matters could take effect only if they survived a mandatory referendum while  
other housing ordinances took effect without any such special election....The Court concluded 
that Akron had advanced no sufficient reasons to justify this racial classification and hence that it 
was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Unlike the Akron referendum provision, it cannot be said that California's Article 
XXXIV rests on "distinctions based on race." Id., at 391. The Article requires referendum 
approval for any low-rent public housing project, not only for projects which will be occupied by 
a racial minority.  And the record here would not support any claim that a law seemingly neutral 
on its face is in fact aimed at a racial minority.  Cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
The present case could be affirmed only by extending Hunter, and this we decline to do. 
California's entire history demonstrates the repeated use of referendums to give citizens a 
voice on questions of public policy.  A referendum provision was included in the first state 
constitution, Cal. Const. of 1849, Art. VIII, and referendums have been a commonplace 
occurrence in the State's active political life. Provisions for referendums demonstrate devotion to 
democracy, not to bias, discrimination,  or prejudice....  
 The people of California have also decided by their own vote to require referendum 
approval of low-rent public housing projects.  This procedure ensures that all the people of a 
community will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures of local 
governmental funds for increased public services and to lower tax revenues. It gives them a voice 
in decisions that will affect the future development of their own community.  This procedure for 
democratic decision-making does not violate the constitutional command that no State shall deny 
to any person "the equal protection of the laws."  The judgment of the three-judge court is 
reversed and the cases  are remanded for dismissal of the complaint. 
Reversed and remanded. 
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. 
DISSENT: MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting. 
By its very terms, the mandatory prior referendum provision of Art. XXXIV applies 
solely to 
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"any development composed of urban or rural dwellings, apartments or other 
living accommodations for   persons of low income, financed in whole or in part 
by the Federal Government or a state public body or to which the Federal 
Government or a state public body extends assistance by supplying all or part of 
the labor, by guaranteeing the payment of liens, or otherwise."   
Persons of low income are defined as: 
"persons or families who lack the amount of income which is necessary . . . to 
enable them, without financial assistance, to live in decent, safe and sanitary 
dwellings, without overcrowding." 
The article explicitly singles out low-income persons to bear its burden. Publicly assisted 
housing developments designed to accommodate the aged,  veterans, state employees, persons of 
moderate income, or any class of citizens other than the poor, need not be approved by prior 
referenda. In my view, Art. XXXIV on its face constitutes invidious discrimination which the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment plainly prohibits.  "The States, of course, 
are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause from discriminating between 'rich' and 'poor' as 
such in the formulation and application of their laws." Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 
(1963) (HARLAN, J., dissenting).  Article XXXIV is neither "a law of general applicability   that 
may affect the poor more harshly than it does the rich," ibid., nor an "effort to redress economic 
imbalances," ibid.  It is rather an explicit   classification on the basis of poverty -- a suspect 
classification which demands exacting judicial scrutiny, see McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 
U.S. 802, 807 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. 
California, supra. The Court, however, chooses to subject the article to no scrutiny whatsoever 
and treats the provision as if it contained a totally benign, technical economic classification.  
Both the appellees and the Solicitor General of the United States as amicus curiae have 
strenuously argued, and the court below found, that Art. XXXIV, by imposing a substantial 
burden solely on the poor, violates the Fourteenth Amendment.  Yet after observing that the  
article does not discriminate on the basis of race, the Court's only response to the real question in 
these cases is the unresponsive assertion that "referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, 
not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice." It is far too late in the day to contend that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only racial discrimination; and to me, singling out the poor to 
bear a burden not placed on any other class of citizens tramples the values that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was designed to protect. 
I respectfully dissent.  
FASANO v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1972) 
The plaintiffs, homeowners in Washington County, unsuccessfully opposed a zone 
change before the Board of County Commissioners of Washington County.  Plaintiffs applied for 
and received a writ of review of the action of the commissioners allowing the change.  The trial 
court found in favor of plaintiffs, disallowed the zone change, and reversed the commissioners’ 
order. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 7 Or. App. 176, 489 P.2d 693 (1971), and this court 
granted review. 
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The defendants are the Board of County Commissioners and A.G.S. Development 
Company. A.G.S., the owner of 32 acres which had been zoned R-7 (Single Family Residential), 
applied for a zone change to P-R (Planned Residential), which allows for the construction of a 
mobile home park.  The change failed to receive a majority vote of the Planning Commission. 
The Board of County Commissioners approved the change and found, among other matters, that 
the change allows for “increased densities and different types of housing to meet the needs of 
urbanization over that allowed by the existing zoning.” 
The trial court, relying on its interpretation of Roseta v. County of Washington, 254 Or. 
161, 458 P.2d 405, 40 ALR3d 364 (1969), reversed the order of the commissioners because the 
commissioners had not shown any change in the character of the neighborhood which would 
justify the rezoning.  The Court of Appeals affirmed for the same reason, but added the 
additional ground that the defendants failed to show that the change was consistent with the 
comprehensive plan for Washington County. 
According to the briefs, the comprehensive plan of development for Washington County 
was adopted in 1959 and included classifications in the county for residential, neighborhood 
commercial, retail commercial, general commercial, industrial park and light industry, general 
and heavy industry, and agricultural areas. 
The land in question, which was designated “residential” by the comprehensive plan, was 
zoned R-7, Single Family Residential. 
Subsequent to the time the comprehensive plan was adopted, Washington County 
established a Planned Residential (P-R) zoning classification in 1963.  The P-R classification 
was adopted by ordinance and provided that a planned residential unit development could be 
established and should include open space for utilities, access, and recreation; should not be less 
than 10 acres in size; and should be located in or adjacent to a residential zone.  The P-R zone 
adopted by the 1963 ordinance is of the type known as a “floating zone,” so-called because the 
ordinance creates a zone classification authorized for future use but not placed on the zoning 
map until its use at a particular location is approved by the governing body.  The R-7 
classification for the 32 acres continued until April 1970 when the classification was changed to 
P-R to permit the defendant A.G.S. to construct the mobile home park on the 32 acres involved. 
The defendants argue that (1) the action of the county commissioners approving the 
change is presumptively valid, requiring plaintiffs to show that the commissioners acted 
arbitrarily in approving the zone change; (2) it was not necessary to show a change of conditions 
in the area before a zone change could be accomplished; and (3) the change from R-7 to P-R was 
in accordance with the Washington County comprehensive plan. 
We granted review in this case to consider the questions--by what standards does a 
county commission exercise its authority in zoning matters; who has the burden of meeting those 
standards when a request for change of zone is made; and what is the scope of court review of 
such actions? 
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Any meaningful decision as to the proper scope of judicial review of a zoning decision 
must start with a characterization of the nature of that decision.  The majority of jurisdictions 
state that a zoning ordinance is a legislative act and is thereby entitled to presumptive validity. 
At this juncture we feel we would be ignoring reality to rigidly view all zoning decisions 
by local governing bodies as legislative acts to be accorded a full presumption of validity and 
shielded from less than constitutional scrutiny by the theory of separation of powers.  Local and 
small decision groups are simply not the equivalent in all respects of state and national 
legislatures.  There is a growing judicial recognition of this fact of life: 
“It is not a part of the legislative function to grant permits, make special 
exceptions, or decide particular cases.  Such activities are not legislative but 
administrative, quasi-judicial, or judicial in character.  To place them in the hands 
of legislative bodies, whose acts as such are not judicially reviewable, is to open 
the door completely to arbitrary government.” Ward v. Village of Skokie, 26 
Ill.2d 415, 186 NE 2d 529, 533 (1962) (Klingbiel, J., specially concurring). 
The Supreme Court of Washington, in reviewing a rezoning decision, recently stated: 
“Whatever descriptive characterization may be otherwise attached to the role or 
function of the planning commission in zoning procedures, e.g., advisory, 
recommendatory, investigatory, administrative or legislative, it is manifest . . . 
that it is a public agency, . . . a principle [sic] and statutory duty of which is to 
conduct public hearings in specified planning and zoning matters, enter findings 
of fact- often on the basis of disputed facts- and make recommendations with 
reasons assigned thereto.  Certainly, in its role as a hearing and fact-finding 
tribunal, the planning commission’s function more nearly than not partakes of the 
nature of an administrative, quasi-judicial proceeding, . . . .”  Chrobuck v. 
Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 884, 480 P.2d 489, 495-96 (1971). 
Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific piece of property 
are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are subject to limited review, and may only be 
attacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse of authority.  On the other hand, a 
determination whether the permissible use of a specific piece of property should be changed is 
usually an exercise of judicial authority and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test. 
An illustration of an exercise of legislative authority is the passage of the ordinance by the 
Washington County Commission in 1963 which provided for the formation of a planned 
residential classification to be located in or adjacent to any residential zone.  An exercise of 
judicial authority is the county commissioners’ determination in this particular matter to change 
the classification of A.G.S. Development Company’s specific piece of property. 
We reject the proposition that judicial review of the county commissioners’ 
determination to change the zoning of the particular property in question is limited to a 
determination whether the change was arbitrary and capricious. In order to establish a standard 
of review, it is necessary to delineate certain basic principles relating to land use regulation. 
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The basic instrument for county or municipal land use planning is the “comprehensive 
plan.” Haar, “In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan,” 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1154 (1955); 1 
Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice, §3-2 (1965); 1 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, 
§9-1 (3d ed. 1969).  The plan has been described as a general plan to control and direct the use 
and development of property in a municipality.  Nowicki v. Planning and Zoning Board, 148 
Conn. 492, 172 A.2d 386, 389 (1961). 
In Oregon the county planning commission is required by ORS 215.050 to adopt a 
comprehensive plan for the use of some or all of the land in the county.  Under ORS 215.110(1), 
after the comprehensive plan has been adopted, the planning commission recommends to the 
governing body of the county the ordinances necessary to “carry out” the comprehensive plan. 
The purpose of the zoning ordinances, both under our statute and the general law of land use 
regulation, is to “carry out” or implement the comprehensive plan.  1 Anderson, American Law 
of Zoning, §1.12 (1968).  Although we are aware of the analytical distinction between zoning 
and planning, it is clear that under our statutes the plan adopted by the planning commission and 
the zoning ordinances enacted by the county governing body are closely related; both are 
intended to be parts of a single integrated procedure for land use control.  The plan embodies 
policy determinations and guiding principles; the zoning ordinances provide the detailed means 
of giving effect to those principles. 
We believe that the state legislature has conditioned the county’s power to zone upon the 
prerequisite that the zoning attempt to further the general welfare of the community through 
consciousness, in a prospective sense, of the factors mentioned above.  In other words, except as 
noted later in this opinion, it must be proved that the change is in conformance with the 
comprehensive plan. 
In proving that the change is in conformance with the comprehensive plan in this case, 
the proof, at a minimum, should show (1) there is a public need for a change of the kind in 
question, and (2) that need will be best served by changing the classification of the particular 
piece of property in question as compared with other available property. 
In the instant case the trial court and the Court of Appeals interpreted prior decisions of 
this court as requiring the county commissions to show a change of conditions within the 
immediate neighborhood in which the change was sought since the enactment of the 
comprehensive plan, or a mistake in the comprehensive plan as a condition precedent to the zone 
change. 
In Roseta v. Washington County, supra, the land in question was classified as residential 
under the comprehensive plan and had been originally zoned as R-10, Single Family Residential. 
The county commissioners granted a zone change to A-1, Duplex Residential.  We held that the 
commissioners had not sustained the burden of proving that the change was consistent with the 
comprehensive plan and reversed the order allowing the zone change.  In regard to defendants’ 
argument that the change was consistent with the comprehensive plan because the plan 
designated the areas as “residential” and the term included both single family dwellings and 
duplex residences, we stated: 
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“. . . [H]owever, the ordinance established a distinction between the two types of 
use by classifying one area as R-10 and another area as A-1.  It must be assumed 
that the Board had some purpose in making a distinction between these two 
classifications.  It was for defendant to prove that this distinction was not valid or 
that the change in the character of the use of the . . . parcel was not inconsistent 
with the comprehensive plan.”  254 Or. at 169. 
The instant case could be distinguished from Roseta on the basis that we are involved 
with a floating zone which was not before the court in Roseta. 
However, Roseta should not be interpreted as establishing a rule that a physical change of 
circumstances within the rezoned neighborhood is the only justification for rezoning.  The 
county governing body is directed by ORS 215.055 to consider a number of other factors when 
enacting zoning ordinances, and the list there does not purport to be exclusive.  The important 
issues, as Roseta recognized, are compliance with the statutory directive and consideration of the 
proposed change in light of the comprehensive plan. 
Because the action of the commission in this instance is an exercise of judicial authority, 
the burden of proof should be placed, as is usual in judicial proceedings, upon the one seeking 
change.  The more drastic the change, the greater will be the burden of showing that it is in 
conformance with the comprehensive plan as implemented by the ordinance, that there is a 
public need for the kind of change in question, and that the need is best met by the proposal 
under consideration.  As the degree of change increases, the burden of showing that the potential 
impact upon the area in question was carefully considered and weighed will also increase.  If 
other areas have previously been designated for the particular type of development, it must be 
shown why it is necessary to introduce it into an area not previously contemplated and why the 
property owners there should bear the burden of the departure. 
Although we have said in Roseta that zoning changes may be justified without a showing 
of a mistake in the original plan or ordinance, or of changes in the physical characteristics of an 
affected area, any of these factors which are present in a particular case would, of course, be 
relevant.  Their importance would depend upon the nature of the precise change under 
consideration. 
By treating the exercise of authority by the commission in this case as the exercise of 
judicial rather than of legislative authority and thus enlarging the scope of review on appeal, and 
by placing the burden of the above level of proof upon the one seeking change, we may lay the 
court open to criticism by legal scholars who think it desirable that planning authorities be vested 
with the ability to adjust more freely to changed conditions.  However, having weighed the 
dangers of making desirable change more difficult against the dangers of the almost irresistible 
pressures that can be asserted by private economic interests on local government, we believe that 
the latter dangers are more to be feared. 
What we have said above is necessarily general, as the approach we adopt contains no 
absolute standards or mechanical tests.  We believe, however, that it is adequate to provide 
meaningful guidance for local governments making zoning decisions and for trial courts called 
upon to review them. 
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When we apply the standards we have adopted to the present case, we find that the 
burden was not sustained before the commission.  The record now before us is insufficient to 
ascertain whether there was a justifiable basis for the decision.  The only evidence in the record, 
that of the staff report of the Washington County Planning Department, is too conclusory and 
superficial to support the zoning change.  Such . . . conclusions, without any statement of the 
facts on which they are based, are insufficient to justify a change of use.  Moreover, no portions 
of the comprehensive plan of Washington County are before us, and we feel it would be 
improper for us to take judicial notice of the plan without at least some reference to its specifics 
by counsel. 
As there has not been an adequate showing that the change was in accord with the plan, 
or that the factors listed in ORS 215.055 were given proper consideration, the judgment is 
affirmed. 
CITY OF EASTLAKE v. FOREST CITY ENTERPRISES, INC.  
426 U.S. 668 (1976) 
Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether a city charter provision requiring proposed land use 
changes to be ratified by 55% of the votes cast violates the due process rights of a landowner 
who applies for a zoning change. 
The city of Eastlake, Ohio, a suburb of Cleveland, has a comprehensive zoning plan 
codified in a municipal ordinance.  Respondent, a real estate developer, acquired an eight-acre 
parcel of real estate in Eastlake zoned for “light industrial” uses at the time of purchase. 
In May 1971, respondent applied to the City Planning Commission for a zoning change 
to permit construction of a multifamily, high-rise apartment building.  The Planning Commission 
recommended the proposed change to the City Council, which under Eastlake’s procedures could 
either accept or reject the Planning Commission’s recommendation.  Meanwhile, by popular 
vote, the voters of Eastlake amended the city charter to require that any changes in land use 
agreed to by the Council be approved by a 55% vote in a referendum.  The City Council 
approved the Planning Commission’s recommendation for reclassification of respondent’s 
property to permit the proposed project.  Respondent then applied to the Planning Commission 
for “parking and yard” approval for the proposed building.  The Commission rejected the 
application, on the ground that the City Council’s rezoning action had not yet been submitted to 
the voters for ratification. 
Respondent then filed an action in state court, seeking a judgment declaring the charter 
provision invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the people.  While the 
case was pending, the City Council’s action was submitted to a referendum, but the proposed 
zoning change was not approved by the requisite 55% margin.  Following the election, the Court 
of Common Pleas and the Ohio Court of Appeals sustained the charter provision. 
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The Ohio Supreme Court reversed.  41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E. 2d 740 (1975). 
Concluding that enactment of zoning and rezoning provisions is a legislative function, the court 
held that a popular referendum requirement, lacking standards to guide the decision of the voters, 
permitted the police power to be exercised in a standardless, hence arbitrary and capricious 
manner. Relying on this Court’s decisions in Washington ex rel. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 
278 U.S. 116 (1928), Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917), and Eubank v. 
Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912), but distinguishing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), the 
court concluded that the referendum provision constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative 
power.  We reverse. 
I 
The conclusion that Eastlake’s procedure violates federal constitutional guarantees rests 
upon the proposition that a zoning referendum involves a delegation of legislative power.  A 
referendum cannot, however, be characterized as a delegation of power.  Under our 
constitutional assumptions, all power derives from the people, who can delegate it to 
representative instruments which they create.  See, e.g., The Federalist, No. 39 (J. Madison).  In 
establishing legislative bodies, the people can reserve to themselves power to deal directly with 
matters which might otherwise be assigned to the legislature.  Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 
392 (1969). 
The reservation of such power is the basis for the town meeting, a tradition which 
continues to this day in some States as both a practical and symbolic part of our democratic 
processes.  The referendum, similarly, is a means for direct political participation, allowing the 
people the final decision, amounting to a veto power, over enactments of representative bodies. 
The practice is designed to “give citizens a voice on questions of public policy.”  James v. 
Valtierra, supra, at 141. 
In framing a state constitution, the people of Ohio specifically reserved the power of 
referendum to the people of each municipality within the State. 
“The initiative and referendum powers are hereby reserved to the people of each 
municipality on all questions which such municipalities may now or hereafter be authorized by 
law to control by legislative action . . . .” Ohio Const., Art. II, §f.I.  To be subject to Ohio’s 
referendum procedure, the question must be one within the scope of legislative power.  The Ohio 
Supreme Court expressly found that the City Council’s action in rezoning respondent’s eight 
acres from light industrial to high-density residential use was legislative in nature. Distinguishing 
between administrative and legislative acts, the court separated the power to zone or rezone, by 
passage or amendment of a zoning ordinance, from the power to grant relief from unnecessary 
hardship. The former function was found to be legislative in nature. 
II 
The Ohio Supreme Court further concluded that the amendment to the city charter 
constituted a “delegation” of power violative of federal constitutional guarantees because the 
voters were given no standards to guide their decision.  Under Eastlake’s procedure, the Ohio 
Supreme Court reasoned, no mechanism existed, nor indeed could exist, to assure that the voters 
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would act rationally in passing upon a proposed zoning change.  This meant that “appropriate 
legislative action [would] be made dependent upon the potentially arbitrary and unreasonable 
whims of the voting public.”  41 Ohio St. 2d, at 195, 324 N.E. 2d, at 746.  The potential for 
arbitrariness in the process, the court concluded, violated due process. 
In basing its claim on federal due process requirements, respondent . . . invokes Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), but it does not rely on the direct teaching of that case. 
Under Euclid, a property owner can challenge a zoning restriction if the measure is “clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare.”  Id., at 395. If the substantive result of the referendum is arbitrary and 
capricious, bearing no relation to the police power, then the fact that the voters of Eastlake wish 
it so would not save the restriction.  As this Court held in invalidating a charter amendment 
enacted by referendum: “The sovereignty of the people is itself subject to those constitutional 
limitations which have been duly adopted and remain unrepealed.”  Hunter v. Erickson, 393 
U.S., at 392. 
But no challenge of the sort contemplated in Euclid v. Ambler Realty is before us.  The 
Ohio Supreme Court did not hold, and respondent does not argue, that the present zoning 
classification under Eastlake’s comprehensive ordinance violates the principles established in 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty.  If respondent considers the referendum result itself to be unreasonable, 
the zoning restriction is open to challenge in state court, where the scope of the state remedy 
available to respondent would be determined as a matter of state law, as well as under Fourteenth 
Amendment standards.  That being so, nothing more is required by the Constitution. 
The judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Mr. Justice Powell, dissenting. 
There can be no doubt as to the propriety and legality of submitting generally applicable 
legislative questions, including zoning provisions, to a popular referendum.  But here the only 
issue concerned the status of a single small parcel owned by a single “person.” This procedure, 
affording no realistic opportunity for the affected person to be heard, even by the electorate, is 
fundamentally unfair.  The “spot” referendum technique appears to open disquieting 
opportunities for local government bodies to bypass normal protective procedures for resolving 
issues affecting individual rights. 
Mr. Justice Stevens, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, dissenting. 
The city’s reliance on the town meeting process of decision-making tends to obfuscate 
the two critical issues in this case.  These issues are (1) whether the procedure which a city 
employs in deciding to grant or to deny a property owner’s request for a change in the zoning of 
his property must comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) if 
so, whether the procedure employed by the city of Eastlake is fundamentally fair?  
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I 
We might rule in favor of the city on the theory that the referendum requirement did not 
deprive respondent of any interest in property and therefore the Due Process Clause is wholly 
inapplicable.   After all, when respondent bought this parcel, it was zoned for light industrial use 
and it still retains that classification.  The Court does not adopt any such rationale; nor, indeed, 
does the city even advance that argument.  On the contrary, throughout this litigation everyone 
has assumed, without discussing the problem, that the Due Process Clause does apply.  Both 
reason and authority support that assumption. 
Subject to limitations imposed by the common law of nuisance and zoning restrictions, 
the owner of real property has the right to develop his land to his own economic advantage.  As 
land continues to become more scarce, and as land use planning constantly becomes more 
sophisticated, the needs and the opportunities for unforeseen uses of specific parcels of real 
estate continually increase.  For that reason, no matter how comprehensive a zoning plan may be, 
it regularly contains some mechanism for granting variances, amendments, or exemptions for 
specific uses of specific pieces of property.  No responsibly prepared plan could wholly deny the 
need for presently unforeseeable future change. 
A zoning code is unlike other legislation affecting the use of property.  The deprivation 
caused by a zoning code is customarily qualified by recognizing the property owner’s right to 
apply for an amendment or variance to accommodate his individual needs.  The expectancy that 
particular changes consistent with the basic zoning plan will be allowed frequently and on their 
merits is a normal incident of property ownership.  When the governing body offers the owner 
the opportunity to seek such a change–whether that opportunity is denominated a privilege or a 
right–it is affording protection to the owner’s interest in making legitimate use of his property. 
The fact that an individual owner (like any other petitioner or plaintiff) may not have a 
legal right to the relief he seeks does not mean that he has no right to fair procedure in the 
consideration of the merits of his application.  The fact that codes regularly provide a procedure 
for granting individual exceptions or changes, the fact that such changes are granted in individual 
cases with great frequency, and the fact that the particular code in the record before us 
contemplates that changes consistent with the basic plan will be allowed, all support my opinion 
that the opportunity to apply for an amendment is an aspect of property ownership protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although this Court has decided only a handful of zoning cases, literally thousands of 
zoning disputes have been resolved by state courts.  Those courts have repeatedly identified the 
obvious difference between the adoption of a comprehensive citywide plan by legislative action 
and the decision of particular issues involving specific uses of specific parcels.  In the former 
situation there is generally great deference to the judgment of the legislature; in the latter 
situation state courts have not hesitated to correct manifest injustice. 
The distinction was plainly drawn by the Supreme Court of Oregon: 
“Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific piece of 
property are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are subject to limited 
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review, and may only be attacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary 
abuse of authority.  On the other hand, a determination whether the permissible 
use of a specific piece of property should be changed is usually an exercise of 
judicial authority and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test.” 
Fasano v. Board of County Comm’rs, 264 Ore. 574, 580-581, 507 P. 2d 23, 26 
(1973). 
Specialists in the practice of zoning law are unhappily familiar with the potential for 
abuse which exists when inadequate procedural safeguards apply to the dispensation of special 
grants.  The power to deny arbitrarily may give rise to the power to exact intolerable conditions. 
The insistence on fair procedure in this area of the law falls squarely within the purpose of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
II 
When we examine a state procedure for the purpose of deciding whether it comports with 
the constitutional standard of due process, the fact that a State may give it a “legislative” label 
should not save an otherwise invalid procedure.  In this case the Ohio Supreme Court 
characterized the Council’s approval of respondent’s proposal as “legislative.”  I think many 
state courts would have characterized it as “administrative.”  The courts thus may well differ in 
their selection of the label to apply to this action, but I find substantial agreement among state 
tribunals on the proposition that requiring a citywide referendum for approval of a particular 
proposal like this is manifestly unreasonable.  Surely that is my view. 
The essence of fair procedure is that the interested parties be given a reasonable 
opportunity to have their dispute resolved on the merits by reference to articulable rules.  If a 
dispute involves only the conflicting rights of private litigants, it is elementary that the 
decisionmaker must be impartial and qualified to understand and to apply the controlling rules. 
I have no doubt about the validity of the initiative or the referendum as an appropriate 
method of deciding questions of community policy.  I think it is equally clear that the popular 
vote is not an acceptable method of adjudicating the rights of individual litigants.  The problem 
presented by this case is unique, because it may involve a three-sided controversy, in which there 
is at least potential conflict between the rights of the property owner and the rights of his 
neighbors, and also potential conflict with the public interest in preserving the city’s basic zoning 
plan.  If the latter aspect of the controversy were predominant, the referendum would be an 
acceptable procedure.  On the other hand, when the record indicates without contradiction that 
there is no threat to the general public interest in preserving the city’s plan–as it does in this case, 
since respondent’s proposal was approved by both the Planning Commission and the City 
Council and there has been no allegation that the use of this eight-acre parcel for apartments 
rather than light industry would adversely affect the community or raise any policy issue of 
citywide concern – I think the case should be treated as one in which it is essential that the 
private property owner be given  a fair opportunity to have his claim determined on its merits. 
As Justice Stern points out in his concurring opinion, it would be absurd to use a 
referendum to decide whether a gasoline station could be operated on a particular corner in the 
city of Cleveland.  The case before us is not that clear because we are told that there are only 
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20,000 people in the city of Eastlake.  Conceivably, an eight-acre development could be 
sufficiently dramatic to arouse the legitimate interest of the entire community; it is also 
conceivable that most of the voters would be indifferent and uninformed about the wisdom of 
building apartments rather than a warehouse or factory on these eight acres.  The record is silent 
on which of these alternatives is the more probable.  Since the ordinance places a manifestly 
unreasonable obstacle in the path of every property owner seeking any zoning change, since it 
provides no standards or procedures for exempting particular parcels or claims from the 
referendum requirement, and since the record contains no justification for the use of the 
procedure in this case, I am persuaded that we should respect the state judiciary’s appraisal of the 
fundamental fairness of this decision-making process in this case. 
I therefore conclude that the Ohio Supreme Court correctly held that Art. VIII, §3, of the 
Eastlake charter violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that its 
judgment should be affirmed. 
VILLAGE OF ARLINGTON HEIGHTS v. METROPOLITAN HOUSING 
DEVELOPMENT CORP.  
429 U.S. 252 (1976) 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In 1971 respondent Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (MHDC) applied to 
petitioner, the Village of Arlington Heights, Ill., for the rezoning of a 15-acre parcel from single-
family to multiple-family classification.  Using federal financial assistance, MHDC planned to 
build 190 clustered townhouse units for low- and moderate-income tenants.  The Village denied 
the rezoning request.  MHDC, joined by other plaintiffs who are also respondents here, brought 
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.  They alleged that the 
denial was racially discriminatory and that it violated, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 81, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq.  Following a bench trial, the 
District Court entered judgment for the Village, 373 F. Supp. 208 (1974), and respondents 
appealed.  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the "ultimate 
effect" of the denial was racially discriminatory, and that the refusal to rezone therefore violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  517 F. 2d 409 (1975).  We granted the Village's petition for 
certiorari, 423 U.S. 1030 (1975), and now reverse. 
I 
Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago, located about 26 miles northwest of the 
downtown Loop area.  Most of the land in Arlington Heights is zoned for detached single-family 
homes, and this is in fact the prevailing land use.  The Village experienced substantial growth 
during the 1960's, but, like other communities in northwest Cook County, its population of racial 
minority groups remained quite low.  According to the 1970 census, only 27 of the Village's 
64,000 residents were black. 
The Clerics of St. Viator, a religious order (Order), own an 80-acre parcel just east of the 
center of Arlington Heights.  Part of the site is occupied by the Viatorian high school, and part by 
the Order's three-story novitiate building, which houses dormitories and a Montessori school.  
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Much of the site, however, remains vacant.  Since 1959, when the Village first adopted a zoning 
ordinance, all the land surrounding the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3, a single-family 
specification with relatively small minimum lot-size requirements. On three sides of the 
Viatorian land there are single-family homes just across a street; to the east the Viatorian 
property directly adjoins the backyards  of other single-family homes. 
The Order decided in 1970 to devote some of its land to low- and moderate-income 
housing.  Investigation revealed that the most expeditious way to build such housing was to work 
through a nonprofit developer experienced in the use of federal housing subsidies under §236 of 
the National Housing Act, 48 Stat. 1246, as added and amended, 12 U.S.C.  §1715z-1.  
MHDC is such a developer.  It was organized in 1968 by several prominent Chicago 
citizens for the purpose of building low- and moderate-income housing throughout the Chicago 
area.  In 1970 MHDC was in the process of building one §236 development near Arlington 
Heights and already had provided some federally assisted housing on a smaller scale in other 
parts of the Chicago area. 
After some negotiation, MHDC and the Order entered into a 99-year lease and an 
accompanying agreement of sale covering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian 
property.  MHDC became the lessee immediately, but the sale agreement was contingent upon 
MHDC's securing zoning clearances from the Village and §236 housing assistance from the 
Federal Government.  If MHDC proved unsuccessful in securing either, both the lease and the 
contract of sale would lapse.  The agreement established a bargain purchase price of $300,000, 
low enough to comply with federal limitations governing land-acquisition costs for §236 
housing. 
MHDC engaged an architect and proceeded with the project, to be known as Lincoln 
Green.  The plans called for 20 two-story buildings with a total of 190 units, each unit having its 
own private entrance from the outside.  One hundred of the units would have a single bedroom, 
thought likely to attract elderly citizens.  The remainder would have two, three, or four 
bedrooms.  A large portion of the site would remain open, with shrubs and trees to screen the 
homes abutting the property to the east. 
The planned development did not conform to the Village's zoning ordinance and could 
not be built unless Arlington Heights rezoned the parcel to R-5, its multiple-family housing 
classification.  Accordingly, MHDC filed with the Village Plan Commission a petition for 
rezoning, accompanied by supporting materials describing the development and specifying that it 
would be subsidized under §236.  The materials made clear that one requirement under §236 is 
an affirmative marketing plan designed to assure that a subsidized development is racially 
integrated.  MHDC also submitted studies demonstrating the need for housing of this type and 
analyzing the probable impact of the development.  To prepare for the hearings before the Plan 
Commission and to assure compliance with the Village building code, fire regulations, and 
related requirements, MHDC consulted with the Village staff for preliminary review of the 
development.  The parties have stipulated that every change recommended during such 
consultations was incorporated into the plans. 
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During the spring of 1971, the Plan Commission considered the proposal at a series of 
three public meetings, which drew large crowds.  Although many of those attending were quite 
vocal and demonstrative in opposition to Lincoln Green, a number of individuals and 
representatives of community groups spoke in support of rezoning.  Some of the comments, both 
from opponents and supporters, addressed what was referred to as the "social issue" - the 
desirability or undesirability of introducing at this location in Arlington Heights low- and 
moderate-income housing, housing that would probably be racially integrated. 
Many of the opponents, however, focused on the zoning aspects of the petition, stressing 
two arguments.  First, the area always had been zoned single-family, and the neighboring 
citizens had built or purchased there in reliance on that classification.  Rezoning threatened to 
cause a measurable drop in property value for neighboring sites.  Second, the Village's apartment 
policy, adopted by the Village Board in 1962 and amended in 1970, called for R-5 zoning 
primarily to serve as a buffer between single-family development and land uses thought 
incompatible, such as commercial or manufacturing districts.  Lincoln Green did not meet this 
requirement, as it adjoined no commercial or manufacturing district. 
At the close of the third meeting, the Plan Commission adopted a motion to recommend 
to the Village's Board of Trustees that it deny the request.  The motion stated: "While the need 
for low and moderate income housing may exist in Arlington Heights or its environs, the Plan 
Commission would be derelict in recommending it at the proposed location."  Two members 
voted against the motion and submitted a minority report, stressing that in their view the change 
to accommodate Lincoln Green represented "good zoning."  The Village Board met on 
September 28, 1971, to consider MHDC's request and the recommendation of the Plan 
Commission.  After a public hearing, the Board denied the rezoning by a 6-1 vote. 
The following June MHDC and three Negro individuals filed this lawsuit against the 
Village, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.  A second nonprofit corporation and an 
individual of Mexican-American descent intervened as plaintiffs.  The trial resulted in a 
judgment for petitioners.  Assuming that MHDC had standing to bring the suit, the District Court 
held that the petitioners were not motivated by racial discrimination or intent to discriminate 
against low-income groups when they denied rezoning, but rather by a desire "to protect property 
values and the integrity of the Village's zoning plan." 373 F. Supp., at 211. The District Court 
concluded also that the denial would not have a racially discriminatory effect. 
A divided Court of Appeals reversed.  It first approved the District Court's finding that 
the defendants were motivated by a concern for the integrity of the zoning plan, rather than by 
racial discrimination.  Deciding whether their refusal to rezone would have discriminatory 
effects was more complex.  The court observed that the refusal would have a disproportionate 
impact on blacks.  Based upon family income, blacks constituted 40% of those Chicago area 
residents who were eligible to become tenants of Lincoln Green, although they composed a far 
lower percentage of total area population.  The court reasoned, however, that under our decision 
in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), such a disparity in racial impact alone does not call 
for strict scrutiny of a municipality's decision that prevents the construction of the low-cost 
housing. 
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There was another level to the court's analysis of allegedly discriminatory results.  
Invoking language from Kennedy Park Homes Assn. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d 108, 112 
(CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971), the Court of Appeals ruled that the denial of 
rezoning must be examined in light of its "historical context and ultimate effect." 517 F. 2d, at 
413. Northwest Cook County was enjoying rapid growth in employment opportunities and 
population, but it continued to exhibit a high degree of residential segregation.  The court held 
that Arlington Heights could not simply ignore this problem.  Indeed, it found that the Village 
had been "exploiting" the situation by allowing itself to become a nearly all-white community.  
Id., at 414.  The Village had no other current plans for building low- and moderate-income 
housing, and no other R-5 parcels in the Village were available to MHDC at an economically 
feasible price. 
Against this background, the Court of Appeals ruled that the denial of the Lincoln Green 
proposal had racially discriminatory effects and could be tolerated only if it served compelling 
interests.  Neither the buffer policy nor the desire to protect property values met this exacting 
standard. The court therefore concluded that the denial violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
II 
MHDC's right [is]  to be free of arbitrary or irrational zoning actions.  See Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); 
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). But the heart of this litigation has never 
been the claim that the Village's decision fails the generous Euclid test, recently reaffirmed in 
Belle Terre.  Instead it has been the claim that the Village's refusal to rezone discriminates 
against racial minorities in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  As a corporation, MHDC 
has no racial identity and cannot be the direct target of the petitioners' alleged discrimination.  In 
the ordinary case, a party is denied standing to assert the rights of third persons.  Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S., at 499.  But we need not decide whether the circumstances of this case would justify 
departure from that prudential limitation and permit MHDC to assert the constitutional rights of 
its prospective minority tenants.  See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); cf. Sullivan v. 
Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 72-73 (1917). 
For we have at least one individual plaintiff who has demonstrated standing to assert these rights 
as his own. 
Respondent Ransom, a Negro, works at the Honeywell factory in Arlington Heights and 
lives approximately 20 miles away in Evanston in a 5-room house with his mother and his son.  
The complaint alleged that he seeks and would qualify for the housing MHDC wants to build in 
Arlington Heights.  Ransom testified at trial that if Lincoln Green were built he would probably 
move there, since it is closer to his job. 
The injury Ransom asserts is that his quest for housing nearer his employment has been 
thwarted by official action that is racially discriminatory.  If a court grants the relief he seeks, 
there is at least a "substantial probability," Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 504, that the Lincoln Green 
project will materialize, affording Ransom the housing opportunity he desires in Arlington 
Heights.  His is not a generalized grievance.  Instead, as we suggested in Warth, supra, at 507, 
508 n. 18, it focuses on a particular project and is not dependent on speculation about the 
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possible actions of third parties not before the court. See id., at 505; Simon v. Eastern Ky. 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S., at 41-42. Unlike the individual plaintiffs in Warth, Ransom has 
adequately averred an "actionable causal relationship" between Arlington Heights' zoning 
practices and his asserted injury.  Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 507.  We therefore proceed to the 
merits. 
III 
Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), made it clear that 
official action  will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially 
disproportionate impact.  "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole 
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination." Id., at 242. Proof of racially discriminatory 
intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  Although some 
contrary indications may be drawn from some of our cases, the holding in Davis reaffirmed a 
principle well established in a variety of contexts.  E.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 
Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (schools); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1964) 
(election districting); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-404 (1945) (jury selection). 
Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on 
racially discriminatory purposes.  Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body 
operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even 
that a particular purpose was the "dominant" or "primary" one.  In fact, it is because legislators 
and administrators are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations 
that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness 
or irrationality.  But racial discrimination is not just another competing consideration.  When 
there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this 
judicial deference is no longer justified. 
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands 
a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.  
The impact of the official action - whether it "bears more heavily on one race than another," 
Washington v. Davis, supra, at 242 - may provide an important starting point.  Sometimes a clear 
pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action 
even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.  Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 
356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).  The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy.  
But such cases are rare.  Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone 
is not determinative,  and the Court must look to other evidence. 
The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source, particularly if it 
reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes.  See Lane v. Wilson, supra; 
Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (SD Ala.), aff'd 
per curiam, 336 U.S. 933  (1949); cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver Colo., supra, at 207.  
The specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision also may shed some light 
on the decisionmaker's purposes.  Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373-376 (1967); Grosjean 
v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). For example, if the property involved here 
always had been zoned R-5 but suddenly was changed to R-3 when the town learned of MHDC's 
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plans to erect integrated housing, we would have a far different case.  Departures from the 
normal procedural sequence also might afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a 
role.  Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if the factors usually considered 
important by the decision-maker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.  
The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where there 
are contemporary statements by members of the decision-making body, minutes of its meetings, 
or reports.  In some extraordinary instances the members might be called to the stand at trial to 
testify concerning the purpose of the official action, although even then such testimony 
frequently will be barred by privilege.  See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2371 (McNaughton rev. ed. 
1961).  The foregoing summary identifies, without purporting to be exhaustive, subjects of 
proper inquiry in determining whether racially discriminatory intent existed.  With these in mind, 
we now address the case before us. 
IV 
This case was tried in the District Court and reviewed in the Court of Appeals before our 
decision in Washington v. Davis, supra.  The respondents proceeded on the erroneous theory that 
the Village's refusal to rezone carried a racially discriminatory effect and was, without more, 
unconstitutional.  But both courts below understood that at least part of their function was to 
examine the purpose underlying the decision.  In making its findings on this issue, the District 
Court noted that some of the opponents of Lincoln Green who spoke at the various hearings 
might have been motivated by opposition to minority groups.  The court held, however, that the 
evidence "does not warrant the conclusion that this motivated the defendants."  373 F. Supp., at 
211. 
On appeal the Court of Appeals focused primarily on respondents' claim that the Village's 
buffer policy had not been consistently applied and was being invoked with a strictness here that 
could only demonstrate some other underlying motive.  The court concluded that the buffer 
policy, though not always applied with perfect consistency, had on several occasions formed the 
basis for the Board's decision to deny other rezoning proposals.  "The evidence does not 
necessitate a finding that Arlington Heights administered this policy in a discriminatory manner."  
517 F. 2d, at 412.  The Court of Appeals therefore approved the District Court's findings 
concerning the Village's purposes in denying rezoning to MHDC. 
We also have reviewed the evidence.  The impact of the Village's decision does arguably 
bear more heavily on racial minorities.  Minorities constitute 18% of the Chicago area 
population, and 40% of the income groups said to be eligible for Lincoln Green.  But there is 
little about the sequence of events leading up to the decision that would spark suspicion.  The 
area around the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3 since 1959, the year when Arlington 
Heights first adopted a zoning map.  Single-family homes surround the 80-acre site, and the 
Village is undeniably committed to single-family homes as its dominant residential land use.  
The rezoning request progressed according to the usual procedures.  The Plan Commission even 
scheduled two additional hearings, at least in part to accommodate MHDC and permit it to 
supplement its presentation with answers to questions generated at the first hearing. 
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The statements by the Plan Commission and Village Board members, as reflected in the 
official minutes, focused almost exclusively on the zoning aspects of the MHDC petition, and the 
zoning factors on which they relied are not novel criteria in the Village's rezoning decisions.  
There is no reason to doubt that there has been reliance by some neighboring property owners on 
the maintenance of single-family zoning in the vicinity.  The Village originally adopted its buffer 
policy long before MHDC entered the picture and has applied the policy too consistently for us 
to infer discriminatory purpose from its application in this case.  Finally, MHDC called one 
member of the Village Board to the stand at trial.  Nothing in her testimony supports an inference 
of invidious purpose. 
In sum, the evidence does not warrant overturning the concurrent findings of both courts 
below.  Respondents simply failed to carry their burden of proving that discriminatory purpose 
was a motivating factor in the Village's decision.  This conclusion ends the constitutional 
inquiry.  The Court of Appeals' further finding that the Village's decision carried a discriminatory 
"ultimate effect" is without independent constitutional significance. 
V 
Respondents' complaint also alleged that the refusal to rezone violated the Fair Housing 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq.  They continue to urge here that a zoning decision made by a public 
body may, and that petitioners' action did, violate §3604 or §3617.  The Court of Appeals, 
however, proceeding in a somewhat (unorthodox) fashion, did not decide the statutory question.  
We remand the case for further consideration of respondents' statutory claims. 
Reversed and remanded. 
CITY OF CUYAHOGA FALLS v. BUCKEYE COMMUNITY HOPE FOUNDATION 
538 U.S. 188 (2003) 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In 1995, the city of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio (hereinafter City), submitted to voters a facially 
neutral referendum petition that called for the repeal of a municipal housing ordinance 
authorizing construction of a low-income housing complex. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit found genuine issues of material fact with regard to whether the City 
violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Fair Housing Act by 
placing the petition on the ballot. We granted certiorari to determine whether the Sixth Circuit 
erred in ruling that respondents' suit against the City could proceed to trial. 
I 
A 
In June 1995, respondents Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, a nonprofit 
corporation dedicated to developing affordable housing through the use of low-income tax 
credits, and others (hereinafter Buckeye or respondents), purchased land zoned for apartments in 
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Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio. In February 1996, Buckeye submitted a site plan for Pleasant Meadows, a 
multifamily, low-income housing complex, to the city planning commission. Residents of 
Cuyahoga Falls immediately expressed opposition to the proposal. After respondents agreed to 
various conditions, including that it build an earthen wall surrounded by a fence on one side of 
the complex, the commission unanimously approved the site plan and submitted it to the city 
council for final authorization. 
As the final approval process unfolded, public opposition to the plan resurfaced and 
eventually coalesced into a referendum   petition drive. At city council meetings and independent 
gatherings, some of which the mayor attended to express his personal opposition to the site plan, 
citizens of Cuyahoga Falls voiced various concerns: that the development would cause crime and 
drug activity to escalate, that families with children would move in, and that the complex would 
attract a population similar to the one on Prange Drive, the City's only African-American 
neighborhood. Nevertheless, because the plan met all municipal zoning requirements, the city 
council approved the project on April 1, 1996, through City Ordinance No. 48-1996. 
On April 29, a group of citizens filed a formal petition with the City requesting that the 
ordinance be repealed or submitted to a popular vote. Pursuant to the City Charter, which 
provides that an ordinance challenged by a petition "shall [not] go into effect until approved by a 
majority" of voters, the filing stayed the implementation of the site plan. On April 30, 
respondents sought an injunction against the petition in state court, arguing that the Ohio 
Constitution does not authorize popular referendums on administrative matters. On May 31, the 
Court of Common Pleas denied the injunction. A month later, respondents nonetheless requested 
building permits from the City in order to begin construction. On June 26, the city engineer 
rejected the request after being advised by the city law director that the permits "could not be 
issued because the site plan ordinance 'does not take effect' due to the petitions."  263 F.3d at 
633. 
In November 1996, the voters of Cuyahoga Falls passed the referendum, thus repealing 
Ordinance No. 48-1996. In  a joint stipulation, however, the parties agreed that the results of the 
election would not be certified until the litigation over the referendum was resolved. See 
Stipulation and Jointly Agreed upon Preliminary Injunction Order in No. 5:96 CV 1458 (ND 
Ohio, Nov. 25, 1996). In July 1998, the Ohio Supreme Court, having initially concluded that the 
referendum was proper, reversed itself and declared the referendum unconstitutional.  Buckeye 
Community Hope Foundation v. Cuyahoga Falls, 82 Ohio St. 3d 539, 697 N.E.2d 181 (holding 
that the Ohio State Constitution authorizes referendums only in relation to legislative acts, not 
administrative acts, such as the site-plan ordinance). The City subsequently issued the building 
permits, and Buckeye commenced construction of Pleasant Meadows. 
B 
In July 1996, with the state-court litigation still pending, respondents filed suit in federal 
court against the City and several city officials, seeking an injunction ordering the City to issue 
the building permits, as well as declaratory and monetary relief. Buckeye alleged that "in 
allowing a site plan approval ordinance to be submitted to the electors of Cuyahoga Falls through 
a referendum and in rejecting [its] application for building permits," the City and its officials 
violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as 
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the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601. In June 1997, the District Court dismissed the case 
against the mayor in his individual capacity but denied the City's motion for summary judgment 
on the equal protection and due process claims, concluding that genuine issues of material fact 
existed as to both claims.  Buckeye Community Hope Found. v. City of Cuyahoga Falls, 970 F. 
Supp. 1289, 1308 (ND Ohio 1997). After the Ohio Supreme Court declared the referendum 
invalid in 1998, thus reducing respondents' action to a claim for damages for the delay in 
construction, the City and its officials again moved for summary judgment. On November 19, 
1999, the District Court granted the motion on all counts.  
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. As to respondents' equal protection 
claim, the court concluded that they had produced sufficient evidence to go to trial on the 
allegation that the City, by allowing the referendum petition to stay the implementation of the 
site plan, gave effect to the racial bias reflected in the public's opposition to the project. See 263 
F.3d at 639. The court then held that even if respondents failed to prove intentional 
discrimination, they stated a valid claim under the Fair Housing Act on the theory that the City's 
actions had a disparate impact based on race and family status. Finally, the court concluded that a 
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the City, by denying respondents the benefit 
of the lawfully approved site plan, engaged in arbitrary and irrational government conduct in 
violation of substantive due process.  We granted certiorari, 536 U.S. , 536 U.S. 938, 153 L. Ed. 
2d 802, 122 S. Ct. 2618 (2002), and now reverse the constitutional holdings and vacate the Fair 
Housing Act holding. 
II 
Respondents allege that by submitting the petition to the voters and refusing to issue 
building permits while the petition was pending, the City and its officials violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. Petitioners claim that the Sixth Circuit went astray by ascribing the 
motivations of a handful of citizens supportive of the referendum to the City. We agree with 
petitioners that respondents have failed to present sufficient evidence of an equal protection 
violation to survive summary judgment. 
We have made clear that "proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required" 
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). In deciding  the 
equal protection question, the Sixth Circuit erred in relying on cases in which we have subjected 
enacted, discretionary measures to equal protection scrutiny and treated decision-makers' 
statements as evidence of such intent. Because respondents claim injury from the referendum 
petitioning process and not from the referendum itself -- which never went into effect -- these 
cases are inapposite. Ultimately, neither of the official acts respondents challenge reflects the 
intent required to support equal protection liability. 
First, in submitting the referendum petition to the voters, the City acted pursuant to the 
requirements of its charter, which sets out a facially neutral petitioning procedure. See Art. 9, §2. 
By placing the referendum on the ballot, the City did not enact the referendum and therefore 
cannot be said to have given effect to voters' allegedly discriminatory motives for supporting the 
petition. Similarly, the city engineer, in refusing to issue the building permits while the 
referendum was still pending, performed a nondiscretionary, ministerial act. He acted in response 
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to the city law director's instruction that the building permits "could not . . . issue" because the 
City Charter prohibited a challenged site-plan ordinance from going into effect until "approved 
by a majority of those voting thereon," See 263 F.3d at 633. Respondents point to no evidence 
suggesting that these official acts were themselves motivated by racial animus. Respondents do 
not, for example, offer evidence that the City followed the obligations set forth in its charter 
because of the referendum's discriminatory purpose, or that city officials would have selectively 
refused to follow standard charter procedures in a different case. 
Instead, to establish discriminatory intent, respondents and the Sixth Circuit both rely 
heavily on evidence of allegedly discriminatory voter sentiment. But statements made by private 
individuals in the course of a citizen- driven petition drive, while sometimes relevant to equal 
protection analysis, do not, in and of themselves, constitute state action for the purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, respondents put forth no evidence that the "private motives 
[that] triggered" the referendum drive "can fairly be attributable to the State."  Blum v. Yaretsky, 
457 U.S. 991 at 1004.   
In fact, by adhering to charter procedures, city officials enabled public debate on the 
referendum to take place, thus advancing significant First Amendment interests. In assessing the 
referendum as a "basic instrument of democratic government," Eastlake v. Forest City 
Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 679, 49 L. Ed. 2d 132, 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976), we have observed 
that "provisions for referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, 
or prejudice," James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141, 28 L. Ed. 2d 678, 91 S. Ct. 1331 (1971). 
And our well established First Amendment admonition that "government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable," 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989), dovetails with 
the notion that all citizens, regardless of the content of their ideas, have the right to petition their 
government. Again, statements made by decision-makers or referendum sponsors during 
deliberation over a referendum may constitute relevant evidence of discriminatory intent in a 
challenge to an ultimately enacted initiative. See,  e.g., Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 
458 U.S. 457, 471, 73 L. Ed. 2d 896, 102 S. Ct. 3187 (1982) (considering statements of initiative 
sponsors in subjecting enacted referendum to equal protection scrutiny);  Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S., at 268. But respondents do not challenge 
an enacted referendum. 
In their brief to this Court, respondents offer an alternate theory of equal protection 
liability: that city officials, including the mayor, acted in concert with private citizens to prevent 
Pleasant Meadows from being built because of the race and family status of its likely residents. 
Respondents allege, among other things, that the city law director prompted disgruntled voters to 
file the petition, that the city council intentionally delayed its deliberations to thwart the 
development, and that the mayor stoked the public opposition. Not only did the courts below not 
directly address this theory of liability, but respondents also appear to have disavowed this claim 
at oral argument, focusing instead on the denial of the permits.  
What is more, respondents never articulated a cognizable legal claim on these grounds. 
Respondents fail to show that city officials exercised any power over voters' decision-making 
during the drive, much less the kind of "coercive power" either "overt or covert" that would 
render the voters' actions and statements, for all intents and purposes, state action.  Blum v. 
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Yaretsky, 457 U.S., at 1004. Nor, as noted above, do respondents show that the voters' 
sentiments can be attributed in any way to the state actors against which it has brought suit. 
Indeed, in finding a genuine issue of material fact with regard to intent, the Sixth Circuit relied 
almost entirely on apparently independent statements by private citizens. And in dismissing the 
claim against the mayor in his individual capacity, the District Court found no evidence that he 
orchestrated the referendum. Respondents thus fail to present an equal protection claim sufficient 
to survive summary judgment. 
III 
In evaluating respondents' substantive due process claim, the Sixth Circuit found, as a 
threshold matter, that respondents had a legitimate claim of entitlement to the building permits, 
and therefore a property interest in those permits, in light of the city council's approval of the site 
plan. See  263 F.3d at 642. The court then held that respondents had presented sufficient 
evidence to survive summary judgment on their claim that the City engaged in arbitrary conduct 
by denying respondents the benefit of the plan.  Id., at 644. Both in their complaint and before 
this Court, respondents contend that the City violated substantive due process, not only for the 
reason articulated by the Sixth Circuit, but also on the grounds that the City's submission of an 
administrative land-use determination to the charter's referendum procedures constituted per se 
arbitrary conduct. We find no merit in either claim. 
We need not decide whether respondents possessed a property interest in the building 
permits, because the city engineer's refusal to issue the permits while the petition was pending in 
no sense constituted egregious or arbitrary government conduct. See  County of Sacramento v. 
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1043, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998) (noting that in our 
evaluations of "abusive executive action," we have held that "only the most egregious official 
conduct can be said to be 'arbitrary in the constitutional sense'"). In light of the charter's 
provision that "no such ordinance [challenged by a petition] shall go into effect until approved by 
a majority of those voting  thereon," Art. 9, §2, App. 15, the law director's instruction to the 
engineer to not issue the permits represented an eminently rational directive. Indeed, the site 
plan, by law, could not be implemented until the voters passed on the referendum. 
Respondents' second theory of liability has no basis in our precedent. As a matter of 
federal constitutional law, we have rejected the distinction that respondents ask us to draw, and 
that the Ohio Supreme Court drew as a matter of state law, between legislative and 
administrative referendums. In Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S., at 672, 675, 
we made clear that because all power stems from the people, "[a] referendum cannot . . . be 
characterized as a delegation of power," unlawful unless accompanied by "discernible 
standards." The people retain the power to govern through referendum "'with respect to any 
matter, legislative or administrative, within the realm of local affairs.'"  Id., at 674, n. 9. Cf.  
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S., at 137. Though the "substantive result" of a referendum may be 
invalid if it is "arbitrary and capricious," Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, supra, at 676, 
respondents do not challenge the referendum itself. The subjection of the site-plan ordinance to 
the City's referendum process, regardless of whether that ordinance reflected an administrative or 
legislative decision, did not constitute per se arbitrary government conduct in violation of due 
process. 
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IV 
For the reasons detailed above, we reverse the Sixth Circuit's judgment with regard to 
respondents' equal protection and substantive due process claims. The Sixth Circuit also held that 
respondents' disparate impact claim under the Fair Housing Act could proceed to trial,  263 F.3d 
at 641, but respondents have now abandoned the claim.. We therefore vacate the Sixth Circuit's 
disparate impact holding and remand with instructions to dismiss, with prejudice, the relevant 
portion of the complaint.  
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is, accordingly, 
reversed in part, and vacated in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion, including Part III, which concludes that respondents' assertions 
of arbitrary government conduct must be rejected. I write separately to observe that, even if there 
had been arbitrary government conduct, that would not have established the substantive-due-
process violation that respondents claim. 
It would be absurd to think that all "arbitrary and capricious" government action violates 
substantive due process -- even, for example, the arbitrary and capricious cancellation of a public 
employee's parking privileges. The judicially created substantive component of the Due Process 
Clause protects, we have said, certain "fundamental liberty interests" from deprivation by the 
government, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 117 S. Ct. 
2302 (1997). Freedom from delay in receiving a building permit is not among these 
"fundamental liberty interests." To the contrary, the Takings Clause allows government 
confiscation of private property so long as it is taken for a public use and just compensation is 
paid; mere regulation of land use need not be "narrowly tailored" to effectuate a "compelling 
state interest." Those who claim "arbitrary" deprivations of nonfundamental liberty interests must 
look to the Equal Protection Clause, and  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 104 L. Ed. 2d 
443, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989), precludes the use of "'substantive due process'" analysis when a 
more specific constitutional provision governs. 
As for respondents' assertion that referendums may not be used to decide whether low-
income housing may be built on their land: that is not a substantive-due-process claim, but rather a 
challenge to the procedures by which respondents were deprived of their alleged liberty interest in 
building on their land. There is nothing procedurally defective about conditioning the right to build 
low-income housing on the outcome of a popular referendum, cf.  James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 
28 L. Ed. 2d 678, 91 S. Ct. 1331 (1971), and the delay in issuing the permit was prescribed by a duly 
enacted provision of the Cuyahoga Falls City Charter (Art. 9, §2), which surely constitutes "due 
process of law," see Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe, ante, p.     (SCALIA, J., concurring). 
With these observations, I join the Court's opinion. 
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Session 21. Religious Land Use  
LEMON v. KURTZMAN 
403 U.S. 602 (1971) 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
These two appeals raise questions as to Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes providing 
state aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools.  Both statutes are challenged as 
violative of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Pennsylvania has adopted a statutory program that provides financial support to nonpublic 
elementary and secondary schools by way of reimbursement for the cost of teachers' salaries, 
textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects.  Rhode Island has adopted a 
statute under which the State pays directly to teachers in nonpublic elementary schools a 
supplement of 15% of their annual salary. Under each statute state aid has been given to church-
related educational institutions.  We hold that both statutes are unconstitutional. 
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria 
developed by the Court over many years.  Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases.  First, 
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be 
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive 
government entanglement with religion."Inquiry into the legislative purposes of the Pennsylvania 
and  Rhode Island statutes affords no basis for a conclusion that the legislative intent was to 
advance religion. On the contrary, the statutes themselves clearly state that they are intended to 
enhance the quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance 
laws.  There is no reason to believe the legislatures meant anything else.  A State always has a 
legitimate concern for maintaining minimum standards in all schools it allows to operate.  The 
legislatures of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania have concluded that secular and religious education 
are identifiable and separable.  In the abstract we have no quarrel with this conclusion. We conclude 
[however] that the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each 
State involves excessive entanglement between government and religion. 
LARKIN v. GRENDEL'S DEN, INC.  
459 U.S. 116 (1982) 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented by this appeal is whether a Massachusetts statute, which vests in the 
governing bodies of churches and schools the power effectively to veto applications for liquor 
licenses within a 500-foot radius of the church or school, violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Appellee operates a restaurant located in the Harvard Square area of Cambridge, Mass.  The 
Holy Cross Armenian Catholic Parish is located adjacent to the restaurant; the back walls of the two 
buildings are 10 feet apart. In 1977, appellee applied to the Cambridge License Commission for 
approval of an alcoholic beverages license for the restaurant. 
Section 16C of Chapter 138 of the Massachusetts General Laws provides: "Premises . . . 
located within a radius of five hundred feet of a church or school shall not be licensed for the sale of 
alcoholic beverages if the governing body of such church or school files written objection thereto."  
Holy Cross Church objected to appellee's application, expressing concern over "having so 
many licenses so near" (emphasis in original).  The License Commission voted to deny the 
application, citing only the objection of Holy Cross Church and noting that the church "is within 10 
feet of the proposed location." 
On appeal, the Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission upheld the License 
Commission's action.  The Beverages Control Commission found that "the church's objection under 
Section 16C was the only basis on which the [license] was denied." 
Appellee then sued the License Commission and the Beverages Control Commission in 
United States District Court.  Relief was sought on the grounds that §16C, on its face and as 
applied, violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and the Sherman Act. 
The District Court held that §16C violated the Due Process Clause and the Establishment 
Clause and held §16C void on its face, Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 495 F.Supp. 761 (Mass. 
1980). The District Court rejected appellee's equal protection arguments....  It certified the judgment 
to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1292, and the Court of Appeals 
accepted certification. 
The First Circuit ... in a divided opinion, affirmed the District Court's judgment on 
Establishment Clause grounds without reaching the due process . . . claims, Grendel's Den, Inc. v. 
Goodwin, 662 F.2d 102 (1981). 
The Court of Appeals noted that appellee does not contend that §16C lacks a secular 
purpose, and turned to the question of "whether the law 'has the direct and immediate effect of 
advancing religion' as contrasted with 'only a remote and incidental effect advantageous to religious 
institutions,'" id., at 104 (emphasis in original), quoting Committee for Public Education & 
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783, n. 39 (1973).  The court concluded that §16C 
confers a direct and substantial benefit upon religions by "the grant of a veto power over liquor 
sales in roughly one million square feet . . . of what may be a city's most commercially valuable 
sites," 662 F.2d, at 105. 
The court acknowledged that §16C "extends its benefits beyond churches to schools," but 
concluded that the inclusion of schools "does not dilute [the statute's] forbidden religious 
classification," since §16C does not "encompass all who are otherwise similarly situated to churches 
in all respects except dedication to 'divine worship.'" Id., at 106-107 (footnote omitted).  In the view 
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of the Court of Appeals, this "explicit religious discrimination," id., at 105, provided an additional 
basis for its holding that §16C violates the Establishment Clause. 
The court found nothing in the Twenty-first Amendment to alter its conclusion, and affirmed 
the District Court's holding that §16C is facially unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. 
We noted probable jurisdiction, 454 U.S. 1140 (1982), and we affirm. 
Appellants contend that the State may, without impinging on the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment, enforce what it describes as a "zoning" law in order to shield schools and 
places of divine worship from the presence nearby of liquor-dispensing establishments.  It is also 
contended that a zone of protection around churches and schools is essential to protect diverse 
centers of spiritual, educational, and cultural enrichment.  It is to that end that the State has vested in 
the governing bodies of all schools, public or private, and all churches, the power to prevent the 
issuance of liquor licenses for any premises within 500 feet of their institutions. 
Plainly schools and churches have a valid interest in being insulated from certain kinds of 
commercial establishments, including those dispensing liquor.  Zoning laws have long been 
employed to this end, and there can be little doubt about the power of a state to regulate the 
environment in the vicinity of schools, churches, hospitals, and the like by exercise of reasonable 
zoning laws. 
We have upheld reasonable zoning ordinances regulating the location of so-called "adult" 
theaters, see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976); and in Grayned v. 
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), we recognized the legitimate governmental interest in 
protecting the environment around certain institutions when we sustained an ordinance prohibiting 
willfully making, on grounds adjacent to a school,  noises which are disturbing to the good order of 
the school sessions. 
However, §16C is not simply a legislative exercise of zoning power.  As the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court concluded, §16C delegates to private, nongovernmental entities power to 
veto certain liquor license applications, Arno v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 377 Mass., 
at 89, 384 N. E. 2d, at 1227.  This is a power ordinarily vested in agencies of government.  See, e. 
g., California v. LaRue, supra, at 116, commenting that a "state agency . . . is itself the repository of 
the State's power under the Twenty-first Amendment."  We need not decide whether, or upon what 
conditions, such power may ever be delegated to non-governmental entities; here, of two classes of 
institutions to which the legislature has delegated this important decision-making power, one is 
secular, but one is religious. Under these circumstances, the deference normally due a legislative 
zoning judgment is not merited. 
The purposes of the First Amendment guarantees relating to religion were twofold: to 
foreclose state interference with the practice of religious faiths, and to foreclose the establishment of 
a state religion familiar in other 18th-century systems.  Religion and government, each insulated 
from the other, could then coexist.  Jefferson's idea of a "wall," see Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145, 164 (1879), quoting reply from Thomas Jefferson to an address by a committee of the 
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Danbury Baptist Association (January 1, 1802), reprinted in 8 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 113 
(H. Washington ed. 1861), was a useful figurative illustration to emphasize the concept of 
separateness. Some limited and incidental entanglement between church and state authority is 
inevitable in a complex modern society, see, e. g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); 
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970), but the concept of a "wall" of separation is a useful 
signpost. Here that "wall" is substantially breached by vesting discretionary governmental powers in 
religious bodies. 
This Court has consistently held that a statute must satisfy    three criteria to pass muster 
under the Establishment Clause: 
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or 
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally, 
the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, at 674. 
The purpose of §16C, as described by the District Court, is to "[protect] spiritual, cultural, 
and educational centers from the 'hurly-burly' associated with liquor outlets." 495 F.Supp., at 766. 
There can be little doubt that this embraces valid secular legislative purposes.  However, these valid 
secular objectives can be readily accomplished by other means–either through an absolute 
legislative ban on liquor outlets within reasonable prescribed distances from churches, schools, 
hospitals, and like institutions, or by ensuring a hearing for the views of affected institutions at 
licensing proceedings where, without question, such views would be entitled to substantial weight. 
Appellants argue that §16C has only a remote and incidental effect on the advancement of 
religion.  The highest court in Massachusetts, however, has construed the statute as conferring upon 
churches a veto power over governmental licensing authority.  Section 16C gives churches the right 
to determine whether a particular applicant will be granted a liquor license, or even which one of 
several competing applicants will receive a license. 
The churches' power under the statute is standard-less, calling for no reasons, findings, or 
reasoned conclusions.  That power may therefore be used by churches to promote goals beyond 
insulating the church from undesirable neighbors; it could be employed for explicitly religious 
goals, for example, favoring liquor licenses for members of that congregation or adherents of that 
faith. 
Turning to the third phase of the inquiry ... we see that we have not previously had occasion 
to consider the entanglement implications of a statute vesting significant governmental authority in 
churches.  This statute enmeshes churches in the exercise of substantial governmental powers 
contrary to our consistent interpretation of the Establishment Clause; "[the] objective is to prevent, 
as far as possible, the intrusion of either [Church or State] into the precincts of the other." Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S., at 614. 
As these and other cases make clear, the core rationale underlying the Establishment Clause 
is preventing "a fusion of governmental and religious functions," Abington School District v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).  See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S., at 674-675; 
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Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1947).  The Framers did not set up a system of 
government in which important, discretionary governmental powers would be delegated to or 
shared with religious institutions. 
Section 16C substitutes the unilateral and absolute power of a church for the reasoned 
decision-making of a public legislative body acting on evidence and guided by standards, on issues 
with significant economic and political implications.  The challenged statute thus enmeshes 
churches in the processes of government and creates the danger of "[political] fragmentation and 
divisiveness on religious lines," Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 623. Ordinary human experience and 
a long line of cases teach that few entanglements could be more offensive to the spirit of the 
Constitution. 
So ordered. 
GRENDEL'S DEN v. LARKIN 
749 F.2d 945 (1st Cir. 1984) 
Coffin, Circuit Judge. 
Appellants challenge an award of attorney's fees.  Arguing that the district court abused its 
discretion by granting an award which was not "reasonable" within the meaning of the Fees Act, 42 
U.S.C. §1988, appellants ask us to  modify it.  After carefully reviewing the district court's opinion, 
as well as the evidence submitted to support appellee's original fees application, we conclude that 
the district court's analysis was in some respects erroneous and the resulting award excessive.  In 
view of the already protracted and expensive proceedings and the adequacy of the existing record 
for fee decision purposes, we make our own modifications to the award. 
Having prevailed on its section 1983 claim, Grendel's applied to the district court for 
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Fees Act, 42 U.S.C. §1988.  In support of the application, 
affidavits were filed by its counsel, Professors Laurence Tribe and David Rosenberg of Harvard 
Law School, and Mr. Ira Karasick.  Each affidavit documented the individual's educational and 
professional background, summarized the role he played in the litigation, and described the legal 
services that he had performed and the expenses that he had incurred.  Compensation was requested 
in the amount of $176,137.50 (640.5 hours at $275 per hour) for Professor Tribe, $21,750.00 (174 
hours at $125 per hour) for Professor Rosenberg, and $15,747.50 (399 hours at hourly rates ranging 
from $25 to $75) for Mr. Karasick.  Unfortunately, despite the duration of the litigation and the 
distinction of counsel, no contemporaneous time records were kept or submitted in support of these 
requests.  The CLC and the ABCC responded by challenging the reasonableness of the time spent 
and the rates requested. 
Although fee litigation as a substantial component of judicial time is a relatively new 
phenomenon, the general ground rules are well known.  District courts have discretion when 
awarding fees and expenses under 42 U.S.C. §1988, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 
1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), and appellate courts accord deference to the exercise of that 
discretion . . . .  The ultimate goal is to award fees "adequate to attract competent counsel but which 
do not produce windfalls."  Hensley, 103 S.Ct. at 1938 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976)). 
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The difficulty for both fee-setting and fee-reviewing courts, in a field so susceptible to 
arbitrariness, is the achievement of decision-making that is fair to the parties and understandable to 
the community at large yet not unnecessarily burdensome to the courts themselves.  Thus, we 
normally prefer to defer to any thoughtful rationale and decision developed by a trial court and to 
avoid extensive second guessing.  Occasionally, however, we feel constrained to examine a fee 
appeal in greater depth, particularly if it presents novel problems or claims.  The absence of 
contemporary time records, in conjunction with extraordinarily high hourly rates and claims for 
time spent in the most punctilious appellate research and preparation, makes this such a case. 
What concerns us in this case and what we now proceed to review is the district court's 
analysis of the following critical points:  the failure of counsel to keep contemporaneous time 
records, the reasonableness of hours claimed, the justifiability of the hourly rates requested, the 
reasonableness of certain of the claimed expenses, and the proper apportionment of the total fees 
assessed against the two defendants.  In reviewing these matters, we find that the evidence which 
causes us to criticize the district court also suggests the upper limits of what we think is reasonable. 
1.  Failure to Keep Contemporaneous Time Records 
The initial problem confronting the attorneys, parties, trial court and reviewing court stems 
from the process by which a fee application covering six years of work must be constructed when 
no contemporaneous time records exist . . . 
We now take the same step and serve notice that henceforth, in cases involving fee 
applications for services rendered after the date of this opinion, the absence of detailed 
contemporaneous time records, except in extraordinary circumstances, will call for a substantial 
reduction in any award or, in egregious cases, disallowance.  In the instant case we feel it would be 
unfair to apply this standard, but subject the retrospectively created record of time spent to a more 
exacting scrutiny than we would bring to contemporaneous and detailed records. 
2.  Reasonableness of Time Spent 
We find that on a number of occasions, Professor Tribe spent inordinately large numbers of 
hours analyzing the briefs of his opponents, researching and drafting briefs for Grendel's, and 
preparing for oral argument.  To set the stage for our analysis, we point to the fact that Professors 
Tribe and Rosenberg together took only 25 hours to prepare a forty-page response to defendants' 
initial motion to dismiss.  Not only do we find here an economy of effort but also a legal brief 
sufficiently persuasive that Grendel's subsequently decided to file no new brief after the motion to 
dismiss was denied and cross-motions for partial summary judgment were filed.  Indeed, the district 
court was so persuaded by the brief that it ruled in Grendel's favor on all issues except the Equal 
Protection claim. What this demonstrates is that Professors Tribe and Rosenberg clearly had the 
ability to draft a compelling brief quickly and efficiently. 
What followed during the rest of the litigation, however, convinces us that the early 
economy of effort and careful focus upon only what was necessary was lost in the heat and 
excitement of litigating an interesting First Amendment case.  We reduce Professor Tribe's hours 
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from 640.5 to 468.5 by deducting 171 hours of excessive time spent at the appellate stages of 
litigation. 
3.  Reasonableness of Hourly Rates 
Attorney fees' under §1988 are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in 
the relevant community," that is "those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers 
of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation."  Blum v. Stenson, ___ U.S. ___, 104 
S.Ct. 1541, 1547 & n. 11, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984).  In the instant case, we conclude that the district 
court's determination of a market rate of $125 per hour for Professor Rosenberg can be sustained, 
but not the rate of $275 per hour for Professor Tribe. We cannot conscientiously allow an overall 
rate, notwithstanding his academic distinction, of more than $175 an hour.  Accordingly, Professor 
Tribe's fees award is reduced to $81,987.50 for 468.5 hours . . . .  The order of the district court is 
hereby so modified.  No costs.  
CITY OF BOERNE v. FLORES 
521 U.S. 507 (1997) 
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and 
STEVENS, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ. joined.  
A decision by local zoning authorities to deny a church  a building permit was challenged 
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb 
et seq. The case calls into question the authority of Congress to enact RFRA. We conclude the 
statute exceeds Congress' power. 
I 
Situated on a hill in the city of Boerne, Texas, some 28 miles northwest of San Antonio, is 
St. Peter Catholic Church. Built in 1923, the church's structure replicates the mission style of the 
region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing 
parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses. In order to 
meet the needs of the congregation the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to 
plan alterations to enlarge the building. 
A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's 
Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks 
and districts. Under the ordinance, the Commission must pre-approve construction affecting historic 
landmarks or buildings in a historic district. 
Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the 
church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic 
district (which, they argued, included the church), denied the application. The Archbishop brought 
this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Texas. 877 F. Supp. 355 (1995). 
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The complaint contained various claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on 
RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The Archbishop relied upon RFRA as one basis for 
relief from the refusal to issue the permit. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA 
Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be 
constitutional. 73 F. 3d 1352 (1996). We granted certiorari, 519 U.S.  (1996), and now reverse. 
II 
Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., 
Dept. of Human Resources of Ore.  v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). There we considered a Free 
Exercise Clause claim brought by members of the Native American Church who were denied 
unemployment benefits when they lost their jobs because they had used peyote. Their practice was 
to ingest peyote for sacramental purposes, and they challenged an Oregon statute of general 
applicability which made use of the drug criminal. In evaluating the claim, we declined to apply the 
balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), under which we would have 
asked whether Oregon's prohibition substantially burdened a religious practice and, if it did, 
whether the burden was justified by a compelling government interest. We stated:   
"Government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful 
conduct . . . cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious 
objector's spiritual development. To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent 
upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling' 
. . . contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense." 494 U. S., at 885 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
The application of the Sherbert test, the Smith decision explained, would have produced an 
anomaly in the law, a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general applicability. The 
anomaly would have been accentuated, the Court reasoned, by the difficulty of determining whether 
a particular practice was central to an individual's religion. We explained, moreover, that it "is not 
within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the 
validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds." 494 U. S., at 887 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
Many criticized the Court's reasoning, and this disagreement resulted in the passage of 
RFRA. Congress announced:   
"(1) The framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an 
unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution; 
"(2) laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws 
intended to interfere with religious exercise; 
"(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without 
compelling justification; 
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"(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Supreme Court 
virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious 
exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and  
"(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a 
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing 
prior governmental interests." 42 U.S.C. §2000bb (a).   
The Act's stated purposes are: 
"(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its 
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and 
"(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially 
burdened by government." §2000bb (b). 
RFRA prohibits "government" from "substantially burdening" a person's exercise of religion 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless the government can 
demonstrate the burden "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the 
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." §2000bb-1. The Act's 
mandate applies to any "branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person 
acting under color of law) of the United States," as well as to any "State, or . . . subdivision of a 
State." §2000bb-2(1). The Act's universal coverage is confirmed in §2000bb-3(a), under which 
RFRA "applies to all Federal and State law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory 
or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after [RFRA's enactment]." In accordance with RFRA's 
usage of the term, we shall use "state law" to include local and municipal ordinances.  
III 
A 
Under our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of enumerated powers.  McCulloch 
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819); see also The Federalist No. 45, p. 292 (C. Rossiter ed. 
1961) (J. Madison). The judicial authority to determine the constitutionality of laws, in cases and 
controversies, is based on the premise that the "powers of the legislature are defined and limited; 
and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written." Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176 (1803). 
Congress relied on its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power in enacting the most far 
reaching and substantial of RFRA's provisions, those which impose its requirements on the States. 
See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, S. Rep. No. 103-111, pp. 13-14 (1993) (Senate 
Report); H. R. Rep. No. 103-88, p. 9 (1993) (House Report). The Fourteenth Amendment provides, 
in relevant part: 
"Section 1. . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
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any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.    . . . . . 
"Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article." 
The parties disagree over whether RFRA is a proper exercise of Congress' §5 power "to 
enforce" by "appropriate legislation" the constitutional guarantee that no State shall deprive any 
person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" nor deny any person "equal 
protection of the laws."  
In defense of the Act respondent contends, with support from the United States as amicus, 
that RFRA is permissible enforcement legislation. Congress, it is said, is only protecting by 
legislation one of the liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the 
free exercise of religion, beyond what is necessary under Smith. It is said the congressional decision 
to dispense with proof of deliberate or overt discrimination and instead concentrate on a law's 
effects accords with the settled understanding that §5 includes the power to enact legislation 
designed to prevent as well as remedy constitutional violations. It is further contended that 
Congress' §5 power is not limited to remedial or preventive legislation.  
While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and 
measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress 
must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed. 
There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and 
the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in 
operation and effect. History and our case law support drawing the distinction, one apparent from 
the text of the Amendment.  
The design of the Fourteenth Amendment has proved significant also in maintaining the 
traditional separation of powers between Congress and the Judiciary. The first eight Amendments to 
the Constitution set forth self-executing prohibitions on governmental action, and this Court has had 
primary authority to interpret those prohibitions. As enacted, the Fourteenth Amendment confers 
substantive rights against the States which, like the provisions of the Bill of Rights, are self-
executing. The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary. 
Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment is not supported by our case law. If Congress could define its own powers by altering 
the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution be "superior paramount 
law, unchangeable by ordinary means." It would be "on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, 
like other acts . . . alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it." Marbury v. Madison, 1 
Cranch, at 177. . . . Under this approach, it is difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit 
congressional power. See Van Alstyne, “The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,” 46 Duke L. J. 291, 292-303 (1996). Shifting 
legislative majorities could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and 
detailed amendment process contained in Article V. 
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We now turn to consider whether RFRA can be considered enforcement legislation under §5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
B 
Respondent contends that RFRA is a proper exercise of Congress' remedial or preventive 
power. The Act, it is said, is a reasonable means of protecting the free exercise of religion as 
defined by Smith. It prevents and remedies laws which are enacted with the unconstitutional object 
of targeting religious beliefs and practices. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) ("[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible"). To 
avoid the difficulty of proving such violations, it is said, Congress can simply invalidate any law 
which imposes a substantial burden on a religious practice unless it is justified by a compelling 
interest and is the least restrictive means of accomplishing that interest. If Congress can prohibit 
laws with discriminatory effects in order to prevent racial discrimination in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause, see Fullilove  v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 477 (1980) (plurality opinion); City of 
Rome, 446 U. S., at 177, then it can do the same, respondent argues, to promote religious liberty. 
While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there must be a 
congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved.  RFRA cannot be considered 
remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have any meaning. RFRA is so out of 
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, 
or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive 
change in constitutional protections. Preventive measures prohibiting certain types of laws may be 
appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of the laws affected by the congressional 
enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional. See City of Rome, 446 U. S., at 
177 (since "jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination . . . create 
the risk of purposeful discrimination" Congress could "prohibit changes that have a discriminatory 
impact" in those jurisdictions). Remedial legislation under §5 "should be adapted to the mischief 
and wrong which the [Fourteenth] Amendment was intended to provide against." Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U. S., at 13. 
RFRA is not so confined. Sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of 
government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and 
regardless of subject matter. RFRA's restrictions apply to every agency and official of the Federal, 
State, and local Governments. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-2(1). RFRA applies to all federal and state law, 
statutory or otherwise, whether adopted before or after its enactment. §2000bb-3(a). RFRA has no 
termination date or termination mechanism. Any law is subject to challenge at any time by any 
individual who alleges a substantial burden on his or her free exercise of religion. 
The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflects a lack of proportionality or 
congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved. If an objector can 
show a substantial burden on his free exercise, the State must demonstrate a compelling 
governmental interest and show that the law is the least restrictive means of furthering its interest. 
Claims that a law substantially burdens someone's exercise of religion will often be difficult to 
contest. Requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling interest and show that it has adopted the 
least restrictive means of achieving that interest is the most demanding test known to constitutional 
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law. If "'compelling interest' really means what it says . . . many laws will not meet the test.  Even 
assuming RFRA would be interpreted in effect to mandate some lesser test, say one equivalent to 
intermediate scrutiny, the statute nevertheless would require searching judicial scrutiny of state law 
with the attendant likelihood of invalidation. This is a considerable congressional intrusion into the 
States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their 
citizens. 
It is a reality of the modern regulatory state that numerous state laws, such as the zoning 
regulations at issue here, impose a substantial burden on a large class of individuals. When the 
exercise of religion has been burdened in an incidental way by a law of general application, it does 
not follow that the persons affected have been burdened any more than other citizens, let alone 
burdened because of their religious beliefs.  
When Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right 
but the duty to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution.  Our 
national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each part of the 
government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of the other 
branches. When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the 
Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, at 
177. When the political branches of the Government act against the background of a judicial 
interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and 
controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, 
including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed. RFRA was designed to 
control cases and controversies, such as the one before us; but as the provisions of the federal 
statute here invoked are beyond congressional authority, it is this Court's precedent, not RFRA, 
which must control.  
Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the 
federal balance. The judgment of the Court of Appeals sustaining the Act's constitutionality is 
reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
In my opinion, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) is a "law respecting 
an establishment of religion" that violates the First Amendment to the Constitution. 
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring in part. [Omitted]  
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE BREYER dissenting. [Omitted] 
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RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT OF 2000 
42 USCS §2000 
SECTION 1.  SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the “Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000.” 
SECTION 2.  PROTECTION OF LAND USE AS RELIGIOUS EXERCISE. 
Substantial Burdens. 
General rule. No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner 
that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious 
assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that 
person, assembly, or institution-- 
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
Scope of application. This subsection applies in any case in which— 
the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal 
financial assistance, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability; 
the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect, 
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes, even 
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability; or 
the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation or 
system of land use regulations, under which a government makes, or has in place 
formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make, 
individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved. 
Discrimination and Exclusion. 
Equal terms. No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner 
that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly 
or institution. 
Nondiscrimination. No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that 
discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination. 
Exclusions and limits. No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that- 
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totally excludes religious assemblies from a jurisdiction; or 
unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a 
jurisdiction. 
SECTION 3.  PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE OF INSTITUTIONALIZED 
PERSONS. 
General Rule. No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of 
a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 2 of the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 1997), even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person— 
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
Scope of Application. This section applies in any case in which— 
the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal 
financial assistance; or 
the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect, 
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes. 
SECTION 4.  JUDICIAL RELIEF. 
(a) Cause of Action. A person may assert a violation of this Act as a claim or defense in 
a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim 
or defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of 
the Constitution. 
Burden of Persuasion. If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to support a claim 
alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause or a violation of section 2, the government shall 
bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim, except that the plaintiff shall bear the 
burden of persuasion on whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice that is 
challenged by the claim substantially burdens the plaintiff’s exercise of religion. 
Full Faith and Credit. Adjudication of a claim of a violation of section 2 in a non-Federal 
forum shall not be entitled to full faith and credit in a Federal court unless the claimant had a full 
and fair adjudication of that claim in the non-Federal forum. 
Attorneys’ Fees. Section 722(b) of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1988(b)) is amended- 
by inserting “the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,” 
after “Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993”; and  
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by striking the comma that follows a comma. 
Prisoners. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to amend or repeal the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (including provisions of law amended by that Act). 
Authority of United States To Enforce This Act. The United States may bring an action for 
injunctive or declaratory relief to enforce compliance with this Act. Nothing in this subsection shall 
be construed to deny, impair, or otherwise affect any right or authority of the Attorney General, the 
United States, or any agency, officer, or employee of the United States, acting under any law other 
than this subsection, to institute or intervene in any proceeding. 
Limitation. If the only jurisdictional basis for applying a provision of this Act is a claim that 
a substantial burden by a government on religious exercise affects, or that removal of that 
substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with 
Indian tribes, the provision shall not apply if the government demonstrates that all substantial 
burdens on, or the removal of all substantial burdens from, similar religious exercise throughout the 
Nation would not lead in the aggregate to a substantial effect on commerce with foreign nations, 
among the several States, or with Indian tribes. 
SECTION 5.  RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. 
(a) Religious Belief Unaffected. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize any 
government to burden any religious belief. 
Religious Exercise Not Regulated. Nothing in this Act shall create any basis for restricting 
or burdening religious exercise or for claims against a religious organization including any 
religiously affiliated school or university, not acting under color of law. 
Claims to Funding Unaffected. Nothing in this Act shall create or preclude a right of any 
religious organization to receive funding or other assistance from a government, or of any person to 
receive government funding for a religious activity, but this Act may require a government to incur 
expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise. 
Other Authority To Impose Conditions on Funding Unaffected. Nothing in this Act shall— 
authorize a government to regulate or affect, directly or indirectly, the activities or 
policies of a person other than a government as a condition of receiving funding or 
other assistance; or 
restrict any authority that may exist under other law to so regulate or affect, except as 
provided in this Act. 
Governmental Discretion in Alleviating Burdens on Religious Exercise. A government may 
avoid the preemptive force of any provision of this Act by changing the policy or practice that 
results in a substantial burden on religious exercise, by retaining the policy or practice and 
exempting the substantially burdened religious exercise, by providing exemptions from the policy 
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or practice for applications that substantially burden religious exercise, or by any other means that 
eliminates the substantial burden. 
Effect on Other Law. With respect to a claim brought under this Act, proof that a substantial 
burden on a person’s religious exercise affects, or removal of that burden would affect, commerce 
with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes, shall not establish any 
inference or presumption that Congress intends that any religious exercise is, or is not, subject to 
any law other than this Act. 
Broad Construction. This Act shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious 
exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act and the Constitution. 
No Preemption or Repeal. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to preempt State law, or 
repeal Federal law, that is equally as protective of religious exercise as, or more protective of 
religious exercise than, this Act. 
Severability. If any provision of this Act or of an amendment made by this Act, or any 
application of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the 
remainder of this Act, the amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provision to any 
other person or circumstance shall not be affected. 
SECTION 6.  ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE UNAFFECTED. 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address portions of 
the first amendment to the Constitution prohibiting laws respecting an establishment of religion 
(referred to in this section as the “Establishment Clause”). Granting government funding, benefits, 
or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a 
violation of this Act. In this section, the term “granting,” used with respect to government funding, 
benefits, or exemptions, does not include the denial of government funding, benefits, or exemptions. 
SECTION 7.  AMENDMENTS TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT. 
Definitions. Section 5 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb-
2) is amended-- 
in paragraph (1), by striking “a State, or a subdivision of a State” and inserting “or of 
a covered entity”; 
in paragraph (2), by striking “term” and all that follows through “includes” and 
inserting “term ‘covered entity’ means”; and 
in paragraph (4), by striking all after “means” and inserting “religious exercise, as 
defined in section 8 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000.” 
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Conforming Amendment. Section 6(a) of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
(42 U.S.C. 2000bb-3(a)) is amended by striking “and State.” 
SECTION 8.  DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
Claimant. The term “claimant” means a person raising a claim or defense under this Act. 
Demonstrates. The term “demonstrates” means meets the burdens of going forward with the 
evidence and of persuasion.  
Free exercise clause. The term “Free Exercise Clause” means that portion of the first 
amendment to the Constitution that proscribes laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion. 
Government. The term “government” means - 
a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the 
authority of a State; 
any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in 
clause (i); and 
any other person acting under color of State law; and 
for the purposes of sections 4(b) and 5, includes the United States, a branch, 
department, agency, instrumentality, or official of the United States, and any other 
person acting under color of Federal law. 
Land use regulation. The term “land use regulation” means a zoning or landmarking law, or 
the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land 
(including a structure affixed to land), if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, 
servitude, or other property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an 
interest. 
Program or activity. The term “program or activity” means all of the operations of any entity 
as described in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 606 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  (42 U.S.C. 
2000d-4a). 
Religious exercise. In general. The term “religious exercise” includes any exercise of 
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief. 
Rule. The use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise 
shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the 
property for that purpose. 
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REACHING HEARTS INTERNATIONAL v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY 
368 Fed. Appx. 370 (4th Cir. 2010) 
PER CURIAM: 
Reaching Hearts International, Inc. ("Reaching Hearts"), a Seventh Day Adventist 
congregation, purchased property in Prince George's County, Maryland ("the County") on which it 
intended to build a church and related facilities. The property's zoning permitted churches as a 
matter of right. However, Reaching Hearts was unable to obtain a change in the sewer and water 
classification for portions of the property. The denial of reclassification effectively prohibited the 
church's planned development of a worship center. Many other properties received approval for 
sewer and water reclassifications in 2003 and 2005, but Reaching Hearts – the only church property 
– was denied such a reclassification. 
After multiple unsuccessful administrative applications and appeals, Reaching Hearts filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that the County had 
violated its rights under the Equal Protection Clause and the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA")..See 42 U.S.C. §§2000cc et seq. Reaching Hearts 
prevailed on both claims in a seven-day jury trial, obtaining an award of $3,714,822.36 in damages 
and an injunction against the County as to future discriminatory treatment. The County filed a 
timely appeal and our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. §1291. 
On appeal, the County argues that the district court should have granted its request for 
judgment as a matter of law on both the Equal Protection and RLUIPA claims, or – in the 
alternative – that multiple deficiencies in the proceedings below necessitate a new trial. Because our 
review of the record reveals no error requiring reversal, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 
I 
The County's initial argument that the district court erred in denying it judgment as a matter 
of law against Reaching Hearts is reviewed de novo. Our analysis of this issue is, however, greatly 
circumscribed by the applicable standard of review. See Dotson v. Pfizer, Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 292 
(4th Cir. 2009). Judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate if any reasonable jury, "viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to" Reaching Hearts, would necessarily find in the County's 
favor. Id. In determining whether the evidence supports "only one reasonable verdict," id. 
(quotation omitted), we refrain from making "credibility determinations or weigh[ing] the 
evidence," as these are "jury functions, not those of a judge." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000). 
We have reviewed the record, disregarded "all evidence favorable" to the County that the 
jury was "not required to believe," and cannot say that the district court erred in denying the 
County's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Viewed in the light most favorable to Reaching 
Hearts, the evidence presented at trial of the County's anti-church animus was very strong. The 
evidence thus supports the jury's conclusion that (1) the County intentionally discriminated against 
Reaching Hearts on a prohibited ground, and (2) the County imposed or implemented a land use 
 523 
regulation in a manner that imposed a substantial burden on Reaching Heart's religious exercise, 
without satisfying the standard of strict scrutiny. 
The County, in the alternative, contends that multiple evidentiary and instructional errors by 
the district court necessitate a new trial. We disagree. Our review of these claims, at least to the 
extent the County's arguments were preserved below, is for an abuse of discretion. See Buckley v. 
Mukasey, 538 F.3d 306, 317, 322 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 564 n.4 
(4th Cir. 2009). Even if we were to conclude the district court erred on any of the evidentiary claims 
the County now argues, reversal is appropriate only if the County demonstrates sufficient resulting 
prejudice. See Buckley, 538 F.3d at 317, 322. Given the strength of Reaching Hearts' evidence, the 
County has failed to show that any plausible error committed by the district court was sufficiently 
prejudicial to warrant a new trial, i.e., that an error-free trial was likely to result in a different 
outcome in this case.  See Muhammad v. Kelly, 575 F.3d 359, 375 (4th Cir. 2009). 
The County's arguments relating to the scope of damages and injunctive relief awarded by 
the district court are also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Robles v. Prince George's County, 
302 F.3d 262, 271 (4th Cir. 2002); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 703 (4th Cir. 
1995). We thus "give the benefit of every doubt to the judgment of the trial judge." Robles, 302 
F.3d at 271 (quotation omitted). After considering the evidence and the arguments presented below, 
we cannot say that the district court's remedial rulings were "outside the range of choices 
permitted." Evans v. Eaton Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 514 F.3d 315, 322 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(quotation omitted). 
Thus, having found no reversible error in any of the challenged actions of the district court, 
we affirm the judgment of the district court. 
AFFIRMED.
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PART VII. REGULATORY TAKINGS 
“[T]he just compensation requirement… is designed to bar the government from 
forcing some individuals to bear burdens which, in all fairness, should be borne 
by the public as a whole. When one person is asked to assume more than a fair 
share of the public burden, the payment of just compensation operates to 
redistribute that economic cost from the individual to the public at large.” 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San 
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1980) 
Session 22. Challenges in State Courts 
A disappointed land owner faces a number of questions when deciding where and when 
to litigate a regulatory taking claim. The complainant must make strategic choices as to whether 
to sue in state court or in federal court, and whether to attack the government action on its face or 
“as applied.” 
AGINS v. CITY OF TIBURON 
447 U.S. 255 (1980) 
Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question in this case is whether a municipal zoning ordinance took appellants' 
property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
I 
After the appellants acquired five acres of unimproved land in the city of Tiburon, Cal., 
for residential development, the city was required by state law to prepare a general plan 
governing both land use and the development of open-space land.  Cal. Govt. Code Ann. 
§§65302 (a) and (e) (West Supp. 1979); see §65563.  In response, the city adopted two 
ordinances that modified existing zoning requirements.  Tiburon, Cal., Ordinances Nos. 123 N. 
S. and 124 N. S. (June 28, 1973).  The zoning ordinances placed the appellants' property in 
"RPD-1," a Residential Planned Development and Open Space Zone. RPD-1 property may be 
devoted to one-family dwellings, accessory buildings, and open-space uses.  Density restrictions 
permit the appellants to build between one and five single-family residences on their 5-acre tract.  
The appellants never have sought approval for development of their land under the zoning 
ordinances.
1
 
                                                 
1
 Shortly after it enacted the ordinances, the city began eminent domain proceedings against the appellants' land. The 
following year, however, the city abandoned those proceedings, and its complaint was dismissed. The appellants 
were reimbursed for costs incurred in connection with the action. 
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The appellants filed a two-part complaint against the city in State Superior Court.  The 
first cause of action sought $2 million in damages for inverse condemnation.2  The second cause 
of action requested a declaration that the zoning ordinances were facially unconstitutional.  The 
gravamen of both claims was the appellants' assertion that the city had taken their property 
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint 
alleged that land in Tiburon has greater value than any other suburban property in the State of 
California.  App. 3. The ridgelands that appellants own "possess magnificent views of San 
Francisco Bay and the scenic surrounding areas [and] have the highest market values of all 
lands" in Tiburon.  Id., at 4.  Rezoning of the land "forever prevented [its] development for 
residential use. . . ." Id., at 5.  Therefore, the appellants contended, the city had "completely 
destroyed the value of [appellants'] property for any purpose or use whatsoever. . . ."  Id., at 7.
3
 
The city demurred, claiming that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.  The 
Superior Court sustained the demurrer,
4 
 and the California Supreme Court affirmed.  24 Cal. 3d 
266, 598 P. 2d 25 (1979).  The State Supreme Court first considered the inverse condemnation 
claim.  It held that a landowner who challenges the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance may 
not "sue in inverse condemnation and thereby transmute an excessive use of the police power 
into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be paid."  Id., at 273, 598 
P. 2d, at 28.  The sole remedies for such a taking, the court concluded, are mandamus and 
declaratory judgment.  Turning therefore to the appellants' claim for declaratory relief, the 
California Supreme Court held that the zoning ordinances had not deprived the appellants of 
their property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
5
 
We noted probable jurisdiction.  444 U.S. 1011 (1980). We now affirm the holding that 
the zoning ordinances on their face do not take the appellants' property without just 
compensation.
6
 
                                                 
2
 Inverse condemnation should be distinguished from eminent domain.  Eminent domain refers to a legal proceeding 
in which a government asserts its authority to condemn property.  United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255-258 
(1980). Inverse condemnation is "a shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just 
compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted."  Id., at 257. 
3
 The appellants also contended that the city's aborted attempt to acquire the land through eminent domain had 
destroyed the use of the land during the pendency of the condemnation proceedings.  App. 10. 
4
 The State Superior Court granted the appellants leave to amend the cause of action seeking a declaratory judgment, 
but the appellants did not avail themselves of that opportunity. 
5
 The California Supreme Court also rejected appellants' argument that the institution and abandonment of eminent 
domain proceedings themselves constituted a taking.  The court found that the city had acted reasonably and that 
general municipal planning decisions do not violate the Fifth Amendment. 
6
 The appellants also contend that the state courts erred by sustaining the demurrer despite their uncontroverted 
allegations that the zoning ordinances would "forever [prevent .] . . development for residential use," id., at 5, and 
"completely [destroy] the value of [appellant's] property for any purpose or use whatsoever . . . ," id., at 7.  The 
California Supreme Court compared the express terms of the zoning ordinances with the factual allegations of the 
complaint.  The terms of the ordinances permit construction of one to five residences on the appellants' 5-acre tract.  
The court therefore rejected the contention that the ordinances prevented all use of the land.  Under California 
practice, allegations in a complaint are taken to be true unless "contrary to law or to a fact of which a court may take 
judicial notice."  Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal. App. 3d 101, 105, 127 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (1976); see 
Martinez v. Socoma Cos., 11 Cal. 3d 394, 399-400, 521 P. 2d 841, 844 (1974).  California courts may take judicial 
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II 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that private property shall not "be taken for public use, 
without just compensation."  The appellants' complaint framed the question as whether a zoning 
ordinance that prohibits all development of their land effects a taking under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  The California Supreme Court rejected the appellants' characterization 
of the issue by holding, as a matter of state law, that the terms of the challenged ordinances allow 
the appellants to construct between one and five residences on their property.  The court did not 
consider whether the zoning ordinances would be unconstitutional if applied to prevent 
appellants from building five homes.  Because the appellants have not submitted a plan for 
development of their property as the ordinances permit, there is as yet no concrete controversy 
regarding the application of the specific zoning provisions.  See Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 
406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972).  See also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., 
concurring).  Thus, the only question properly before us is whether the mere enactment of the 
zoning ordinances constitutes a taking. 
The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the 
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, see Nectow v. Cambridge, 
277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), or denies an owner economically viable use of his land, see Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138, n. 36 (1978).  The determination that 
governmental action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, 
rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public 
interest.  Although no precise rule determines when property has been taken, see Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), the question necessarily requires a weighing of private and 
public interests.  The seminal decision in Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), is 
illustrative.  In that case, the landowner challenged the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance 
that restricted commercial development of his property. Despite alleged diminution in value of 
the owner's land, the Court held that the zoning laws were facially constitutional.  They bore a 
substantial relationship to the public welfare, and their enactment inflicted no irreparable injury 
upon the landowner.  Id., at 395-397. 
In this case, the zoning ordinances substantially advance legitimate governmental goals.  
The State of California has determined that the development of local open-space plans will 
discourage the "premature and unnecessary conversion of open-space land to urban uses."  Cal. 
Govt. Code Ann. §65561 (b) (West. Supp. 1979).
7 
 The specific zoning regulations at issue are 
exercises of the city's police power to protect the residents of Tiburon from the ill effects of 
                                                                                                                                                             
notice of municipal ordinances.  Cal. Evid. Code Ann. §452 (b) (West 1966).  In this case, the State Supreme Court 
merely rejected allegations inconsistent with the explicit terms of the ordinance under review.  The appellants' 
objection to the State Supreme Court's application of state law does not raise a federal question appropriate for 
review by this Court.  See Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 461 (1907). 
7
 The State also recognizes that the preservation of open space is necessary "for the assurance of the continued 
availability of land for the production of food and fiber, for the enjoyment of scenic beauty, for recreation and for 
the use of natural resources."  Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §65561 (a) (West. Supp. 1979); see Tiburon, Cal., Ordinance 
No. 124 N. S. §§1 (f) and (h). 
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urbanization.
8
  Such governmental purposes long have been recognized as legitimate.  See Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, supra, at 129; Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 
1, 9 (1974); Euclid v. Ambler Co., supra, at 394-395. 
The ordinances place appellants' land in a zone limited to single-family dwellings, 
accessory buildings, and open-space uses.  Construction is not permitted until the builder submits 
a plan compatible with "adjoining patterns of development and open space."  Tiburon, Cal., 
Ordinance No. 123 N. S. §2 (F).  In passing upon a plan, the city also will consider how well the 
proposed development would preserve the surrounding environment and whether the density of 
new construction will be offset by adjoining open spaces.  Ibid.  The zoning ordinances benefit 
the appellants as well as the public by serving the city's interest in assuring careful and orderly 
development of residential property with provision for open-space areas.  There is no indication 
that the appellants' 5-acre tract is the only property affected by the ordinances.  Appellants 
therefore will share with other owners the benefits and burdens of the city's exercise of its police 
power.  In assessing the fairness of the zoning ordinances, these benefits must be considered 
along with any diminution in market value that the appellants might suffer. 
Although the ordinances limit development, they neither prevent the best use of 
appellants' land, see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262, and n.7 (1946), nor extinguish a 
fundamental attribute of ownership, see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, supra, at 179-180.  The 
appellants have alleged that they wish to develop the land for residential purposes, that the land 
is the most expensive suburban property in the State, and that the best possible use of the land is 
residential.  App. 3-4. The California Supreme Court has decided, as a matter of state law, that 
appellants may be permitted to build as many as five houses on their five acres of prime 
residential property.  At this juncture, the appellants are free to pursue their reasonable 
investment expectations by submitting a development plan to local officials.  Thus, it cannot be 
said that the impact of general land-use regulations has denied appellants the "justice and 
fairness" guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. 
New York City, 438 U.S., at 124.
9
 
                                                 
8
 The City Council of Tiburon found that "[it] is in the public interest to avoid unnecessary conversion of open space 
land to strictly urban uses, thereby protecting against the resultant adverse impacts, such as air, noise and water 
pollution, traffic congestion, destruction of scenic beauty, disturbance of the ecology and environment, hazards 
related to geology, fire and flood, and other demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl."  Id., §1 (c). 
9
 Appellants also claim that the city's precondemnation activities constitute a taking.  See nn. 1, 3, and 5, supra. The 
State Supreme Court correctly rejected the contention that the municipality's good-faith planning activities, which 
did not result in successful prosecution of an eminent domain claim, so burdened the appellants' enjoyment of their 
property as to constitute a taking.  See also City of Walnut Creek v. Leadership Housing Systems, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 
3d 611, 620-624, 140 Cal. Rptr. 690, 695-697 (1977).  Even if the appellants' ability to sell their property was 
limited during the pendency of the condemnation proceeding, the appellants were free to sell or develop their 
property when the proceedings ended.  Mere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decision-
making, absent extraordinary delay, are "incidents of ownership.  They cannot be considered as a ‘taking' in the 
constitutional sense."  Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939).  See Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. City of 
St. Louis, 596 F.2d 784, 787 (CA8), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979); Reservation Eleven Associates v. District of 
Columbia, 136 U. S. App. D. C. 311, 315-316, 420 F.2d 153, 157-158 (1969); Virgin Islands v. 50.05 Acres of 
Land, 185 F.Supp. 495, 498 (V. I. 1960); 2 J. Sackman & P. Rohan, Nichols' Law of Eminent Domain §6.13[3] (3d 
ed. 1979). 
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III 
The State Supreme Court determined that the appellants could not recover damages for 
inverse condemnation even if the zoning ordinances constituted a taking.  The court stated that 
only mandamus and declaratory judgment are remedies available to such a landowner.  Because 
no taking has occurred, we need not consider whether a State may limit the remedies available to 
a person whose land has been taken without just compensation. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is 
Affirmed. 
MacDONALD, SOMMER & FRATES v. COUNTY OF YOLO 
477 U.S. 340 (1986) 
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, 
BLACKMUN, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.  WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
BURGER, C. J., joined and in Parts I, II, and III of which POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., 
joined, post, p. 353.  REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which POWELL, J., joined.   
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.  
The question presented is whether rejection of a subdivision proposal deprived appellant 
of its property without just compensation contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution. 
This appeal is taken from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to a property owner's 
complaint for money damages for an alleged "taking" of its property.  In 1975, appellant 
submitted a tentative subdivision map to the Yolo County Planning Commission.  Under 
appellant's proposal, the subject property, at least part of which was planted with corn, would be 
subdivided into 159 single-family and multifamily residential lots. 
The Yolo County Planning Commission rejected the subdivision plan, however, and the 
Board of Supervisors of the county affirmed that determination.  The Board found numerous 
reasons why appellant's tentative subdivision map was neither "consistent with the General Plan 
of the County of Yolo, nor with the specific plan of the County of Yolo embodied in the Zoning 
Regulations for the County." Appellant focuses our attention on four of those reasons.  First, the 
Board criticized the plan because it failed to provide for access to the proposed subdivision by a 
public street: the city of Davis, to which the subdivision would adjoin, refused to permit the 
extension of Cowell Boulevard into the development.  Even ignoring this obstacle, "[the] map 
presented [made] no provision for any other means of access to the subdivision," and the Board 
calculated that relying on an extension of Cowell Boulevard alone would "[constitute] a real and 
substantial danger to the public health in the event of fire, earthquake, flood, or other natural 
disaster."  
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Second, the Board found that appellant's "Tentative Map as presented [did] not provide 
for sewer service by any governmental entity": 
"The only means for provision of sewer services by the El Macero interceptor 
sewer require that the proposed subdivision [annex] to the existing Community 
Services Area.  Said annexation is subject to Local Agency Formation 
Commission jurisdiction.  The Board finds that no proceedings currently are 
pending before LAFCO for the annexation of the proposed subdivision."  
Third, the Board rejected the development plan because "[the] level of [police] protection 
capable of being afforded to the proposed site by the [Yolo County] Sheriff's Department is not 
intense enough to meet the needs of the proposed subdivision." Fourth, the Board found 
inadequate the provision for water service for the reason that there was "no provision made in the 
proposed subdivision for the provision of water or maintenance of a water system for the 
subdivision by any governmental entity."  
After this rebuff, appellant filed the present action and, on the same day, a petition for a 
writ of mandate.  The mandate action, which is still pending, seeks to set aside the Board's 
decision and to direct the Board to reconsider appellant's subdivision proposal.  This action, in 
contrast, seeks declaratory and monetary relief.  In it, appellant accuses appellees County of 
Yolo and city of Davis of "restricting the Property to an open-space agricultural use by denying 
all permit applications, subdivision maps, and other requests to implement any other use," and 
thereby of appropriating the "entire economic use" of appellant's property "for the sole purpose 
of [providing] . . . a public, open-space buffer." In particular, the fourth amended complaint 
challenges the Board's decision with respect to the adequacy of public access, sanitation services, 
water supplies, and fire and police protection. Because appellees denied these services, according 
to the complaint, "none of the beneficial uses" allowed even for agricultural land would be 
suitable for appellant's property.  The complaint alleged, in capital letters and "WITHOUT 
LIMITATION BY THE FOREGOING ENUMERATION," that "ANY APPLICATION FOR A 
ZONE CHANGE, VARIANCE OR OTHER RELIEF WOULD BE FUTILE." The complaint 
also alleged that appellant had "exhausted all of its administrative remedies" and that its seven 
causes of action were "ripe" for adjudication.  
In response to these charges appellees demurred. Pointing to "its earlier Order Sustaining 
Demurrers and Granting Leave to Amend," the California Superior Court contended that "the 
property had obvious other uses than agriculture under the Yolo County Code," and referenced 
sections permitting such uses, among others, as ranch and farm dwellings and agricultural 
storage facilities, see Yolo County Code §§8-2.502, 8-2.503.  The court rejected appellant's 
"[attempt] to overcome that defect by alleging as conclusionary fact that each and every principal 
use and each and every multiple accessory use is no longer possible so that the property does 
have no value as zoned." It concluded that, irrespective of the insufficiency of appellant's factual 
allegations, monetary damages for inverse condemnation are foreclosed by the California 
Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 274-277, 598 P. 2d 25, 
29-31 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).  
The California Court of Appeal affirmed.  It "[accepted] as true all the properly pled 
factual allegations of the complaint," and did "not consider whether the complaint was barred by 
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the failure to exhaust administrative remedies or by res judicata," id., at 125-126.  But it "[found] 
the decision in Agins to be controlling herein,": 
"In that case the [California] Supreme Court specifically and clearly established, 
for policy reasons, a rule of law which precludes a landowner from recovering in 
inverse condemnation based upon land use regulation. We emphasize that the 
Court did not hold that regulation cannot amount to a taking without 
compensation, it simply held that in such event the remedy is not inverse 
condemnation. The remedy instead is an action to have the regulation set aside as 
unconstitutional. Plaintiff has filed a mandate action in the trial court which is 
currently pending. That is its proper remedy.  The claim for inverse condemnation 
cannot be maintained."  
In the alternative, the California Court of Appeal determined that appellant would not be 
entitled to monetary relief even if California law provided for this remedy: 
"In any event, even if an inverse condemnation action were available in a land use 
regulation situation, we would be constrained to hold that plaintiff has failed to 
state a cause of action. Pared to their essence, the allegations are that plaintiff 
purchased property for residential development, the property is zoned for 
residential development, plaintiff submitted an application for approval of 
development of the property into 159 residential units, and, in part at the urging of 
the City, the County denied approval of the application.  In these  allegations 
plaintiff is not unlike the plaintiffs in Agins . . . [a case in which] both the 
California Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court held that the 
plaintiffs had failed to allege facts which would establish an unconstitutional 
taking of private property. 
"The plaintiff's claim here must fail for the same reasons the claims in Agins 
failed.  Here plaintiff applied for approval of a particular and relatively intensive 
residential development and the application was denied.  The denial of that 
particular plan cannot be equated with a refusal to permit any development, and 
plaintiff concedes that the property is zoned for residential purposes in the County 
general plan and zoning ordinance. Land use planning is not an all-or-nothing 
proposition.  A governmental entity is not required to permit a landowner to 
develop property to [the] full extent he might desire or be charged with an 
unconstitutional taking of the property.  Here, as in Agins, the refusal of the 
defendants to permit the intensive development desired by the landowner does not 
preclude less intensive, but still valuable development.  Accordingly, the 
complaint fails to state a cause of action." Id., at 132-133 (citation omitted).  
The California Supreme Court denied appellant's petition for hearing, and appellant 
perfected an appeal to this Court.  Because of the importance of the question whether a monetary 
remedy in inverse condemnation is constitutionally required in appropriate cases involving 
regulatory takings, we noted probable jurisdiction.  474 U.S. 917 (1985). On further 
consideration of our jurisdiction to hear this appeal, aided by briefing and oral argument, we find 
ourselves unable to address the merits of this question. 
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II 
The regulatory takings claim advanced by appellant has two components.  First, appellant 
must establish that the regulation has in substance "taken" his property -- that is, that the 
regulation "goes too far." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). See 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979). Second, appellant must demonstrate 
that any proffered compensation is not "just."  
It follows from the nature of a regulatory takings claim that an essential prerequisite to its 
assertion is a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of development 
legally permitted on the subject property.  A court cannot determine whether a regulation has 
gone "too far" unless it knows how far the regulation goes.  As Justice Holmes emphasized 
throughout his opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S., at 416, "this 
is a question of degree -- and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." To this 
day we have no "set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins." Goldblatt v. 
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). Instead, we rely "as much [on] the exercise of judgment 
as [on] the application of logic." Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979). Our cases have 
accordingly "examined the 'taking' question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries 
that have identified several factors -- such as the economic impact of the regulation, its 
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the 
governmental action -- that have particular significance." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
U.S., at 175. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) 
("ad hoc, factual inquiries"); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 
(1958) ("question properly turning upon the particular circumstances of each case").  Until a 
property owner has "obtained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance 
and subdivision regulations to its property," "it is impossible to tell whether the land [retains] any 
reasonable beneficial use or whether [existing] expectation interests [have] been destroyed." 
Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 190 (1985). As we 
explained last Term: 
"[The] difficult problem [is] how to  define "too far," that is, how to distinguish 
the point at which regulation becomes so onerous that it has the same effect as an 
appropriation of the property through eminent domain or physical possession. . . . 
[Resolution] of that question depends, in significant part, upon an analysis of the 
effect the Commission's application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision 
regulations had on the value of respondent's property and investment-backed 
profit expectation.  That effect cannot be measured until a final decision is made 
as to how the regulations will be applied to respondent's property." (footnote 
omitted). 
For similar reasons, a court cannot determine whether a municipality has failed to provide 
"just compensation" until it knows what, if any, compensation the responsible administrative 
body intends to provide.  ("[The] State's action here is not 'complete' until the State fails to 
provide adequate compensation for the taking" (footnote omitted)).  The local agencies charged 
with administering regulations governing property development are singularly flexible 
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institutions; what they take with the one hand they may give back with the other.  In Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, for example, we recognized that the Landmarks 
Preservation Commission, the administrative body primarily responsible for administering New 
York City's Landmarks Preservation Law, had authority in appropriate circumstances to 
authorize alterations, remit taxes, and transfer development rights to ensure the landmark owner 
a reasonable return on its property.  . Because the railroad had "not sought approval for the 
construction of a smaller structure" than its proposed 50-plus story office building, and because 
its development rights in the airspace above its Grand Central Station Terminal were transferable 
"to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of which [had] been found 
suitable for the construction of a new office building," id., at 137, we concluded that "the 
application of New York City's Landmarks Law [had] not effected a 'taking' of [the railroad's] 
property," Whether the inquiry asks if a regulation has "gone too far," or whether it seeks to 
determine if proffered compensation is "just," no answer is possible until a court knows what 
use, if any, may be made of the affected property.  
Our cases uniformly reflect an insistence on knowing the nature and extent of permitted 
development before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport to limit it. 
Thus, in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), we held that zoning ordinances which 
authorized the development of between one and five single-family residences on appellants' 5-
acre tract did not effect a taking of their property on their face, and, because appellants had not 
made application for any improvements to their property, the constitutionality of any particular 
application of the ordinances was not properly before us.  Most recently, in Williamson Planning 
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, we held that the developer's failure either to seek variances that 
would have allowed it to develop the property in accordance with its proposed plat, or to avail 
itself of an available and facially adequate state procedure by which it might obtain "just 
compensation," meant that its regulatory taking claim was premature.  
Here, in comparison to the situations of the property owners in the preceding cases, 
appellant has submitted one subdivision proposal and has received the Board's response thereto.  
Nevertheless, appellant still has yet to receive the Board's "final, definitive position regarding 
how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question." Williamson Planning 
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S., at 191. In Agins, and Williamson  Planning Comm'n, we 
declined to reach the question whether the Constitution requires a monetary remedy to redress 
some regulatory takings because the records in those cases left us uncertain whether the property 
at issue had in fact been taken.  Likewise, in this case, the holdings of both courts below leave 
open the possibility that some development will be permitted, and thus again leave us in doubt 
regarding the antecedent question whether appellant's property has been taken. The judgment is 
therefore.   
Affirmed.   
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PENNELL v. CITY OF SAN JOSE 
485 U.S. 1 (1987) 
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The case involves a challenge to a rent control ordinance enacted by the City of San Jose, 
California, that allows a hearing officer to consider, among other factors, the “hardship to a 
tenant” when determining whether to approve a rent increase proposed by a landlord.  Appellants 
Richard Pennell and the Tri-County Apartment House Owners Association sued in the Superior 
Court of Santa Clara County seeking a declaration that the ordinance, in particular the “tenant 
hardship” provisions, are “facially unconstitutional and therefore . . . illegal and void.”  The 
Superior Court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of appellants, sustaining their claim 
that the tenant hardship provisions violated the Takings Clause of the 5th and 14th Amendments.  
The California Court of Appeal affirmed this judgment, 201 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1984), but the 
Supreme Court of California reversed, 42 Cal. 3d 365, 721 P. 2d, 1111 (1986), each by a divided 
vote. The majority of the Supreme Court rejected appellants’ arguments under the Takings 
Clause of the 5th and 14th Amendments and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of 
the 14th Amendment; the dissenters in that court thought that the tenant hardship provisions were 
a “forced subsidy imposed on the landlord” in violation of the Takings Clause.  Id. at 377, 721 P. 
2d, at 1119.  On appellants’ appeal to this Court we postponed consideration of the question of 
jurisdiction, 480 U. S. 905 (1987), and now having heard oral argument we affirm the judgment 
of the Supreme Court of California.  
The City of San Jose enacted its rent control ordinance (Ordinance) in 1979 with the 
stated purpose of 
“alleviating some of the more immediate needs created by San Jose’s housing 
situation.  These needs include but are not limited to the prevention of excessive 
and unreasonable rent increases, the alleviation of undue hardships upon 
individual tenants, and the assurance to landlords of a fair and reasonable return 
on the value of their property.”  San Jose Municipal Ordinance 19696, §5701.2. 
At the heart of the Ordinance is a mechanism for determining the amount by which 
landlords subject to its provisions may increase the annual rent which they charge their tenants.  
A landlord is automatically entitled to raise the rent of a tenant in possession by as much as eight 
percent; if a tenant objects to an increase greater than eight percent, a hearing is required before a 
“Mediation Hearing Officer” to determine whether the landlord’s proposed increase is 
“reasonable under the circumstances.”  The Ordinance sets forth a number of factors to be 
considered by the hearing officer in making this determination, including “the hardship to a 
tenant.” §5703.28(c)(7).  Because appellants concentrate their attack on the consideration of this 
factor, we set forth the relevant provision of the Ordinance in full: 
“5703.29 Hardship to Tenants.  In the case of a rent increase or any portion 
thereof which exceeds the standard set in Section 5703.28(a) or (b), then with 
respect to such excess and whether or not to allow same to be part of the increase 
allowed under this Chapter, the Hearing Officer shall consider the economic and 
financial hardship imposed on the present tenant or tenants of the unit or units to 
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which such increases apply.  If, on balance, the Hearing Officer determines that 
the proposed increase constitutes an unreasonably severe financial or economic 
hardship on a particular tenant, he may order that the excess of the increase which 
is subject to consideration under subparagraph (c) of Section 5703.28, or any 
portion thereof, be disallowed. Any tenant whose household income and monthly 
housing expense meets [certain income requirements] shall be deemed to be 
suffering under financial and economic hardship which must be weighed in the 
Hearing Officer’s determination.  The burden of proof in establishing any other 
economic hardship shall be on the tenant.” 
If either a tenant or a landlord is dissatisfied with the decision of the hearing officer, the 
Ordinance provides for binding arbitration.  A landlord who attempts to charge or who receives 
rent in excess of the maximum rent established as provided in the Ordinance is subject to 
criminal and civil penalties. 
We first address appellants’ contention that application of the Ordinance’s tenant 
hardship provisions violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition against taking of 
private property for public use without just compensation. In essence, appellants’ claim is as 
follows: §5703.28 of the Ordinance establishes the seven factors that a Hearing Officer is to take 
into account in determining the reasonable rent increase. The first six of these factors are all 
objective, and are related either to the landlord’s costs of providing an adequate rental unit, or to 
the condition of the rental market. Application of these six standards results in a rent that is 
“reasonable” by reference to what appellants’ contend is the only legitimate purpose of rent 
control:  the elimination of “excessive” rents caused by San Jose’s housing shortage.  When the 
Hearing Officer then takes into account “hardship to a tenant” pursuant to §5703.28(c)(7) and 
reduces the rent below the objectively “reasonable” amount established by the first six factors, 
this additional reduction in the rent increase constitutes a “taking.”  This taking is impermissible 
because it does not serve the purpose of eliminating excessive rents – that objective has already 
been accomplished by considering the first six factors – instead, it serves only the purpose of 
providing assistance to “hardship tenants.”  In short, appellants contend, the additional reduction 
of rent on grounds of hardship accomplishes a transfer of the landlord’s property to individual 
hardship tenants; the Ordinance forces private individuals to shoulder the “public” burden of 
subsidizing their poor tenants’ housing.  As appellants’ point out, “it is axiomatic that the Fifth 
Amendment’s just compensation provision is ‘designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.’”  First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 318-319 (1987) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 
(1960)). 
We think it would be premature to consider this contention on the present record.  As 
things stand, there simply is no evidence that the “tenant hardship clause” has in fact ever been 
relied upon by a Hearing Officer to reduce a rent below the figure it would have been set at on 
the basis of the other factors set forth in the Ordinance.  In addition, there is nothing in the 
Ordinance requiring that a Hearing Officer in fact reduce a proposed rent increase on grounds of 
tenant hardship.  Section 5703.29 does make it mandatory that hardship be considered--it states 
that “the Hearing Officer shall consider the economic hardship imposed on the present 
tenant”-but it then goes on to state that if “the proposed increase constitutes an unreasonably 
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severe financial or economic hardship . . . he may order that the excess of the increase” be 
disallowed.  §5703.29 (emphasis added).  Given the “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiry” 
involved in the takings analysis, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 175 (1979), we 
have found it particularly important in takings cases to adhere to our admonition that “the 
constitutionality of statutes ought not be decided except in an actual factual setting that makes 
such a decision necessary.”  Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 
U. S. 264, 294-295 (1981).  In this case we find that the mere fact that a Hearing Officer is 
enjoined to consider hardship to the tenant in fixing a landlord’s rent, without any showing in a 
particular case as to the consequences of that injunction in the ultimate determination of the rent, 
does not present a sufficiently concrete factual setting for the adjudication of the takings claim 
appellants raise here.  Cf. Congress of Industrial Organizations v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 472, 
475-476 (1945) (declining to consider the validity of a state statute when the record did not show 
that the statute would ever be applied to any of the petitioner’s members).  
Appellants also urge that the mere provision in the Ordinance that a Hearing Officer may 
consider the hardship of the tenant in finally fixing a reasonable rent renders the Ordinance 
“facially invalid” under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, even though no landlord 
ever has its rent diminished by as much as one dollar because of the application of this provision.  
The standard for determining whether a state price-control regulation is constitutional under the 
Due Process Clause is well established: “Price control is unconstitutional . . . if arbitrary, 
discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt. . . . .’”  
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 769-770 (1968). Accordingly, appellants do not 
dispute that the Ordinance’s asserted purpose of “preventing excessive and unreasonable rent 
increases” caused by the “growing shortage of and increasing demand for housing in the City of 
San Jose,” §5701.2, is a legitimate exercise of appellees’ police powers.1  They do argue, 
however, that it is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant,” Permain Basin Area 
Rate Cases, supra, at 769-770, for appellees to attempt to accomplish the additional goal of 
reducing the burden of housing costs on low-income tenants by requiring that “hardship to a 
tenant” be considered in determining the amount of excess rent increase that is “reasonable under 
the circumstances” pursuant to §5703.28.  As appellants put it, “The objective of alleviating 
individual tenant hardship is . . . not a ‘policy the legislature is free to adopt’ in a rent control 
ordinance.”  Reply Brief for Appellants 16. 
We reject this contention, however, because we have long recognized that a legitimate 
and rational goal of price or rate regulation is the protection of consumer welfare. Indeed, a 
primary purpose of rent control is the protection of tenants.  We accordingly find that the 
Ordinance, which so carefully considers both the individual circumstances of the landlord and 
the tenant before determining whether to allow an additional increase in rent over and above 
                                                 
1
 Appellants do not claim, as do some amici, that rent control is per se a taking.  We stated in Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982), that we have “consistently affirmed that States have 
broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant relationship in particular without 
paying compensation for all economic injuries that such regulation entails.” Id. at 440 (citing, inter alia, Bowles v. 
Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 517-518 (1944)). And in FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U. S. 245 (1987), we stated 
that “statutes regulating the economic relations of landlords and tenants are not per se takings.”  Id. at 252.  Despite 
amici’s urgings, we see no need to reconsider the constitutionality of rent control per se.  
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certain amounts that are deemed reasonable, does not on its face violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.2 
We also find that the Ordinance does not violate the Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause. Here again, the standard is deferential; appellees need only show that the classification 
scheme embodied in the Ordinance is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”  New 
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976). In light of our conclusion above that the 
Ordinance’s tenant hardship provisions are designed to serve the legitimate purpose of protecting 
tenants, we can hardly conclude that it is irrational for the Ordinance to treat certain landlords 
differently on the basis of whether or not they have hardship tenants.   
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that it is premature to consider appellants’ claim 
under the Takings Clause and we reject their facial challenge to the Ordinance under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment.  The judgment of the Supreme 
Court of California is accordingly Affirmed. 
Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
Dissent:  Justice Scalia, with whom Justice O’Connor joins, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
I agree that the tenant hardship provision of the Ordinance does not, on its face, violate 
either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  I 
disagree, however, with the Court’s conclusion that appellants’ takings claim is premature.  I 
would decide that claim on the merits, and would hold that the tenant hardship provision of the 
Ordinance effects a taking of private property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The traditional manner in which American government has met the problem of those who 
cannot pay reasonable prices for privately sold necessities–a problem caused by the society at 
large–has been the distribution to such persons of funds raised from the public at large through 
taxes, either in cash (welfare payments) or in goods (public housing, publicly subsidized 
housing, and food stamps). Unless we are to abandon the guiding principle of the Takings Clause 
that “public burdens should be borne by the public as a whole,” Armstrong, supra, at 49, this is 
the only manner that our Constitution permits.  The fact that government acts through the 
landlord-tenant relationship does not magically transform general public welfare, which must be 
supported by all the public, into mere “economic regulation,” which can disproportionately 
burden particular individuals.  Here the City is not “regulating” rents in the relevant sense of 
preventing rents that are excessive; rather, it is using the occasion of rent regulation 
                                                 
2
 The consideration of tenant hardship also serves the additional purpose, not stated on the face of the Ordinance, of 
reducing the costs of dislocation that might otherwise result if landlords were to charge rents to tenants that they 
could not afford.  Particularly during a housing shortage, the social costs of the dislocation of low-income tenants 
can be severe. By allowing tenant hardship to be considered under §5703.28(c), the Ordinance enables appellees to 
“fine tune” their rent control to take into account the risk that a particular tenant will be forced to relocate as a result 
of a proposed rent increase.   
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(accomplished by the rest of the Ordinance) to establish a welfare program privately funded by 
those landlords who happen to have “hardship” tenants.” 
Of course all economic regulation effects wealth transfer.  When excessive rents are 
forbidden, for example, landlords as a class become poorer and tenants as a class (or at least 
incumbent tenants as a class) become richer.  Singling out landlords to be the transferors may be 
within our traditional constitutional notions of fairness, because they can plausibly be regarded 
as the source or the beneficiary of the high-rent problem.  Once such a connection is no longer 
required, however, there is no end to the social transformations that can be accomplished by so-
called “regulation,” at great expense to the democratic process. 
The politically attractive feature of regulation is not that it permits wealth transfers to be 
achieved that could not be achieved otherwise; but rather that it permits them to be achieved “off 
budget,” with relative invisibility and thus relative immunity from normal democratic processes.  
San Jose might, for example, have accomplished something like the result here by simply raising 
the real estate tax upon rental properties and using the additional revenues thus acquired to pay 
part of the rents of “hardship” tenants.  It seems to me doubtful, however, whether the citizens of 
San Jose would allow funds in the municipal treasury, from wherever derived, to be distributed 
to a family of four with income as high as $32,400 a year–the generous maximum necessary to 
qualify automatically as a “hardship” tenant under the rental ordinance.3 The voters might well 
see other, more pressing, social priorities.  And of course what $32,400-a-year renters can 
acquire through spurious “regulation,” other groups can acquire as well.  Once the door is 
opened it is not unreasonable to expect price regulations requiring private businesses to give 
special discounts to senior citizens (no matter how affluent), or to students, the handicapped, or 
war veterans.  Subsidies for these groups may well be a good idea, but because of the operation 
of the Takings Clause our governmental system has required them to be applied, in general, 
through the process of taxing and spending, where both economic effects and competing 
priorities are more evident. 
That fostering of an intelligent democratic process is one of the happy effects of the 
constitutional prescription . . . .  I would hold that the seventh factor in §5703.28(c) of the San 
Jose Ordinance effects a taking of property without just compensation. 
                                                 
3
 Under the San Jose Ordinance, “hardship” tenants include (though are not limited to) those whose “household 
income and monthly housing expense meets [sic] the criteria” for assistance under the existing housing provisions of 
§8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U. S. C. §1437f (1982 ed. and Supp. III).  The 
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development currently limits assistance under these provisions for 
families of four in the San Jose area to those who earn $32,400 or less per year.  Memorandum from U. S. Dept. of 
Housing and Urban Development, Assist. Secretary for Housing – Federal Housing Comm’r, Income Limits for 
Lower Income and Very Low-Income Families Under the Housing Act of 1937 (Jan. 15, 1988).   
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YEE v. CITY OF ESCONDIDO 
503 U.S. 519 (1992) 
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: “Nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”  Most of our cases interpreting the Clause fall 
within two distinct classes.  Where the government authorizes a physical occupation of property 
(or actually takes title), the Takings Clause generally requires compensation. See, e. g., Loretto 
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). But where the government 
merely regulates the use of property, compensation is required only if considerations such as the 
purpose of the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the owner of the economic use of the 
property suggest that the regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a burden 
that should be borne by the public as a whole.  See, e. g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-125 (1978). The first category of cases requires courts to apply a clear 
rule; the second necessarily entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic 
effects of government actions. 
Petitioners own mobile home parks in Escondido, California.  They contend that a local 
rent control ordinance, when viewed against the backdrop of California’s Mobilehome 
Residency Law, amounts to a physical occupation of their property entitling them to 
compensation under the first category of cases discussed above. 
I 
The term “mobile home” is somewhat misleading.  Mobile homes are largely immobile 
as a practical matter, because the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of the value of 
the mobile home itself. They are generally placed permanently in parks; once in place, only 
about one in every hundred mobile homes is ever moved. Hirsch & Hirsch, Legal-Economic 
Analysis of Rent Controls in a Mobile Home Context: Placement Values and Vacancy 
Decontrol, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 399, 405 (1988).  A mobile home owner typically rents a plot of 
land, called a “pad,” from the owner of a mobile home park.  The park owner provides private 
roads within the park, common facilities such as washing machines or a swimming pool, and 
often utilities.  The mobile home owner often invests in site-specific improvements such as a 
driveway, steps, walkways, porches, or landscaping. When the mobile home owner wishes to 
move, the mobile home is usually sold in place, and the purchaser continues to rent the pad on 
which the mobile home is located. 
In 1978, California enacted its Mobilehome Residency Law, Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §798 
(West 1982 and Supp. 1991).  The Legislature found “that, because of the high cost of moving 
mobilehomes, the potential for damage resulting therefrom, the requirements relating to the 
installation of mobilehomes, and the cost of landscaping or lot preparation, it is necessary that 
the owners of mobilehomes occupied within mobilehome parks be provided with the unique 
protection from actual or constructive eviction afforded by the provisions of this chapter.”  
§798.55(a). 
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The Mobilehome Residency Law limits the bases upon which a park owner may 
terminate a mobile home owner’s tenancy.  These include the nonpayment of rent, the mobile 
home owner’s violation of law or park rules, and the park owner’s desire to change the use of his 
land.  §798.56. While a rental agreement is in effect, however, the park owner generally may not 
require the removal of a mobilehome when it is sold.  §798.73.  The park owner may neither 
charge a transfer fee for the sale, §798.72, nor disapprove of the purchaser, provided that the 
purchaser has the ability to pay the rent, §798.74.  The Mobilehome Residency Law contains a 
number of other detailed provisions, but none limit the rent the park owner may charge. 
In the wake of the Mobilehome Residency Law, various communities in California 
adopted mobilehome rent control ordinances.  See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra, at 408-411.  The 
voters of Escondido did the same in 1988 by approving Proposition K, the rent control ordinance 
challenged here.  The ordinance sets rents back to their 1986 levels, and prohibits rent increases 
without the approval of the City Council.  Park owners may apply to the Council for rent 
increases at any time. The Council must approve any increases it determines to be “just, fair and 
reasonable,” after considering the following nonexclusive list of factors: (1) changes in the 
Consumer Price Index; (2) the rent charged for comparable mobile home pads in Escondido; 
(3) the length of time since the last rent increase; (4) the cost of any capital improvements related 
to the pad or pads at issue; (5) changes in property taxes; (6) changes in any rent paid by the park 
owner for the land; (7) changes in utility charges; (8) changes in operating and maintenance 
expenses; (9) the need for repairs other than for ordinary wear and tear; (10) the amount and 
quality of services provided to the affected tenant; and (11) any lawful existing lease. Ordinance 
§4(g), App. 11-12. 
Petitioners John and Irene Yee own the Friendly Hills and Sunset Terrace Mobile Home 
Parks, both of which are located in the city of Escondido.  A few months after the adoption of 
Escondido’s rent control ordinance, they filed suit in San Diego County Superior Court.  
According to the complaint, “the rent control law has had the effect of depriving the plaintiffs of 
all use and occupancy of [their] real property and granting to the tenants of mobilehomes 
presently in The Park, as well as the successors in interest of such tenants, the right to physically 
permanently occupy and use the real property of Plaintiff.”  Id. at 3, para. 6.  The Yees requested 
damages of six million dollars, a declaration that the rent control ordinance is unconstitutional, 
and an injunction barring the ordinance’s enforcement.  Id. at 5-6. 
In their opposition to the city’s demurrer, the Yees relied almost entirely on Hall v. City 
of Santa Barbara, 833 F. 2d 1270 (CA9 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988), which had held 
that a similar mobile home rent control ordinance effected a physical taking under Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).   The Yees candidly admitted that 
“in fact, the Hall decision was used [as] a guide in drafting the present Complaint.” 2 Tr. 318, 
Points & Authorities in Opposition to Demurrer 4.  The Superior Court nevertheless sustained 
the city’s demurrer and dismissed the Yees’ complaint.  App. to Pet. for Cert. C-42. 
The Yees were not alone.  Eleven other park owners filed similar suits against the city 
shortly afterwards, and all were dismissed. By stipulation, all 12 cases were consolidated for 
appeal; the parties agreed that all would be submitted for decision by the California Court of 
Appeal on the briefs and oral argument in the Yee case. 
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The Court of Appeal affirmed, in an opinion primarily devoted to expressing the court’s 
disagreement with the reasoning of Hall.  The court concluded:  “Loretto in no way suggests that 
the Escondido ordinance authorizes a permanent physical occupation of the landlord’s property 
and therefore constitutes a per se taking.”  224 Cal. App. 3d 1349, 1358 (1990).  The California 
Supreme Court denied review. App. to Pet. for Cert. B-41. 
Eight of the twelve park owners, including the Yees, joined in a petition for certiorari.  
We granted certiorari, 502 U.S. (1991), to resolve the conflict between the decision below and 
those of two of the federal Courts of Appeals, in Hall, supra, and Pinewood Estates of Michigan 
v. Barnegat Township Leveling Board, 898 F. 2d 347 (CA3 1990). 
II 
Petitioners do not claim that the ordinary rent control statutes regulating housing 
throughout the country violate the Takings Clause. Brief for Petitioners 7, 10. Cf. Pennell v. San 
Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 12, n.6 (1988); Loretto, supra, at 440.  Instead, their argument is predicated on 
the unusual economic relationship between park owners and mobile home owners.  Park owners 
may no longer set rents or decide who their tenants will be.  As a result, according to petitioners, 
any reduction in the rent for a mobile home pad causes a corresponding increase in the value of a 
mobile home, because the mobilehome owner now owns, in addition to a mobile home, the right 
to occupy a pad at a rent below the value that would be set by the free market.  Cf. Hirsch & 
Hirsch, 35 UCLA L. Rev., at 425.  Because under the California Mobilehome Residency Law the 
park owner cannot evict a mobile home owner or easily convert the property to other uses, the 
argument goes, the mobile home owner is effectively a perpetual tenant of the park, and the 
increase in the mobile home’s value thus represents the right to occupy a pad at below-market 
rent indefinitely.  And because the Mobilehome Residency Law permits the mobile home owner 
to sell the mobile home in place, the mobile home owner can receive a premium from the 
purchaser corresponding to this increase in value.  The amount of this premium is not limited by 
the Mobilehome Residency Law or the Escondido ordinance.  As a result, petitioners conclude, 
the rent control ordinance has transferred a discrete interest in land–the right to occupy the land 
indefinitely at a sub-market rent–from the park owner to the mobile home owner.  Petitioners 
contend that what has been transferred from park owner to mobile home owner is no less than a 
right of physical occupation of the park owner’s land. 
This argument, while perhaps within the scope of our regulatory taking cases, cannot be 
squared easily with our cases on physical takings.  The government effects a physical taking only 
where it requires the landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his land. “This element 
of required acquiescence is at the heart of the concept of occupation.”  FCC v. Florida Power 
Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987).  Thus whether the government floods a landowner’s property, 
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166 (1872), or does no more than require the landowner to 
suffer the installation of a cable, Loretto, supra, the Takings Clause requires compensation if the 
government authorizes a compelled physical invasion of property. 
But the Escondido rent control ordinance, even when considered in conjunction with the 
California Mobilehome Residency Law, authorizes no such thing.  Petitioners voluntarily rented 
their land to mobile home owners.  At least on the face of the regulatory scheme, neither the City 
nor the State compels petitioners, once they have rented their property to tenants, to continue 
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doing so. To the contrary, the Mobilehome Residency Law provides that a park owner who 
wishes to change the use of his land may evict his tenants, albeit with six or twelve months 
notice.  Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §798.56(g).  Put bluntly, no government has required any physical 
invasion of petitioners’ property. Petitioners’ tenants were invited by petitioners, not forced upon 
them by the government.  See Florida Power, supra, at 252-253.  While the “right to exclude” is 
doubtless, as petitioners assert, “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property,” Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979), 
we do not find that right to have been taken from petitioners on the mere face of the Escondido 
ordinance. 
On their face, the state and local laws at issue here merely regulate petitioners’ use of 
their land by regulating the relationship between landlord and tenant.  “This Court has 
consistently affirmed that States have broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and 
the landlord-tenant relationship in particular without paying compensation for all economic 
injuries that such regulation entails.”  Loretto, 458 U. S., at 440.  See also Florida Power, supra, 
at 252 (“statutes regulating the economic relations of landlords and tenants are not per se 
takings”).  When a landowner decides to rent his land to tenants, the government may place 
ceilings on the rents the landowner can charge, see, e. g., Pennell, supra, at 12, n.6, or require the 
landowner to accept tenants he does not like, see, e. g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964), without automatically having to pay compensation.  See also 
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-84 (1980). Such forms of regulation are 
analyzed by engaging in the “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries” necessary to determine 
whether a regulatory taking has occurred.  Kaiser Aetna, supra, at 175.  In the words of Justice 
Holmes, “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.”  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
Petitioners emphasize that the ordinance transfers wealth from park owners to incumbent 
mobile home owners.  Other forms of land use regulation, however, can also be said to transfer 
wealth from the one who is regulated to another.  Ordinary rent control often transfers wealth 
from landlords to tenants by reducing the landlords’ income and the tenants’ monthly payments, 
although it does not cause a one-time transfer of value as occurs with mobile homes.  Traditional 
zoning regulations can transfer wealth from those whose activities are prohibited to their 
neighbors; when a property owner is barred from mining coal on his land, for example, the value 
of his property may decline but the value of his neighbor’s property may rise.  The mobile home 
owner’s ability to sell the mobile home at a premium may make this wealth transfer more visible 
than in the ordinary case, see Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 
Brooklyn L. Rev. 741, 758-759 (1988), but the existence of the transfer in itself does not convert 
regulation into physical invasion. 
Petitioners also rely heavily on their allegation that the ordinance benefits incumbent 
mobile home owners without benefiting future mobile home owners, who will be forced to 
purchase mobile homes at premiums.  Mobile homes, like motor vehicles, ordinarily decline in 
value with age.  But the effect of the rent control ordinance, coupled with the restrictions on the 
park owner’s freedom to reject new tenants, is to increase significantly the value of the mobile 
home.  This increased value normally benefits only the tenant in possession at the time the rent 
control is imposed.  See Hirsch & Hirsch, 35 UCLA L. Rev., at 430-431. Petitioners are correct 
in citing the existence of this premium as a difference between the alleged effect of the 
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Escondido ordinance and that of an ordinary apartment rent control statute.  Most apartment 
tenants do not sell anything to their successors (and are often prohibited from charging “key 
money”), so a typical rent control statute will transfer wealth from the landlord to the incumbent 
tenant and all future tenants.  By contrast, petitioners contend that the Escondido ordinance 
transfers wealth only to the incumbent mobile home owner.  This effect might have some bearing 
on whether the ordinance causes a regulatory taking, as it may shed some light on whether there 
is a sufficient nexus between the effect of the ordinance and the objectives it is supposed to 
advance.   But it has nothing to do with whether the ordinance causes a physical taking.  Whether 
the ordinance benefits only current mobile home owners or all mobile home owners, it does not 
require petitioners to submit to the physical occupation of their land. 
The same may be said of petitioners’ contention that the ordinance amounts to compelled 
physical occupation because it deprives petitioners of the ability to choose their incoming 
tenants. Again, this effect may be relevant to a regulatory taking argument, as it may be one 
factor a reviewing court would wish to consider in determining whether the ordinance unjustly 
imposes a burden on petitioners that should “be compensated by the government, rather than 
remaining disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.”  Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U. S., at 124.  But it does not convert regulation into the unwanted physical 
occupation of land. Because they voluntarily open their property to occupation by others, 
petitioners cannot assert a per se right to compensation based on their inability to exclude 
particular individuals.  See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S., at 261; see 
also id., at 259 (“appellant has no ‘right’ to select its guests as it sees fit, free from governmental 
regulation”); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S., at 82-84. 
Petitioners’ final line of argument rests on a footnote in Loretto, in which we rejected the 
contention that “the landlord could avoid the requirements of [the statute forcing her to permit 
cable to be permanently placed on her property] by ceasing to rent the building to tenants.”  We 
found this possibility insufficient to defeat a physical taking claim, because “a landlord’s ability 
to rent his property may not be conditioned on his forfeiting the right to compensation for a 
physical occupation.”  Loretto, 458 U. S., at 439, n. 17.  Petitioners argue that if they have to 
leave the mobile home park business in order to avoid the strictures of the Escondido ordinance, 
their ability to rent their property has in fact been conditioned on such a forfeiture.  This 
argument fails at its base, however, because there has simply been no compelled physical 
occupation giving rise to a right to compensation that petitioners could have forfeited.  Had the 
city required such an occupation, of course, petitioners would have a right to compensation, and 
the city might then lack the power to condition petitioners’ ability to run mobile home parks on 
their waiver of this right.  Cf. Nollan, 483 U. S., at 837.  But because the ordinance does not 
effect a physical taking in the first place, this footnote in Loretto does not help petitioners. 
The Escondido rent control ordinance, even considered against the backdrop of 
California’s Mobilehome Residency Law, does not authorize an unwanted physical occupation 
of petitioners’ property. It is a regulation of petitioners’ use of their property, and thus does not 
amount to a per se taking. 
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III 
In this Court, petitioners attempt to challenge the ordinance on two additional grounds: 
They argue that it constitutes a denial of substantive due process and a regulatory taking.  
Neither of these claims is properly before us.  The first was not raised or addressed below, and 
the second is not fairly included in the question on which we granted certiorari. 
A 
The Yees did not include a due process claim in their complaint.  Nor did petitioners raise 
a due process claim in the Court of Appeal.  It was not until their petition for review in the 
California Supreme Court that petitioners finally raised a substantive due process claim.  But the 
California Supreme Court denied discretionary review.  Such a denial, as in this Court, expresses 
no view as to the merits.  See People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 890-891, 506 P. 2d 232, 236 
(1973).  In short, petitioners did not raise a substantive due process claim in the state courts, and 
no state court has addressed such a claim. 
In reviewing the judgments of state courts under the jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. 
§1257, the Court has, with very rare exceptions, refused to consider petitioners’ claims that were 
not raised or addressed below.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 218-220 (1983).  While we have 
expressed inconsistent views as to whether this rule is jurisdictional or prudential in cases arising 
from state courts, see ibid., we need not resolve the question here.  (In cases arising from federal 
courts, the rule is prudential only.  See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17, n. 2 (1980)).  
Even if the rule were prudential, we would adhere to it in this case.  Because petitioners did not 
raise their substantive due process claim below, and because the state courts did not address it, 
we will not consider it here. 
B 
Petitioners unquestionably raised a taking claim in the state courts.  The question whether 
the rent control ordinance took their property without compensation, in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause, is thus properly before us.  Once a federal claim is properly 
presented, a party can make any argument in support of that claim; parties are not limited to the 
precise arguments they made below.  Petitioners’ arguments that the ordinance constitutes a 
taking in two different ways, by physical occupation and by regulation, are not separate claims.  
They are rather separate arguments in support of a single claim–that the ordinance effects an 
unconstitutional taking.  Having raised a taking claim in the state courts, therefore, petitioners 
could have formulated any argument they liked in support of that claim here. 
A litigant seeking review in this Court of a claim properly raised in the lower courts thus 
generally possesses the ability to frame the question to be decided in any way he chooses, 
without being limited to the manner in which the question was framed below. While we have on 
occasion rephrased the question presented by a petitioner, see, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 
502 U.S. ___ (1992), or requested the parties to address an important question of law not raised 
in the petition for certiorari, see, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 498 U.S. ___ (1991), by and large it is 
the petitioner himself who controls the scope of the question presented.  The petitioner can 
generally frame the question as broadly or as narrowly as he sees fit. 
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The framing of the question presented has significant consequences, however, because 
under this Court’s Rule 14.1(a), “only the questions set forth in the petition, or fairly included 
therein, will be considered by the Court.” While “the statement of any question presented will be 
deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein,” ibid., we ordinarily do 
not consider questions outside those presented in the petition for certiorari. See, e.g., Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443, n.38 (1984). This rule is prudential in nature, but we disregard it 
“only in the most exceptional cases,” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481, n.15 (1976), where 
reasons of urgency or of economy suggest the need to address the unpresented question in the 
case under consideration. 
Rule 14.1(a) serves two important and related purposes.  First, it provides the respondent 
with notice of the grounds upon which the petitioner is seeking certiorari, and enables the 
respondent to sharpen the arguments as to why certiorari should not be granted. Were we 
routinely to consider questions beyond those raised in the petition, the respondent would lack 
any opportunity in advance of litigation on the merits to argue that such questions are not worthy 
of review.  Where, as is not unusual, the decision below involves issues on which the petitioner 
does not seek certiorari, the respondent would face the formidable task of opposing certiorari on 
every issue the Court might conceivably find present in the case.  By forcing the petitioner to 
choose his questions at the outset, Rule 14.1(a) relieves the respondent of the expense of 
unnecessary litigation on the merits and the burden of opposing certiorari on unpresented 
questions. 
Second, Rule 14.1(a) assists the Court in selecting the cases in which certiorari will be 
granted. Last Term alone we received over 5,000 petitions for certiorari, but we have the 
capacity to decide only a small fraction of these cases on the merits.  To use our resources most 
efficiently, we must grant certiorari only in those cases that will enable us to resolve particularly 
important questions. Were we routinely to entertain questions not presented in the petition for 
certiorari, much of this efficiency would vanish, as parties who feared an inability to prevail on 
the question presented would be encouraged to fill their limited briefing space and argument time 
with discussion of issues other than the one on which certiorari was granted.  Rule 14.1(a) forces 
the parties to focus on the questions the Court has viewed as particularly important, thus enabling 
us to make efficient use of our resources. 
We granted certiorari on a single question pertaining to the Takings Clause: “Two federal 
courts of appeal have held that the transfer of a premium value to a departing mobilehome 
tenant, representing the value of the right to occupy at a reduced rate under local mobilehome 
rent control ordinances, constitutes an impermissible taking.  Was it error for the state appellate 
court to disregard the rulings and hold that there was no taking under the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments?” This was the question presented by petitioners.  Pet. for Cert. i.  It asks whether 
the court below erred in disagreeing with the holdings of the Courts of Appeals for the Third and 
Ninth Circuits in Pinewood Estates of Michigan v. Barnegat Township Leveling Board, 898 F. 
2d 347 (CA3 1990), and Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F. 2d 1270 (CA9 1987), cert. denied, 
485 U.S. 940 (1988). These cases, in turn, held that mobile home ordinances effected physical 
takings, not regulatory takings.  Fairly construed, then, petitioners’ question presented is the 
equivalent of the question “Did the court below err in finding no physical taking?” 
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Whether or not the ordinance effects a regulatory taking is a question related to the one 
petitioners presented, and perhaps complementary to the one petitioners presented, but it is not 
“fairly included therein.”  Consideration of whether a regulatory taking occurred would not assist 
in resolving whether a physical taking occurred as well; neither of the two questions is subsidiary 
to the other.  Rule 14.1(a) accordingly creates a heavy presumption against our consideration of 
petitioners’ claim that the ordinance causes a regulatory taking.  Petitioners have not overcome 
that presumption. While the regulatory taking question is no doubt important, from an 
institutional perspective it is not as important as the physical taking question.  The lower courts 
have not reached conflicting results, so far as we know, on whether similar mobile home rent 
control ordinances effect regulatory takings. They have reached conflicting results over whether 
such ordinances cause physical takings; such a conflict is, of course, a substantial reason for 
granting certiorari under this Court’s Rule 10. Moreover, the conflict is between two courts 
whose jurisdiction includes California, the State with the largest population and one with a 
relatively high percentage of the nation’s mobile homes. Forum-shopping is thus of particular 
concern.  See Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575, 579 (CA9 1991) (mobile 
home park owners may file physical taking suits in either state or federal court).  Prudence also 
dictates awaiting a case in which the issue was fully litigated below, so that we will have the 
benefit of developed arguments on both sides and lower court opinions squarely addressing the 
question.  See Lytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 552, n. 3 (1990) 
(“Applying our analysis . . . to the facts of a particular case without the benefit of a full record or 
lower court determinations is not a sensible exercise of this Court’s discretion”).  In fact, were 
we to address the issue here, we would apparently be the first court in the nation to determine 
whether an ordinance like this one effects a regulatory taking.  We will accordingly follow Rule 
14.1(a), and consider only the question petitioners raised in seeking certiorari.  We leave the 
regulatory taking issue for the California courts to address in the first instance. 
Because the Escondido rent control ordinance does not compel a landowner to suffer the 
physical occupation of his property, it does not effect a per se taking under Loretto.  The 
judgment of the Court of Appeal is accordingly 
Affirmed. 
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Session 23. Challenges in Federal Courts 
When there has been a “regulatory taking” claimants are guaranteed a day in court by the 
due to the “self-executing” character of the 5th and 14th Amendments. The Court of Federal 
Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over just compensation claims against the United States while 
the U.S. District courts have the power to grant declaratory and injunctive relief against federal 
officials. Judicial revitalization of §1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has  also provided 
private litigants with a federal cause of action against state and local governments, subject to 
significant 11th amendment limitations.  
LAKE COUNTRY ESTATES, INC. v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY 
440 U.S. 391 (1978) 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, an entity 
created by Compact between California and Nevada, is entitled to the immunity that the Eleventh 
Amendment provides to the compacting States themselves.
1
 The case also presents the question 
whether the individual members of the Agency's governing body are entitled to absolute 
immunity from federal damages claims when acting in a legislative capacity.   
Lake Tahoe, a unique mountain lake, is located partly in California and partly in Nevada. 
The Lake Tahoe Basin, an area comprising 500 square miles, is a popular resort area that has 
grown rapidly in recent years. 
In 1968, the States of California and Nevada agreed to create a single agency to 
coordinate and regulate development in the Basin and to conserve its natural resources. As 
required by the Constitution, in 1969 Congress gave its consent to the Compact, and the Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) was organized. The Compact authorized TRPA to adopt and 
to enforce a regional plan for land use, transportation, conservation, recreation, and public 
services.  
Petitioners own property in the Lake Tahoe Basin.  In 1973, they filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California alleging that TRPA, the 
individual members of its governing body, and its executive officer had adopted a land-use 
ordinance and general plan, and engaged in other conduct, that destroyed the economic value of 
petitioners' property. Petitioners alleged that respondents had thereby taken their property 
without due process of law and without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.  They sought monetary and 
equitable relief. 
                                                 
1
 "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State." 
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Petitioners advanced alternative theories to support their federal claim.  First, they 
asserted that the alleged violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments gave rise to an 
implied cause of action that jurisdiction could be predicated on 28 U. S. C. §1331.
2
 Second, they 
claimed that respondents had acted under color of state law and therefore their cause of action 
was authorized by 42 U. S. C. §1983
3
 and jurisdiction was provided by 28 U. S. C. §1343.
4
 
The District Court dismissed the complaint.  Although it concluded that the complaint 
sufficiently alleged a cause of   action for "inverse condemnation," it held that such an action 
could not be brought against TRPA because that agency did not have the authority to condemn 
property. The court also held that the individual defendants were immune from liability for the 
exercise of the discretionary functions alleged in the complaint.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of TRPA, but reinstated the complaint against the 
individual respondents.  566 F.2d 1353. Addressing first the questions of cause of action and 
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' claims based on §§1983 and 1343. The 
court held that congressional approval had transformed the Compact between the States into 
federal law.  As a result, the respondents were acting pursuant to federal authority, rather than 
under color of state law, and §§1983 and 1343 could not be invoked to provide a cause of action 
and federal jurisdiction.  But the court accepted petitioners' alternative argument: It held that they 
had alleged a deprivation of due process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
that an implied remedy was available, and that federal jurisdiction was provided by §1331.  
Having found a cause of action and a basis for federal jurisdiction, the court turned to the 
immunity questions.  Although the point had not been argued, the Court of Appeals decided that 
the Eleventh Amendment immunized TRPA from suit in a federal court.  With respect to the 
individual respondents, the Court of Appeals held that absolute immunity should be afforded for 
conduct of a legislative character and qualified immunity for executive action.  Since the record 
did not adequately disclose whether the challenged conduct was legislative or executive, the 
court remanded for a hearing. 
                                                 
2
 The amount in controversy exceeds $10,000.  Title 28 U. S. C. §1331, the general federal – question jurisdiction 
statute, provides in part: 
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the 
sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States except that no such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought against the United 
States, any agency, thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity."  
3
 Title 42 U. S. C. §1983 provides: 
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."   
4
 Title 28 U. S. C. §1343 provides in part: 
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any 
person:   . . . . 
"(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any 
right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing 
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States." 
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Petitioners ask this Court to hold that TRPA is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity and that the individual respondents are not entitled to absolute immunity when acting 
in a legislative capacity.  
I 
Before addressing the immunity issues, we must consider whether petitioners properly 
invoked the jurisdiction of a federal court. 
Even if the lack of a cause of action were considered a jurisdictional defect in a suit 
brought under §1331, we may not dismiss for that reason if the record discloses that federal 
jurisdiction does in fact exist.  In this case...we conclude that there is both a cause of action and 
federal jurisdiction. Section 1983 provides a remedy for individuals alleging deprivations of their 
constitutional rights by action taken "under color of state law." The Court of Appeals incorrectly 
assumed that the requirement of federal approval of the interstate Compact foreclosed the 
possibility that the conduct of TRPA and its officers could be found to be "under color of state 
law" within the meaning of §1983. 
The Compact had its genesis in the actions of the compacting States, and it remains part 
of the statutory law of both States. The actual implementation of TRPA, after federal approval 
was obtained, depended upon the appointment of governing members and executives by the two 
States and their subdivisions and upon mandatory financing secured, by the terms of the 
Compact, from the counties. In discharging their duties as officials of TRPA, the state and 
county appointees necessarily have also served the interests of the political units that appointed 
them.  The federal involvement, by contrast, is limited to the appointment of one nonvoting 
member to the governing board. While congressional consent to the original Compact was 
required, the States may confer additional powers and duties on TRPA without further 
congressional action.  And each State retains an absolute right to withdraw from the Compact. 
Even if it were not well settled that §1983 must be given a liberal construction, these 
facts adequately characterize the alleged actions of the respondents as "under color of state law" 
within the meaning of that statute.  Federal jurisdiction therefore rests on §1343, and there is no 
need to address the question whether there is an implied remedy for violation of the Fifth or the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  
II 
The Court of Appeals held that California and Nevada had delegated authority ordinarily 
residing in each of those States to TRPA.  Because "the bi-state Authority serves as an agency of 
the participant states, exercising a specially aggregated slice of state power," the court concluded 
"that the TRPA is protected by sovereign immunity, preserved for the states by the Eleventh 
Amendment." 566 F.2d, at 1359-1360. 
The reasoning of the Court of Appeals would extend Eleventh Amendment immunity to 
every bistate agency unless that immunity were expressly waived. TRPA argues that the 
propriety of this result is evidenced by the special constitutional requirement of congressional 
approval of any interstate compact. Any agency that is so important that it could not even be 
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created by the States without a special Act of Congress should receive the same immunity that is 
accorded to the States themselves. 
We cannot accept such an expansive reading of the Eleventh Amendment.  By its terms, 
the protection afforded by that Amendment is only available to "one of the United States." It is 
true, of course, that some agencies exercising  state power have been permitted to invoke the 
Amendment in order to protect the state treasury from liability that would have had essentially 
the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself. But the Court has 
consistently refused to construe the Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions 
such as counties and municipalities, even though such entities exercise a "slice of state power." 
If an interstate compact discloses that the compacting States created an agency 
comparable to a county or municipality, which has no Eleventh Amendment immunity, the 
Amendment should not be construed to immunize such an entity. Unless there is good reason to 
believe that the States structured the new agency to enable it to enjoy the special constitutional 
protection of the States themselves, and that Congress concurred in that purpose, there would 
appear to be no justification for reading additional meaning into the limited language of the 
Amendment. 
California and Nevada have both filed briefs in this Court disclaiming any intent to 
confer immunity on TRPA.  They point to provisions of their Compact that indicate that TRPA is 
to be regarded as a political subdivision rather than an arm of the State. Finally, instead of the 
state treasury being directly responsible for judgments against TRPA, Art. VII (f) expressly 
provides that obligations of TRPA shall not be binding on either State. 
The regulation of land use is traditionally a function performed by local governments. 
Concern with the proper performance of that function in the bistate area was a primary 
motivation for the creation of TRPA itself, and gave rise to the specific controversy at issue in 
this litigation. Moreover, while TRPA, like cities, towns, and counties, was originally created by 
the States, its authority to make rules within its jurisdiction is not subject to veto at the state 
level.  Indeed, that TRPA is not in fact an arm of the State subject to its   control is perhaps most 
forcefully demonstrated by the fact that California has resorted to litigation in an unsuccessful 
attempt to impose its will on TRPA. 
The intentions of Nevada and California, the terms of the Compact, and the actual 
operation of TRPA make clear that nothing short of an absolute rule, such as that implicit in the 
holding of the Court of Appeals, would allow TRPA to claim the sovereign immunity provided 
by the Constitution to Nevada and California.  Because the Eleventh Amendment prescribes no 
such rule, we hold that TRPA is subject to "the judicial power of the United States" within the 
meaning of that Amendment.  
III 
We turn, finally, to petitioners' challenge to the Court of Appeals' holding that the 
individual respondents are absolutely immune from federal damages liability for actions taken in 
their legislative capacities.  
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The immunity of legislators from civil suit for what they do or say as legislators has its 
roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th- and 17th-century England; such immunity was 
consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation's 
founders. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, this Court reasoned that Congress, in enacting 
§1983 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, could not have intended "to overturn the tradition 
of legislative freedom achieved in England by Civil War and carefully preserved in the formation 
of State and National Governments here." 341 U.S., at 376. It therefore held that state legislators 
are absolutely immune from suit under §1983 for actions "in the sphere of legitimate legislative 
activity." 341 U.S., at 376. 
Petitioners do not challenge the validity of the holding in Tenney, or of the decisions 
recognizing the absolute immunity of federal legislators. Rather, their claim is that absolute 
immunity should be limited to the federal and state levels, and should not extend to individuals 
acting in a legislative capacity at a regional level.  In support of this proposed distinction, 
petitioners argue that the source of immunity for state legislators is found in constitutional 
provisions, such as the Speech or Debate Clause, which have no application to a body such as 
TRPA.  In addition, they point out that because state legislatures have effective means of 
disciplining their members that TRPA does not have, the threat of possible personal liability is 
necessary to deter lawless conduct by the governing members of TRPA.  
We find these arguments unpersuasive.  The Speech or Debate Clause of the United 
States Constitution is no more applicable to the members of state legislatures than to the 
members of TRPA.  The States are, of course, free to adopt similar clauses in their own 
constitutions, and many have in fact done so. These clauses reflect the central importance 
attached to legislative freedom in our Nation.  But the absolute immunity for state legislators 
recognized in Tenney reflected the Court's interpretation of federal law; the decision did not 
depend on the presence of a speech or debate clause in the constitution of any State, or on any 
particular set of state rules or procedures available to discipline erring legislators.  Rather, the 
rule of that case recognizes the need for immunity to protect the "public good." 
This reasoning is equally applicable to federal, state, and regional legislators. Whatever 
potential damages liability regional legislators may face as a matter of state law, we hold that 
petitioners' federal claims do not encompass the recovery of damages from the members of 
TRPA acting in a legislative capacity. 
Like the Court of Appeals, we are unable to determine from the record the extent to 
which petitioners seek to impose liability upon the individual respondents for the performance of 
their legislative duties.  We agree, however, that to the extent the evidence discloses that these 
individuals were acting in a capacity comparable to that of members of a state legislature, they 
are entitled to absolute immunity from federal damages liability.  
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
It is so ordered. 
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WILLIAMSON COUNTY REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION v. HAMILTON 
BANK OF JOHNSON CITY 
473 U.S. 172 (1985) 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondent, the owner of a tract of land it was developing as a residential subdivision, 
sued petitioners, the Williamson County (Tennessee) Regional Planning Commission and its 
members and staff, in United States District Court, alleging that petitioners' application of 
various zoning laws and regulations to respondent's property amounted to a "taking" of that 
property.  At trial, the jury agreed and awarded respondent $350,000 as just compensation for the 
"taking." Although the jury's verdict was rejected by the District Court, which granted a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict to petitioners, the verdict was reinstated on appeal. 
Petitioners and their amici urge this Court to overturn the jury's award. We examine the 
procedural posture of respondent's claim. 
I 
A 
Under Tennessee law, responsibility for land-use planning is divided between the 
legislative body of each of the State's counties and regional and municipal "planning 
commissions."  The county legislative body is responsible for zoning ordinances to regulate the 
uses to which particular land and buildings may be put, and to control the density of population 
and the location and dimensions of buildings.  Tenn. Code Ann. §13-7-101 (1980).  The planning 
commissions are responsible for more specific regulations governing the subdivision of land 
within their region or municipality for residential development.  §§13-3-403, 13-4-303.  
As required by §13-3-402, respondent's predecessor-in-interest (developer) in 1973 
submitted a preliminary plat for the cluster development of its tract, the Temple Hills Country 
Club Estates (Temple Hills), to the Williamson County Regional Planning Commission for 
approval.  
On May 3, 1973, the Commission approved the developer's preliminary plat for Temple 
Hills. The plat indicated that the development was to include 676 acres, of which 260 acres 
would be open space, primarily in the form of a golf course.  
Upon approval of the preliminary plat, the developer conveyed to the county a permanent 
open space easement for the golf course, and began building roads and installing utility lines for 
the project.  The developer spent approximately $3 million building the golf course, and another 
$500,000 installing sewer and water facilities. Before housing construction was to begin on a 
particular section, a final plat of that section was submitted for approval. Several sections, 
containing a total of 212 units, were given final approval by 1979.  The preliminary plat, as well, 
was reapproved four times during that period.  
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In 1977, the county changed its zoning ordinance to require that calculations of allowable 
density exclude 10% of the total acreage to account for roads and utilities. allowed in 1973.  The 
Commission continued to apply the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations in effect in 
1973 to Temple Hills, however, and reapproved the preliminary plat in 1978.  In August 1979, 
the Commission reversed its position and decided that plats submitted for renewal should be 
evaluated under the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations in effect when the renewal was 
sought. [T]he Commission disapproved the plat on two other grounds: first, the plat did not 
comply with the density requirements of the zoning ordinance or subdivision regulations, 
because no deduction had been made for the land taken for the parkway, and because there had 
been no deduction for 10% of the acreage attributable to roads or for 50% of the land having a 
slope of more than 25%; and second, lots were placed on slopes with a grade greater than 25%. 
The developer then appealed to the County Board of Zoning Appeals for an 
"interpretation of the Residential Cluster zoning [ordinance] as it relates to Temple Hills."   On 
November 11, 1980, the Board determined that the Commission should apply the zoning 
ordinance and subdivision regulations that were in effect in 1973 in evaluating the density of 
Temple Hills.  It also decided that in measuring which lots had excessive grades, the 
Commission should define the slope in a manner more favorable to the developer.  
On November 26, respondent, Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, acquired through 
foreclosure the property in the Temple Hills subdivision that had not yet been developed, a total 
of 257.65 acres. This included many of the parcels that had been left blank in the preliminary 
plat approved in 1973. In June 1981, respondent submitted two preliminary plats to the 
Commission - the plat that had been approved in 1973 and subsequently reapproved several 
times, and a plat indicating respondent's plans for the undeveloped areas, which was similar to 
the plat submitted by the developer in 1980.  Id., at 88.  The new plat proposed the development 
of 688 units; the reduction from 736 units represented respondent's concession that 18.5 acres 
should be removed from the acreage because that land had been taken for the parkway.  Id., at 
424, 425. 
On June 18, the Commission disapproved the plat for eight reasons, including the density 
and grade problems cited in the October 1980 denial, as well as the objections the Temple Hills 
Committee had raised in 1980 to the length of two cul-de-sacs, the grade of various roads, the 
lack of fire protection, the disrepair of the main-access road, and the minimum frontage.  The 
Commission declined to follow the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals that the plat should 
be evaluated by the 1973 zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations, stating that the Board 
lacked jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Commission.  
B 
Respondent then filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Tennessee, pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging that the Commission had taken its property 
without just compensation and asserting that the Commission should be estopped under state law 
from denying approval of the project.  Respondent's expert witnesses testified that the design that 
would meet each of the Commission's eight objections would allow respondent to build only 67 
units, 409 fewer than respondent claims it is entitled to build,  and that the development of only 
67 sites would result in a net loss of over $1 million.   Petitioners' expert witness, on the other 
554 
hand, testified that the Commission's eight objections could be overcome by a design that would 
allow development of approximately 300 units. 
After a 3-week trial, the jury found that respondent had been denied the "economically 
viable" use of its property in violation of the Just Compensation Clause, and that the 
Commission was estopped under state law from requiring respondent to comply with the current 
zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations rather than those in effect in 1973. The jury 
awarded damages of $350,000 for the temporary taking of respondent's property. The court 
entered a permanent injunction requiring the Commission to apply the zoning ordinance and 
subdivision regulations in effect in 1973 to Temple Hills, and to approve the plat submitted in 
1981.  
The court then granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the Commission 
on the taking claim, reasoning in part that respondent was unable to derive economic benefit 
from its property on a temporary basis only, and that such a temporary deprivation, as a matter of 
law, cannot constitute a taking. 
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.  729 
F.2d 402 (1984).  The court held that application of government regulations affecting an owner's 
use of property may constitute a taking if the regulation denies the owner all "economically 
viable" use of the land, and that the evidence supported the jury's finding that the property had no 
economically feasible use during the time between the Commission's refusal to approve the 
preliminary plat and the jury's verdict.   
II 
We granted certiorari to address the question whether Federal, State, and local 
Governments must pay money damages to a landowner whose property allegedly has been 
"taken" temporarily by the application of government regulations.  469 U.S. 815 (1984).  We 
conclude that respondent's claim is premature. 
III 
We examine the posture of respondent's cause of action first by viewing it as stating a 
claim under the Just Compensation Clause.  This Court often has referred to regulation that "goes 
too far," Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), as a "taking." 
The jury verdict in this case cannot be upheld.  Because respondent has not yet obtained a 
final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its 
property, nor utilized the procedures Tennessee provides for obtaining just compensation, 
respondent's claim is not ripe. 
A 
As the Court has made clear in several recent decisions, a claim that the application of 
government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government 
entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the 
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application of the regulations to the property at issue.  [I]n Agins v. Tiburon, supra, the Court 
held that a challenge to the application of a zoning ordinance was not ripe because the property 
owners had not yet submitted a plan for development of their property.  447 U.S., at 260.  
Respondent's claim is premature....  [R]espondent did not then seek variances that would 
have allowed it to develop the property according to its proposed plat, notwithstanding the 
Commission's finding that the plat did not comply with the zoning ordinance and subdivision 
regulations.  It appears that variances could have been granted to resolve at least five of the 
Commission's eight objections to the plat.  The Board of Zoning Appeals had the power to grant 
certain variances from the zoning ordinance, including the ordinance's density requirements and 
its restriction on placing units on land with slopes having a grade in excess of 25%. 
Respondent argues that it "did everything possible to resolve the conflict with the 
commission," Brief for Respondent 42, and that the Commission's denial of approval for 
respondent's plat was equivalent to a denial of variances.  The record does not support 
respondent's claim, however. There is no evidence that respondent applied to the Board of 
Zoning Appeals for variances from the zoning ordinance.  
Our reluctance to examine taking claims until such a final decision has been made is 
compelled by the very nature of the inquiry required by the Just Compensation Clause. Although 
"[the] question of what constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to 
be a problem of considerable difficulty," Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S., 
at 123, this Court consistently has indicated that among the factors of particular significance in 
the inquiry are the economic impact of the challenged action and the extent to which it interferes 
with reasonable investment-backed expectations.  Id., at 124.  See also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
Co., 467 U.S., at 1005; PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S., at 83; Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S., at 175.  Those factors simply cannot be evaluated until the 
administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the 
regulations at issue to the particular land in question. 
The Commission's refusal to approve the preliminary plat does not determine that issue; it 
prevents respondent from developing its subdivision without obtaining the necessary variances, 
but leaves open the possibility that respondent may develop the subdivision according to its plat 
after obtaining the variances.  In short, the Commission's denial of approval does not 
conclusively determine whether respondent will be denied all reasonable beneficial use of its 
property, and therefore is not a final, reviewable decision. 
B 
A second reason the taking claim is not yet ripe is that respondent did not seek 
compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so.  The Fifth Amendment 
does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation.  If the 
government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that 
process "[yields] just compensation," then the property owner "has no claim against the 
Government" for a taking.  Thus, we have held that taking claims against the Federal 
Government are premature until the property owner has availed itself of the process provided by 
the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. §1491. Monsanto, 467 U.S., at 1016-1020.  Similarly, if a State 
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provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim 
a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just 
compensation. 
Under Tennessee law, a property owner may bring an inverse condemnation action to 
obtain just compensation for an alleged taking of property under certain circumstances.  Tenn. 
Code Ann. §29-16-123 (1980).  Respondent has not shown that the inverse condemnation 
procedure is unavailable or inadequate, and until it has utilized that procedure, its taking claim is 
premature. 
As we have noted, resolution of that [taking] question depends, in significant part, upon 
an analysis of the effect the Commission's application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision 
regulations had on the value of respondent's property and investment-backed profit expectations. 
That effect cannot be measured until a final decision is made as to how the regulations will be 
applied to respondent's property.  No such decision had been made at the time respondent filed 
its §1983 action, because respondent failed to apply for variances from the regulations. 
V 
In sum, respondent's claim is premature, whether it is analyzed as a deprivation of 
property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, or as a taking under the Just 
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY 
520 U.S. 725 (1997) 
JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.  
Petitioner Bernadine Suitum owns land near the Nevada shore of Lake Tahoe. 
Respondent Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, which regulates land use in the region, 
determined that Suitum's property is ineligible for development but entitled to receive certain 
allegedly valuable "Transferable Development Rights" (TDRs). Suitum has brought an action for 
compensation under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming that the Agency's 
determinations amounted to a regulatory taking of her property. While the pleadings raise issues 
about the significance of the TDRs both to the claim that a taking has occurred and to the 
constitutional requirement of just compensation, we have no occasion to decide, and we do not 
decide, whether or not these TDRs may be considered in deciding the issue of whether there has 
been a taking in this case, as opposed to the issue of whether just compensation has been 
afforded for such a taking. The sole question here is whether the claim is ripe for adjudication, 
even though Suitum has not attempted to sell the development rights she has or is eligible to 
receive. We hold that it is. 
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I 
In 1969, Congress approved the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact between the States of 
California and Nevada, creating respondent as an interstate agency to regulate development in 
the Lake Tahoe basin. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 
U.S. 391, 394, 59 L. Ed. 2d 401, 99 S. Ct. 1171 (1979). After the 1969 compact had proven 
inadequate for protection of the lake and its environment, the States proposed and Congress 
approved an amendment in 1980, requiring the agency to adopt a plan barring any development 
exceeding such specific "environmental threshold carrying capacities" as the agency might find 
appropriate. Pub. L. 96-551, Arts. I(b), V(b), V(g), 94 Stat. 3234, 3239-3241.
1
 
In 1987, the agency adopted a new Regional Plan providing for an "Individual Parcel 
Evaluation System" (IPES) to rate the suitability of vacant residential parcels for building and 
other modification. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency Code of Ordinances ch. 37 (TRPA Code). 
Whereas any property must attain a minimum IPES score to qualify for construction, id., 
§37.8.E; App. 145, an undeveloped parcel in certain areas carrying run-off into the watershed 
(known as "Stream Environment Zones" (SEZs)) receives an IPES score of zero, TRPA Code 
§37.4.A(3). With limited exceptions not relevant here, the agency permits no "additional land 
coverage or other permanent land disturbance" on such a parcel. Id., §20.4. 
Although the agency's 1987 plan does not provide for the variances and exceptions of 
conventional land use schemes, it addresses the potential sharpness of its restrictions by granting 
property owners TDRs that may be sold to owners of parcels eligible for construction, id., 
§§20.3.C, 34.0 to 34.3. There are three kinds of residential TDRs. An owner needs both a 
"Residential Development Right" and a "Residential Allocation" to place a residential unit on a 
buildable parcel, id., §§21.6.C, 33.2.A; the latter permits construction to begin in a specific 
calendar year, but expires at year's end, id., §33.2.B(3)(b). An owner must also have "Land 
Coverage Rights" for each square foot of impermeable cover placed upon land. App. 145; see 
also TRPA Code ch. 20. All owners of vacant residential parcels that existed at the effective date 
of the 1987 plan (July 1, 1987), including SEZ parcels, automatically receive one Residential 
Development Right, id., §21.6.A; owners of SEZ property may obtain and transfer bonus points 
equivalent to three additional Residential Development Rights, id., §§35.2.C, 35.2.D. SEZ 
property owners also receive Land Coverage Rights authorizing coverage of an area equal to 1% 
of the surface area of their land. Id., §§20.3.A, 37.11. Finally, SEZ owners, like other property 
owners, may apply for a Residential Allocation, awarded by local jurisdictions in random 
drawings each year.
2
  Id., §33.2.B; App. 98-99. All three kinds of TDRs may be transferred for 
the benefit of any eligible property in the Lake Tahoe Region, subject to approval by the agency 
based on the eligibility of the receiving parcel for development. TRPA Code §§20.3.C. 
                                                 
1
 The 1980 Compact defines "environmental threshold carrying capacity" as "an environmental standard necessary 
to maintain a significant scenic, recreational, educational, scientific or natural value of the region or to maintain 
public health and safety within the region. Such standards shall include but not be limited to standards for air 
quality, water quality, soil conservation, vegetation preservation and noise." Art. II(i), 94 Stat. 3235.   
2
 Counsel for the agency at oral argument represented that "at this point" there are "fewer applicants than 
allocations" in Washoe County, where petitioner's land is located, and there is thus a "100 percent chance of winning 
the [drawing]." See Tr. of Oral Arg. 39-40. 
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In 1972, Suitum and her late husband bought an undeveloped lot in Washoe County, 
Nevada, within the agency's jurisdiction, and 17 years later, after adoption of the 1987 Regional 
Plan, Suitum obtained a Residential Allocation through Washoe County's annual drawing. When 
she then applied to the agency for permission to construct a house on her lot, the agency 
determined that her property was located within a SEZ, assigned it an IPES score of zero, and 
denied permission to build. Suitum appealed the denial to the agency's governing board, which 
itself denied relief. 
After the agency turned down the request for a building permit, Suitum made no effort to 
transfer any of the TDRs that were hers under the 1987 plan, and there is no dispute that she still 
has the one Residential Development Right that owners of undeveloped lots automatically 
received, plus the Land Coverage Rights for 183 square feet that she got as the owner of 18,300 
square feet of SEZ land. It is also common ground that Suitum has the right to receive three 
"bonus" Residential Development Rights. Although Suitum has questioned the certainty that she 
would obtain a new Residential Allocation if she sought one, the agency has represented to this 
Court that she undoubtably would, see n.2, supra. 
Instead, Suitum brought this 42 U.S.C. §1983 action alleging that in denying her the right 
to construct a house on her lot, the agency's restrictions deprived her of "all reasonable and 
economically viable use" of her property, and so amounted to a taking of her property without 
just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The agency responded 
by objecting, among other things, that Suitum's taking claim was not ripe due to her "failure to 
obtain a final decision by TRPA as to the amount of development . . . that may be allowed by" 
the agency.  On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ordered supplemental 
briefing on the nature of Suitum's TDRs, including "what [TDRs] can be transferred in 
[Suitum's] case and the procedures, prerequisites and value of such transfer as applicable in this 
case." The agency introduced an affidavit from a real estate appraiser, whose opinion was that 
the Residential Development Right that Suitum already has, and the three more to which she is 
entitled, have a market value between $1,500 and $2,500 each; that her Land Coverage Rights 
can be sold for $6 to $12 per square foot ($1,098 - $2,196 total); and that her lot devoid of all 
TDRs would sell for $7,125 to $16,750. The appraiser also said that if Suitum were to obtain a 
Residential Allocation and sell it with a Development Right, together they would bring between 
$30,000 and $35,000.  As if in spite of the figures supplied by its own affidavit, however, the 
agency maintained that the "actual benefits of the [TDR] program for [Suitum] . . . can only be 
known if she pursues an appropriate [transfer] application," with the result that Suitum's claim 
was not ripe for adjudication. Id., at 91. For her part, Suitum insisted that trying to transfer her 
TDRs would be an "'idle and futile act'" because the TDR program is a "sham,"  and she supplied 
the affidavit of one of the agency's former employees whose view was that "there is little to no 
value to [Suitum's TDRs] at the present time as . . . either [there is] no market for them or the 
procedure for transferring one particular right would restrict the opportunity to transfer a 
remaining right," Id., at 135. 
The District Court decided that Suitum's claim was not ripe for consideration because "as 
things now stand, there is no final decision as to how [Suitum] will be allowed to use her 
property." Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, No. CV-N-91-040-ECR (D. Nev., Mar. 
30, 1994) (App. to Pet. for Cert. C-3)). Although the Court found that "there is significant value 
in the transfer of [Suitum's TDRs], . . . . until [specific] values attributable to the transfer 
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program are known, the court cannot realistically assess whether and to what extent [the 
agency's] regulations have frustrated [Suitum's] reasonable expectations." Id., at C-3 to C-4. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed this ripeness ruling for the like 
reason that "without an application for the transfer of development rights" there would be no way 
to "know the regulations' full economic impact or the degree of their interference with [Suitum's] 
reasonable investment-backed expectations[,]" and without action on a transfer application there 
would be no "final decision from [the agency] regarding the application of the regulations to the 
property at issue."  80 F.3d 359, 362-363 (1996). We granted certiorari to consider the ripeness 
of Suitum's taking claim, 519 U.S.    , 117 S. Ct. 293, 136 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1996), and now reverse. 
II 
The only issue presented is whether Suitum's claim of a regulatory taking of her land in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is ready for judicial review under prudential 
ripeness principles.
3 
 There are two independent prudential hurdles to a regulatory taking claim 
brought against a state entity in federal court. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985), 
explained that a plaintiff must demonstrate that she has both received a "final decision regarding 
the application of the [challenged] regulations to the property at issue" from "the government 
entity charged with implementing the regulations," id., at 186, and sought "compensation 
through the procedures the State has provided for doing so," id., at 194. The first requirement 
follows from the principle that only a regulation that "goes too far," Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922), results in a taking under the 
Fifth Amendment, see, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348, 
91 L. Ed. 2d 285, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) ("[a] court cannot determine whether a regulation has 
gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes"); see also Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-1019, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) 
(regulation "goes too far" and results in a taking "at least in the extraordinary circumstance when 
no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted"). The second hurdle stems 
from the Fifth Amendment's proviso that only takings without "just compensation" infringe that 
Amendment; "if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the 
property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it   has used the 
procedure and been denied just compensation," Williamson County, supra, at 195. Because only 
the "final decision" prong of Williamson was addressed below and briefed before this Court, we 
confine our discussion here to that issue.
4
 
                                                 
3
 "We have noted that ripeness doctrine is drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from 
prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction." Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57, 
n.18, 125 L. Ed. 2d 38, 113 S. Ct. 2485 (1993). The agency does not question that Suitum properly presents a 
genuine "case or controversy" sufficient to satisfy Article III, but maintains only that Suitum's action fails to satisfy 
our prudential ripeness requirements. 
4
 We therefore do not decide whether Williamson County's "state procedures" requirement has been satisfied in this 
case. Ordinarily, a plaintiff must seek compensation through state inverse condemnation proceedings before 
initiating a taking suit in federal court, unless the State does not provide adequate remedies for obtaining 
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In holding Suitum's claim to be unripe, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the agency's 
argument that Suitum had failed to obtain a final and authoritative decision from the agency 
sufficient to satisfy the first prong of Williamson County, supra. Although it is unclear whether 
the agency still urges precisely that position before this Court, see, e.g., Brief for Respondent 21 
(conceding that "we know the full extent of the regulation's impact in restricting petitioner's 
development of her own land"), we think it important to emphasize that the rationale adopted in 
the decision under review is unsupported by our precedents. 
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 65 L. Ed. 2d 106, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980), is the 
first case in which this Court employed a notion of ripeness in declining to reach the merits of an 
as-applied regulatory taking claim. In Agins, the landowners who challenged zoning ordinances 
restricting the number of houses they could build on their property sued without seeking 
approval for any particular development on their land. We held that the only issue justiciable at 
that point was whether mere enactment of the statute amounted to a taking.
5
  Id., at 260. Without 
employing the term "ripeness," the Court explained that because the owners "had not submitted a 
plan for development of their property as the [challenged] ordinances permitted, there [was] as 
yet no concrete controversy regarding the application of the specific zoning provisions." Ibid. 
The following Term, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 
U.S. 264, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981), toughened our nascent ripeness requirement. 
There, coal producers and landowners challenged the enactment of the Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §1201 et seq., as a taking of their property. As in Agins, 
we concluded that an as-applied challenge was unripe, reasoning that "there is no indication in 
the record that appellees had availed themselves of the opportunities provided by the Act to 
obtain administrative relief by requesting . . . a variance from the [applicable provisions of the 
Act]," 452 U.S. at 297. Hodel thus held that where the regulatory regime offers the possibility of 
a variance from its facial requirements, a landowner must go beyond submitting a plan for 
development and actually seek such a variance to ripen his claim.   
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 
U.S. 172, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985), confirmed Hodel's holding. In Williamson 
County, a developer's plan to build a residential complex was rejected by the local Planning 
Commission as inconsistent with zoning ordinances and subdivision regulations in eight different 
                                                                                                                                                             
compensation. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194-196. Suitum's counsel stated at oral argument that "the 
position of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency is that they do not . . . have provisions for paying just 
compensation," Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, thus suggesting that the agency is not subject to inverse condemnation 
proceedings, and the agency's counsel did not disagree. Suitum's position therefore appears to be that the sole 
remedy against the agency for a taking without just compensation is a §1983 suit for damages, such as she has 
brought here. Cf. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 1331, 
1341-1342 (CA9 1990). We leave this matter to the Court of Appeals on remand. 
5
 Such "facial" challenges to regulation are generally ripe the moment the challenged regulation or ordinance is 
passed, but face an "uphill battle," Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495, 94 L. Ed. 
2d 472, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987), since it is difficult to demonstrate that "mere enactment" of a piece of legislation 
"deprived [the owner] of economically viable use of [his] property." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 297, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981). Suitum does not purport to 
challenge the agency's regulations on their face. 
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respects. This Court acknowledged that "respondent had submitted a plan for developing its 
property, and thus had passed beyond the Agins threshold," id., at 187, but nonetheless held the 
taking challenge unripe, reasoning that "among the factors of particular significance in the 
[taking] inquiry are the economic impact of the challenged action and the extent to which it 
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations," id., at 191, "factors [that] simply 
cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position 
regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question," ibid. Thus, 
a developer must at least "resort to the procedure for obtaining variances . . . [and obtain] a 
conclusive determination by the Commission whether it would allow" the proposed 
development, id., at 193, in order to ripen its taking claim. 
Leaving aside the question of how definitive a local zoning decision must be to satisfy 
Williamson County's demand for finality, two points about the requirement are clear: it applies to 
decisions about how a taking plaintiff's own land may be used, and it responds to the high degree 
of discretion characteristically possessed by land use boards in softening the strictures of the 
general regulations they administer. When such flexibility or discretion may be brought to bear 
on the permissible use of property as singular as a parcel of land, a sound judgment about what 
use will be allowed simply cannot be made by asking whether a parcel's characteristics or a 
proposal's details facially conform to the terms of the general use regulations. 
The demand for finality is satisfied by Suitum's claim, however, there being no question 
here about how the "regulations at issue [apply] to the particular land in question." Williamson 
County, supra, at 191. It is undisputed that the agency "has finally determined that petitioner's 
land lies entirely within an SEZ," Brief for Respondent 21, and that it may therefore permit "no 
additional land coverage or other permanent land disturbance" on the parcel, TRPA Code §20.4. 
Because the agency has no discretion to exercise over Suitum's right to use her land, no occasion 
exists for applying Williamson County's requirement that a landowner take steps to obtain a final 
decision about the use that will be permitted on a particular parcel. The parties, of course, contest 
the relevance of the TDRs to the issue of whether a taking has occurred, but resolution of that 
legal issue will require no further agency action of the sort demanded by Williamson County. 
Suitum does not challenge the validity of the agency's regulations; her litigating position 
assumes that the agency may validly bar her land development just as all agree it has actually 
done, and her only challenge to the TDRs raises a question about their value, not about the 
lawfulness of issuing them. Suitum seeks not to be free of the regulations but to be paid for their 
consequences, and even if for some odd reason she had decided to bring things to a head by 
building without a permit, a §1983 action for money would not be a defense to an equity 
proceeding to enjoin development.  
* * * 
Because we find that Suitum has received a "final decision" consistent with Williamson 
County's ripeness requirement, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
It is so ordered. 
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JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR and JUSTICE THOMAS join, 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. 
I concur in the judgment of the Court, and join its opinion except for those sections [that] 
consider whether the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) [has] reached a final decision 
regarding Suitum's ability to sell her Transferable Development Rights (TDRs), and whether the 
value of Suitum's TDRs [are] known. That discussion presumes that the answers to those 
questions may be relevant to the issue presented at this preliminary stage of the present case: 
whether Suitum's takings claim is ripe for judicial review under the "final decision" requirement. 
In my view they are not relevant to that issue, and the Court's discussion is beside the point.  
To describe the nature of the "final decision" inquiry, the Court's opinion quotes only the 
vague language of Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson 
City, 473 U.S. 172, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985), that there must be a "final decision 
regarding the application of the [challenged] regulations to the property at issue,” and  that "[a] 
court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the 
regulation goes". Unmentioned in the opinion are other, more specific, statements in those very 
cases (and elsewhere) which display quite clearly that the quoted generalizations (and the "final 
decision" inquiry) have nothing to do with TDRs. The Court fails even to mention, in its 
otherwise encyclopedic description of the development of the "final decision" requirement, the 
most recent of our opinions addressing the subject, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), in which we relied exclusively on these 
more precise formulations and did not mention the vague language quoted by the Court today, 
see id., at 1011. 
The focus of the "final decision" inquiry is on ascertaining the extent of the governmental 
restriction on land use, not what the government has given the landowner in exchange for that 
restriction. When our cases say, as the Court explains that without a "final decision" it is 
impossible to know whether the regulation "goes too far," Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 415, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922), they mean "goes too far in restricting the 
profitable use of the land," not "goes not far enough in providing compensation for restricting the 
profitable use of the land." The latter pertains not to whether there has been a taking, but to the 
subsequent question of whether, if so, there has been just compensation. 
TDRs, of course, have nothing to do with the use or development of the land to which 
they are (by regulatory decree) "attached." The right to use and develop one's own land is quite 
distinct from the right to confer upon someone else an increased power to use and develop his 
land. The latter is valuable, to be sure, but it is a new right conferred upon the landowner in 
exchange for the taking, rather than a reduction of the taking. In essence, the TDR permits the 
landowner whose right to use and develop his property has been restricted or extinguished to 
extract money from others. Just as a cash payment from the government would not relate to 
whether the regulation "goes too far" (i.e., restricts use of the land so severely as to constitute a 
taking), but rather to whether there has been adequate compensation for the taking; and just as a 
chit or coupon from the government, redeemable by and hence marketable to third parties, would 
relate not to the question of taking but to the question of compensation; so also the marketable 
TDR, a peculiar type of chit which enables a third party not to get cash from the government but 
to use his land in ways the government would otherwise not permit, relates not to taking but to 
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compensation. It has no bearing upon whether there has been a "final decision" concerning the 
extent to which the plaintiff's land use has been constrained.  
Putting TDRs on the taking rather than the just-compensation side of the equation (as the 
Ninth Circuit did below) is a clever, albeit transparent, device that seeks to take advantage of a 
peculiarity of our takings-clause jurisprudence: once there is a taking, the Constitution requires 
just (i.e., full) compensation, see, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 
104, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978). If money that the government-regulator gives to 
the landowner can be counted on the question of whether there is a taking (causing the courts to 
say that the land retains substantial value, and has thus not been taken), rather than on the 
question of whether the compensation for the taking is adequate, the government can get away 
with paying much less. That is all that is going on here. It would be too obvious, of course, for 
the government simply to say "although your land is regulated, our land-use scheme entitles you 
to a government payment of $1,000." That is patently compensation and not retention of land-
value. It would be a little better to say "under our land-use scheme, TDRs are attached to every 
parcel, and if the parcel is regulated its TDR can be cashed in with the government for $1,000." 
But that still looks too much like compensation. The cleverness of the scheme before us here is 
that it causes the payment to come, not from the government but from third parties-whom the 
government reimburses for their outlay by granting them (as the TDRs promise) a variance from 
otherwise applicable land-use restrictions. 
Respondent maintains that Penn Central supports the conclusion that TDRs are relevant 
to the question whether there has been a taking. In Penn Central we remarked that because the 
rights to develop the airspace above Grand Central Terminal had been made transferable to other 
parcels in the vicinity (some of which the owners of the terminal themselves owned), it was "not 
literally accurate to say that [the owners] have been denied all use of [their] pre-existing air 
rights"; and that even if the TDRs were inadequate to constitute "just compensation" if a taking 
had occurred, they could nonetheless "be taken into account in considering the impact of 
regulation." Penn Central, supra, at 137 (emphasis in original). This analysis can be distinguished 
from the case before us on the ground that it was applied to landowners who owned at least eight 
nearby parcels, some immediately adjacent to the Terminal, that could be benefited by the TDRs. 
See 438 U.S. at 115. The relevant land, it could be said, was the aggregation of the owners' 
parcels subject to the regulation (or at least the contiguous parcels); and the use of that land, as a 
whole, had not been diminished. It is for that reason that the TDRs affected "the impact of the 
regulation." This analysis is supported by the concluding clause of the opinion, which says that 
the restrictions "not only permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford 
appellants opportunities further to enhance not only the Terminal site proper but also other 
properties." Id., at 138. If Penn Central's one-paragraph expedition into the realm of TDRs were 
not distinguishable in this fashion, it would deserve to be overruled. Considering in the takings 
calculus the market value of TDRs is contrary to the import of a whole series of cases, before 
and since, which make clear that the relevant issue is the extent to which use or development of 
the land has been restricted. Indeed, it is contrary to the whole principle that land-use regulation, 
if severe enough, can constitute a taking which must be fully compensated. 
I do not mean to suggest that there is anything undesirable or devious about TDRs 
themselves. To the contrary, TDRs can serve a commendable purpose in mitigating the economic 
loss suffered by an individual whose property use is restricted, and property value diminished, 
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but not so substantially as to produce a compensable taking. They may also form a proper part, 
or indeed the entirety, of the full compensation accorded a landowner when his property is taken. 
Accord, Penn Central, supra, at 152 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that Penn Central had 
been "offered substantial amounts" for its TDRs and suggesting the appropriateness of a remand 
for a determination of whether the TDRs are valuable enough to constitute full compensation). I 
suggest only that the relevance of TDRs is limited to the compensation side of the takings 
analysis, and that taking them into account in determining whether a taking has occurred will 
render much of our regulatory takings jurisprudence a nullity, see Comment, “Environmental 
Interest Groups and Land Regulation: Avoiding the Clutches of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council,” 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 1179, 1212 (1994). 
In sum, I would resolve the question of whether there has been a "final decision" in this 
case by looking only to the fixing of petitioner's rights to use and develop her land. There has 
never been any dispute over whether that has occurred. Before bringing the present suit, 
petitioner applied for permission to build a house on her lot, and was denied permission to do so 
on the basis of TRPA's determination that her property is located within a "Stream Environment 
Zone"--a designation that carries the consequence that "no additional land coverage or other 
permanent land disturbance shall be permitted," TRPA Code §20.4. Respondent in fact concedes 
that "we know the full extent of the regulation's impact in restricting petitioner's development of 
her own land," Brief for Respondent 21. That is all we need to know to conclude that the final 
decision requirement has been met.  
SAN REMO HOTEL v. SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 
545 U.S. 323 
JUDGES: STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, 
SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C. J., filed an opinion 
concurring in the judgment, in which O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether federal courts may craft an exception to the full 
faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. §1738, for claims brought under the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.  
Petitioners, who own and operate a hotel in San Francisco, California (hereinafter City), 
initiated this litigation in response to the application of a city ordinance that required them to pay 
a $567,000 "conversion fee" in 1996. After the California courts rejected petitioners' various 
state-law takings claims, they advanced in the Federal District Court a series of federal takings 
claims that depended on issues identical to those that had previously been resolved in the state-
court action. In order to avoid the bar of issue preclusion, petitioners asked the District Court to 
exempt from §1738's reach claims brought under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Petitioners' argument is predicated on Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985), which 
held that takings claims are not ripe until a State fails "to provide adequate compensation for the 
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taking." Id., at 195, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126, 105 S. Ct. 3108. Unless courts disregard §1738 in takings 
cases, petitioners argue, plaintiffs will be forced to litigate their claims in state court without any 
realistic possibility of ever obtaining review in a federal forum.  
I 
The San Remo Hotel is a three-story, 62-unit hotel in the Fisherman's Wharf 
neighborhood in San Francisco. In 1979, San Francisco's Board of Supervisors responded to "a 
severe shortage" of affordable rental housing for elderly, disabled, and low-income persons by 
instituting a moratorium on the conversion of residential hotel units into tourist units. Two years 
later, the City enacted the first version of the Hotel Conversion Ordinance to regulate all future 
conversions. San Francisco Ordinance No. 330-81, codified in §41.1 et seq.  
The City zoned the San Remo Hotel as "residential hotel" -- in other words, a hotel that 
consisted entirely of residential units. And that zoning determination meant that petitioners were 
required to apply for a conditional use permit to do business officially as a "tourist hotel," 27 
Cal. 4th 643, 654, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269, 41 P. 3d 87, 94 (2002).  
In 1993, the City Planning Commission granted petitioners' requested conversion and 
conditional use permit, but only after imposing several conditions, one of which included the 
requirement that petitioners pay a $567,000 "in lieu" fee. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the 
HCO requirement was unconstitutional. 
In March 1993, Petitioners filed for a writ of administrative mandamus in California 
Superior Court. That action lay dormant for several years, and the parties ultimately agreed to 
stay that action after petitioners filed for relief in Federal District Court.  Petitioners filed in 
federal court for the first time on May 4, 1993. Petitioners' first amended complaint alleged four 
counts of takings (facial and as-applied) violations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution, one count seeking damages under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.S.C. 
§1983, for those violations. The District Court granted respondents summary judgment. As 
relevant to this action, the court found that the as-applied takings claim was unripe under 
Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126, 105 S. Ct. 3108.  
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit the court, however, affirmed the 
District Court's determination that petitioners' as-applied takings claim -- the claim that the 
application of the HCO to the San Remo Hotel violated the Takings Clause -- was unripe. 
Because petitioners had failed to pursue an inverse condemnation action in state court, they had 
not yet been denied just compensation as contemplated by Williamson County. 145 F.3d at 1105.  
At the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the court appended a footnote stating 
that petitioners would be free to raise their federal takings claims in the California courts. [There] 
the California Supreme Court in the portion of its opinion discussing the Takings Clause 
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"analyze[d] [the petitioners’] takings claim under the relevant decisions of both this court and the 
United States Supreme Court" [and denied relief].  
Petitioners did not seek a writ of certiorari from the California Supreme Court's decision 
in this Court. Instead, they returned to Federal District Court by filing an amended complaint 
based on the complaint that they had filed [originally].  The District Court reasoned that 28 
U.S.C. §1738 requires federal courts to give preclusive effect to any state-court judgment that 
would have preclusive effect under the laws of the State in which the judgment was rendered. 
Because California courts had interpreted the relevant substantive state takings law coextensively 
with federal law, petitioners' federal claims constituted the same claims that had already been 
resolved in state court. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed[finding] itself bound to apply general issue preclusion 
doctrine. Given that general issue preclusion principles governed, the only remaining  question 
was whether the District Court properly applied that doctrine; the court concluded that it did. The 
court expressly rejected petitioners' contention "that California takings law is not coextensive 
with federal takings law," and held that the state court's application of the "reasonable 
relationship" test was an "'equivalent determination' of such claims under the federal takings 
clause." We granted certiorari and now affirm. 
II 
Article IV, §1, of the United States Constitution demands that "Full Faith and Credit shall 
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. 
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and 
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." In 1790, Congress responded to the 
Constitution's invitation by enacting the first version of the full faith and credit statute. See Act 
of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. The modern version of the statute, 28 U.S.C. §1738, 
provides that "judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court 
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the 
courts of such State . . . ." This statute has long been understood to encompass the doctrines of 
res judicata, or "claim preclusion," and collateral estoppel, or "issue preclusion." See Allen v. 
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-96, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308, 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980).  
The general rule implemented by the full faith and credit statute -- that parties should not 
be permitted to relitigate issues that have been resolved by courts of competent jurisdiction -- 
predates the Republic. It "has found its way into every system of jurisprudence, not only from its 
obvious fitness and propriety, but because without it, an end could never be put to litigation." 
Hopkins v. Lee, 19 U.S. 109, 6 Wheat. 109, 114, 5 L. Ed. 218 (1821).  
As this case is presented to us, under our limited grant of certiorari, we have only one 
narrow question to decide: whether we should create an exception to the full faith and credit 
statute, and the ancient rule on which it is based, in order to provide a federal forum for litigants 
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who seek to advance federal takings claims that are not ripe until the entry of a final state 
judgment denying just compensation. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126, 
105 S. Ct. 3108.  
The essence of petitioners' argument is as follows: because no claim that a state agency 
has violated the federal Takings Clause can be heard in federal court until the property owner has 
"been denied just compensation" through an available state compensation procedure, id., at 195, 
87 L. Ed. 2d 126, 105 S. Ct. 3108, "federal courts [should be] required to disregard the decision 
of the state court" in order to ensure that federal takings claims can be "considered on the merits 
in . . . federal court." Therefore, the argument goes, whenever plaintiffs reserve their claims 
under England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 11 L. Ed. 2d 440, 84 S. Ct. 
461 (1964), federal courts should review the reserved federal claims de novo, regardless of what 
issues the state court may have decided or how it may have decided them. 
Federal courts are not free to disregard 28 U.S.C. §738 simply to guarantee that all 
takings plaintiffs can have their day in federal court.  
Petitioners' argue that federal courts simply should not apply ordinary preclusion rules to 
state-court judgments when a case is forced into state court by the ripeness rule of Williamson 
County.  
We are presently concerned only with issues actually decided by the state court that are 
dispositive of federal claims raised under §1983. And, it is clear that petitioners would have 
preferred not to have been forced to have their federal claims resolved by issues decided in state 
court. Unfortunately for petitioners, it is entirely unclear why their preference for a federal forum 
should matter for constitutional or statutory purposes. 
The second reason we find petitioners' argument unpersuasive is that it assumes that 
courts may simply create exceptions to 28 U.S.C. §1738 wherever courts deem them appropriate. 
Congress has not expressed any intent to exempt from the full faith and credit statute federal 
takings claims. Consequently, we apply our normal assumption that the weighty interests in 
finality and comity trump the interest in giving losing litigants access to an additional appellate 
tribunal.  
It is hardly a radical notion to recognize that, as a practical matter, a significant number 
of plaintiffs will necessarily litigate their federal takings claims in state courts. It was settled well 
before Williamson County that "a claim that the application of government regulations effects a 
taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing 
the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the 
property at issue." 473 U.S., at 186, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126, 105 S. Ct. 3108. As a consequence, there 
is scant precedent for the litigation in federal district court of claims that a state agency has taken 
property in violation of the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. To the contrary, most of the cases 
in our takings jurisprudence, including nearly all of the cases on which petitioners rely, came to 
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us on writs of certiorari from state courts of last resort. At base, petitioners' claim amounts to 
little more than the concern that it is unfair to give preclusive effect to state-court proceedings 
that are not chosen, but are instead required in order to ripen federal takings claims. Whatever 
the merits of that concern may be, we are not free to disregard the full faith and credit statute 
solely to preserve the availability of a federal forum. The Court of Appeals was correct to decline 
petitioners' invitation to ignore the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §1738. The judgment of the Court 
of Appeals is therefore affirmed. 
It is so ordered 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR, JUSTICE 
KENNEDY, and JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in the judgment. 
It is not clear to me that Williamson County was correct in demanding that, once a 
government entity has reached a final decision with respect to a claimant's property, the claimant 
must seek compensation in state court before bringing a federal takings claim in federal court. It 
is not obvious that either constitutional or prudential principles require claimants to utilize all 
state compensation procedures before they can bring a federal takings claim.  
Williamson County's state-litigation rule has created some real anomalies, justifying our 
revisiting the issue. For example, our holding today ensures that litigants who go to state court to 
seek compensation will likely be unable later to assert their federal takings claims in federal 
court. As the Court recognizes, Williamson County all but guarantees that claimants will be 
unable to utilize the federal courts to enforce the Fifth Amendment's just compensation 
guarantee. The basic principle that state courts are competent to enforce federal rights and to 
adjudicate federal takings claims is sound, but that principle does not explain why federal takings 
claims in particular should be singled out to be confined to state court, in the absence of any 
asserted justification or congressional directive.  
I joined the opinion of the Court in Williamson County. But further reflection and 
experience lead me to think that the justifications for its state-litigation requirement are suspect, 
while its impact on takings plaintiffs is dramatic. Here, no court below has addressed the 
correctness of Williamson County, neither party has asked us to reconsider it, and resolving the 
issue could not benefit petitioners. In an appropriate case, I believe the Court should reconsider 
whether plaintiffs asserting a Fifth Amendment takings claim based on the final decision of a 
state or local government entity must first seek compensation in state courts. 
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EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL [Part I]  
524 U.S. 498 (1998) 
[Jurisdictional Question] 
[The 1992 “Coal Act” required  Eastern Enterprises which had left the industry 27 years 
before to provide pensions for over 1000 miners who had worked for the company before 1966. 
Ed.]  
JUSTICE O'CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court. 
We begin with a threshold jurisdictional question, raised in the federal respondents' 
answer to Eastern's complaint: Whether petitioner's takings claim was properly filed in Federal 
District Court rather than the United States Court of Federal Claims. Although the Commissioner 
no longer challenges the Court's adjudication of this action, it is appropriate that we clarify the 
basis of our jurisdiction over petitioner's claims.  
Under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §1491(a)(1), the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive 
jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States for money damages 
exceeding $10,000 that is "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any 
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United 
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." Accordingly, a 
claim for just compensation under the Takings Clause must be brought to the Court of Federal 
Claims in the first instance, unless Congress has withdrawn the Tucker Act grant of jurisdiction 
in the relevant statute. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016-1019, 81 L. 
Ed. 2d 815, 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984). 
In this case, however, Eastern does not seek compensation from the Government. Instead, 
Eastern requests a declaratory judgment that the Coal Act violates the Constitution and a 
corresponding injunction against the Commissioner's enforcement of the Act as to Eastern. Such 
equitable relief is arguably not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims under the 
Tucker Act. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216, 77 L. Ed. 2d 580, 103 S. Ct. 2961 
(1983) (explaining that, in order for a claim to be "cognizable under the Tucker Act," it "must be 
one for money damages against the United States"). 
Some Courts of Appeals have accepted the view that the Tucker Act does not apply to 
suits seeking only equitable relief, see In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 493 (CA2), cert. 
denied sub nom.  LTV Steel Co. v. Shalala, 516 U.S. 913, 133 L. Ed. 2d 204, 116 S. Ct. 298 
(1995); Southeast Kansas Community Action Program, Inc. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 967 F.2d 
1452, 1455-1456  
(CA10 1992), while others have concluded that a claim for equitable relief under the 
Takings Clause is hypothetical, and therefore not within the district courts' jurisdiction, until 
compensation has been sought and refused in the Court of Federal Claims. 
On the one hand, this Court's precedent can be read to support the latter conclusion that 
regardless of the nature of relief sought, the availability of a Tucker Act remedy renders 
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premature any takings claim in federal district court. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 11, 108 L. 
Ed. 2d 1, 110 S. Ct. 914 (1990); see also Monsanto, supra, at 1016.  On the other hand, in a case 
such as this one, it cannot be said that monetary relief against the Government is an available 
remedy. The payments mandated by the Coal Act, although calculated by a Government agency, 
are paid to the privately operated Combined Fund. Congress could not have contemplated that 
the Treasury would compensate coal operators for their liability under the Act, for "every dollar 
paid pursuant to a statute would be presumed to generate a dollar of Tucker Act compensation."  
In re Chateaugay Corp., supra, at 493. Accordingly, the "presumption of Tucker Act availability 
must be reversed where the challenged statute, rather than burdening real or physical property, 
requires a direct transfer of funds" mandated by the Government. Ibid. In that situation, a claim 
for compensation "would entail an utterly pointless set of activities." Student Loan Marketing 
Assn. v. Riley, 322 U.S. App. D.C. 354, 104 F.3d 397, 401 (CADC), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 913, 
139 L. Ed. 2d 227, 118 S. Ct. 295 (1997). Instead, as we explained in Duke Power Co. v. 
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 71, n. 15, 57 L. Ed. 2d 595, 98 S. Ct. 
2620 (1978), the Declaratory Judgment Act "allows individuals threatened with a taking to seek 
a declaration of the constitutionality of the disputed governmental action before potentially 
uncompensable damages are sustained." 
Moreover, in situations analogous to this case, we have assumed the lack of a 
compensatory remedy and have granted equitable relief for Takings Clause violations without 
discussing the applicability of the Tucker Act. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 243-
245, 136 L. Ed. 2d 696, 117 S. Ct. 727 (1997); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-718, 95 L. Ed. 
2d 668, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987). Without addressing the basis of this Court's jurisdiction, we have 
also upheld similar statutory schemes against Takings Clause challenges. See Concrete Pipe & 
Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 
641-647, 124 L. Ed. 2d 539, 113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993); Connolly, 475 U.S. at 221-228.  "While we 
are not bound by previous exercises of jurisdiction in cases in which our power to act was not 
questioned but was passed sub silentio, neither should we disregard the implications of an 
exercise of judicial authority assumed to be proper" in previous cases.  Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 307, 8 L. Ed. 2d 510, 82 S. Ct. 1502 (1962) (citations omitted). 
Based on the nature of the taking alleged in this case, we conclude that the declaratory judgment 
and injunction sought by petitioner constitute an appropriate remedy under the circumstances, 
and that it is within the district courts' power to award such equitable relief. [remainder of the 
opinion omitted]. 
PRESLEY v. CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE 
464 F.3d 480 (2006) 
MOTZ, Circuit Judge: 
Shirley Presley, a long-time resident of Charlottesville, Virginia, brought this 42 U.S.C. 
§1983 (2000) action against the City of Charlottesville and the Rivanna Trails Foundation 
("RTF"), a nonprofit private corporation (collectively, the Defendants). She alleges that, without 
her consent, the Defendants conspired to publish a map that showed a public trail crossing her 
yard. Presley further alleges that, even after the Defendants realized their error, they did not 
correct it but rather criminally prosecuted her when she herself took measures to prevent 
trespasses on her property. Presley asserts that the Defendants' actions violated her Fourth 
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Amendment rights. The district court granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss Presley's 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. For the reasons that 
follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.  
Presley's home and yard encompass less than an acre of land along the Rivanna River. In 
1998, without having obtained her consent, the RTF began distributing a map that displayed a 
public trail -- known as the Rivanna trail -- crossing a portion of Presley's property. The City 
publicized the RTF's map on the City's official website. Relying on the Rivanna trail map, 
members of the public began traveling across Presley's yard, leaving behind trash, damaging the 
vegetation, and sometimes even setting up overnight camp sites. Initially, Presley did not realize 
the extent of the intrusion because she was caring for her ailing husband in a nursing home. After 
her husband's death in 2001, however, Presley became aware of the extent of the trail's use and 
began complaining to the RTF and the City about the trespasses. 
Although the Defendants acknowledged their error, they assertedly neither changed the 
map nor stopped its distribution. Rather, several RTF officials and members of the 
Charlottesville city council met with Presley and asked her to give the Defendants an easement 
across her property in exchange for favorable tax treatment and other official favors (but not 
compensation). Presley refused. 
The intrusions by trespassers persisted and became more severe. Presley called  the City 
police several times to eject the trespassers, but, although the police responded regularly, they 
could not stem the tide. Presley then posted over one hundred "no trespassing" signs on her 
property, all of which were defaced and destroyed. Finally, Presley installed razor wire along the 
perimeter of her property. City officials responded by revising a local ordinance to prohibit 
Presley's protective measures and then bringing a criminal prosecution against her for violating 
that ordinance. The prosecution was later dismissed. 
When Presley filed this action in February 2005, the City and the RTF still had not 
amended the trail map. Presley alleges that the Defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to 
violate her constitutional rights. Specifically, she asserts that the Defendants' actions constitute 
an unreasonable Fourth Amendment seizure. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), the Defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim. The district 
court granted their motions, and Presley filed a timely appeal.  
We consider whether Presley has stated a claim under the Fourth Amendment, which 
provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable . . . seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Presley alleges 
that an unreasonable seizure of her property occurred here when private individuals trespassed 
onto her land due to the active and knowing encouragement of the Defendants. 
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The Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable seizures clearly extend to real 
property.
1
 Nevertheless, the district court held that Presley had failed to allege a Fourth 
Amendment violation. The court offered two grounds for its holding; we find neither persuasive. 
A 
The district court held that Presley's Fourth Amendment seizure claim was foreclosed 
because it "merely amount[ed]" to a Fifth Amendment takings claim. But the Supreme Court has 
time and again considered multiple constitutional claims based on the same facts.  
As the Court has explained, "[c]ertain wrongs affect more than a single right and, 
accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution's commands." Soldal v. Cook 
County, 506 U.S. 56, 70, 113 S. Ct. 538, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1992). Indeed, the Court has 
squarely rejected the argument that, on the basis of a single set of facts, a plaintiff could only 
assert the violation of one constitutional provision, holding instead that the plaintiff could 
simultaneously bring a due process claim and a Fourth Amendment claim. See James Daniel 
Good Real Property, 510 U.S. at 52; Soldal, 506 U.S. at 70-71. Moreover, the Court has 
observed that it sees "no basis for doling out constitutional protections" one at a time; rather, a 
court should examine each constitutional claim in turn. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 70. 
In just one circumstance has the Supreme Court held that a single set of facts may not 
simultaneously give rise to two constitutional violations: when one of the provisions assertedly 
violated contains only a "generalized notion" of constitutional rights -- such as substantive due 
process -- and the other provision is "an explicit textual source of constitutional protection" that 
specifically addresses the precise harm at issue. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S. 
Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989). This is not the case here -- both the Fourth Amendment 
Seizure Clause and the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause address specific, rather than general, 
harms, and the Court has never held that one specific constitutional clause gives way to another 
equally specific clause when their domains overlap.  
More importantly, even when the same appropriation does constitute both a seizure and a 
taking, meaningful legal differences continue to separate a Fourth Amendment seizure claim 
from a Fifth Amendment takings claim. To prevail on a seizure claim, a plaintiff must prove that 
the government unreasonably seized property. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 71. By contrast, to make out a 
takings claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the government took property without just 
compensation. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 
194, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985). Because the legal elements of a seizure claim and 
                                                 
1
 We recognize that the Fourth Amendment may not protect real property other than a house and its surrounding 
curtilage. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173, 176, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984) 
(holding that "open fields" – land "over a mile" from defendant's home and beyond its curtilage – was not among 
"the places and things encompassed by [the Fourth Amendment's] protections"). To date, the district court has made 
no finding as to the extent of the curtilage surrounding Presley's home. The Defendants have not contended that the 
property allegedly seized – a trail through Presley's less-than-one-acre yard – extends beyond the curtilage, and the 
facts as alleged in Presley's complaint provide no basis for so concluding. 
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a takings claim differ, there is no danger that one constitutional provision will subsume the other, 
even if a single set of facts provides the basis for a cause of action under both. 
In sum, here, as in James Daniel Good Real Property and Soldal, "the seizure of property 
implicates two explicit textual sources of constitutional protection, the Fourth Amendment and 
the Fifth." James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Soldal, 506 U.S. at 70. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court has directed that "the proper 
question is not which Amendment controls but whether either Amendment is violated." James 
Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 50. 
Like the lower court in Soldal, the dissent here worries that applying the Fourth 
Amendment to seizures of real property would lead to "unworkable" results. But the Supreme 
Court in Soldal expressly rejected this concern, explaining why it is appropriate to subject even 
seizures for a public purpose to constitutional scrutiny. Soldal pointed out that because 
"reasonableness" is still the "ultimate" Fourth Amendment standard, numerous seizures of the 
"type" in Soldal, including those pursuant to a court order, "will survive constitutional scrutiny," 
since a "showing of unreasonableness" in such circumstances will be a "laborious task indeed."  
Soldal, 506 U.S. at 71. Thus, the Soldal Court itself rejected the dissent's theory: a seizure for a 
public purpose may well be reasonable and so "survive constitutional scrutiny" under the Fourth 
Amendment, but an allegation that a seizure was for a public purpose does not somehow 
eliminate Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  
Put simply, that Presley may also have a claim under the Fifth Amendment's Takings 
Clause does not bar her from bringing a Fourth Amendment seizure claim. 
B 
The district court alternatively held that no seizure had occurred here because Presley 
was not "completely deprived . . . of her possessory interests in her property." But a deprivation 
need not be this severe to constitute a seizure subject to constitutional protections. Rather, the 
Fourth Amendment also governs temporary or partial seizures. See United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696, 705, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1983)  
In fact, the Supreme Court has held that a seizure of property occurs whenever "there is 
some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." United 
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984). Presley has 
alleged an "interference with" her "possessory interests" that is clearly "meaningful"; indeed, this 
interference has assertedly been disruptive, stressful, and invasive. Her complaint states that she 
has been deprived of the use of part of her property due to the regular presence of a veritable 
army of trespassers who freely and regularly traverse her yard, littering, making noise, damaging 
her land, and occasionally even camping overnight. This constant physical occupation certainly 
constitutes a "meaningful interference" with Presley's "possessory interests" in her property. 
Of course, it is private individuals, not City officials, who have actually interfered with 
Presley's possessory interests here. Although private actions generally do not implicate the 
Fourth Amendment, when a private person acts "as an agent of the Government or with the 
participation or knowledge of any governmental official," then the private person's acts are 
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attributed to the government. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
government need not compel nor even involve itself directly in the private person's actions.  
In this case "combine to convince us that [the Defendants] did more than adopt a passive 
attitude toward the underlying private conduct" and that therefore the acts of private persons are 
attributable to the Defendants. At some point, the Defendants knew that their map was 
erroneous. They also knew that the Rivanna trail map would encourage public use of the trail -- 
this was, after all, the map's purpose. Finally, Defendants also knew that the City's involvement 
would communicate to trail users that there were no legal barriers to their use of the entire trail, 
including the portion that cut through Presley's property.   
Nevertheless, despite this knowledge, the Defendants assertedly did nothing to correct 
their error, and consequently, in reliance upon the erroneous map, private individuals trespassed 
onto Presley's yard. Moreover, when Presley attempted to protect her own property, the 
Defendants initiated a meritless criminal prosecution against her to force her to take down the 
razor wire. See Soldal, 506 U.S. at 60 n.6 (noting that Fourth Amendment is implicated when 
government officials prevent lawful resistance against seizures effected by private persons). 
These factors "are clear indices of the [Defendants'] encouragement, endorsement, and 
participation, and suffice to implicate the Fourth Amendment." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615-16; see 
also United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that a private search is 
attributed to the government if the government is "involved . . . indirectly as an encourager of the 
private citizen's actions"). 
C 
In sum, we cannot agree with the district court that Presley "can prove no set  of facts in 
support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief." Although she ultimately may not be 
able to prevail, Presley has at least raised a Fourth Amendment seizure claim by alleging that 
private individuals, knowingly encouraged and aided by the Defendants, trespassed onto her 
property. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's dismissal of this claim. 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court dismissing her 
Fourth Amendment seizure and conspiracy claims and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
TRAXLER, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
Today's decision, in my view, departs from a long and well-established body of law 
under the Fifth Amendment and drastically changes important substantive and procedural aspects 
of federal inverse condemnation actions. As I explain below, permitting Presley to pursue her 
claim under the Fourth Amendment results in nothing less than the application of a new standard 
of liability, the creation of a new spectrum of damages, and the elimination of procedural 
prerequisites for pursuing an inverse condemnation claim in federal court. 
According to Presley's complaint, the City "seized" a strip of her land for a public use -- 
to establish a section of a public hiking trail along the Rivanna River. She does not want her land 
used by the public, however, and sued to stop the City from representing to the public that her  
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property is open for public use as part of the Rivanna trail system. Instead of raising a Fifth 
Amendment claim that the City is taking her property without just compensation, Presley asserts 
only that she suffered an unreasonable seizure of her property in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. My belief is that Presley's allegations present a quintessential takings claim under 
the Fifth Amendment and that to allow her to pursue relief under the Fourth Amendment here 
would undercut well-established Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence.  
At first glance, the Fourth Amendment may appear to apply in this situation. There was a 
seizure of her property, and an easy argument can be made that the seizure was unreasonable. In 
my judgment, however, the fact that the City seized her real property for permanent public use 
puts this matter under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment exclusively. The Supreme 
Court's Fifth Amendment case law establishes both procedural requirements and remedies 
tailored to circumstances involving landowners who are informally dispossessed of all or a 
portion of their real property by the government for an ongoing public use. As explained below, 
permitting Presley to invoke the Fourth Amendment here would allow her to make an end-run 
around this well-established body of law. And, just as significantly, I believe that application of 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standards to Presley's claim would ultimately prove to be 
unworkable.  
First, to say the City's actions may fall within the definition of a seizure does not 
necessarily mean Presley's claim arises under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, a "seizure" as 
defined in Fourth Amendment cases occurs in every case where there is a  taking by physical 
occupation as opposed to a regulatory taking. But the application of the Fourth Amendment to 
cases like this one would upset the well-established and clear procedure for raising constitutional 
challenges to this type of taking by the government, requiring the plaintiff first to seek in state 
court compensation for the taking and permitting the plaintiff to proceed to federal court only if 
just compensation is denied. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank 
of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194-95, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985). Allowing a 
plaintiff to bring a Fourth Amendment claim any time a state government physically seizes real 
property for public use, as Presley contends we must, would severely undermine the process 
contemplated by the Supreme Court in Williamson.  
Moreover, permitting plaintiffs like Presley to proceed under the Fourth Amendment 
would expose governments to a radically different measure of damages than would be available 
in a traditional inverse condemnation action where the plaintiff's damages are generally limited 
to the fair market value of the property taken. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 
U.S. 1, 10, 104 S. Ct. 2187, 81 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1984) ("'Just compensation'. . . means in most cases 
the fair market value of the property on the date it is appropriated."). A plaintiff asserting a 
Fourth Amendment violation, however, would be entitled to recover the full measure of damages 
typically available in a §1983 action, including damages for the emotional distress caused by the 
government's unreasonable conduct, and even punitive damages in the proper case. Accordingly, 
when §1983 plaintiffs seek damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of damages 
is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts 
I also believe that permitting Presley to pursue a Fourth Amendment claim under the 
facts of this case is inconsistent with existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Most Fourth 
Amendment seizure cases involve relatively brief and completed seizures, such as traffic stops 
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and arrests. Since the seizure at issue in this case is a continuing one, the cases rejecting the 
"continuing seizure" concept and placing a temporal restriction on Fourth Amendment claims 
would seem to foreclose Presley's claim that she may proceed under the Fourth Amendment. 
Even assuming, however, that the continuing nature of the seizure was not an insuperable 
obstacle to Presley's Fourth Amendment claim, application of the general Fourth Amendment 
standard would simply be unworkable in cases like this one. Reasonableness is the overarching 
standard in Fourth Amendment inquiries. I cannot envision a case where a government taking of 
private property for a public purpose without just compensation, which is what Presley alleges 
happened in this case, would be anything but unreasonable per se. To accept Presley's 
characterization of her claim as arising under the Fourth Amendment would thus create an entire 
class of constitutional tort claims where liability on the part of the government would be virtually 
automatic and where the government would be exposed to the full panoply of common-law 
damages.  
Accordingly, I would hold that although the district court erred by concluding that no 
seizure occurred in this case, the dismissal of Presley's complaint was nonetheless proper. 
Although Presley might be unhappy with the City's apparent decision to place a public trail 
across her property, the exercise of eminent domain does not require the consent of the affected 
landowner. Her remedy is to initiate an inverse condemnation action in state court and seek just 
compensation for the public easement that the City created over a portion of her property. See 
Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194-96. At that point, the City would be required to decide how to 
proceed. If the City believes that the public is best served by the trail continuing to cross 
Presley's property, then it would be required to pay her just compensation for the permanent 
easement across her land. If the City were instead to decide that the trail could be relocated so 
that it did not cross Presley's property, then it would be required to compensate her only for the 
time that easement was in place. If Presley does not receive just compensation through the state 
proceedings, her Fifth Amendment claim would then be ripe. But until then, Presley's 
constitutional claim based on the taking of her property for a public purpose is premature and she 
cannot circumvent the ripeness hurdle by couching her claim in Fourth Amendment terms. Thus, 
I believe the district court properly dismissed this claim. 
JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY v. UNITED STATES 
2008 U.S. LEXIS 744 
JUDGES: BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 
and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether a court must raise on its own the timeliness of a 
lawsuit filed in the Court of Federal Claims, despite the Government's waiver of the issue. We 
hold that the special statute of limitations governing the Court of Federal Claims requires that 
sua sponte consideration. 
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I 
Petitioner John R. Sand & Gravel Company filed an action in the Court of Federal Claims 
in May 2002. The complaint explained that petitioner held a 50-year mining lease on certain 
land. And it asserted that various Environmental Protection Agency activities on that land 
(involving, e.g., the building and moving of various fences) amounted to an unconstitutional 
taking of its leasehold rights. 
The Government initially asserted that petitioner's several claims were all untimely in 
light of the statute providing that "every claim of which the United States Court of Federal 
Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after 
such claim first accrues." 28 U.S.C. §2501. Later, however, the Government effectively 
conceded that certain claims were timely. The Government subsequently won on the merits. See 
62 Fed. Cl. 556, 589 (2004). 
Petitioner appealed the adverse judgment to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
See 457 F.3d 1345, 1346 (2006). The Government's brief said nothing about the statute of 
limitations, but an amicus brief called the issue to the court's attention. The court considered 
itself obliged to address the limitations issue, and it held that the action was untimely. We 
subsequently agreed to consider whether the Court of Appeals was right to ignore the 
Government's waiver and to decide the timeliness question.  
II 
Most statutes of limitations seek primarily to protect defendants against stale or unduly 
delayed claims. Thus, the law typically treats a limitations defense as an affirmative defense that 
the defendant must raise at the pleadings stage and that is subject to rules of forfeiture and 
waiver. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8(c)(1), 12(b), 15(a). Such statutes also typically permit courts 
to toll the limitations period in light of special equitable considerations. 
Some statutes of limitations, however, seek not so much to protect a defendant's case-
specific interest in timeliness as to achieve a broader system-related goal, such as facilitating the 
administration of claims, limiting the scope of a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity, or 
promoting judicial efficiency. The Court has often read the time limits of these statutes as more 
absolute, say as requiring a court to decide a timeliness question despite a waiver, or as 
forbidding a court to consider whether certain equitable considerations warrant extending a 
limitations period. As convenient shorthand, the Court has sometimes referred to the time limits 
in such statutes as "jurisdictional."  
This Court has long interpreted the court of claims limitations statute as setting forth this 
second, more absolute, kind of limitations period. 
A 
In Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123 (1883), the Court applied a predecessor of the 
current 6-year bar to a claim that had first accrued in 1865 but that the plaintiff did not bring 
until 1872. The plaintiff, a former Confederate States employee, had asked for equitable tolling 
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on the ground that he had not been able to bring the suit until Congress, in 1868, lifted a 
previously imposed legal disability. But the Court denied the request. It did so not because it 
thought the equities ran against the plaintiff, but because the statute (with certain listed 
exceptions) did not permit tolling. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, said the statute was 
"jurisdictional," that it was not susceptible to judicial "engrafting" of unlisted disabilities such as 
"sickness, surprise, or inevitable accident," and that "it [was] the duty of the court to raise the 
[timeliness] question whether it [was] done by plea or not." Ibid. (emphasis added). 
Four years later, in Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, (1887), the Court found untimely 
a claim that had originally been filed with a Government agency, but which that agency had then 
voluntarily referred by statute to the Court of Claims. That Government reference, it might have 
been argued, amounted to a waiver by the Government of any limitations-based defense. The 
Court nonetheless held that the long (over 10-year) delay between the time the claim accrued and 
the plaintiff's filing of the claim before the agency made the suit untimely. And as to any 
argument of Government waiver or abandonment of the time-bar defense, Justice Harlan, again 
writing for the Court, said that the ordinary legal principle that "limitation . . . is a defence [that a 
defendant] must plead . . . has no application to suits in the Court of Claims against the United 
States."  
Over the years, the Court has reiterated in various contexts this or similar views about the 
more absolute nature of the court of claims limitations statute. 
B – III 
In consequence, petitioner can succeed only by convincing us that this Court has 
overturned, or that it should now overturn, its earlier precedent. 
Petitioner's argument must therefore come down to an invitation now to reject or to 
overturn Kendall, Finn, and related cases. Basic principles of stare decisis, however, require us to 
reject this argument. Further, stare decisis in respect to statutory interpretation has "special 
force," for "Congress remains free to alter what we have done." Patterson v. McLean Credit 
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) Additionally, Congress has long acquiesced in the interpretation we 
have given. See ibid.; Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 23, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 161 L. Ed. 2d 
205 (2005). 
To overturn a decision settling one such matter simply because we might believe that 
decision is no longer "right" would inevitably reflect a willingness to reconsider others. And that 
willingness could itself threaten to substitute disruption, confusion, and uncertainty for necessary 
legal stability. We have not found here any factors that might overcome these considerations. 
IV 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins, dissenting. [omitted] 
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Session 24. Procedure and Remedies 
When a claimant wins a regulatory taking claim and the government agency recants, the 
question arises as to the availability of interim damages for the temporary taking.  On one hand 
“lost time is lost money,” but on the other the threat of unbudgeted for, and unexpected damages 
may have a “chilling effect” which discourages regulators from imposing legitimate controls.  
SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC CO. v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
450 U.S. 621 (1980) 
Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Appellant San Diego Gas & Electric Company, a California corporation, asks this Court 
to rule that a State must provide a monetary remedy to a landowner whose property allegedly has 
been "taken" by a regulatory ordinance claimed to violate the Just Compensation Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.  This question was left open last Term in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 
255, 263 (1980). Because we conclude that we lack jurisdiction in this case, we again must leave 
the issue undecided. 
I 
Appellant owns a 412-acre parcel of land in Sorrento Valley, an area in the northwest part 
of the city of San Diego, Cal.  It assembled and acquired the acreage in 1966, at a cost of about 
$1,770,000, as a possible site for a nuclear power plant to be constructed in the 1980's. 
Approximately 214 acres of the parcel lie within or near an estuary known as the Los 
Penasquitos Lagoon.  These acres are low-lying land which serves as a drainage basin for three 
river systems.  About a third of the land is subject to tidal action from the nearby Pacific Ocean. 
The 214 acres are unimproved, except for sewer and utility lines. 
When appellant acquired the 214 acres, most of the land was zoned either for industrial 
use or in an agricultural "holding" category.  The city's master plan, adopted in 1967, designated 
nearly all the area for industrial use. 
Several events that occurred in 1973 gave rise to this litigation.  First, the San Diego City 
Council rezoned parts of the property.  It changed 39 acres from industrial to agricultural, and 
increased the minimum lot size in some of the agricultural areas from 1 acre to 10 acres.  The 
Council recommended, however, that 50 acres of the agricultural land be considered for 
industrial development upon the submission of specific development plans. 
Second, the city, pursuant to Cal. Gov't Code Ann. §65563 (West Supp. 1981), 
established an open-space plan.  This statute required each California city and county to adopt a 
plan "for the comprehensive and long-range preservation and conservation of open-space land 
within its jurisdiction."  The plan adopted by the city of San Diego placed appellant's property 
among the city's open-space areas, which it defined as "any urban land or water surface that is 
essentially open or natural in character, and which has appreciable utility for park and recreation 
purposes, conservation of land, water or other natural resources or historic or scenic purposes." 
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App. 159. The plan acknowledged appellant's intention to construct a nuclear power plant on the 
property, stating that such a plant would not necessarily be incompatible with the open-space 
designation. The plan proposed, however, that the city acquire the property to preserve it as 
parkland. 
Third, the City Council proposed a bond issue in order to obtain funds to acquire open-
space lands.  The Council identified appellant's land as among those properties to be acquired 
with the proceeds of the bond issue.  The proposition, however, failed to win the voters' 
approval.  The open-space plan has remained in effect, but the city has made no attempt to 
acquire appellant's property. 
On August 15, 1974, appellant instituted this action in the Superior Court for the County 
of San Diego against the city and a number of its officials.  It alleged that the city had taken its 
property without just compensation, in violation of the Constitutions of the United States and 
California.  Appellant's theory was that the city had deprived it of the entire beneficial use of the 
property through the rezoning and the adoption of the open-space plan.  It alleged that the city 
followed a policy of refusing to approve any development that was inconsistent with the plan, 
and that the only beneficial use of the property was as an industrial park, a use that would be 
inconsistent with the open-space designation.  The city disputed this allegation, arguing that 
appellant had never asked its approval for any development plan for the property. 
Appellant sought damages of $6,150,000 in inverse condemnation, as well as mandamus 
and declaratory relief.  Prior to trial, the court dismissed the mandamus claim, holding that 
"mandamus is not the proper remedy to challenge the validity of a legislative act."  Clerk's Tr. 
42.  After a nonjury trial on the issue of liability, the court granted judgment for appellant, 
finding that . . . the city had taken the property and that just compensation was required by the 
Constitutions of both the United States and California.  A subsequent jury trial on the question of 
damages resulted in a judgment for appellant for over $3 million. 
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal . . . decided that monetary compensation is not 
an appropriate remedy for any taking of appellant's property that may have occurred, but it has 
not decided whether any other remedy is available because it has not decided whether any taking 
in fact has occurred. 
Thus, however we might rule with respect to the Court of Appeal's decision that appellant 
is not entitled to a monetary remedy--and we are frank to say that the federal constitutional 
aspects of that issue are not to be cast aside lightly--further proceedings are necessary to resolve 
the federal question whether there has been a taking at all.  The court's decision, therefore, is not 
final, and we are without jurisdiction to review it. 
Because §1257 permits us to review only "[final] judgments or decrees" of a state court, 
the appeal must be, and is, dismissed. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Rehnquist, concurring. 
 581 
If I were satisfied that this appeal was from a "final judgment or decree" of the California 
Court of Appeal, as that term is used in 28 U. S. C. §1257, I would have little difficulty in 
agreeing with much of what is said in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan.  
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Stewart, Justice Marshall, and Justice Powell join, 
dissenting. 
Title 28 U. S. C. §1257 limits this Court's jurisdiction to review judgments of state courts 
to "[final] judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision 
could be had."  The Court today dismisses this appeal on the ground that the Court of Appeal of 
California, Fourth District, failed to decide the federal question whether a "taking" of appellant's 
property had occurred, and therefore had not entered a final judgment or decree on that question 
appealable under §1257.  Because the Court's conclusion fundamentally mischaracterizes the 
holding and judgment of the Court of Appeal, I respectfully dissent from the Court's dismissal 
and reach the merits of appellant's claim. 
I 
In 1966, appellant assembled a 412-acre parcel of land as a potential site for a nuclear 
power plant.  At that time, approximately 116 acres of the property were zoned for industrial use, 
with most of the balance zoned in an agricultural holding category.  In 1967, appellee city of San 
Diego adopted its general plan designating most of appellant's property for industrial use.  In 
1973, the city took three critical actions which together form the predicate of the instant 
litigation: it down-zoned some of appellant's property from industrial to agricultural; it 
incorporated a new open-space element in its plan that designated about 233 acres of appellant's 
land for open-space use; and it prepared a report mapping appellant's property for purchase by 
the city for open-space use, contingent on passage of a bond issue. 
Appellant filed suit in California Superior Court alleging, inter alia, a "taking" of its 
property by "inverse condemnation" in violation of the United States and California 
Constitutions, and seeking compensation of over $6 million.  After a nonjury trial on liability, the 
court held that appellee city had taken a portion of appellant's property without just 
compensation, thereby violating the United States and California Constitutions.  Id. at 42-43.  A 
subsequent jury trial on damages resulted in a judgment of over $3 million, plus interest as of the 
date of the "taking," and appraisal, engineering, and attorney's fees.  Id. at 46. 
The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, affirmed, holding that there was 
"substantial evidence to support the court's conclusion [that] there was inverse condemnation." 
Id. The California Supreme Court denied further review. 
II 
This Court therefore errs, I respectfully submit, when it concludes that the Court of 
Appeal "has not decided whether any taking in fact has occurred."  For whatever the merits of 
the California courts' substantive rulings on the federal constitutional issue, it is clear that the 
California Supreme Court has held that California courts in a challenge, as here, to a police 
power regulation, are barred from holding that a Fifth Amendment "taking" requiring just 
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compensation has occurred.  No set of factual circumstances, no matter how severe, can 
"transmute" an arbitrary exercise of the city's police power into a Fifth Amendment "taking." 
Agins v. City of Tiburon, supra, at 273, 598 P.2d, at 28. 
III 
The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, states in clear and unequivocal terms:  "[Nor] shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation."  The question presented on the 
merits in this case is whether a government entity must pay just compensation when a police 
power regulation has effected a "taking" of "private property" for "public use" within the 
meaning of that constitutional provision. Implicit in this question is the corollary issue whether a 
government entity's exercise of its regulatory police power can ever effect a "taking" within the 
meaning of the Just Compensation Clause. 
A 
The California courts have held that a city's exercise of its police power, however 
arbitrary or excessive, cannot as a matter of federal constitutional law constitute a "taking" 
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.  This holding flatly contradicts clear precedents of 
this Court. 
The principle . . . has its source in Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), in which he stated: "The general rule at least is, 
that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking."  The determination of a "taking" is "a question of degree--and therefore 
cannot be disposed of by general propositions." Id. at 416. While acknowledging that 
"[government] hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law," id., at 413, the Court 
rejected the proposition that police power restrictions could never be recognized as a Fifth 
Amendment "taking."
1
 
                                                 
1
 More recent Supreme Court cases have emphasized this aspect of "taking" analysis, commenting that the Court has 
been unable to develop any "set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins," Goldblatt v. Town 
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962), and that "[it] calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the 
application of logic," Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979). See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S., at 124 ("ad hoc, factual inquiries"); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) 
("question properly turning upon the particular circumstances of each case"). 
One distinguished commentator has characterized the attempt to differentiate "regulation" from "taking" as "the 
most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of contemporary land-use law . . . one that may be the lawyer's 
equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark."  C. Haar, Land-Use Planning 766 (3d ed. 1976).  See generally id., 
at 766-777; Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 165 (1974); Michelman, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36 (1964).  Another has described a 30-year 
series of Court opinions resulting from this case-by-case approach as a "crazy-quilt pattern." Dunham, Griggs v. 
Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 S. Ct. Rev. 63. 
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B 
Not only does the holding of the California Court of Appeal contradict precedents of this 
Court, but it also fails to recognize the essential similarity of regulatory "takings" and other 
"takings." The typical "taking" occurs when a government entity formally condemns a 
landowner's property and obtains the fee simple pursuant to its sovereign power of eminent 
domain.  See, e. g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).  However, a "taking" may also 
occur without a formal condemnation proceeding or transfer of fee simple.  This Court long ago 
recognized that 
"[it] would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing [the Just 
Compensation Clause] . . . it shall be held that if the government refrains from the 
absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public it can destroy its 
value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in 
effect, subject it to total destruction without making any compensation, because, 
in the narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use." Pumpelly v. 
Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 177-178 (1872) (emphasis in original). 
In service of this principle, the Court frequently has found "takings" outside the context 
of formal condemnation proceedings or transfer of fee simple, in cases where government action 
benefiting the public resulted in destruction of the use and enjoyment of private property. 
Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other land-use restrictions can 
destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to promote the public good just as effectively 
as formal condemnation or physical invasion of property.  From the property owner's point of 
view, it may matter little whether his land is condemned or flooded, or whether it is restricted by 
regulation to use in its natural state, if the effect in both cases is to deprive him of all beneficial 
use of it.  From the government's point of view, the benefits flowing to the public from 
preservation of open space through regulation may be equally great as from creating a wildlife 
refuge through formal condemnation or increasing electricity production through a dam project 
that floods private property. 
IV 
Having determined that property may be "taken for public use" by police power 
regulation within the meaning of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the 
question remains whether a government entity may constitutionally deny payment of just 
compensation to the property owner and limit his remedy to mere invalidation of the regulation 
instead. Appellant argues that it is entitled to the full fair market value of the property. Appellees 
argue that invalidation of the regulation is sufficient without payment of monetary compensation.  
In my view, once a court establishes that there was a regulatory "taking," the Constitution 
demands that the government entity pay just compensation for the period commencing on the 
date the regulation first effected the "taking," and ending on the date the government entity 
chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation.  This interpretation, I believe, is supported 
by the express words and purpose of the Just Compensation Clause, as well as by cases of this 
Court construing it. 
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The language of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the "[taking]" of private property for 
"public use" without payment of "just compensation."  As soon as private property has been 
taken, whether through formal condemnation proceedings, occupancy, physical invasion, or 
regulation, the landowner has already suffered a constitutional violation, and "‘the self-executing 
character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation,’" United States v. Clarke, 
445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980), quoting 6 J. Sackman, Nichols' Law of Eminent Domain §25.41 (rev. 
3d ed. 1980), is triggered.  This Court has consistently recognized that the just compensation 
requirement in the Fifth Amendment is not precatory: once there is a "taking," compensation 
must be awarded.  Invalidation unaccompanied by payment of damages would hardly 
compensate the landowner for any economic loss suffered during the time his property was 
taken.
2
 
Moreover, mere invalidation would fall far short of fulfilling the fundamental purpose of 
the Just Compensation Clause.  That guarantee was designed to bar the government from forcing 
some individuals to bear burdens which, in all fairness, should be borne by the public as a whole. 
When one person is asked to assume more than a fair share of the public burden, the payment of 
just compensation operates to redistribute that economic cost from the individual to the public at 
large.  Because police power regulations must be substantially related to the advancement of the 
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
U.S. 365, 395 (1926), it is axiomatic that the public receives a benefit while the offending 
regulation is in effect.  If the regulation denies the private property owner the use and enjoyment 
of his land and is found to effect a "taking," it is only fair that the public bear the cost of benefits 
received during the interim period between application of the regulation and the government 
entity's rescission of it. 
The fact that a regulatory "taking" may be temporary, by virtue of the government's 
power to rescind or amend the regulation, does not make it any less of a constitutional "taking." 
Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that "takings" must be permanent and 
irrevocable. 
                                                 
2
 The instant litigation is a good case in point.  The trial court, on April 9, 1976, found that the city's actions effected 
a "taking" of appellant's property on June 19, 1973.  If true, then appellant has been deprived of all beneficial use of 
its property in violation of the Just Compensation Clause for the past seven years. 
Invalidation hardly prevents enactment of subsequent unconstitutional regulations by the government entity.  At the 
1974 annual conference of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers in California, a California City Attorney 
gave fellow City Attorneys the following advice: 
"IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND START OVER AGAIN.  
"If legal preventive maintenance does not work, and you still receive a claim attacking the land use regulation, or if 
you try the case and lose, don't worry about it.  All is not lost.  One of the extra ‘goodies’ contained in the recent 
[California] Supreme Court case of Selby v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 C. 3d 110, appears to allow the City to 
change the regulation in question, even after trial and judgment, make it more reasonable, more restrictive, or 
whatever, and everybody starts over again. 
"See how easy it is to be a City Attorney.  Sometimes you can lose the battle and still win the war.  Good luck."  
Longtin, Avoiding and Defending Constitutional Attacks on Land Use Regulations (Including Inverse 
Condemnation), in 38B NIMLO Municipal Law Review 192-193 (1975) (emphasis in original). 
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But contrary to appellant's claim that San Diego must formally condemn its property and 
pay full fair market value, nothing in the Just Compensation Clause empowers a court to order a 
government entity to condemn the property and pay its full fair market value, where the "taking" 
already effected is temporary and reversible and the government wants to halt the "taking."  Just 
as the government may cancel condemnation proceedings before passage of title, it must have 
the same power to rescind a regulatory "taking."  As the Court has noted: "[An] abandonment 
does not prejudice the property owner.  It merely results in an alteration of the property interest 
taken--from full ownership to one of temporary use and occupation . . . .  In such cases 
compensation would be measured by the principles normally governing the taking of a right to 
use property temporarily."  Ibid.; see Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284 (1939). 
The constitutional rule I propose requires that, once a court finds that a police power 
regulation has effected a "taking," the government entity must pay just compensation for the 
period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the "taking," and ending on the date 
the government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation.  Ordinary principles 
determining the proper measure of just compensation, regularly applied in cases of permanent 
and temporary "takings" involving formal condemnation proceedings, occupations, and physical 
invasions, should provide guidance to the courts in the award of compensation for a regulatory 
"taking."  As a starting point, the value of the property taken may be ascertained as of the date of 
the "taking."  The government must inform the court of its intentions vis-a-vis the regulation 
with sufficient clarity to guarantee a correct assessment of the just compensation award.  Should 
the government decide immediately to revoke or otherwise amend the regulation, it would be 
liable for payment of compensation only for the interim during which the regulation effected a 
"taking."  Rules of valuation already developed for temporary "takings" may be particularly 
useful to the courts in their quest for assessing the proper measure of monetary relief in cases of 
revocation or amendment.  Alternatively the government may choose formally to condemn the 
property, or otherwise to continue the offending regulation: in either case the action must be 
sustained by proper measures of just compensation. 
Because I believe that the Just Compensation Clause requires the constitutional rule 
outlined supra, I would vacate the judgment of the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 
and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
FIRST ENGLISH EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH OF GLENDALE v. 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 
482 U.S. 304 (1987) 
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case the California Court of Appeal held that a landowner who claims that his 
property has been “taken” by a land-use regulation may not recover damages for the time before 
it is finally determined that the regulation constitutes a “taking” of his property.  We disagree, 
and conclude that in these circumstances the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution would require compensation for that period. 
In 1957, appellant First English Evangelical Lutheran Church purchased a 21-acre parcel 
of land in a canyon along the banks of the Middle Fork of Mill Creek in the Angeles National 
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Forest.  The Middle Fork is the natural drainage channel for a watershed area owned by the 
National Forest Service.  Twelve of the acres owned by the church are flat land, and contained a 
dining hall, two bunkhouses, a caretaker’s lodge, an outdoor chapel, and a footbridge across the 
creek.  The church operated on the site a campground, known as “Lutherglen,” as a retreat center 
and a recreational area for handicapped children. 
In July 1977, a forest fire denuded the hills upstream from Lutherglen, destroying 
approximately 3,860 acres of the watershed area and creating a serious flood hazard.  Such 
flooding occurred on February 9 and 10, 1978, when a storm dropped 11 inches of rain in the 
watershed.  The runoff from the storm overflowed the banks of the Mill Creek, flooding 
Lutherglen and destroying its buildings. 
In response to the flooding of the canyon, appellee County of Los Angeles adopted 
Interim Ordinance No. 11,855 in January 1979.  The ordinance provided that “[a] person shall 
not construct, reconstruct, place or enlarge any building or structure, any portion of which is, or 
will be, located within the outer boundary lines of the interim flood protection area located in 
Mill Creek Canyon . . . .”  App. to Juris. Statement A31.  The ordinance was effective 
immediately because the county determined that it was “required for the immediate preservation 
of the public health and safety  . . . .”  Id. at A32.  The interim flood protection area described by 
the ordinance included the flat areas on either side of Mill Creek on which Lutherglen had stood. 
The church filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California a little more than a 
month after the ordinance was adopted.  As subsequently amended, the . . . second claim sought 
to recover from the Flood Control District in inverse condemnation . . . .  Appellant sought 
damages . . . for loss of use of Lutherglen.  The defendants moved to strike the portions of the 
complaint alleging that the county’s ordinance denied all use of Lutherglen, on the view that the 
California Supreme Court’s decision in Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P. 2d 25 (1979), 
aff’d on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), rendered the allegation “entirely immaterial and 
irrelevant, [with] no bearing upon any conceivable cause of action herein.”  In Agins v. Tiburon, 
supra, the California Supreme Court decided that a landowner may not maintain an inverse 
condemnation suit in the courts of that State based upon a “regulatory” taking.  24 Cal. 3d, at 
275-277, 598 P. 2d, at 29-31.  In the court’s view, maintenance of such a suit would allow a 
landowner to force the legislature to exercise its power of eminent domain.  Under this decision, 
then, compensation is not required until the challenged regulation or ordinance has been held 
excessive in an action for declaratory relief or a writ of mandamus and the government has 
nevertheless decided to continue the regulation in effect.  Based on this decision, the trial court in 
the present case granted the motion to strike the allegation that the church had been denied all 
use of Lutherglen. It explained that “a careful rereading of the Agins case persuades the Court 
that when an ordinance, even a non-zoning ordinance, deprives a person of the total use of his 
lands, his challenge to the ordinance is by way of declaratory relief or possibly mandamus.”  
App. 26. Because the appellant alleged a regulatory taking and sought only damages, the 
allegation that the ordinance denied all use of Lutherglen was deemed irrelevant. 
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal declin[ed] appellant’s invitation to reevaluate 
Agins in light of this Court’s opinions in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 
621 (1981).  The court found itself obligated to follow Agins “because the United States 
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Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the question of whether a state may constitutionally limit the 
remedy for a taking to nonmonetary relief . . . .” 
This appeal followed, and we noted probable jurisdiction.  478 U.S. 1003 (1986). 
Appellant asks us to hold that the California Supreme Court erred in Agins v. Tiburon in 
determining that the Fifth Amendment, as made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, does not require compensation as a remedy for “temporary” regulatory takings–
those regulatory takings which are ultimately invalidated by the courts.  Four times this decade, 
we have considered similar claims and have found ourselves for one reason or another unable to 
consider the merits of the Agins rule.  See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 
U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 
172 (1985); San Diego Gas & Electric Co., supra; Agins v. Tiburon, supra.  For the reasons 
explained below, however, we find the constitutional claim properly presented in this case, and 
hold that on these facts the California courts have decided the compensation question 
inconsistently with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. 
I 
Concerns with finality left us unable to reach the remedial question in the earlier cases 
where we have been asked to consider the rule of Agins.  Consideration of the remedial question 
in those circumstances, we concluded, would be premature.  The posture of the present case is 
quite different.  Appellant’s complaint alleged that “Ordinance No. 11,855 denies [it] all use of 
Lutherglen,” and sought damages for this deprivation.  In affirming the decision to strike this 
allegation, the Court of Appeal assumed that the complaint sought “damages for the 
uncompensated taking of all use of Lutherglen by County Ordinance No. 11,855.”  It relied on 
the California Supreme Court’s Agins decision for the conclusion that “the remedy for a taking 
[is limited] to nonmonetary relief . . . .”  The disposition of the case on these grounds isolates the 
remedial question for our consideration.  The California Court of Appeal has thus held that, 
regardless of the correctness of appellant’s claim that the challenged ordinance denies it “all use 
of Lutherglen,” appellant may not recover damages until the ordinance is finally declared 
unconstitutional, and then only for any period after that declaration for which the county seeks to 
enforce it.  The constitutional question pretermitted in our earlier cases is therefore squarely 
presented here. 
II 
Consideration of the compensation question must begin with direct reference to the 
language of the Fifth Amendment, which provides in relevant part that “private property [shall 
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”  As its language indicates, and as the 
Court has frequently noted, this provision does not prohibit the taking of private property, but 
instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.  This basic understanding of the 
Amendment makes clear that it is designed not to limit the governmental interference with 
property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper 
interference amounting to a taking.  Thus, government action that works a taking of property 
rights necessarily implicates the “constitutional obligation to pay just compensation.”  Armstrong 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
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We have recognized that a landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse 
condemnation as a result of “‘the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with 
respect to compensation . . . .’”  United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980), quoting 6 P. 
Nichols, Eminent Domain §25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972).  As noted in Justice Brennan’s dissent in 
San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 450 U.S., at 654-655, it has been established at least since Jacobs 
v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933), that claims for just compensation are grounded in the 
Constitution itself. 
It has also been established doctrine at least since Justice Holmes’ opinion for the Court 
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), that “the general rule at least is, that 
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.”  Id. at 415.  Later cases have unhesitatingly applied this principle.  See, 
e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 
745, 750 (1947); United States v. Causby, supra. 
While the California Supreme Court may not have actually disavowed this general rule in 
Agins, we believe that it has truncated the rule by disallowing damages that occurred prior to the 
ultimate invalidation of the challenged regulation.  The California Supreme Court justified its 
conclusion at length in the Agins opinion, concluding that: 
“In combination, the need for preserving a degree of freedom in the land-use 
planning function, and the inhibiting financial force which inheres in the inverse 
condemnation remedy, persuade us that on balance mandamus or declaratory 
relief rather than inverse condemnation is the appropriate relief under the 
circumstances.”  24 Cal. 3d, at 276-277, 598 P. 2d, at 31. 
We, of course, are not unmindful of these considerations, but they must be evaluated in 
the light of the command of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The Court 
has recognized in more than one case that the government may elect to abandon its intrusion or 
discontinue regulations.  Similarly, a governmental body may acquiesce in a judicial declaration 
that one of its ordinances has effected an unconstitutional taking of property; the landowner has 
no right under the Just Compensation Clause to insist that a “temporary” taking be deemed a 
permanent taking.  But we have not resolved whether abandonment by the government requires 
payment of compensation for the period of time during which regulations deny a landowner all 
use of his land. 
In considering this question, we find substantial guidance in cases where the government 
has only temporarily exercised its right to use private property.  These cases reflect the fact that 
“temporary” takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different in 
kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.  In the 
present case the interim ordinance was adopted by the County of Los Angeles in January 1979, 
and became effective immediately.  Appellant filed suit within a month after the effective date of 
the ordinance and yet when the California Supreme Court denied a hearing in the case on 
October 17, 1985, the merits of appellant’s claim had yet to be determined.  The United States 
has been required to pay compensation for leasehold interests of shorter duration than this.  The 
value of a leasehold interest in property for a period of years may be substantial, and the burden 
on the property owner in extinguishing such an interest for a period of years may be great indeed. 
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Where this burden results from governmental action that amounted to a taking, the Just 
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that the government pay the landowner 
for the value of the use of the land during this period.  Invalidation of the ordinance or its 
successor ordinance after this period of time, though converting the taking into a “temporary” 
one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Just Compensation Clause. 
Nothing we say today is intended to abrogate the principle that the decision to exercise 
the power of eminent domain is a legislative function “‘for Congress and Congress alone to 
determine.’”  Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984), quoting Berman 
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).  Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the 
government retains the whole range of options already available–amendment of the regulation, 
withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain.  Thus we do not, as the 
Solicitor General suggests, “permit a court, at the behest of a private person, to require the . . . 
Government to exercise the power of eminent domain . . . .”  Brief for United States as Amicus 
Curiae 22.  We merely hold that where the government’s activities have already worked a taking 
of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to 
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective. 
We also point out that the allegation of the complaint which we treat as true for purposes 
of our decision was that the ordinance in question denied appellant all use of its property.  We 
limit our holding to the facts presented, and of course do not deal with the quite different 
questions that would arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in 
zoning ordinances, variances, and the like which are not before us.  We realize that even our 
present holding will undoubtedly lessen to some extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use 
planners and governing bodies of municipal corporations when enacting land-use regulations. 
But such consequences necessarily flow from any decision upholding a claim of constitutional 
right; many of the provisions of the Constitution are designed to limit the flexibility and freedom 
of governmental authorities, and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of 
them.  As Justice Holmes aptly noted more than 50 years ago, “a strong public desire to improve 
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the 
constitutional way of paying for the change.”  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S., at 
416. 
Here we must assume that the Los Angeles County ordinance has denied appellant all use 
of its property for a considerable period of years, and we hold that invalidation of the ordinance 
without payment of fair value for the use of the property during this period of time would be a 
constitutionally insufficient remedy.  The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is therefore 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun and Justice O’Connor join as to Parts I and 
III, dissenting. 
One thing is certain.  The Court’s decision today will generate a great deal of litigation. 
Most of it, I believe, will be unproductive.  But the mere duty to defend the actions that today’s 
decision will spawn will undoubtedly have a significant adverse impact on the land-use 
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regulatory process.  The Court has reached out to address an issue not actually presented in this 
case, and has then answered that self-imposed question in a superficial and, I believe, dangerous 
way.  The policy implications of today’s decision are obvious and, I fear, far reaching.  Cautious 
local officials and land-use planners may avoid taking any action that might later be challenged 
and thus give rise to a damages action.  Much important regulation will never be enacted, even 
perhaps in the health and safety area.  Were this result mandated by the Constitution, these 
serious implications would have to be ignored.  But the loose cannon the Court fires today is not 
only unattached to the Constitution, but it also takes aim at a long line of precedents in the 
regulatory takings area.  It would be the better part of valor simply to decide the case at hand 
instead of igniting the kind of litigation explosion that this decision will undoubtedly touch off. 
I respectfully dissent. 
CITY OF MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES 
526 U.S. 687 (1999) 
KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court. 
This case began with attempts by the respondent, Del Monte Dunes, and its predecessor 
in interest to develop a parcel of land within the jurisdiction of the petitioner, the city of 
Monterey. The city, in a series of repeated rejections, denied proposals to develop the property, 
each time imposing more rigorous demands on the developers. Del Monte Dunes brought suit in 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, under 42 U.S.C. §1983. 
After protracted litigation, the case was submitted to the jury on Del Monte Dunes’ theory that 
the city effected a regulatory taking or otherwise injured the property by unlawful acts, without 
paying compensation or providing an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the loss. The jury 
found for Del Monte Dunes, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
The petitioner contends that the regulatory takings claim should not have been decided by 
the jury and that the Court of Appeals adopted an erroneous standard for regulatory takings 
liability. We need not decide all of the questions presented by the petitioner, nor need we 
examine each of the points given by the Court of Appeals in its decision to affirm. The 
controlling question is whether, given the city’s apparent concession that the instructions were a 
correct statement of the law, the matter was properly submitted to the jury. We conclude that it 
was, and that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. 
The property which respondent and its predecessor in interest (landowners) sought to 
develop was a 37.6 acre ocean-front parcel located in the city of Monterey, at or near the city’s 
boundary to the north, where Highway 1 enters. With the exception of the ocean and a state park 
located to the northeast, the parcel was virtually surrounded by a railroad right-of-way and 
properties devoted to industrial, commercial, and multifamily residential uses. The parcel itself 
was zoned for multifamily residential use under the city’s general zoning ordinance. 
The parcel had not been untouched by its urban and industrial proximities. A sewer line 
housed in 15-foot man-made dunes covered with jute matting and surrounded by snow fencing 
traversed the property. Trash, dumped in violation of the law, had accumulated on the premises. 
The parcel had been used for many years by an oil company as a terminal and tank farm where 
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large quantities of oil were delivered, stored, and reshipped. When the company stopped using 
the site, it had removed its oil tanks but left behind tank pads, an industrial complex, pieces of 
pipe, broken concrete, and oil-soaked sand. The company had introduced nonnative ice plant to 
prevent erosion and to control soil conditions around the oil tanks. Ice plant secretes a substance 
that forces out other plants and is not compatible with the parcel’s natural flora. By the time the 
landowners sought to develop the property, ice plant had spread to some 25 percent of the parcel, 
and, absent human intervention, would continue to advance, endangering and perhaps 
eliminating the parcel’s remaining natural vegetation. 
The natural flora the ice plant encroached upon included buckwheat, the natural habitat of 
the endangered Smith’s Blue Butterfly. The butterfly lives for one week, travels a maximum of 
200 feet, and must land on a mature, flowering buckwheat plant to survive. Searches for the 
butterfly from 1981 through 1985 yielded but a single larva, discovered in 1984. No other 
specimens had been found on the property, and the parcel was quite isolated from other possible 
habitats of the butterfly. 
In 1981 the landowners submitted an application to develop the property in conformance 
with the city’s zoning and general plan requirements. Although the zoning requirements 
permitted the development of up to 29 housing units per acre, or more than 1,000 units for the 
entire parcel, the landowners’ proposal was limited to 344 residential units. In 1982 the city’s 
planning commission denied the application but stated that a proposal for 264 units would 
receive favorable consideration. In keeping with the suggestion, the landowners submitted a 
revised proposal for 264 units. In late 1983, however, the planning commission again denied the 
application. The commission once more requested a reduction in the scale of the development, 
this time saying a plan for 224 units would be received with favor. The landowners returned to 
the drawing board and prepared a proposal for 224 units, which, its previous statements 
notwithstanding, the planning commission denied in 1984. The landowners appealed to the city 
council, which overruled the planning commission’s denial and referred the project back to the 
commission, with instructions to consider a proposal for 190 units. 
The landowners once again reduced the scope of their development proposal to comply 
with the city’s request, and submitted four specific, detailed site plans, each for a total of 190 
units for the whole parcel. Even so, the planning commission rejected the landowners’ proposal 
later in 1984. Once more the landowners appealed to the city council. The council again 
overruled the commission, finding the proposal conceptually satisfactory and in conformance 
with the city’s previous decisions regarding, inter alia, density, number of units, location on the 
property, and access. The council then approved one of the site plans, subject to various specific 
conditions, and granted an 18-month conditional use permit for the proposed development. 
The landowners spent most of the next year revising their proposal and taking other steps 
to fulfill the city’s conditions. Their final plan, submitted in 1985, devoted 17.9 of the 37.6 acres 
to public open space (including a public beach and areas for the restoration and preservation of 
the buckwheat habitat), 7.9 acres to open, landscaped areas, and 6.7 acres to public and private 
streets (including public parking and access to the beach). Only 5.1 acres were allocated to 
buildings and patios. The plan was designed, in accordance with the city’s demands, to provide 
the public with a beach, a buffer zone between the development and the adjoining state park, and 
view corridors so the buildings would not be visible to motorists on the nearby highway; the 
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proposal also called for restoring and preserving as much of the sand dune structure and 
buckwheat habitat as possible consistent with development and the city’s requirements. 
After detailed review of the proposed buildings, roads, and parking facilities, the city’s 
architectural review committee approved the plan. Following hearings before the planning 
commission, the commission’s professional staff found the final plan addressed and substantially 
satisfied the city’s conditions. It proposed the planning commission make specific findings to 
this effect and recommended the plan be approved. 
In January 1986, less than two months before the landowners’ conditional use permit was 
to expire, the planning commission rejected the recommendation of its staff and denied the 
development plan. The landowners appealed to the city council, also requesting a 12-month 
extension of their permit to allow them time to attempt to comply with any additional 
requirements the council might impose. The permit was extended until a hearing could be held 
before the city council in June 1986. After the hearing, the city council denied the final plan, not 
only declining to specify measures the landowners could take to satisfy the concerns raised by 
the council but also refusing to extend the conditional use permit to allow time to address those 
concerns. The council’s decision, moreover, came at a time when a sewer moratorium issued by 
another agency would have prevented or at least delayed development based on a new plan. 
The council did not base its decision on the landowners’ failure to meet any of the 
specific conditions earlier prescribed by the city. Rather, the council made general findings that 
the landowners had not provided adequate access for the development (even though the 
landowners had twice changed the specific access plans to comply with the city’s demands and 
maintained they could satisfy the city’s new objections if granted an extension), that the plan’s 
layout would damage the environment (even though the location of the development on the 
property was necessitated by the city’s demands for a public beach, view corridors, and a buffer 
zone next to the state park), and that the plan would disrupt the habitat of the Smith’s Blue 
Butterfly (even though the plan would remove the encroaching ice plant and preserve or restore 
buckwheat habitat on almost half of the property, and even though only one larva had ever been 
found on the property). 
After five years, five formal decisions, and 19 different site plans, respondent Del Monte 
Dunes decided the city would not permit development of the property under any circumstances. 
Del Monte Dunes commenced suit against the city in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging, inter alia, that denial of the final 
development proposal was a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and an uncompensated, and so unconstitutional, regulatory taking. 
The District Court determined, over the city’s objections, to submit Del Monte Dunes’ 
takings and equal protection claims to a jury but to reserve the substantive due process claim for 
decision by the court. Del Monte Dunes argued to the jury that, although the city had a right to 
regulate its property, the combined effect of the city’s various demands–that the development be 
invisible from the highway, that a buffer be provided between the development and the state 
park, and that the public be provided with a beach–was to force development into the “bowl” 
area of the parcel. As a result, Del Monte Dunes argued, the city’s subsequent decision that the 
bowl contained sensitive buckwheat habitat which could not be disturbed blocked the 
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development of any portion of the property. While conceding the legitimacy of the city’s stated 
regulatory purposes, Del Monte Dunes emphasized the tortuous and protracted history of 
attempts to develop the property, as well as the shifting and sometimes inconsistent positions 
taken by the city throughout the process, and argued that it had been treated in an unfair and 
irrational manner. Del Monte Dunes also submitted evidence designed to undermine the validity 
of the asserted factual premises for the city’s denial of the final proposal and to suggest that the 
city had considered buying, or inducing the State to buy, the property for public use as early as 
1979, reserving some money for this purpose but delaying or abandoning its plans for financial 
reasons. The State of California’s purchase of the property during the pendency of the litigation 
may have bolstered the credibility of Del Monte Dunes’ position. 
At the close of argument, the District Court instructed the jury it should find for Del 
Monte Dunes if it found either that Del Monte Dunes had been denied all economically viable 
use of its property or that “the city’s decision to reject the plaintiff’s 190 unit development 
proposal did not substantially advance a legitimate public purpose.” The essence of these 
instructions was proposed by the city. The jury delivered a general verdict for Del Monte Dunes 
on its takings claim, a separate verdict for Del Monte Dunes on its equal protection claim, and a 
damages award of $1.45 million. After the jury’s verdict, the District Court ruled for the city on 
the substantive due process claim, stating that its ruling was not inconsistent with the jury’s 
verdict on the equal protection or the takings claim. The court later denied the city’s motions for 
a new trial or for judgment as a matter of law. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 95 F.3d 1422 (CA9 1996). The court first ruled that the 
District Court did not err in allowing Del Monte Dunes’ regulatory takings claim to be tried to a 
jury, 95 F.3d at 1428, because Del Monte Dunes had a right to a jury trial under §1983, 95 F.3d 
at 1426-1427, and whether Del Monte Dunes had been denied all economically viable use of the 
property and whether the city’s denial of the final proposal substantially advanced legitimate 
public interests were, on the facts of this case, questions suitable for the jury, 95 F.3d at 1430. 
The court ruled that sufficient evidence had been presented to the jury from which it reasonably 
could have decided each of these questions in Del Monte Dunes’ favor.  95 F.3d at 1430-1434. 
Because upholding the verdict on the regulatory takings claim was sufficient to support the 
award of damages, the court did not address the equal protection claim. 95 F.3d at 1426. The 
court stated that  
“Del Monte provided evidence sufficient to rebut each of these reasons [for denying the 
final proposal]. Taken together, Del Monte argued that the City’s reasons for denying their 
application were invalid and that it unfairly intended to forestall any reasonable development of 
the Dunes. In light of the evidence proffered by Del Monte, the City has incorrectly argued that 
no rational juror could conclude that the City’s denial of Del Monte’s application lacked a 
sufficient nexus with its stated objectives.” 95 F.3d at 1431-1432. 
The controlling question is whether, given the city’s apparent concession that the 
instructions were a correct statement of the law, the matter was properly submitted to the jury. 
We conclude that it was, and that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. The 
questions presented in the city’s petition for certiorari were whether (1) issues of liability were 
properly submitted to the jury on Del Monte Dunes’ regulatory takings claim, (2) whether the 
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Court of Appeals impermissibly based its decision on a standard that allowed the jury to reweigh 
the reasonableness of the city’s land-use decision. 
The city challenges the Court of Appeals’ holding that the jury could have found the 
city’s denial of the final development plan not reasonably related to legitimate public interests. 
Although somewhat obscure, the city’s argument is not cast as a challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence; rather, the city maintains that the Court of Appeals adopted a legal standard for 
regulatory takings liability that allows juries to second-guess public land-use policy. 
As the city itself proposed the essence of the instructions given to the jury, it cannot now 
contend that the instructions did not provide an accurate statement of the law. In any event, 
although this Court has provided neither a definitive statement of the elements of a claim for a 
temporary regulatory taking nor a thorough explanation of the nature or applicability of the 
requirement that a regulation substantially advance legitimate public interests we note that the 
trial court’s instructions are consistent with our previous general discussions of regulatory 
takings liability. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126, 88 L. 
Ed. 2d 419, 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 65 L. Ed. 2d 
106, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980). The city did not challenge below the applicability or continued 
viability of the general test for regulatory takings liability recited by these authorities and upon 
which the jury instructions appear to have been modeled. Given the posture of the case before us, 
we decline the suggestions of amici to revisit these precedents. 
In short, the question submitted to the jury on this issue was confined to whether, in light 
of all the history and the context of the case, the city’s particular decision to deny Del Monte 
Dunes’ final development proposal was reasonably related to the city’s proffered justifications. 
This question was couched, moreover, in an instruction that had been proposed in essence by the 
city, and as to which the city made no objection. 
Thus, despite the protests of the city and its amici, it is clear that the Court of Appeals did 
not adopt a rule of takings law allowing wholesale interference by judge or jury with municipal 
land-use policies, laws, or routine regulatory decisions. To the extent the city argues that, as a 
matter of law, its land-use decisions are immune from judicial scrutiny under all circumstances, 
its position is contrary to settled regulatory takings principles. We reject this claim of error. 
We next address whether it was proper for the District Court to submit the question of 
liability on Del Monte Dunes’ regulatory takings claim to the jury. As the Court of Appeals 
recognized, the answer depends on whether Del Monte Dunes had a statutory or constitutional 
right to a jury trial, and, if it did, the nature and extent of the right. Del Monte Dunes asserts the 
right to a jury trial is conferred by §1983 and by the Seventh Amendment. 
The Seventh Amendment provides that “in Suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .” 
Consistent with the textual mandate that the jury right be preserved, our interpretation of the 
Amendment has been guided by historical analysis comprising two principal inquiries. “We ask, 
first, whether we are dealing with a cause of action that either was tried at law at the time of the 
founding or is at least analogous to one that was.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 
U.S. 370, 376, 134 L. Ed. 2d 577, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996). “If the action in question belongs in 
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the law category, we then ask whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to 
preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791.” 
Del Monte Dunes brought this suit pursuant to §1983 to vindicate its constitutional rights. 
We hold that a §1983 suit seeking legal relief is an action at law within the meaning of the 
Seventh Amendment. It is undisputed that when the Seventh Amendment was adopted there was 
no action equivalent to §1983, framed in specific terms for vindicating constitutional rights. It is 
settled law, however, that the Seventh Amendment jury guarantee extends to statutory claims 
unknown to the common law, so long as the claims can be said to “sound basically in tort,” and 
seek legal relief. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195-196. 
Here Del Monte Dunes sought legal relief. It was entitled to proceed in federal court 
under §1983 because, at the time of the city’s actions, the State of California did not provide a 
compensatory remedy for temporary regulatory takings. The constitutional injury alleged, 
therefore, is not that property was taken but that it was taken without just compensation. Had the 
city paid for the property or had an adequate post-deprivation remedy been available, Del Monte 
Dunes would have suffered no constitutional injury from the taking alone. See Williamson, 473 
U.S. at 194-195. Because its’ statutory action did not accrue until it was denied just 
compensation, in a strict sense Del Monte Dunes sought not just compensation per se but rather 
damages for the unconstitutional denial of such compensation. Damages for a constitutional 
violation are a legal remedy. 
In attempt to avoid the force of this conclusion, the city urges us [that] the jury’s role in 
estimating just compensation in condemnation proceedings was inconsistent and unclear at the 
time the Seventh Amendment was adopted, this Court has said “that there is no constitutional 
right to a jury in eminent domain proceedings.” United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 18, 25 
L. Ed. 2d 12, 90 S. Ct. 803 (1970); accord, Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 593, 42 L. Ed. 270, 
17 S. Ct. 966 (1897). The city submits that the analogy to formal condemnation proceedings is 
controlling, so that there is no jury right here. 
Although condemnation proceedings spring from the same Fifth Amendment right to 
compensation which, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, is applicable here a 
condemnation action differs in important respects from a §1983 action to redress an 
uncompensated taking. Most important, when the government initiates condemnation 
proceedings, it concedes the landowner’s right to receive just compensation and seeks a mere 
determination of the amount of compensation due. Liability simply is not an issue. As a result, 
even if condemnation proceedings were an appropriate analogy, condemnation practice would 
provide little guidance on the specific question whether Del Monte Dunes was entitled to a jury 
determination of liability. 
This difference renders the analogy to condemnation proceedings not only unhelpful but 
also inapposite. When the government takes property without initiating condemnation 
proceedings, it “shifts to the landowner the burden to discover the encroachment and to take 
affirmative action to recover just compensation.” United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 
(1980). Even when the government does not dispute its seizure of the property or its obligation to 
pay for it, the mere “shifting of the initiative from the condemning authority to the condemnee” 
can place the landowner “at a significant disadvantage.” Id., at 258.  Where, as here, the 
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government not only denies liability but fails to provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy 
(thus refusing to submit the question of liability to an impartial arbiter), the disadvantage to the 
owner becomes all the greater. At least in these circumstances, the analogy to ordinary 
condemnation procedures is simply untenable. 
Our conclusion is confirmed by precedent. Early authority finding no jury right in a 
condemnation proceeding did so on the ground that condemnation did not involve the 
determination of legal rights because liability was undisputed 
Condemnation proceedings differ from the instant cause of action in another fundamental 
respect as well. When the government condemns property for public use, it provides the 
landowner a forum for seeking just compensation, as is required by the Constitution. If the 
condemnation proceedings do not, in fact, deny the landowner just compensation, the 
government’s actions are neither unconstitutional nor unlawful. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194 
(“The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without 
just compensation”). Even when the government takes property without initiating condemnation 
proceedings, there is no constitutional violation “‘unless or until the state fails to provide an 
adequate post-deprivation remedy for the property loss.’” 473 U.S. at 195 (quoting Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n. 12, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984)). In this case, 
however, Del Monte Dunes was denied not only its property but also just compensation or even 
an adequate forum for seeking it. That is the gravamen of the §1983 claim. In these 
circumstances, we conclude the cause of action sounds in tort and is most analogous to the 
various actions that lay at common law to recover damages for interference with property 
interests. 
Having decided Del Monte Dunes’ §1983 suit was an action at law, we must determine 
whether the particular issues of liability were proper for determination by the jury. Where history 
does not provide a clear answer, we look to precedent and functional considerations. 
Just as no exact analogue of Del Monte Dunes’ §1983 suit can be identified at common 
law, so also can we find no precise analogue for the specific test of liability submitted to the jury 
in this case. We do know that in suits sounding in tort for money damages, questions of liability 
were decided by the jury, rather than the judge, in most cases. This allocation preserved the 
jury’s role in resolving what was often the heart of the dispute between plaintiff and defendant. 
Although these general observations provide some guidance on the proper allocation between 
judge and jury of the liability issues in this case, they do not establish a definitive answer. 
 We turn next to considerations of process and function. Almost from the inception of our 
regulatory takings doctrine, we have held that whether a regulation of property goes so far that 
“there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act . . . depends 
upon the particular facts.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 67 L. Ed. 322, 
43 S. Ct. 158 (1922). Consistent with this understanding, we have described determinations of 
liability in regulatory takings cases as “‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,’” Penn Central 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978)), 
requiring “complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government 
actions,” Yee, 503 U.S. at 523. In accordance with these pronouncements, we hold that the issue 
whether a landowner has been deprived of all economically viable use of his property is a 
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predominantly factual question. As our implied acknowledgment of the procedure in 
Williamson, supra, suggests, in actions at law otherwise within the purview of the Seventh 
Amendment, this question is for the jury. 
The jury’s role in determining whether a land-use decision substantially advances 
legitimate public interests within the meaning of our regulatory takings doctrine presents a more 
difficult question. Although our cases make clear that this inquiry involves an essential factual 
component, see Yee, 503 U.S. at 523, it no doubt has a legal aspect as well, and is probably best 
understood as a mixed question of fact and law. 
We note the limitations of our Seventh Amendment holding. We do not address the jury’s 
role in an ordinary inverse condemnation suit. The action here was brought under §1983, a 
context in which the jury’s role in vindicating constitutional rights has long been recognized by 
the federal courts. A federal court, moreover, cannot entertain a takings claim under §1983 
unless or until the complaining landowner has been denied an adequate post-deprivation remedy. 
Even the State of California, where this suit arose, now provides a facially adequate procedure 
for obtaining just compensation for temporary takings such as this one. Our decision is also 
circumscribed in its conceptual reach. The posture of the case does not present an appropriate 
occasion to define with precision the elements of a temporary regulatory takings claim; although 
the city objected to submitting issues of liability to the jury at all, it approved the instructions that 
were submitted to the jury and therefore has no basis to challenge them. 
For these reasons, we do not attempt a precise demarcation of the respective provinces of 
judge and jury in determining whether a zoning decision substantially advances legitimate 
governmental interests. The city and its amici suggest that sustaining the judgment here will 
undermine the uniformity of the law and eviscerate state and local zoning authority by subjecting 
all land-use decisions to plenary, and potentially inconsistent, jury review. Our decision raises no 
such specter.  Del Monte Dunes did not bring a broad challenge to the constitutionality of the 
city’s general land-use ordinances or policies, and our holding does not extend to a challenge of 
that sort. In such a context, the determination whether the statutory purposes were legitimate, or 
whether the purposes, though legitimate, were furthered by the law or general policy, might well 
fall within the province of the judge. Nor was the gravamen of Del Monte Dunes’ complaint 
even that the city’s general regulations were unreasonable as applied to Del Monte Dunes’ 
property; we do not address the proper trial allocation of the various questions that might arise in 
that context. Rather, to the extent Del Monte Dunes’ challenge was premised on unreasonable 
governmental action, the theory argued and tried to the jury was that the city’s denial of the final 
development permit was inconsistent not only with the city’s general ordinances and policies but 
even with the shifting ad hoc restrictions previously imposed by the city. Del Monte Dunes’ 
argument, in short, was not that the city had followed its zoning ordinances and policies but 
rather that it had not done so. As is often true in §1983 actions, the disputed questions were 
whether the government had denied a constitutional right in acting outside the bounds of its 
authority, and, if so, the extent of any resulting damages. These were questions for the jury. 
AFFIRMED. 
JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE O’CONNOR, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and 
JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting in part. 
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The city’s proposed analogy of inverse condemnation proceedings to direct ones is 
intuitively sensible, given their common Fifth Amendment constitutional source and link to the 
sovereign’s power of eminent domain. The intuition is borne out by closer analysis of the 
respective proceedings. The ultimate issue is identical in both direct and inverse condemnation 
actions: a determination of “the fair market value of the property [taken] on the date it is 
appropriated,” as the measure of compensation required by the Fifth Amendment.  Kirby Forest 
Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10, 81 L. Ed. 2d 1, 104 S. Ct. 2187 (1984). As we 
said in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987): 
“‘The fact that condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that the right 
was asserted in suits by the owners does not change the essential nature of the 
claim. The form of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth 
Amendment.’” 482 U.S. at 315 (quoting Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16, 
78 L. Ed. 142, 54 S. Ct. 26 (1933)). 
The strength of the analogy is fatal to respondents’ claim to a jury trial as a matter of 
right. Reaffirming what was already a well-established principle, the Court explained over a 
century ago that “the estimate of the just compensation for property taken for the public use, 
under the right of eminent domain, is not required to be made by a jury,” Bauman v. Ross, 167 
U.S. 548, 593, 42 L. Ed. 270, 17 S. Ct. 966 (1897) 
In sum, at the time of the framing the notion of regulatory taking or inverse 
condemnation was yet to be derived, the closest analogue to the then-unborn claim was that of 
direct condemnation, and the right to compensation for such direct takings carried with it no right 
to a jury trial, just as the jury right is foreign to it in the modern era. On accepted Seventh 
Amendment analysis, then, there is no reason to find a jury right either by direct analogy or for 
the sake of preserving the substance of any jury practice known to the law at the crucial time. 
Indeed, the analogy with direct condemnation actions is so strong that there is every reason to 
conclude that inverse condemnation should implicate no jury right. 
Even if an argument for §1983 simplicity and uniformity were sustainable, however, it 
would necessarily be weaker than the analogy with direct condemnation actions. That analogy 
rests on two elements that are present in each of the two varieties of condemnation actions: a 
Fifth Amendment constitutional right and a remedy specifically mandated by that same 
amendment. Because constitutional values are superior to statutory values, uniformity as 
between different applications of a given constitutional guarantee is more important than 
uniformity as between different applications of a given statute. If one accepts that proposition as 
I do, a close analogy between direct and inverse condemnation proceedings is necessarily 
stronger than even a comparably close resemblance between two statutory actions. 
IV 
Were the results of the analysis to this point uncertain, one final anomaly of the Court’s 
position would point up its error. The inconsistency of recognizing a jury trial right in inverse 
condemnation, notwithstanding its absence in condemnation actions, appears the more 
pronounced on recalling that under Agins one theory of recovery in inverse condemnation cases 
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is that the taking makes no substantial contribution to a legitimate governmental purpose. This 
issue includes not only a legal component that may be difficult to resolve, but one so closely 
related to similar issues in substantive due process property claims, that this Court cited a 
substantive due process case when recognizing the theory under the rubric of inverse 
condemnation. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188, 72 
L. Ed. 842, 48 S. Ct. 447 (1928)). Substantive due process claims are, of course, routinely 
reserved without question for the court. Thus, it would be far removed from usual practice to 
charge a jury with the duty to assess the constitutional legitimacy of the government’s objective 
or the constitutional adequacy of its relationship to the government’s chosen means.  
The usual practice makes perfect sense. While juries are not customarily called upon to 
assume the subtleties of deferential review, courts apply this sort of limited scrutiny in all sorts 
of contexts and are routinely accorded institutional competence to do it. It therefore should bring 
no surprise to find that in the taking cases a question whether regulatory action substantially 
advances a legitimate public aim has more often than not been treated by the federal courts as a 
legal issue. See, e.g., New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F.3d 1084, 1092 (CA11 1996) 
(whether regulatory taking occurred is an issue for the court); Mid Gulf, Inc. v. Bishop, 792 F. 
Supp. 1205, 1213-1214, 1215 (Kan. 1992) (whether city’s regulations unreasonable and a taking 
a question of law for the court); Gissel v. Kenmare Township, 512 N.W.2d 470, 474 (N. D. 
1994) (necessity for proposed taking a question for the court); Yegen v. Bismarck, 291 N.W.2d 
422, 424 (N. D. 1980) (taking vel non of private property for public use a question of law). These 
practices point up the great gulf between the practical realities of taking litigation, and the 
Court’s reliance on the assertion that “in suits sounding in tort for money damages, questions of 
liability were decided by the jury, rather than the judge, in most cases,” ante, at 27. 
The Court apparently seeks to distance itself from the ramifications of today’s 
determination. The Court disclaims any attempt to set a “precise demarcation of the respective 
provinces of judge and jury in determining whether a zoning decision substantially advances 
legitimate governmental interests.” It denies that today’s holding would extend to “a broad 
challenge to the constitutionality of the city’s general land-use ordinances or policies,” in which 
case, “the determination whether the statutory purposes were legitimate, or whether the purposes, 
though legitimate, were furthered by the law or general policy, might well fall within the 
province of the judge.” (And the plurality presumably does not mean to address any Seventh 
Amendment issue that someone might raise when the government has provided an adequate 
remedy, for example, by recognizing a compensatory action for inverse condemnation, see ante, 
at 23, 26.) But the Court’s reticence is cold comfort simply because it rests upon distinctions that 
withstand analysis no better than the tort-law analogies on which the Court’s conclusion purports 
to rest. The narrowness of the Court’s intentions cannot, therefore, be accepted as an effective 
limit on the consequences on its reasoning, from which, I respectfully dissent. 
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Session 25. Ad Hoc Factual Inquiries   
PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION CO. v. CITY OF NEW YORK  
438 U.S. 104 (1978) 
[Review in Session 8] 
ANDRUS v. ALLARD 
444 U.S. 51 (1979) 
Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act are conservation 
statutes designed to prevent the destruction of certain species of birds.
1
  Challenged in 
this case is the validity of regulations promulgated by appellant Secretary of the Interior 
that prohibit commercial transactions in parts of birds legally killed before the birds came 
under the protection of the statutes.  The regulations provide in pertinent part: 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The Eagle Protection Act, §1, 54 Stat. 250, as amended, as set forth in 16 U. S. C. §668 (a), provides in 
pertinent part: 
“Whoever, within the United States or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, without being permitted 
to do so as provided in this subchapter, shall knowingly, or with wanton disregard for the consequences of 
his act take, possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import, at 
any time or in any manner any bald eagle commonly known as the American eagle or any golden eagle, 
alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof of the foregoing eagles, or whoever violates any permit or 
regulation issued pursuant to this subchapter, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more 
than one year or both . . . .  Provided further, That nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit possession 
or transportation of any bald eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, lawfully taken prior to 
June 8, 1940, and that nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit possession or transportation of any 
golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, lawfully taken prior to the addition to this 
subchapter of the provisions relating to preservation of the golden eagle.” 
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, §2, 40 Stat. 755, as amended, as set forth in 16 U. S. C. §703, similarly 
provides: 
“Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter provided in this subchapter, it shall be 
unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, 
capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for 
shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation, 
transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, 
carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any part, nest, or eggs of any such bird, or any product, whether or 
not manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or 
egg thereof, included in the terms of the conventions between the United States and Great Britain for the 
protection of migratory birds concluded August 16, 1916 (39 Stat. 1702), the United States and the United 
Mexican States for the protection of migratory birds and game mammals concluded February 7, 1936, and 
the United States and the Government of Japan for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of 
extinction, and their environment concluded March 4, 1972.” 
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50 CFR §21.2 (a) (1978): 
“Migratory birds, their parts, nests, or eggs, lawfully acquired prior to the 
effective date of Federal protection under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act . . 
. may be possessed or transported without a Federal permit, but may not 
be imported, exported, purchased, sold, bartered, or offered for purchase, 
sale, trade, or barter . . . .” 
50 CFR §22.2 (a) (1978): 
“Bald eagles, alive or dead, or their parts, nests, or eggs lawfully acquired 
prior to June 8, 1940, and golden eagles, alive or dead, or their parts, nests, 
or eggs lawfully acquired prior to October 24, 1962, may be possessed, or 
transported without a Federal permit, but may not be imported, exported, 
purchased, sold, traded, bartered, or offered for purchase, sale, trade or 
barter . . . .” 
Appellees are engaged in the trade of Indian artifacts: several own commercial 
enterprises, one is employed by such an enterprise, and one is a professional appraiser.  A 
number of the artifacts are partly composed of the feathers of currently protected birds, 
but these artifacts existed before the statutory protections came into force.  After two of 
the appellees who had sold “pre-existing” artifacts were prosecuted for violations of the 
Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, appellees brought this suit for 
declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court for the District of Colorado.  The 
complaint alleged that the statutes do not forbid the sale of appellees’ artifacts insofar as 
the constituent birds’ parts were obtained prior to the effective dates of the statutes.  It 
further alleged that if the statutes and regulations do apply to such property, they violate 
the Fifth Amendment. 
A three-judge court, convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2282 (1970 ed.), held that 
because of “grave doubts whether these two acts would be constitutional if they were 
construed to apply to pre-act bird products,” the Acts were to be interpreted as “not 
applicable to preexisting, legally-obtained bird parts or products therefrom . . . .”  App. to 
Juris. Statement 13a-14a. Accordingly, the court ruled that “the interpretive regulations, 
50 C. F. R. §§21.2 (a) and 22.2 (a) [are] void as unauthorized extensions of the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act and the Eagle Protection Act and [are] violative of the [appellees’] Fifth 
Amendment property rights.” Id. at 14a. Judgment was entered declaring “the subject 
regulations to be invalid and unenforceable as against the [appellees’] property rights in 
feathers and artifacts owned before the effective date of the subject statute,” and 
enjoining appellants “from any interference with the exercise of such rights, including the 
rights of sale, barter or exchange.”  Id. at 16a-17a.  We noted probable jurisdiction.  440 
U.S. 905 (1979).  We reverse. 
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I 
Appellant Secretary of the Interior contends that both the Eagle Protection and 
Migratory Bird Treaty Acts contemplate regulatory prohibition of commerce in the parts 
of protected birds, without regard to when those birds were originally taken.  Appellees 
respond that such a prohibition serves no purpose, arguing that statutory protection of 
wildlife is not furthered by an embargo upon traffic in avian artifacts that existed before 
the statutory safeguards came into effect. 
A 
Our point of departure in statutory analysis is the language of the enactment.  See 
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979).  “Though we may 
not end with the words in construing a disputed statute, one certainly begins there.”  F. 
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes 16 (1947). 
The terms of the Eagle Protection Act plainly must be read as appellant Secretary 
argues. The sweepingly framed prohibition in §668 (a) makes it unlawful to “take, 
possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or 
import” protected birds. Congress expressly dealt with the problem of pre-existing bird 
products by qualifying that general prohibition with the proviso that “nothing herein shall 
be construed to prohibit possession or transportation” of bald or golden eagle parts taken 
prior to the effective date of coverage under the Act.  (Emphasis supplied.) 
In view of the exhaustive and careful enumeration of forbidden acts in §668 (a), 
the narrow limitation of the proviso to “possession or transportation”  compels the 
conclusion that, with respect to pre-existing artifacts, Congress specifically declined to 
except any activities other than possession and transportation from the general statutory 
ban.  To read a further exemption for pre-existing artifacts into the Eagle Protection Act, 
“we would be forced to ignore the ordinary meaning of plain language.”  TVA v. Hill, 
437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978).  Nor can there be any question of oversight or drafting error.  
Throughout the statute the distinct concepts of possession, transportation, taking, and sale 
or purchase are treated with precision.  The broad proscriptive provisions of the Eagle 
Protection Act were consistently framed to encompass a full catalog of prohibited acts, 
always including sale or purchase.  See §§668 (a), 668 (b), 668b (b). In contrast, the 
exemptions created were specifically limited to possession or transportation, §668 (a), 
taking, §668a, n.6 or taking, possession, or transportation, ibid. 
The prohibition against the sale of bird parts lawfully taken before the effective 
date of federal protection is fully consonant with the purposes of the Eagle Protection 
Act.  It was reasonable for Congress to conclude that the possibility of commercial gain 
presents a special threat to the preservation of the eagles because that prospect creates a 
powerful incentive both to evade statutory prohibitions against taking birds and to take a 
large volume of birds.  The legislative draftsmen might well view evasion as a serious 
danger because there is no sure means by which to determine the age of bird feathers; 
feathers recently taken can easily be passed off as having been obtained long ago. 
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B 
The fundamental prohibition in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act is couched in 
language as expansive as that employed in the Eagle Protection Act.  Title 16 U. S. C. 
§703 provides: 
“[unless] and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter 
provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful . . . to pursue, hunt, take, 
capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, 
offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, 
ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver 
for transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be 
carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export.” 
But the Migratory Bird Treaty Act contains no explicit exception for the 
possession or transportation of bird parts obtained before the federal protection became 
effective: that exception is created by the Secretary’s regulation.  50 CFR §21.2 (1978).  
Unlike our analysis under the Eagle Protection Act, therefore, reliance upon the negative 
inference from a narrow statutory exemption for the transportation or possession of pre-
existing artifacts is precluded.
2
 Nevertheless, the text, context, and purpose of the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act support the Secretary’s interpretative regulations of that 
enactment. 
On its face, the comprehensive statutory prohibition is naturally read as 
forbidding transactions in all bird parts, including those that compose pre-existing 
artifacts.  While there is no doubt that regulations may exempt transactions from the 
general ban, nothing in the statute requires an exception for the sale of pre-existing 
artifacts.  And no such statutory exception can be implied.
3
 When Congress wanted an 
exemption from the statutory prohibition, it provided so in unmistakable terms.  Cf. 16 U. 
S. C. §711. 
We are therefore persuaded that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act empowers the 
Secretary of the Interior to bar commercial transactions in covered bird parts in spite of 
the fact that the parts were lawfully taken before the onset of federal protection.  We see 
                                                 
2
 The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, passed in 1918, 40 Stat. 755, predates the Eagle Protection Act by 22 
years. Originally the legislation implementing a Migratory Bird Convention between Great Britain (on 
behalf of Canada) and the United States, the Act now implements similar treaties between this country and 
other nations.  See generally Coggins & Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act, 50 Colo. L. Rev. 165, 169-174 (1979); M. Bean, The Evolution of National Wildlife Law 68-74 
(1977). 
3
 Our interpretation of the statute does not depart from any course of construction adopted by other courts. 
United States v. Marks, 4 F.2d 420 (SD Tex. 1925), did hold it impermissible to punish the sale of birds 
taken before the Migratory Bird Treaty Act was passed.  But that ruling rested upon the court’s view that 
Congress’ authority to regulate the birds must rest wholly upon the treaty rather than the commerce power.  
Whatever the logic of that ruling, the underlying assumption that the national commerce power does not 
reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed.  See, e. g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
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no indication to the contrary. It follows that the Secretary could properly permit the 
possession or transportation, and not the sale or purchase, of pre-existing bird artifacts.  
Accordingly, we disagree with the District Court’s interpretation of the Act as 
inapplicable to pre-existing legally obtained bird parts. 
II 
We also disagree with the District Court’s holding that, as construed to authorize 
the prohibition of commercial transactions in pre-existing avian artifacts, the Eagle 
Protection and Migratory Bird Treaty Acts violate appellees’ Fifth Amendment property 
rights because the prohibition wholly deprives them of the opportunity to earn a profit 
from those relics.
4 
 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 
123-128 (1978), is our most recent exposition on the Takings Clause.  That exposition 
need not be repeated at length here.  Suffice it to say that government regulation–by 
definition–involves the adjustment of rights for the public good.  Often this adjustment 
curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property.  To 
require compensation in all such circumstances would effectively compel the government 
to regulate by purchase. “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values 
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the 
general law.”  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); see Penn 
Central, supra, at 124. 
The Takings Clause, therefore, preserves governmental power to regulate, subject 
only to the dictates of “‘justice and fairness.’” Ibid; see Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 
590, 594 (1962). There is no abstract or fixed point at which judicial intervention under 
the Takings Clause becomes appropriate.  Formulas and factors have been developed in a 
variety of settings. See Penn Central, supra, at 123-128.  Resolution of each case, 
however, ultimately calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the application of 
logic. 
The regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender of the artifacts, and 
there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them.  Rather, a significant restriction has 
been imposed on one means of disposing of the artifacts.  But the denial of one traditional 
property right does not always amount to a taking.  At least where an owner possesses a 
full “bundle” of property rights, the destruction of one “strand” of the bundle is not a 
taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.  Compare Penn Central, 
supra, at 130-131, and United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956), with 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, and United States v. Virginia Electric & Power 
Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961).  See also Michelman, “Property, Utility, and Fairness: 
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law,” 80 Harv. L. Rev. 
1165, 1230-1233 (1967).  In this case, it is crucial that appellees retain the rights to 
possess and transport their property, and to donate or devise the protected birds. 
                                                 
4
 Although this argument appears to have been cast in the District Court in terms of economic substantive 
due process, before this Court appellees have used the terminology of the Takings Clause. 
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It is, to be sure, undeniable that the regulations here prevent the most profitable 
use of appellees’ property.  Again, however, that is not dispositive.  When we review 
regulation, a reduction in the value of property is not necessarily equated with a taking.  
In the instant case, it is not clear that appellees will be unable to derive economic benefit 
from the artifacts; for example, they might exhibit the artifacts for an admissions charge.  
At any rate, loss of future profits–unaccompanied by any physical property restriction–
provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim.  Prediction of profitability is 
essentially a matter of reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent to 
perform.  Further, perhaps because of its very uncertainty, the interest in anticipated gains 
has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other property-related interests.  
Cf., e. g., Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 Yale L. 
J. 52 (1936). 
Regulations that bar trade in certain goods have been upheld against claims of 
unconstitutional taking.  For example, the Court has sustained regulations prohibiting the 
sale of alcoholic beverages despite the fact that individuals were left with previously 
acquired stocks. Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545 (1924), involved a federal 
statute that forbade the sale of liquors manufactured before passage of the statute.  The 
claim of a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment was tersely rejected.  Id. at 563. 
It is true that appellees must bear the costs of these regulations.  But, within 
limits, that is a burden borne to secure “the advantage of living and doing business in a 
civilized community.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, at 422 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting).  We hold that the simple prohibition of the sale of lawfully acquired property 
in this case does not effect a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
Reversed. 
RUCKELSHAUS v. MONSANTO 
467 U.S. 986 (1984) 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, we are asked to review a United States District Court’s determination 
that several provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA), 61 Stat. 163, as amended, 7 U. S. C. §136 et seq., are unconstitutional.  The 
provisions at issue authorize the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to use data 
submitted by an applicant for registration of a pesticide in evaluating the application of a 
subsequent applicant, and to disclose publicly some of the submitted data. 
I 
Over the past century, the use of pesticides to control weeds and minimize crop 
damage caused by insects, disease, and animals has become increasingly more important 
for American agriculture.  While pesticide use has led to improvements in productivity, it 
has also led to increased risk of harm to humans and the environment.  Although the 
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Federal Government has regulated pesticide use for nearly 75 years, FIFRA was first 
adopted in 1947.  61 Stat. 163. 
In 1970, the Department of Agriculture’s FIFRA responsibilities were transferred 
to the then newly created Environmental Protection Agency, whose Administrator is the 
appellant in this case. Because of mounting public concern about the safety of pesticides 
and their effect on the environment and because of a growing perception that the existing 
legislation was not equal to the task of safeguarding the public interest, Congress 
undertook a comprehensive revision of FIFRA through the adoption of the Federal 
Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 973.  The amendments 
transformed FIFRA from a labeling law into a comprehensive regulatory statute.  As 
amended, FIFRA regulated the use, as well as the sale and labeling, of pesticides; 
regulated pesticides produced and sold in both intrastate and interstate commerce; 
provided for review, cancellation, and suspension of registration; and gave EPA greater 
enforcement authority.  Congress also added a new criterion for registration: that EPA 
determine that the pesticide will not cause “unreasonable adverse effects on the 
environment.” §§3(c)(5)(C) and (D), 86 Stat. 980-981. 
For purposes of this litigation, the most significant of the 1972 amendments 
pertained to the pesticide-registration procedure and the public disclosure of information 
learned through that procedure.  Congress added to FIFRA a new section governing 
public disclosure of data submitted in support of an application for registration.  
The 1972 amendments also included a provision that allowed EPA to consider 
data submitted by one applicant for registration in support of another application 
pertaining to a similar chemical, provided the subsequent applicant offered to compensate 
the applicant who originally submitted the data.  In effect, the provision instituted a 
mandatory data-licensing scheme.  The amount of compensation was to be negotiated by 
the parties, or, in the event negotiations failed, was to be determined by EPA, subject to 
judicial review upon the instigation of the original data submitter. 
Congress enacted other amendments to FIFRA in 1978. [A]s amended in 1978, 
applicants are granted a 10-year period of exclusive use for data on new active 
ingredients contained in pesticides registered after September 30, 1978.  §3(c)(1)(D)(i).  
All other data submitted after December 31, 1969, may be cited and considered in 
support of another application for 15 years after the original submission if the applicant 
offers to compensate the original submitter. §3(c)(1)(D)(ii). If the parties cannot agree on 
the amount of compensation, either may initiate a binding arbitration proceeding.  
II 
Appellee Monsanto Company (Monsanto) is an inventor, developer, and producer 
of various kinds of chemical products, including pesticides. Monsanto, headquartered in 
St. Louis County, Mo., sells in both domestic and foreign markets.  It is one of a 
relatively small group of companies that invent and develop new active ingredients for 
pesticides and conduct most of the research and testing with respect to those ingredients.  
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The District Court found that development of a potential commercial pesticide 
candidate typically requires the expenditure of $5 million to $15 million annually for 
several years.  The development process may take between 14 and 22 years, and it is 
usually that long before a company can expect any return on its investment.  Id., at 555. 
For every manufacturing-use pesticide the average company finally markets, it will have 
screened and tested 20,000 others. Monsanto has a significantly better-than-average 
success rate; it successfully markets 1 out of every 10,000 chemicals tested.  Ibid. 
Monsanto, like any other applicant for registration of a pesticide, must present 
research and test data supporting its application.  The District Court found that Monsanto 
had incurred costs in excess of $23.6 million in developing the health, safety, and 
environmental data submitted by it under FIFRA.  Id., at 560. The information submitted 
with an application usually has value to Monsanto beyond its instrumentality in gaining 
that particular application.  Monsanto uses this information to develop additional end-use 
products and to expand the uses of its registered products.  The information would also be 
valuable to Monsanto’s competitors. For that reason, Monsanto has instituted stringent 
security measures to ensure the secrecy of the data. Ibid. 
It is this health, safety, and environmental data that Monsanto sought to protect by 
bringing this suit.  The District Court found that much of these data “[contain] or [relate] 
to trade secrets as defined by the Restatement of Torts and Confidential, commercial 
information.” Id., at 562. 
Monsanto brought suit in District Court, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief 
from the operation of the data-consideration provisions of FIFRA’s §3(c)(1)(D), and the 
data-disclosure provisions of FIFRA’s §10 and the related §3(c)(2)(A).  Monsanto 
alleged that all of the challenged provisions effected a “taking” of property without just 
compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In addition, Monsanto alleged that 
the data-consideration provisions violated the Amendment because they effected a taking 
of property for a private, rather than a public, purpose.  Finally, Monsanto alleged that the 
arbitration scheme provided by §3(c)(1)(D)(ii) violates the original submitter’s due 
process rights and constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power. 
After a bench trial, the District Court concluded that Monsanto possessed property 
rights in its submitted data, specifically including the right to exclude others from the 
enjoyment of such data by preventing their unauthorized use and by prohibiting their 
disclosure. 564 F.Supp., at 566. The court found that the challenged data-consideration 
provisions “give Monsanto’s competitors a free ride at Monsanto’s expense.” Ibid.  The 
District Court reasoned that §3(c)(1)(D) appropriated Monsanto’s fundamental right to 
exclude, and that the effect of that appropriation is substantial.  The court further found 
that Monsanto’s property was being appropriated for a private purpose and that this 
interference was much more significant than the public good that the appropriation might 
serve.  564 F.Supp., at 566-567. 
The District Court also found that operation of the disclosure provisions of FIFRA 
constituted a taking of Monsanto’s property.  The cost incurred by Monsanto when its 
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property is “permanently committed to the public domain and thus effectively destroyed” 
was viewed by the District Court as significantly outweighing any benefit to the general 
public from having the ability to scrutinize the data, for the court seemed to believe that 
the general public could derive all the assurance it needed about the safety and 
effectiveness of a pesticide from EPA’s decision to register the product and to approve 
the label.  Id., at 567, and n. 4. 
After finding that the data-consideration provisions operated to effect a taking of 
property, the District Court found  that the compulsory binding-arbitration scheme set 
forth in §3(c)(1)(D)(ii) did not adequately provide compensation for the property taken.  
The court found the arbitration provision to be arbitrary and vague, reasoning that the 
statute does not give arbitrators guidance as to the factors that enter into the concept of 
just compensation, and that judicial review is foreclosed except in cases of fraud.  564 
F.Supp., at 567. The District Court also found that the arbitration scheme was infirm 
because it did not meet the requirements of Art. III of the Constitution.  Ibid.  Finally, the 
court found that a remedy under the Tucker Act was not available for the deprivations of 
property effected by §§3 and 10.  564 F.Supp., at 567-568. 
The District Court therefore declared §§3(c)(1)(D), 3(c)(2)(A), 10(b), and 10(d) 
of FIFRA, as amended by the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, to be unconstitutional, and 
permanently enjoined EPA from implementing or enforcing those We noted probable 
jurisdiction.  464 U.S. 890 (1983). 
III 
In deciding this case, we are faced with four questions: (1) Does Monsanto have a 
property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause in the health, safety, 
and environmental data it has submitted to EPA?  (2) If so, does EPA’s use of the data to 
evaluate the applications of others or EPA’s disclosure of the data to qualified members 
of the public effect a taking of that property interest? (3) If there is a taking, is it a taking 
for a public use? (4) If there is a taking for a public use, does the statute adequately 
provide for just compensation? 
For purposes of this case, EPA has stipulated that “Monsanto has certain property 
rights in its information, research and test data that it has submitted under FIFRA to EPA 
and its predecessor agencies which may be protected by the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.”.  Since the exact import of that stipulation is not clear, 
we address the question whether the data at issue here can be considered property for the 
purposes of the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  
This Court never has squarely addressed the applicability of the protections of the 
Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment to commercial data of the kind involved in this 
case.  In answering the question now, we are mindful of the basic axiom that “‘[property] 
interests . . .  are not created by the Constitution.  Rather, they are created and their 
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law.’” Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 
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161 (1980), quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).  Monsanto 
asserts that the health, safety, and environmental data it has submitted to EPA are 
property under Missouri law, which recognizes trade secrets, as defined in §757, 
Comment b, of the Restatement of Torts, as property.  The Restatement defines a trade 
secret as “any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in 
one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over 
competitors who do not know or use it.” §757, Comment b. And the parties have 
stipulated that much of the information, research, and test data that Monsanto has 
submitted under FIFRA to EPA “contains or relates to trade secrets as defined by the 
Restatement of Torts.”  
Because of the intangible nature of a trade secret, the extent of the property right 
therein is defined by the extent to which the owner of the secret protects his interest from 
disclosure to others.  Information that is public knowledge or that is generally known in 
an industry cannot be a trade secret. Restatement of Torts, supra.  If an individual 
discloses his trade secret to others who are under no obligation to protect the 
confidentiality of the information, or otherwise publicly discloses the secret, his property 
right is extinguished.  See Harrington, supra; 1 R. Milgrim, Trade Secrets §1.01[2] 
(1983).  
Trade secrets have many of the characteristics of more tangible forms of property.  
A trade secret is assignable.  A trade secret can form the res of a trust, Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts §82, Comment e (1959); 1 A. Scott, Law of Trusts §82.5, p. 703 (3d 
ed. 1967), and it passes to a trustee in bankruptcy.  See In re Uniservices, Inc., 517 F.2d 
492, 496-497 (CA7 1975). 
Even the manner in which Congress referred to trade secrets in the legislative 
history of FIFRA supports the general perception of their property-like nature.  In 
discussing the 1978 amendments to FIFRA, Congress recognized that data developers 
like Monsanto have a “proprietary interest” in their data.  S. Rep. No. 95-334, at 31.  
Further, Congress reasoned that submitters of data are “entitled” to “compensation” 
because they “have legal ownership of the data.”This general perception of trade secrets 
as property is consonant with a notion of “property” that extends beyond land and 
tangible goods and includes the products of an individual’s “labour and invention.” 2 W. 
Blackstone, Commentaries  405; see generally J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil 
Government, ch. 5 (J. Gough ed. 1947). 
Although this Court never has squarely addressed the question whether a person 
can have a property interest in a trade secret, which is admittedly intangible, the Court 
has found other kinds of intangible interests to be property for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Taking Clause.  See, e. g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44, 46 
(1960) (materialman’s lien provided for under Maine law protected by Taking Clause); 
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 596-602 (1935) (real estate 
lien protected); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (valid contracts are 
property within meaning of the Taking Clause).  That intangible property rights protected 
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by state law are deserving of the protection of the Taking Clause has long been implicit in 
the thinking of this Court: 
“It is conceivable that [the term ‘property’ in the Taking Clause] was used 
in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to 
which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law.  On the other hand, it 
may have been employed in a more accurate sense to denote the group of 
rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right to 
possess, use and dispose of it.  In point of fact, the construction given the 
phrase has been the latter.” United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 
U.S. 373, 377-378 (1945).  
We therefore hold that to the extent that Monsanto has an interest in its health, 
safety, and environmental data cognizable as a trade-secret property right under Missouri 
law, that property right is protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
IV 
Having determined that Monsanto has a property interest in the data it has 
submitted to EPA, we confront the difficult question whether a “taking” will occur when 
EPA discloses those data or considers the data in evaluating another application for 
registration. The question of what constitutes a “taking” is one with which this Court has 
wrestled on many occasions.  It has never been the rule that only governmental 
acquisition or destruction of the property of an individual constitutes a taking, for 
“courts have held that the deprivation of the former owner rather than the 
accretion of a right or interest  to the sovereign constitutes the taking. 
Governmental action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been 
held, if its effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of 
his interest in the subject matter, to amount to a taking.” United States v. 
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S., at 378. 
See also PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).  
As has been admitted on numerous occasions, “this Court has generally ‘been 
unable to develop any “set formula” for determining when “justice and fairness” require 
that economic injuries caused by public action’” must be deemed a compensable taking.  
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979), quoting Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The inquiry into 
whether a taking has occurred is essentially an “ad hoc, factual” inquiry.  Kaiser Aetna, 
444 U.S., at 175. The Court, however, has identified several factors that should be taken 
into account when determining whether a governmental action has gone beyond 
“regulation” and effects a “taking.” Among those factors are: “the character of the 
governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable 
investment-backed expectations.” PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S., at 83; 
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see Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S., at 175; Penn Central, 438 U.S., at 124.  It is to the last of 
these three factors that we now direct our attention, for we find that the force of this 
factor is so overwhelming, at least with respect to certain of the data submitted by 
Monsanto to EPA, that it disposes of the taking question regarding those data. 
A 
A “reasonable investment-backed expectation” must be more than a “unilateral 
expectation or an abstract need.” Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S., at 161.  We 
find that with respect to any health, safety, and environmental data that Monsanto 
submitted to EPA after the effective date of the 1978 FIFRA amendments–that is, on or 
after October 1, 1978–Monsanto could not have had a reasonable, investment-backed 
expectation that EPA would keep the data confidential beyond the limits prescribed in the 
amended statute itself.  Monsanto was on notice of the manner in which EPA was 
authorized to use and disclose any data turned over to it by an applicant for registration. 
Thus, with respect to any data submitted to EPA on or after October 1, 1978, 
Monsanto knew that, for a period of 10 years from the date of submission, EPA would 
not consider those data in evaluating the application of another without Monsanto’s 
permission.  §3(c)(1)(D)(i).  It was also aware, however, that once the 10-year period had 
expired, EPA could use the data without Monsanto’s permission.  §§3(c)(1)(D)(ii) and 
(iii).  Monsanto was further aware that it was entitled to an offer of compensation from 
the subsequent applicant only until the end of the 15th year from the date of submission.  
§3(c)(1)(D)(iii).  In addition, Monsanto was aware that information relating to formulae 
of products could be revealed by EPA to “any Federal agency consulted and [could] be 
revealed at a public hearing or in findings of fact” issued by EPA “when necessary to 
carry out” EPA’s duties under FIFRA.  §10(b).  The statute also gave Monsanto notice 
that much of the health, safety, and efficacy data provided by it could be disclosed to the 
general public at any time.  §10(d).  If, despite the data-consideration and data-disclosure 
provisions in the statute, Monsanto chose to submit the requisite data in order to receive a 
registration, it can hardly argue that its reasonable investment-backed expectations are 
disturbed when EPA acts to use or disclose the data in a manner that was authorized by 
law at the time of the submission.  
Thus, as long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions under which the data are 
submitted, and the conditions are rationally related to a legitimate Government interest, a 
voluntary submission of data by an applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of 
a registration can hardly be called a taking.  See Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249 
U.S. 427, 431-432 (1919) (“The right of a manufacturer to maintain secrecy as to his 
compounds and processes must be held subject to the right of the State, in the exercise of 
its police power and in promotion of fair dealing, to require that the nature of the product 
be fairly set forth”); see also Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, 555 F.2d 82, 95 (CA3 1977). 
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B 
Prior to the 1972 amendments, FIFRA was silent with respect to EPA’s 
authorized use and disclosure of data submitted to it in connection with an application for 
registration. Neither FIFRA nor any other provision of law gave EPA authority to 
disclose data obtained from Monsanto.  But in an industry that long has been the focus of 
great public concern and significant government regulation, the possibility was 
substantial that the Federal Government, which had thus far taken no position on 
disclosure of health, safety, and environmental data concerning pesticides, upon focusing 
on the issue, would  find disclosure to be in the public interest.  Thus, with respect to data 
submitted to EPA in connection with an application for registration prior to October 22, 
1972, [there was] no basis for a reasonable investment-backed expectation that data 
submitted to EPA would remain confidential. 
C 
The situation may be different, however, with respect to data submitted by 
Monsanto to EPA during the period from October 22, 1972, through September 30, 1978.  
Under the statutory scheme then in effect, a submitter was given an opportunity to protect 
its trade secrets from disclosure by designating them as trade secrets at the time of 
submission.  When Monsanto provided data to EPA during this period, it was with the 
understanding, embodied in FIFRA, that EPA was free to use any of the submitted data 
that were not trade secrets in considering the application of another, provided that EPA 
required the subsequent applicant to pay “reasonable compensation” to the original 
submitter. §3(c)(1)(D), 86 Stat. 979.  But the statute also gave Monsanto explicit 
assurance that EPA was prohibited from disclosing publicly, or considering in connection 
with the application of another, any data submitted by an applicant if both the applicant 
and EPA determined the data to constitute trade secrets. §10, 86 Stat. 989.  Thus, with 
respect to trade secrets submitted under the statutory regime in force between the time of  
the adoption of the 1972 amendments and the adoption of the 1978 amendments, the 
Federal Government had explicitly guaranteed to Monsanto and other registration 
applicants an extensive measure of confidentiality and exclusive use. This explicit 
governmental guarantee formed the basis of a reasonable investment-backed expectation.  
If EPA, consistent with the authority granted it by the 1978 FIFRA amendments, were 
now to disclose trade-secret data or consider those data in evaluating the application of a 
subsequent applicant in a manner not authorized by the version of FIFRA in effect 
between 1972 and 1978, EPA’s actions would frustrate Monsanto’s reasonable 
investment-backed expectation with respect to its control over the use and dissemination 
of the data it had submitted.  
The right to exclude others is generally “one of the most essential sticks in the 
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.” Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S., at 
176. With respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude others is central to the very 
definition of the property interest. Once the data that constitute a trade secret are 
disclosed to others, or others are allowed to use those data, the holder of the trade secret 
has lost his property interest in the data. That the data retain usefulness for Monsanto 
614 
even after they are disclosed–for example, as bases from which to develop new products 
or refine old products, as marketing and advertising tools, or as information necessary to 
obtain registration in foreign countries–is irrelevant to the determination of the economic 
impact of the EPA action on Monsanto’s property right. The economic value of that 
property right lies in the competitive advantage over others that Monsanto enjoys by 
virtue of its exclusive access to the data, and disclosure or use by others of the data would 
destroy that competitive edge.  
EPA encourages us to view the situation not as a taking of Monsanto’s property 
interest in the trade secrets, but as a “pre-emption” of whatever property rights Monsanto 
may have had in those trade secrets.  The agency argues that the proper functioning of the 
comprehensive FIFRA registration scheme depends upon its uniform application to all 
data.  Thus, it is said, the Supremacy Clause dictates that the scheme not vary depending 
on the property law of the State in which the submitter is located.  Id., at 28.  This 
argument proves too much.  If Congress can “pre-empt” state property law in the manner 
advocated by EPA, then the Taking Clause has lost all vitality.  This Court has stated that 
a sovereign, “by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property 
without compensation. . . .  This is the very kind of thing that the Taking Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent.” Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. 
Beckwith, 449 U.S., at 164. 
In summary, we hold that EPA’s consideration or disclosure of data submitted by 
Monsanto to the agency prior to October 22, 1972, or after September 30, 1978, does not 
effect a taking. We further hold that EPA consideration or disclosure of health, safety, 
and environmental data will constitute a taking if Monsanto submitted the data to EPA 
between October 22, 1972, and September 30, 1978;  the data constituted trade secrets 
under Missouri law; Monsanto had designated the data as trade secrets at the time of its 
submission; the use or disclosure conflicts with the explicit assurance of confidentiality 
or exclusive use contained in the statute during that period; and the operation of the 
arbitration provision does not adequately compensate for the loss in market value of the 
data that Monsanto suffers because of EPA’s use or disclosure of the trade secrets. 
V 
We must next consider whether any taking of private property that may occur by 
operation of the data-disclosure and data-consideration provisions of FIFRA is a taking 
for a “public use.” We have recently stated that the scope of the “public use” requirement 
of the Taking Clause is “coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.” 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, ante, at 240; see Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 
33 (1954). The role of the courts in second-guessing the legislature’s judgment of what 
constitutes a public use is extremely narrow.  Midkiff, supra; Berman, supra, at 32. 
So long as the taking has a conceivable public character, “the means by which it 
will be attained is . . . for Congress to determine.  “ Berman, 348 U.S., at 33.  Here, the 
public purpose behind the data-consideration provisions is clear from the legislative 
history.  Congress believed that the provisions would eliminate costly duplication of 
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research and streamline the registration process, making new end-use products available 
to consumers more quickly.  Allowing applicants for registration, upon payment of 
compensation, to use data already accumulated by others, rather than forcing them to go 
through the time-consuming process of repeating the research, would eliminate a 
significant barrier to entry into the pesticide market, thereby allowing greater competition 
among producers of end-use products.  Such a procompetitive purpose is well within the 
police power of Congress.  See Midkiff, ante, at 241-242. 
We therefore hold that any taking of private property that may occur in 
connection with EPA’s use or disclosure of data submitted to it by Monsanto between 
October 22, 1972, and September 30, 1978, is a taking for a public use. 
VI 
Equitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for 
a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought 
against the sovereign subsequent to the taking.  Larson v. Domestic & Foreign 
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 697, n. 18 (1949). The Fifth Amendment does not 
require that compensation precede the taking.  Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 
(1932). Generally, an individual claiming that the United States has taken his property 
can seek just compensation under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. §1491. United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946) (“If there is a taking, the claim is ‘founded upon the 
Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine”); 
Yearsley v. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940).  
Here, contrary to Monsanto’s claim, it is entirely possible for the Tucker Act and 
FIFRA to co-exist.  That is, FIFRA does not withdraw the possibility of a Tucker Act 
remedy. In any event, any taking claim under FIFRA is one “founded . . . upon the 
Constitution,” and is thus remediable under the Tucker Act. The District Court erred in 
enjoining the taking. 
VII 
Because we hold that the Tucker Act is available as a remedy for any 
uncompensated taking Monsanto may suffer as a result of the operation of the challenged 
provisions of FIFRA, we conclude that Monsanto’s challenges to the constitutionality of 
the arbitration and compensation scheme are not ripe for our resolution.  
VIII 
We find no constitutional infirmity in the challenged provisions of FIFRA.  
Operation of the provisions may effect a taking with respect to certain health, safety, and 
environmental data constituting trade secrets under state law and designated by Monsanto 
as trade secrets upon submission to EPA between October  22, 1972, and September 30, 
1978. But whatever taking may occur is one for a public use, and a Tucker Act remedy is 
available to provide Monsanto with just compensation.  Once a taking has occurred, the 
616 
proper forum for Monsanto’s claim is the Claims Court.  Monsanto’s challenges to the 
constitutionality of the arbitration procedure are not yet ripe for review.  The judgment of 
the District Court is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
It is so ordered. 
HODEL v. IRVING 
481 U.S. 704 (1987) 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether the original version of the "escheat" provision 
of the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, Pub. L. 97-459, Tit. II, 96 Stat. 2519, 
effected a "taking" of appellees' decedents' property without just compensation. 
Towards the end of the 19th century, Congress enacted a series of land Acts 
which divided the communal reservations of Indian tribes into individual allotments for 
Indians and unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement.  This legislation seems to have 
been in part animated by a desire to force Indians to abandon their nomadic ways in order 
to "speed the Indians' assimilation into American society," Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 
463, 466 (1984), and in part a result of pressure to free new lands for further white 
settlement.  Ibid.  Two years after the enactment of the General Allotment Act of 1887, 
ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, Congress adopted a specific statute authorizing the division of the 
Great Reservation of the Sioux Nation into separate reservations and the allotment  of 
specific tracts of reservation land to individual Indians, conditioned  on the consent of 
three-fourths of the adult male Sioux.  Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888. Under 
the Act, each male Sioux head of household took 320 acres of land and most other 
individuals 160 acres.  25 Stat. 890.  In order to protect the allottees from the improvident 
disposition of their lands to white settlers, the Sioux allotment statute provided that the 
allotted lands were to be held in trust by the United States.  Id., at 891.  Until 1910, the 
lands of deceased allottees passed to their heirs "according to the laws of the State or 
Territory" where the land was located, ibid., and after 1910, allottees were permitted to 
dispose of their interests  by will in accordance with regulations promulgated by the 
Secretary of the Interior.  36 Stat. 856, 25 U. S. C. §373. Those regulations generally 
served to protect Indian ownership of the allotted lands.  
The policy of allotment of Indian lands quickly proved disastrous for the Indians.  
Cash generated by land sales to whites was quickly dissipated, and the Indians, rather 
than farming the land themselves, evolved into  petty landlords, leasing their allotted 
lands to white ranchers and farmers and living off the meager rentals.  Lawson, Heirship: 
The Indian Amoeba, reprinted in Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663 before the Senate 
Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 82-83 (1984).  The failure of 
the allotment program became even clearer as successive generations came to hold the 
allotted lands.  Thus 40-, 80-, and 160-acre parcels became splintered into multiple 
undivided interests in land, with some parcels having hundreds, and many parcels having 
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dozens, of owners.  Because the land was held in trust and often could not be alienated or 
partitioned, the fractionation problem grew and grew over time. 
A 1928 report commissioned by the Congress found the situation administratively 
unworkable and economically wasteful.  L. Meriam, Institute for Government Research, 
The Problem of Indian Administration 40-41. Good, potentially productive, land was 
allowed to lie fallow, amidst great poverty, because of the difficulties of managing 
property held in this manner. Hearings on H. R. 11113 before the Subcommittee on 
Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior  and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 10 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Aspinall).  In discussing the Indian Reorganization Act 
of 1934, Representative Howard said: 
"It is in the case of the inherited allotments, however, that the 
administrative costs become incredible. . . .  On allotted reservations, 
numerous cases exist where the shares of each individual heir from lease 
money may be 1 cent a month. Or one heir may own minute fractional 
shares in 30 or 40 different allotments. The cost of leasing, bookkeeping, 
and distributing the proceeds in many cases far exceeds the total income.  
The Indians and the Indian Service personnel are thus trapped in a 
meaningless system of minute partition in which all thought of the 
possible use of land to satisfy human needs is lost in a mathematical haze 
of bookkeeping." 78 Cong. Rec. 11728 (1934).  
In 1934, in response to arguments such as these, the Congress acknowledged the 
failure of its policy and ended further allotment of Indian lands.  Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. §461 et seq.  
But the end of future allotment by itself could not prevent the further 
compounding of the existing problem caused by the passage of time. Ownership 
continued to fragment as succeeding generations came to hold the property, since, in the 
order of things, each property owner was apt to have more than one heir.  In 1960, both 
the House and the Senate undertook comprehensive studies of the problem.  See House 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Indian Heirship Land Study, 86th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (Comm. Print 1961); Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Indian 
Heirship Land Survey, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1960-1961).  These studies 
indicated that one-half of the approximately 12 million acres of allotted trust lands were 
held in fractionated ownership, with over 3 million acres held by more than six heirs to a 
parcel. Id., at pt. 2, p. x.  Further hearings were held in 1966, Hearings on H. R. 11113, 
supra, but not until the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983 did the Congress take 
action to ameliorate the problem of fractionated ownership of Indian lands. 
Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act – the escheat provision at issue 
in this case – provided: 
"No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted land 
within a tribe's reservation or otherwise subjected to a tribe's jurisdiction 
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shall descedent [sic] by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to that tribe if 
such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the total acreage in such 
tract and has earned to its owner less than $100 in the preceding year 
before it is due to escheat." 96 Stat. 2519.  
Congress made no provision for the payment of compensation to the owners of 
the interests covered by §207.  The statute was signed into law on January 12, 1983, and 
became effective immediately. 
The three appellees – Mary Irving, Patrick Pumpkin Seed, and Eileen Bissonette – 
are enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe.  They are, or represent, heirs or devisees 
of members of the Tribe who died in March, April, and June 1983.  Eileen Bissonette's 
decedent, Mary Poor Bear-Little Hoop Cross, purported to will all her property, including 
property subject to §207, to her five minor children in whose name Bissonette claims the 
property.  Chester Irving, Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed, and Edgar Pumpkin Seed all died 
intestate. At the time of their deaths, the four decedents owned 41 fractional interests 
subject to the provisions of §207. The Irving estate lost two interests whose value 
together was approximately $100; the Bureau of Indian Affairs placed total values of 
approximately $2,700 on the 26 escheatable interests in the Cross estate and $1,816 on 
the 13 escheatable interests in the Pumpkin Seed estates.  But for §207, this property 
would have passed, in the ordinary course, to appellees or those they represent. 
Appellees filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South 
Dakota, claiming that §207 resulted in a taking of property without just compensation in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.  The District Court concluded that the statute was 
constitutional.  It held that appellees had no vested interest in the property of the 
decedents prior to their deaths and that Congress had plenary authority to abolish the 
power of testamentary disposition of Indian property and to alter the rules of intestate 
succession.  
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.  Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d 
1260 (1985). Although it agreed that appellees had no vested rights in the decedents' 
property, it concluded that their decedents had a right, derived from the original Sioux 
allotment statute, to control disposition of their property at death.  The Court of Appeals 
held that appellees had standing to invoke that right and that the taking of that right 
without compensation to decedents' estates violated the Fifth Amendment.  
The Congress, acting pursuant to its broad authority to regulate the descent and 
devise of Indian trust lands, Jefferson v. Fink, 247 U.S. 288, 294 (1918), enacted §207 as 
a means of ameliorating, over time, the problem of extreme fractionation of certain 
Indian lands.  By forbidding the passing on at death of small, undivided interests in 
Indian lands, Congress hoped that future generations of Indians would be able to make 
more productive use of the Indians' ancestral lands.  We agree with the Government that 
encouraging the consolidation of Indian lands is a public purpose of high order.  The 
fractionation problem on Indian reservations is extraordinary and may call for dramatic 
action to encourage consolidation.  The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, appearing as 
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amicus curiae in support of the Secretary of the Interior, is a quintessential victim of 
fractionation.  Forty-acre tracts on the Sisseton-Wahpeton Lake Traverse Reservation, 
leasing for about $1,000 annually, are commonly subdivided into hundreds of undivided 
interests, many of which generate only pennies a year in rent.  The average tract has 196 
owners and the average owner undivided interests in 14 tracts.  The administrative 
headache this represents can be fathomed by examining Tract 1305, dubbed "one of the 
most fractionated parcels of land in the world." Lawson, Heirship: The Indian Amoeba, 
reprinted in Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663 before the Senate Select Committee on 
Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 85 (1984).  Tract 1305 is 40 acres and produces 
$1,080 in income annually.  It is valued at $8,000.  It has 439 owners, one-third of whom 
receive less than $.05 in annual rent and two-thirds of whom receive less than $1.  The 
largest interest holder receives $82.85 annually.  The common denominator used to 
compute fractional interests in the property is 3,394,923,840,000.  The smallest heir 
receives $0.01 every 177 years.  If the tract were sold (assuming the 439 owners could 
agree) for its estimated $8,000 value, he would be entitled to $0.000418.  The 
administrative costs of handling this tract are estimated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs at 
$17,560 annually. Id., at 86, 87.  See also Comment, Too Little Land, Too Many Heirs -- 
The Indian Heirship Land Problem, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 709, 711-713 (1971). 
There is no question that the relative economic impact of §207 upon the owners of 
these property rights can be substantial.  Section 207 provides for the escheat of small 
undivided property interests that are unproductive during the year preceding the owner's 
death.  Even if we accept the Government's assertion that the income generated by such 
parcels may be properly thought of as de minimis, their value may not be.  While the 
Irving estate lost two interests whose value together was only approximately $100, the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs placed total values of approximately $2,700 and $1,816 on the 
escheatable interests in the Cross and Pumpkin Seed estates.  See App. 20, 21-28, 29-39. 
These are not trivial sums.  There are suggestions in the legislative history regarding the 
1984 amendments to §207 that the failure to "look back" more than one year at the 
income generated by the property had caused the escheat of potentially valuable timber 
and mineral interests.  S. Rep. No. 98-632, p. 12 (1984); Hearing on H. J. Res. 158 before 
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 20, 26, 32, 75 
(1984); Amendments to the Indian  Land Consolidation Act: Hearing on H. J. Res. 158 
before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 8, 29 
(1983). Of course, the whole of appellees' decedents' property interests were not taken by 
§207. Appellees' decedents retained full beneficial use of the property during their 
lifetimes as well as the right to convey it inter vivos.  There is no question, however, that 
the right to pass on valuable property to one's heirs is itself a valuable right. Depending 
on the age of the owner, much or most of the value of the parcel may inhere in this 
"remainder" interest.  See 26 CFR §20.2031-7(f) (Table A) (1986) (value of remainder 
interest when life tenant is age 65 is approximately 32% of the whole). 
The extent to which any of appellees' decedents had "investment-backed 
expectations" in passing on the property is dubious.  Though it is conceivable that some 
of these interests were purchased with the expectation that the owners might pass on the 
remainder to their heirs at death, the property has been held in trust for the Indians for 
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100 years and is overwhelmingly acquired by gift, descent, or devise.  Because of the 
highly fractionated ownership, the property is generally held for lease rather than 
improved and used by the owners.  None of the appellees here can point to any specific 
investment-backed expectations beyond the fact that their ancestors agreed to accept 
allotment only after ceding to the United States large parts of the original Great Sioux 
Reservation.   The character of the Government regulation here is extraordinary.   The 
regulation here amounts to virtually the abrogation of the right to pass on a certain type of 
property – the small undivided interest – to one's heirs.  In one form or another, the right 
to pass on property – to one's family in particular – has been part of the Anglo-American 
legal system since feudal times.  See United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S.  625, 627-628 
(1896). The fact that it may be possible for the owners of these interests to effectively 
control disposition upon death through complex inter vivos transactions such as 
revocable trusts is simply not an adequate substitute for the rights taken, given the nature 
of the property.  Even the United States concedes that total abrogation of the right to pass 
property is unprecedented and likely unconstitutional.   Moreover, this statute effectively 
abolishes both descent and devise of these property interests even when the passing of the 
property to the heir might result in consolidation   of property – as for instance when the 
heir already owns another undivided interest in the property. Cf. 25 U. S. C. §2206(b) 
(1982 ed., Supp. III).  Since the escheatable interests are not, as the United States argues, 
necessarily de minimis, nor, as it also argues, does the availability of inter vivos transfer 
obviate the need for descent and devise, a total abrogation of these rights cannot be 
upheld.  
In holding that complete abolition of both the descent and devise of a particular 
class of property may be a taking, we reaffirm the continuing vitality of the long line of 
cases recognizing the States', and where appropriate, the United States', broad authority to 
adjust the rules governing the descent and devise of property without implicating the 
guarantees of the Just Compensation Clause.  See, e. g., Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 
556, 562 (1942); Jefferson v. Fink, 247 U.S., at 294. The difference in this case is the fact 
that both descent and devise are completely abolished; indeed they are abolished even in 
circumstances when the governmental purpose sought to be advanced, consolidation of 
ownership of Indian lands, does not conflict with the further descent of the property. 
There is little doubt that the extreme fractionation of Indian lands is a serious 
public problem. It may well be appropriate for the United States to ameliorate 
fractionation by means of regulating the descent and devise of Indian lands.  Surely it is 
permissible for the United States to prevent the owners of such interests from further 
subdividing  them among future heirs on pain of escheat.  See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 
U.S. 516, 542 (1982) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).  It may be appropriate to minimize 
further compounding of the problem by abolishing the descent of such interests by rules 
of intestacy, thereby forcing the owners to formally designate an heir to prevent escheat 
to the Tribe.  What is certainly not appropriate is to take the extraordinary step of 
abolishing both descent and devise of these property interests even when the passing of 
the property to the heir might result in consolidation of property. Accordingly, we find 
that this regulation, in the words of Justice Holmes, "goes too far." Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S., at 415. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
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KEYSTONE BITUMINOUS COAL ASSN. v. DeBENEDICTIS 
480 U.S. 470 (1987) 
JUSTICE STEVENS, delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute that admittedly destroyed "previously existing 
rights of property and contract."  Id., at 413....  Now, 65 years later, we address a 
different set of "particular facts," involving the Pennsylvania Legislature's 1966 
conclusion that the Commonwealth's existing mine subsidence legislation had failed to 
protect the public interest in safety, land conservation, preservation of affected 
municipalities' tax bases, and land development in the Commonwealth. Based on detailed 
findings, the legislature enacted the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation 
Act (Subsidence Act or Act), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 52, §1406.1 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1986).  
Petitioners contend, relying heavily on our decision in Pennsylvania Coal, that §§4 and 6 
of the Subsidence Act and certain implementing regulations violate the Takings Clause, 
and that §6 of the Act violates the Contracts Clause of the Federal Constitution.  The 
District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that that neither §4 nor §6 is 
unconstitutional on its face.  We agree. 
I 
Coal mine subsidence is the lowering of strata overlying a coal mine, including 
the land surface, caused by the extraction of underground coal.  This lowering of the 
strata can have devastating effects. It often causes substantial damage to foundations, 
walls, other structural members, and the integrity of houses and buildings.  Subsidence 
frequently causes sinkholes or troughs in land which make the land difficult or 
impossible to develop.  Its effect on farming has been well documented -- many subsided 
areas cannot be plowed or properly prepared.  Subsidence can also cause the loss of 
groundwater and surface ponds.  In short, it presents the type of environmental concern 
that has been the focus of so much federal, state, and local regulation in recent decades. 
Despite what their name may suggest, neither of the "full extraction" mining 
methods currently used in western Pennsylvania enables miners to extract all subsurface 
coal; considerable amounts need to be left in the ground to provide access, support, and 
ventilation to  the mines. Additionally, mining companies have long been required by 
various Pennsylvania laws and regulations, the legitimacy of which is not challenged 
here, to leave coal in certain areas for public safety reasons. Since 1966, Pennsylvania 
has placed an additional set of restrictions on the amount of coal that may be extracted; 
these restrictions are designed to diminish subsidence and subsidence damage in the 
vicinity of certain structures and areas. 
Pennsylvania's Subsidence Act authorizes the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Resources (DER) to implement and enforce a comprehensive program to 
prevent or minimize subsidence and to regulate its consequences....  Since 1966 the DER 
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has applied a formula that generally requires 50% of the coal beneath structures protected 
by §4 to be kept in place as a means of providing surface support. 
II 
In 1982, petitioners filed a civil rights action in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania seeking to enjoin officials of the DER from 
enforcing the Subsidence Act and its implementing regulations.  Petitioners are an 
association of coal mine operators, and four corporations that are engaged, either directly 
or through affiliates, in underground mining of bituminous coal in western Pennsylvania. 
The complaint alleges that Pennsylvania recognizes three separate estates in land: 
The mineral estate; the surface estate; and the "support estate."  Beginning well over 100 
years ago, landowners began severing title to underground coal and the right of surface 
support while retaining or conveying away ownership of the surface estate.  It is 
stipulated that approximately 90% of the coal that is or will be mined by petitioners in 
western Pennsylvania was severed from the surface in the period between 1890 and 1920. 
When acquiring or retaining the mineral estate, petitioners or their predecessors typically 
acquired or retained certain additional rights that would enable them to extract and 
remove the coal.  Thus, they acquired the right to deposit wastes, to provide for drainage 
and ventilation, and to erect facilities such as tipples, roads, or railroads, on the surface. 
Additionally, they typically acquired a waiver of any claims for damages that might result 
from the removal of the coal. 
In the portions of the complaint that are relevant to us, petitioners alleged that 
both §4 of the Subsidence Act, as implemented by the 50% rule, and §6 of the 
Subsidence Act, constitute a taking of their private property without compensation in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. They also alleged that §6 impairs 
their contractual agreements in violation of Article I, §10, of the Constitution. 
III 
Petitioners assert that disposition of their takings claim calls for no more than a 
straightforward application of the Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.  
Although there are some obvious similarities between the cases, we agree with the Court 
of Appeals and the District Court that the similarities are far less significant than the 
differences, and that Pennsylvania Coal does not control this case. 
The holdings and assumptions of the Court in Pennsylvania Coal provide obvious 
and necessary reasons for distinguishing Pennsylvania Coal from the case before us 
today.   The two factors that the Court considered relevant, have become integral parts of 
our takings analysis.  We have held that land use regulation can effect a taking if it "does 
not substantially advance legitimate state interests, . . . or denies an owner economically 
viable use of his land."  Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citations omitted); 
see also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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Application of these tests to petitioners' challenge demonstrates that they have not 
satisfied their burden of showing that the Subsidence Act constitutes a taking.  First the 
character of the governmental action involved here leans heavily against finding a taking; 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a 
significant threat to the common welfare. Second, there is no record in this case to 
support a finding, similar to the one the Court made in Pennsylvania Coal, that the 
Subsidence Act makes it impossible for petitioners to profitably engage in their business, 
or that there has been undue interference with their investment-backed expectations. 
The Public Purpose 
Unlike the Kohler Act, which was passed upon in Pennsylvania Coal, the 
Subsidence Act does not merely involve a balancing of the private economic interests of 
coal companies against the private interests of the surface owners.  The Subsidence Act 
differs from the Kohler Act in critical and dispositive respects.  With regard to the Kohler 
Act, the Court believed that the Commonwealth had acted only to ensure against damage 
to some private landowners' homes.  Justice Holmes stated that if the private individuals 
needed support for their structures, they should not have "[taken] the risk of acquiring 
only surface rights."  260 U.S., at 416.  Here, by contrast, the Commonwealth is acting to 
protect the public interest in health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area. 
That private individuals erred in taking a risk cannot estop the Commonwealth from 
exercising its police power to abate activity akin to a public nuisance. 
Diminution of Value and Investment-Backed Expectations 
The second factor that distinguishes this case from Pennsylvania Coal is the 
finding in that case that the Kohler Act made mining of "certain coal" commercially 
impracticable.  In this case, by contrast, petitioners have not shown any deprivation 
significant enough to satisfy the heavy burden placed upon one alleging a regulatory 
taking.  For this reason, their takings claim must fail. 
In addressing petitioners' claim we must not disregard the posture in which this 
case comes before us.  The District Court granted summary judgment to respondents only 
on the facial challenge to the Subsidence Act.  The court explained that "[because] 
plaintiffs have not alleged any injury due to the enforcement of the statute, there is as yet 
no concrete controversy regarding the application of the specific provisions and 
regulations.  Thus, the only question before this court is whether the mere enactment of 
the statutes and regulations constitutes a taking."  581 F.Supp., at 513 (emphasis added). 
The posture of the case is critical because we have recognized an important 
distinction between a claim that the mere enactment of a statute constitutes a taking and a 
claim that the particular impact of government action on a specific piece of property 
requires the payment of just compensation. 
Because appellees' taking claim arose in the context of a facial challenge, it 
presented no concrete controversy concerning either application of the Act to particular 
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surface mining operations or its effect on specific parcels of land.  Thus, the only issue is 
whether the 'mere enactment' of the Surface Mining Act constitutes a taking. 
The test to be applied in considering this facial challenge is fairly straightforward.  
A statute regulating the uses that can be made of property effects a taking if it 'denies an 
owner economically viable use of his land . . . .' Agins v. Tiburon, supra, at 260; see also 
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)." 452 U.S., at 295-296. 
Petitioners thus face an uphill battle in making a facial attack on the Act as a taking. 
The hill is made especially steep because petitioners have not claimed, at this 
stage, that the Act makes it commercially impracticable for them to continue mining their 
bituminous coal interests in western Pennsylvania.  Indeed, petitioners have not even 
pointed to a single mine that can no longer be mined for profit. 
Instead, petitioners have sought to narrowly define certain segments of their 
property and assert that, when so defined, the Subsidence Act denies them economically 
viable use.  They advance two alternative ways of carving their property in order to reach 
this conclusion.  First, they focus on the specific tons of coal that they must leave in the 
ground under the Subsidence Act, and argue that the Commonwealth has effectively 
appropriated this coal since it has no other useful purpose if not mined. Second, they 
contend that the Commonwealth has taken their separate legal interest in property -- the 
"support estate." 
In Penn Central the Court explained: 
“ ‘Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete 
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment 
have been entirely abrogated.  In deciding whether a particular 
governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both 
on the character of the action and on the nature of the interference with 
rights in the parcel as a whole --here the city tax block designated as the 
'landmark site.’ ” 438 U.S., at 130-131. 
The Coal in Place 
The parties have stipulated that enforcement of the DER's 50% rule will require 
petitioners to leave approximately 27 million tons of coal in place.  Because they own 
that coal but cannot mine it, they contend that Pennsylvania has appropriated it for the 
public purposes described in the Subsidence Act. 
This argument fails for the reason explained in Penn Central.  The 27 million tons 
of coal do not constitute a separate segment of property for takings law purposes.  There 
is no basis for treating the less than 2% of petitioners' coal as a separate parcel of 
property. 
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When the coal that must remain beneath the ground is viewed in the context of 
any reasonable unit of petitioners' coal mining operations and financial-backed 
expectations, it is plain that petitioners have not come close to satisfying their burden of 
proving that they have been denied the economically viable use of that property.  The 
record indicates that only about 75% of petitioners' underground coal can be profitably 
mined in any event, and there is no showing that petitioners' reasonable "investment-
backed expectations" have been materially affected by the additional duty to retain the 
small percentage that must be used to support the structures protected by §4.  
The Support Estate 
Pennsylvania property law is apparently unique in regarding the support estate as 
a separate interest in land that can be conveyed apart from either the mineral estate or the 
surface estate. Petitioners therefore argue that even if comparable legislation in another 
State would not constitute a taking, the Subsidence Act has that consequence because it 
entirely destroys the value of their unique support estate.  It is clear, however, that our 
takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such legalistic distinctions within a bundle of 
property rights.  For example, in Penn Central, the Court rejected the argument that the 
"air rights" above the terminal constituted a separate segment of property for Takings 
Clause purposes.  438 U.S., at 130.  Likewise, in Andrus v. Allard, we viewed the right to 
sell property as just one element of the owner's property interest.  444 U.S., at 65-66. In 
neither case did the result turn on whether state law allowed the separate sale of the 
segment of property. 
But even if we were to accept petitioners' invitation to view the support estate as a 
distinct segment of property for "takings" purposes, they have not satisfied their heavy 
burden of sustaining a facial challenge to the Act.  Petitioners have acquired or retained 
the support estate for a great deal of land, only part of which is protected under the 
Subsidence Act, which, of course, deals with subsidence in the immediate vicinity of 
certain structures, bodies of water, and cemeteries. The record is devoid of any evidence 
on what percentage of the purchased support estates, either in the aggregate or with 
respect to any individual estate, has been affected by the Act.  Under these circumstances, 
petitioners' facial attack under the Takings Clause must surely fail. 
IV 
In addition to their challenge under the Takings Clause, petitioners assert that §6 
of the Subsidence Act violates the Contracts Clause by not allowing them to hold the 
surface owners to their contractual waiver of liability for surface damage.   The 
Commonwealth's strong public interests in the legislation are more than adequate to 
justify the impact of the statute on petitioners' contractual agreements. 
Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was Article I, §10, that 
provided the primary constitutional check on state legislative power.  It is well settled 
that the prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts is not to be read literally.  
The context in which the Contracts Clause is found, the historical setting in which it was 
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adopted, and our cases construing the Clause, indicate that its primary focus was upon 
legislation that was designed to repudiate or adjust pre-existing debtor-creditor 
relationships that obligors were unable to satisfy.  See e. g., ibid.; Home Building & Loan 
Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).  Even in such cases, the Court has refused to 
give the Clause a literal reading.  Thus, in the landmark case of Home Building & Loan 
Assn. v. Blaisdell, the Court upheld Minnesota's statutory moratorium against home 
foreclosures, in part, because the legislation was addressed to the "legitimate end" of 
protecting "a basic interest of society," and not just for the advantage of some favored 
group.  Id., at 445. 
In assessing the validity of petitioners' Contracts Clause claim in this case, we 
begin by identifying the precise contractual right that has been impaired and the nature of 
the statutory impairment.  Petitioners claim that they obtained damages waivers for a 
large percentage of the land surface protected by the Subsidence Act, but that the Act 
removes the surface owners' contractual obligations to waive damages.  We agree that the 
statute operates as "a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship," id., at 244, 
and therefore proceed to the asserted justifications for the impairment. 
The record indicates that since 1966 petitioners have conducted mining operations 
under approximately 14,000 structures protected by the Subsidence Act.  It is not clear 
whether that number includes the cemeteries and water courses under which mining has 
been conducted.  In any event, it is petitioners' position that, because they contracted with 
some previous owners of property generations ago, they have a constitutionally protected 
legal right to conduct their mining operations in a way that would make a shambles of all 
those buildings and cemeteries.  As we have discussed, the Commonwealth has a strong 
public interest in preventing this type of harm, the environmental effect of which 
transcends any private agreement between contracting parties. 
As we explained more fully above, the Subsidence Act plainly survives scrutiny 
under our standards for evaluating impairments of private contracts.  The Commonwealth 
has determined that in order to deter mining practices that could have severe effects on 
the surface, it is not enough to set out guidelines and impose restrictions, but that 
imposition of liability is necessary.  By requiring the coal companies either to repair the 
damage or to give the surface owner funds to repair the damage, the Commonwealth 
accomplishes both deterrence and restoration of the environment to its previous 
condition.  We refuse to second-guess the Commonwealth's determinations that these are 
the most appropriate ways of dealing with the problem.  We conclude, therefore, that the 
impairment of petitioners' right to enforce the damages waivers is amply justified by the 
public purposes served by the Subsidence Act. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE POWELL, JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR, and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting. 
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More than 50 years ago, this Court determined the constitutionality of 
Pennsylvania's Kohler Act as it affected the property interests of coal mine operators.  
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The Bituminous Mine 
Subsidence and Land Conservation Act approved today effects an interference with such 
interests in a strikingly similar manner.  The Court finds at least two reasons why this 
case is different.  First, we are told, "the character of the governmental action involved 
here leans heavily against finding a taking." Ante, at 485.  Second, the Court concludes 
that the Subsidence Act neither "makes it impossible for petitioners to profitably engage 
in their business," nor involves "undue interference with [petitioners'] investment-backed 
expectations." Ibid.  Neither of these conclusions persuades me that this case is different, 
and I believe that the Subsidence Act works a taking of petitioners' property interests.  
Examination of the relevant factors presented here convinces me that the differences 
between them and those in Pennsylvania Coal verge on the trivial. 
The similarity of the public purpose of the present Act to that in Pennsylvania 
Coal does not resolve the question whether a taking has occurred; the existence of such a 
public purpose is merely a necessary prerequisite to the government's exercise of its 
taking power. 
Though suggesting that the purposes alone are sufficient to uphold the Act, the 
Court avoids reliance on the nuisance exception by finding that the Subsidence Act does 
not impair petitioners' investment-backed expectations or ability to profitably operate 
their businesses.  The Court's conclusion that the restriction on particular coal does not 
work a taking is primarily the result of its view that the 27 million tons of coal in the 
ground "do not constitute a separate segment of property for takings law purposes."   
In this case, enforcement of the Subsidence Act and its regulations will require 
petitioners to leave approximately 27 million tons of coal in place.  There is no question 
that this coal is an identifiable and separable property interest.  From the relevant 
perspective – that of the property owners – this interest has been destroyed every bit as 
much as if the government had proceeded to mine the coal for its own use.  In these 
circumstances, I think it unnecessary to consider whether petitioners may operate 
individual mines or their overall mining operations profitably, for they have been denied 
all use of 27 million tons of coal.  I would hold that §4 of the Subsidence Act works a 
taking of these property interests. 
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Session 26. Exactions 
Regulators sometimes condition permits on concessions from the applicant. When 
considering the legitimacy of this practice the Court admixes constitutional limits traditionally 
imposed on the taxing power with those imposed on the police power.  
NOLLAN v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION 
483 U.S. 825 (1987) 
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 
James and Marilyn Nollan appeal from a decision of the California Court of Appeal ruling 
that the California Coastal Commission could condition its grant of permission to rebuild their 
house on their transfer to the public of an easement across their beachfront property.  177 Cal. App. 
3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1986).  The California court rejected their claim that imposition of that 
condition violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated against the States by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  We noted probable jurisdiction.  479 U.S. 913 (1986). 
I 
The Nollans own a beachfront lot in Ventura County, California.  A quarter-mile north of 
their property is Faria County Park, an oceanside public park with a public beach and recreation 
area.  Another public beach area, known locally as “the Cove,” lies 1,800 feet south of their lot. A 
concrete seawall approximately eight feet high separates the beach portion of the Nollans’ property 
from the rest of the lot.  The historic mean high tide line determines the lot’s oceanside boundary. 
The Nollans originally leased their property with an option to buy.  The building on the lot 
was a small bungalow, totaling 504 square feet, which for a time they rented to summer vacationers.  
After years of rental use, however, the building had fallen into disrepair, and could no longer be 
rented out. 
The Nollans’ option to purchase was conditioned on their promise to demolish the bungalow 
and replace it.  In order to do so, under Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. §§30106, 30212, and 30600 (West 
1986), they were required to obtain a coastal development permit from the California Coastal 
Commission. On February 25, 1982, they submitted a permit application to the Commission in 
which they proposed to demolish the existing structure and replace it with a three-bedroom house in 
keeping with the rest of the neighborhood. 
The Nollans were informed that their application had been placed on the administrative 
calendar, and that the Commission staff had recommended that the permit be granted subject to the 
condition that they allow the public an easement to pass across a portion of their property bounded 
by the mean high tide line on one side, and their seawall on the other side.  This would make it 
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easier for the public to get to Faria County Park and the Cove.  The Nollans protested imposition of 
the condition, but the Commission overruled their objections and granted the permit subject to their 
recordation of a deed restriction granting the easement. 
The Commission . . . found that the new house would increase blockage of the view of the 
ocean, thus contributing to the development of “a ‘wall’ of residential structures” that would 
prevent the public “psychologically . . . from realizing a stretch of coastline exists nearby that they 
have every right to visit.”  The new house would also increase private use of the shorefront. These 
effects of construction of the house, along with other area development, would cumulatively 
“burden the public’s ability to traverse to and along the shorefront.”  Therefore the Commission 
could properly require the Nollans to offset that burden by providing additional lateral access to the 
public beaches in the form of an easement across their property. 
The Nollans filed a supplemental petition for a writ of administrative mandamus with the 
Superior Court, in which they argued that imposition of the access condition violated the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
The Superior Court . . . granted the writ of mandamus and directed that the permit condition be 
struck. 
The Commission appealed to the California Court of Appeal.  While that appeal was 
pending, the Nollans satisfied the condition on their option to purchase by tearing down the 
bungalow and building the new house, and bought the property.  They did not notify the 
Commission that they were taking that action. 
The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court.  177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 
(1986).  It . . . ruled that that requirement did not violate the Constitution under the reasoning of an 
earlier case of the Court of Appeal, Grupe v. California Coastal Comm’n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 
212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985).  In that case, the court had found that so long as a project contributed to 
the need for public access, even if the project standing alone had not created the need for access, 
and even if there was only an indirect relationship between the access exacted and the need to which 
the project contributed, imposition of an access condition on a development permit was sufficiently 
related to burdens created by the project to be constitutional.  It ruled that the Nollans’ taking claim 
also failed because, although the condition diminished the value of the Nollans’ lot, it did not 
deprive them of all reasonable use of their property. 
The Nollans appealed to this Court . . . . 
II 
Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront 
available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach, rather 
than conditioning their permit to rebuild their house on their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt 
there would have been a taking.  To say that the appropriation of a public easement across a 
landowner’s premises does not constitute the taking of a property interest but rather (as Justice 
Brennan contends) “a mere restriction on its use,” is to use words in a manner that deprives them of 
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all their ordinary meaning. We think a “permanent physical occupation” has occurred where 
individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property 
may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself 
permanently upon the premises.
1
 
Given, then, that requiring uncompensated conveyance of the easement outright would 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the question becomes whether requiring it to be conveyed as a 
condition for issuing a land-use permit alters the outcome.  We have long recognized that land-use 
regulation does not effect a taking if it “substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests” and does 
not “den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land,” Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 
(1980). See also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) 
(“[A] use restriction may constitute a ‘taking’ if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a 
substantial government purpose”). Our cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining 
what constitutes a “legitimate state interest” or what type of connection between the regulation and 
the state interest satisfies the requirement that the former “substantially advance” the latter. They 
have made clear, however, that a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfies 
these requirements (scenic zoning; landmark preservation; residential zoning). 
The Commission argues that among these permissible purposes are protecting the public’s 
ability to see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming the “psychological barrier” to using the 
beach created by a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public beaches. We 
assume, without deciding, that this is so–in which case the Commission unquestionably would be 
able to deny the Nollans their permit outright if their new house (alone, or by reason of the 
cumulative impact produced in conjunction with other construction) would substantially impede 
these purposes, unless the denial would interfere so drastically with the Nollans’ use of their 
property as to constitute a taking. 
The Commission argues that a permit condition that serves the same legitimate police-power 
purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the 
permit would not constitute a taking.  We agree.  Thus, if the Commission attached to the permit 
some condition that would have protected the public’s ability to see the beach notwithstanding 
construction of the new house–for example, a height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on 
fences–so long as the Commission could have exercised its police power (as we have assumed it 
could) to forbid construction of the house altogether, imposition of the condition would also be 
constitutional.  Moreover (and here we come closer to the facts of the present case), the condition 
                                                 
1
 If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of California’s attempt to remedy these problems, although 
they had not contributed to it more than other coastal landowners, the State’s action, even if otherwise valid, might 
violate either the incorporated Takings Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.  One of the principal purposes of the 
Takings Clause is “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) . . . But that is 
not the basis of the Nollans’ challenge here. 
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would be constitutional even if it consisted of the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing 
spot on their property for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would 
interfere. 
Although such a requirement, constituting a permanent grant of continuous access to the 
property, would have to be considered a taking if it were not attached to a development permit, the 
Commission’s assumed power to forbid construction of the house in order to protect the public’s 
view of the beach must surely include the power to condition construction upon some concession by 
the owner, even a concession of property rights, that serves the same end.  If a prohibition designed 
to accomplish that purpose would be a legitimate exercise of the police power rather than a taking, 
it would be strange to conclude that providing the owner an alternative to that prohibition which 
accomplishes the same purpose is not. 
The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition substituted for the 
prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition. When 
that essential nexus is eliminated, the situation becomes the same as if California law forbade 
shouting fire in a crowded theater, but granted dispensations to those willing to contribute $100 to 
the state treasury.  While a ban on shouting fire can be a core exercise of the State’s police power to 
protect the public safety, and can thus meet even our stringent standards for regulation of speech, 
adding the unrelated condition alters the purpose to one which, while it may be legitimate, is 
inadequate to sustain the ban.  Therefore, even though, in a sense, requiring a $100 tax contribution 
in order to shout fire is a lesser restriction on speech than an outright ban, it would not pass 
constitutional muster.  Similarly here, the lack of nexus between the condition and the original 
purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was.  The 
purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental 
purpose, but without payment of compensation.  Whatever may be the outer limits of “legitimate 
state interests” in the takings and land-use context, this is not one of them.  In short, unless the 
permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building 
restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but “an out-and-out plan of extortion.” J. E. D. 
Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N. H. 581, 584, 432 A. 2d 12, 14-15 (1981); see Brief for United 
States as Amicus Curiae 22, and n. 20.  See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan  CATV Corp., 
458 U.S., at 439, n. 17.
2
 
III 
The Commission claims that it concedes as much, and that we may sustain the condition at 
issue here by finding that it is reasonably related to the public need or burden that the Nollans’ new 
house creates or to which it contributes. We can accept, for purposes of discussion, the 
                                                 
2
 One would expect that a regime in which this kind of leveraging of the police power is allowed would produce 
stringent land-use regulation which the State then waives to accomplish other purposes, leading to lesser realization of 
the land-use goals purportedly sought to be served than would result from more lenient (but nontradeable) development 
restrictions.  Thus, the importance of the purpose underlying the prohibition not only does not justify the imposition of 
unrelated conditions for eliminating the prohibition, but positively militates against the practice. 
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Commission’s proposed test as to how close a “fit” between the condition and the burden is 
required, because we find that this case does not meet even the most untailored standards.  The 
Commission’s principal contention to the contrary essentially turns on a play on the word “access.”  
The Nollans’ new house, the Commission found, will interfere with “visual access” to the beach.  
That in turn (along with other shorefront development) will interfere with the desire of people who 
drive past the Nollans’ house to use the beach, thus creating a “psychological barrier” to “access.”  
The Nollans’ new house will also, by a process not altogether clear from the Commission’s opinion 
but presumably potent enough to more than offset the effects of the psychological barrier, increase 
the use of the public beaches, thus creating the need for more “access.”  These burdens on “access” 
would be alleviated by a requirement that the Nollans provide “lateral access” to the beach. 
Rewriting the argument to eliminate the play on words makes clear that there is nothing to it. 
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the public beaches be 
able to walk across the Nollans’ property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the 
new house. It is also impossible to understand how it lowers any “psychological barrier” to using 
the public beaches, or how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on them caused by 
construction of the Nollans’ new house.  We therefore find that the Commission’s imposition of the 
permit condition cannot be treated as an exercise of its land-use power for any of these purposes. 
We view the Fifth Amendment’s Property Clause to be more than a pleading requirement, 
and compliance with it to be more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination. As indicated 
earlier, our cases describe the condition for abridgment of property rights through the police power 
as a “substantial advanc[ing]” of a legitimate state interest.  We are inclined to be particularly 
careful about the adjective where the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the 
lifting of a land-use restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that the purpose is 
avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective. 
Reversed. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting. 
Appellants in this case sought to construct a new dwelling on their beach lot that would both 
diminish visual access to the beach and move private development closer to the public tidelands. 
The Commission reasonably concluded that such “buildout,” both individually and cumulatively, 
threatens public access to the shore.  It sought to offset this encroachment by obtaining assurance 
that the public may walk along the shoreline in order to gain access to the ocean.  The Court finds 
this an illegitimate exercise of the police power, because it maintains that there is no reasonable 
relationship between the effect of the development and the condition imposed. 
The first problem with this conclusion is that the Court imposes a standard of precision for 
the exercise of a State’s police power that has been discredited for the better part of this century. 
Furthermore, even under the Court’s cramped standard, the permit condition imposed in this case 
directly responds to the specific type of burden on access created by appellants’ development. 
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Finally, a review of those factors deemed most significant in takings analysis makes clear that the 
Commission’s action implicates none of the concerns underlying the Takings Clause.  The Court 
has thus struck down the Commission’s reasonable effort to respond to intensified development 
along the California coast, on behalf of landowners who can make no claim that their reasonable 
expectations have been disrupted.  The Court has, in short, given appellants a windfall at the 
expense of the public. 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, dissenting. 
[omitted] 
DOLAN v. CITY OF TIGARD 
512 U.S. 374 (1994) 
REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’CONNOR, SCALIA, 
KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN 
and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.  
Petitioner challenges the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court which held that the city of 
Tigard could condition the approval of her building permit on the dedication of a portion of her 
property for flood control and traffic improvements. 317 Ore. 110, 854 P. 2d 437 (1993). We 
granted certiorari to resolve a question left open by our decision in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987), of what is the required degree of 
connection between the exactions imposed by the city and the projected impacts of the proposed 
development. 
I 
The State of Oregon enacted a comprehensive land use management program in 1973. Ore. 
Rev. Stat. §§197.005-197.860 (1991). The program required all Oregon cities and counties to adopt 
new comprehensive land use plans that were consistent with the statewide planning goals. 
§§197.175(1), 197.250. The plans are implemented by land use regulations which are part of an 
integrated hierarchy of legally binding goals, plans, and regulations. §§197.175, 197.175(2)(b). 
Pursuant to the State’s requirements, the city of Tigard, a community of some 30,000 residents on 
the southwest edge of Portland, developed a comprehensive plan and codified it in its Community 
Development Code (CDC). The CDC requires property owners in the area zoned Central Business 
District to comply with a 15% open space and landscaping requirement, which limits total site 
coverage, including all structures and paved parking, to 85% of the parcel. After the completion of a 
transportation study that identified congestion in the Central Business District as a particular 
problem, the city adopted a plan for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway intended to encourage alternatives 
to automobile transportation for short trips. The CDC requires that new development facilitate this 
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plan by dedicating land for pedestrian pathways where provided for in the pedestrian/bicycle 
pathway plan.
1
 
The city also adopted a Master Drainage Plan (Drainage Plan). The Drainage Plan noted that 
flooding occurred in several areas along Fanno Creek, including areas near petitioner’s property. 
The Drainage Plan also established that the increase in impervious surfaces associated with 
continued urbanization would exacerbate these flooding problems. To combat these risks, the 
Drainage Plan suggested a series of improvements to the Fanno Creek Basin, including channel 
excavation in the area next to petitioner’s property.  Other recommendations included ensuring that 
the floodplain remains free of structures and that it be preserved as greenways to minimize flood 
damage to structures. The Drainage Plan concluded that the cost of these improvements should be 
shared based on both direct and indirect benefits, with property owners along the waterways paying 
more due to the direct benefit that they would receive.  Petitioner Florence Dolan owns a plumbing 
and electric supply store located on Main Street in the Central Business District of the city. The 
store covers approximately 9,700 square feet on the eastern side of a 1.67-acre parcel, which 
includes a gravel parking lot. Fanno Creek flows through the southwestern corner of the lot and 
along its western boundary. The year-round flow of the creek renders the area within the creek’s 
100-year floodplain virtually unusable for commercial development. The city’s comprehensive plan 
includes the Fanno Creek floodplain as part of the city’s greenway system.  
Petitioner applied to the city for a permit to redevelop the site. Her proposed plans called for 
nearly doubling the size of the store to 17,600 square feet, and paving a 39-space parking lot. The 
existing store, located on the opposite side of the parcel, would be razed in sections as construction 
progressed on the new building. In the second phase of the project, petitioner proposed to build an 
additional structure on the northeast side of the site for complementary businesses, and to provide 
more parking. The proposed expansion and intensified use are consistent with the city’s zoning 
scheme in the Central Business District.  
The City Planning Commission granted petitioner’s permit application subject to conditions 
imposed by the city’s CDC. The CDC establishes the following standard for site development 
review approval: 
“Where landfill and/or development is allowed within and adjacent to the 100-year 
floodplain, the city shall require the dedication of sufficient open land area for 
greenway adjoining and within the floodplain. This area shall include portions at a 
                                                 
1
 CDC §18.86.040.A.1.b provides: “The development shall facilitate pedestrian/bicycle circulation if the site is located 
on a street with designated bikepaths or adjacent to a designated greenway/open space/park. Specific items to be 
addressed [include]: (i) Provision of efficient, convenient and continuous pedestrian and bicycle transit circulation 
systems, linking developments by requiring dedication and construction of pedestrian and bikepaths identified in the 
comprehensive plan. If direct connections cannot be made, require that funds in the amount of the construction cost be 
deposited into an account for the purpose of constructing paths.” 
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suitable elevation for the construction of a pedestrian/bicycle pathway within the 
floodplain in accordance with the adopted pedestrian/bicycle plan.”  
Thus, the Commission required that petitioner dedicate the portion of her property lying 
within the 100-year floodplain for improvement of a storm drainage system along Fanno Creek and 
that she dedicate an additional 15-foot strip of land adjacent to the floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle 
pathway.
2
 
The dedication required by that condition encompasses approximately 7,000 square feet, or 
roughly 10% of the property. In accordance with city practice, petitioner could rely on the dedicated 
property to meet the 15% open space and landscaping requirement mandated by the city’s zoning 
scheme.  The city would bear the cost of maintaining a landscaped buffer between the dedicated 
area and the new store.  
Petitioner requested variances from the CDC standards. Variances are granted only where it 
can be shown that, owing to special circumstances related to a specific piece of the land, the literal 
interpretation of the applicable zoning provisions would cause “an undue or unnecessary hardship” 
unless the variance is granted.
3
 Rather than posing alternative mitigating measures to offset the 
expected impacts of her proposed development, as allowed under the CDC, petitioner simply argued 
that her proposed development would not conflict with the policies of the comprehensive plan.  The 
Commission denied the request.  
The Commission made a series of findings concerning the relationship between the 
dedicated conditions and the projected impacts of petitioner’s project. First, the Commission noted 
that “it is reasonable to assume that customers and employees of the future uses of this site could 
utilize a pedestrian/bicycle pathway adjacent to this development for their transportation and 
recreational needs.” The Commission noted that the site plan has provided for bicycle parking in a 
                                                 
2
 The city’s decision includes the following relevant conditions: “1. The applicant shall dedicate to the City as 
Greenway all portions of the site that fall within the existing 100-year floodplain [of Fanno Creek] (i.e., all portions of 
the property below elevation 150.0) and all property 15 feet above (to the east of) the 150.0 foot floodplain boundary. 
The building shall be designed so as not to intrude into the greenway area.” App. to Pet. for Cert. G-43. 
3
 CDC §18.134.050 contains the following criteria whereby the decision-making authority can approve, approve with 
modifications, or deny a variance request: 
“(1) The proposed variance will not be materially detrimental to the purposes of this title, be in conflict with the policies 
of the comprehensive plan, to any other applicable policies of the Community Development Code, to any other 
applicable policies and standards, and to other properties in the same zoning district or vicinity; 
“(2) There are special circumstances that exist which are peculiar to the lot size or shape, topography or other 
circumstances over which the applicant has no control, and which are not applicable to other properties in the same 
zoning district; 
“(3) The use proposed will be the same as permitted under this title and City standards will be maintained to the greatest 
extent possible, while permitting some economic use of the land; 
“(4) Existing physical and natural systems, such as but not limited to traffic, drainage, dramatic land form or parks will 
not be adversely affected any more than would occur if the development were located as specified in the title; and   
“(5) The hardship is not self-imposed and the variance requested is the minimum variance which would alleviate the 
hardship.” 
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rack in front of the proposed building and “it is reasonable to expect that some of the users of the 
bicycle parking provided for by the site plan will use the pathway adjacent to Fanno Creek if it is 
constructed.”  In addition, the Commission found that creation of a convenient, safe 
pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an alternative means of transportation “could offset some of 
the traffic demand on [nearby] streets and lessen the increase in traffic congestion.” 
The Commission went on to note that the required floodplain dedication would be 
reasonably related to petitioner’s request to intensify the use of the site given the increase in the 
impervious surface. The Commission stated that the “anticipated increased storm water flow from 
the subject property to an already strained creek and drainage basin can only add to the public need 
to manage the stream channel and floodplain for drainage purposes.”  Based on this anticipated 
increased storm water flow, the Commission concluded that “the requirement of dedication of the 
floodplain area on the site is related to the applicant’s plan to intensify development on the site.” 
The Tigard City Council approved the Commission’s final order, subject to one minor modification; 
the City Council reassigned the responsibility for surveying and marking the floodplain area from 
petitioner to the city’s engineering department.  
Petitioner appealed to the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) on the ground that the city’s 
dedication requirements were not related to the proposed development, and, therefore, those 
requirements constituted an uncompensated taking of their property under the Fifth Amendment. In 
evaluating the federal taking claim, LUBA assumed that the city’s findings about the impacts of the 
proposed development were supported by substantial evidence.  Dolan v. Tigard, LUBA 91-161 
(Jan. 7, 1992).  Given the undisputed fact that the proposed larger building and paved parking area 
would increase the amount of impervious surfaces and the runoff into Fanno Creek, LUBA 
concluded that “there is a ‘reasonable relationship’ between the proposed development and the 
requirement to dedicate land along Fanno Creek for a greenway.” With respect to the 
pedestrian/bicycle pathway, LUBA noted the Commission’s finding that a significantly larger retail 
sales building and parking lot would attract larger numbers of customers and employees and their 
vehicles. It again found a “reasonable relationship” between alleviating the impacts of increased 
traffic from the development and facilitating the provision of a pedestrian/bicycle pathway as an 
alternative means of transportation. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting petitioner’s contention that in Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987), we had 
abandoned  the “reasonable relationship” test in favor of a stricter “essential nexus” test. 113 Ore. 
App. 162, 832 P. 2d 853 (1992).  The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.  317 Ore. 110, 854 P. 2d 
437 (1993). The court also disagreed with petitioner’s contention that the Nollan Court abandoned 
the “reasonably related” test. Id. at 118, 854 P. 2d, at 442. Instead, the court read Nollan to mean 
that an “exaction is reasonably related to an impact if the exaction serves the same purpose that a 
denial of the permit would serve.”  Id. at 120, 854 P. 2d, at 443.  The court decided that both the 
pedestrian/bicycle pathway condition and the storm drainage dedication had an essential nexus to 
the development of the proposed site.  Id. at 121, 854 P. 2d, at 443. Therefore, the court found the 
conditions to be reasonably related to the impact of the expansion of petitioner’s business.  We 
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granted certiorari, 510 U.S. ___ (1993), because of an alleged conflict between the Oregon Supreme 
Court’s decision and our decision in Nollan, supra.  
II 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 
166 U.S. 226, 239, 41 L. Ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581 (1897), provides: “Nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”4  One of the principal purposes of the Takings 
Clause is “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”  Armstrong v. United States, 364 
U.S. 40, 49, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1554, 80 S. Ct. 1563 (1960).  Without question, had the city simply 
required petitioner to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for public use, rather than 
conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her property on such a dedication, a taking would 
have occurred. Nollan, supra, at 831. Such public access would deprive petitioner of the right to 
exclude others, “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property.”  Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332, 100 
S. Ct. 383 (1979).   
On the other side of the ledger, the authority of state and local governments to engage in 
land use planning has been sustained against constitutional challenge as long ago as our decision in 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 71 L. Ed. 303, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926). “Government 
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without 
paying for every such change in the general law.”  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 
413, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922).  A land use regulation does not effect a taking if it 
“substantially advances legitimate state interests” and does not “deny an owner economically viable 
use of his land.” Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 65 L. Ed. 2d 106, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980).5  
                                                 
4
 Justice Stevens’ dissent suggests that this case is actually grounded in “substantive” due process, rather than in the 
view that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
But there is no doubt that later cases have held that the Fourteenth Amendment does make the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment applicable to the States, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122, 57 L. Ed. 
2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677, 107 S. Ct. 
3141 (1987). Nor is there any doubt that these cases have relied upon Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 
226, 41 L. Ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581 (1897), to reach that result.  See, e.g., Penn Central, supra, at 122 (“The issue 
presented . . . [is] whether the restrictions imposed by New York City’s law upon appellants’ exploitation of the 
Terminal site effect a ‘taking’ of appellants’ property for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, 
which of course is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239, 41 L. Ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581 (1897)”). 
5
 There can be no argument that the permit conditions would deprive petitioner “economically beneficial use” of her 
property as she currently operates a retail store on the lot. Petitioner assuredly is able to derive some economic use from 
her property. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina, 505 U.S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 13); Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 124, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978).   
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The sort of land use regulations discussed in the cases just cited, however, differ in two 
relevant particulars from the present case. First, they involved essentially legislative determinations 
classifying entire areas of the city, whereas here the city made an adjudicative decision to condition 
petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual parcel. Second, the conditions 
imposed were not simply a limitation on the use petitioner might make of her own parcel, but a 
requirement that she deed portions of the property to the city.  In Nollan, supra, we held that 
governmental authority to exact such a condition was circumscribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Under the well-settled doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions,” the government may 
not require a person to give up a constitutional right–here the right to receive just compensation 
when property is taken for a public use–in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the 
government where the property sought has little or no relationship to the benefit.  See Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570, 92 S. Ct. 2694 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Ed. of 
Township High School Dist., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811, 88 S. Ct. 1731 (1968). 
Petitioner contends that the city has forced her to choose between the building permit and 
her right under the Fifth Amendment to just compensation for the public easements. Petitioner does 
not quarrel with the city’s authority to exact some forms of dedication as a condition for the grant of 
a building permit, but challenges the showing made by the city to justify these exactions. She argues 
that the city has identified “no special benefits” conferred on her, and has not identified any “special 
quantifiable burdens” created by her new store that would justify the particular dedications required 
from her which are not required from the public at large. 
III 
In evaluating petitioner’s claim, we must first determine whether the “essential nexus” exists 
between the “legitimate state interest” and the permit condition exacted by the city. Nollan, 483 
U.S., at 837. If we find that a nexus exists, we must then decide the required degree of connection 
between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development. We were not required 
to reach this question in Nollan, because we concluded that the connection did not meet even the 
loosest standard. 483 U.S., at 838. Here, however, we must decide this question. 
A 
We addressed the essential nexus question in Nollan. The California Coastal Commission 
demanded a lateral public easement across the Nollan’s beachfront lot in exchange for a permit to 
demolish an existing bungalow and replace it with a three-bedroom house. 483 U.S., at 828. The 
public easement was designed to connect two public beaches that were separated by the Nollan’s 
property. The Coastal Commission had asserted that the public easement condition was imposed to 
promote the legitimate state interest of diminishing the “blockage of the view of the ocean” caused 
by construction of the larger house.  
We agreed that the Coastal Commission’s concern with protecting visual access to the ocean 
constituted a legitimate public interest. Id. at 835. We also agreed that the permit condition would 
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have been constitutional “even if it consisted of the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing 
spot on their property for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would 
interfere.” Id. at 836. We resolved, however, that the Coastal Commission’s regulatory authority 
was set completely adrift from its constitutional moorings when it claimed that a nexus existed 
between visual access to the ocean and a permit condition requiring lateral public access along the 
Nollan’s beachfront lot. Id. at 837. How enhancing the public’s ability to “traverse to and along the 
shorefront” served the same governmental purpose of “visual access to the ocean” from the 
roadway was beyond our ability to countenance. The absence of a nexus left the Coastal 
Commission in the position of simply trying to obtain an easement through gimmickry, which 
converted a valid regulation of land use into “an out-and-out plan of extortion.” Ibid., quoting J.E.D. 
Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N. H. 581, 584, 432 A. 2d 12, 14-15 (1981).  
No such gimmicks are associated with the permit conditions imposed by the city in this case. 
Undoubtedly, the prevention of flooding along Fanno Creek and the reduction of traffic congestion 
in the Central Business District qualify as the type of legitimate public purposes we have upheld. 
Agins, supra, at 260-262. It seems equally obvious that a nexus exists between preventing flooding 
along Fanno Creek and limiting development within the creek’s 100-year floodplain. Petitioner 
proposes to double the size of her retail store and to pave her now-gravel parking lot, thereby 
expanding the impervious surface on the property and increasing the amount of stormwater run-off 
into Fanno Creek.  
The same may be said for the city’s attempt to reduce traffic congestion by providing for 
alternative means of transportation. In theory, a pedestrian/bicycle pathway provides a useful 
alternative means of transportation for workers and shoppers: “Pedestrians and bicyclists occupying 
dedicated spaces for walking and/or bicycling . . . remove potential vehicles from streets, resulting 
in an overall improvement in total transportation system flow.” A. Nelson, Public Provision of 
Pedestrian and Bicycle Access Ways: Public Policy Rationale and the Nature of Private Benefits 11, 
Center for Planning Development, Georgia Institute of Technology, Working Paper Series (Jan. 
1994). See also, Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-240, 105 
Stat. 1914; (recognizing pedestrian and bicycle facilities as necessary components of any strategy to 
reduce traffic congestion). 
B 
The second part of our analysis requires us to determine whether the degree of the exactions 
demanded by the city’s permit conditions bear the required relationship to the projected impact of 
petitioner’s proposed development. Nollan, supra, at 834, quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 127, 
57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978) (“‘[A] use restriction may constitute a taking if not 
reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose’”). Here the Oregon 
Supreme Court deferred to what it termed the “city’s unchallenged factual findings” supporting the 
dedication conditions and found them to be reasonably related to the impact of the expansion of 
petitioner’s business. 317 Ore., at 120-121, 854 P. 2d, at 443.  
The city required that petitioner dedicate “to the city as Greenway all portions of the site that 
fall within the existing 100-year floodplain [of Fanno Creek] . . . and all property 15 feet above [the 
 641 
floodplain] boundary.” In addition, the city demanded that the retail store be designed so as not to 
intrude into the greenway area. The city relies on the Commission’s rather tentative findings that 
increased stormwater flow from petitioner’s property “can only add to the public need to manage 
the [floodplain] for drainage purposes” to support its conclusion that the “requirement of dedication 
of the floodplain area on the site is related to the applicant’s plan to intensify development on the 
site.” City of Tigard Planning Commission Final Order No. 91-09 PC, App. to Pet. for Cert. G37. 
The city made the following specific findings relevant to the pedestrian/bicycle pathway: 
“In addition, the proposed expanded use of this site is anticipated to generate 
additional vehicular traffic thereby increasing congestion on nearby collector and 
arterial streets. Creation of a convenient, safe pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as 
an alternative means of transportation could offset some of the traffic demand on 
these nearby streets and lessen the increase in traffic congestion.”  Id. at 24. 
The question for us is whether these findings are constitutionally sufficient to justify the 
conditions imposed by the city on petitioner’s building permit. Since state courts have been dealing 
with this question a good deal longer than we have, we turn to representative decisions made by 
them.  
In some States, very generalized statements as to the necessary connection between the 
required dedication and the proposed development seem to suffice. See, e.g., Billings Properties, 
Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P. 2d 182 (1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N. Y. 
2d 78, 218 N. E. 2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966). We think this standard is too lax to adequately 
protect petitioner’s right to just compensation if her property is taken for a public purpose. 
Other state courts require a very exacting correspondence, described as the “specific and 
uniquely attributable” test. The Supreme Court of Illinois first developed this test in Pioneer Trust 
& Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 380, 176 N. E. 2d 799, 802 (1961).
6
 Under this 
standard, if the local government cannot demonstrate that its exaction is directly proportional to the 
specifically created need, the exaction becomes “a veiled exercise of the power of eminent domain 
and a confiscation of private property behind the defense of police regulations.” Id. at 381, 176 N.E. 
2d, at 802. We do not think the Federal Constitution requires such exacting scrutiny, given the 
nature of the interests involved. 
                                                 
6
 The “specifically and uniquely attributable” test has now been adopted by a minority of other courts. See, e.g., J. E. D. 
Associates., Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N. H. 581, 585, 432 A. 2d 12, 15 (1981); Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of 
Twp. of Wayne, 66 N. J. 582, 600-601, 334 A. 2d 30, 40 (1975); McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm’n, 26 Ohio App. 
2d 171, 176, 270 N. E. 2d 370, 374 (1971); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. Cranston, 107 R. I. 63, 69, 264 A. 2d 910, 913 
(1970). 
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A number of state courts have taken an intermediate position, requiring the municipality to 
show a “reasonable relationship” between the required dedication and the impact of the proposed 
development. Typical is the Supreme Court of Nebraska’s opinion in Simpson v. North Platte, 206 
Neb. 240, 245, 292 N. W. 2d 297, 301 (1980), where that court stated: 
“The distinction, therefore, which must be made between an appropriate exercise of 
the police power and an improper exercise of eminent domain is whether the 
requirement has some reasonable relationship or nexus to the use to which the 
property is being made or is merely being used as an excuse for taking property 
simply because at that particular moment the landowner is asking the city for some 
license or permit.” 
Thus, the court held that a city may not require a property owner to dedicate private property 
for some future public use as a condition of obtaining a building permit when such future use is not 
“occasioned by the construction sought to be permitted.” Id. at 248, 292 N. W. 2d, at 302.  
Some form of the reasonable relationship test has been adopted in many other jurisdictions. 
See, e.g., Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N. W. 2d 442 (1965); Collis v. 
Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N. W. 2d 19 (1976) (requiring a showing of a reasonable 
relationship between the planned subdivision and the municipality’s need for land); College Station 
v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S. W. 2d 802, 807 (Tex. 1984); Call v. West Jordan, 606 P. 2d 217, 220 
(Utah 1979) (affirming use of the reasonable relation test). Despite any semantical differences, 
general agreement exists among the courts “that the dedication should have some reasonable 
relationship to the needs created by the [development].” Ibid. See generally, Morosoff, Take My 
Beach Please!: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional 
Analysis of Development Exactions, 69 B. U. L. Rev. 823 (1989); see also Parks v. Watson, 716 
F.2d 646, 651-653 (CA9 1983). 
We think the “reasonable relationship” test adopted by a majority of the state courts is closer 
to the federal constitutional norm than either of those previously discussed. But we do not adopt it 
as such, partly because the term “reasonable relationship” seems confusingly similar to the term 
“rational basis” which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. We think a term such as “rough proportionality” best encapsulates 
what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is 
required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required 
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.
7
  
                                                 
7
 Justice Stevens’ dissent takes us to task for placing the burden on the city to justify the required dedication. He is 
correct in arguing that in evaluating most generally applicable zoning regulations, the burden properly rests on the party 
challenging the regulation to prove that it constitutes an arbitrary regulation of property rights. See, e.g., Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 71 L. Ed. 303, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926). Here, by contrast, the city made an adjudicative 
decision to condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual parcel. In this situation, the burden 
properly rests on the city. See Nollan, 483 U.S., at 836. This conclusion is not, as he suggests, undermined by our 
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We turn now to analysis of whether the findings relied upon by the city here, first with 
respect to the floodplain easement, and second with respect to the pedestrian/bicycle path, satisfied 
these requirements. 
It is axiomatic that increasing the amount of impervious surface will increase the quantity 
and rate of storm-water flow from petitioner’s property. Therefore, keeping the floodplain open and 
free from development would likely confine the pressures on Fanno Creek created by petitioner’s 
development. In fact, because petitioner’s property lies within the Central Business District, the 
Community Development Code already required that petitioner leave 15% of it as open space and 
the undeveloped floodplain would have nearly satisfied that requirement. But the city demanded 
more- it not only wanted petitioner not to build in the floodplain, but it also wanted petitioner’s 
property along Fanno Creek for its Greenway system. The city has never said why a public 
greenway, as opposed to a private one, was required in the interest of flood control.  
The difference to petitioner, of course, is the loss of her ability to exclude others. As we 
have noted, this right to exclude others is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights 
that are commonly characterized as property.”  Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S., at 176. It is difficult to see 
why recreational visitors trampling along petitioner’s floodplain easement are sufficiently related to 
the city’s legitimate interest in reducing flooding problems along Fanno Creek, and the city has not 
attempted to make any individualized determination to support this part of its request.  
The city contends that recreational easement along the Greenway is only ancillary to the 
city’s chief purpose in controlling flood hazards. It further asserts that unlike the residential 
property at issue in Nollan, petitioner’s property is commercial in character and therefore, her right 
to exclude others is compromised.  Brief for Respondent 41, quoting United States v. Orito, 413 
U.S. 139, 142, 37 L. Ed. 2d 513, 93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973) (“‘The Constitution extends special 
safeguards to the privacy of the home’”). The city maintains that “there is nothing to suggest that 
preventing [petitioner] from prohibiting [the easements] will unreasonably impair the value of [her] 
property as a [retail store].” PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83, 64 L. Ed. 2d 
741, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980). 
Admittedly, petitioner wants to build a bigger store to attract members of the public to her 
property. She also wants, however, to be able to control the time and manner in which they enter. 
The recreational easement on the Greenway is different in character from the exercise of state-
protected rights of free expression and petition that we permitted in PruneYard. In PruneYard, we 
held that a major private shopping center that attracted more than 25,000 daily patrons had to 
provide access to persons exercising their state constitutional rights to distribute pamphlets and ask 
                                                                                                                                                                  
decision in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977), in which we struck down a 
housing ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family as violating the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ordinance at issue in Moore intruded on choices concerning family living 
arrangements, an area in which the usual deference to the legislature was found to be inappropriate.  Id. at 499. 
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passersby to sign their petitions. Id. at 85. We based our decision, in part, on the fact that the 
shopping center “may restrict expressive activity by adopting time, place, and manner regulations 
that will minimize any interference with its commercial functions.” Id. at 83. By contrast, the city 
wants to impose a permanent recreational easement upon petitioner’s property that borders Fanno 
Creek. Petitioner would lose all rights to regulate the time in which the public entered onto the 
Greenway, regardless of any interference it might pose with her retail store. Her right to exclude 
would not be regulated, it would be eviscerated. 
If petitioner’s proposed development had somehow encroached on existing greenway space 
in the city, it would have been reasonable to require petitioner to provide some alternative greenway 
space for the public either on her property or elsewhere.  See Nollan, 483 U.S., at 836 (“Although 
such a requirement, constituting a permanent grant of continuous access to the property, would have 
to be considered a taking if it were not attached to a development permit, the Commission’s 
assumed power to forbid construction of the house in order to protect the public’s view of the beach 
must surely include the power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a 
concession of property rights, that serves the same end”). But that is not the case here. We conclude 
that the findings upon which the city relies do not show the required reasonable relationship 
between the floodplain easement and the petitioner’s proposed new building. 
With respect to the pedestrian/bicycle pathway, we have no doubt that the city was correct in 
finding that the larger retail sales facility proposed by petitioner will increase traffic on the streets of 
the Central Business District. The city estimates that the proposed development would generate 
roughly 435 additional trips per day.
8
 Dedications for streets, sidewalks, and other public ways are 
generally reasonable exactions to avoid excessive congestion from a proposed property use. But on 
the record before us, the city has not met its burden of demonstrating that the additional number of 
vehicle and bicycle trips generated by the petitioner’s development reasonably relate to the city’s 
requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement. The city simply found that 
the creation of the pathway “could offset some of the traffic demand . . . and lessen the increase in 
traffic congestion.”9  
As Justice Peterson of the Supreme Court of Oregon explained in his dissenting opinion, 
however, “the findings of fact that the bicycle pathway system ‘could offset some of the traffic 
demand’ is a far cry from a finding that the bicycle pathway system will, or is likely to, offset some 
of the traffic demand.” 317 Ore., at 127, 854 P. 2d, at 447 (emphasis in original). No precise 
mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in 
support of the dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory statement that it 
could offset some of the traffic demand generated. 
                                                 
8
 The city uses a weekday average trip rate of 53.21 trips per 1000 square feet. Additional Trips Generated = 53.21 X 
(17,600-9720). App. to Pet. for Cert. G15. 
9
 In rejecting petitioner’s request for a variance from the pathway dedication condition, the city stated that omitting the 
planned section of the pathway across petitioner’s property would conflict with its adopted policy of providing a 
continuous pathway system. But the Takings Clause requires the city to implement its policy by condemnation unless 
the required relationship between the petitioner’s development and added traffic is shown. 
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IV 
Cities have long engaged in the commendable task of land use planning, made necessary by 
increasing urbanization particularly in metropolitan areas such as Portland. The city’s goals of 
reducing flooding hazards and traffic congestion, and providing for public greenways, are laudable, 
but there are outer limits to how this may be done. “A strong public desire to improve the public 
condition [will not] warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of 
paying for the change.”  Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S., at 416.  
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Oregon is reversed, and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
It is so ordered. 
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting. 
The record does not tell us the dollar value of petitioner Florence Dolan’s interest in 
excluding the public from the greenway adjacent to her hardware business. The mountain of briefs 
that the case has generated nevertheless makes it obvious that the pecuniary value of her victory is 
far less important than the rule of law that this case has been used to establish. It is unquestionably 
an important case. 
Certain propositions are not in dispute. The enlargement of the Tigard unit in Dolan’s chain 
of hardware stores will have an adverse impact on the city’s legitimate and substantial interests in 
controlling drainage in Fanno Creek and minimizing traffic congestion in Tigard’s business district. 
That impact is sufficient to justify an outright denial of her application for approval of the 
expansion. The city has nevertheless agreed to grant Dolan’s application if she will comply with 
two conditions, each of which admittedly will mitigate the adverse effects of her proposed 
development. The disputed question is whether the city has violated the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution by refusing to allow Dolan’s planned construction to proceed unless those 
conditions are met. 
The Court is correct in concluding that the city may not attach arbitrary conditions to a 
building permit or to a variance even when it can rightfully deny the application outright. I also 
agree that state court decisions dealing with ordinances that govern municipal development plans 
provide useful guidance in a case of this kind. Yet the Court’s description of the doctrinal 
underpinnings of its decision, the phrasing of its fledgling test of “rough proportionality,” and the 
application of that test to this case run contrary to the traditional treatment of these cases and break 
considerable and unpropitious new ground. 
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I 
The Court recognizes as an initial matter that the city’s conditions satisfy the “essential 
nexus” requirement announced in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 97 L. Ed. 2d 
677, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987), because they serve the legitimate interests in minimizing floods and 
traffic congestions.
10
 The Court goes on, however, to erect a new constitutional hurdle in the path of 
these conditions. In addition to showing a rational nexus to a public purpose that would justify an 
outright denial of the permit, the city must also demonstrate “rough proportionality” between the 
harm caused by the new land use and the benefit obtained by the condition. The Court also decides 
for the first time that the city has the burden of establishing the constitutionality of its conditions by 
making an “individualized determination” that the condition in question satisfies the proportionality 
requirement.  
II 
Our cases require the analysis to focus on the impact of the city’s action on the entire parcel 
of private property. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 57 L. Ed. 
2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978), we stated that takings jurisprudence “does not divide a single parcel 
into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been 
entirely abrogated.” Id. at 130-131. Instead, this Court focuses “both on the character of the action 
and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.”  Ibid. Andrus 
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 62 L. Ed. 2d 210, 100 S. Ct. 318 (1979), reaffirmed the non-divisibility 
principle outlined in Penn Central, stating that “at least where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of 
property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate 
must be viewed in its entirety.” Id. at 65-66.11  
The city of Tigard has demonstrated that its plan is rational and impartial and that the 
conditions at issue are “conducive to fulfillment of authorized planning objectives.”  Dolan, on the 
other hand, has offered no evidence that her burden of compliance has any impact at all on the value 
or profitability of her planned development. Following the teaching of the cases on which it 
                                                 
10
 In Nollan the Court recognized that a State agency may condition the grant of a land-use permit on the dedication of a 
property interest if the dedication serves a legitimate police-power purpose that would justify a refusal to issue the 
permit. For the first time, however, it held that such a condition is unconstitutional if the condition “utterly fails” to 
further a goal that would justify the refusal. 483 U.S., at 837. In the Nollan Court’s view, a condition would be 
constitutional even if it required the Nollans to provide a viewing spot for passersby whose view of the ocean was 
obstructed by their new house. Id. at 836. “Although such a requirement, constituting a permanent grant of continuous 
access to the property, would have to be considered a taking if it were not attached to a development permit, the 
Commission’s assumed power to forbid construction of the house in order to protect the public’s view of the beach must 
surely include the power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a concession of property 
rights, that serves the same end.”  Ibid. 
11
 Similarly, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498-499, 94 L. Ed. 2d 472, 107 S. Ct. 
1232 (1987), we concluded that “the 27 million tons of coal do not constitute a separate segment of property for takings 
law purposes” and that “there is no basis for treating the less than 2% of petitioners’ coal as a separate parcel of 
property.” 
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purports to rely, the Court should not isolate the burden associated with the loss of the power to 
exclude from an evaluation of the benefit to be derived from the permit to enlarge the store and the 
parking lot.  
The Court’s assurances that its “rough proportionality” test leaves ample room for cities to 
pursue the “commendable task of land use planning,”– even twice avowing that “no precise 
mathematical calculation is required,” ante –are wanting given the result that test compels here. 
Under the Court’s approach, a city must not only “quantify its findings,” and make “individualized 
determinations” with respect to the nature and the extent of the relationship between the conditions 
and the impact, but also demonstrate “proportionality.”  The correct inquiry should instead 
concentrate on whether the required nexus is present and venture beyond considerations of a 
condition’s nature or germaneness only if the developer establishes that a concededly germane 
condition is so grossly disproportionate to the proposed development’s adverse effects that it 
manifests motives other than land use regulation on the part of the city. The heightened requirement 
the Court imposes on cities is even more unjustified when all the tools needed to resolve the 
questions presented by this case can be garnered from our existing case law. 
III 
Applying its new standard, the Court finds two defects in the city’s case. First, while the 
record would adequately support a requirement that Dolan maintain the portion of the floodplain on 
her property as undeveloped open space, it does not support the additional requirement that the 
floodplain be dedicated to the city.  Second, while the city adequately established the traffic 
increase that the proposed development would generate, it failed to quantify the offsetting decrease 
in automobile traffic that the bike path will produce. Ante, at 18-19. Even under the Court’s new 
rule, both defects are, at most, nothing more than harmless error. 
In her objections to the floodplain condition, Dolan made no effort to demonstrate that the 
dedication of that portion of her property would be any more onerous than a simple prohibition 
against any development on that portion of her property. Given the commercial character of both 
the existing and the proposed use of the property as a retail store, it seems likely that potential 
customers “trampling along petitioner’s floodplain,” are more valuable than a useless parcel of 
vacant land. Moreover, the duty to pay taxes and the responsibility for potential tort liability may 
well make ownership of the fee interest in useless land a liability rather than an asset. That may 
explain why Dolan never conceded that she could be prevented from building on the floodplain. 
The City Attorney also pointed out that absent a dedication, property owners would be required to 
“build on their own land” and “with their own money” a storage facility for the water runoff. Dolan 
apparently “did have that option,” but chose not to seek it.  If Dolan might have been entitled to a 
variance confining the city’s condition in a manner this Court would accept, her failure to seek that 
narrower form of relief at any stage of the state administrative and judicial proceedings clearly 
should preclude that relief in this Court now. 
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The Court’s rejection of the bike path condition amounts to nothing more than a play on 
words. Everyone agrees that the bike path “could” offset some of the increased traffic flow that the 
larger store will generate, but the findings do not unequivocally state that it will do so, or tell us just 
how many cyclists will replace motorists. Predictions on such matters are inherently nothing more 
than estimates. Certainly the assumption that there will be an offsetting benefit here is entirely 
reasonable and should suffice whether it amounts to 100 percent, 35 percent, or only 5 percent of 
the increase in automobile traffic that would otherwise occur. If the Court proposes to have the 
federal judiciary micromanage state decisions of this kind, it is indeed extending its welcome mat to 
a significant new class of litigants. Although there is no reason to believe that state courts have 
failed to rise to the task, property owners have surely found a new friend today. 
IV 
The Court has made a serious error by abandoning the traditional presumption of 
constitutionality and imposing a novel burden of proof on a city implementing an admittedly valid 
comprehensive land use plan. Even more consequential than its incorrect disposition of this case, 
however, is the Court’s resurrection of a species of substantive due process analysis that it firmly 
rejected decades ago.  
The Court begins its constitutional analysis by citing Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 
166 U.S. 226, 239, 41 L. Ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581 (1897), for the proposition that the Takings Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment is “applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.” That 
opinion, however, contains no mention of either the Takings Clause or the Fifth Amendment;
12
 it 
held that the protection afforded by the Due Process
13
 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends 
to matters of substance as well as procedure, and that the substance of “the due process of law 
enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment requires compensation to be made or adequately secured to 
the owner of private property taken for public use under the authority of a State.”  Chicago, B. & Q. 
R. Co., 166 U.S., at 235, 236-241. It applied the same kind of substantive due process analysis more 
frequently identified with a better known case that accorded similar substantive protection to a 
baker’s liberty interest in working 60 hours a week and 10 hours a day. See Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45, 49 L. Ed. 937, 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905).
14
  
                                                 
12
 An earlier case deemed it “well settled” that the Takings Clause “is a limitation on the power of the Federal 
government, and not on the States.” Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 13 Wall. 166, 177, 20 L. Ed. 557 (1872). 
13
 The Court held that a State “may not, by any of its agencies, disregard the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Its judicial authorities may keep within the letter of the statute prescribing forms of procedure in the courts and give the 
parties interested the fullest opportunity to be heard, and yet it might be that its final action would be inconsistent with 
that amendment. In determining what is due process of law regard must be had to substance, not to form.” Chicago, B. 
& Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234-235, 41 L. Ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581 (1897). 
14
 The Lochner Court refused to presume that there was a reasonable connection between the regulation and the state 
interest in protecting the public health. 198 U.S., at 60-61. A similar refusal to identify a sufficient nexus between an 
enlarged building with a newly paved parking lot and the state interests in minimizing the risks of flooding and traffic 
congestion proves fatal to the city’s permit conditions in this case under the Court’s novel approach. 
 649 
Later cases have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive protection against 
uncompensated deprivations of private property by the States as though it incorporated the text of 
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 481, n. 10, 94 L. Ed. 2d 472, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). There was 
nothing problematic about that interpretation in cases enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment against 
state action that involved the actual physical invasion of private property. See Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-433, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868, 102 S. Ct. 3164 
(1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-180, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332, 100 S. Ct. 383 
(1979).  Justice Holmes charted a significant new course, however, when he opined that a state law 
making it “commercially impracticable to mine certain coal” had “very nearly the same effect for 
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.”  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 414, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922).  The so-called “regulatory takings” doctrine that 
the Holmes dictum
15
 kindled has an obvious kinship with the line of substantive due process cases 
that Lochner exemplified. Besides having similar ancestry, both doctrines are potentially 
open-ended sources of judicial power to invalidate state economic regulations that Members of this 
Court view as unwise or unfair. 
This case inaugurates an even more recent judicial innovation than the regulatory takings 
doctrine: the application of the “unconstitutional conditions” label to a mutually beneficial 
transaction between a property owner and a city.  The Court tells us that the city’s refusal to grant 
Dolan a discretionary benefit infringes her right to receive just compensation for the property 
interests that she has refused to dedicate to the city “where the property sought has little or no 
relationship to the benefit.”16 Although it is well settled that a government cannot deny a benefit on 
a basis that infringes constitutionally protected interests–”especially [one’s] interest in freedom of 
speech,” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570, 92 S. Ct. 2694 (1972)– the 
“unconstitutional conditions” doctrine provides an inadequate framework in which to analyze this 
case.
17
 
                                                 
15
 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 484, 94 L. Ed. 2d 472, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987) 
(explaining why this portion of the opinion was merely “advisory”). 
16
 The Court’s entire explanation reads: “Under the well-settled doctrine of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’ the 
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right- here the right to receive just compensation when 
property is taken for a public use -in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the 
property sought has little or no relationship to the benefit.”  Ibid. 
17
 Although it has a long history, see Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 20 Wall. 445, 451, 22 L. Ed. 365 (1874), the 
“unconstitutional conditions” doctrine has for just as long suffered from notoriously inconsistent application; it has 
never been an overarching principle of constitutional law that operates with equal force regardless of the nature of the 
rights and powers in question. See, e.g., Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism, 70 
B. U. L. Rev. 593, 620 (1990) (doctrine is “too crude and too general to provide help in contested cases”). The 
necessary and traditional breadth of municipalities’ power to regulate property development, together with the absence 
here of fragile and easily “chilled” constitutional rights such as that of free speech, make it quite clear that the Court is  
really writing on a clean slate rather than merely applying “well-settled” doctrine. 
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Even if Dolan should accept the city’s conditions in exchange for the benefit that she seeks, 
it would not necessarily follow that she had been denied “just compensation” since it would be 
appropriate to consider the receipt of that benefit in any calculation of “just compensation.”  See 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922) (noting 
that an “average reciprocity of advantage” was deemed to justify many laws); Hodel v. Irving, 481 
U.S. 704, 715, 95 L. Ed. 2d 668, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987) (such “‘reciprocity of advantage’” weighed 
in favor of a statute’s constitutionality).  
Particularly in the absence of any evidence on the point, we should not presume that the 
discretionary benefit the city has offered is less valuable than the property interests that  Dolan can 
retain or surrender at her option. But even if that discretionary benefit were so trifling that it could 
not be considered just compensation when it has “little or no relationship” to the property, the Court 
fails to explain why the same value would suffice when the required nexus is present. In this 
respect, the Court’s reliance on the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine is assuredly novel, and 
arguably incoherent. The city’s conditions are by no means immune from constitutional scrutiny. 
The level of scrutiny, however, does not approximate the kind of review that would apply if the city 
had insisted on a surrender of  Dolan’s  First Amendment rights in exchange for a building permit.  
One can only hope that the Court’s reliance today on First Amendment cases, see ante, at 10 (citing 
Perry v. Sindermann, supra, and Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist., 391 U.S. 
563, 568, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811, 88 S. Ct. 1731 (1968)), and its candid disavowal of the term “rational 
basis” to describe its new standard of review, see ante, at 15-16, do not signify a reassertion of the 
kind of super-legislative power the Court exercised during the Lochner era.  
The Court has decided to apply its heightened scrutiny to a single strand–the power to 
exclude–in the bundle of rights that enables a commercial enterprise to flourish in an urban 
environment. That intangible interest is undoubtedly worthy of constitutional protection–much like 
the grandmother’s interest in deciding which of her relatives may share her home in Moore v. East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977). Both interests are protected from 
arbitrary state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is, however, a 
curious irony that Members of the majority in this case would impose an almost insurmountable 
burden of proof on the property owner in the Moore case while saddling the city with a heightened 
burden in this case. 
In its application of what is essentially the doctrine of substantive due process, the Court 
confuses the past with the present. On November 13, 1922, the village of Euclid, Ohio, adopted a 
zoning ordinance that effectively confiscated 75 percent of the value of property owned by the 
Ambler Realty Company. Despite its recognition that such an ordinance “would have been rejected 
as arbitrary and oppressive” at an earlier date, the Court (over the dissent of Justices Van Devanter, 
McReynolds and Butler) upheld the ordinance. Today’s majority should heed the words of Justice 
Sutherland: 
“Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for 
reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the advent 
of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have been condemned as 
fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for while the 
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meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must 
expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly 
coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it 
should be otherwise.”  Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 71 L. Ed. 303, 47 S. 
Ct. 114 (1926). 
In our changing world one thing is certain: uncertainty will characterize predictions about 
the impact of new urban developments on the risks of floods, earthquakes, traffic congestion, or 
environmental harms. When there is doubt concerning the magnitude of those impacts, the public 
interest in averting them must outweigh the private interest of the commercial entrepreneur. If the 
government can demonstrate that the conditions it has imposed in a land-use permit are rational, 
impartial and conducive to fulfilling the aims of a valid land-use plan, a strong presumption of 
validity should attach to those conditions. The burden of demonstrating that those conditions have 
unreasonably impaired the economic value of the proposed improvement belongs squarely on the 
shoulders of the party challenging the state action’s constitutionality. That allocation of burdens has 
served us well in the past. The Court has stumbled badly today by reversing it. 
I respectfully dissent. 
CITY OF MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES 
526 U.S. 687 (1999)  
[The rest of this case may be found in SESSION 24.  PROCEDURE AND REMEDIES ] 
KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion for a 
unanimous Court with respect to Part I  
I 
This case began with attempts by the respondent, Del Monte Dunes, and its predecessor in 
interest to develop a parcel of land within the jurisdiction of the petitioner, the city of Monterey. 
The city, in a series of repeated rejections, denied proposals to develop the property, each time 
imposing more rigorous demands on the developers. Del Monte Dunes brought suit in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California, under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.S.C. 
§1983. After protracted litigation, the case was submitted to the jury on Del Monte Dunes' theory 
that the city effected a regulatory taking or otherwise injured the property by unlawful acts, without 
paying compensation or providing an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the loss. The jury found 
for Del Monte Dunes, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
The petitioner contends that the regulatory takings claim should not have been decided by 
the jury and that the Court of Appeals adopted an erroneous standard for regulatory takings liability. 
We need not decide all of the questions presented by the petitioner, nor need we examine each of 
the points given by the Court of Appeals in its decision to affirm. The controlling question is 
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whether, given the city's apparent concession that the instructions were a correct statement of the 
law, the matter was properly submitted to the jury. We conclude that it was, and that the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. 
II 
After five years, five formal decisions, and 19 different site plans, respondent Del Monte 
Dunes decided the city would not permit development of the property under any circumstances. Del 
Monte Dunes commenced suit against the city in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging, inter alia, that denial of the final 
development proposal was a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and an uncompensated, and so unconstitutional, regulatory taking. 
The District Court determined, over the city's objections, to submit Del Monte Dunes' 
takings claim to a jury. While conceding the legitimacy of the city's stated regulatory purposes, Del 
Monte Dunes emphasized the tortuous and protracted history of attempts to develop the property, as 
well as the shifting and sometimes inconsistent positions taken by the city throughout the process, 
and argued that it had been treated in an unfair and irrational manner.  
At the close of argument, the District Court instructed the jury it should find for Del Monte 
Dunes if it found either that Del Monte Dunes had been denied all economically viable use of its 
property or that "the city's decision to reject the plaintiff's 190 unit development proposal did not 
substantially advance a legitimate public purpose." The essence of these instructions was proposed 
by the city. The jury delivered a general verdict for Del Monte Dunes on its takings claim, and a 
damages award of $1.45 million.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 95 F.3d 1422 (CA9 1996). The court ruled that the District 
Court did not err in allowing Del Monte Dunes' regulatory takings claim to be tried to a jury, and 
[that] whether Del Monte Dunes had been denied all economically viable use of the property and 
whether the city's denial of the final proposal substantially advanced legitimate public interests 
were, on the facts of this case, questions suitable for the jury. The court ruled that sufficient 
evidence had been presented to the jury from which it reasonably could have decided each of these 
questions in Del Monte Dunes' favor.   
In the course of holding a reasonable jury could have found the city's denial of the final 
proposal not substantially related to legitimate public interests, the Court of Appeals stated: "even if 
the City had a legitimate interest in denying Del Monte's development application, its action must 
be 'roughly proportional' to furthering that interest . . . . That is, the City's denial must be related 
'both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.'"  
Although in a general sense concerns for proportionality animate the Takings Clause, see 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1554, 80 S. Ct. 1563 (1960) ("The Fifth 
Amendment's guarantee . . . was designed to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole"), 
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we have not extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special context of 
exactions -- land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property 
to public use. See Dolan, supra, at 385; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841, 97 
L. Ed. 2d 677, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). The rule applied in Dolan considers whether dedications 
demanded as conditions of development are proportional to the development's anticipated impacts. 
It was not designed to address, and is not readily applicable to, the much different questions arising 
where, as here, the landowner's challenge is based not on excessive exactions but on denial of 
development. We believe, accordingly, that the rough-proportionality test of Dolan is inapposite to 
a case such as this one. 
The instructions given to the jury, however, did not mention proportionality, let alone 
require it to find for Del Monte Dunes unless the city's actions were roughly proportional to its 
asserted interests. The Court of Appeals' discussion of rough proportionality, we conclude, was 
unnecessary to its decision to sustain the jury's verdict.  
Given this holding, it was unnecessary for the Court of Appeals to discuss rough 
proportionality. That it did so is irrelevant to our disposition of the case. 
LAMBERT v. SAN FRANCISCO 
529 U.S. 1045 (2000) 
Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District 
denied. Dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia with whom Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas join.  
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY and JUSTICE THOMAS join, 
dissenting from the denial of certiorari. 
Petitioners Claude and Micheline Lambert own the Cornell Hotel in San Francisco. The 
hotel has 24 residential units and 34 tourist units. After experiencing difficulty renting the hotel’s 
residential units, petitioners applied to the San Francisco Planning Commission for a conditional 
use permit to convert those units to tourist use.
1
 That request implicated two bodies of San 
Francisco’s land-use law: the Planning Code and the Residential Hotel Unit Conversion and 
Demolition Ordinance (HCO). The Planning Code provides that a tourist hotel may not be 
“significantly altered, enlarged, or intensified, except upon approval of a new conditional use 
application.” S. F. Planning Code, Art. 1.7, §178(c) (2000). The HCO prohibits the issuance of a 
permit for the conversion of units from residential to tourist use unless the proprietor agrees to 
                                                 
1
 When petitioners first sought to convert their residential units to tourist use, the hotel contained 31 residential units. 
Petitioners were successful, however, in convincing the San Francisco Board of Permit Appeals to reclassify seven of 
those as tourist units, producing the hotel’s configuration noted in the text. 
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provide either one-to-one replacement for those units or to pay a portion of the replacement costs. 
See S. F. Admin. Code, ch. 41, §41.13 (2000). 
Pursuant to the HCO, the city obtained two appraisals of the replacement costs for the units 
petitioners wished to convert. The first appraisal was $488,584 and the second was $612,887; the 
city settled on $600,000. Petitioners, however, offered only $100,000. After the Planning 
Commission denied the permit application, petitioners brought the present suit.  
They contended that the replacement fee is unconstitutional under this Court’s decisions in 
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987), and 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 129 L. Ed. 2d 304, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), which held that a 
burden imposed as a condition of permit approval must be related to the public harm that would 
justify denying the permit, and must be roughly proportional to what is needed to eliminate that 
harm. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s rejection of petitioners’ claim. It 
held that the HCO played no part in the commission’s decision, and therefore “San Francisco did 
not demand anything from [petitioners] as a condition of a use permit.” 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 569.  
Instead, the court maintained, the commission relied solely on the Planning Code and, basing its 
decision upon such traditional zoning concerns as compatibility with surrounding development, 
effect on traffic patterns, and availability of housing stock, “simply denied the permit outright.” 
Ibid. Because, the court continued, “neither a property right nor money was in fact taken from 
[petitioners], there [was] no reason to determine if a taking would have occurred had [petitioners] 
been required to pay $600,000 as a condition of a use permit, and thus there [was] nothing requiring 
review under” Nollan and Dolan, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 569. 
The record belies the Court of Appeal’s claim that the commission ignored petitioners’ 
refusal to meet its demand for a $600,000 payment. After acknowledging petitioners’ offer of 
$100,000, the commission compared this figure with the amounts offered by two other hotels that 
had successfully requested similar conversions. 1 Appellants’ App. in No. A076116 (Cal. Ct. App.), 
pp. 100, 102. It noted that in those two applications, the fee amounted to $10,000 and $15,000 per 
room, respectively. See id. at 102. (The  fee in petitioners’ case, by contrast, amounted to only 
$3,226 per room. See 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 571.) The commission then found that petitioners’ 
application was “not comparable to those previously granted . . . ,” because petitioners “failed to 
demonstrate that the amount offered” was “sufficient to mitigate the loss of housing stock.” It is 
simply and obviously not true that the commission ignored petitioners’ refusal to satisfy its fee 
demand. 
The Court of Appeal itself, after asserting that “San Francisco did not demand anything” 
from petitioners, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 569, in the next breath found it “somewhat disturbing that San 
Francisco’s concerns about congestion, parking and preservation of a neighborhood might have 
been overcome by payment of [a] significant sum of money,” ibid. (emphasis added). This 
observation makes no sense, of course, unless the court concluded from the record that the 
commission might have rendered a different decision if petitioners had been more generous. It 
sought to evade the natural consequence of that conclusion with the following unelaborated 
assertion: “That the Planning Commission might have granted the permit upon payment of 
$600,000 does not make its refusal to issue the permit into a taking.” Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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There are three possible readings of the Court of Appeal’s opinion. First, and most 
obviously, one might take at face value the court’s factual finding that the fee played no role in the 
decision. That would be a gross distortion of the record. 
Secondly, one might ignore the court’s initial see-no-evil disclaimer, and assume that it 
accepted what the record undeniably showed, that petitioners’ refusal to meet the fee demand was a 
motivating force behind the commission’s decision. On that assumption, the court’s refusal to apply 
Nollan and Dolan might be thought to rest upon its determination that that factor was irrelevant, 
since the commission also relied upon ordinary criteria under the Planning Code. But it is always 
the case that if the permit applicant does not yield to the extortionate demand, the ordinary criteria 
will be invoked to deny his permit. If indeed unjustified denial can constitute a taking (the question 
presented by the third basis for the decision, discussed below), Nollan and Dolan  can surely not be 
evaded by simply adding boilerplate “ordinary criteria” language to the denial. The increasing 
complexity of land-use permitting processes, and of the criteria by which permit applications are 
judged, makes an “ordinary criteria” claim almost always plausible. When there is uncontested 
evidence of a demand for money or other property–and still assuming that denial of a permit 
because of failure to meet such a demand constitutes a taking–it should be up to the permitting 
authority to establish either (1) that the demand met the requirements of Nollan and Dolan, or (2) 
that denial would have ensued even if the demand had been met. Cf. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471, 97 S. Ct. 568 (1977). The record (and the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion) make clear that the latter cannot be established here. 
Finally, and still on the assumption that the Court of Appeal acknowledged that petitioners’ 
failure to accede to the fee demand was a motivating factor in the commission’s denial, the court’s 
refusal to apply Nollan and Dolan might rest upon the distinction that it drew between the grant of a 
permit subject to an unlawful condition and the denial of a permit when an unlawful condition is not 
met. See Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 569 (Strankman P. J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority’s opinion in 
this fashion). From one standpoint, of course, such a distinction makes no sense. The object of the 
Court’s holding in Nollan and Dolan was to protect against the State’s cloaking within the permit 
process “‘an out-and-out plan of extortion,’” Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J. E. D. Associates, 
Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981)). There is no apparent reason why 
the phrasing of an extortionate demand as a condition precedent rather than as a condition 
subsequent should make a difference. It is undeniable, on the other hand, that the subject of any 
supposed taking in the present case is far from clear. Whereas in Nollan there was arguably a 
completed taking of an easement (the homeowner had completed construction that had been 
conditioned upon conveyance of the easement), and in Dolan there was at least a threatened taking 
of an easement (if the landowner had gone ahead with her contemplated expansion plans the 
easement would have attached), in the present case there is neither a taking nor a threatened taking 
of any money. If petitioners go ahead with the conversion of their apartments, the city will not sue 
for $600,000 imposed as a condition of the conversion; it will sue to enjoin and punish a conversion 
that has been prohibited. 
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The first two of the conceivable bases for the Court of Appeal’s decision are so implausible 
as to call into question the state court’s willingness to hold state administrators to the Fifth 
Amendment standards set forth by this tribunal. There is reason to believe that this may be more 
than a local and isolated phenomenon. See, e.g., Delaney, Development Agreements: The Road 
from Prohibition to “Let’s Make a Deal!” 25 Urb. Law. 49, 52 (1993) (“In addition to anti-
development attitudes and vesting problems, property owners and developers are confronting 
decisions of state courts which either ignore or do not follow the ‘essential nexus’ standard set forth 
in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n to validate development exactions” (footnote omitted)); M. 
Berger, Recent Developments in the Law of Inverse Condemnation, Q203 ALI-ABA Video Law 
Review Study 1, 4 (1991) (“Last  year, we noted that the California appellate courts had reacted to 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los 
Angeles, (1987) 482 U.S. 304, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250, 107 S. Ct. 2378 and Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm’n (1987) 483 U.S. 825, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677, 107 S. Ct. 3141 by seeking ways to evade their 
evident mandate, either procedurally or substantively”). Were they the only arguable bases for the 
decision I would favor summary reversal, and remand for conduct of the Nollan-Dolan analysis. 
The third basis, however, is at least a plausible one, and raises a question that will doubtless be 
presented in many cases. Though I am unaware of a conflict of authority on the precise point, the 
other grounds upon which the court relied entitle this case to our attention, and should overcome our 
usual preference for cases that present actual conflicts. I would therefore grant certiorari and 
schedule the case for argument. 
ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT v. KOONTZ  
77 So. 3d 1220; 2011 Fla. LEXIS 2617 
U.S. Supreme Court cert. granted  2012 U.S. LEXIS 7808  
LEWIS, J. 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal 
in St. Johns River Water Management District v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). In its 
decision, the Fifth District construed provisions of the state and federal constitutions. The district 
court also certified a question to be of great public importance, which we have rephrased as follows: 
DO[ES] THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION …RECOGNIZE AN EXACTIONS TAKING UNDER THE 
HOLDINGS OF NOLLAN V. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION AND 
DOLAN V. CITY OF TIGARD WHERE THERE IS NO COMPELLED 
DEDICATION OF ANY INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE 
AND THE ALLEGED EXACTION IS A NON LAND-USE MONETARY 
CONDITION FOR PERMIT APPROVAL WHICH NEVER OCCURS AND NO 
PERMIT IS EVER ISSUED? 
For the reasons expressed below, we answer the question in the negative and quash the 
decision under review. 
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BACKGROUND  
The decision resulting from that appeal in St. Johns River Water Management District v. 
Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) provides the following background: 
This case involves a landowner, Mr. Koontz, who, in 1994, requested permits from [St. 
Johns] so that he could develop a greater portion of his commercial property than was authorized by 
existing regulation. . . . Based on the permit denial, Mr. Koontz brought an inverse condemnation 
claim asserting an improper "exaction" by [St. Johns]. 
In the most general sense, an "exaction" is a condition sought by a governmental entity in 
exchange for its authorization to allow some use of land that the government has otherwise 
restricted. Even though the government may have the authority to deny a proposed use outright, 
under the exactions theory of takings jurisprudence, it may not attach arbitrary conditions to 
issuance of a permit. 
In 1994, Koontz sought approval from [St. Johns] for a 3.7 acre development area adjacent 
to Highway 50, of which 3.4 acres were wetlands and .3 acres were uplands. In his concurring [trial 
court] opinion Judge Pleus explained the positions [advanced] by the parties during the permit 
approval process: 
Koontz proposed to develop 3.7 acres closest to Highway 50, back to and including 
the power line easement. In order to develop his property, he sought a management 
and storage of surface waters permit to dredge three and one quarter acres of 
wetlands. A staffer from St. Johns agreed to recommend approval if Koontz would 
deed the remaining portion of his property into a conservation area and perform 
offsite mitigation by either replacing culverts four and one-half miles southeast of his 
property or plug certain drainage canals on other property some seven miles away. 
Alternatively, St. Johns demanded that Koontz reduce his development to one acre 
and turn the remaining 14 acres into a deed-restricted conservation area. Koontz 
agreed to deed his excess property into conservation status but refused St. Johns' 
demands for offsite mitigation or reduction of his development from three and seven-
tenths acres to one acre. Consequently, St. Johns denied his permit applications. 
In its orders denying the permits, [St. Johns] said that Mr. Koontz's proposed development 
would adversely impact Riparian Habitat Protection Zone fish and wildlife, and that the purpose of 
the mitigation was to offset that impact. 
After hearing conflicting evidence, the trial court concluded that [St. Johns] had effected a 
taking of Mr. Koontz's property . . . . In reaching this conclusion, the trial court applied the 
constitutional standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Nollan and Dolan. In Nollan, with 
respect to discretionary decisions to issue permits, the Supreme Court held that the government 
could impose a condition on the issuance of the permit without effecting a taking requiring just 
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compensation if the condition "serves the same governmental purpose as the developmental ban." 
This test is referred to as the "essential nexus" test. In Dolan, the Court added the requirement that, 
for such a condition to be constitutional, there must also be a "rough proportionality" between the 
condition and the impact of the proposed development.  
After the circuit court determined that St. Johns had effected a taking of Mr. Koontz's 
property, statutory law required St. Johns to take one of three possible actions: (a) agree to issue the 
permit; (b) agree to pay damages; or (c) agree to modify its decision to avoid an unreasonable 
exercise of police power. Here, St. Johns chose to issue the permits to Mr. Koontz after it received 
additional evidence which demonstrated that the amount of wetlands on Mr. Koontz's property was 
significantly less than originally believed. The circuit court subsequently awarded Mr. Koontz 
$376,154 for a temporary taking of his property by St. Johns. The Fifth District affirmed the trial 
court judgment awarding compensation to Mr. Koontz.  
In dissent, Judge Griffin asked, "[i]n what parallel legal universe or deep chamber of 
Wonderland's rabbit hole could there be a right to just compensation for the taking of property 
under the Fifth Amendment when no property of any kind was ever taken by the government and 
none ever given up by the owner?" Judge Griffin asserted that whether a taking has occurred 
depends on whether a landowner gives up any protected interest in his or her land:  
If [a protected interest is given up], whether temporarily or permanently, the 
landowner is entitled to compensation as set forth in the "taking" cases. If, however, 
the unconstitutional condition does not involve the taking of an interest in land, the 
remedy of inverse condemnation is not available. In this case, the objected-to 
condition that was found to be an exaction was not an interest in land; it was the 
requirement to perform certain off-site mitigation in the form of clean-up of culverts 
and ditches to enhance wetlands several miles away. 
Judge Griffin also reasoned that whether a condition that has been rejected can constitute a 
taking was not resolved in Dolan, and that a taking does not occur under such circumstances: 
In this case, if Mr. Koontz had given in to [St. Johns'] condition, gotten his 
development permit and done the off-site mitigation, he would be entitled to recover 
the value of the off-site mitigation. If he elected to refuse the offer, he had a judicial 
remedy to invalidate the condition . . . . The parcel of land for which he sought the 
development permit was not, however, in any wise "taken" by [St. Johns]. The only 
way a "taking" can even be conceptualized in such a circumstance is by adopting the 
view that by proposing an "unconstitutional condition" that was rejected, [St. Johns] 
forfeited its right (and duty) to protect the public interest to refuse the permit at all. 
St. Johns subsequently filed a motion for certification, which the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal granted. The district court then certified a question to this Court as one of great public 
importance. 
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ANALYSIS  
Constitutional Provisions  
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that private property shall 
not be taken for public use without just compensation. See amend. V, U.S. Const. The Fifth 
Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The purpose behind the 
takings doctrine is to prevent government from forcing an individual to bear burdens that should be 
carried by the public as a whole.  
Takings Under Supreme Court Case Law  
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment 
does not prohibit the taking of private property by the government, but instead places conditions on 
the exercise of that power. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of 
Los Angeles (1987). The clause is not intended to limit government interference with property 
rights, but rather to secure compensation where otherwise proper interference amounts to a taking.  
Outside the special context of land-use exactions the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized two types of regulatory actions that generally constitute per se takings under the Fifth 
Amendment. First, if government action causes a permanent physical invasion of private property, 
the government must provide just compensation to the owner of the property. See Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan (1982) (taking occurred where state law required landlords to allow cable 
companies to install cable equipment in their apartment buildings). Second, a government 
regulation that completely deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use of his or her 
property effects a Fifth Amendment taking. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992). In 
Lucas, the United States Supreme Court held that the government must pay just compensation for 
such "total regulatory takings," except to the extent that the owner's intended use of his or her 
property is restricted by nuisance and property law.  
Aside from regulations that allow physical invasions of private property or deprive a 
property owner of all beneficial property use, regulatory takings challenges are governed by the 
standard articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City (1978). The United States 
Supreme Court in Penn Central acknowledged that it had previously been unable to establish any 
"set formula" for evaluating regulatory takings claims, but identified a number of factors that have 
particular significance. The United States Supreme Court stated that the primary factor to consider 
is "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations." The Supreme Court also 
concluded that the character of the governmental action, such as whether the action constitutes a 
physical invasion or merely impacts property interests, can be relevant to a determination of 
whether a taking has occurred. The Penn Central standard has served as the principal guide for 
assessing allegations that a regulatory taking has occurred where the government action does not 
fall within the physical-invasion or Lucas takings categories. 
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With regard to the doctrine of exactions, in the late 1980s and early-to-mid 1990s, the 
United States Supreme Court issued two decisions, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 
(1987), a California case that involved a beach pass-through easement, and Dolan v. City of Tigard 
(1994), an Oregon case that involved storm-water and bike-path land dedications. These cases arose 
from landowner requests for building permits to expand the structures located on their real property. 
In response, the pertinent governmental entities approved the permits, but conditioned that approval 
on the receipt of exactions. 
In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission approved the Nollans' request for a building 
permit subject to the dedication of an easement that would allow the public to pass across the beach 
that was owned by the Nollans behind their home. The Nollans proceeded to build their expanded 
home but legally contested the exaction imposed as an uncompensated taking. On certiorari review, 
the United States Supreme Court articulated an "essential nexus" test, which required a government 
entity to establish that the condition imposed for approval of a building permit (i.e., the exaction) 
served the same public purpose that would have supported a total ban of the proposed development. 
Thus, if (as the Commission asserted) the public's right to view the shore from the street was the 
supporting reason for denying the Nollans' permit, the proposed condition/exaction must directly 
relate to and further this supporting reason. For example, a height restriction on the proposed 
development to preserve the view corridor might satisfy the requirement. However, the easement at 
issue in Nollan, which would allow members of the public to pass across beach owned by the 
Nollans, failed this test because the right of the public to view the shore from a nearby street was 
not served by the ability of individuals to traverse up and down the Nollans' beach property. Thus, 
the United States Supreme Court concluded that if the State of California desired an easement 
across the Nollans' property, the State must pay compensation for that easement.  
On certiorari review in Dolan, the Court expanded upon Nollan to not only require an 
"essential nexus" between the permit-approval condition upon the land and the alleged public 
problem caused by the proposed development, but also to require "rough proportionality" between 
the condition placed on the land and the extent of the impact of the proposed development. For 
example, where (as in Dolan) one asserted impact of the development was increased traffic 
congestion, and the permit-approval condition on the property was the dedication of land for a bike 
path, the government must demonstrate that the additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips 
generated by the development are reasonably related to the government's requirement for dedication 
of a bicycle path easement over the property. Similar to Nollan, the government entity in Dolan 
approved the requested permit subject to contested conditions on the land (i.e., storm-water and 
bike-path land dedications), and the landowner filed an action claiming that these conditions over 
the land constituted uncompensated takings.  
The Scope of the Nollan/Dolan Test  
State and federal courts have been inconsistent with regard to interpretations of the scope of 
the Nollan/Dolan test. The divide is most clearly evident on the issue of whether the test applies to 
conditions that do not involve the dedication of land or conditions imposed upon the land. 
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One line of cases holds that the Nollan/Dolan standard applies solely to exactions cases 
involving land-use dedications. The other line of cases holds that the Nollan/Dolan test extends 
beyond the context of the imposition of real property conditions on real property. Despite the varied 
interpretations of the scope of Nollan/Dolan, we must follow the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court with regard to Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. Thus, we decline to interpret 
a decision of the United States Supreme Court not to review a case that addresses an exactions issue 
as an approval of the merits or holding of the underlying decision in that case. 
Instead, we are guided only by decisions in which the Supreme Court has expressly applied, 
or commented upon the scope of, exactions takings. Nollan and Dolan both involved exactions that 
required the property owner to dedicate real property in exchange for approval of a permit. 
Additionally, in both cases the regulatory entities issued the permits sought with the objected-to 
exactions imposed. Absent a more limiting or expanding statement from the United States Supreme 
Court with regard to the scope of Nollan and Dolan, we decline to expand this doctrine beyond the 
express parameters for which it has been applied by the High Court. Accordingly, we hold that 
under the takings clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions, the Nollan/Dolan rule with 
regard to "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" is applicable only where the 
condition/exaction sought by the government involves a dedication of or over the owner's interest in 
real property in exchange for permit approval; and only when the regulatory agency actually issues 
the permit sought, thereby rendering the owner's interest in the real property subject to the 
dedication imposed. 
It is both necessary and logical to limit land-use exactions doctrine to these narrow 
circumstances. Governmental entities must have the authority and flexibility to independently 
evaluate permit applications and negotiate a permit award that will benefit a landowner without 
causing undue harm to the community or the environment. If a property owner is authorized to file 
an inverse condemnation claim on the basis of the exactions theory any time regulatory negotiations 
are not successful and a permit is denied, two undesirable outcomes inevitably ensue. First, the 
regulation of land use, deemed by the United States Supreme Court to be "peculiarly within the 
province of state and local legislative authorities," would become prohibitively expensive.  
Second, and as a result of the first consequence, agencies will opt to simply deny permits 
outright without discussion or negotiation rather than risk the crushing costs of litigation. Property 
owners will have no opportunity to amend their applications or discuss mitigation options because 
the regulatory entity will be unwilling to subject itself to potential liability. Land development in 
certain areas of Florida would come to a standstill. We decline to approve a rule of law that would 
place Florida land-use regulation in such an unduly restrictive position. 
Based on the above analysis, we conclude that the Fifth District in Koontz IV erroneously 
applied the Nollan/Dolan exactions test to the offsite mitigation proposed by St. Johns. Since St. 
Johns did not condition approval of the permits on Mr. Koontz dedicating any portion of his interest 
in real property in any way to public use, this analysis does not apply. Further, even if we were to 
conclude that the Nollan/Dolan test applied to non-real property exactions--which we do not--Mr. 
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Koontz would nonetheless fail in his exactions challenge because St. Johns did not issue permits, 
Mr. Koontz never expended any funds towards the performance of offsite mitigation, and nothing 
was ever taken from Mr. Koontz. As noted by the United States Supreme Court, Nollan and Dolan 
were not designed to address the situation where a landowner's challenge is based not on excessive 
exactions but on a denial of development. Here, all that occurred was that St. Johns did not issue 
permits for Mr. Koontz to develop his property based on existing regulations and, therefore, an 
exactions analysis does not apply.  
CONCLUSION  
Based on our analysis in this case, we answer the certified question in the negative, quash 
the decision of the Fifth District in and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We 
emphasize that our decision today is limited solely to answering the rephrased certified question. 
We decline to address the other issues raised by the parties. 
It is so ordered. 
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Session 27. Deprivation of All Economically Feasible Use 
For the past quarter century the Supreme Court has struggled to find a principled basis for 
deciding whether private property has been “taken” by overzealous government regulations. 
ANTONIN SCALIA, “THE RULE OF LAW AS A LAW OF RULES”  
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) 
via HeinOnline 
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/uclr56&id=1185&collection=journals 
 
LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL 
505 U.S. 1003 (1992) 
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas paid $975,000 for two residential lots on the Isle of 
Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, on which he intended to build single-family homes. In 
1988, however, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act, S.C. Code 
§48-39-250 et seq. (Su1990) (Act), which had the direct effect of barring petitioner from erecting 
any permanent habitable structures on his two parcels.  See §48-39- 290(A).  A state trial court 
found that this prohibition rendered Lucas’s parcels “valueless.”  Ato Pet. for Cert. 37. This case 
requires us to decide whether the Act’s dramatic effect on the economic value of Lucas’s lots 
accomplished a taking of private property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments requiring the 
payment of “just compensation.” U.S. Const., Amdt. 5. 
I 
A 
South Carolina’s expressed interest in intensively managing development activities in the 
so-called “coastal zone” dates from 1977 when, in the aftermath of Congress’s passage of the 
federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1280, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §1451 et seq., 
the legislature enacted a Coastal Zone Management Act of its own.  See S. C. Code §48-39-10 et 
seq. (1987).  In its original form, the South Carolina Act required owners of coastal zone land that 
qualified as a “critical area” (defined in the legislation to include beaches and immediately adjacent 
sand dunes, §48-39-10(J)) to obtain a permit from the newly created South Carolina Coastal 
Council (respondent here) prior to committing the land to a “use other than the use the critical area 
was devoted to on [September 28, 1977].” §48-39-130(A). 
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In the late 1970’s, Lucas and others began extensive residential development of the Isle of 
Palms, a barrier island situated eastward of the City of Charleston. Toward the close of the 
development cycle for one residential subdivision known as “Beachwood East,” Lucas in 1986 
purchased the two lots at issue in this litigation for his own account.  No portion of the lots, which 
were located approximately 300 feet from the beach, qualified as a “critical area” under the 1977 
Act; accordingly, at the time Lucas acquired these parcels, he was not legally obliged to obtain a 
permit from the Council in advance of any development activity.  His intention with respect to the 
lots was to do what the owners of the immediately adjacent parcels had already done:  erect single-
family residences.  He commissioned architectural drawings for this purpose. 
The Beachfront Management Act brought Lucas’s plans to an abrupt end.  Under that 1988 
legislation, the Council was directed to establish a “baseline” connecting the landward-most “points 
of erosion . . . during the past forty years” in the region of the Isle of Palms that includes Lucas’s 
lots.  §48-39-280(A)(2) (Su1988).  In action not challenged here, the Council fixed this baseline 
landward of Lucas’s parcels.  That was significant, for under the Act construction of occupable 
improvements was flatly prohibited seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of, and parallel to, the 
baseline, §48-39-290(A) (Su1988).  The Act provided no exceptions.
1
 
B 
Lucas promptly filed suit in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, contending that the 
Beachfront Management Act’s construction bar effected a taking of his property without just 
compensation.  Lucas did not take issue with the validity of the Act as a lawful exercise of South 
Carolina’s police power, but contended that the Act’s complete extinguishment of his property’s 
value entitled him to compensation regardless of whether the legislature had acted in furtherance of 
legitimate police power objectives.  Following a bench trial, the court agreed.  Among its factual 
determinations was the finding that “at the time Lucas purchased the two lots, both were zoned for 
single-family residential construction and . . . there were no restrictions imposed upon such use of 
the property by either the State of South Carolina, the County of Charleston, or the Town of the Isle 
of Palms.”  Ato Pet. for Cert. 36.  The trial court further found that the Beachfront Management Act 
decreed a permanent ban on construction insofar as Lucas’s lots were concerned, and that this 
prohibition “deprived Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots, . . . eliminated the 
unrestricted right of use, and rendered them valueless.”  Id. at 37. The court thus concluded that 
Lucas’s properties had been “taken” by operation of the Act, and it ordered respondent to pay “just 
compensation” in the amount of $1,232,387.50. Id. at 40. 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed.  It found dispositive what it described as 
Lucas’s concession “that the Beachfront Management Act [was] properly and validly designed to 
preserve . . . South Carolina’s beaches.”  304 S. C. 376, 379, 404 S. E. 2d 895, 896 (1991). Failing 
an attack on the validity of the statute as such, the court believed itself bound to accept the 
                                                 
1
 The Act did allow the construction of certain non-habitable improvements, e.g., “wooden walkways no larger in width 
than six feet,” and “small wooden decks no larger than one hundred forty-four square feet.”  §§48-39-290(A)(1) and (2) 
(Su1988). 
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“uncontested . . . findings” of the South Carolina legislature that new construction in the coastal 
zone–such as petitioner intended–threatened this public resource.  Id. at 383, 404 S. E. 2d, at 898.  
The Court ruled that when a regulation respecting the use of property is designed “to prevent 
serious public harm,” id., at 383, 404 S. E. 2d, at 899 (citing, inter alia, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 
623 (1887)), no compensation is owing under the Takings Clause regardless of the regulation’s 
effect on the property’s value. 
Two justices dissented. They acknowledged that our Mugler line of cases recognizes 
governmental power to prohibit “noxious” uses of property–i.e., uses of property akin to “public 
nuisances”–without having to pay compensation. But they would not have characterized the 
Beachfront Management Act’s “primary purpose [as] the prevention of a nuisance.”  304 S. C., at 
395, 404 S. E. 2d, at 906 (Harwell, J., dissenting).  To the dissenters, the chief purposes of the 
legislation, among them the promotion of tourism and the creation of a “habitat for indigenous flora 
and fauna,” could not fairly be compared to nuisance abatement.  Id. at 396, 404 S. E. 2d, at 906.  
As a consequence, they would have affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the Act’s obliteration 
of the value of petitioner’s lots accomplished a taking. 
We granted certiorari. 502 U.S. ___ (1991). 
III 
A 
Prior to Justice Holmes’ exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 
(1922), it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a “direct appropriation” of 
property, Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 551 (1871), or the functional equivalent of a “practical 
ouster of [the owner’s] possession.”  Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879). See 
also Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 275-276 (1897). Justice Holmes recognized in Mahon, 
however, that if the protection against physical appropriations of private property was to be 
meaningfully enforced, the government’s power to redefine the range of interests included in the 
ownership of property was necessarily constrained by constitutional limits. 260 U.S., at 414-415.  
If, instead, the uses of private property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualification 
under the police power, “the natural tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the 
qualification more and more until at last private property disappeared.” Id. at 415.  These 
considerations gave birth in that case to the oft-cited maxim that, “while property may be regulated 
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”  Ibid. 
Nevertheless, our decision in Mahon offered little insight into when, and under what 
circumstances, a given regulation would be seen as going “too far” for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment.  In 70-odd years of succeeding “regulatory takings” jurisprudence, we have generally 
eschewed any “set formula” for determining how far is too far, preferring to “engage in . . . 
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,” Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 
104, 124 (1978) (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)). See Epstein, Takings: 
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Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 4.  We have, however, described at least two 
discrete categories of regulatory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public 
interest advanced in support of the restraint.  The first encompasses regulations that compel the 
property owner to suffer a physical “invasion” of his property.  In general (at least with regard to 
permanent invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public 
purpose behind it, we have required compensation. For example, in Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), we determined that New York’s law requiring 
landlords to allow television cable companies to emplace cable facilities in their apartment 
buildings constituted a taking, id., at 435-440, even though the facilities occupied at most only 1½ 
cubic feet of the landlords’ property, see id., at 438, n.16. See also United States v. Causby, 328 
U.S. 256, 265, and n. 10 (1946) (physical invasions of airspace); cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
444 U.S. 164 (1979) (imposition of navigational servitude upon private marina). 
The second situation in which we have found categorical treatment appropriate is where 
regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land. See Agins, 447 U.S., at 260; 
see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295-296 (1981).  As we have said on numerous occasions, 
the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation “does not substantially advance 
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.”  Agins, supra, at 
260 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
1
 
We have never set forth the justification for this rule. Perhaps it is simply, as Justice 
Brennan suggested, that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner’s point of view, 
the equivalent of a physical appropriation. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 
                                                 
1
 Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our “deprivation of all economically feasible use” rule is greater than its precision, 
since the rule does not make clear the “property interest” against which the loss of value is to be measured.  When, for 
example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we 
would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the 
burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a 
whole. (For an extreme–and, we think, unsupportable–view of the relevant calculus, see Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City, 42 N. Y. 2d 324, 333-334, 366 N. E. 2d 1271, 1276-1277 (1977), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), 
where the state court examined the diminution in a particular parcel’s value produced by a municipal ordinance in light 
of total value of the taking claimant’s other holdings in the vicinity.)  Unsurprisingly, this uncertainty regarding the 
composition of the denominator in our “deprivation” fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court.  
Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (law restricting subsurface extraction of coal held 
to effect a taking), with Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-502 (1987) (nearly 
identical law held not to effect a taking); see also id., at 515-520 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Rose, Mahon 
Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561, 566-569 (1984).  The answer to this 
difficult question may lie in how the owner’s reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State’s law of property–
i.e., whether and to what degree the State’s law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest in 
land with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value.  In any event, we avoid 
this difficulty in the present case, since the “interest in land” that Lucas has pleaded (a fee simple interest) is an estate 
with a rich tradition of protection at common law, and since the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas found that the 
Beachfront Management Act left each of Lucas’s beachfront lots without economic value. 
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U.S., at 652 (Brennan, J., dissenting). “For what is the land but the profits thereof?” 1 E. Coke, 
Institutes ch. 1, §1 (1st Am. ed. 1812).  Surely, at least, in the extraordinary circumstance when no 
productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual 
assumption that the legislature is simply “adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life,” Penn 
Central Transportation Co., 438 U.S., at 124, in a manner that secures an “average reciprocity of 
advantage” to everyone concerned.  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S., at 415.  And the 
functional basis for permitting the government, by regulation, to affect property values without 
compensation– that “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property 
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law,” Id., at 413–does 
not apply to the relatively rare situations where the government has deprived a landowner of all 
economically beneficial uses. 
On the other side of the balance, affirmatively supporting a compensation requirement, is the 
fact that regulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or productive 
options for its use–typically, as here, by requiring land to be left substantially in its natural state–
carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public 
service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.  As Justice Brennan explained: “From the 
government’s point of view, the benefits flowing to the public from preservation of open space 
through regulation may be equally great as from creating a wildlife refuge through formal 
condemnation or increasing electricity production through a dam project that floods private 
property.”  San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., supra, at 652 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  We think, in short, 
that there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that when the owner of real property 
has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, 
that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
2
 
                                                 
2 Justice Stevens criticizes the “deprivation of all economically beneficial use” rule as “wholly arbitrary,” in that “[the] 
landowner whose property is diminished in value 95% recovers nothing,” while the landowner who suffers a complete 
elimination of value “recovers the land’s full value.” This analysis errs in its assumption that the landowner whose 
deprivation is one step short of complete is not entitled to compensation.  Such an owner might not be able to claim the 
benefit of our categorical formulation, but, as we have acknowledged time and again, “the economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant and . . . the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations” are keenly relevant to takings analysis generally.  Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  It is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will get nothing, while the 
landowner with total loss will recover in full.  But that occasional result is no more strange than the gross disparity 
between the landowner whose premises are taken for a highway (who recovers in full) and the landowner whose 
property is reduced to 5% of its former value by the highway (who recovers nothing). Takings law is full of these “all-
or-nothing” situations. 
Justice Stevens similarly misinterprets our focus on “developmental” uses of property (the uses proscribed by the 
Beachfront Management Act) as betraying an “assumption that the only uses of property cognizable under the 
Constitution are developmental uses.”   We make no such assumption. Though our prior takings cases evince an abiding 
concern for the productive use of, and economic investment in, land, there are plainly a number of noneconomic 
interests in land whose impairment will invite exceedingly close scrutiny under the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982) (interest in excluding strangers from one’s land).  
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The trial court found Lucas’s two beachfront lots to have been rendered valueless by 
respondent’s enforcement of the coastal-zone construction ban.  Under Lucas’s theory of the case, 
which rested upon our “no economically viable use” statements, that finding entitled him to 
compensation.  Lucas believed it unnecessary to take issue with either the purposes behind the 
Beachfront Management Act, or the means chosen by the South Carolina Legislature to effectuate 
those purposes.  The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, thought otherwise. In its view, the 
Beachfront Management Act was no ordinary enactment, but involved an exercise of South 
Carolina’s “police powers” to mitigate the harm to the public interest that petitioner’s use of his 
land might occasion.  304 S. C., at 384, 404 S. E. 2d, at 899.  By neglecting to dispute the findings 
enumerated in the Act or otherwise to challenge the legislature’s purposes, petitioner “conceded that 
the beach/dune area of South Carolina’s shores is an extremely valuable public resource; that the 
erection of new construction, inter alia, contributes to the erosion and destruction of this public 
resource; and that discouraging new construction in close proximity to the beach/dune area is 
necessary to prevent a great public harm.”  Id. at 382-383, 404 S. E. 2d, at 898.  In the court’s view, 
these concessions brought petitioner’s challenge within a long line of this Court’s cases sustaining 
against Due Process and Takings Clause challenges the State’s use of its “police powers” to enjoin a 
property owner from activities akin to public nuisances. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) 
(law prohibiting manufacture of alcoholic beverages); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) 
(law barring operation of brick mill in residential area); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) 
(order to destroy diseased cedar trees to prevent infection of nearby orchards); Goldblatt v. 
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (law effectively preventing continued operation of quarry in 
residential area). 
It is correct that many of our prior opinions have suggested that “harmful or noxious uses” 
of property may be proscribed by government regulation without the requirement of compensation. 
For a number of reasons, however, we think the South Carolina Supreme Court was too quick to 
conclude that that principle decides the present case.  The “harmful or noxious uses” principle was 
the Court’s early attempt to describe in theoretical terms why government may, consistent with the 
Takings Clause, affect property values by regulation without incurring an obligation to compensate–
a reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly with respect to the full scope of the State’s police 
power.  See, e.g., Penn Central Transportation Co., 438 U.S., at 125 (where State “reasonably 
concludes that ‘the health, safety, morals, or general welfare’ would be promoted by prohibiting 
particular contemplated uses of land,” compensation need not accompany prohibition).  We made 
this very point in Penn Central Transportation Co., where, in the course of sustaining New York 
City’s landmarks preservation program against a takings challenge, we rejected the petitioner’s 
suggestion that Mugler and the cases following it were premised on, and thus limited by, some 
objective conception of “noxiousness”: 
“The uses in issue in Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt were perfectly lawful in 
themselves.  They involved no blameworthiness, . . . moral wrongdoing or conscious 
act of dangerous risk-taking which induce[d society] to shift the cost to a particular 
individual.’  Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36, 50 (1964).  These 
cases are better understood as resting not on any supposed noxious’ quality of the 
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prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably related 
to the implementation of a policy–not unlike historic preservation–expected to 
produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated 
property.”  438 U.S., at 133-134, n. 30. 
“Harmful or noxious use” analysis was, in other words, simply the progenitor of our more 
contemporary statements that “land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it ‘substantially 
advances legitimate state interests’ . . . .” Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S., at 260; see also Penn Central 
Transportation Co., supra, at 127; Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-388 (1926). 
The transition from our early focus on control of “noxious” uses to our contemporary 
understanding of the broad realm within which government may regulate without compensation was 
an easy one, since the distinction between “harm-preventing” and “benefit-conferring” regulation is 
often in the eye of the beholder.  It is quite possible, for example, to describe in either fashion the 
ecological, economic, and aesthetic concerns that inspired the South Carolina legislature in the 
present case.  One could say that imposing a servitude on Lucas’s land is necessary in order to 
prevent his use of it from “harming” South Carolina’s ecological resources; or, instead, in order to 
achieve the “benefits” of an ecological preserve.3 Whether one or the other of the competing 
characterizations will come to one’s lips in a particular case depends primarily upon one’s 
evaluation of the worth of competing uses of real estate.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts §822, 
Comment g, p. 112 (1979) (“practically all human activities unless carried on in a wilderness 
interfere to some extent with others or involve some risk of interference”).  A given restraint will be 
seen as mitigating “harm” to the adjacent parcels or securing a “benefit” for them, depending upon 
the observer’s evaluation of the relative importance of the use that the restraint favors.  See Sax, 
“Takings and the Police Power,” 74 Yale L. J. 36, 49 (1964) (“The problem [in this area] is not one 
of noxiousness or harm-creating activity at all; rather it is a problem of inconsistency between 
                                                 
3 In the present case, in fact, some of the “[South Carolina] legislature’s ‘findings’” to which the South Carolina 
Supreme Court purported to defer in characterizing the purpose of the Act as “harm-preventing,” 304 S. C. 376, 385, 
404 S. E. 2d 895, 900 (1991), seem to us phrased in “benefit-conferring” language instead.  For example, they describe 
the importance of a construction ban in enhancing “South Carolina’s annual tourism industry revenue,” S. C. Code §48-
39-250(1)(b) (Su1991), in “providing habitat for numerous species of plants and animals, several of which are 
threatened or endangered,” §48-39-250(1)(c), and in “providing a natural healthy environment for the citizens of South 
Carolina to spend leisure time which serves their physical and mental well-being.”  §48-39-250(1)(d).  It would be 
pointless to make the outcome of this case hang upon this terminology, since the same interests could readily be 
described in “harm-preventing” fashion. 
Justice Blackmun, however, apparently insists that we must make the outcome hinge (exclusively) upon the South 
Carolina Legislature’s other,” harm-preventing” characterizations, focusing on the declaration that “prohibitions on 
building in front of the setback line are necessary to protect people and property from storms, high tides, and beach 
erosion.”  He says “nothing in the record undermines [this] assessment,” ibid., apparently seeing no significance in the 
fact that the statute permits owners of existing structures to remain (and even to rebuild if their structures are not 
“destroyed beyond repair,” S. C. Code Ann. §48-39-290(B)), and in the fact that the 1990 amendment authorizes the 
Council to issue permits for new construction in violation of the uniform prohibition, see S. C. Code §48-39-290(D)(1) 
(Su1991).
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perfectly innocent and independently desirable uses”).  Whether Lucas’s construction of single-
family residences on his parcels should be described as bringing “harm” to South Carolina’s 
adjacent ecological resources thus depends principally upon whether the describer believes that the 
State’s use interest in nurturing those resources is so important that any competing adjacent use 
must yield. 
When it is understood that “prevention of harmful use” was merely our early formulation of 
the police power justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) any regulatory 
diminution in value; and that the distinction between regulation that “prevents harmful use” and that 
which “confers benefits” is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective, value-free basis; 
it becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory 
“takings”–which require compensation–from regulatory deprivations that do not require 
compensation.  A fortiori the legislature’s recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the 
basis for departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated.  If it 
were, departure would virtually always be allowed.  The South Carolina Supreme Court’s approach 
would essentially nullify Mahon’s affirmation of limits to the noncompensable exercise of the 
police power.  Our cases provide no support for this: None of them that employed the logic of 
“harmful use” prevention to sustain a regulation involved an allegation that the regulation wholly 
eliminated the value of the claimant’s land.4 
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial 
use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of 
the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.  
This accords, we think, with our “takings” jurisprudence, which has traditionally been guided by the 
understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the State’s power over, the “bundle of 
rights” that they acquire when they obtain title to property.  It seems to us that the property owner 
necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures 
newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers; “as long recognized, some 
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power.”  Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S., at 413.  And in the case of personal property, by reason of the State’s 
traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings, he ought to be aware of the 
possibility that new regulation might even render his property economically worthless (at least if the 
property’s only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for sale), see Andrus v. Allard, 
444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979) (prohibition on sale of eagle feathers).  In the case of land, however, we 
think the notion pressed by the Council that title is somehow held subject to the “implied limitation” 
that the State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the 
                                                 
4  
E.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (prohibition upon use of a building as a brewery; other uses permitted); 
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914) (requirement that “pillar” of coal be left in ground to 
safeguard mine workers; mineral rights could otherwise be exploited); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) 
(declaration that livery stable constituted a public nuisance; other uses of the property permitted); Hadacheck v. 
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibition of brick manufacturing in residential area; other uses permitted); Goldblatt 
v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (prohibition on excavation; other uses permitted). 
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historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional 
culture.
5
 
Where “permanent physical occupation” of land is concerned, we have refused to allow the 
government to decree it anew (without compensation), no matter how weighty the asserted “public 
interests” involved, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S., at 426–though we 
assuredly would permit the government to assert a permanent easement that was a pre-existing 
limitation upon the landowner’s title.  Compare Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900) 
(interests of “riparian owner in the submerged lands . . . bordering on a public navigable water” held 
subject to Government’s navigational servitude), with Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S., at 
178-180 (imposition of navigational servitude on marina created and rendered navigable at private 
expense held to constitute a taking).  We believe similar treatment must be accorded confiscatory 
regulations, i.e., regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land:  Any limitation so 
severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title 
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance 
already place upon land ownership.  A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no 
more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts–by adjacent landowners 
(or other uniquely affected persons) under the State’s law of private nuisance, or by the State under 
its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.
6
 
On this analysis, the owner of a lake bed, for example, would not be entitled to 
compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to engage in a landfilling operation that would 
have the effect of flooding others’ land.  Nor the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant, 
when it is directed to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery that the plant sits 
astride an earthquake fault.  Such regulatory action may well have the effect of eliminating the 
land’s only economically productive use, but it does not proscribe a productive use that was 
                                                 
5
 After accusing us of “launching a missile to kill a mouse,” Justice Blackmun expends a good deal of throw-weight of 
his own upon a noncombatant, arguing that our description of the “understanding” of land ownership that informs the  
Takings Clause is not supported by early American experience.  That is largely true, but entirely irrelevant.  The 
practices of the States prior to incorporation of the Takings and Just Compensation Clauses, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)–which, as Justice Blackmun acknowledges, occasionally included outright 
physical appropriation of land without compensation . . . were out of accord with any plausible interpretation of those 
provisions.  Justice Blackmun is correct that early constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced 
regulations of property at all . . . but even he does not suggest (explicitly, at least) that we renounce the Court’s contrary 
conclusion in Mahon.  Since the text of the Clause can be read to encompass regulatory as well as physical deprivations 
(in contrast to the text originally proposed by Madison, see “Speech Proposing Bill of Rights” (June 8, 1789), in 12 J. 
Madison, The Papers of James Madison 201 (C. Hobson, R. Rutland, W. Rachal, & J. Sisson ed. 1979) (“No person 
shall be . . . obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just compensation”), 
we decline to do so as well. 
6 The principal “otherwise” that we have in mind is litigation absolving the State (or private parties) of liability for the 
destruction of “real and personal property, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire” or to forestall 
other grave threats to the lives and property of others. Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18-19 (1880); see United States 
v. Pacific Railroad, 120 U.S. 227, 238-239 (1887). 
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previously permissible under relevant property and nuisance principles.  The use of these properties 
for what are now expressly prohibited purposes was always unlawful, and (subject to other 
constitutional limitations) it was open to the State at any point to make the implication of those 
background principles of nuisance and property law explicit.  See Michelman, Property, Utility, and 
Fairness, Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 
1165, 1239-1241 (1967).  In light of our traditional resort to “existing rules or understandings that 
stem from an independent source such as state law” to define the range of interests that qualify for 
protection as “property” under the Fifth (and Fourteenth) amendments, Board of Regents of State 
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 
1011-1012 (1984); Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 295 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring), this 
recognition that the Takings Clause does not require compensation when an owner is barred from 
putting land to a use that is proscribed by those “existing rules or understandings” is surely 
unexceptional.  When, however, a regulation that declares “off-limits” all economically productive 
or beneficial uses of land goes beyond what the relevant background principles would dictate, 
compensation must be paid to sustain it. 
The “total taking” inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail (as the application of state 
nuisance law ordinarily entails) analysis of, among other things, the degree of harm to public lands 
and resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant’s proposed activities, see, e.g., 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§826, 827, the social value of the claimant’s activities and their 
suitability to the locality in question, see, e.g., id., §§828(a) and (b), 831, and the relative ease with 
which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the claimant and the government 
(or adjacent private landowners) alike, see, e.g., id., §§827(e), 828(c), 830.  The fact that a 
particular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack of 
any common-law prohibition (though changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what 
was previously permissible no longer so, see Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, §827, comment 
g. So also does the fact that other landowners, similarly situated, are permitted to continue the use 
denied to the claimant. 
It seems unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented the erection of any 
habitable or productive improvements on petitioner’s land; they rarely support prohibition of the 
“essential use” of land, Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911).  The question, however, is one of 
state law to be dealt with on remand.  We emphasize that to win its case South Carolina must do 
more than proffer the legislature’s declaration that the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent with the 
public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law maxim such as sic utere 
tuo ut alienum non laedas.  As we have said, a “State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private 
property into public property without compensation . . . .”  Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. 
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980).  Instead, as it would be required to do if it sought to restrain 
Lucas in a common-law action for public nuisance, South Carolina must identify background 
principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses he now intends in the circumstances in 
which the property is presently found.  Only on this showing can the State fairly claim that, in 
proscribing all such beneficial uses, the Beachfront Management Act is taking nothing. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
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So ordered. 
Justice Blackmun, dissenting. 
Today the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse. 
The State of South Carolina prohibited petitioner Lucas from building a permanent structure 
on his property from 1988 to 1990.  Relying on an unreviewed (and implausible) state trial court 
finding that this restriction left Lucas’ property valueless, this Court granted review to determine 
whether compensation must be paid in cases where the State prohibits all economic use of real 
estate.  According to the Court, such an occasion never has arisen in any of our prior cases, and the 
Court imagines that it will arise “relatively rarely” or only in “extraordinary circumstances.” Almost 
certainly it did not happen in this case. 
Nonetheless, the Court presses on to decide the issue, and as it does, it ignores its 
jurisdictional limits, remakes its traditional rules of review, and creates simultaneously a new 
categorical rule and an exception (neither of which is rooted in our prior case law, common law, or 
common sense).  I protest not only the Court’s decision, but each step taken to reach it.  More 
fundamentally, I question the Court’s wisdom in issuing sweeping new rules to decide such a 
narrow case.  
My fear is that the Court’s new policies will spread beyond the narrow confines of the 
present case.  For that reason, I, like the Court, will give far greater attention to this case than its 
narrow scope suggests–not because I can intercept the Court’s missile, or save the targeted mouse, 
but because I hope perhaps to limit the collateral damage.
7
 
Petitioner Lucas is a contractor, manager, and part owner of the Wild Dune development on 
the Isle of Palms.  He has lived there since 1978. In December 1986, he purchased two of the last 
four pieces of vacant property in the development.  The area is notoriously unstable.  In roughly half 
of the last 40 years, all or part of petitioner’s property was part of the beach or flooded twice daily 
by the ebb and flow of the tide. Between 1957 and 1963, petitioner’s property was under water.  
Between 1963 and 1973 the shoreline was 100 to 150 feet onto petitioner’s property.  In 1973 the 
first line of stable vegetation was about halfway through the property.  Between 1981 and 1983, the 
                                                 
7
 The country has come to recognize that uncontrolled beachfront development can cause serious damage to life and 
property.  See Brief for Sierra Club, et al. as Amici Curiae 2-5. Hurricane Hugo’s September 1989 attack upon South 
Carolina’s coastline, for example, caused 29 deaths and approximately $6 billion in property damage, much of it the 
result of uncontrolled beachfront development.  See Zalkin, Shifting Sands and Shifting Doctrines: The Supreme 
Court’s Changing Takings Doctrine and South Carolina’s Coastal Zone Statute, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 205, 212-213 (1991).  
The beachfront buildings are not only themselves destroyed in such a storm, “but they are often driven, like battering 
rams, into adjacent inland homes.”  Ibid. Moreover, the development often destroys the natural sand dune barriers that 
provide storm breaks.  Ibid. 
674 
Isle of Palms issued 12 emergency orders for sandbagging to protect property in the Wild Dune 
development.  Determining that local habitable structures were in imminent danger of collapse, the 
Council issued permits for two rock revetments to protect condominium developments near 
petitioner’s property from erosion; one of the revetments extends more than halfway onto one of his 
lots.  
C 
The South Carolina Supreme Court found that the Beach Management Act did not take 
petitioner’s property without compensation.  The decision rested on two premises that until today 
were unassailable–that the State has the power to prevent any use of property it finds to be harmful 
to its citizens, and that a state statute is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. 
The Beachfront Management Act includes a finding by the South Carolina General 
Assembly that the beach/dune system serves the purpose of “protecting life and property by serving 
as a storm barrier which dissipates wave energy and contributes to shoreline stability in an 
economical and effective manner.” §48-39-250(1)(a).  The General Assembly also found that 
“development unwisely has been sited too close to the [beach/dune] system.  This type of 
development has jeopardized the stability of the beach/dune system, accelerated erosion, and 
endangered adjacent property.”  §48-39-250(4); see also §48-39-250(6) (discussing the need to 
“afford the beach/dune system space to accrete and erode”). 
If the state legislature is correct that the prohibition on building in front of the setback line 
prevents serious harm, then, under this Court’s prior cases, the Act is constitutional.  “Long ago it 
was recognized that all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner’s 
use of it shall not be injurious to the community, and the Takings Clause did not transform that 
principle to one that requires compensation whenever the State asserts its power to enforce it.”  
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-492 (1987) (internal 
quotations omitted); see also id., at 488-489, and n.18.  The Court consistently has upheld 
regulations imposed to arrest a significant threat to the common welfare, whatever their economic 
effect on the owner.  See e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-593 (1962); Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927); Mugler v. 
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
Petitioner never challenged the legislature’s findings that a building ban was necessary to 
protect property and life.  Nor did he contend that the threatened harm was not sufficiently serious 
to make building a house in a particular location a “harmful” use, that the legislature had not made 
sufficient findings, or that the legislature was motivated by anything other than a desire to minimize 
damage to coastal areas.  Indeed, petitioner objected at trial that evidence as to the purposes of the 
setback requirement was irrelevant.  Tr. 68.  The South Carolina Supreme Court accordingly 
understood petitioner not to contest the State’s position that “discouraging new construction in close 
proximity to the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a great public harm,” 304 S.C. 376, 404 
S.E. 2d 895, 898 (1991), and “to prevent serious injury to the community.” Id. at 404 S.E. 2d, at 
901.  The court considered itself “bound by these uncontested legislative findings . . . [in the 
absence of] any attack whatsoever on the statutory scheme.” Id. at ___, 404 S.E.2d, at 898. 
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Nothing in the record undermines the General Assembly’s assessment that prohibitions on 
building in front of the setback line are necessary to protect people and property from storms, high 
tides, and beach erosion.  Because that legislative determination cannot be disregarded in the 
absence of such evidence, see, e.g., Euclid, 272 U.S., at 388; O’Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co, 282 U.S. 251, 257-258 (1931) (Brandeis, J.), and because its determination of harm to life 
and property from building is sufficient to prohibit that use under this Court’s cases, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court correctly found no taking  
LINGLE v. CHEVRON U.S.A., INC.  
543 U.S. 1118 (2005) 
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.  
On occasion, a would-be doctrinal rule or test finds its way into our case law through simple 
repetition of a phrase-however fortuitously coined. A quarter century ago, in Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255 (1980), the Court declared that government regulation of private property 
"effects a taking if [such regulation] does not substantially advance legitimate state interests ... ." 
Id., at 260. Through reiteration in a half dozen or so decisions since Agins, this language has been 
ensconced in our Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. See Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at 
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U. S. 687, 704 (1999) (citing cases).  
In the case before us, the lower courts applied Agins' "substantially advances" formula to 
strike down a Hawaii statute that limits the rent that oil companies may charge to dealers who lease 
service stations owned by the companies. The lower courts held that the rent cap effects an 
uncompensated taking of private property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
because it does not substantially advance Hawaii's asserted interest in controlling retail gasoline 
prices. This case requires us to decide whether the "substantially advances" formula announced in 
Agins is an appropriate test for determining whether a regulation effects a Fifth Amendment taking. 
We conclude that it is not. 
I 
The State of Hawaii, whose territory comprises an archipelago of 132 islands clustered in 
the midst of the Pacific Ocean, is located over 1,600 miles from the U. S. mainland and ranks 
among the least populous of the 50 States. Because of Hawaii's small size and geographic isolation, 
its wholesale market for oil products is highly concentrated. When this lawsuit began in 1997, only 
two refineries and six gasoline wholesalers were doing business in the State. As of that time, 
respondent Chevron U.S.A. Inc. was the largest refiner and marketer of gasoline in Hawaii: It 
controlled 60 percent of the market for gasoline produced or refined in-state and 30 percent of the 
wholesale market on the State's most populous island, Oahu.  
Gasoline is sold at retail in Hawaii from about 300 different service stations. About half of 
these stations are leased from oil companies by independent lessee-dealers, another 75 or so are 
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owned and operated by "open" dealers, and the remainder are owned and operated by the oil 
companies. Chevron sells most of its product through 64 independent lessee-dealer stations. In a 
typical lessee-dealer arrangement, Chevron buys or leases land from a third party, builds a service 
station, and then leases the station to a dealer on a turnkey basis. Chevron charges the lessee-dealer 
a monthly rent, defined as a percentage of the dealer's margin on retail sales of gasoline and other 
goods. In addition, Chevron requires the lessee-dealer to enter into a supply contract, under which 
the dealer agrees to purchase from Chevron whatever is necessary to satisfy demand at the station 
for Chevron's product. Chevron unilaterally sets the wholesale price of its product.  
The Hawaii Legislature enacted Act 257 in June 1997, apparently in response to concerns 
about the effects of market concentration on retail gasoline prices. See 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws no. 
257, §1. The statute seeks to protect independent dealers by imposing certain restrictions on the 
ownership and leasing of service stations by oil companies. It prohibits oil companies from 
converting existing lessee-dealer stations to company-operated stations and from locating new 
company-operated stations in close proximity to existing dealer-operated stations. Haw. Rev. Stat. 
§§486H-10.4(a), (b) (1998 Cum. Supp.). More importantly for present purposes, Act 257 limits the 
amount of rent that an oil company may charge a lessee-dealer to 15 percent of the dealer's gross 
profits from gasoline sales plus 15 percent of gross sales of products other than gasoline. §486H-
10.4(c).  
Thirty days after Act 257's enactment, Chevron sued the Governor and Attorney General of 
Hawaii in their official capacities (collectively Hawaii) in the United States District Court for the 
District of Hawaii, raising several federal constitutional challenges to the statute. As pertinent here, 
Chevron claimed that the statute's rent cap provision, on its face, effected a taking of Chevron's 
property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Chevron sought a declaration to this 
effect as well as an injunction against the application of the rent cap to its stations. Chevron swiftly 
moved for summary judgment on its takings claim, arguing that the rent cap does not substantially 
advance any legitimate government interest. Hawaii filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on 
all of Chevron's claims.  
To facilitate resolution of the summary judgment motions, the parties jointly stipulated to 
certain relevant facts. They agreed that Act 257 reduces by about $207,000 per year the aggregate 
rent that Chevron would otherwise charge on 11 of its 64 lessee-dealer stations. On the other hand, 
the statute allows Chevron to collect more rent than it would otherwise charge at its remaining 53 
lessee-dealer stations, such that Chevron could increase its overall rental income from all 64 stations 
by nearly $1.1 million per year. The parties further stipulated that, over the past 20 years, Chevron 
has not fully recovered the costs of maintaining lessee-dealer stations in any State through rent 
alone. Rather, the company recoups its expenses through a combination of rent and product sales. 
Finally, the joint stipulation states that Chevron has earned in the past, and anticipates that it will 
continue to earn under Act 257, a return on its investment in lessee-dealer stations in Hawaii that 
satisfies any constitutional standard.  
The District Court granted summary judgment to Chevron, holding that "Act 257 fails to 
substantially advance a legitimate state interest, and as such, effects an unconstitutional taking in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 
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2d 1003, 1014 (1998). The District Court accepted Hawaii's argument that the rent cap was intended 
to prevent concentration of the retail gasoline market-and, more importantly, resultant high prices 
for consumers-by maintaining the viability of independent lessee-dealers. Id., at 1009-1010. The 
court concluded that the statute would not substantially advance this interest, however, because it 
would not actually reduce lessee-dealers' costs or retail prices. It found that the rent cap would allow 
incumbent lessee-dealers, upon transferring occupancy rights to a new lessee, to charge the 
incoming lessee a premium reflecting the value of the rent reduction. Accordingly, the District 
Court reasoned, the incoming lessee's overall expenses would be the same as in the absence of the 
rent cap, so there would be no savings to pass along to consumers. Id., at 1010-1012. Nor would 
incumbent lessees benefit from the rent cap, the court found, because the oil company lessors would 
unilaterally raise wholesale fuel prices in order to offset the reduction in their rental income. Id., at 
1012-1014.  
On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the 
District Court had applied the correct legal standard to Chevron's takings claim. Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F. 3d 1030, 1033-1037 (2000). The Court of Appeals vacated the grant of 
summary judgment, however, on the ground that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to 
whether the Act would benefit consumers. Id., at 1037-1042. Judge William Fletcher concurred in 
the judgment, maintaining that the "reasonableness" standard applicable to "ordinary rent and price 
control laws" should instead govern Chevron's claim. Id., at 1048.  
On remand, the District Court entered judgment for Chevron after a 1-day bench trial in 
which Chevron and Hawaii called competing expert witnesses (both economists) to testify. 198 F. 
Supp. 2d 1182 (2002). Finding Chevron's expert witness to be "more persuasive" than the State's 
expert, the District Court once again concluded that oil companies would raise wholesale gasoline 
prices to offset any rent reduction required by Act 257, and that the result would be an increase in 
retail gasoline prices. Id., at 1187-1189. Even if the rent cap did reduce lessee-dealers' costs, the 
court found, they would not pass on any savings to consumers. Id., at 1189. The court went on to 
reiterate its determination that Act 257 would enable incumbent lessee-dealers to sell their 
leaseholds at a premium, such that incoming lessees would not obtain any of the benefits of the rent 
cap. Id., at 1189-1190. And while it acknowledged that the rent cap could preclude oil companies 
from constructively evicting dealers through excessive rents, the court found no evidence that 
Chevron or any other oil company would attempt to charge such rents in the absence of the cap. Id., 
at 1191. Finally, the court concluded that Act 257 would in fact decrease the number of lessee-
dealer stations because the rent cap would discourage oil companies from building such stations. 
Id., at 1191-1192. Based on these findings, the District Court held that "Act 257 effect[ed] an 
unconstitutional regulatory taking given its failure to substantially advance any legitimate state 
interest." Id., at 1193.  
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that its decision in the prior appeal barred Hawaii from 
challenging the application of the "substantially advances" test to Chevron's takings claim or from 
arguing for a more deferential standard of review. 363 F. 3d 846, 849-855 (2004). The panel 
majority went on to reject Hawaii's challenge to the application of the standard to the facts of the 
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case. Id., at 855-858. Judge Fletcher dissented, renewing his contention that Act 257 should not be 
reviewed under the "substantially advances" standard. Id., at 859-861. We granted certiorari, 543 U. 
S. ___ (2004), and now reverse.  
II 
A 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the 
Fourteenth, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1897), provides that private 
property shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensation." As its text makes plain, the 
Takings Clause "does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on 
the exercise of that power." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of 
Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 314 (1987). In other words, it "is designed not to limit the 
governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the 
event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking." Id., at 315 (emphasis in original). 
While scholars have offered various justifications for this regime, we have emphasized its role in 
"bar[ring] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness 
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 
(1960); see also Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 325 (1893).  
The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or 
physical invasion of private property. See, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114 
(1951) (Government's seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal 
miners effected a taking); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373 (1945) 
(Government's occupation of private warehouse effected a taking). Indeed, until the Court's 
watershed decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922), "it was generally 
thought that the Takings Clause reached only a 'direct appropriation' of property, or the functional 
equivalent of a 'practical ouster of [the owner's] possession.' " Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (citations omitted and emphasis added; brackets in original); 
see also id., at 1028, n. 15 ("[E]arly constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause 
embraced regulations of property at all").  
Beginning with Mahon, however, the Court recognized that government regulation of 
private property may, in some instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct 
appropriation or ouster-and that such "regulatory takings" may be compensable under the Fifth 
Amendment. In Justice Holmes' storied but cryptic formulation, "while property may be regulated 
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 260 U. S., at 415. 
The rub, of course, has been-and remains-how to discern how far is "too far." In answering that 
question, we must remain cognizant that "government regulation-by definition-involves the 
adjustment of rights for the public good," Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 65 (1979), and that 
"Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law," Mahon, supra, at 413.  
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Our precedents stake out two categories of regulatory action that generally will be deemed 
per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes. First, where government requires an owner to suffer a 
permanent physical invasion of her property-however minor-it must provide just compensation. See 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982) (state law requiring 
landlords to permit cable companies to install cable facilities in apartment buildings effected a 
taking). A second categorical rule applies to regulations that completely deprive an owner of "all 
economically beneficial us[e]" of her property. Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1019 (emphasis in original). We 
held in Lucas that the government must pay just compensation for such "total regulatory takings," 
except to the extent that "background principles of nuisance and property law" independently 
restrict the owner's intended use of the property. Id., at 1026-1032.  
Outside these two relatively narrow categories (and the special context of land-use 
exactions), regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978). The Court in Penn Central acknowledged that 
it had hitherto been "unable to develop any 'set formula' " for evaluating regulatory takings claims, 
but identified "several factors that have particular significance." Id., at 124. Primary among those 
factors are "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations." Ibid. In addition, 
the "character of the governmental action"-for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or 
instead merely affects property interests through "some public program adjusting the benefits and 
burdens of economic life to promote the common good"-may be relevant in discerning whether a 
taking has occurred. Ibid. The Penn Central factors-though each has given rise to vexing subsidiary 
questions-have served as the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not 
fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U. S. 606, 
617-618 (2001); id., at 632-634 (O'Connor, J., concurring).  
Although our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized as unified, these 
three inquiries (reflected in Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central) share a common touchstone. Each 
aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which 
government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain. Accordingly, 
each of these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that government imposes upon 
private property rights. The Court has held that physical takings require compensation because of 
the unique burden they impose: A permanent physical invasion, however minimal the economic 
cost it entails, eviscerates the owner's right to exclude others from entering and using her property-
perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374, 
384 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825, 831-832 (1987); Loretto, supra, at 
433; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 176 (1979). In the Lucas context, of course, the 
complete elimination of a property's value is the determinative factor. See Lucas, supra, at 1017 
(positing that "total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the 
equivalent of a physical appropriation"). And the Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not 
exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation's economic impact and the degree to which it 
interferes with legitimate property interests.  
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B 
In Agins v. City of Tiburon, a case involving a facial takings challenge to certain municipal 
zoning ordinances, the Court declared that "[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular 
property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, 
see Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 188 (1928), or denies an owner economically viable use 
of his land, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 138, n. 36 (1978)." 447 
U. S., at 260. Because this statement is phrased in the disjunctive, Agins' "substantially advances" 
language has been read to announce a stand-alone regulatory takings test that is wholly independent 
of Penn Central or any other test. Indeed, the lower courts in this case struck down Hawaii's rent 
control statute as an "unconstitutional regulatory taking," 198 F. Supp. 2d, at 1193, based solely 
upon a finding that it does not substantially advance the State's asserted interest in controlling retail 
gasoline prices.. Although a number of our takings precedents have recited the "substantially 
advances" formula minted in Agins, this is our first opportunity to consider its validity as a 
freestanding takings test. We conclude that this formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due 
process, not a takings, test, and that it has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence.  
There is no question that the "substantially advances" formula was derived from due 
process, not takings, precedents. In support of this new language, Agins cited Nectow v. 
Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, a 1928 case in which the plaintiff claimed that a city zoning ordinance 
"deprived him of his property without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth 
Amendment," id., at 185. Agins then went on to discuss Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U. S. 365 (1926), a historic decision holding that a municipal zoning ordinance would survive a 
substantive due process challenge so long as it was not "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having 
no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Id., at 395 (emphasis 
added); see also Nectow, supra, at 188 (quoting the same "substantial relation" language from 
Euclid).  
When viewed in historical context, the Court's reliance on Nectow and Euclid is 
understandable. Agins was the Court's first case involving a challenge to zoning regulations in many 
decades, so it was natural to turn to these seminal zoning precedents for guidance. See Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae in Agins v. City of Tiburon, O. T. 1979, No. 602, pp. 12-13 
(arguing that Euclid "set out the principles applicable to a determination of the facial validity of a 
zoning ordinance attacked as a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment"). 
Moreover, Agins' apparent commingling of due process and takings inquiries had some precedent in 
the Court's then-recent decision in Penn Central. See 438 U. S., at 127 (stating in dicta that "[i]t is ... 
implicit in Goldblatt [v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590 (1962),] that a use restriction on real property 
may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public 
purpose, see Nectow v. Cambridge, supra"). But see Goldblatt, supra, at 594-595 (quoting " 
'reasonably necessary' " language from Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 137 (1894), a due process 
case, and applying a deferential " 'reasonableness' " standard to determine whether a challenged 
regulation was a "valid exercise of the ... police power" under the Due Process Clause). Finally, 
when Agins was decided, there had been some history of referring to deprivations of property 
without due process of law as "takings," see, e.g., Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728, 740 
(1970), and the Court had yet to clarify whether "regulatory takings" claims were properly 
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cognizable under the Takings Clause or the Due Process Clause, see Williamson County Regional 
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Jefferson City, 473 U. S. 172, 197-199 (1985).  
Although Agins' reliance on due process precedents is understandable, the language the 
Court selected was regrettably imprecise. The "substantially advances" formula suggests a means-
ends test: It asks, in essence, whether a regulation of private property is effective in achieving some 
legitimate public purpose. An inquiry of this nature has some logic in the context of a due process 
challenge, for a regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so 
arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., County of Sacramento 
v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 846 (1998) (stating that the Due Process Clause is intended, in part, to 
protect the individual against "the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the 
service of a legitimate governmental objective"). But such a test is not a valid method of discerning 
whether private property has been "taken" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.  
In stark contrast to the three regulatory takings tests discussed above, the "substantially 
advances" inquiry reveals nothing about the magnitude or character of the burden a particular 
regulation imposes upon private property rights. Nor does it provide any information about how any 
regulatory burden is distributed among property owners. In consequence, this test does not help to 
identify those regulations whose effects are functionally comparable to government appropriation or 
invasion of private property; it is tethered neither to the text of the Takings Clause nor to the basic 
justification for allowing regulatory actions to be challenged under the Clause.  
Chevron appeals to the general principle that the Takings Clause is meant " 'to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' " Brief for Respondent 17-21 (quoting 
Armstrong, 364 U. S., at 49). But that appeal is clearly misplaced, for the reasons just indicated. A 
test that tells us nothing about the actual burden imposed on property rights, or how that burden is 
allocated cannot tell us when justice might require that the burden be spread among taxpayers 
through the payment of compensation. The owner of a property subject to a regulation that 
effectively serves a legitimate state interest may be just as singled out and just as burdened as the 
owner of a property subject to an ineffective regulation. It would make little sense to say that the 
second owner has suffered a taking while the first has not. Likewise, an ineffective regulation may 
not significantly burden property rights at all, and it may distribute any burden broadly and evenly 
among property owners. The notion that such a regulation nevertheless "takes" private property for 
public use merely by virtue of its ineffectiveness or foolishness is untenable.  
Instead of addressing a challenged regulation's effect on private property, the "substantially 
advances" inquiry probes the regulation's underlying validity. But such an inquiry is logically prior 
to and distinct from the question whether a regulation effects a taking, for the Takings Clause 
presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose. The Clause 
expressly requires compensation where government takes private property "for public use." It does 
not bar government from interfering with property rights, but rather requires compensation "in the 
event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking." First English Evangelical Lutheran 
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Church, 482 U. S., at 315 (emphasis added). Conversely, if a government action is found to be 
impermissible-for instance because it fails to meet the "public use" requirement or is so arbitrary as 
to violate due process-that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of compensation can authorize such 
action.  
Chevron's challenge to the Hawaii statute in this case illustrates the flaws in the 
"substantially advances" theory. To begin with, it is unclear how significantly Hawaii's rent cap 
actually burdens Chevron's property rights. The parties stipulated below that the cap would reduce 
Chevron's aggregate rental income on 11 of its 64 lessee-dealer stations by about $207,000 per year, 
but that Chevron nevertheless expects to receive a return on its investment in these stations that 
satisfies any constitutional standard. See supra, at 4. Moreover, Chevron asserted below, and the 
District Court found, that Chevron would recoup any reductions in its rental income by raising 
wholesale gasoline prices. See supra, at 5. In short, Chevron has not clearly argued-let alone 
established-that it has been singled out to bear any particularly severe regulatory burden. Rather, the 
gravamen of Chevron's claim is simply that Hawaii's rent cap will not actually serve the State's 
legitimate interest in protecting consumers against high gasoline prices. Whatever the merits of that 
claim, it does not sound under the Takings Clause. Chevron plainly does not seek compensation for 
a taking of its property for a legitimate public use, but rather an injunction against the enforcement 
of a regulation that it alleges to be fundamentally arbitrary and irrational.  
Finally, the "substantially advances" formula is not only doctrinally untenable as a takings 
test-its application as such would also present serious practical difficulties. The Agins formula can 
be read to demand heightened means-ends review of virtually any regulation of private property. If 
so interpreted, it would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of state and federal 
regulations-a task for which courts are not well suited. Moreover, it would empower-and might 
often require-courts to substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and 
expert agencies.  
Although the instant case is only the tip of the proverbial iceberg, it foreshadows the hazards 
of placing courts in this role. To resolve Chevron's takings claim, the District Court was required to 
choose between the views of two opposing economists as to whether Hawaii's rent control statute 
would help to prevent concentration and supra-competitive prices in the State's retail gasoline 
market. Finding one expert to be "more persuasive" than the other, the court concluded that the 
Hawaii Legislature's chosen regulatory strategy would not actually achieve its objectives. See 198 
F. Supp. 2d, at 1187-1193. Along the way, the court determined that the State was not entitled to 
enact a prophylactic rent cap without actual evidence that oil companies had charged, or would 
charge, excessive rents. See id., at 1191. Based on these findings, the District Court enjoined further 
enforcement of Act 257's rent cap provision against Chevron. We find the proceedings below 
remarkable, to say the least, given that we have long eschewed such heightened scrutiny when 
addressing substantive due process challenges to government regulation. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. 
Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117, 124-125 (1978); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 730-732 
(1963). The reasons for deference to legislative judgments about the need for, and likely 
effectiveness of, regulatory actions are by now well established, and we think they are no less 
applicable here.  
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For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the "substantially advances" formula announced 
in Agins is not a valid method of identifying regulatory takings for which the Fifth Amendment 
requires just compensation. Since Chevron argued only a "substantially advances" theory in support 
of its takings claim, it was not entitled to summary judgment on that claim.  
III 
We emphasize that our holding today-that the "substantially advances" formula is not a valid 
takings test-does not require us to disturb any of our prior holdings. To be sure, we applied a 
"substantially advances" inquiry in Agins itself, see 447 U. S., at 261-262 (finding that the 
challenged zoning ordinances "substantially advance[d] legitimate governmental goals"), and 
arguably also in Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. 470, 485-492 (1987) 
(quoting " 'substantially advance[s]' " language and then finding that the challenged statute was 
intended to further a substantial public interest). But in no case have we found a compensable taking 
based on such an inquiry. Indeed, in most of the cases reciting the "substantially advances" formula, 
the Court has merely assumed its validity when referring to it in dicta. See Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U. S. 302, 334 (2002); Del 
Monte Dunes, 526 U. S., at 704; Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1016; Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 534 
(1992); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U. S. 121, 126 (1985).  
It might be argued that this formula played a role in our decisions in Nollan v. California 
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374 (1994). See 
Brief for Respondent 21-23. But while the Court drew upon the language of Agins in these cases, it 
did not apply the "substantially advances" test that is the subject of today's decision. Both Nollan 
and Dolan involved Fifth Amendment takings challenges to adjudicative land-use exactions-
specifically, government demands that a landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to 
her property as a condition of obtaining a development permit. See Dolan, supra, at 379-380 (permit 
to expand a store and parking lot conditioned on the dedication of a portion of the relevant property 
for a "greenway," including a bike/pedestrian path); Nollan, supra, at 828 (permit to build a larger 
residence on beachfront property conditioned on dedication of an easement allowing the public to 
traverse a strip of the property between the owner's seawall and the mean high-tide line).  
In each case, the Court began with the premise that, had the government simply appropriated 
the easement in question, this would have been a per se physical taking. Dolan, supra, at 384; 
Nollan, supra, at 831-832. The question was whether the government could, without paying the 
compensation that would otherwise be required upon effecting such a taking, demand the easement 
as a condition for granting a development permit the government was entitled to deny. The Court in 
Nolan answered in the affirmative, provided that the exaction would substantially advance the same 
government interest that would furnish a valid ground for denial of the permit. 483 U. S., at 834-
837. The Court further refined this requirement in Dolan, holding that an adjudicative exaction 
requiring dedication of private property must also be " 'rough[ly] proportiona[l]' ... both in nature 
and extent to the impact of the proposed development." 512 U. S., at 391; see also Del Monte 
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Dunes, supra, at 702 (emphasizing that we have not extended this standard "beyond the special 
context of [such] exactions").  
Although Nollan and Dolan quoted Agins' language, see Dolan, supra, at 385; Nollan, supra, 
at 834, the rule those decisions established is entirely distinct from the "substantially advances" test 
we address today. Whereas the "substantially advances" inquiry before us now is unconcerned with 
the degree or type of burden a regulation places upon property, Nollan and Dolan both involved 
dedications of property so onerous that, outside the exactions context, they would be deemed per se 
physical takings. In neither case did the Court question whether the exaction would substantially 
advance some legitimate state interest. See Dolan, supra, at 387-388; Nollan, supra, at 841. Rather, 
the issue was whether the exactions substantially advanced the same interests that land-use 
authorities asserted would allow them to deny the permit altogether. As the Court explained in 
Dolan, these cases involve a special application of the "doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions,' " 
which provides that "the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right-here 
the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use-in exchange for a 
discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit has little or no relationship to 
the property." 512 U. S., at 385. That is worlds apart from a rule that says a regulation affecting 
property constitutes a taking on its face solely because it does not substantially advance a legitimate 
government interest. In short, Nollan and Dolan cannot be characterized as applying the 
"substantially advances" test we address today, and our decision should not be read to disturb these 
precedents.  
* * * 
Twenty-five years ago, the Court posited that a regulation of private property "effects a 
taking if [it] does not substantially advance [a] legitimate state interes[t]." Agins, supra, at 260. The 
lower courts in this case took that statement to its logical conclusion, and in so doing, revealed its 
imprecision. Today we correct course. We hold that the "substantially advances" formula is not a 
valid takings test, and indeed conclude that it has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence. In so 
doing, we reaffirm that a plaintiff seeking to challenge a government regulation as an 
uncompensated taking of private property may proceed under one of the other theories discussed 
above-by alleging a "physical" taking, a Lucas-type "total regulatory taking," a Penn Central taking, 
or a land-use exaction violating the standards set forth in Nollan and Dolan. Because Chevron 
argued only a "substantially advances" theory in support of its takings claim, it was not entitled to 
summary judgment on that claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
It is so ordered.  
Justice Kennedy, concurring.  
This separate writing is to note that today's decision does not foreclose the possibility that a 
regulation might be so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 
524 U. S. 498, 539 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). The failure 
of a regulation to accomplish a stated or obvious objective would be relevant to that inquiry. 
 685 
Chevron voluntarily dismissed its due process claim without prejudice, however, and we have no 
occasion to consider whether Act 257 of the 1997 Hawaii Session Laws "represents one of the rare 
instances in which even such a permissive standard has been violated." Apfel, supra, at 550. With 
these observations, I join the opinion of the Court.  
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Session 28. Disambiguating Lucas 
FLORIDA ROCK INDUSTRIES, INC. v. THE UNITED STATES 
18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
Before NIES, Chief Judge, NEWMAN and PLAGER, Circuit Judges.  
PLAGER, Circuit Judge. 
This is a regulatory taking case.  It arose when the plaintiff Florida Rock Industries Inc. 
(Florida Rock) sought a permit under §404 of the Clean Water Act from the Army Corps of 
Engineers (Corps) to mine the limestone which lay beneath a tract of wetlands. The Corps denied 
the permit on October 5, 1980.  On May 25, 1982, Florida Rock filed suit in the United States Court 
of Federal Claims, seeking monetary compensation from the defendant United States 
(Government); Florida Rock alleged that the Corps’ permit denial constituted an uncompensated 
taking of private property for public use in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Federal 
Claims agreed, Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985) (Florida Rock I), and 
awarded Florida Rock $1,029,000 plus attorney fees and simple interest. On appeal, this court 
vacated the judgment that a taking had occurred and remanded for further consideration. Florida 
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1053, 93 L. 
Ed. 2d 978, 107 S. Ct. 926 (1987) (Florida Rock II). On remand, the Court of Federal Claims found 
that the permit denial deprived Florida Rock of all value in its land, and so again concluded that 
there had been a taking and reinstated the $1,029,000 damages award, this time with compound 
interest.  Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990) (Florida Rock III).  The 
Government appeals both the damages award and the choice of compound rather than simple 
interest. We again find it necessary to vacate the judgment that there has been a taking, and remand 
for further consideration consistent with this opinion.  
BACKGROUND 
The detailed background of the case is described in the several opinions referred to above as 
Florida Rock I-III. We provide here only a brief overview before proceeding to the heart of the 
matter:  whether the Corps’ denial of the §404 permit effected a regulatory taking, thus requiring the 
Government to pay just compensation.  The answer to that question depends on the impact the 
regulatory imposition had on the economic use, and hence value, of the property.  
In 1972, shortly before the enactment of the Clean Water Act, Florida Rock purchased a 
1,560 acre wetlands parcel in Dade County, Florida, to the west of suburban Miami.  The purchase 
price was $2,964,000 (an average of $1,900 per acre).  Florida Rock obtained the parcel in order to 
extract the underlying limestone- a process which destroys the surface wetlands.  
During the 1970s, however, the ecological importance of wetlands was increasingly 
appreciated.  The Corps in 1977 enacted regulations requiring owners of wetlands parcels to obtain 
688 
permits under §404 of the Clean Water Act before engaging in dredging or filling activities.  See 
generally United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123-24, 88 L. Ed. 2d 419, 
106 S. Ct. 455 (1985).  Not long after, Florida Rock began mining operations on the parcel, without 
having applied for a §404 permit.  The Corps issued a cease and desist order on September 7, 1978.  
Florida Rock stopped mining, restored the area as best it could, and began negotiating with the 
Corps for the permit.  
Initially, Florida Rock sought a permit for the entire 1,560 acres. The Corps responded that 
permits would be issued only for parcels of a size to suffice for three years of mining; in Florida 
Rock’s case, 98 acres would serve its anticipated needs for three years. Florida Rock acquiesced in 
the Corps’ demand and applied for a permit covering only the 98 acre parcel at issue here. After 
considering the revised application, the Corps concluded that the proposed mining would cause 
irremediable loss of an ecologically valuable wetland parcel and would create undesirable water 
turbidity. The permit application was denied on October 2, 1980. 
Florida Rock, conceding the validity of the Corps’ actions, filed suit in the United States 
Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the permit denial was an uncompensated regulatory taking of 
its land. In Florida Rock I, the Court of Federal Claims found that the value of the parcel before the 
taking was $10,500 per acre and that the value after the taking was negligible because rock mining-- 
in the view of the court, the only viable economic use --had been foreclosed. Florida Rock I, 8 Cl. 
Ct. at 164 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96, 
69 L. Ed. 2d 1, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981)).  The Court of Federal Claims concluded that the permit 
denial was a regulatory taking, for which the landowner must be compensated.  Florida Rock I, 8 
Cl. Ct. at 165. 
On appeal to this court, that judgment was vacated in Florida Rock II.  The Federal Circuit 
held that the Court of Federal Claims in determining the after- taking value of the affected property 
had erred in focusing on immediate use --the proper focus should instead have been on a 
determination of “fair market value.”  Id. 791 F.2d at 903. The case was remanded to the Court of 
Federal Claims for further proceedings. 
On remand, the Court of Federal Claims entertained evidence seeking to establish the fair 
market value of the property subsequent to the permit denial. The Government presented two 
assessors, Mr. Slack and Mr. Cantwell, who had investigated contemporaneous land sales in the 
area.  Using the standard comparable sales valuation method, one assessor concluded that the 
property had a fair market value of $4,000 per acre, while the other found a value of $4,615 per 
acre. 
[The Court of Federal Claims] on the other hand, read Florida Rock II to require a detailed 
inquiry into the motivations and sophistication of buyers of the comparable properties upon which 
assessment was based.  It crafted a survey–viewed to be “admittedly novel,” Florida Rock III, 21 
Cl. Ct. at 173– and concluded that virtually all the buyers of the comparable properties were lacking 
in sufficient knowledge in order for their purchases to qualify as truly comparable sales. Florida 
Rock’s assessor, Mr. Failla, used the results of this survey to justify discarding evidence that the 
average retail price of parcels in the vicinity of Florida Rock’s land was $6,100 per acre, and 
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concluded that the actual fair market value of the tract following the permit denial was negligible.  
Implicit in this result is the assumption that no one with full knowledge of the regulatory regime 
would be willing to gamble that concern for the ecological importance of the wetlands would give 
way in the future to the economics of development pressure from nearby Miami.  The Court of 
Federal Claims decided accordingly.  
DISCUSSION 
A 
How to determine whether a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment has occurred is a 
subject of on-going debate.
1
  The Supreme Court has provided various articulations, influenced, as 
could be expected, by the particular circumstances of the cases before it. One formula that has 
emerged and has been repeated in several cases requires that the court balance several pragmatic 
considerations in making its regulatory takings determination. These considerations include:  the 
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation interferes with 
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the Government action.  (The leading case is 
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, at 124, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 
(1978) (Penn Central)). In this appeal, it is the economic impact of the regulation that is at issue.  
The recent Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 120 L. Ed. 
2d 798, 505 U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (Lucas), teaches that the economic impact factor 
alone may be determinative; in some circumstances, no balancing of factors is required. If a 
regulation categorically prohibits all economically beneficial use of land- destroying its economic 
value for private ownership -the regulation has an effect equivalent to a permanent physical 
occupation.  There is, without more, a compensable taking. 
                                                 
1 
The literature is extensive; readers conversant with the field will be familiar with much of it. Among symposia and 
significant individual contributions in the last year are: Richard Ausness, Wild Dunes and Serbonian Bogs: The Impact 
of the Lucas Decision on Shoreline Protection Programs, 70 Denv. U. L. Rev. 437 (1993); Catholic University Law 
Review: United States Court of Federal Claims Symposium, Cath. U. L. Rev. 717 (contributions by James E. 
Brookshire, Dennis J. Coyle, John A. Humbach, Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., George W. Miller & Jonathan Abram, and Loren 
A. Smith) (1993); David Mandelker, Of Nice and Missiles: A True Account of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 8 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 285 (1993). Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College: A 
Colloquium on Lucas, 23 Envtl. L. 869 (contributions by Michael C. Blumm, William Funk, James L. Huffman, Donald 
Large, Edward Sullivan, and Lawrence Watters) (1993); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 Yale L.J. 1077 (1993); Stanford 
Law Review: Symposium on Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1369 (contributions by Richard 
Epstein, William W. Fisher, Richard Lazarus, and Joseph L. Sax) (1993); Windfalls and Wipeouts: Environmental 
Regulation, Property, and the ‘Takings’ Clause after Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 17 Vt. L. Rev. 645 
(1993); Walker, Common Law Rules and Land Use Regulations: Lucas and Future Takings Jurisprudence, 3 Seton Hall 
Const. L.J. 3 (1993). 
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If, however, a regulation prohibits less than all economically beneficial use of the land and 
causes at most a partial destruction of its value, the case does not come within the Supreme Court’s 
‘categorical’ taking rule. As we explain below, we reject the trial court’s analysis that led to its 
conclusion that all economically beneficial use of the land was taken by the Government. We 
remand for determination of what economic use as measured by market value, if any, remained after 
the permit denial, and for consideration of whether, in light of the properly assessed value of the 
land, Florida Rock has a valid takings claim.  
B 
In Florida Rock II this court stated that, with regard to the property at issue, although “there 
may be a question what knowledgeable buyers would have paid, but that they would have paid 
some substantial figure seems certain.”  Id., 791 F.2d 893 at 903. The trial court on remand was 
instructed: “if there is found to exist a solid and adequate fair market value (for the 98 acres) which 
Florida Rock could have obtained from others for that property, that would be a sufficient 
remaining use of the property to forestall a determination that a taking had occurred or that any just 
compensation had to be paid by the government.”  Id.  We did not discuss what residual fair market 
value would be “adequate” to forestall a taking determination.  In short, we understand Florida 
Rock II to hold that purchases which are made by market speculators as well as home builders and 
other developers are comparable sales, with the caveat that particular sales might be discarded by 
the assessor if those sales appear questionable in light of the market as a whole. 
The Court of Federal Claims on remand in Florida Rock III, read Florida Rock II differently.  
Our passing reference to buyers being “correctly informed” was read to require a detailed inquiry 
into the motivation and sophistication of the buyers whose purchases comprised the comparable 
sales used in the fair market value assessment.  The Court of Federal Claims rejected the testimony 
because [the government’s assessor]  assumed sufficient knowledge on the part of the purchasers.  
Florida Rock II, 21 Cl. Ct. at 172. Instead, the court accepted the testimony of Florida Rock’s 
assessor, who rejected all of the comparable sales values on the principle that none of the purchasers 
were sufficiently sophisticated and knowledgeable. That was error–contrary to our instruction in 
Florida Rock II, contrary to generally accepted understandings of market valuation, and finally, 
contrary to the working assumptions of a free market. 
There is no disagreement as to the facts regarding the existence and nature of the market. 
Florida Rock’s study identified in the immediate vicinity of the 98 acre tract 240 land sales during 
the period 1971 through 1987.  A significant number of those sales occurred in the early 1980s, 
despite the intervening change in the regulatory environment.  The average sales price per acre in 
1980 was $6,100.  The price per acre varied predominantly as a function of the overall lot size; 
smaller lots commanded higher per acre prices.  Florida Rock’s survey indicated that roughly 80% 
of the buyers had purchased the land for ‘investment’ purposes and that, overall, the purchasers 
intended to hold the land for an average of 9 to 10 years. 
Thus, there was an active though speculative investment market for Florida Rock’s land at 
the time of and following the permit denial.  Accord, Bystrom, 485 So. 2d at 447-48.  The fair 
market price which Florida Rock could have commanded at that time remains, still, to be 
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determined, but it was certainly much higher than the nominal $500 per acre value accepted by the 
Court of Federal Claims.  
A speculative market may exist in land that is regulated as well as in land that is not, and the 
precise content of regulations at any given time may not be particularly important to those active in 
the market.  As this court observed in Florida Rock II, 791 F.2d 893 at 902-03, yesterday’s 
Everglades swamp to be drained as a mosquito haven is today’s wetland to be preserved for wildlife 
and aquifer recharge;  who knows what tomorrow’s view of public policy will bring, or how the 
market will respond to it. 
We need not decide such speculative questions here.  The uncontroverted evidence of an 
active real estate market compels the conclusion that the typical ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ 
requirement of fair market value had been met; it would be inappropriate for a court to substitute its 
own judgment of value for that of the market. While an assessor might be justified in adjusting the 
fair market value figure by discarding aberrational values based upon sales between related entities 
or fraudulent sales to widows and orphans, an assessor may not discard an entire market as 
aberrational.  ‘Aberrational’ means outside the norm established by general activity. The fact that 
many players in the market chose to disregard the immediate potential for development in favor of a 
long-term perspective– hardly unusual behavior in Florida’s history of real estate investment–does 
not make the market as a whole ‘aberrational.’  When the market provides a well-substantiated 
value for a property, a court may not substitute its own judgment as to what is a wise investment. 
It was error to read Florida Rock II as requiring a detailed inquiry into the motivation and 
sophistication of the buyers of comparable parcels.  Dollars are fungible; a speculative market 
provides a landowner with monetary compensation which is just as satisfactory as that provided by 
any other market.  Should a landowner wish to pick and choose her buyers, that luxury is not 
chargeable to the federal fisc.  To conclude otherwise would be tantamount to concluding that there 
could never be a market fueled by speculation- a conclusion at odds both with common sense and 
with our directions in Florida Rock II.  
C 
Ultimately, the question that must be answered is whether, as a result of the denial of certain 
economic uses, there was a taking of Florida Rock’s property by the Government. This question 
turns on “the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 
measured by the change, if any, in the fair market value caused by the regulatory imposition.  On 
the state of the record before us we are unable to answer the question.  The Court of Federal Claims 
answered it with a straightforward ‘yes’ when the per acre value of the 98 acre parcel after the 
permit denial was found to be only a nominal $500 per acre, as compared to the $10,500 found by 
the trial court to be the per acre value prior to the permit denial.  This represented a loss in value of 
roughly 95%.  Florida Rock III, 21 Cl. Ct. at 175. The court in effect treated the permit denial as 
essentially a ‘categorical’ taking of all economic use.  See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.  “The second 
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situation in which we have found categorical treatment appropriate is where regulation denies all 
economically beneficial or productive use of land.”  id. 
The Court of Federal Claims’ analysis was correct in theory, but started from an incorrect 
premise-- that the value of the parcel after denial of the permit was a nominal $500 per acre. When 
a figure closer to $4,000 per acre is substituted, the correct outcome is no longer clear. On remand, 
with a fair market value calculated in accordance with this opinion, the Court of Federal Claims 
must again return to the approach dictated by Florida Rock II:  
The court should consider, along with other relevant matters, the relationship of the 
owner’s basis or investment, and the fair market value before the alleged taking to 
the fair market value after the alleged taking. In determining the severity of the 
economic impact, the owner’s opportunity to recoup its investment or better, subject 
to the regulation, cannot be ignored.  Id. 791 F.2d at 905. 
The Court of Federal Claims must reconsider the assessments proffered by the parties and 
other evidence in the record, and determine a fair market value accordingly.  Should that 
determination establish, as the evidence in the record suggests, that there was some (but not a total) 
reduction in the overall market value of plaintiff’s property as a result of the regulatory imposition, 
the question will then be posed:  does that reduction constitute a taking of property compensable 
under the Fifth Amendment? 
In Lucas, the Supreme Court touched upon the question of a partial regulatory taking, see 
120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893-95, but, concluding on the facts before it that the case was 
one in which the owner was called upon “to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name 
of the common good,” Id. at 2895, the Court found a categorical taking and thus did not have to 
decide the partial taking question.  Id. at 2896 n. 9. 
The felt need for some kind of a special rule in regulatory takings cases may stem from the 
difficult line that has to be drawn between a partial regulatory taking and the mere ‘diminution in 
value’ that often accompanies otherwise valid regulatory impositions. As expressed by Justice 
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal, 
“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could 
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long 
recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to 
the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the 
contract and due process clauses are gone.”  Id. 260 U.S. at 413.  
Gone as well, it is almost superfluous to add, would be the constraints imposed on the 
Government by the takings clause. 
The trial court will find itself with little direct case law guidance. As Pennsylvania Coal and 
subsequent appellate court decisions have recognized, the question of when a regulatory taking 
occurs cannot be answered as a matter of absolute doctrine, but instead requires case by case 
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adjudication: “the question depends upon the particular facts.”  Id. 260 U.S. 393 at 413. But 
recourse to the facts hardly solves the basic problem at hand–there simply is no bright line dividing 
compensable from non-compensable exercises of the Government’s power when a regulatory 
imposition causes a partial loss to the property owner.  What is necessary is a classic exercise of 
judicial balancing of competing values. 
When there is reciprocity of advantage, paradigmatically in a zoning case, see, e.g., Euclid 
v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 71 L. Ed. 303, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926), then the claim that the 
Government has taken private property has little force: the claimant has in a sense been 
compensated by the public program “adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote 
the common good.”  Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646. Thus 
shared economic impacts resulting from certain types of land use controls have been held to be non-
compensable.  Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63, 65 L. Ed. 2d 106, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980) 
(shared ‘benefits and burdens’ of a zoning ordinance); Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 at 131, 57 L. Ed. 
2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (same). 
That the purpose and function of the regulatory imposition is relevant to drawing the line 
between mere diminution and partial taking should not be read to suggest that when Government 
acts in pursuit of an important public purpose, its actions are excused from liability
2
.  To so hold 
would eviscerate the plain language of the Takings Clause, and would be inconsistent with Supreme 
Court guidance.  It is necessary that the Government act in a good cause, but it is not sufficient.  
The takings clause already assumes the Government is acting in the public interest: “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use without just compensation” (emphasis added). 
It is for the trial court as an initial matter to determine whether the Government acted within 
its proper role in the circumstances presented by the case of Florida Rock.  Marketplace decisions 
should be made under the working assumption that the Government will neither prejudice private 
citizens, unfairly shifting the burden of a public good onto a few people, nor act arbitrarily or 
capriciously, that is, will not act to disappoint reasonable investment-backed expectations.  The 
Government, in a word, must act fairly and reasonably, so that private parties can pursue their 
interests.  At the same time, when Government acts as the intermediary between private interests to 
provide a mutually beneficial environment from which all benefit and in which all can thrive, the 
                                                 
2 
Identification of a specific property interest to be transferred to the Government should pose little problem for property 
lawyers. Property interests are about as diverse as the human mind can conceive. Property interests may be real and 
personal, tangible and intangible, possessory and non-possessory. They can be defined in terms of sequential rights to 
possession (present interests –life estates and various types of fees-- and future interests), and in terms of shared 
interests (such as the various kinds of co-ownership). There are specially structured property interests (such as those of a 
mortgagee, lessee, bailee, adverse possessor), and there are interests in special kinds of things (such as water, and 
commercial contracts). And property interests play across the entire range of legal ideas: see, e.g., Tompkins v. Superior 
Court of San Francisco, 59 Cal. 2d 65, 378 P.2d 113, 27 Cal. Rptr. 889 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1963) (did joint occupancy of an 
apartment give one occupant the kind of possessory property interest that carried with it the power to grant to police 
legal entry to search without a warrant for the other occupant’s marijuana stash).  
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shared diminution of free choice that results may not rise to the level of constitutionally required 
compensation. 
In addition, then, to a demonstration of loss of economic use to the property owner as a 
result of the regulatory imposition- a fact yet to be properly determined in this case -the trial court 
must consider: are there direct compensating benefits accruing to the property, and others similarly 
situated, flowing from the regulatory environment?  Or are benefits, if any, general and widely 
shared through the community and the society, while the costs are focused on a few? Are alternative 
permitted activities economically realistic in light of the setting and circumstances, and are they 
realistically available?  In short, has the Government acted in a responsible way, limiting the 
constraints on property ownership to those necessary to achieve the public purpose, and not 
allocating to some number of individuals, less than all, a burden that should be borne by all? 
Admittedly this is not a bright line, simply drawn. Property owners and regulators, 
attempting to predict whether a governmental regulation has gone too far, will still need to use 
judgment and exercise care in making decisions. In this sense our decision today continues the 
tradition of ad hoc judicial decision-making in this area. Over time, however, enough cases will be 
decided with sufficient care and clarity that the line will more clearly emerge.  
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Court of Federal Claims is vacated and the matter is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
Vacated and Remanded. 
Nies, Chief Judge, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s remand for a determination of whether the United 
States must pay compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the extent that the 98 acres in issue 
lost a substantial part, but not essentially all, of its economic use or value. The majority’s theory is 
contrary to Fifth Amendment “takings” jurisprudence as delineated by the Supreme Court and this 
court. Labelling its lost use/value theory a “partial taking” (ipse dixit) does not give it any 
legitimacy. 
Inverse condemnation of land, like the affirmative exercise of the power of eminent domain, 
requires the transfer of the property found to be taken to the United States.  Value is not a 
transferable interest. Thus, a claim for loss of value does not constitute a takings claim within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 
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LOVELADIES HARBOR, INC. v. UNITED STATES 
28 F.3d 1171 (Fed.Cir.1994) 
Before Plager, Clevenger, and Rader, Circuit Judges.  
PLAGER, Circuit Judge. 
This is a regulatory, taking case.  It arose when the plaintiffs (Loveladies) sought a fill 
permit under §404 of the Clean Water Act from the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to 
complete the final stage of an ongoing real estate development project.  The Corps denied the 
permit on May 5, 1982. Loveladies challenged the validity of that permit denial in a proceeding 
in Federal District Court under §554 of the Administrative Procedure Act.  Loveladies Harbor, 
Inc. and Loveladies Harbor, Unit D, Inc. v. Baldwin, Civ. No. 82-1948 (filed June 15, 1982). The 
challenge proved unsuccessful. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. and Loveladies Harbor, Unit D, Inc. v. 
Baldwin, Civ. No. 82-1948 (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 1984), aff'd 751 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1984) (table). 
Loveladies then proceeded with a suit in the Court of Federal Claims, which they had 
filed sometime earlier, Loveladies Harbor, Inc. and Loveladies Harbor, Unit D, Inc. v. United 
States, No. 243-83 L (filed Apr. 14, 1983), seeking monetary compensation from the United 
States (Government).  That court denied cross motions for summary judgment, Loveladies 
Harbor, Inc. and Loveladies Harbor, Unit D, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988) 
(Loveladies 1), and after trial on the merits awarded Loveladies $2,658,000 plus interest in 
compensation.  Loveladies Harbor, Inc. and Loveladies Harbor, Unit D, Inc. v. United States, 21 
Cl. Ct. 153 (1990) (Loveladies 2).  The Government here appeals this award. 
Subsequent to the time this case was briefed and argued on appeal, [a] significant legal 
developments occurred which directly bear on the issues of the case. [It] was the decision by the 
United States Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 
505 U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). We turn then to the effect of the Supreme Court's decision 
in Lucas on the outcome of the case. 
BACKGROUND 
The property at issue in this dispute is a 12.5 acre parcel (the parcel) consisting of 11.5 
acres of wetlands and one acre of filled land, located on Long Beach Island, Ocean County, New 
Jersey.  Barnegat Bay bounds the wetlands on the west, while single-family homes bound it on 
the east and southeast.  The 12.5 acres is part of a 51 acre parcel owned by Loveladies, which in 
turn is part of an original 250 acre tract which Loveladies had acquired in 1958.  The balance of 
the 250 acres–199 acres–had been developed before 1972 and the enactment of §404 of the 
Clean Water Act. 
In order to develop the remaining 51 acre parcel for residential use, Loveladies needed to 
fill 50 acres, the one acre having been previously filled, and that in turn required Loveladies to 
obtain permission from both the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) 
and the Corps. That process proved to be lengthy and contentious, marked by several years of 
negotiation (with Loveladies submitting progressively less ambitious and less environmentally 
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objectionable proposals), a 1977 permit denial, appeal of that denial to the Commissioner of 
NJDEP, and judicial review in state court.  
During the course of the proceedings, NJDEP offered, as a compromise, permission for 
Loveladies to develop 12.5 of the 51 acres.  Loveladies initially declined that offer. Eventually 
Loveladies acquiesced to the 12.5 acre limitation, the dispute was resolved, and the permit, on 
September 9, 1981, issued.
1
  See In re Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 176 N.J. Super. 69, 422 A.2d 107 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980), cert. denied 85 N.J. 501, 427 A.2d 588 (N.J. 1981).  The permit 
granted permission to fill and develop 11.5 acres in addition to the one acre which had been 
filled previously–this is the 12.5 acre parcel at issue–and to construct 35 single family homes 
thereon.   
Loveladies then sought the requisite federal permit for the development project. As 
required, the Corps sought the views of the counterpart state agency, the NJDEP.  NJDEP in its 
response acknowledged that they had issued Loveladies the permit as they were obligated to do 
under the terms of the settlement, but denied that the permit approval was in compliance with the 
state's requirements. The response went on to explain that the 12.5 acre development would be 
"anachronistic," a "throwback to the 1950's-1960's style of shore development," and closed by 
noting, "[a] denial of the federal permit appears appropriate under this Division's understanding 
of the pertinent federal law." 
The Corps rejected Loveladies' §404 permit application on May 5, 1982.  Loveladies 
again resorted to the courts. As previously noted, the §404 permit denial was challenged in 
Federal District Court under §554 of the APA, and that challenge was unsuccessful.  Loveladies 
Harbor, Inc. and Loveladies Harbor, Unit D, Inc., v. Baldwin, supra. Between the time the 
District court made its decision and the appeal was decided, Loveladies filed a claim in the Court 
of Federal Claims for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. That case proceeded to 
trial following issuance of the Third Circuit's affirmance of the district court's rejection of 
Loveladies' APA claims. 
Following a full hearing, factual issues were resolved in favor of Loveladies.  Loveladies 
2, 21 Cl. Ct. at 153. The court found that the fair market value of the parcel prior to the permit 
denial was $2,658,000 whereas the value after the permit denial was $12,500.  This greater than 
99% diminution of value, "coupled with the court's earlier determination of a lack of a 
countervailing substantial legitimate state interest," led the court to conclude that there had been 
a taking.  Loveladies 2, 21 Cl. Ct. at 160 (referring to Loveladies 1, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388-90). The 
Government appeals the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The permit was issued subject to several conditions, including a requirement that Loveladies submit a "deed 
restriction or conservation easement which insures that the site's remaining wetlands, lagoons, creeks, and bay 
bottom will not be filled or used for non-water dependent uses." 
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DISCUSSION 
At the outset we wish to make clear exactly what is at issue, and what is not.  What is not 
at issue is whether the Government can lawfully prevent a property owner from filling or 
otherwise injuring or destroying vital wetlands. The importance of preserving the environment, 
the authority of state and federal governments to protect and preserve ecologically significant 
areas, whether privately or publicly held, through appropriate regulatory mechanisms is not here 
being questioned.  There can be no doubt today that every effort must be made individually and 
collectively to protect our natural heritage, and to pass it to future generations unspoiled. The 
destruction of ancient civilizations by human misuse of the environment, such as that at Ephesus, 
teaches the need for public policies that work within the natural environment, rather than attempt 
radically to alter it. 
The question at issue here is, when the Government fulfills its obligation to preserve and 
protect the public interest, may the cost of obtaining that public benefit fall solely upon the 
affected property owner, or is it to be shared by the community at large.  In the final analysis the 
answer to that question is one of fundamental public policy.  It calls for balancing the legitimate 
claims of the society to constrain individual actions that threaten the larger community, on the 
one side, and, on the other, the rights of the individual and our commitment to private property as 
a bulwark for the protection of those rights.
2
  It requires us to decide which collective rights are 
to be obtained at collective cost, in order better to preserve collectively the rights of the 
individual.  The role of the court is to implement and enforce that public policy as it appears in 
governing law, in this case in the words of the Constitution and the controlling pronouncements 
of the Supreme Court. 
June 29, 1992 marked the decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 120 L. 
Ed. 2d 798, 505 U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).  The only real question was whether the state's 
policy for preservation of the ocean-front ecology trumped Lucas' property rights in such a 
manner that Lucas should bear the full cost of the application of that policy to his property. The 
trial court said no. If the state wished to pursue the policy in that manner, cost to property owners 
must be shared by all, not just the relatively few persons on whom the policy happened adversely 
to impact.  The trial court awarded Lucas 1.1 million dollars for the taking.  
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in a split decision, reversed.  That court held that 
the determination by the South Carolina legislature to preserve and protect the state's oceanfront 
ecology reflected a paramount public policy which, when balanced against the private property 
rights of the individual, required that the property rights yield.  Thus there was no governmental 
                                                 
2
 The only dependable foundation of personal liberty is the personal economic security of private property . . . There 
is no surer way to give men the courage to be free than to insure them a competence upon which they can rely. Men 
cannot be made free by laws unless they are in fact free because no man can buy and no man can coerce them. That 
is why the Englishman's belief that his home is his castle and that the king cannot enter it . . . [is] the very essence of 
the free man's way of life. Walter Lippmann, The Method of Freedom 100-102 (1934). 
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taking under the Fifth Amendment, and no compensation was owed.  Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 304 S.C. 376, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991).  
When the Supreme Court accepted Lucas' appeal, the case was understood to confront the 
Court with a much-heralded opportunity to clarify how courts were to balance public interest 
claims against liberty claims of private property owners, and to do it in a case in which the issue 
was sharply focused on fundamental ecological and environmental values.  Instead, the Court 
recast the issue.  The question, said the Court, was not one of balance between competing public 
and private claims.  Rather the question is simply one of basic property ownership rights: within 
the bundle of rights which property lawyers understand to constitute property, is the right or 
interest at issue, as a matter of law, owned by the property owner or reserved to the state?  
The Court explained that the basis for the state's reservation lies in the principles of 
common law nuisance.  Property rights as a matter of law since Blackstone's day have been 
understood to be subject to the power of the state to abate nuisances.  If the imposed restraint 
would have been justified under the state's traditional nuisance law, then the property owner's 
bundle of rights did not include the right claimed, and no taking could occur.  The Court 
remanded the case to the South Carolina Supreme Court to determine, under that state's nuisance 
laws, whether the interest at issue was the state's or the property owner's.
3
 
In sum, then, to restate the law of regulatory taking as currently applicable to the case 
before us: 
a) A property owner who can establish that a regulatory taking of property has 
occurred is entitled to a monetary recovery for the value of the interest taken, 
measured by what is just compensation. 
b) With regard to the interest alleged to be taken, there has been a regulatory 
taking if 
(1) there was a denial of economically viable use of the property as a result of the 
regulatory imposition; 
(2) the property owner had distinct investment-backed expectations; and  (3) it 
was an interest vested in the owner, as a matter of state property law, and not 
within the power of the state to regulate under common law nuisance doctrine. 
 
                                                 
3
In a summary opinion, published November 20, 1992, in response to the Supreme Court's remand, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court concluded "we have reviewed the record and heard arguments from the parties regarding 
whether [the state] possesses the ability under the common law to prohibit Lucas from constructing a habitable 
structure on his land. [The state] has not persuaded us that any common law basis exists by which it could restrain 
Lucas' desired use of his land; nor has our research uncovered any such common law principle." Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992). 
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The effect, then, of Lucas was to dramatically change the third criterion, from one in 
which courts, including federal courts, were called upon to make ad hoc balancing decisions, 
balancing private property rights against state regulatory policy, to one in which state property 
law, incorporating common law nuisance doctrine, controls.  This sea change removed from 
regulatory takings the vagaries of the balancing process, so dependent on judicial perceptions 
with little effective guidance in law.  It substituted instead a referent familiar to property lawyers 
everywhere, and one which will have substantial (though varying from state to state) likelihood 
of predictability for both property owners and regulators. 
With regard to the second criterion–investment-backed expectations– it is not disputed 
that Loveladies purchased the land involved with the reasonable expectation and intention of 
developing it over time for sale to purchasers of the improved lots; that the regulation constitutes 
an interference with their investment-backed expectations cannot be denied.  There is, however, 
less agreement between the parties with regard to the first and third criteria.  We will address 
each in turn. 
A. Denial of Economically Viable Use and the Denominator Problem  
On the facts of the case before us, the question of whether there has been a partial or total 
loss of economic use (in the latter case a ‘categorical' taking, see Lucas), depends on what is the 
specific property that was affected by the permit denial.  
* * * 
The relevant property for the takings analysis is the 12.5 acres, for which the trial court 
found the remaining value to be de minimis. This is not, then, a case of a partial taking, involving 
linedrawing between non-compensable ‘mere diminution' and compensable partial taking.  See 
Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (1994).  Rather, this is a case in 
which the owner of the relevant parcel was deprived of all economically feasible use. The trial 
court's conclusion that the permit denial was effectively a total taking of the property owner's 
interest in these acres is fully supported in the record; there is no clear error in that conclusion. 
B. The Nuisance Question 
What remains, then, in light of Lucas is consideration of the third criterion--the question 
of whether, under controlling law, the regulatory imposition goes beyond the Government's 
powers under common law nuisance doctrine, and thus constitutes a taking.  On the facts of this 
case, we need not examine this question exhaustively, and can leave to another day and to other 
cases the working out of the full scope of this new requirement. 
The question of whether filling of the 11.5 acres of unfilled wetlands would constitute a 
nuisance arose at trial. The Government argued that allowing the fill would constitute a nuisance.  
The Lucas test is a matter of ascertaining the continuing boundary between private ownership 
and government reach, and inheres in the title of every piece of property without necessarily 
being defined with regard to a particular use or activity of the owner.   
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At trial, in view of the Government's having raised the issue, the scope of nuisance law 
was explored at some length, and the record contains the parties' developed views on whether the 
common law of nuisance would justify the denial of the permit to develop the 12.5 acre tract.  
The trial court concluded that the Government had failed to carry its burden of showing that that 
law could have been invoked to prevent the fill.  Our review of the record leads us to the same 
conclusion. 
It is important to note that Loveladies purchased the property with the intent to develop it 
long before these particular state and federal regulatory programs came into effect. Furthermore, 
the state did not include in its original conditions for development of the property any restrictions 
on the filling of the 12.5 acres at issue here.  The fill restrictions did not arise until long after the 
development project was undertaken. 
In other words, nothing in the state's conduct reflected a considered determination that 
certain defined activities would violate the state's understanding of its nuisance powers. Cf. 
Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387-88 ("the law of nuisances . . . may be consulted, not for the purpose of 
controlling, but for the helpful aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the scope of, the 
[police] power.")  Nor did Loveladies have the opportunity to decide, at the beginning, whether 
its investment backed expectations could be realized under the regulatory environment the state 
later attempted to impose.  
CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons, we find that, on the particular facts of this case, no error was 
committed by the trial judge in determining that a taking occurred when the Federal Government 
denied the §404 permit. The judgment of the trial court is 
AFFIRMED. 
PALM BEACH ISLES ASSOCIATES v. UNITED STATES 
208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
PLAGER, Circuit Judge. 
This is an inverse condemnation–regulatory taking–case, on appeal from the United 
States Court of Federal Claims. Palm Beach Isles Associates, (PBIA) claim that the United States 
(the “Government”) effected a regulatory taking of their property in Florida when the Army 
Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) refused to grant a permit to dredge and fill the property. The 
Court of Federal Claims granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment of no liability. 
See Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 340 (1998). 
PBIA appeals the ruling of the Court of Federal Claims. Because a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the applicability of the federal navigational servitude is in dispute, an 
issue on which the outcome of the case hinges, summary judgment was improvidently granted. 
The judgment of the Court of Federal Claims is vacated, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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BACKGROUND 
In 1956, a group of investors bought 311.7 acres of land in Florida for $380,190. With 
various transfers through the years, primarily by devise and inheritance, this group eventually 
became PBIA. The property is located north of Palm Beach on a long spit of land which sits 
between the Atlantic Ocean on the east and Lake Worth on the west. A road traverses the spit 
from north to south, and splits the property into two parcels. Of the 311.7 acres, 261 acres are 
east of the road, and constitute upland oceanfront property. This parcel was sold in 1968 to a 
developer for some $1 million; it is not as such involved in this law suit. 
The remaining 50.7 acres are located west of the road. This 50.7 acre parcel consists of 
1.4 acres of shoreline wetlands adjacent to the road, and 49.3 acres of submerged land adjacent 
to the wetlands. The submerged acreage lies below the mean high water mark, in the bed of Lake 
Worth. It is this 50.7 acre parcel that is the subject of this action. 
Lake Worth is a long, narrow, shallow body of water having a north-south orientation. At 
one time the lake was a landlocked freshwater lake, but years ago a cut, Lake Worth Inlet, was 
made across the spit that separates the lake from the ocean, and as a result the lake is now a tidal 
water with direct access to the ocean. Lake Worth serves as a segment of the Atlantic 
Intracoastal Waterway (“ICW”). A channel has been dredged along the western shore of the lake 
to provide a readily-navigable passage for vessels. As a part of the ICW, Lake Worth is 
considered a navigable water of the United States, and thus the submerged portion of PBIA’s 
property lies in the bed of a navigable water of the United States. 
Shortly after purchasing the property, in 1957, PBIA applied for and received from the 
Corps the necessary permits to dredge and fill the 50.7 acres. The permits were renewed in 1960. 
However, PBIA never performed the work and the permits expired in 1963.   
Some twenty-five years later, in 1988, PBIA applied to the State of Florida Department 
of Environmental Regulation (“DER”) for a permit, as now required by state law, to dredge and 
fill the submerged lake bottom it owned, along with the adjoining wetlands. After the DER in 
1990 denied the permit on environmental grounds, PBIA sued the DER and the Trustees of the 
Internal Improvement Fund of the State of Florida, the state agency from whom PBIA derived its 
title to the property.
1
 Eventually a settlement of the suit was reached. The State acknowledged 
that, pursuant to the deed from the Trustees, PBIA had the legal right to erect a bulkhead around 
the submerged land and fill the 50.7 acres. The settlement stipulated that the State would not 
interfere with PBIA’s efforts to obtain permits from the Corps. 
                                                 
1 
Title to the beds of navigable waters of the United States is either in the state in which the waters are located, as a 
matter of state sovereignty, or in the owners of the land bordering the waters. Whether in the one or the other is a 
question of state law. See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 60, 57 L. Ed. 1063, 33 
S. Ct. 667 (1913). In Florida, title to the beds of navigable waterbodies is held by the state in public trust; the 
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund administer the trust, and in general have power to convey submerged 
lands to private owners if the sale is not contrary to the public interest. In the early years of Florida’s development, 
much of the State’s sovereignty land was so conveyed. See F.E. Maloney, S.J. Plager, & F.N. Baldwin, Water Law 
and Administration: The Florida Experience §§120-128 (1968) (ch. 12: Title to Beds Under Navigable Waters). 
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PBIA again applied to the Corps for the dredge and fill permits required by the Rivers & 
Harbors Act. Meanwhile, however, in 1972, Congress had passed the Clean Water Act (codified 
at 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1376 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. §1344 (1994), also requires a permit from the Corps for dredging and filling navigable 
waters of the United States, and requires that environmental concerns be taken into account in 
deciding whether to grant such a permit. After consulting with the State of Florida, the Corps 
denied the permits. 
The Corps’ denial letter made clear that the denial was primarily predicated on 
environmental grounds and the requirements of the Clean Water Act, but the Memorandum 
accompanying the denial letter also stated:  
(11) Navigation: Shallow water depths that already exist in the proposed project 
area have limited boating activities to shallow draft vessels. Therefore, other than 
the elimination of [49.3] acres of navigable waters, the project should not have a 
significant adverse impact on navigation, in general.  
After the denial of the permits, PBIA filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, claiming 
that the denial of the permits prevents any economically viable use of the 50.7 acres and 
therefore constitutes a regulatory taking of the parcel. PBIA requested more than $10 million as 
compensation for the taking. 
The Court of Federal Claims found that the 49.3 acres, which lie below the mean high 
water mark, are part of the bed of Lake Worth and are subject to the federal navigational 
servitude, citing United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 19 L. Ed. 2d 329, 88 S. Ct. 265 (1967), 
and Owen v. United States, 851 F.2d 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc). Citing Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), the Court 
of Federal Claims ruled that the navigational servitude was a “pre-existing limitation upon the 
landowner’s title,” 505 U.S. at 1029, and therefore “the proscribed use interests were not part of 
[the owner’s] title to begin with,” id. at 1027. In this circumstance, concluded the court, there 
was no taking despite the total loss of value for the land. 
With regard to the 1.4 adjacent acres of wetlands, the Court of Federal Claims again 
found no taking on three grounds. First, it determined that the 1.4 acres should be viewed not as 
a separate parcel in itself, but rather as a part of the whole initial 311.7 acre parcel, for which 
PBIA had received adequate compensation when it sold the 261 acres for $1 million. Second, the 
Court of Federal Claims held that PBIA knew when it bought the property that it would need 
permits to develop the land (as evidenced by its 1957 and 1960 filings), and thus the existing 
statutory regime precluded any reasonable investment-backed expectation of being able to 
develop the property. Finally, the court found that the 1.4-acre section by itself is insufficient for 
building homes, and PBIA had not established that all other uses were foreclosed. The 
Government’s summary judgment motion was granted. 
DISCUSSION 
The analytical method for examining a regulatory taking claim is set forth in Loveladies 
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  Loveladies Harbor extensively 
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reviewed the law of regulatory takings as it stood prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), 
and then explained the impact of Lucas on that body of law. As a result of this analysis, 
Loveladies Harbor described the law of regulatory takings in the following manner:  
a) A property owner who can establish that a regulatory taking of property has 
occurred is entitled to a monetary recovery for the value of the interest taken, 
measured by what is just compensation. 
b) With regard to the interest alleged to be taken, there has been a regulatory 
taking if 
(1) there was a denial of economically viable use of the property as a result of the 
regulatory imposition; 
(2) the property owner had distinct investment-backed expectations; and 
(3) it was an interest vested in the owner, as a matter of state property law, and 
not within the power of the state to regulate under common law nuisance doctrine.  
28 F.3d at 1179. 
Subsequently, again citing Lucas, this court explained in Florida Rock Indus. v. United 
States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), that “if a regulation categorically prohibits all 
economically viable use of the land– destroying its economic value for private ownership–the 
regulation has an effect equivalent to a permanent physical occupation. There is, without more, a 
compensable taking.” Id. at 1564-65. Florida Rock went on to point out that even when the 
taking is considered ‘categorical,’ Lucas preserved for the Government a nuisance defense to 
such a taking claim. See id. at 1565 n.10. Thus, when the analysis of prong (1) reveals that the 
regulatory imposition has deprived the owner of all economically viable use of the property (a 
‘categorical taking’), then the only remaining issue is the Government’s defense under prong (3). 
I. Denial of Economically Viable Use and the Denominator Problem 
Because the analysis of a regulatory takings claim differs depending on whether there has 
been an alleged total deprivation of economically viable use or only a partial deprivation, we first 
address the question whether the Corps’ permit denials preclude all economically viable use of 
the property. If that is so, then, as we have noted, we are dealing with a categorical taking, and 
the Government’s available defense to the takings claim lies in showing that the property 
owner’s rights are subject, as a matter of basic property law, to the Government’s asserted 
regulatory imposition. Whether the asserted imposition causes a total wipeout or something less 
(see Florida Rock for a discussion of the implications of ‘something less’) depends in a case such 
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as this on what is the economically relevant parcel– the ‘denominator problem.’2 We must decide 
if the whole 311.7 acre parcel is the relevant denominator, as argued by the Government and 
found by the Court of Federal Claims, or whether the relevant parcel is the 50.7 acres for which 
the permit was denied, as argued by PBIA. This is a conclusion of law, based on the facts of the 
case. 
The Government argues that since the land was purchased together, it should all be 
treated as one parcel. PBIA should not be allowed to sever the part that is subject to regulation 
from the part that is not. The value of the part sold in 1968 should be considered as part of the 
denominator in assessing the proportionate value of the 50.7 acres. 
PBIA counters that the two parcels have never been part of a common development 
scheme; their only link was that they were purchased at the same time. PBIA points out that the 
two parts are separated by a road, they are different types of property, subject to different zoning, 
and PBIA applied for its original permits only for the lakeside property because PBIA never 
planned to develop the entire property as a unit. PBIA also notes that the oceanfront property 
was sold in 1968, before the now-existing regulatory fabric came into place. 
In the instant case, the Court of Federal Claims found the relevant parcel to be the 311.7 
acres. The court based its conclusion, inter alia, on the Government’s assertion that the 
regulatory structure under the Rivers and Harbors Act that led to the permit denials was in place 
before the 261 acres were sold in 1968, and therefore they should be included in the 
denominator. 
The timing of property acquisition and development, compared with the enactment and 
implementation of the governmental regimen that led to the regulatory imposition, is a factor, but 
only one factor, to be considered in determining the proper denominator for analysis. In a given 
case, other factors may be more compelling. 
In this case, PBIA never planned to develop the parcels as a single unit. Furthermore, 
PBIA bought the land in 1956 and sold the 261 acres in 1968, both events occurring before the 
environmental considerations contained in the Clean Water Act came into play, beginning in 
1972. It is inappropriate to consider those transactions to have occurred in the context of the 
substance of a regulatory structure that was not in place at the relevant times. 
The regulatory imposition that infected the development plans for the 50.7 acres was 
unrelated to PBIA’s plans for and disposition of the 261 acres of beachfront upland on the east 
side of the road. The development of that property was physically and temporally remote from, 
and legally unconnected to, the 50.7 acres of wetlands and submerged lake bed on the lake side 
of the spit. Combining the two tracts for purposes of the regulatory takings analysis involved 
                                                 
2
 The problem is referred to as the denominator problem because, in comparing the value that has been taken from 
the property by the imposition with the value that remains in the property, “one of the critical questions is 
determining how to define the unit of property whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.” Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497, 94 L. Ed. 2d 472, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987) (internal 
quotes and citation omitted). 
 705 
here, simply because at one time they were under common ownership, or because one of the 
tracts sold for a substantial price, cannot be justified. The trial court’s conclusion to the contrary 
was error. 
Once the proper parcel is defined as the 50.7 acres, it becomes clear that, without the 
dredge and fill permits, the entire 50.7 acres, including the 1.4 acres of wetlands, have no or 
minimal value. Thus, the facts are uncontrovertible that the permit denial has the effect of 
denying the property owner all economically viable use of the property, and, since the State has 
stipulated that the property owner under state law has the right to dredge and fill, the denial by 
the Corps of the permits constitutes a categorical taking of the 50.7 acres by the Federal 
Government. The Court of Federal Claims erred in holding otherwise. 
Since there is a categorical taking of the 50.7 acres, the issue of PBIA’s investment-
backed expectations under prong (2) of the Loveladies Harbor analysis is not applicable. We 
move to the Government’s asserted defense under prong (3). 
II. The Government’s Power to Regulate and the Navigational Servitude 
The key issue here is whether the navigational servitude defense is available to the 
Government in this case. 
A 
The question to be addressed first in this context is whether the submerged 49.3 acres are 
subject to the navigational servitude. The ‘navigational servitude’ derives from the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution, and gives the United States Government a ‘dominant servitude’–a 
power to regulate and control the waters of the United States in the interest of commerce. See 
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 122-23, 19 L. Ed. 2d 329, 88 S. Ct. 265 (1967).   
PBIA argues that the water depth over the 49.3 acres (1-3 feet) is insufficient to support 
commercial navigation, and thus does not implicate the navigational servitude. Under this view, 
the underlying land would not be subject to it. According to PBIA, the fact that Lake Worth as a 
whole is navigable is irrelevant; only the navigability of the 49.3 acre portion matters. The 
Government counters that navigation need not be ‘commercial’ to implicate the navigational 
servitude, and the mere ability of the water to support even small boats is sufficient to implicate 
it; since Lake Worth as a whole is navigable, the entire body up to the mean high water mark is 
subject to the navigational servitude, regardless of particular depths. 
A review of the relevant authorities and precedent indicates that the Government’s 
understanding of the concept of federal navigability is closer to correct than is PBIA’s,3 and that 
the property is subject to the navigational servitude. In Rands the Supreme Court noted that the 
navigational servitude “extends to the entire [navigable] stream and the stream bed below 
ordinary high-water mark.” 389 U.S. at 123. This court later cited  Rands and other Supreme 
                                                 
3
 See generally Maloney, Plager, & Baldwin, supra, §22: The Navigability Concept. 
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Court precedent and said that “land or property within the bed [of a navigable waterbody] are 
always subject to (or burdened with) the potential exercise of the navigational servitude,” and 
that “the Supreme Court has left no doubt that the high-water mark bounds the bed of the 
[navigable body].” Owen v. United States, 851 F.2d 1404, 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc). Thus, 
since the parcel at issue lies below the high water mark, is part of the bed of Lake Worth, and 
Lake Worth is a navigable water of the United States, the parcel is subject to the navigational 
servitude. The particular water depth over PBIA’s land is not controlling. 
 
B 
The next question is the application of the navigational servitude to a purported 
regulatory taking. This is an issue of first impression in this court. We therefore review the 
relevant precedent on the application of the navigational servitude and fit it into the analytical 
framework of controlling Supreme Court law regarding regulatory takings, as enunciated in that 
Court’s decision in Lucas. 
1 
The Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Lucas refined and clarified the structure for 
analyzing regulatory takings. As explained in Loveladies Harbor, the third prong of the takings 
analysis derived from the Supreme Court’s Lucas decision provides the Government with a 
defense to what would otherwise be a regulatory taking. The Supreme Court described the 
defense as follows:  
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically 
beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically 
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed 
interests were not part of his title to begin with. 
505 U.S. at 1027.  
The Court tied this exception to the common law of nuisance, saying that confiscatory 
regulations 
 . . . must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of 
the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. A 
law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate 
the result that could have been achieved in the courts–by adjacent landowners . . . 
under the State’s law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary 
power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally . . .  
Id. at 1029. 
The Court went on to explain further the rationale for this nuisance defense, as well as its 
application. The common law of nuisance makes unlawful certain conduct by property owners, 
 707 
and the State may convert these implicit background principles into explicit laws without thereby 
effecting a taking. See id. at 1030. When a regulation that forbids all economically beneficial 
uses of the land goes beyond these background principles, however, the Government must pay 
compensation. See id. Thus, in order to assert this defense, the Government must “identify 
background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses he now intends in the 
circumstances in which the property is presently found. Only on this showing can the State fairly 
claim that, in proscribing all beneficial uses, the [regulatory action] is taking nothing.” Id. at 
1031-32. 
The Court also mentioned the navigational servitude in this context, stating “we assuredly 
would permit the government to assert a permanent easement that was a pre-existing limitation 
upon the landowner’s title. . . .  Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163, 45 L. Ed. 126, 21 S. Ct. 
48 (1900) (interests of ‘riparian owner in the submerged lands . . . bordering on a public 
navigable water’ held subject to Government’s navigational servitude).” 505 U.S. at 1028-29. 
Thus, the Supreme Court seems to suggest that, though much of the discussion in Lucas focused 
on property rights as defined by state law, the United States Government could assert the federal 
navigational servitude as a defense against a regulatory takings claim. 
In light of our understanding of Lucas and the other cases we have considered, we hold 
that the navigational servitude may constitute part of the “background principles” to which a 
property owner’s rights are subject, and thus may provide the Government with a defense to a 
takings claim. As noted by the Supreme Court, the navigational servitude is “a pre-existing 
limitation on the landowner’s title.” Id.  In a case in which the navigational servitude applies, a 
denial of permits to dredge and fill may “do no more than duplicate the result that could have 
been obtained by the courts.” 505 U.S. at 1029. 
2 
The effect of the Government’s invocation of the navigational servitude as a defense to a 
regulatory taking, in a case in which it properly applies, is to give the Government a defense to 
the alleged taking. As the Supreme Court said in Rands:  
“The proper exercise of [the navigational servitude] power is not an invasion of 
any private property rights in the stream or the lands underlying it, for the damage 
sustained does not result from taking property from riparian owners within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment but from the lawful exercise of a power to 
which the interests of riparian owners have always been subject.” 389 U.S. at 123. 
With regard to what constitutes “proper exercise” of the navigational servitude, the 
Government takes the position here that the servitude is absolute, and that essentially there never 
can be a taking of property that is in a waterbody subject to the navigational servitude. The 
Government concedes that in the case before us its stated rationale for denying the permits was 
environmental, but it asserts that it also had a navigational purpose, and therefore even if the 
navigational servitude is not absolute there was no taking. PBIA counters that the navigational 
servitude only protects the Government when it regulates the use of private property if the 
purpose of the regulation is related to navigation. In the present case, PBIA argues, the permit 
denials were predicated on environmental grounds, not navigational grounds. 
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The precedents clearly establish that the Government’s purpose must be related to 
navigation if it wishes to avoid paying compensation for the regulation or control of private 
property. In a straightforward declaration on this point, the Supreme Court said:  
The right of the United States in the navigable waters within the several States is, 
however, “limited to the control thereof for purposes of navigation.” Port of Seattle v. Oregon [& 
Wash. R. Co.], 255 U.S. 56, 63, 65 L. Ed. 500, 41 S. Ct. 237 [(1921)]. And while Congress, in 
the exercise of this power, may adopt, in its judgment, any means having some positive relation 
to the control of navigation and not otherwise inconsistent with the Constitution, United States v. 
Chandler-Dunbar Co. [229 U.S. 53, 62, 33 S. Ct. 667, 57 L. Ed. 1063 (1913)], it may not 
arbitrarily destroy or impair the rights of riparian owners by legislation which has no real or 
substantial relation to the control of navigation or appropriateness to that end. 
United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 419, 70 L. Ed. 339, 46 S. 
Ct. 144 (1926); see also United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 737, 94 L. Ed. 
1231, 70 S. Ct. 955 (1950) (rejecting the Government’s claim of immunity for the Central Valley 
Project under the navigational servitude rubric, finding that the project’s purpose was 
reclamation, not navigation: “Claimants . . . observe that this court has never permitted the 
Government to pervert its navigational servitude into a right to destroy riparian interests without 
reimbursement where no navigation purpose existed.”); cf.  United States v. Twin City Power 
Co., 350 U.S. 222, 100 L. Ed. 240, 76 S. Ct. 259 (1956) (project whose purposes included power 
generation along with flood control and improving low-water flows for navigation held to be 
subject to the navigational servitude:  “If the interests of navigation are served, it is 
constitutionally irrelevant that other purposes may also be advanced.”); Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979) (Government could not require 
public access to privately owned waterbody without paying just compensation, even if water-
body otherwise within definition of “navigable waters of the United States”). 
In Owen, this court noted the issue, commenting that “no compensation is owed when the 
government takes such land or property [i.e., land or property subject to the navigational 
servitude] as the result of aiding the navigability of the stream.” 851 F.2d at 1409 (emphasis 
added). 
Thus it is clear that in order to assert a defense under the navigational servitude, the 
Government must show that the regulatory imposition was for a purpose related to navigation; 
absent such a showing, it will have failed to “identify background principles . . . that prohibit the 
uses [the landowner] now intends.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031. 
In the present case, we are unable to determine whether the Government has made a 
sufficient showing of a navigational purpose behind the permit denial. The denial letter itself 
refers only to the “elimination of 50.7 acres of important Lake Worth shallow water habitat”; it 
makes no mention of navigation. The Memorandum accompanying the denial letter does discuss 
navigation, but its findings are contradictory. The Memorandum states that the project area 
currently allows “limited boating activities to shallow draft vessels” and granting the permit 
would result in “the elimination of [49.3] acres of navigable waters,” language which appears to 
support a finding of a navigational purpose. However, the Memorandum goes on to conclude that 
“the project should not have a significant adverse impact on navigation, in general.” 
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Because there is a disputed issue of material fact, we vacate the judgment of the trial 
court, and remand the case for further development of this issue. On remand, the Court of 
Federal Claims should determine whether the Government had bona fide navigational grounds 
for its permit denial. If so, the Government will have sustained its defense under Lucas, and there 
will be no taking. If, on the other hand, the Government cannot demonstrate that it denied the 
permit on navigational grounds, then its defense under the navigational servitude fails. 
We have focused this discussion on the 49.3 acres of submerged land, though addressing 
in general the entire 50.7 acres. The trial court concluded that, without development of the 49.3 
acres of submerged land, the 1.4 acres of adjoining wetlands would be of little, if any, value. 
Upon full examination of the record, we see no error in that conclusion. If there is a taking by the 
Government of the 49.3 acres, then there also must be a taking of the adjoining wetlands as well, 
and PBIA will be entitled to compensation therefor; if there is no taking because of the 
navigational servitude, the developmental value of the adjacent wetlands strip standing alone 
would be at most nominal–the attorney for PBIA admitted as much in oral argument–and in any 
event PBIA has failed to establish that no other uses are available to it. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Court of Federal Claims is VACATED AND REMANDED. 
PALM BEACH ISLES ASSOCIATES v. UNITED STATES 
231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
Before PLAGER, LOURIE, and CLEVENGER, Circuit Judges.   
PLAGER, Circuit Judge. 
1 
In the original opinion in this regulatory takings case, the court (1) held that there was a 
categorical taking of the 50.7 acres at issue; (2) stated its understanding of the law that when 
there is a categorical taking, i.e., a deprivation of all economically viable use of the subject 
property, the question of investment-backed expectations drops out of the analysis; and (3) 
concluded that, under the proper analysis of nuisance-type legal defenses remaining to the 
Government, the federal navigation servitude qualified as such a defense, assuming that 
protection of navigation was the purpose for the Government's regulatory imposition. See Palm 
Beach Isles  Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000). We remanded the case to 
the trial court for fact-finding with regard to the Government's purpose for imposing the 
regulatory constraint. 
The Government has filed a petition for rehearing .The main issue presented ... is whether 
the court failed to follow its own controlling precedent when it stated that, if a taking is 
'categorical,' that determination removes from the analytical equation the question of investment-
backed expectations. In its original opinion, the panel, assuming that the law on this point was 
already well established, and quoting from the court's earlier opinion in Florida Rock Industries 
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v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), stated in summary fashion "that 'if a regulation 
categorically prohibits all economically viable use of the land – destroying its economic value 
for private ownership – the regulation has an effect equivalent to a permanent physical 
occupation. There is, without more, a compensable taking.'" Palm Beach Isles, 208 F.3d at 1379 
(quoting Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1564-65).. We went on to note that, of course, the statement in 
Florida Rock was subject to the Government's nuisance defense preserved for it by the Supreme 
Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 
2886 (1992). 
A 'categorical' taking is, by accepted convention, one in which all economically viable 
use, i.e., all economic value, has been taken by the regulatory imposition. Such a taking is 
distinct from a taking that is the consequence of a regulatory imposition that prohibits or restricts 
only some of the uses that would otherwise be available to the property owner, but leaves the 
owner with substantial viable economic use. In the original opinion in this case, the court, 
following what it believed to be established law, treated the categorical regulatory taking for 
purposes of the case before it as akin to a physical taking. In a physical taking context, the 
question is not why the owner acquired the property taken, but only did she own it at the time of 
the taking. Questions of whether the owner had reasonable investment-backed expectations at the 
time the property was first acquired are simply not part of the analysis.  
Government points to the contrary statement in Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 
1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999) that "reasonable investment-backed expectations are an element  of every 
regulatory takings case." Id. The Government argues that on this issue Florida Rock is not 
controlling, that the statement in Good is consistent with the prior law of this court, specifically 
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994), and therefore the panel 
in this case was bound to follow Loveladies Harbor and Good. 
Since the Government has made this issue its central ground for relief, and since there 
seems to be doubt in the minds of others, we grant the Government's petition for rehearing by the 
panel for the purpose of adding this Order as an addendum to the original opinion of the court; in 
all other respects the opinion and judgment of the court is reaffirmed. 
2 
The Government places much weight on this court's earlier opinion in Loveladies Harbor, 
stating that "Good's carefully-reasoned holding follows directly from this Court's analysis in 
Loveladies." The "holding" referred to by the Government is the above-quoted statement in 
Good that "reasonable investment-backed expectations are an element of every regulatory 
takings case." Since the Government's position is premised on our Loveladies Harbor decision, 
we examine that case first. 
Loveladies Harbor, as does this case, involved a categorical taking. The issue in 
Loveladies Harbor was the proper application of the Supreme Court's Penn Central test, the 
established analytical test for regulatory takings, to determine whether the trial court was correct 
that a taking had occurred. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 57 L. 
Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978). As we explained in the Loveladies Harbor opinion, the 
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original Penn Central test set out three criteria for determining whether a regulatory taking had 
occurred: (1) Was there a denial of economically viable use of the property as a result of the 
regulatory imposition? (2) Were there investment-backed expectations? (3) What was the right 
balance between private rights and government need? See Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1176-
77 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). 
Between the time the trial court rendered its decision in Loveladies Harbor, decided on 
the basis of these three original Penn Central criteria, and the time the case was before us on 
appeal, the Supreme Court handed down its seminal opinion in the case of Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). In Lucas, 
the Court, among other things, redefined the third Penn Central criterion, the balancing step. The 
Loveladies Harbor appeal presented us with the task of clarifying how Lucas impacted on the 
three-part Penn Central test, and of applying the revised test to the case at hand. To do this, we 
set out the three criteria from Penn Central, re-stated the criteria with the Lucas gloss, and 
decided the case accordingly. 
In Loveladies Harbor our concern was with the third of the Penn Central criteria, and to a 
lesser extent the first. As we noted in the opinion, on the facts before us there was no need to 
address the second criterion, investment-backed expectations, since the parties appeared to be in 
agreement regarding that issue. See 28 F.3d at 1179. After making note of that fact, we 
specifically pointed out that "there is less agreement between the parties with regard to the first 
and third criteria." Id. Application of the first criterion, the question of denial of economically 
viable use, turned on the so-called denominator issue. See id. at 1179-82. With regard to the 
application of the third criterion, the critical issue in the case, we were required to substitute the 
new Lucas-created nuisance law defense for the original Penn Central balancing requirement. 
See id. at 1182-83. 
The opinion in Loveladies Harbor contains an extensive examination of the first and third 
criteria and their application to the facts of the case. It is clear from a careful reading of 
Loveladies Harbor that the references to investment-backed expectations in the discussion of the 
three Penn Central criteria, as they were stated both before and after Lucas, was for 
completeness. This court's focus was, first, on the denominator question, which decided the issue 
of whether there had been a sufficient denial of economically viable use, and, second and most 
importantly, on the "sea change" in takings law brought about by Lucas, which "dramatically 
changed the third criterion, from one in which courts . . . were called upon to make ad hoc 
balancing decisions . . . to one in which state property law, incorporating common law nuisance 
doctrine, controls." Id. at 1179. 
With regard to the question now before us--are investment-backed expectations a part of 
every regulatory takings case, even categorical takings cases--that was not an issue squarely 
presented to the court in Loveladies Harbor, nor was it addressed or necessary to the decision 
there. It would be improper to read into the opinion in Loveladies Harbor a decision on a 
question of such importance that was not consciously addressed by the court. 
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The question was addressed, however, in the case that preceded Loveladies Harbor that 
year, Florida Rock, and it is to that case that we now turn. Florida Rock contains the statement, 
quoted in the original opinion in this case and set out above, to the effect that when there has 
been a prohibition of all economically viable use of land, there is, without more, a compensable 
taking. See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1564-65. Read in context, that statement clearly means that 
a categorical taking is akin to a physical taking, and the reasons why the owner acquired the 
property are not a relevant part of the taking analysis. 
The Government's brief seeking rehearing concerned itself with Loveladies Harbor and 
Florida Rock. There have been several other cases in this court since Florida Rock and 
Loveladies Harbor that are relevant to the issue, but were not discussed by the Government in its 
brief. 
In Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the issue was whether a 
government freshwater diversion project that impacted on the plaintiffs' oyster beds created a 
compensable taking. The trial court held that plaintiffs had no protected property rights in their 
state-granted oyster bed leases. We concluded that the oyster bed leases did constitute "property" 
under the Fifth Amendment, but that plaintiffs knew when they acquired the leases that their 
rights to use the bottom-lands for oystering were subject to the inevitable changes that the long-
anticipated government project would bring about. See id. at 936-38. In short, they did not  have 
reasonable investment-backed expectations. See id. at 937. 
We noted in the opinion that the record established that the government project had 
substantially reduced the value of plaintiffs' property "well beyond the level of 'mere 
diminution,'" the assumption being that there was probably at least a partial taking. See id. at 
937. Nowhere was the taking described as 'categorical.' The plaintiffs retained the use of their 
leaseholds; it was not the plaintiffs who were ousted by the government project, but the oysters. 
On these facts, we found no compensable taking by the Government. 
3 
We are left then with a situation in which no decision by this court has authoritatively 
answered the question posed. For the answer to this question, we turn to Lucas. 
The facts of Lucas are familiar to all those interested in takings law. Under its Beachfront 
Management Act, the State of South Carolina prevented Mr. Lucas from building on his 
beachfront property. The case was treated by all courts involved as a total wipeout of Lucas's 
investment in the property— what the U.S. Supreme Court in its opinion in the case called a 
'categorical' taking. The state trial court awarded Lucas over one million dollars on his takings 
claim against the state. The state supreme court reversed, holding that under the balancing test 
(the third criterion) of Penn Central, the state was not liable. The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, and in turn reversed the state supreme court. 
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A major issue in the case was the application of the three criteria in the traditional Penn 
Central analysis, in particular the third, which called for balancing private rights against state 
needs. As discussed above, the decision in Lucas dramatically changed this third criterion. But to 
ignore the impact of Lucas on other aspects of takings law is to deny the authority of the 
Supreme Court to develop further the parameters of the jurisprudence. 
The Court's opening discussion in its Lucas opinion cited and referred to the leading 
takings law cases, including the Penn Central case. Had the court intended to make analysis of a 
categorical regulatory taking different from the categorical physical taking, for example 
regarding the question of investment-backed expectations, surely somewhere in the opinion there 
would be a hint of it. There is not. The Court well understood that, in takings law involving a 
'physical' taking of land by the government, the reason the owner acquired the land in the first 
instance is of no concern; that is, the owner's investment-backed expectations, or lack of them, 
are not a consideration. In light of the Court's repeated juxtaposition of physical takings with 
'categorical' regulatory takings, and the Court's repeated unqualified statements that the latter 
deserve the same compensation without more, we can only conclude that the Court's purpose was 
to convey the principle that, when there is a physical taking of land, or a regulatory taking that 
constitutes a total wipeout, investment-backed expectations play no role. 
The rationale behind asking about investment-backed expectations in the typical case of a 
regulatory imposition (for example, barring gasoline stations from an area zoned for residential 
uses) is not difficult to understand. The purchaser who buys a parcel with a known and valid 
regulatory restriction on certain uses cannot complain that she thereafter sustains an economic 
loss when the restriction is enforced. If the purchaser paid more than the property with the 
restriction on it is worth, the loss is the result of an error in market judgment, not a result of the 
restriction as such. In the parlance of takings law, the purchaser does not have reasonable 
expectations that the property can be used for the prohibited purpose; to assess the government 
for such a loss is to give the purchaser a windfall to which she is not entitled. 
A different case arises when government, though purporting to regulate the uses of a 
property, in fact imposes restrictions that have the same effect as a physical seizure and 
occupation for public purposes--leaving the owner with essentially no viable economic uses 
whatever and no rights except bare legal title. A purchaser who pays a substantial price for a 
parcel can be assumed to have expectations that the parcel can be used for some lawful purpose. 
When government seizes the entire estate for government purposes, whether by physical 
occupation or categorical regulatory taking, it is not necessary to explore what those expectations 
may have been. The purchaser may have had no particular expectations regarding immediate use, 
but only purchased for long-term investment. Or the purchaser's expectations may have been 
wholly unrealistic, and she may have paid more than the property is worth. It matters not. The 
Government is not obligated to pay for her expectations, but only to pay for the property interest 
taken. The Government's cost for the taking--the just compensation the Constitution imposes--is 
measured by the fair market value of the parcel, not the owner's hopes regarding its use. See 
generally 4 Julius Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain §§12.01-12C.03 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 
1999).  
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This does not mean that use restrictions are irrelevant to the takings calculus, even in 
categorical takings cases. Once a taking has been found, the use restrictions on the property are 
one of the factors that are taken into account in determining damages due the owner. See id. 
§12C.03[1]. It does mean that in the initial analysis of whether a taking has occurred, when it is 
determined that the effect of the regulatory imposition is to eliminate all economic viability of 
the property alleged to have been taken, the owner's  expectations regarding future  use of the 
property are not a factor in deciding whether the imposition requires a remedy. 
As the Supreme Court noted, it is "the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or 
economically beneficial use of land is permitted . . . ." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017. This is because 
most land use restrictions do not deny the owner of the regulated property all economically 
viable uses of it. In the relatively few cases when they do, we have no doubt that both law and 
sound constitutional policy entitle the owner to just compensation without regard to the nature of 
the owner's initial investment-backed expectations. 
In sum, we conclude that, in accord with Lucas, and not inconsistent with any prior 
holdings of this court, when a regulatory taking, properly determined to be 'categorical,' is found 
to have occurred, the property owner is entitled to a recovery without regard to consideration of 
investment-backed expectations. In such a case, "reasonable investment-backed expectations" are 
not a proper part of the analysis, just as they are not in physical takings cases. The statement in 
the original opinion in this case to that effect is a correct statement of the law. The right to 
recovery is of course subject to the government's defenses under the general rubric of nuisance 
enunciated in Lucas and explained in Loveladies Harbor, and as further explained in the original 
opinion in this case. 
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Session 29. Dimension of Property 
BABBITT v. YOUPEE 
519 U.S. 234 (1997) 
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.  
In this case, we consider for a second time the constitutionality of an escheat-to-tribe 
provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act (ILCA). 96 Stat. 2519, as amended, 25 U.S.C. 
§2206. Specifically, we address §207 of the ILCA, as amended in 1984. Congress enacted the 
original provision in 1983 to ameliorate the extreme fractionation problem attending a century-
old allotment policy that yielded multiple ownership of single parcels of Indian land. Pub. L. 97-
459, §207, 96 Stat. 2519. Amended §207 provides that certain small interests in Indian lands will 
transfer – or  “escheat” – to the tribe upon the death of the owner of the interest. Pub. L. 98-608, 
98 Stat. 3173. In Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 95 L. Ed. 2d 668, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987), this 
Court held that the original version of §207 of the ILCA effected a taking of private property 
without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 481 U.S. at 716-718. We now hold that amended §207 does not cure the 
constitutional deficiency this Court identified in the original version of §207. 
I 
In the late Nineteenth Century, Congress initiated an Indian land program that authorized 
the division of communal Indian property. Pursuant to this allotment policy,   some Indian land 
was parcelled out to individual tribal members. Lands not allotted to individual Indians were 
opened to non-Indians for settlement. See General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388. 
Allotted lands were held in trust by the United States or owned by the allottee subject to 
restrictions on alienation. On the death of the allottee, the land descended according to the laws 
of the State or Territory in which the land was located. 24 Stat. 389. In 1910, Congress also 
provided that allottees could devise their interests in allotted land. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, 
§2, 36 Stat. 856, codified as amended, 25 U.S.C. §373. 
The allotment policy “quickly proved disastrous for the Indians.” Irving, 481 U.S. at 707. 
The program produced a dramatic decline in the amount of land in Indian hands. F. Cohen, 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 138 (1982) (hereinafter Cohen). And as allottees passed their 
interests on to multiple heirs, ownership of allotments became increasingly fractionated, with 
some parcels held by dozens of owners. Lawson, Heirship: The Indian Amoeba, reprinted in 
Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663 before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 77 (1984) (hereinafter Lawson). A number of factors augmented the problem: 
Because Indians often died without wills, many interests passed to multiple heirs, H. R. Rep. No. 
97-908, p. 10 (1982); Congress’ allotment acts subjected trust lands to alienation restrictions that 
impeded holders of small interests from transferring those interests, Lawson 78-79; Indian lands 
were not subject to state real estate taxes, Cohen 406, which ordinarily serve as a strong 
disincentive to retaining small fractional interests in land. The fractionation problem proliferated 
with each succeeding generation as multiple heirs took undivided interests in allotments. 
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The administrative difficulties and economic inefficiencies associated with multiple 
undivided ownership in allotted lands gained official attention as early as 1928. See L. Meriam, 
Institute for Government Research, The Problem of Indian Administration 40-41 (1928). 
Governmental administration of these fractionated interests proved costly, and individual owners 
of small undivided interests could not make productive use of the land. Congress ended further 
allotment in 1934. See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. §461 
et seq. But that action left the legacy in place. As most owners had more than one heir, interests 
in lands already allotted continued to splinter with each generation. In the 1960’s, congressional 
studies revealed that approximately half of all allotted trust lands were held in fractionated 
ownership; for over a quarter of allotted trust lands, individual allotments were held by more 
than six owners to a parcel. See Irving, 481 U.S. at 708-709 (citing Senate Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs, Indian Heirship Land Survey, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. x (Comm. Print 
1960-1961)). 
In 1983, Congress adopted the ILCA in part to reduce fractionated ownership of allotted 
lands. Pub. L. 97-459, tit. II, 96 Stat. 2517. Section 207 of the Act– the “escheat” provision 
--prohibited the descent or devise of small fractional interests in allotments. 96 Stat. 2519.  
Instead of passing to heirs, such fractional interests would escheat to the tribe, thereby 
consolidating the ownership of Indian lands. Congress defined the targeted fractional interest as 
one that both constituted 2 percent or less of the total acreage in an allotted tract and had earned 
less than $100 in the preceding year. Section 207 made no provision for the payment of 
compensation to those who held such interests. 
In Hodel v. Irving, this Court invalidated §207 on the ground that it effected a taking of 
property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 481 U.S. at 716-718. 
The appellees in Irving were, or represented, heirs or devisees of members of the Oglala Sioux 
Tribe. But for §207, the appellees would have received 41 fractional interests in allotments; 
under §207, those interests would escheat to the Tribe. 481 U.S. at 709-710. This Court tested 
the legitimacy of §207 by considering its economic impact, its effect on investment-backed 
expectations, and the essential character of the measure. See id., at 713-718; see also Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 
(1978). Turning first to the economic impact of §207, the Court in Irving observed that the 
provision’s income- generation test might fail to capture the actual economic value of the land. 
481 U.S. at 714. The Court next indicated that §207 likely did not interfere with investment-
backed expectations. Id., at 715. Key to the decision in Irving, however, was the “extraordinary” 
character of the Government regulation. Id., at 716. As this Court noted, §207 amounted to the 
“virtual abrogation of the right to pass on a certain type of property.” Ibid. Such a complete 
abrogation of the rights of descent and devise could not be upheld. Id., at 716-717. 
II 
In 1984, while Irving was still pending in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 
Congress amended §207. Pub. L. 96-608, §1(4), 98 Stat. 3173. Amended §207   differs from the 
original escheat provision in three relevant respects. First, an interest is considered fractional if it 
both constitutes 2 percent or less of the total acreage of the parcel and “is incapable of earning 
$100 in any one of the five years [following the] decedent’s death”-- as opposed to one year 
before the decedent’s death in the original §207. 25 U.S.C. §2206(a). If the interest earned less 
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than $100 in any one of five years prior to the decedent’s death, “there shall be a rebuttable 
presumption that such interest is incapable of earning $100 in any one of the five years following 
the death of the decedent.” Ibid. Second, in lieu of a total ban on devise and descent of fractional 
interests, amended §207 permits devise of an otherwise escheatable interest to “any other owner 
of an undivided fractional interest in such parcel or tract” of land. 25 U.S.C. §2206(b). Finally, 
tribes are authorized to override the provisions of amended §207 through the adoption of their 
own codes governing the disposition of fractional interests; these codes are subject to the 
approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U.S.C. §2206(c). In Irving, “we expressed no 
opinion on the constitutionality of §207 as amended.” 481 U.S. at 710, n. 1.   
Under amended §207, the interests in this case would escheat to tribal governments. The 
initiating plaintiffs, respondents here, are the children and potential heirs of William Youpee. An 
enrolled member of the Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation in Montana, 
William Youpee died testate in October 1990. His will devised to respondents, all of them 
enrolled tribal members, his several undivided interests in allotted trust lands on various 
reservations in Montana and North Dakota. These interests, as the Ninth Circuit reported, were 
valued together at $1,239. 67 F.3d 194, 199 (CA9 1995). Each interest was devised to a single 
descendant. Youpee’s will thus perpetuated existing fractionation, but it did not splinter 
ownership further by bequeathing any single fractional interest to multiple devisees. 
In 1992, in a proceeding to determine the heirs to and claims against William Youpee’s 
estate, an administrative law judge (ALJ) in the Department of the Interior found that interests 
devised to each of the respondents fell within the compass of amended §207 and should therefore 
escheat to the tribal governments of the Fort Peck, Standing Rock, and Devils Lake Sioux 
Reservations. App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a-40a. Respondents, asserting the unconstitutionality of 
amended §207, appealed the ALJ’s order to the Department of the Interior Board of Indian 
Appeals. The Board, stating that it did not have jurisdiction to consider respondents’ 
constitutional claim, dismissed the appeal.  
Respondents then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of 
Montana, naming the Secretary of the Interior as defendant, and alleging that amended §207 of 
the ILCA violates the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court 
agreed with respondents and granted their request for declaratory and injunctive relief. 857 F. 
Supp. 760, 766 (Mont. 1994). 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 67 F.3d 194 (1995). That court 
carefully inspected the 1984 revisions to §207. Hewing closely to the reasoning of this Court in 
Irving, the Ninth Circuit determined that amended §207 did not cure the deficiencies that 
rendered the original provision unconstitutional. In particular, the Ninth Circuit observed that 
amended §207 “continued to completely abolish one of the sticks in the bundle of rights 
[constituting  property] for a class of Indian landowners.” 67 F.3d at 200. The Ninth Circuit 
noted that “Congress may pursue other options to achieve consolidation of . . . fractional 
interests,” including Government purchase of the land, condemnation for a public purpose 
attended by payment of just compensation, or regulation to impede further fractionation. Ibid. 
But amended §207 could not stand, the Ninth Circuit concluded, for the provision remained “an 
extraordinary and impermissible regulation of Indian lands and effected an unconstitutional 
taking without just compensation.” Ibid. 
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On the petition of the United States, we granted certiorari, 517 U.S. (1996), and now 
affirm. 
III 
In determining whether the 1984 amendments to §207 render the provision constitutional, 
we are guided by Irving.
1
 The United States maintains that the amendments, though enacted 
three years prior to the Irving decision, effectively anticipated the concerns expressed in the 
Court’s opinion. As already noted, amended §207 differs from the original in three relevant 
respects: it looks back five years instead of one to determine the income produced from a small 
interest, and creates a  rebuttable presumption that this income stream will continue; it permits 
devise of otherwise escheatable interests to persons who already own an interest in the same 
parcel; and it authorizes tribes to develop their own codes governing the disposition of fractional 
interests. These modifications, according to the United States, rescue amended §207 from the 
fate of its predecessor. The Government maintains that the revisions moderate the economic 
impact of the provision and temper the character of the Government’s regulation; the latter factor 
weighed most heavily against the constitutionality of the original version of §207. 
The narrow revisions Congress made to §207, without benefit of our ruling in Irving, do 
not warrant a disposition different than the one this Court announced and explained in Irving. 
Amended §207 permits a five-year window rather than a one-year window to assess the income-
generating capacity of the interest. As the Ninth Circuit observed, however, argument that this 
change substantially mitigates the economic impact of §207 “misses the point.” 67 F.3d at 199. 
Amended §207 still trains on income generated from the land, not on the value of the parcel. The 
Court observed in Irving that “even if . . . the income generated by such parcels may be properly 
thought of as de minimis,” the value of the land may not fit that description. 481 U.S. at 714. The 
parcels at issue in Irving were valued by the Bureau of Indian Affairs at $2,700 and $1,816, 
amounts we found “not trivial.” Ibid. The value of the disputed parcels in this case is not of a 
different order; as the Ninth Circuit reported, the value of decedent Youpee’s fractional interests 
was $1,239. 67 F.3d at 199. In short, the economic impact of amended §207 might still be 
palpable.  
Even if the economic impact  of amended §207 is not significantly less than the impact of 
the original provision, the United States correctly comprehends that Irving rested primarily on 
the “extraordinary” character of the governmental regulation. Irving stressed that the original 
§207 “amounted to virtually the abrogation of the right to pass on a certain type of property–the 
small undivided interest– to one’s heirs.” 481 U.S. at 716; see also id., at 717 (“both descent and 
devise are completely abolished”). The Irving Court further noted that the original §207 
“effectively abolished both descent and devise [of fractional interests] even when the passing of 
the property to the heir might result in consolidation of property.” Id., at 716. As the United 
                                                 
1 
In Irving we relied on Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 
(1978). Because we find Irving dispositive, we do not reach respondents’ argument that amended §207 effects a 
“categorical” taking, and is therefore subject to the more stringent analysis employed in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
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States construes Irving, Congress cured the fatal infirmity in §207 when it revised the section to 
allow transmission of fractional interests to successors who already own an interest in the 
allotment. 
Congress’ creation of an ever-so-slight class of individuals equipped to receive fractional 
interests by devise does not suffice, under a fair reading of Irving, to rehabilitate the measure. 
Amended §207 severely restricts the right of an individual to direct the descent of his property. 
Allowing a decedent to leave an interest only to a current owner in the same parcel shrinks 
drastically the universe of possible successors. And, as the Ninth Circuit observed, the “very 
limited group [of permissible devisees] is unlikely to contain any lineal descendants.” 67 F.3d at 
199-200. Moreover, amended §207 continues to restrict devise “even in circumstances when the 
governmental purpose sought to be advanced, consolidation of ownership of Indian lands, does 
not conflict with the further descent of the property.” Irving, 481 U.S. at 718. William Youpee’s 
will, the United States acknowledges, bequeathed each fractional interest to one heir. Giving 
effect to Youpee’s directive, therefore, would not further fractionate Indian land holdings. 
The United States also contends that amended §207 satisfies the Constitution’s demand 
because it does not diminish the owner’s right to use or enjoy property during his lifetime, and 
does not affect the right to transfer property at death through non-probate means. These 
arguments did not persuade us in Irving and they are no more persuasive today. See 481 U.S. at 
716-178. 
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C. §2206, did not, in my view, 
effect an unconstitutional taking of William Youpee’s right to make a testamentary disposition of 
his property. As I explained in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 719-720, 95 L. Ed. 2d 668, 107 S. 
Ct. 2076 (1987) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment), the Federal Government, like a State, 
has a valid interest in  removing legal impediments to the productive development of real estate. 
For this reason, the Court has repeatedly “upheld the power of the State to condition the retention 
of a property right upon the performance of an act within a limited period of time.” Texaco, Inc. 
v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 529, 70 L. Ed. 2d 738, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982). I remain convinced that 
“Congress has ample power to require the owners of fractional interests in allotted lands to 
consolidate their holdings during their lifetimes or to face the risk that their interests will be 
deemed to be abandoned.” Hodel, 481 U.S. at 732 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). The 
federal interest in minimizing the fractionated ownership of Indian lands–and thereby paving the 
way to the productive development of their property–is strong enough to justify the legislative 
remedy created by §207, provided, of course, that affected owners have adequate notice of the 
requirements of the law and an adequate opportunity to adjust their affairs to protect against loss. 
See ibid. 
In my opinion, William Youpee did have such notice and opportunity. With regard to 
notice, the requirements of §207 are set forth in the United States Code.   “Generally, a 
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legislature need do nothing more than enact and publish the law, and afford the citizenry a 
reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself with its terms and to comply. . . . It is well established 
that persons owning property within a [jurisdiction] are charged with knowledge of relevant 
statutory provisions affecting the control or disposition of such property.” Texaco, 454 U.S. 516 
at 531-532, 70 L. Ed. 2d 738, 102 S. Ct. 781. Unlike the landowners in Hodel, Mr. Youpee also 
had adequate opportunity to comply. More than six years passed from the time §207 was 
amended until Mr. Youpee died on October 19, 1990 (this period spans more than seven years if 
we count from the date §207 was originally enacted). During this time, Mr. Youpee could have 
realized the value of his fractional interests (approximately $1,239) in a variety of ways, 
including selling the property, giving it to his children as a gift, or putting it in trust for them. I 
assume that he failed to do so because he was not aware of the requirements of §207. This loss is 
unfortunate. But I believe Mr. Youpee’s failure to pass on his property is the product of 
inadequate legal advice rather than an unconstitutional defect in the statute.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
DISTRICT INTOWN PROPERTIES LTD. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
EDWARDS, Chief Judge: In 1961, District Intown Limited Properties Partnership 
("District Intown") purchased Cathedral Mansions South, an apartment building and landscaped 
lawn on Connecticut Avenue across from the National Zoo.  District Intown subdivided this 
property into nine contiguous lots in 1988. In March 1989, all nine lots were declared historic 
landmarks. In July 1992, the Mayor of the District of Columbia denied District Intown's request 
for construction permits to build eight townhouses on eight of the nine lots, finding that the 
construction was incompatible with the property's landmark status. Alleging that the District of 
Columbia's denial constituted a taking, District Intown and its general partners sued under 42 
U.S.C. §1983 (1994) for just compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District Court granted summary 
judgment for the District of Columbia. See District Intown Properties Ltd. Partnership v. District 
of Columbia, 23 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 1998). The District Court held that the relevant parcel 
for the purposes of determining whether a taking had occurred consisted of the entire property, 
including the apartment building, not the eight individual lots that District Intown sought to 
develop. The court then analyzed the alleged taking under the Supreme Court's holdings in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), 
and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. 
Ct. 2646 (1978). The District Court found that there was no categorical taking under Lucas, 
because District Intown had not been deprived of all economic value in the relevant parcel. The 
trial court further held that District Intown could not make out a claim under Penn Central, 
because its reasonable investment-backed expectations had not been disappointed and it 
continued to receive economic benefits from the property. 
We hold that the District Court correctly found that the relevant parcel for the takings 
analysis consisted of the entire property held by District Intown, i.e., the property as it was 
originally purchased in 1961 and as it was held for 27 years prior to the 1988 subdivision. All 
relevant objective and subjective factors support this conclusion. When the property is viewed as 
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a single parcel, there is no doubt that it has not been rendered valueless. Indeed, even if each 
subdivided parcel is considered separately, District Intown has not shown a "total taking" under 
Lucas. In addition, the record here does not show that District Intown's investment-backed 
expectations were disappointed. This is not surprising, because District Intown could not have 
had any reasonable investment-backed expectations of development given the background 
regulatory structure at the time of subdivision. Accordingly, we hold that District Intown did not 
present any genuine issue of material fact in support of a takings claim under Penn Central or 
Lucas. We therefore affirm the District Court's judgment. 
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: The District of Columbia's 
Historic Preservation Board imposed historic landmark status not only on an apartment building 
named Cathedral Mansions South but also on a substantial stretch of adjacent lawn bordering the 
sidewalks of Connecticut Avenue. District Intown, the owner of both, claims that as applied to 
the lawn the landmarking effects a taking of its property in violation of the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. The majority's disposition is--with one important exception--in general accord 
with the current opinions of the Supreme Court. Those decisions are of course binding. At the 
same time, however, it is not inappropriate to identify ways in which the prevailing analysis 
elevates formal concepts over economic reality and tends to strip the Clause of its potential for 
fulfilling the framers' likely purposes. 
The economist's justification for the Takings Clause is that it provides a check on 
government's likely tendency to waste resources by treating private property as a free good. See 
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 58 (4th ed. 1992) ("The simplest economic 
explanation for the requirement of just compensation is that it prevents the government from 
overusing the taking power."). This is just an application of the general principle that if a firm 
can externalize costs (e.g., the health costs of polluting the air), it will use more of the unpriced 
resource (in this example, air as a waste sink) than it would if required to pay. And it will tend to 
overproduce the goods or services whose production uses the superficially "free" good--i.e., it 
will produce them at a level where the true value of the extra inputs exceeds the true value of the 
extra output. See generally Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 45-46 (1988). 
As applied to government regulation, similar oversupply can be expected--here, production of 
regulations that impose more costs than they afford benefits, that do more harm than good. 
The framers, though not articulating the purpose of the Clause in economic terms, 
evidently did view it as aimed at correcting the incentives of the political branches. There is 
evidence, for example, that James Madison saw electoral power slipping into the hands of a non-
landholding majority, which in a "leveling" mode could be expected to invade landowners' 
rights. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the 
Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 849 (1995). Late twentieth century America, of course, 
displays a far greater range of purposes than "leveling" for reallocation of rights. While the 
resulting proposals are naturally advanced in the name of the public good, many are surely 
driven by interest-group purposes, commonly known as "rent-seeking." Among these proposals, 
at least some inflict aggregate costs considerably outweighing their aggregate benefits, 
paralleling the wasteful production associated with private firms' externalization of costs. The 
Takings Clause serves to curb such inefficiencies. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private 
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 281 (1985) ("The Takings Clause is designed to 
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control rent seeking and political faction. It is those practices, and only those practices, that it 
reaches."). 
A Takings Clause construction that was dedicated without qualification to preventing 
such government externalization would require compensation whenever regulation reduced the 
value of anyone's property, however slightly. Balanced against that goal is an array of 
considerations. Most obvious is the cost of calculating and administering compensation, which 
would tend to sink many a beneficent statute. "Government hardly could go on if to some extent 
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the 
general law." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 67 L. Ed. 
322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922)). (The compensation cost itself would be only a weak countervailing 
factor, for most beneficent regulation would presumably generate gains large enough to pay the 
losers if identification and calculation were costless.) My goal here is not to pinpoint the 
appropriate balance between these competing considerations, much less to suggest that the 
correct reading is one under which all regulation materially adversely affecting a property's value 
would be compensable. Rather, it is simply to note the ways in which modern interpretation of 
the Takings Clause, as exemplified in today's decision, impairs its role as a disincentive to 
wasteful government activities. 
* * * 
The majority applies an apparent presumption that contiguous parcels under common 
ownership should be treated as one parcel for purposes of the takings analysis. This presumption 
tends to reduce the likelihood that courts will order compensation. The larger the parcel, the 
greater the chance that the regulated land will retain an economically viable use. From the 
perspective of ensuring that the government not engage in wasteful behavior, however, the focus 
on the uses of the land that remain is misplaced: "What is decisive is that which is taken, not that 
which is retained." Epstein, Takings, supra, at 58. Whether the landowner is left with a limited 
use of the land or none at all is hardly relevant to that issue. And as the regulating government 
delineates the scope of regulation, the opportunity for strategic behavior is obvious. 
The majority's cursory application of the Penn Central factors further broadens the gap 
between the two modes of analysis, reinforcing the seemingly predetermined conclusion: in 
partial takings cases, the government wins. The majority states that District Intown has not 
shown the land "unprofitable to maintain,"; it is unimaginable, however, absent an extraordinary 
tax liability, that a parcel could retain an economically viable use yet have a net negative value. 
The majority goes on to say that District Intown has failed to show that the land does not "bring 
in a sufficient return," id., but does not answer the all-important question: a return on what? on 
out-of-pocket costs? on initial purchase price? on fair market value? Moreover, the majority 
provides no guidance as to how "sufficient" the return must be, except to cite Penn Central, in 
which the Court found that a 75% diminution in value did not constitute a compensable taking. 
See id. 
Similarly, in its consideration of District Intown’s "reasonable investment-backed 
expectations," the majority's analysis begs the question whether any landowner, in a world where 
zoning regulations are prevalent, could ever argue that a particular regulation was "unexpected." 
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The presumption is insurmountable: Although the Takings Clause is meant to curb inefficient 
takings, such a notion of "reasonable investment-backed expectations" strips it of any 
constraining sense: except for a regulation of almost unimaginable abruptness, all regulation will 
build on prior regulation and hence be said to defeat any expectations. Thus regulation begets 
regulation. 
Although the presumption in favor of looking at the parcel as a whole, and in turn the 
increased reliance on the partial takings mode of analysis, is at odds with the underlying 
principle of the Takings Clause, it is perhaps the best construction of the Supreme Court's limited 
guidance. The Court has never squarely addressed the question of how courts should define the 
relevant geographic parcel of land, also known as "horizontal severance." Marc R. Lisker, 
Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem, 27 Rutgers L.J. 663, 705 (1996). In Nectow 
v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 72 L. Ed. 842, 48 S. Ct. 447 (1928), the Court considered 
whether the city council had effectuated a taking of plaintiff's land by zoning as "residential" a 
100-foot strip on plaintiff's 140,000 square foot parcel. Although the Court appeared to treat the 
relevant parcel as encompassing only the fractional strip, this was in no respect relevant to the 
Court's decision. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 57 L. Ed. 
2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978), the Court applied a very weak form of horizontal severance, 
focusing exclusively on the landmarked building itself without treating the owner's neighboring--
but not adjacent--property as part of the greater parcel, as had the New York Court of Appeals. 
See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276-
77, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. 1977). But Penn Central tells little, as the properties were not all 
contiguous, had been put to different uses, and had never been treated as a unified whole by the 
owners or the City. 
Penn Central's handling of "vertical severance," however, is informative, if only by 
analogy. Using language seemingly broad enough to encompass horizontal severance, the Court 
made clear that it would not consider the air rights above Grand Central separately from the land 
rights: " 'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt 
to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated." Penn Central, 
438 U.S. at 130; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 496-
502, 94 L. Ed. 2d 472, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987) (refusing to regard either coal that statute required 
miners to leave in place (about 2% of total coal), or the "support estate," as distinct property for 
ascertaining whether statute denied owners all economically viable uses). 
The Court has expressed similar reluctance to engage in "conceptual severance" more 
generally (i.e., the treatment of any specific property right as a single unit). In Andrus v. Allard, 
444 U.S. 51, 62 L. Ed. 2d 210, 100 S. Ct. 318 (1979), the Court refused to treat extinction of the 
right to sell any part of a lawfully killed bald eagle as a total taking. See id. at 65-66 ("At least 
where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the 
bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety."). The Court 
arguably evidenced a retreat from this strong position in  Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717-18, 
95 L. Ed. 2d 668, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987), in which it found a taking in legislation that 
"completely abolished" certain landowners' rights to dispose of their property by descent or 
devise, even though they retained complete rights to possess and to make inter vivos transfers. 
The Court has not, however, reached agreement on the scope of this retreat. Compare id. at 719 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (saying the decision "effectively limits Allard to its facts"), with id. at 718 
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(Brennan, J., concurring) (saying that the case was "unusual" and thus had no impact on Allard). 
Overall, I think the majority is correct in its implicit understanding that the Supreme Court is 
reluctant to carve a landowner's parcel into smaller units for which compensation might be more 
likely. 
But the factors that the majority applies in making the decision, drawn from decisions of 
the Federal Circuit and Claims Court and characterized by the majority as "eminently sound," 
strike me as uninformative and largely irrelevant. The factors considered are: (1) whether the 
neighboring parcels are contiguous, (2) whether they were acquired simultaneously, (3) whether 
they have been treated as a single unit, and (4) the extent to which the restricted lot benefits the 
neighboring lot. Maj. Op. at 8-9. 
The first factor, contiguity, is clearly necessary but in no way sufficient. The next two 
factors--simultaneity of acquisition and unity of use--are more troublesome. Both elevate history-
-either the historical purchase or the historical use-over the real-world present relationship 
between the tracts. Compare Laura M. Schleich, Takings: The Fifth Amendment, Government 
Regulation, and the Problem of the Relevant Parcel, 8 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 381 (1993) 
(proposing that courts look to the "moment of regulation" when defining the relevant parcel). 
The majority's focus on the property's use prior to regulation tells us nothing about the value 
producing opportunities foreclosed at the time of regulation. "It is, of course, irrelevant that [the 
government] interfered with or destroyed property rights that [plaintiff] had not yet physically 
used. The Fifth Amendment must be applied with 'reference to the uses for which the property is 
suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the community, or such as may be 
reasonably expected in the immediate future.' ").  Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 143 n.6 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting, quoting Boom v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 408, 25 L. Ed. 206 (1879)). 
The majority mentions but brushes aside a fourth factor-the extent to which the regulated 
parcel benefits the neighboring lot. Yet this appears the most relevant. The more a burdened tract 
in its regulated use benefits contiguous property, the less likely that the regulation has a net 
negative impact. In the extreme case a property interest may be worthless except in conjunction 
with another.  Thus in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, the Court pointed out that the "support 
estate" had "value only insofar as it protects or enhances the value of the estate with which it is 
associated [i.e., the mineral estate]," 480 U.S. at 501, and therefore refused to treat the "support 
estate" as a separate interest at all. Similarly, small parcels of land, either in the interior or 
around the edges of greater parcels, commonly are valuable only when they combine with the 
greater parcel to create a more valuable whole; for regulation of the exterior (such as setback 
requirements), then, it makes sense to measure the impact in conjunction with the "primary" 
parcel. Looking to the property owner's benefit from these internal synergies parallels use of 
"average reciprocity of advantage," Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 67 L. 
Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922), which considers the benefit that each burdened owner— as in 
ordinary zoning or historic districting-receives from the similar restriction of his neighbors. 
Of course there will be some synergy between almost any two neighboring parcels under 
common ownership, since unified ownership creates options for the sole owner that multiple 
landowners could achieve only by contracting. But synergy is a matter of degree, and mere 
contiguity should not be enough. One commentator proposes a rather demanding synergy test, 
arguing that the regulated tract should be considered as its own parcel so long as not all of its 
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value derives from synergies with neighboring land; in such cases, the parcel would have an 
independent economically viable use, which if destroyed by regulation would be compensable 
under Lucas. See John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking 
Claims, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1535, 1557-58 (1994). One need not go so far to see the skimpiness 
of the synergy here. 
To be sure, Cathedral Mansions is more than several contiguous parcels. According to the 
decision of the Historic Preservation Review Board, "The buildings are sited imaginatively to 
provide the greatest possible integration of living space with well-landscaped open space." Joint 
Appendix ("J.A.") 320. (Passersby who observe the rather bare lawn will have to reach their own 
judgments on the adjective "well landscaped.") Integration there doubtless is--almost any lawn 
around a building will manifest a degree of integration. But there is no explicit showing that 
these synergies depend on the entire lawn remaining undeveloped. The proposed townhouses 
would cover only the portion of the lawn abutting Connecticut Avenue, still leaving the interior 
portion, approximately half the lawn, undeveloped. Common sense would suggest that at some 
distance from the building marginal synergies created by extra lawn space become slight, and 
thus that the part of the lawn beyond that line should be treated as its own parcel for takings 
purposes. Further, although District rent-control law evidently allows the owner to earn a return 
on the tax-assessed value of land in a single tract with a rent-controlled building (here the owner 
could apparently recover that status by undoing the formalities of subdivision), that value is 
likely to be only a tiny fraction of the value absent the historic landmarking. 
In fact, it may well be completely different synergies--ones between the lawn and 
adjacent Connecticut Avenue--that have driven the landmarking decision. The Board observed 
that the lawn "contributes significantly to the unique open space character of Connecticut 
Avenue.  " J.A. 320. A cynic might suspect that the alleged relationship between the lawn and 
the Cathedral Mansions apartments is little more than a cloak by which the citizens of Upper 
Northwest Washington have secured some parkland on the cheap. Parks are good, but the Fifth 
Amendment says that taking them is not. 
Of course, there is another synergy between the two parcels and adjacent Connecticut 
Avenue, namely the historical value that inheres in the preservation of a building as it was 
initially constructed (i.e., with an expansive lawn beside it). Uncompensated landmark 
preservation seems to rest on this synergy. The Court in Penn Central embraced the view that 
"the preservation of landmarks benefits all New York citizens and all structures, both 
economically and by improving the quality of life in the city as a whole." 438 U.S. at 134. This 
broad language seems to redefine "reciprocity of advantage" in such a way that no government 
act could ever require compensation, as the afflicted owner would be a member of the taking 
polity and thus in receipt of offsetting advantages, artificially presumed to be adequate. 
Apart from obliterating takings law, such a view has peculiarly perverse effects in the 
realm of historic preservation. Although such laws try to preserve for society the positive 
externalities created by buildings like Cathedral Mansions, inflicting the entire cost on the 
creator of the landmark (or his successor in interest) is bound to discourage investment in first-
class design. Moreover, while insurance markets can achieve the risk-spreading (or anti-
"demoralization") goals that some attribute to the Takings Clause, compare Posner, Economic 
Analysis of law, supra, at 58, they cannot offset non-compensation's disincentive to good design. 
726 
Historic landmark preservation, after all, is imposed selectively on those who went out of their 
way to secure architectural distinction. The higher the quality, the higher the premium for takings 
insurance; the disincentive is inescapable. 
Having found that the lawn and apartment parcels should be treated as a unit, the majority 
nevertheless considers whether compensation would be due even if the lawn were analyzed 
separately; in doing so, it gratuitously takes an even harsher stance against compensation than 
does present law. The majority finds that District Intown has failed to offer evidence that the 
regulation denies it "economically viable use of [the] land," Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016, even 
though the Mayor's own agent found that "any construction that destroyed the lawn would be 
incompatible with the lawn's status as an historic landmark." Thus, so long as the lawn is 
untouched, "economically viable" uses are permissible. It is hard to imagine what "economically 
viable" use that constraint leaves, unless the majority means that the very barest thread of value, 
yielded by some thoroughly bucolic use, is enough to defeat a total takings claim. By this 
standard, no regulation can ever effect a total taking, and at best will be tested only under the far 
weaker partial takings rubric. 
* * * 
The prevailing Federal Circuit-Claims Court method of defining the relevant parcel, 
followed by the panel here, focuses on marginal issues and largely overlooks the more critical 
concern of synergies; the focus on the landowner's historical, rather than proposed, use further 
skews the analysis. But the Supreme Court's general approach seems to militate in favor of 
looking to the parcel as a whole. Similarly, although resting uncompensated landmark 
preservation on the idea of reciprocal advantage stretches the concept into meaninglessness, and 
the denial of compensation discourages ex ante what it hopes to foster ex post, the current cases 
give these arguments little purchase. Accordingly, I concur in the majority's decision to affirm.  
RITH ENERGY v. UNITED STATES 
247 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir.2001) 
Before MAYER, Chief Judge, LOURIE, and BRYSON, Circuit Judges.   
BRYSON, Circuit Judge. 
In 1985, Rith Energy, Inc., purchased two coal mining leases in Tennessee. It 
subsequently applied for, and obtained, a federal permit to conduct mining operations on the 
leased property. After Rith had mined for a period of time, the Office of Surface Mining 
Reclamation and Enforcement of the United States Department of the Interior (OSM) concluded 
that a portion of the property on which Rith was mining contained high levels of potentially toxic 
materials that could pollute the groundwater in the area through a process known as “acid mine 
drainage.” OSM therefore suspended Rith’s permit and prohibited it from mining most of the 
coal covered by the mining leases until Rith devised a plan to address the problem of acid mine 
drainage at its mining site. When Rith was unable to devise a plan that satisfied OSM, Rith’s 
request to revise its mining permit was denied and Rith was unable to conduct any more mining 
at the site. 
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After several unsuccessful administrative and judicial challenges to OSM’s actions, Rith 
sued the United States in the Court of Federal Claims, contending that its property had been 
taken without compensation, in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The 
Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment for the government, and Rith appealed. 
Because the government’s conduct at issue in this case did not result in a categorical taking of 
Rith’s property, and because Rith did not have reasonable investment-backed expectations that it 
would be permitted to mine in a way that would create a high risk of acid mine drainage, we 
affirm. 
I 
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (“SMCRA”), 30 U.S.C. 
§§1201-1328, established a “nationwide program to protect society and the environment from 
the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations.” 30 U.S.C. §1202(a). Pursuant to SMCRA, 
coal mine operators such as Rith must obtain a permit in order to conduct any mining operations. 
30 U.S.C. §1256. Any permit issued under SMCRA must comply with certain environmental 
performance standards.  30 U.S.C. §1265. SMCRA also authorizes the Department of the Interior 
to prohibit mining operations that create an imminent danger to the health and safety of the 
public or can reasonably be expected to cause significant, imminent environmental harm to land, 
air, or water resources.  30 U.S.C. §1271. 
The environmental performance standards set forth in SMCRA require, among other 
things, that the mine operator: 
minimize the disturbances to the prevailing hydrologic balance at the mine-site 
and in associated offsite areas and to the quality and quantity of water in surface 
and ground water systems both during and after surface coal mining operations 
and during reclamation by– 
avoiding acid or other toxic mine drainage by such measures as, but not limited 
to– 
preventing or removing water from contact with toxic producing deposits; 
treating drainage to reduce toxic content which adversely affects downstream 
water upon being released to water courses; 
casing, sealing, or otherwise managing boreholes, shafts, and wells and keeping 
acid or other toxic drainage from entering ground and surface waters[.] 30 U.S.C. 
§1265(b). 
Acid mine drainage is an environmental problem long associated with mining activity. It 
occurs when certain types of acidic soil are exposed to air and water. Once acid mine drainage 
begins, the chemical reaction that creates the toxic product becomes self-sustaining and can 
continue for years, long after all mining activity has ceased. See Rith Energy, Inc. v. United 
States, 44 Fed. Cl. 108, 111 n.3 (1999); see also 30 C.F.R. §701.5 (defining acid mine drainage). 
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The coal leases at issue are located in the Cumberland Plateau region of Tennessee. Prior 
to April 1984, the State of Tennessee had administered SMCRA in that region. In the wake of 
failures by the State to implement, administer, maintain and enforce the state program 
adequately, OSM took over the administration of SMCRA in Tennessee. OSM promulgated a 
federal program for Tennessee in October 1984. See 49 Fed. Reg. 15,496 (Apr. 18, 1984); 49 
Fed. Reg. 38,874 (Oct. 1, 1984). 
In June 1985, long after SMCRA was enacted and shortly after the federal takeover of 
SMCRA enforcement in Tennessee, Rith acquired the mineral leases at issue in this case. The 
two leases covered 250 acres in Bledsoe County, Tennessee, and cost Rith approximately 
$33,500. The leases included warnings regarding the uncertainties of obtaining mining permits 
and removing coal. After acquiring the leases, Rith applied to OSM for a permit to surface mine 
coal from two coal seams within the leased property, the Sewanee and Richland seams. At the 
time, there was extensive evidence that acid mine drainage was endemic to the Sewanee coal 
seam. That coal seam is situated above the Sewanee Conglomerate aquifer, a source of drinking 
water for area residents. 
Rith planned to mine the leased property in three stages, with the first stage to cover the 
89-acre area identified in the permit application. Rith estimated that a total of 385,000 tons of 
coal was located within the 250-acre leasehold; of that amount, Rith stated in its permit 
application that it anticipated obtaining 250,000 tons of coal from the 89-acre area covered by 
the permit. 
As required by SMCRA, Rith submitted a determination of the probable hydrologic 
consequences of mining and reclamation operations in the subject area, supported by soil test 
results. The test results showed that the sampled materials were of low acidity and that the 
surrounding soils had buffering capabilities, thereby greatly reducing the risk of acid mine 
drainage. Based in part on those test results, OSM issued Rith a permit to mine in January 1986. 
In response to several complaints, OSM visited Rith’s mine site in March 1986 and 
obtained additional soil samples. Those samples showed the presence of a thick zone of acidic 
material in the shale overburden of the Sewanee coal seam. The OSM samples indicated that the 
potential acidity of the overburden at Rith’s site was some 250 percent greater than had been 
represented by Rith, and that the neutralization capacity of the soil was near zero. OSM directed 
Rith to provide further soil samples. Based on those samples, OSM concluded that the 
overburden posed a threat to the hydrological balance outside the permit area. In light of the 
“diametrically opposite” test results and what it characterized as a greatly heightened risk of acid 
mine drainage, OSM suspended Rith’s permit in June 1986. Rith did not appeal OSM’s decision 
to suspend its permit. 
OSM invited Rith to submit a toxic materials handling plan that would take into account 
the heightened risk of acid mine drainage at the Sewanee coal seam. Rith submitted a number of 
plans in an effort to have the suspension lifted, but none satisfied OSM that Rith had adequately 
addressed the concerns OSM had raised. From shortly after the issuance of the suspension order 
until May 1987, however, Rith was permitted to continue mining portions of the Richland coal 
seam where the risk of acid mine drainage was not as great. Rith ultimately extracted 
 729 
approximately 35,700 tons of coal from the Sewanee and Richland coal seams, which resulted in 
a profit of approximately $14 per ton. 
In September 1988, OSM rejected Rith’s final proposed toxic materials handling plan and 
denied a permit to resume mining in the disputed area. Rith then filed an administrative appeal 
pursuant to 30 U.S.C. §1264. In the administrative appeal, Rith challenged OSM’s actions on a 
number of grounds, including its contention that acid mine drainage was unlikely to occur at the 
mine site and that its toxic materials handling plan was sufficient to prevent hydrologic damage 
outside the permit area if acid mine drainage did occur. 
After a hearing, an administrative law judge from the Interior Department’s Office of 
Hearings and Appeals sustained OSM’s rejection of Rith’s plan. The administrative law judge 
concluded that “the overburden on the north side of [Rith’s] permit was undeniably of a highly 
acidic nature” and that it “had a high propensity to produce acid mine drainage.” Absent an 
adequate toxic materials handling plan, the administrative law judge found, there was “a high 
probability that there would be acid mine drainage into the Sewanee Conglomerate aquifer.” 
Finally, the administrative law judge concluded that Rith’s toxic materials handling plan “would 
not accomplish the necessary reclamation of the site, nor would it prevent damage to the 
hydrologic balance.” Rith appealed the decision of the administrative law judge to the Interior 
Board of Land Appeals (IBLA), which upheld the administrative law judge’s findings and 
affirmed his ruling. 
Both before and after the conclusion of the administrative proceedings, Rith instituted 
several actions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee 
challenging OSM’s conduct with respect to Rith’s mining permit, including an action seeking 
review of the IBLA ruling. In August 1990, Rith moved to dismiss the action in which it sought 
review of the IBLA decision. The district court granted that motion and dismissed the appeal 
with prejudice. After most of the claims in the other proceedings were dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds, the only remaining claim from the various district court actions was 
Rith’s claim for damages of $5 million against the United States. The district court transferred 
that claim to the United States Court of Federal Claims in May 1992. 
In the Court of Federal Claims, Rith filed an amended complaint that included a takings 
claim. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court ruled that no taking had occurred and 
accordingly entered judgment for the United States. The court found that “OSM’s denial of a 
mining permit to plaintiff, because of the high probability of acid mine draining into the Sewanee 
Conglomerate aquifer, represented an exercise of regulatory authority indistinguishable in 
purpose and result from that to which plaintiff was always subject under Tennessee nuisance 
law.” Rith Energy, 44 Fed. Cl. at 115. The fact that Rith was granted a surface water discharge 
permit by the state regulatory body was not persuasive evidence that Rith’s mining activities 
were consistent with state law, the court explained, because:  
the information plaintiff submitted to the state officials no more informed them of 
the high probability of harm to the Sewanee aquifer than did that same data when 
presented to the federal officials. We can justifiably assume, however, that even 
as the federal officials were persuaded to reexamine the validity of the permit they 
initially had issued, so too would the state officials. A high probability of 
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pollution of an aquifer is not within the tolerances of either regulatory scheme–the 
Tennessee Water Quality Control Act or SMCRA. Id. 
In an order denying a motion for reconsideration, the trial court added that the property 
use that was denied in this case–”the conduct of a surface mining operation that held out a ‘high 
probability’ of introducing acid mine drainage into the Sewanee Conglomerate aquifer”–is not a 
property use that Rith “could legitimately claim it had a right to pursue in consonance with 
relevant state property and nuisance principles.” Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 
366, 367 (1999). 
II 
Rith asserts that by preventing it from mining on the property covered by its coal leases, 
the government took its property without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
The Court of Federal Claims rejected Rith’s takings claim on the ground that under Tennessee 
nuisance law, Rith had no right to mine in a way that was likely to produce acid mine drainage, 
and that its property right in the coal leases therefore did not include the right to mine the 
Sewanee seam in the way that it wanted to. The court’s analysis was based on the so-called 
“nuisance defense” to takings claims described by the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), where the Court held 
that to avoid constituting a taking, a regulatory restraint that prohibits all economically beneficial 
use of land “must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the 
State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.” Id. at 1029. The Court 
in Lucas explained that when a regulation “that declares ‘off-limits’ all economically productive 
or beneficial uses of land goes beyond what the relevant background principles would dictate, 
compensation must be paid to sustain it.” Id. at 1030. 
Rith argues that its activities would not have been contrary to Tennessee nuisance law 
and that OSM’s restraint on Rith’s mining activities, which deprived Rith of all economic value 
in the coal leases, therefore constituted a compensable taking of its property interest in those 
leases. We need not reach the question whether Rith’s mining activities would have been 
prohibited by Tennessee nuisance law, however, because we conclude that when Rith purchased 
its coal leases it did not have any reason to expect that it would be permitted to mine in a way 
that was likely to produce acid mine drainage. 
A 
Under the current state of takings law, it is often important to determine at the outset 
whether a particular claimed taking was “categorical” or not. A categorical taking has been 
defined as one in which “all economically viable use, i.e., all economic value, has been taken by 
the regulatory imposition.” Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1357 
(Fed. Cir.), modifying 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A categorical taking is distinct from a 
taking “that is the consequence of a regulatory imposition that prohibits or restricts only some of 
the uses that would otherwise be available to the property owner, but leaves the owner with 
substantial viable economic use.” Id. In Palm Beach Isles, this court held that one significant 
difference between a categorical taking and a non-categorical taking is that in the former case, 
analyzing whether compensation is due does not require an inquiry into whether the plaintiff had 
 731 
reasonable investment-backed expectations that were defeated by the regulatory measure that 
gave rise to the takings claim. 
We agree with the government that the regulatory restraint at issue in this case did not 
result in a categorical taking. During the period that Rith was permitted to mine coal under the 
permit that OSM issued in January 1986, it extracted approximately 15,900 tons of coal from the 
leased property. Even after OSM suspended Rith’s permit in June 1986, OSM permitted Rith to 
continue mining coal from one of the two coal seams on the property, and Rith extracted an 
additional 19,800 tons of coal from that seam. Although Rith stated in its permit application that 
it expected to extract a total of approximately 250,000 tons of coal from the property covered by 
the permit (and later stated that it expected to extract approximately 385,000 tons of coal from 
the entire 250-acre area), Rith acknowledges that the 35,700 tons of coal that it extracted before 
it terminated its mining activities produced a profit of approximately $14 per ton, or a total profit 
of approximately $500,000, for Rith’s investors. Because Rith purchased the coal leases for a 
total of $33,500, it was able to recover its investment and considerably more in spite of the 
permitting restrictions imposed by OSM. 
Rith argues that in determining whether the government action in this case constituted a 
categorical taking, the loss to Rith must be measured as of September 1988, when OSM refused 
to accept Rith’s last version of its toxic materials handling plan. After that date, Rith was unable 
to mine any more coal from the leased property, and Rith contends that as of that time it was 
deprived of all remaining economic value in the coal leases. 
In measuring the regulatory burden on Rith’s mining activities, it is appropriate to look at 
the extent to which Rith was able to exploit its leases throughout the permitting period. By 
focusing on its inability to mine any coal under its permit after September 1988, Rith ignores the 
fact that it was allowed to extract a substantial amount of coal under its mining permit prior to 
that date. If the permit had provided at the outset that Rith could mine 35,700 tons of coal on the 
89 acres that were covered by its permit, it would not be accurate to characterize the regulatory 
restraint as categorical. The analysis is not different simply because OSM imposed a condition 
on the permit during the course of Rith’s mining activities that had the effect of preventing Rith 
from extracting any more than the 35,700 tons it had already mined. If, for example, OSM’s 
restraints had been made effective after Rith had removed half the coal from the leased property, 
it could hardly be said that the restraint gave rise to a categorical taking because OSM’s 
prohibition on further mining took the entire remaining value of the leases as of that time. See 
Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 643-44, 124 L. Ed. 2d 
539, 113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993) (“a claimant’s parcel of property could not first be divided into what 
was taken and what was left for the purpose of demonstrating the taking of the former to be 
complete and hence compensable”); Keystone Bituminous Coal Co. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 
470, 498-99, 94 L. Ed. 2d 472, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). 
Because Rith applied for a permit to mine all of the coal within the 89-acre area identified 
in the application, the impact of OSM’s action must be measured, at minimum, by the entire coal 
reserve covered by the permit, not the portion that remained at the time Rith was forced to stop 
mining. The regulatory program began with the issuance of the permit in January 1986, extended 
through the period in which the permit was suspended, starting in June 1986, and ended when 
Rith abandoned further efforts to devise a satisfactory toxic materials handling plan in September 
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1988. During the first six months of that period, Rith was able to mine under the authority of the 
permit, and even during the period following the permit suspension, Rith was allowed to 
continue mining coal from one of the two seams on the leased property. Viewing the impact of 
the regulatory program as a whole, OSM’s restraints significantly limited Rith’s rights to mine, 
but even within those limits Rith was able to mine a significant amount of coal that earned Rith a 
substantial profit on its investment in the leases. 
In determining whether a taking is categorical, “the owner’s opportunity to recoup its 
investment or better, subject to the regulation, cannot be ignored.” Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. 
United States, 791 F.2d 893, 905 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 
F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (the fact that, despite the challenged regulatory restraint, the 
value of the subject property increased more than three-fold in 11 years “itself undermines 
Forest’s contention that its property was taken”). While the $500,000 in profit that Rith earned 
on the extracted coal was far less than it hoped to earn from the coal leases, the sum was 
considerably more than the $33,500 that Rith invested in the leases. Thus, the 35,700 tons, 
although only about 14 percent of the amount Rith hoped to extract under its permit, cannot be 
regarded as merely a “nominal” recovery, see Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 
1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1994), reflecting the “total wipe-out” that accompanies a categorical 
taking, see Palm Beach Isles, 208 F.3d at 1380. For that reason, it is not appropriate to 
characterize OSM’s restraints as “a prohibition of all economically viable use” of the property in 
question, see Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1564-65. The restraint in this case therefore did not result 
in one of “the relatively rare situations where the government has deprived a landowner of all 
economically beneficial uses.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.B. 
Under this court’s decision in Palm Beach Isles, the consequence of concluding that there 
was no categorical taking in this case is that in order to establish that OSM’s regulatory restraints 
constituted a compensable taking, Rith must show that it had a reasonable investment-backed 
expectation that it would not be subject to such restraints when it acquired the coal leases. Our 
precedents make clear that Rith could not have had such expectations. SMCRA was enacted 
eight years before Rith purchased the coal leases. Its provisions include environmental 
performance standards that directly address acid mine drainage and make clear that surface 
mining will not be permitted unless the permittee minimizes the “disturbances to the prevailing 
hydrologic balance at the mine-site and in associated offsite areas and to the quality and quantity 
of water in surface and ground water systems . . . by avoiding acid or other toxic mine drainage . 
. . .” 30 U.S.C. §1265(b)(10). In light of that statutory provision, Rith could not reasonably have 
expected that it would be free from regulatory oversight with regard to the potential for acid 
mine drainage, and it could not reasonably have expected that it would not be required to adopt 
potentially expensive measures to avoid acid mine drainage if OSM determined that its mining 
activities could result in the release of those or other toxins. As this court explained in M & J 
Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995), at the time Rith acquired its 
mining rights, “it knew or should have known that it could not mine in such a way as to endanger 
public health or safety and that any state authorization it may have received was subordinate to 
the national standards that were established by SMCRA and enforced by OSM.” See generally 
Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the property owner 
had no reasonable investment-backed expectations because he “had both constructive and actual 
knowledge that either state or federal regulations could ultimately prevent him from building on 
the property”); Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1994)(stating that one who 
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buys with knowledge of regulatory restrictions on the use of property “assumes the risk of 
economic loss. In such a case, the owner presumably paid a discounted price for the property. 
Compensating him for a ‘taking’ would confer a windfall.”). 
Section 521(a)(2) of SMCRA,  30 U.S.C. §1271(a)(2), provides that when the Secretary 
determines that any condition exists that creates “an imminent danger to the health or safety of 
the public or is causing, or can reasonably be expected to cause significant, imminent 
environmental harm to land, air, or water resources,” the Secretary may order the immediate 
cessation of surface coal mining operations relating to that condition. Although OSM did not 
explicitly invoke section 521(a)(2) when it suspended Rith’s permit in June 1986, that was the 
apparent source of its authority to issue the suspension order. Because Rith did not appeal the 
suspension of its permit, it was not necessary for the administrative law judge to address directly 
whether the standard of section 521(a)(2) was satisfied, but the administrative law judge’s 
findings in the appeal from the denial of the revision to Rith’s permit  support the suspension–
particularly his findings that absent an effective toxic materials handling plan, there was “a high 
probability that there would be acid mine drainage into the Sewanee Conglomerate aquifer” 
resulting in damage to the hydrologic balance. In support of his findings, the administrative law 
judge cited testimony from an OSM employee that Rith’s mine site “contained one of the highest 
levels of acid material that he had ever seen, nationwide, in nine years of looking at hundreds of 
permits.” The Court of Federal Claims, moreover, noted that it is well known that acid mine 
drainage can destroy aquatic life and create serious problems for domestic and public water 
supplies, and that acid mine drainage can continue for years, even after mining operations have 
been halted.  Rith Energy, 44 Fed. Cl. at 111 n.3. For those reasons, the court agreed with the 
administrative law judge that if OSM had failed to act, there was a high probability that acid 
mine drainage would have occurred, severely polluting the Sewanee Conglomerate and 
endangering domestic and public water supplies. 
Although Rith attacks the lawfulness of OSM’s rejection of its toxic materials handling 
plan, that challenge is not properly before us. Like the coal mine operator in M & J Coal, Rith 
had the opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of OSM’s actions, including the suspension of its 
permit, the rejection of its toxic materials handling plan, and the ultimate denial of its permit in 
administrative proceedings and through judicial review in a United States district court. In fact, 
Rith challenged the rejection of its toxic materials handling plan administratively, and lost. Like 
the coal mine operator in M & J Coal, Rith appealed that decision to the IBLA. After losing 
before the IBLA, Rith sought judicial review in federal district court, but dismissed that action. 
In a similar setting, we held in M & J Coal that “neither the Court of Federal Claims nor this 
court may entertain a collateral challenge to the validity of OSM’s actions,” 47 F.3d at 1154, and 
we see no reason to depart from that holding here. 
In this case, having forgone its challenge to OSM’s administrative actions, Rith is not 
free to renew its challenge to those actions under the cover of a takings claim in the Court of 
Federal Claims. Rith is thus required to litigate its takings claim on the assumption that the 
administrative action was both authorized and lawful. On the facts of this case, the consequence 
of assuming the lawfulness of OSM’s actions, i.e., that OSM was correct in concluding that 
Rith’s mining activities constituted an unacceptable threat of acid mine drainage and the 
consequent pollution of groundwater in the area surrounding the mine operations, is to limit the 
issue before us to whether prohibiting Rith from mining under those circumstances constitutes a 
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taking. And on that issue, as we have explained, the absence of a reasonable investment-backed 
expectation on Rith’s part that it would be permitted to mine while producing acid mine 
discharge in violation of SMCRA defeats its takings claim. We therefore uphold the judgment of 
the Court of Federal Claims. 
AFFIRMED. 
TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL, INC. v. TAHOE REGIONAL 
PLANNING AGENCY 
535 U.S. 302 (2002) 
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’CONNOR, KENNEDY, 
SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C. J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which SCALIA, J., and THOMAS, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined.   
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether a moratorium on development imposed during the 
process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a per se taking of property 
requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. This case 
actually involves two moratoria ordered by respondent Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 
(TRPA) to maintain the status quo while studying the impact of development on Lake Tahoe and 
designing a strategy for environmentally sound growth. The first, Ordinance 81-5, was effective 
from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983, whereas the second more restrictive Resolution 
83-21 was in effect from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984. As a result of these two 
directives, virtually all development on a substantial portion of the property subject to TRPA’s 
jurisdiction was prohibited for a period of 32 months. 
I 
The relevant facts are undisputed. The Court of Appeals, while reversing the District 
Court on a question of law, accepted all of its findings of fact, and no party challenges those 
findings. All agree that Lake Tahoe is “uniquely beautiful,” that President Clinton was right to 
call it a “‘national treasure that must be protected and preserved,” and that Mark Twain aptly 
described the clarity of its waters as “‘not merely transparent, but dazzlingly, brilliantly so,” 
(emphasis added) (quoting M. Twain, Roughing It 174-175 (1872)). 
Lake Tahoe’s exceptional clarity is attributed to the absence of algae that obscures the 
waters of most other lakes. Historically, the lack of nitrogen and phosphorous, which nourish the 
growth of algae, has ensured the transparency of its waters. Unfortunately, the lake’s pristine 
state has deteriorated rapidly over the past 40 years; increased land development in the Lake 
Tahoe Basin (Basin) has threatened the “‘noble sheet of blue water’” beloved by Twain and 
countless others. Given this trend, the District Court predicted that “unless the process is 
stopped, the lake will lose its clarity and its trademark blue color, becoming green and opaque 
for eternity.” 
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Those areas in the Basin that have steeper slopes produce more runoff; therefore, they are 
usually considered “high hazard” lands. Moreover, certain areas near streams or wetlands known 
as “Stream Environment Zones” (SEZs) are especially vulnerable to the impact of development 
because, in their natural state, they act as filters for much of the debris that runoff carries. 
Because “the most obvious response to this problem . . . is to restrict development around the 
lake–especially in SEZ lands, as well as in areas already naturally prone to runoff,” conservation 
efforts have focused on controlling growth in these high hazard areas. 
In the 1960’s, when the problems associated with the burgeoning development began to 
receive significant attention, jurisdiction over the Basin, which occupies 501 square miles, was 
shared by the States of California and Nevada, five counties, several municipalities, and the 
Forest Service of the Federal Government. In 1968, the legislatures of the two States adopted the 
Tahoe Regional Planning Compact. The compact set goals for the protection and preservation of 
the lake and created TRPA as the agency assigned “to coordinate and regulate development in 
the Basin and to conserve its natural resources.” Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 394, 59 L. Ed. 2d 401, 99 S. Ct. 1171 (1979).   
Pursuant to the compact, in 1972 TRPA adopted a Land Use Ordinance that divided the 
land in the Basin into seven “land capability districts,” based largely on steepness but also taking 
into consideration other factors affecting runoff. Each district was assigned a “land coverage 
coefficient–a recommended limit on the percentage of such land that could be covered by 
impervious surface.” Those limits ranged from 1% for districts 1 and 2 to 30% for districts 6 and 
7. Land in districts 1, 2, and 3 is characterized as “high hazard” or “sensitive,” while land in 
districts 4, 5, 6, and 7 is “low hazard” or “non-sensitive.” The SEZ lands, though often treated as 
a separate category, were actually a subcategory of district 1.   
Eventually the two States, with the approval of Congress and the President, adopted an 
extensive amendment to the compact that became effective on December 19, 1980. The 1980 
Tahoe Regional Planning Compact (Compact) redefined the structure, functions, and voting 
procedures of TRPA, and directed it to develop regional “environmental threshold carrying 
capacities”–a term that embraced “standards for air quality, water quality, soil conservation, 
vegetation preservation and noise.” The Compact provided that TRPA “shall adopt” those 
standards within 18 months, and that “within 1 year after” their adoption (i.e., by June 19, 1983), 
it “shall” adopt an amended regional plan that achieves and maintains those carrying capacities. 
The Compact also contained a finding by the Legislatures of California and Nevada “that in 
order to make effective the regional plan as revised by [TRPA], it is necessary to halt 
temporarily works of development in the region which might otherwise absorb the entire 
capability of the region for further development or direct it out of harmony with the ultimate 
plan.” Accordingly, for the period prior to the adoption of the final plan (“or until May 1, 1983, 
whichever is earlier”), the Compact itself prohibited the development of new subdivisions, 
condominiums, and apartment buildings, and also prohibited each city and county in the Basin 
from granting any more permits in 1981, 1982, or 1983 than had been granted in 1978. 
Despite the fact that TRPA performed these obligations in “good faith and to the best of 
its ability,” after a few months it concluded that it could not meet the deadlines in the Compact. 
On June 25, 1981, it therefore enacted Ordinance 81-5 imposing the first of the two moratoria on 
development that petitioners challenge in this proceeding. The ordinance provided that it would 
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become effective on August 24, 1981, and remain in effect pending the adoption of the 
permanent plan required by the Compact.  
The District Court made a detailed analysis of the ordinance, noting that it might even 
prohibit hiking or picnicking on SEZ lands, but construed it as essentially banning any 
construction or other activity that involved the removal of vegetation or the creation of land 
coverage on all SEZ lands, as well as on class 1, 2, and 3 lands in California. Some permits could 
be obtained for such construction in Nevada if certain findings were made.  It is undisputed, 
however, that Ordinance 81-5 prohibited the construction of any new residences on SEZ lands in 
either State and on class 1, 2, and 3 lands in California. 
Given the complexity of the task of defining “environmental threshold carrying 
capacities” and the division of opinion within TRPA’s governing board, the District Court found 
that it was “unsurprising” that TRPA failed to adopt those thresholds until August 26, 1982, 
roughly two months after the Compact deadline. Under a liberal reading of the Compact, TRPA 
then had until August 26, 1983, to adopt a new regional plan. “Unfortunately, but again not 
surprisingly, no regional plan was in place as of that date.” TRPA therefore adopted Resolution 
83-21, “which completely suspended all project reviews and approvals, including the acceptance 
of new proposals,” and which remained in effect until a new regional plan was adopted on April 
26, 1984. Thus, Resolution 83-21 imposed an 8-month moratorium prohibiting all construction 
on high hazard lands in either State. In combination, Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 
effectively prohibited all construction on sensitive lands in California and on all SEZ lands in the 
entire Basin for 32 months, and on sensitive lands in Nevada (other than SEZ lands) for eight 
months. It is these two moratoria that are at issue in this case. 
On the same day that the 1984 plan was adopted, the State of California filed an action 
seeking to enjoin its implementation on the ground that it failed to establish land-use controls 
sufficiently stringent to protect the Basin.  The District Court entered an injunction that was 
upheld by the Court of Appeals and remained in effect until a completely revised plan was 
adopted in 1987. Both the 1984 injunction and the 1987 plan contained provisions that prohibited 
new construction on sensitive lands in the Basin. As the case comes to us, however, we have no 
occasion to consider the validity of those provisions. 
II 
Approximately two months after the adoption of the 1984 Plan, petitioners filed parallel 
actions against TRPA and other defendants in federal courts in Nevada and California that were 
ultimately consolidated for trial in the District of Nevada. The petitioners include the Tahoe 
Sierra Preservation Council, a nonprofit membership corporation representing about 2,000 
owners of both improved and unimproved parcels of real estate in the Lake Tahoe Basin, and a 
class of some 400 individual owners of vacant lots located either on SEZ lands or in other parts 
of districts 1, 2, or 3. Those individuals purchased their properties prior to the effective date of 
the 1980 Compact, primarily for the purpose of constructing “at a time of their choosing” a 
single-family home “to serve as a permanent, retirement or vacation residence,” When they made 
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those purchases, they did so with the understanding that such construction was authorized 
provided that “they complied with all reasonable requirements for building.”1 
Petitioners’ complaints gave rise to protracted litigation that has produced four opinions 
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and several published District Court opinions. For 
present purposes, however, we need only describe those courts’ disposition of the claim that 
three actions taken by TRPA–Ordinance 81-5, Resolution 83-21, and the 1984 regional plan–
constituted takings of petitioners’ property without just compensation. Indeed, the challenge to 
the 1984 plan is not before us because both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that 
it was the federal injunction against implementing that plan, rather than the plan itself, that 
caused the post-1984 injuries that petitioners allegedly suffered, and those rulings are not 
encompassed within our limited grant of certiorari. Thus, we limit our discussion to the lower 
courts’ disposition of the claims based on the 2-year moratorium (Ordinance 81-5) and the 
ensuing 8-month moratorium (Resolution 83-21). 
The District Court began its constitutional analysis by identifying the distinction between 
a direct government appropriation of property without just compensation and a government 
regulation that imposes such a severe restriction on the owner’s use of her property that it 
produces “nearly the same result as a direct appropriation.” The court noted that all of the claims 
in this case “are of the ‘regulatory takings’ variety.” Citing our decision in Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 65 L. Ed. 2d 106, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980), it then stated that a “regulation 
will constitute a taking when either: (1) it does not substantially advance a legitimate state 
interest; or (2) it denies the owner economically viable use of her land.” 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1239. 
The District Court rejected the first alternative based on its finding that “further development on 
high hazard lands such as [petitioners’] would lead to significant additional damage to the lake.” 
Id. at 1240. With respect to the second alternative, the court first considered whether the analysis 
adopted in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 
2646 (1978), would lead to the conclusion that TRPA had effected a “partial taking,”2 and then 
whether those actions had effected a “total taking.” 
Emphasizing the temporary nature of the regulations, the testimony that the “average 
holding time of a lot in the Tahoe area between lot purchase and home construction is twenty-
five years,” and the failure of petitioners to offer specific evidence of harm, the District Court 
concluded that “consideration of the Penn Central factors clearly leads to the conclusion that 
there was no taking.” In the absence of evidence regarding any of the individual plaintiffs, the 
court evaluated the “average” purchasers’ intent and found that such purchasers “did not have 
                                                 
1 
As explained above, the petitioners who purchased land after the 1972 compact did so amidst a heavily regulated 
zoning scheme. Their property was already classified as part of land capability districts 1, 2, and 3, or SEZ land. 
And each land classification was subject to regulations as to the degree of artificial disturbance the land could safely 
sustain. 
2
 The Penn Central analysis involves “a complex of factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the 
landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the 
character of the government action.” Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617, 150 L. Ed. 2d 592, 121 S. Ct. 
2448 (2001). 
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reasonable, investment-backed expectations that they would be able to build single-family homes 
on their land within the six-year period involved in this lawsuit.”3 
The District Court had more difficulty with the “total taking” issue. Although it was 
satisfied that petitioners’ property did retain some value during the moratoria, it found that they 
had been temporarily deprived of “all economically viable use of their land.” The court 
concluded that those actions therefore constituted “categorical” takings under our decision in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 
(1992). It rejected TRPA’s response that Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 were “reasonable 
temporary planning moratoria” that should be excluded from Lucas’ categorical approach. The 
court thought it “fairly clear” that such interim actions would not have been viewed as takings 
prior to our decisions in Lucas and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. 
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987), because 
“zoning boards, cities, counties and other agencies used them all the time to ‘maintain the status 
quo pending study and governmental decision making.” After expressing uncertainty as to 
whether those cases required a holding that moratoria on development automatically effect 
takings, the court concluded that TRPA’s actions did so, partly because neither the ordinance nor 
the resolution, even though intended to be temporary from the beginning, contained an express 
termination date. 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1250-1251. Accordingly, it ordered TRPA to pay damages to 
most petitioners for the 32-month period from August 24, 1981, to April 25, 1984, and to those 
owning class 1, 2, or 3 property in Nevada for the 8-month period from August 27, 1983, to 
April 25, 1984.   
Both parties appealed. TRPA successfully challenged the District Court’s takings 
determination, and petitioners unsuccessfully challenged the dismissal of their claims based on 
the 1984 and 1987 plans. Petitioners did not, however, challenge the District Court’s findings or 
conclusions concerning its application of Penn Central. With respect to the two moratoria, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that petitioners had expressly disavowed an argument “that the regulations 
constitute a taking under the ad hoc balancing approach described in Penn Central” and that they 
did not “dispute that the restrictions imposed on their properties are appropriate means of 
securing the purpose set forth in the Compact.” Accordingly, the only question before the court 
was “whether the rule set forth in Lucas applies–that is, whether a categorical taking occurred 
because Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 denied the plaintiffs’ ‘all economically beneficial 
or productive use of land.’” 216 F.3d 764, 773 (2000). Moreover, because petitioners brought 
only a facial challenge, the narrow inquiry before the Court of Appeals was whether the mere 
enactment of the regulations constituted a taking.  
Contrary to the District Court, the Court of Appeals held that because the regulations had 
only a temporary impact on petitioners’ fee interest in the properties, no categorical taking had 
occurred. It reasoned: 
                                                 
3
 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1241. The court stated that petitioners “had plenty of time to build before the restrictions went 
into effect –and almost everyone in the Tahoe Basin knew in the late 1970s that a crackdown on development was in 
the works.” In addition, the court found “the fact that no evidence was introduced regarding the specific diminution 
in value of any of the plaintiffs’ individual properties clearly weighs against a finding that there was a partial taking 
of the plaintiffs’ property.” Ibid. 
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“Property interests may have many different dimensions. For example, the 
dimensions of a property interest may include a physical dimension (which 
describes the size and shape of the property in question), a functional dimension 
(which describes the extent to which an owner may use or dispose of the property 
in question), and a temporal dimension (which describes the duration of the 
property interest). At base, the plaintiffs’ argument is that we should conceptually 
sever each plaintiff’s fee interest into discrete segments in at least one of these 
dimensions–the temporal one–and treat each of those segments as separate and 
distinct property interests for purposes of takings analysis. Under this theory, they 
argue that there was a categorical taking of one of those temporal segments.” 216 
F.3d at 774. 
Putting to one side “cases of physical invasion or occupation,” the court read our cases 
involving regulatory taking claims to focus on the impact of a regulation on the parcel as a 
whole. In its view a “planning regulation that prevents the development of a parcel for a 
temporary period of time is conceptually no different than a land-use restriction that permanently 
denies all use on a discrete portion of property, or that permanently restricts a type of use across 
all of the parcel.” 216 F.3d at 776.  In each situation, a regulation that affects only a portion of 
the parcel–whether limited by time, use, or space–does not deprive the owner of all economically 
beneficial use.
4
 
The Court of Appeals distinguished Lucas as applying to the “‘relatively rare’” case in 
which a regulation denies all productive use of an entire parcel, whereas the moratoria involve 
only a “temporal ‘slice’” of the fee interest and a form of regulation that is widespread and well 
established. It also rejected petitioners’ argument that our decision in First English was 
controlling. According to the Court of Appeals, First English concerned the question whether 
compensation is an appropriate remedy for a temporary taking and not whether or when such a 
taking has occurred. Faced squarely with the question whether a taking had occurred, the court 
held that Penn Central was the appropriate framework for analysis. Petitioners, however, had 
failed to challenge the District Court’s conclusion that they could not make out a taking claim 
under the Penn Central factors. 
                                                 
4
 The Court of Appeals added: 
“Each of these three types of regulation will have an impact on the parcel’s value, because each will affect an aspect 
of the owner’s ‘use’ of the property–by restricting when the ‘use’ may occur, where the ‘use’ may occur, or how the 
‘use’ may occur. Prior to Agins [v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 65 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1980)], the 
Court had already rejected takings challenges to regulations eliminating all ‘use’ on a portion of the property, and to 
regulations restricting the type of ‘use’ across the breadth of the property. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31; 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, 480 U.S. at 498-99; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384, 
397, 71 L. Ed. 303, 47 S. Ct. 114 . . . (1926) (75% diminution in value caused by zoning law); see also William C. 
Haas & Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1979) (value reduced from 
$2,000,000 to $100,000). In those cases, the Court ‘uniformly rejected the proposition that diminution in property 
value, standing alone, can establish a “taking.”‘ Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131 . . .; see also Concrete Pipe and 
Products, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645, 124 L. Ed. 2d 539, 113 S. Ct. 2264 . . . 
(1993). There is no plausible basis on which to distinguish a similar diminution in value that results from a 
temporary suspension of development.” 216 F.3d at 776-777. 
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Over the dissent of five judges, the Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc. 
228 F.3d 998 (2000). In the dissenters’ opinion, the panel’s holding was not faithful to this 
Court’s decisions in First English and Lucas, nor to Justice Holmes admonition in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922), that “‘a strong 
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a 
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.’” 228 F.3d at 1003. Because of 
the importance of the case, we granted certiorari limited to the question stated at the beginning of 
this opinion.  533 U.S. 948, 121 S. Ct. 2589, 150 L. Ed. 2d 749 (2001). We now affirm. 
III 
Petitioners make only a facial attack on Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21. They 
contend that the mere enactment of a temporary regulation that, while in effect, denies a property 
owner all viable economic use of her property gives rise to an unqualified constitutional 
obligation to compensate her for the value of its use during that period. Hence, they “face an 
uphill battle,” Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495, 94 L. Ed. 2d 
472, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987), that is made especially steep by their desire for a categorical rule 
requiring compensation whenever the government imposes such a moratorium on development. 
Under their proposed rule, there is no need to evaluate the landowners’ investment-backed 
expectations, the actual impact of the regulation on any individual, the importance of the public 
interest served by the regulation, or the reasons for imposing the temporary restriction. For 
petitioners, it is enough that a regulation imposes a temporary deprivation–no matter how brief–
of all economically viable use to trigger a per se rule that a taking has occurred. Petitioners assert 
that our opinions in First English and Lucas have already endorsed their view, and that it is a 
logical application of the principle that the Takings Clause was “designed to bar Government 
from forcing some people alone to bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1554, 
80 S. Ct. 1563 (1960). 
We shall first explain why our cases do not support their proposed categorical rule–
indeed, fairly read, they implicitly reject it. Next, we shall explain why the Armstrong principle 
requires rejection of that rule as well as the less extreme position advanced by petitioners at oral 
argument. In our view the answer to the abstract question whether a temporary moratorium 
effects a taking is neither “yes, always” nor “no, never”; the answer depends upon the particular 
circumstances of the case. We conclude that the circumstances in this case are best analyzed 
within the Penn Central framework. 
IV 
The text of the Fifth Amendment itself provides a basis for drawing a distinction between 
physical takings and regulatory takings. Its plain language requires the payment of compensation 
whenever the government acquires private property for a public purpose, whether the acquisition 
is the result of a condemnation proceeding or a physical appropriation. But the Constitution 
contains no comparable reference to regulations that prohibit a property owner from making 
certain uses of her private property. Our jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical 
takings is as old as the Republic and, for the most part, involves the straightforward application 
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of per se rules. Our regulatory takings jurisprudence, in contrast, is of more recent vintage and is 
characterized by “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 . 
When the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some 
public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner, regardless of whether 
the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof. Thus, compensation 
is mandated when a leasehold is taken and the government occupies the property for its own 
purposes, even though that use is temporary. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 
373, 89 L. Ed. 311, 65 S. Ct. 357 (1945). Similarly, when the government appropriates part of a 
rooftop in order to provide cable TV access for apartment tenants, Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868, 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982); or when its 
planes use private airspace to approach a government airport, United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 
256, 90 L. Ed. 1206, 66 S. Ct. 1062 (1946), it is required to pay for that share no matter how 
small. But a government regulation that merely prohibits landlords from evicting tenants 
unwilling to pay a higher rent, Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 65 L. Ed. 865, 41 S. Ct. 458 (1921); 
that bans certain private uses of a portion of an owner’s property, Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 71 L. Ed. 303, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. 
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 94 L. Ed. 2d 472, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987); or that forbids the 
private use of certain airspace, Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 57 L. 
Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978), does not constitute a categorical taking. “The first category of 
cases requires courts to apply a clear rule; the second necessarily entails complex factual 
assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government actions.” Yee v. Escondido, 
503 U.S. 519, 523, 118 L. Ed. 2d 153, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).  
This longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for public use, on the one 
hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases 
involving physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that there has 
been a “regulatory taking,” and vice versa. For the same reason that we do not ask whether a 
physical appropriation advances a substantial government interest or whether it deprives the 
owner of all economically valuable use, we do not apply our precedent from the physical takings 
context to regulatory takings claims. Land-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of them 
impact property values in some tangential way–often in completely unanticipated ways. Treating 
them all as per se takings would transform government regulation into a luxury few governments 
could afford. By contrast, physical appropriations are relatively rare, easily identified, and 
usually represent a greater affront to individual property rights.
5
 “This case does not present the 
                                                 
5
 According to the Chief Justice’s dissent, even a temporary, use-prohibiting regulation should be governed by our 
physical takings cases because, under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017, 120 L. Ed. 2d 
798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), “from the landowner’s point of view,” the moratorium is the functional equivalent of a 
forced leasehold. Of course, from both the landowner’s and the government’s standpoint there are critical 
differences between a leasehold and a moratorium. Condemnation of a leasehold gives the government possession of 
the property, the right to admit and exclude others, and the right to use it for a public purpose. A regulatory taking, 
by contrast, does not give the government any right to use the property, nor does it dispossess the owner or affect her 
right to exclude others. 
The Chief Justice stretches Luca "equivalence” language too far. For even a regulation that constitutes only a minor 
infringement on property may, from the landowner’s perspective, be the functional equivalent of an appropriation. 
Lucas carved out a narrow exception to the rules governing regulatory takings for the “extraordinary circumstance” 
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‘classic taking’ in which the government directly appropriates private property for its own use,” 
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522, 141 L. Ed. 2d 451, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998); 
instead the interference with property rights “arises from some public program adjusting the 
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good,” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 
124. 
Perhaps recognizing this fundamental distinction, petitioners wisely do not place all their 
emphasis on analogies to physical takings cases. Instead, they rely principally on our decision in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 
(1992)–a regulatory takings case that, nevertheless, applied a categorical rule–to argue that the 
Penn Central framework is inapplicable here. A brief review of some of the cases that led to our 
decision in Lucas, however, will help to explain why the holding in that case does not answer the 
question presented here. 
As we noted in Lucas, it was Justice Holmes’ opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922),
6
 that gave birth to our regulatory 
takings jurisprudence.
7
 
In subsequent opinions we have repeatedly and consistently endorsed Holmes’ 
observation that “if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Justice Holmes did 
not provide a standard for determining when a regulation goes “too far,” but he did reject the 
view expressed in Justice Brandeis’ dissent that there could not be a taking because the property 
remained in the possession of the owner and had not been appropriated or used by the public. 
After Mahon, neither a physical appropriation nor a public use has ever been a necessary 
component of a “regulatory taking.” 
                                                                                                                                                             
of a permanent deprivation of all beneficial use. The exception was only partially justified based on the 
“equivalence” theory cited by his dissent. It was also justified on the theory that, in the “relatively rare situations 
where the government has deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses,” it is less realistic to assume 
that the regulation will secure an “average reciprocity of advantage,” or that government could not go on if required 
to pay for every such restriction.  505 U.S. at 1017-1018. But as we explain, infra, at 35-38, these assumptions hold 
true in the context of a moratorium. 
6
 The case involved “a bill in equity brought by the defendants in error to prevent the Pennsylvania Coal Company 
from mining under their property in such way as to remove the supports and cause a subsidence of the surface and of 
their house.” Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.  Mahon sought to prevent Pennsylvania Coal from mining under his property 
by relying on a state statute, which prohibited any mining that could undermine the foundation of a home. The 
company challenged the statute as a taking of its interest in the coal without compensation. 
7
 In Lucas, we explained: “Prior to Justice Holmes’s exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 
67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922), it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a ‘direct 
appropriation’ of property, Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 12 Wall. 457, 551, 20 L. Ed. 287, (1871), or the 
functional equivalent of a ‘practical ouster of [the owner’s] possession,’ Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 
642, 25 L. Ed. 336 (1879) . . . . Justice Holmes recognized in Mahon, however, that if the protection against physical 
appropriations of private property was to be meaningfully enforced, the government’s power to redefine the range of 
interests included in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained by constitutional limits.  260 U.S. at 
414-415. If, instead, the uses of private property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualification under the 
police power, ‘the natural tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the qualification more and more until at 
last private property disappeared.’ Id. at 415. These considerations gave birth in that case to the oft-cited maxim 
that, ‘while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” 
Ibid. 505 U.S. at 1014 (citation omitted). 
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In the decades following that decision, we have “generally eschewed” any set formula for 
determining how far is too far, choosing instead to engage in “‘essentially ad hoc, factual 
inquiries.’” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). Indeed, we still 
resist the temptation to adopt per se rules in our cases involving partial regulatory takings, 
preferring to examine “a number of factors” rather than a simple “mathematically precise” 
formula.  Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court in Penn Central did, however, make it clear 
that even though multiple factors are relevant in the analysis of regulatory takings claims, in such 
cases we must focus on “the parcel as a whole”: 
‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and 
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely 
abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a 
taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the 
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole–here, the 
city tax block designated as the ‘landmark site.’” 438 U.S. at 130-131. 
This requirement that “the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety” explains why, for 
example, a regulation that prohibited commercial transactions in eagle feathers, but did not bar 
other uses or impose any physical invasion or restraint upon them, was not a taking.  Andrus v. 
Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). It also clarifies why restrictions on the use of only limited portions of 
the parcel, such as set-back ordinances, Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927), or a requirement 
that coal pillars be left in place to prevent mine subsidence, Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 498, were not considered regulatory takings. In each of these cases, 
we affirmed that “where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of 
one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking.” Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66. 
While the foregoing cases considered whether particular regulations had “gone too far” 
and were therefore invalid, none of them addressed the separate remedial question of how 
compensation is measured once a regulatory taking is established. In his dissenting opinion in 
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636, 67 L. Ed. 2d 551, 101 S. Ct. 1287 
(1981), Justice Brennan identified that question and explained how he would answer it: 
“The constitutional rule I propose requires that, once a court finds that a police 
power regulation has effected a ‘taking,’ the government entity must pay just 
compensation for the period commencing on the date the regulation first effected 
the ‘taking,’ and ending on the date the government entity chooses to rescind or 
otherwise amend the regulation.” Id. at 658. 
Justice Brennan’s proposed rule was subsequently endorsed by the Court in First English, 
482 U.S. at 315, 318, 321. First English was certainly a significant decision, and nothing that we 
say today qualifies its holding. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that we did not address 
in that case the quite different and logically prior question whether the temporary regulation at 
issue had in fact constituted a taking. 
In First English, the Court unambiguously and repeatedly characterized the issue to be 
decided as a “compensation question” or a “remedial question.” (“The disposition of the case on 
these grounds isolates the remedial question for our consideration”. And the Court’s statement of 
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its holding was equally unambiguous: “We merely hold that where the government’s activities 
have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can 
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was 
effective.” In fact, First English expressly disavowed any ruling on the merits of the takings issue 
because the California courts had decided the remedial question on the assumption that a taking 
had been alleged.  (“We reject appellee’s suggestion that . . . we must independently evaluate the 
adequacy of the complaint and resolve the takings claim on the merits before we can reach the 
remedial question”). After our remand, the California courts concluded that there had not been a 
taking, First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 
3d 1353, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1989), and we declined review of that decision, 493 U.S. 1056 
(1990). 
To the extent that the Court in First English referenced the antecedent takings question, 
we identified two reasons why a regulation temporarily denying an owner all use of her property 
might not constitute a taking. First, we recognized that “the county might avoid the conclusion 
that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing that the denial of all use was insulated as 
a part of the State’s authority to enact safety regulations.” 482 U.S. at 313. Second, we limited 
our holding “to the facts presented” and recognized “the quite different questions that would 
arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, 
variances, and the]  like which [were] not before us.” Thus, our decision in First English surely 
did not approve, and implicitly rejected, the categorical submission that petitioners are now 
advocating. 
Similarly, our decision in Lucas is not dispositive of the question presented. Although 
Lucas endorsed and applied a categorical rule, it was not the one that petitioners propose. Lucas 
purchased two residential lots in 1988 for $975,000. These lots were rendered “valueless” by a 
statute enacted two years later. The trial court found that a taking had occurred and ordered 
compensation of $1,232,387.50, representing the value of the fee simple estate, plus interest. As 
the statute read at the time of the trial, it effected a taking that “was unconditional and 
permanent.” 505 U.S. at 1012. While the State’s appeal was pending, the statute was amended to 
authorize exceptions that might have allowed Lucas to obtain a building permit. Despite the fact 
that the amendment gave the State Supreme Court the opportunity to dispose of the appeal on 
ripeness grounds, it resolved the merits of the permanent takings claim and reversed. Since 
“Lucas had no reason to proceed on a ‘temporary taking’ theory at trial,” we decided the case on 
the permanent taking theory that both the trial court and the State Supreme Court had addressed. 
Ibid. 
The categorical rule that we applied in Lucas states that compensation is required when a 
regulation deprives an owner of “all economically beneficial uses” of his land.  Under that rule, a 
statute that “wholly eliminated the value” of Lucas’ fee simple title clearly qualified as a taking. 
But our holding was limited to “the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or 
economically beneficial use of land is permitted.” The emphasis on the word “no” in the text of 
the opinion was, in effect, reiterated in a footnote explaining that the categorical rule would not 
apply if the diminution in value were 95% instead of 100%.  Anything less than a “complete 
elimination of value,” or a “total loss,” the Court acknowledged, would require the kind of 
analysis applied in Penn Central. 
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Certainly, our holding that the permanent “obliteration of the value” of a fee simple estate 
constitutes a categorical taking does not answer the question whether a regulation prohibiting 
any economic use of land for a 32-month period has the same legal effect. Petitioners seek to 
bring this case under the rule announced in Lucas by arguing that we can effectively sever a 32-
month segment from the remainder of each landowner’s fee simple estate, and then ask whether 
that segment has been taken in its entirety by the moratoria. Of course, defining the property 
interest taken in terms of the very regulation being challenged is circular. With property so 
divided, every delay would become a total ban; the moratorium and the normal permit process 
alike would constitute categorical takings. Petitioners’ “conceptual severance” argument is 
unavailing because it ignores Penn Central’s admonition that in regulatory takings cases we must 
focus on “the parcel as a whole.” We have consistently rejected such an approach to the 
“denominator” question. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497. See also, Concrete Pipe & Products of 
Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 644, 124 L. 
Ed. 2d 539, 113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993) (“To the extent that any portion of property is taken, that 
portion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is whether the property 
taken is all, or only a portion of, the parcel in question”). Thus, the District Court erred when it 
disaggregated petitioners’ property into temporal segments corresponding to the regulations at 
issue and then analyzed whether petitioners were deprived of all economically viable use during 
each period.   The starting point for the court’s analysis should have been to ask whether there 
was a total taking of the entire parcel; if not, then Penn Central was the proper framework. 
An interest in real property is defined by the metes and bounds that describe its 
geographic dimensions and the term of years that describes the temporal aspect of the owner’s 
interest. See Restatement of Property §§7-9 (1936). Both dimensions must be considered if the 
interest is to be viewed in its entirety. Hence, a permanent deprivation of the owner’s use of the 
entire area is a taking of “the parcel as a whole,” whereas a temporary restriction that merely 
causes a diminution in value is not. Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless 
by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as soon as 
the prohibition is lifted. (“Even if the appellants’ ability to sell their property was limited during 
the pendency of the condemnation proceeding, the appellants were free to sell or develop their 
property when the proceedings ended. Mere fluctuations in value during the process of 
governmental decision-making, absent extraordinary delay, are ‘incidents of ownership. They 
cannot be considered as a “taking” in the constitutional sense’”) (quoting Danforth v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 271, 285, 84 L. Ed. 240, 60 S. Ct. 231 (1939)). 
Neither Lucas, nor First English, nor any of our other regulatory takings cases compels us 
to accept petitioners’ categorical submission. In fact, these cases make clear that the categorical 
rule in Lucas was carved out for the “extraordinary case” in which a regulation permanently 
deprives property of all value; the default rule remains that, in the regulatory taking context, we 
require a more fact specific inquiry. Nevertheless, we will consider whether the interest in 
protecting individual property owners from bearing public burdens “which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. at 49, 
justifies creating a new rule for these circumstances. 
 
 
746 
V 
Considerations of “fairness and justice” arguably could support the conclusion that 
TRPA’s moratoria were takings of petitioners’ property based on any of seven different theories. 
First, even though we have not previously done so, we might now announce a categorical rule 
that, in the interest of fairness and justice, compensation is required whenever government 
temporarily deprives an owner of all economically viable use of her property. Second, we could 
craft a narrower rule that would cover all temporary land-use restrictions except those “normal 
delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like” 
which were put to one side in our opinion in First English, 482 U.S. at 321. Third, we could 
adopt a rule like the one suggested by an amicus supporting petitioners that would “allow a short 
fixed period for deliberations to take place without compensation–say maximum one year–after 
which the just compensation requirements” would “kick in.” Fourth, with the benefit of 
hindsight, we might characterize the successive actions of TRPA as a “series of rolling 
moratoria” that were the functional equivalent of a permanent taking. Fifth, were it not for the 
findings of the District Court that TRPA acted diligently and in good faith, we might have 
concluded that the agency was stalling in order to avoid promulgating the environmental 
threshold carrying capacities and regional plan mandated by the 1980 Compact. Sixth, apart from 
the District Court’s finding that TRPA’s actions represented a proportional response to a serious 
risk of harm to the lake, petitioners might have argued that the moratoria did not substantially 
advance a legitimate state interest. Finally, if petitioners had challenged the application of the 
moratoria to their individual parcels, instead of making a facial challenge, some of them might 
have prevailed under a Penn Central analysis. 
As the case comes to us, however, none of the last four theories is available. The “rolling 
moratoria” theory was presented in the petition for certiorari, but our order granting review did 
not encompass that issue; the case was tried in the District Court and reviewed in the Court of 
Appeals on the theory that each of the two moratoria was a separate taking, one for a 2-year 
period and the other for an 8-month period.  And, as we have already noted, recovery on either a 
bad faith theory or a theory that the state interests were insubstantial is foreclosed by the District 
Court’s unchallenged findings of fact. Recovery under a Penn Central analysis is also foreclosed 
both because petitioners expressly disavowed that theory, and because they did not appeal from 
the District Court’s conclusion that the evidence would not support it. Nonetheless, each of the 
three per se theories is fairly encompassed within the question that we decided to answer. 
With respect to these theories, the ultimate constitutional question is whether the 
concepts of “fairness and justice” that underlie the Takings Clause will be better served by one of 
these categorical rules or by a Penn Central inquiry into all of the relevant circumstances in 
particular cases. From that perspective, the extreme categorical rule that any deprivation of all 
economic use, no matter how brief, constitutes a compensable taking surely cannot be sustained. 
Petitioners’ broad submission would apply to numerous “normal delays in obtaining building 
permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like,” 482 U.S. at 321, as well as to 
orders temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that violate health codes, fire-
damaged buildings, or other areas that we cannot now foresee. Such a rule would undoubtedly 
require changes in numerous practices that have long been considered permissible exercises of 
the police power. As Justice Holmes warned in Mahon, “government hardly could go on if to 
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such 
 747 
change in the general law.” 260 U.S. at 413. A rule that required compensation for every delay in 
the use of property would render routine government processes prohibitively expensive or 
encourage hasty decision-making. Such an important change in the law should be the product of 
legislative rulemaking rather than adjudication.
8
 
In rejecting petitioners’ per se rule, we do not hold that the temporary nature of a land-
use restriction precludes finding that it effects a taking; we simply recognize that it should not be 
given exclusive significance one way or the other. 
A narrower rule that excluded the normal delays associated with processing permits, or 
that covered only delays of more than a year, would certainly have a less severe impact on 
prevailing practices, but it would still impose serious financial constraints on the planning 
process. Unlike the “extraordinary circumstance” in which the government deprives a property 
owner of all economic use, moratoria like Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 are used widely 
among land-use planners to preserve the status quo while formulating a more permanent 
development strategy. In fact, the consensus in the planning community appears to be that 
moratoria, or “interim development controls” as they are often called, are an essential tool of 
successful development. Yet even the weak version of petitioners’ categorical rule would treat 
these interim measures as takings regardless of the good faith of the planners, the reasonable 
expectations of the landowners, or the actual impact of the moratorium on property values. 
The interest in facilitating informed decision-making by regulatory agencies counsels 
against adopting a per se rule that would impose such severe costs on their deliberations. 
Otherwise, the financial constraints of compensating property owners during a moratorium may 
force officials to rush through the planning process or to abandon the practice altogether. To the 
extent that communities are forced to abandon using moratoria, landowners will have incentives 
to develop their property quickly before a comprehensive plan can be enacted, thereby fostering 
inefficient and ill-conceived growth. A finding in the 1980 Compact itself, which presumably 
was endorsed by all three legislative bodies that participated in its enactment, attests to the 
importance of that concern. 94 Stat. 3243 (“The legislatures of the States of California and 
Nevada find that in order to make effective the regional plan as revised by the agency, it is 
necessary to halt temporarily works of development in the region which might otherwise absorb 
the entire capability of the region for further development or direct it out of harmony with the 
ultimate plan”). 
We would create a perverse system of incentives were we to hold that landowners must 
wait for a taking claim to ripen so that planners can make well-reasoned decisions while, at the 
same time, holding that those planners must compensate landowners for the delay. Indeed, the 
interest in protecting the decisional process is even stronger when an agency is developing a 
regional plan than when it is considering a permit for a single parcel. In the proceedings 
                                                 
8
 In addition, we recognize the anomaly that would be created if we were to apply Penn Central when a landowner is 
permanently deprived of 95% of the use of her property, Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, n. 8, and yet find a per se taking 
anytime the same property owner is deprived of all use for only five days. Such a scheme would present an odd 
inversion of Justice Holmes’ adage: “A limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that could 
not be upheld as a permanent change.” Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 157, 65 L. Ed. 865, 41 S. Ct. 458 (1921). 
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involving the Lake Tahoe Basin, for example, the moratoria enabled TRPA to obtain the benefit 
of comments and criticisms from interested parties, such as the petitioners, during its 
deliberations. Since a categorical rule tied to the length of deliberations would likely create 
added pressure on decision-makers to reach a quick resolution of land-use questions, it would 
only serve to disadvantage those landowners and interest groups who are not as organized or 
familiar with the planning process. Moreover, with a temporary ban on development there is a 
lesser risk that individual landowners will be “singled out” to bear a special burden that should 
be shared by the public as a whole.  At least with a moratorium there is a clear “reciprocity of 
advantage,” Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415, because it protects the interests of all affected landowners 
against immediate construction that might be inconsistent with the provisions of the plan that is 
ultimately adopted. “While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, 
benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others.” Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491. In fact, 
there is reason to believe property values often will continue to increase despite a moratorium. 
Such an increase makes sense in this context because property values throughout the Basin can 
be expected to reflect the added assurance that Lake Tahoe will remain in its pristine state. Since 
in some cases a 1-year moratorium may not impose a burden at all, we should not adopt a rule 
that assumes moratoria always force individuals to bear a special burden that should be shared by 
the public as a whole. 
It may well be true that any moratorium that lasts for more than one year should be 
viewed with special skepticism. But given the fact that the District Court found that the 32 
months required by TRPA to formulate the 1984 Regional Plan was not unreasonable, we could 
not possibly conclude that every delay of over one year is constitutionally unacceptable. 
Formulating a general rule of this kind is a suitable task for state legislatures. In our view, the 
duration of the restriction is one of the important factors that a court must consider in the 
appraisal of a regulatory takings claim, but with respect to that factor as with respect to other 
factors. We conclude, therefore, that the interest in “fairness and justice” will be best served by 
relying on the familiar Penn Central approach when deciding cases like this, rather than by 
attempting to craft a new categorical. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE 
THOMAS join, dissenting. 
For over half a decade petitioners were prohibited from building homes, or any other 
structures, on their land. Because the Takings Clause requires the government to pay 
compensation when it deprives owners of all economically viable use of their land, see Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), and 
because a ban on all development lasting almost six years does not resemble any traditional land-
use planning device, I dissent. 
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I 
“A court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone ‘too far’ unless it knows how 
far the regulation goes.” MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348, 91 
L. Ed. 2d 285, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986). In failing to undertake this inquiry, the Court ignores 
much of the impact of respondent’s conduct on petitioners. Instead, it relies on the flawed 
determination of the Court of Appeals that the relevant time period lasted only from August 1981 
until April 1984. During that period, Ordinance 81-5 and Regulation 83-21 prohibited 
development pending the adoption of a new regional land-use plan. The adoption of the 1984 
Regional Plan (hereinafter Plan or 1984 Plan) did not, however, change anything from the 
petitioners’ standpoint. After the adoption of the 1984 Plan, petitioners still could make no use of 
their land.  
The Court of Appeals disregarded this post-April 1984 deprivation on the ground that 
respondent did not “cause” it. In a §1983 action, “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
defendant’s conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.” 216 F.3d 764, 783 (CA9 
2000). Applying this principle, the Court of Appeals held that the 1984 Regional Plan did not 
amount to a taking because the Plan actually allowed permits to issue for the construction of 
single-family residences. Those permits were never issued because the District Court 
immediately issued a temporary restraining order, and later a permanent injunction that lasted 
until 1987, prohibiting the approval of any building projects under the 1984 Plan. Thus, the 
Court of Appeals concluded that the “1984 Plan itself could not have constituted a taking,” 
because it was the injunction, not the Plan, that prohibited development during this period.  216 
F.3d at 784. The Court of Appeals is correct that the 1984 Plan did not cause petitioners’ injury. 
But that is the right answer to the wrong question. The causation question is not limited to 
whether the 1984 Plan caused petitioners’ injury; the question is whether respondent caused 
petitioners’ injury. 
Respondent is surely responsible for its own regulations, and it is also responsible for the 
Compact as it is the governmental agency charged with administering the Compact. Compact, 
Art. I(c), 94 Stat 3234. It follows that respondent was the “moving force” behind petitioners’ 
inability to develop its land from April 1984 through the enactment of the 1987 plan. Without the 
environmental thresholds established by the Compact and Resolution 82-11, the 1984 Plan 
would have gone into effect and petitioners would have been able to build single-family 
residences. And it was certainly foreseeable that development projects exceeding the 
environmental thresholds would be prohibited; indeed, that was the very purpose of enacting the 
thresholds. Because respondent caused petitioners’ inability to use their land from 1981 through 
1987, that is the appropriate period of time from which to consider their takings claim. 
II 
I now turn to determining whether a ban on all economic development lasting almost six 
years is a taking. The District Court in this case held that the ordinances and resolutions in effect 
between August 24, 1981, and April 25, 1984, “did in fact deny the plaintiffs all economically 
viable use of their land. The Court does not dispute that petitioners were forced to leave their 
land economically idle during this period. But the Court refuses to apply Lucas on the ground 
that the deprivation was “temporary.” 
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Neither the Takings Clause nor our case law supports such a distinction. For one thing, a 
distinction between “temporary” and “permanent” prohibitions is tenuous. Land-use regulations 
are not irrevocable. And the government can even abandon condemned land. Under the Court’s 
decision today, the takings question turns entirely on the initial label given a regulation, a label 
that is often without much meaning. There is every incentive for government to simply label any 
prohibition on development “temporary,” or to fix a set number of years. As in this case, this 
initial designation does not preclude the government from repeatedly extending the “temporary” 
prohibition into a long-term ban on all development. The Court now holds that such a 
designation by the government is conclusive even though in fact the moratorium greatly exceeds 
the time initially specified. Apparently, the Court would not view even a 10-year moratorium as 
a taking under Lucas because the moratorium is not “permanent.” 
Our opinion in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987), rejects any distinction between 
temporary and permanent takings when a landowner is deprived of all economically beneficial 
use of his land. First English stated that “‘temporary takings which, as here, deny a landowner all 
use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution 
clearly requires compensation.” More fundamentally, even if a practical distinction between 
temporary and permanent deprivations were plausible, to treat the two differently in terms of 
takings law would be at odds with the justification for the Lucas rule. The Lucas rule is derived 
from the fact that a “total deprivation of use is, from the landowner’s point of view, the 
equivalent of a physical appropriation.” The regulation in Lucas was the “practical equivalence” 
of a long-term physical appropriation, i.e., a condemnation, so the Fifth Amendment required 
compensation. The “practical equivalence,” from the landowner’s point of view, of a 
“temporary” ban on all economic use is a forced leasehold. For example, assume the following 
situation: Respondent is contemplating the creation of a National Park around Lake Tahoe to 
preserve its scenic beauty. Respondent decides to take a 6-year leasehold over petitioners’ 
property, during which any human activity on the land would be prohibited, in order to prevent 
any further destruction to the area while it was deciding whether to request that the area be 
designated a National Park. 
Surely that leasehold would require compensation. In a series of World War II-era cases 
in which the Government had condemned leasehold interests in order to support the war effort, 
the Government conceded that it was required to pay compensation for the leasehold interest. 
See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945). From petitioners’ standpoint, 
what happened in this case is no different than if the government had taken a 6-year lease of their 
property. The Court ignores this “practical equivalence” between respondent’s deprivation and 
the deprivation resulting from a leasehold.  
In addition to the “practical equivalence” from the landowner’s perspective of such a 
regulation and a physical appropriation, we have held that a regulation denying all productive 
use of land does not implicate the traditional justification for differentiating between regulations 
and physical appropriations. In “the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or 
economically beneficial use of land is permitted,” it is less likely that “the legislature is simply 
‘adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life’ in a manner that secures an ‘average 
reciprocity of advantage’ to everyone concerned,” Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. (1978), and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415, and more likely that the 
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property “is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious 
public harm,” Lucas, supra. 
Lucas is implicated when the government deprives a landowner of “all economically 
beneficial or productive use of land.” Id. at 1015.  The District Court found, and the Court 
agrees, that the moratorium “temporarily” deprived petitioners of “‘all economically viable use 
of their land.’” Because the rationale for the Lucas rule applies just as strongly in this case, the 
“temporary” denial of all viable use of land for six years is a taking. 
III 
The Court worries that applying Lucas here compels finding that an array of traditional, 
short-term, land-use planning devices are takings. But since the beginning of our regulatory 
takings jurisprudence, we have recognized that property rights “are enjoyed under an implied 
limitation.” Mahon, supra, at 413. Thus, in Lucas, after holding that the regulation prohibiting all 
economically beneficial use of the coastal land came within our categorical takings rule, we 
nonetheless inquired into whether such a result “inhered in the title itself, in the restrictions that 
background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land 
ownership.” 505 U.S. at 1029. Because the regulation at issue in Lucas purported to be 
permanent, or at least long term, we concluded that the only implied limitation of state property 
law that could achieve a similar long-term deprivation of all economic use would be something 
“achieved in the courts–by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the 
State’s law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate 
nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.” Ibid. 
When a regulation merely delays a final land use decision, we have recognized that there 
are other background principles of state property law that prevent the delay from being deemed a 
taking. We thus noted in First English that our discussion of temporary takings did not apply “in 
the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, 
and the like.” 482 U.S. at 321. Thus, the short-term delays attendant to zoning and permit 
regimes are a longstanding feature of state property law and part of a landowner’s reasonable 
investment-backed expectations.  
But a moratorium prohibiting all economic use for a period of six years is not one of the 
longstanding, implied limitations of state property law.
9
 Moratoria are “interim controls on the 
use of land that seek to maintain the status quo with respect to land development in an area by 
either ‘freezing’ existing land uses or by allowing the issuance of building permits for only 
certain land uses that would not be inconsistent with a contemplated zoning plan or zoning 
change.” 1 E. Ziegler, Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning §13:3, p. 13-6 (4th ed. 
2001). Typical moratoria thus prohibit only certain categories of development, such as fast-food 
restaurants, see Schafer v. New Orleans, 743 F.2d 1086 (CA5 1984), or adult businesses, see 
                                                 
9
 Six years is not a “cut-off point,”: it is the length involved in this case. And the “explanation” for the conclusion 
that there is a taking in this case is the fact that a 6-year moratorium far exceeds any moratorium authorized under 
background principles of state property law. 
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Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986), or all 
commercial development, see Arnold Bernhard & Co. v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 194 
Conn. 152, 479 A.2d 801 (1984). Such moratoria do not implicate Lucas because they do not 
deprive landowners of all economically beneficial use of their land. As for moratoria that 
prohibit all development, these do not have the lineage of permit and zoning requirements and 
thus it is less certain that property is acquired under the “implied limitation” of a moratorium 
prohibiting all development. Moreover, unlike a permit system in which it is expected that a 
project will be approved so long as certain conditions are satisfied, a moratorium that prohibits 
all uses is by definition contemplating a new land-use plan that would prohibit all uses. Because 
the prohibition on development of nearly six years in this case cannot be said to resemble any 
“implied limitation” of state property law, it is a taking that requires compensation. 
* * * 
Lake Tahoe is a national treasure and I do not doubt that respondent’s efforts at 
preventing further degradation of the lake were made in good faith in furtherance of the public 
interest. But, as is the case with most governmental action that furthers the public interest, the 
Constitution requires that the costs and burdens be borne by the public at large, not by a few 
targeted citizens. Justice Holmes’ admonition of 80 years ago again rings true: “We are in danger 
of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant 
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.” 
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416. 
JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, dissenting. 
I join the CHIEF JUSTICE’S dissent. I write separately to address the majority’s 
conclusion that the temporary moratorium at issue here was not a taking because it was not a 
“taking of ‘the parcel as a whole.’”. While this questionable rule10 has been applied to various 
alleged regulatory takings, it was, in my view, rejected in the context of temporal deprivations of 
property by First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304, 318, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987), which held that temporary and 
permanent takings “are not different in kind” when a landowner is deprived of all beneficial use 
of his land. I had thought that First English put to rest the notion that the “relevant denominator” 
is land’s infinite life. Consequently, a regulation effecting a total deprivation of the use of a so-
called “temporal slice” of property is compensable under the Takings Clause unless background 
principles of state property law prevent it from being deemed a taking; “total deprivation of use 
is, from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation.” Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 
(1992).  
                                                 
10 The majority’s decision to embrace the “parcel as a whole” doctrine as settled is puzzling. See, e.g., Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016, n. 7, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (recognizing 
that “uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator in [the Court’s] ‘deprivation’ fraction has produced 
inconsistent pronouncements by the Court,” and that the relevant calculus is a “difficult question”). 
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A taking is exactly what occurred in this case. No one seriously doubts that the land use 
regulations at issue rendered petitioners’ land unsusceptible of any economically beneficial use. 
This was true at the inception of the moratorium, and it remains true today. These individuals 
and families were deprived of the opportunity to build single-family homes as permanent, 
retirement, or vacation residences on land upon which such construction was authorized when 
purchased. The Court assures them that “a temporary prohibition on economic use” cannot be a 
taking because “logically . . . the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.” 
But the “logical” assurance that a “temporary restriction . . . merely causes a diminution in 
value,” is cold comfort to the property owners in this case or any other. After all, “in the long run 
we are all dead.” John Maynard Keynes, Monetary Reform 88 (1924). 
I would hold that regulations prohibiting all productive uses of property are subject to 
Lucas’ per se rule, regardless of whether the property so burdened retains theoretical useful life 
and value if, and when, the “temporary” moratorium is lifted. To my mind, such potential future 
value bears on the amount of compensation due and has nothing to do with the question whether 
there was a taking in the first place. It is regrettable that the Court has charted a markedly 
different path today.  
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Session 30. Expectations & Characteristics 
CREPPEL v. UNITED STATES 
41 F.3d 627 (Fed. Cir. 1994)  
Before RICH, NEWMAN, and RADER, Circuit Judges. 
RADER, Circuit Judge. 
Landowners in Louisiana sued the United States Government for blocking a local land 
reclamation project. The United States Court of Federal Claims held that the statute of 
limitations bars their takings claims. Creppel v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 323 (1994). Because 
the statute of limitations bars the temporary but not the permanent taking claim, this court 
affirms in part and reverses in part. 
BACKGROUND 
The claimants own swamp and marshland in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. This land floods 
during the wet season. To control these floods, the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) approved 
the Harvey Canal-Barataria Levee Project (Project) in 1964. The Corps designed the Project to 
close two navigable bayous and to build new levees and a pumping station. The Corps' budget 
was $1 million. In 1967 Jefferson Parish issued $3.6 million in bonds to guarantee the remaining 
costs of the Project. 
The Project had two phases. Phase I, completed on November 24, 1973, dredged the 
bayous and used the mud to begin the new levee system. Phase I exhausted the Corps' $1 million 
budget. Before completion of Phase I, Congress passed the Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA). 
Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). 
Section 404 of the CWA prohibits the discharge of dredge or fill material into navigable 
waterways without a permit.  33 U.S.C. §1344 (1986 & Supp. V 1993) (section 404 of the 
CWA). 
Under Phase II of the Project, the Corps planned to complete the levee system, close the 
bayous, and drain the land behind the levees. Phase II began in March 1974. The Parish let a 
contract for the pumping station to drain the land in August 1974. Meanwhile,  on July 10, 1974, 
the Parish stopped construction until the Corps could determine whether the Project complied 
with section 404. 
On March 26, 1975, the Corps decided that the Project should continue as originally 
planned. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) objected and suggested alternatives to 
draining the wetlands. The EPA also notified the Corps of its intention to use section 404(c) to 
prohibit construction of the levees with dredged or fill material. 
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After negotiations with the EPA and Parish representatives, Brigadier General Drake 
Wilson issued an order modifying the Project on November 16, 1976 (the Wilson Order). 
General Wilson ordered construction of the pumping station to halt and ordered the replacement 
of dikes with flood gates. This order would have eliminated the land reclamation benefits of the 
original Project. The EPA concurred with the Wilson Order. 
Local property owners, many of whom are claimants in this case, obtained a court order 
permanently enjoining the Parish from abandoning the original  Project.  Creppel v. Parish of 
Jefferson, No. 199-345 (24th Jud. Dist. Jefferson Parish, Jan. 12, 1979). They also had obtained a 
preliminary injunction barring the Parish from abandoning the land reclamation project on 
October 31, 1977. This injunction became permanent as well. Creppel v. Parish of Jefferson, 352 
So. 2d 297 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 384 So. 2d 853 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.), writ 
denied, 392 So.2d 689 (La. 1980). 
In 1977, while the state action was pending, the same landowners sued in federal district 
court to overturn the Wilson Order. The district court held, on summary judgment, that General 
Wilson did not abuse his discretion in adopting the modified Project.  Creppel v. United States 
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 500 F. Supp. 1108, 1119 (E.D. La. 1980), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 
670 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1982). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also found 
no abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded to determine whether 
local assurances were available for completion of the Project, and whether section 404(c) 
prevented it.  Creppel, 670 F.2d at 575. On remand, the district court found that the Parish's 
refusal to assure the revised Project made its completion impossible. Creppel v. United States 
Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 77-25, slip op. at 5 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 1984). The district court 
therefore ordered the original Project to proceed. Id.  
The EPA began proceedings on December 17, 1984, to determine whether to block the 
Project by denying a permit under section 404(c). On August 30, 1985, the EPA regional 
administrator issued a Recommended Determination that the EPA use a section 404(c) veto. The 
EPA issued a Final Determination on October 16, 1985, permanently blocking the Project. 
In May 1986, the landowners sought to overturn the EPA's decision. The district court 
upheld the EPA's Final Determination and remanded the case to the Corps to determine whether 
the Parish would grant assurances for the modified Project.  Creppel v. United States Army 
Corps of Eng'rs, No. 77-25, 1988 WL 70103 (E.D. La. June 29, 1988). The Parish did not grant 
the assurances. The district court, therefore, dismissed the landowners' lawsuit. Creppel v. United 
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 77-25 (E.D. La. October 12, 1989).  
The claimants then filed four consolidated takings claims in the Court of Federal Claims 
on July 5, October 10, and October 11, 1991. The Government moved for summary judgment on 
the basis of a time bar under the statute of limitations. The claimants sought to amend their 
complaints to allege that the limitations period began only when the district court upheld the 
EPA's Final Determination on June 30, 1988. The Court of Federal Claims held that the 
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claimants' cause of action accrued when the Wilson Order issued on November 16, 1976. The 
court granted summary judgment to the Government.  Creppel v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 323 
(1994). This appeal followed.
 
DISCUSSION 
A trial court properly grants summary judgment only when no genuine issue of material 
fact exists and the law entitles the movant to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 
Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1987). This court 
reviews a grant of summary judgment by the Court of Federal Claims de novo.  Turner v United 
States, 901 F.2d 1093, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  
A six-year statute of limitations governs claims before the United States Court of Federal 
Claims: 
 
Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction 
shall be barred unless the [claim] thereon is filed within six years after such claim 
first accrues. 28 U.S.C. §2501 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).  
A claim accrues when all events have occurred that fix the alleged liability of the 
Government and entitle the plaintiff to institute an action.  Japanese War Notes Claimants Ass'n 
v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 630, 373 F.2d 356, 358 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 971, 19 L. 
Ed. 2d 461, 88 S. Ct. 466 (1967). The question here is whether "all events" occurred to fix the 
alleged liability of the Government six years before the claimants' 1991 takings claims.  
The claimants allege two distinct takings: (1) a temporary taking commencing when the 
Wilson Order issued in 1976 and ending in 1988 when the district court upheld the EPA's Final 
Determination; and (2) a permanent taking commencing when the EPA issued its Final 
Determination in 1985. The temporary taking claim is time-barred; the permanent taking claim is 
not. 
I 
When presented with a regulatory taking claim, this court analyzes three separate criteria: 
(1) the character of the governmental action; (2) the economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant; and (3) the extent that the regulation interferes with distinct investment-backed 
expectations of the property owner.  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 
124, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978). These criteria define the events that comprise a 
regulatory taking claim. Thus, in this case, this court must examine these criteria to discern the 
events triggering the six-year statute of limitations.  
The first criterion— the character of the governmental action –examines the challenged 
restraint under the lens of state nuisance law. If the regulation prevents what would or legally 
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could have been a nuisance, then no taking occurred. The state merely acted to protect the public 
under its inherent police powers.  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 
112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992). Here the courts must inquire into the degree of harm created by the 
claimant's prohibited activity, its social value and location, and the ease with which any harm 
stemming from it could be prevented. Id. If state nuisance law does not justify the restraint, the 
court must proceed to the remaining criteria. 
The second criterion— the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant -- is 
designed to insure that not every restraint on private property results in a takings claim. This 
concern evolved into the threshold requirement that a claimant show that the Government denied 
him "economically viable use" of his land.  Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 65 L. Ed. 2d 
106, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 834, 97 L. Ed. 
2d 677, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). 
This criterion requires this court to determine whether a partial denial of use constitutes a 
taking. In this context, this court has recognized a dichotomy between non-compensable "mere 
diminutions" and compensable "partial takings" in borderline cases.  Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. 
United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994). "Mere diminution" occurs when the property 
owner has received the benefits of a challenged regulation, such that an "average reciprocity of 
advantage" results from it.  Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894; Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1570. A "partial 
taking" occurs when a regulation singles out a few property owners to bear burdens, while 
benefits are spread widely across the community.  Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1571. This 
dichotomy does not arise where a regulation removes all economically viable use of the  
property. Removal of all use indicates a fully compensable "categorical taking" of the property.  
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893; Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1568.  
The third criterion— the extent to which the regulation interferes with the property 
owner's expectations —limits recovery to owners who can demonstrate that they bought their 
property in reliance on the nonexistence of the challenged regulation. One who buys with 
knowledge of a restraint assumes the risk of economic loss.  Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. 
Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 124 L. Ed. 2d 539, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2291-92 
(1993); Golden Pacific Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In such a case, 
the owner presumably paid a discounted price for the property. Compensating him for a "taking" 
would confer a windfall. 
Finally, the Constitution recognizes a distinction between a temporary and a permanent 
taking. U.S. Const., amend. V; First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987). Simply declaring a regulation 
that takes property invalid does not grant a constitutionally sufficient remedy.  First English, 482 
U.S. at 319; Yuba Natural Resources, Inc. v. United States, 821 F.2d 638, 641-42 (Fed. Cir. 
1987). Thus, property owners cannot sue for a temporary taking until the regulatory process that 
began it has ended. This is because they would not know the extent of their damages until the 
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Government completes the "temporary" taking. Only then may property owners seek 
compensation.  First English, 482 U.S. at 321-22. 
II 
This case features allegations of both temporary and permanent takings. First, the 
temporary taking claim. On November 16, 1976, General Wilson ordered a halt to the land 
reclamation project. This order did not bar a nuisance, did significantly affect the economic value 
of the perennially flooded lands, and did abridge the owners' expectations of gaining valuable 
dry lands.  
As the Court of Federal Claims noted, "it is evident that the act first effecting any taking 
of plaintiffs' properties was the modification of the original Project by the Wilson Order." 
Creppel, 30 Fed. Cl. at 329. The trial court correctly found that the alleged temporary taking 
began when the Wilson Order issued in 1976. The order did not bar a nuisance but eliminated the 
landowners' expectation of land reclamation, causing the property's value to plummet. These 
consequences fulfilled the three requirements of a taking enunciated in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 
124, and Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2886-94. With the issuance of the Wilson Order, then, "all the 
events" had occurred to fix the supposed liability of the Government.  Japanese War Notes, 373 
F.2d at 358. The landowners needed nothing more to state a takings claim. 
The temporary taking allegedly ended on August 13, 1984, when the federal district court 
ordered the original Project to proceed. By restoring some measure of value to the claimants' 
property, this action concluded the "temporary" taking.  See Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 
1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The claimants' property value remained intact for at least four 
months, until the district court suspended its August Order on December 14, 1984. During that 
time, the claimants regained their expectation of development, and could presumably have sold 
the land if they so wished. Because the claimants' temporary taking claims accrued with the 
August 1984 Order, the statute of limitations bars their claims.
 
III 
This court's recent opinion in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545 
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (in banc), gives rise to a question of tolling the statute of limitations for the 
alleged temporary taking.  In Loveladies, a claimant sought to challenge the validity of a 
Government action in district court and simultaneously to challenge its economic consequences 
as a taking in the Court of Federal Claims. This court found it foreseeable that the district court 
would not adjudicate  the challenge before expiration of the statute of limitations on the takings 
claim. Id. at 1555. The court determined that a claimant may commence a challenge in the 
district court and in the Court of Federal Claims without facing the ticking jeopardy of the six 
year bar.  The court stated: "It would not be sound policy to force plaintiffs to forego monetary 
claims in order to challenge the validity of Government action, or to preclude challenges to the 
validity of Government action in order to protect a constitutional claim for compensation." Id.  
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Thus, in Loveladies, this court clarified that a litigant may file a suit challenging the 
validity of governmental regulatory activity concurrently with a takings claim arising from the 
same set of facts. Furthermore, if a district court finds the regulatory activity valid, the Court of 
Federal Claims must hear the takings claim even if the regulatory challenge consumes more than 
six years. Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims may stay a takings action pending 
completion of a related action in a district court. Cf.  Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. United States, 363 
U.S. 202, 204-05, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1165, 80 S. Ct. 1131 (1960); Aulston v. United States, 823 F.2d 
510, 514 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In this case, however, the claimants had not filed concurrent actions in 
the Court of Federal Claims and a district court.  
The claimants, therefore, did not face the Hobson's choice either to challenge the validity 
of the Wilson Order or bring a takings claim. They could have brought both suits 
contemporaneously and had the takings challenge stayed pending resolution of the validity issue. 
Instead, the claimants elected to pursue a single remedy. This conscious choice militates against 
"equitably tolling" the statute of limitations on the basis of the Loveladies decision. Otherwise, 
claimants would be able to file in the Court of Federal Claims as an afterthought, once their 
challenge in the district court was resolved. Requiring that suits be filed contemporaneously, as 
in Loveladies, better insures the claimants' good faith and rewards the diligent prosecution of 
grievances. It also encourages claimants to muster their evidence early, and to preserve it. In 
addition, it prevents claimants from surprising the Government with potentially stale claims 
based on events that transpired many years before. Not coincidentally, these are the very reasons 
that statutes of limitation themselves exist. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 
314, 89 L. Ed. 1628, 65 S. Ct. 1137 (1945); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express 
Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 88 L. Ed. 788, 64 S. Ct. 582 (1944). 
In addition, a federal district judge told the claimants as early as 1980 that the Court of 
Federal Claims was the proper forum in which to seek compensation.  Creppel, 500 F. Supp. at 
1120. This court will not invent a new reason to toll the statute of limitations and pretend that the 
claimants filed their takings claim contemporaneously with their 1976 challenge to the Wilson 
Order. The claimants' temporary taking claim is therefore time-barred.
 
IV 
The claimants' permanent taking claim presents different questions. As this court recently 
held, a claim under the Fifth Amendment accrues when the taking action occurs.  Alliance of 
Descendants of Texas v. United States, 37 F.3d 1478, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1994), citing Steel 
Improvement & Forge Co. v. United States, 174 Ct. Cl. 24, 355 F.2d 627, 631 (Ct. Cl. 1966). 
The Court of Federal Claims determined that the Government could have taken nothing 
permanently because the property's value remained unchanged after the temporary taking 
precipitated by the Wilson Order: "The EPA Final Determination did not diminish the value of 
the land any more than it had been diminished by the Wilson Order." Creppel, 30 Fed. Cl. at 331. 
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The sequence of events discloses an error in the trial court's conclusion. On August 13, 
1984, the federal district court ordered that the original Project proceed. Creppel, No. 77-25 
(E.D. La. Aug. 13, 1984). This order rendered the Wilson Order nugatory. The EPA then 
commenced proceedings on December 17, 1984 to determine whether it would issue a veto 
under section 404(c). The district court stayed its order, pending the EPA's decision. On August 
30, 1985, the EPA regional administrator issued a Recommended Determination that the EPA 
use a section 404(c) veto. The EPA issued a Final Determination on October 16, 1985, 
preventing completion of the Project. 
The court order that the original Project proceed, which issued on August 13, 1984, 
restored some potential expectation of completion of the Project and thus some measure of the 
property's value. This value was maintained at least until December 1984, when the district court 
stayed its order. Between the invalidation of the Wilson Order in August 1984, and the stay in 
December 1984, the landowners owned 3,200 acres of land that appeared destined for 
development. By virtue of the district court's temporary restoration of the original Project, the 
landowners regained the "reasonable expectation" that their property value would increase. The 
EPA began hearings on whether to issue a section 404(c) order upon expiration of the district 
court's stay in December 1984. The EPA issued its order in October 1985. 
Again, this court must determine when the events fixing any potential Government 
liability occurred.  Japanese War Notes, 373 F.2d at 358. Until the EPA issued its Final 
Determination, the property owners retained some expectation of completion of the Project. The 
EPA's Final Determination "fixed the liability" of the Government. The claimants' permanent 
taking claim therefore accrued on October 16, 1985. On this date, the EPA finally fully vetoed 
the original Project and allegedly denied the claimants the ability to make economically viable 
use of their property. The EPA hearings on whether to issue a section 404(c) order did not fix the 
alleged liability of the Government because the outcome was unknown until the Final 
Determination issued. It remained unclear in December 1984 whether a section 404 (c) order 
would issue, and whether that order, if it did issue, would totally veto the Project. The alleged 
taking therefore accrued when the EPA issued its actual section 404(c) order, not when it started 
to consider whether to prepare such an order. 
The claimants filed their permanent taking claim in the Court of Federal Claims within 
six years after it accrued on October 16, 1985. The claim thus was not time-barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
The claimants' temporary taking claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Their 
permanent taking claim is not barred. The Court of Federal Claims shall evaluate the permanent 
taking claim on remand.
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COSTS 
Each party shall bear its own costs.  
AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, and REMANDED 
AVENAL v. UNITED STATES 
100 F.3d 933 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
PLAGER, Circuit Judge. 
This is a Takings case. Albert Avenal, Jr. and 129 similarly situated plaintiffs ("Avenal" 
or "plaintiffs") leased oyster beds from the State of Louisiana. During the lease term, fresh-water 
diversion projects under the aegis of the United States altered the salinity level in the water over 
the oyster beds, thus rendering the beds unsuitable for oyster cultivation. Plaintiffs brought suit 
in the Court of Federal Claims alleging a taking by the United States ("Government") in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. The Court of Federal Claims on summary 
judgment dismissed the claims, holding that Avenal never acquired a constitutionally protectable 
property interest. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims, although on different 
grounds. 
BACKGROUND 
The properties involved in this case are in The Breton Sound Basin, a part of the coastal 
waters of Louisiana lying east of the Mississippi River and south of New Orleans. Because the 
area contained a broad mixing zone of freshwater outflow from the Mississippi River and smaller 
coastal streams and the saline waters of the Gulf of Mexico, the area historically provided 
excellent conditions for oyster growth.  
But life for the oysters, and for those who made their living harvesting them, did not 
remain sweet. Oysters to thrive need a salinity level ranging from 5 parts per thousand to 15 parts 
per thousand. Over time, both man-made and natural changes to the area caused the salinity 
levels in the subdelta marsh lands below New Orleans to increase. The parties attribute the 
changes in salinity primarily to man-made causes, including the establishment of a levee system 
for flood control on the Mississippi, and oil and gas exploration that involved extensive canal 
networks. The natural changes stemmed from subsidence, shoreline erosion, and drought, all 
adding to the saltwater intrusion. 
There is evidence that as early as 1900 the relevant state agencies and various parishes 
(similar to counties) were considering the idea that freshwater be diverted from the Mississippi 
River to adjacent marsh lands in order to improve oyster habitats and to reduce the mortality rate 
associated with increased salinity. In 1959, in a memorandum written by the United States 
Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service to the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers ("Corps"), the Interior Department set forth its conclusions resulting from an 
investigation into the advisability of establishing freshwater diversions via structures to be built 
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for that purpose. The investigation itself was prompted, in part, by requests from local groups, 
including the oyster industry, concerning the need for such diversions. 
The 1959 memorandum discussed a marked reduction in oyster yield that had occurred 
over time, and concluded that freshwater diversion would be beneficial in that it would re-
establish natural patterns of salinity and increase oyster-bed fertility. The memorandum 
identified four separate areas in Plaquemines Parish as freshwater diversion sites, two of which 
are on the east side of the Mississippi. One of these two, Area 4, is in the vicinity of Scarsdale, in 
the upper landward end of the Breton Sound Basin. The area was described in the memorandum 
as itself being too fresh to support an oyster fishery, so that the effect of the Area 4 diversion 
would not be to change the salinity levels themselves, but to combat the effects of subsidence 
and push back salt-water intrusion. 
The 1959 memorandum was later incorporated into House Document No. 308, which led 
to the passage,  on October 27, 1965, of the Public Works-Rivers and Harbors Act, Pub. L. No. 
89-298, 79 Stat. 1037 (1965) (the "Act"), which authorized certain freshwater diversion 
structures to be built in and around the Breton Sound Basin. During 1968 and 1969 the Corps 
met with, among others, the Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Commission and the Plaquemines 
Parish Commission Council to discuss proposed locations for these Congressionally-authorized 
diversion structures. During public hearings, the Corps proposed Caernarvon as the location of 
the freshwater diversion structure for Area No. 4. 
Meanwhile, due to continuing salinity changes the zone favorable for oyster growth 
continued to move landward. This landward salinity movement spawned an oyster community in 
the marsh lands in the northwest portion of the Breton Sound Basin, in the area which had 
previously been too fresh to sustain such growth. While creating new oyster grounds, the change 
in salinity had the effect of rendering unusable large areas of previously productive oyster 
grounds. During the 1970's oyster farmers engaged in the spawning and harvesting of oysters 
noted the changed conditions in the northwest landward part of the Basin and entered into water-
bottom lease agreements with the State of Louisiana for the areas then usable as oyster beds.             
Over the ensuing years the Corps and relevant state and local agencies continued to discuss at 
informal meetings the construction of a freshwater diversion structure at Caernarvon. It was 
known by all parties, including both the state and plaintiffs, that the Caernarvon project would 
create an area in which conditions again would become too fresh for oyster cultivation, and that 
this area would coincide with an area which had been formerly too fresh for oyster cultivation. 
On January 21, 1982, the State of Louisiana submitted a letter to the Corps, announcing its intent 
to participate in the Caernarvon freshwater diversion project. The Corps and the State issued a 
joint public notice regarding the construction surrounding the Caernarvon project.  
On October 30, 1986, Congress authorized the funds for the construction of the 
Caernarvon project. The State of Louisiana entered into a formal agreement with the Corps 
stipulating that the State would maintain and operate the facilities following completion of 
construction, and that the State would be responsible for 25 percent of the total costs of 
construction. The agreement further provided an indemnification clause under which the State 
would indemnify the Federal Government for any losses occasioned by claims for "damages 
arising from the construction, operation, maintenance, and rehabilitation of the project . . . ." The 
Caernarvon project was completed in due course, and it had the expected effect on the salinity 
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levels in The Breton Sound Basin. Although the Caernarvon project was not itself completed 
until 1991, other freshwater diversion structures, upon which Caernarvon was modeled, had been 
completed earlier, some going back as early as 1956 (Bayou Lamoque) and 1964 (White Ditch 
Siphon). 
On April 26, 1994, plaintiffs, who owned leases from the State of water-bottom lands 
used for oyster propagation, filed a complaint in the United States Court of Federal Claims, 
alleging a taking of their leasehold interests resulting from the Caernarvon project. Specifically, 
plaintiffs alleged that the Caernarvon project diluted the salinity level in the waters above their 
leased grounds and caused silt deposits in the leased area. These conditions were not favorable to 
oyster growth. As a result, the Government's Caernarvon project prevented them from continuing 
to cultivate oysters on their leased beds. 
The Court of Federal Claims granted the Government's motion for summary judgment on 
the grounds that the oysterers held no compensable property interest. Since the State acquired no 
property interest in the salinity level of the waters above plaintiffs' leased grounds, plaintiffs 
could have acquired no such right from the State, and thus no property interest to be taken. 
Plaintiffs appeal that determination. 
DISCUSSION 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact in 
dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, the views of 
the trial court regarding the applicable law in light of the undisputed facts are given full 
consideration, but a grant of summary judgment is reviewed without special deference to the trial 
court's decision. In this case, though the parties disagree about certain factual issues, the facts 
material to the decision are not in genuine dispute. Summary judgment is fully appropriate in 
such a case; that it is a takings case does not affect the availability of summary judgment when 
appropriate to the circumstances.  
The case was argued below, and the trial judge based her decision, on the issue of 
whether these plaintiffs owned a compensable property interest. Much of the argument there, as 
on appeal, focused on whether plaintiffs have a vested right, derived from the State, in an 
unintended benefit resulting from a federal government project, such that cessation of that 
benefit, due to the consequences of a separate federal project, warrants compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment. 
The record establishes that plaintiffs own long-term leases from the State, which leases 
entitle plaintiffs to use the lands under the waters of the Breton Sound Basin for the cultivation 
and harvesting of oysters. No challenge is made to the right of the State to issue such leases, or to 
the right of the lessees to engage in the activity for which the leases are issued. The record does 
not establish exactly when the several plaintiffs first acquired their leases. The trial court, in 
absence of evidence from the plaintiffs, made the reasonable inference that, for purposes of 
plaintiffs' complaint, the leases should be considered to have been entered into no earlier than 
1976. This was arrived at by subtracting the term of the leases, 15 years, from the date on which 
the freshwater diversion from the Caernarvon project became operational, 1991. 
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The leases owned by the several plaintiffs granted them valuable property rights. 
Louisiana law has long recognized that the property rights created by such leases, authorized by 
state statute (see La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §56:423 (West 1995)), have the attributes of other forms of 
real property, and are entitled to protection from injury by third parties. See e.g., Inabnett v. 
Exxon Corp., 642 So. 2d 1243 (La. 1994) (Oil company found liable to oyster lessee for any 
damages sustained by oyster lessee due to company's dredging of canal.); Butler v. Baber, 529 
So. 2d 374 (La. 1988) (Oyster lessees could recover against mineral lessees for damage to oyster 
beds and oyster production caused by mineral lessees' dredging operation.). The United States 
Constitution protects such state-created property interests from uncompensated takings by 
government, whether that government be state, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), or federal, Hendler v. United States,  952 
F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
The question, then, is not whether the plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected property 
interest, but whether that property interest was taken by the Government. The leasehold estates 
owned by the plaintiffs entitle them to use the beds of the Basin for the cultivation of oysters. 
The result of the series of government decisions that culminated in the Caernarvon project was 
not to occupy the plaintiffs' property or to have that property used for government purposes, but 
was to limit the uses of the property available to plaintiffs. There can be no doubt from the 
record that the limit on plaintiffs' use imposed by the Government's activities had the effect of 
substantially reducing the value of plaintiffs' property, well beyond the level of "mere 
diminution." Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
When government limits the use a property owner may make of her property, without 
itself occupying or otherwise using the property for government purposes, the classic analytical 
tool for assessing whether a taking has occurred is the three-part test enunciated by the Supreme 
Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 
S. Ct. 2646 (1978): the court considers the character of the governmental action, the economic 
impact on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the governmental action has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.  Id. at 124. Though it is a truism that "no 
set formula exists to determine whether compensation is constitutionally due for a government 
restriction of property," Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1991), see 
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, the Penn Central formulation provides guidance in analyzing what 
the trial court here viewed as a question of first impression. 
The case before us presents a textbook example of a situation in which the plaintiffs, in 
the face of established public concerns and while governmental efforts to address those concerns 
were well known,  moved to take advantage of the existing conditions for their own economic 
benefit. There is nothing wrong with their having done that; the State of Louisiana provided the 
mechanism for it, and their own initiative gave them whatever economic advantages the situation 
afforded. It is hard for them to claim surprise, however, that the pre-existing salinity conditions, 
created at least in part by earlier government activity, were not left alone, but were again 
tampered with to their (this time) disadvantage. 
Though as entrepreneurs they are entitled to capitalize on the opportunities afforded by 
government action, they cannot here insist on a guarantee of non-interference by government 
when they well knew or should have known that, in response to widely-shared public concerns, 
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including concerns of the oystering industry itself, government actions were being planned and 
executed that would directly affect their new economic investments. These concerns and plans 
date back to the early part of the century, and beginning in the 1950's and 1960's were actively 
being pursued by state and federal agencies. They were certainly a part of the environment in 
which the raising and harvesting of oysters in the Louisiana marshes were conducted. Assuming, 
as we must, that these plaintiffs did not invest in their leases until the 1970's, these plaintiffs, in 
the words of Penn Central, cannot have had reasonable investment-backed expectations that their 
oyster leases would give them rights protected from the planned freshwater diversion projects of 
the state and federal governments. 
The arguments put forward by plaintiffs do not persuade us otherwise. We grant that they 
have valuable property rights created by the State and protected by the Constitution. These rights 
include the right to harvest oysters and the right to damages when the acts of another harm the 
oyster beds, including harm caused by deleterious changes in the waters in which the beds lie, for 
example by unlawful pollution. We grant that the decrease in salinity in the water covering the 
plaintiffs' leased grounds has restrained a valuable use of the lease rights. And plaintiffs are 
correct that the existence of certain hold-harmless clauses in some of the leases for the benefit of 
the federal government and against the state does not change the case. Having said all that, 
however, what we do not grant these plaintiffs is the right to be free from the planned and 
announced efforts of the Government to act in ways that would affect their uses of their after-
acquired property interests. In light of the history of events in this case, plaintiffs as a matter of 
law must be assumed to have known that their rights to use the bottom-lands for oystering were 
subject to the inevitable changes that the anticipated government program would bring about.  
We reach, then, the same result as the trial court. In this case there was no taking by the 
United States of a protected property interest. The judgment of the trial court is 
AFFIRMED. 
EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL [Part II] 
524 U.S. 498 (1998) 
[The 1992 “Coal Act” required the plaintiff who had left the industry in twenty seven 
years before to provide pension to  over 1000 miners who had worked for the company before 
1966. The plaintiff claim  a violation of both substantive due process and the “taking” clause.]  
O' CONNOR, J., delivered an opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA and 
THOMAS, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.This case 
does not present the "classic taking" in which the government directly appropriates private 
property for its own use. See United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78, 74 L. 
Ed. 2d 235, 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982). Although takings problems are more commonly presented 
when "the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, 
than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of 
economic life to promote the common good," Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978) (citation omitted), economic regulation 
such as the Coal Act may nonetheless effect a taking, see Security Industrial Bank, supra, at 78. 
See also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 3 Dall. 386, 388, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798) (Chase, J.) ("It is 
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against all reason and justice" to presume that the legislature has been entrusted with the power 
to enact "a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B"). By operation of the Act, Eastern is 
"permanently deprived of those assets necessary to satisfy its statutory obligation, not to the 
Government,  but to [the Combined Benefit Fund]," Connolly, supra, at 222, and "a strong public 
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter 
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change," Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 416, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922). 
Of course, a party challenging governmental action as an unconstitutional taking bears a 
substantial burden. See United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 60, 107 L. Ed. 2d 290, 110 S. 
Ct. 387 (1989). Government regulation often "curtails some potential for the use or economic 
exploitation of private property," Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65, 62 L. Ed. 2d 210, 100 S. Ct. 
318 (1979), and "not every destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been 
held to be a 'taking' in the constitutional sense," Armstrong, supra, at 48. In light of that 
understanding, the process for evaluating a regulation's constitutionality involves an examination 
of the "justice and fairness" of the governmental action. See Andrus, supra, at 65. That inquiry, 
by its nature, does not lend itself to any set formula, see ibid., and the determination whether 
"'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action [must] be 
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few 
persons," is essentially ad hoc and fact intensive, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 
175, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Congress has considerable leeway to fashion economic legislation, including the power to 
affect contractual commitments between private parties. Congress also may impose retroactive 
liability to some degree, particularly where it is "confined to short and limited periods required 
by the practicalities of producing national legislation." Gray, 467 U.S. at 731 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Our decisions, however, have left open the possibility that legislation might be 
unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could 
not have anticipated the liability, and the extent of that liability is substantially disproportionate 
to the parties' experience. 
We believe that the Coal Act's allocation scheme, as applied to Eastern, presents such a 
case. We reach that conclusion by applying the three factors that traditionally have informed our 
regulatory takings analysis. 
As to the first factor relevant in assessing whether a regulatory taking has occurred, 
economic impact, there is no doubt that the Coal Act has forced a considerable financial burden 
upon Eastern. The parties estimate that Eastern's cumulative payments under the Act will be on 
the order of $50 to $100 million.   
That liability is not, of course, a permanent physical occupation of Eastern's property of 
the kind that we have viewed as a per se taking. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868, 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982). 
Here, however, while Eastern contributed to the 1947 and 1950 W&R Funds, it ceased its 
coal mining operations in 1965 and neither participated in negotiations nor agreed to make 
contributions. 
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The company's obligations under the Act depend solely on its roster of employees some 
30 to 50 years before the statute's enactment, without any regard to responsibilities that Eastern 
accepted under any benefit plan the company itself adopted. 
For similar reasons, the Coal Act substantially interferes with Eastern's reasonable 
investment-backed expectations. The Act's beneficiary allocation scheme reaches back 30 to 50 
years to impose liability against Eastern based on the company's activities between 1946 and 
1965. Thus, even though the Act mandates only the payment of future health benefits, it 
nonetheless "attaches new legal consequences to [an employment relationship] completed before 
its enactment." Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 270, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 114 S. Ct. 
1483 (1994). 
Retroactivity is generally disfavored in the law, Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 
488 U.S. 204, 208, 102 L. Ed. 2d 493, 109 S. Ct. 468 (1988), in accordance with "fundamental 
notions of justice" that have been recognized throughout history, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical 
Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855, 108 L. Ed. 2d 842, 110 S. Ct. 1570 (1990) (SCALIA, J., 
concurring). In his Commentaries on the Constitution, Justice Story reasoned, "retro-spective 
laws are, indeed, generally unjust; and, as has been forcibly said, neither accord with sound 
legislation nor with the fundamental principles of the social compact." 2 J. Story, Commentaries 
on the Constitution §1398 (5th ed. 1891). 
Our Constitution expresses concern with retroactive laws through several of its 
provisions, including the Ex Post Facto and Takings Clauses.  Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266. In 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798), this Court held that the Ex Post 
Facto Clause is directed at the retroactivity of penal legislation, while suggesting that the 
Takings Clause provides a similar safeguard against retrospective legislation concerning property 
rights. See id., at 394 (Chase, J.) ("The restraint against making any ex post facto laws was not 
considered, by the framers of the constitution, as extending to prohibit the depriving a citizen 
even of a vested right to property; or the provision, 'that private property should not be taken for 
public use, without just compensation,' was unnecessary").  
The Coal Act operates retroactively, divesting Eastern of property long after the company 
believed its liabilities to have been settled. And the extent of Eastern's retroactive liability is 
substantial and particularly far reaching. 
Finally, the nature of the governmental action in this case is quite unusual. That Congress 
sought a legislative remedy for what it perceived to be a grave problem in the funding of retired 
coal miners' health benefits is understandable; complex problems of that sort typically call for a 
legislative solution. When, however, that solution singles out certain employers to bear a burden 
that is substantial in amount, based on the employers' conduct far in the past, and unrelated to 
any commitment that the employers made or to any injury they caused, the governmental action 
implicates fundamental principles of fairness underlying the Takings Clause. Eastern cannot be 
forced to bear the expense of lifetime health benefits for miners based on its activities decades 
before those benefits were promised. Accordingly, in the specific circumstances of this case, we 
conclude that the Coal Act's application to Eastern effects an unconstitutional taking. 
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Eastern also claims that the manner in which the Coal Act imposes liability upon it 
violates substantive due process. To succeed, Eastern would be required to establish that its 
liability under the Act is "arbitrary and irrational." Turner Elkhorn, supra, at 15. Our analysis of 
legislation under the Takings and Due Process Clauses is correlated to some extent, and there is a 
question whether the Coal Act violates due process in light of the Act's severely retroactive 
impact. At the same time, this Court has expressed concerns about using the Due Process Clause 
to invalidate economic legislation. Because we have determined that the Coal Act's allocation 
scheme violates the Takings Clause as applied to Eastern, we need not address Eastern's due 
process claim. 
In enacting the Coal Act, Congress was responding to a serious problem with the funding 
of health benefits for retired coal miners. While we do not question Congress' power to address 
that problem, the solution it crafted improperly places a severe, disproportionate, and extremely 
retroactive burden on Eastern. Accordingly, we conclude that the Coal Act's allocation of 
liability to Eastern violates the Takings Clause, and that 26 U.S.C. §9706(a)(3) should be 
enjoined as applied to Eastern. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings. 
It is so ordered. 
GOOD v. UNITED STATES 
189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999)  
Before NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, SMITH, Senior Circuit Judge, and GAJARSA, Circuit 
Judge.  
SMITH, Senior Circuit Judge. 
This is a regulatory takings case. Lloyd A. Good, Jr. sued the federal government on the 
basis that it effectively took his property without just compensation when the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers denied him permission to dredge and fill on land he owns in the Florida Keys. The 
U.S. Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment to the United States.  Lloyd A. Good, 
Jr. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81 (1997). We affirm. 
Facts 
Lloyd A. Good, Jr. (“Good”) and his mother purchased a forty-acre tract of undeveloped 
land on Lower Sugarloaf Key, Florida, in 1973,
1
 as part of a much larger real estate purchase. 
The tract, known as Sugarloaf Shores, consists of thirty-two acres of wetlands (a combination of 
salt marsh and freshwater marsh) and eight acres of uplands. The sales contract for the land 
stated that: 
                                                 
1
 Good became the sole owner of the property on his mother’s death in 1975. 
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The Buyers recognize that certain of the lands covered by this contract may be below the 
mean high tide line and that as of today there are certain problems in connection with the 
obtaining of State and Federal permission for dredging and filling operations. 
Good’s efforts to develop the property began in 1980, when he hired Keycology, Inc., a 
land planning and development firm, to obtain the federal, state, and county permits necessary to 
develop Sugarloaf Shores into a residential subdivision. In their contract, Good and Keycology 
acknowledged that “obtaining said permits is at best difficult and by no means assured.” 
Good submitted his first permit application to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(“Corps”) in March 1981. The Corps permit was required for dredging and filling navigable 
waters of the United States, including wetlands adjacent to navigable waters, under the Rivers 
and Harbors Act of 1899
2
 and under §404 of the Clean Water Act.
3
  Good proposed filling 7.4 
acres of salt marsh and excavating another 5.4 acres of salt marsh in order to create a 54-lot 
subdivision and a 48-slip marina. The Corps granted the requested permit in May 1983. Good 
modified the permit in response to county environmental concerns and the modified permit was 
issued January 6, 1984. Under both permits, the authorized work had to be completed within five 
years. See 33 CFR §325.6 (1998). 
Good and Keycology were also pursuing the required state and county permits. In 
February 1983, the state Department of Environmental Regulation issued a permit for the 
requested dredging and filling. The state permit was conditioned, however, on Good obtaining 
county approval for the project. 
On May 10, 1983, Good applied for county approval of the dredge-and-fill proposal that 
had been approved by the federal and state permits. The county determined that the plan was a 
“major development” subject to a more stringent environmental review than under standard 
procedures. After Good appealed the “major development” determination, the County 
Commission ordered the county to process the permit application under standard review 
procedures. The county granted Good’s permit on July 13, 1984. 
At this point, Good had received federal, state, and county approval to develop the 
property. Florida law, however, presented one more hurdle, in the form of the Environmental 
Land and Water Management Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§380.012 to 380.12 (West 1997). The 
Act created a statutory regime for regulating development in Areas of Critical State Concern, 
including the entire Florida Keys.
4
 Under the Act, the Florida Department of Community Affairs 
(“DCA”) reviews local land development orders in Areas of Critical State Concern and may 
                                                 
2
 33 U.S.C. §403 (1994). 
3 
Pub. L. No. 92-500 §2, 86 Stat. 884 (Oct. 18, 1972), amending the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (codified 
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §1344 (1994)). 
4 
The Keys were designated an Area of Critical State Concern in 1977. Although the Florida Supreme Court later 
held the Act’s procedure for designating Areas of Critical State Concern to be unconstitutional, see Askew v. Cross 
Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 918 (Fla. 1978), the Florida Legislature formally so designated the Keys in the 
Florida Keys Protection Act of 1979, FLA. STAT. ANN. §380.0552 (West 1997).
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appeal those orders to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (“FLAWAC”).5  
See FLA. STAT. ANN. §380.07 (West 1997). On September 10, 1984, the DCA appealed the 
county’s approval of Good’s dredge-and-fill project. FLAWAC held that the county had erred in 
subjecting Good’s plan only to the standard review, and on May 29, 1986 ordered the county to 
review the project as a “major development.” 
Making matters worse for Good, the county in the meantime had adopted a new land use 
plan and new development regulations. The new regulations prohibited dredging to provide 
access to docks, prohibited filling of salt marsh for building sites, and limited filling of salt 
marsh to 10% of the salt marsh on a parcel. MONROE COUNTY, FLA. CODE, art. II, §9.5-345 
(1986). Since Good’s plan involved dredging to provide boat access between the proposed 
marina and Upper Sugarloaf Sound, and required filling roughly 25% of the parcel’s salt marsh 
to provide building sites, Good’s project would not have been allowed under the new regulations. 
Good filed suit in state court, alleging that the state had taken his property without just 
compensation and that FLAWAC’s order was an unreasonable exercise of police power. That 
suit was settled on October 22, 1987. The consent decree provided that Good’s application would 
be evaluated under the repealed major development review standard but that any future 
development of Sugarloaf Shores would be subject to later-enacted land use regulations. 
Good’s efforts to get state and county approval for his project had used up most of the 
five-year time limit on the federal permits issued in 1983 and 1984. Good therefore requested 
that the Corps extend the time limits of the permits. The Corps denied Good’s request to reissue 
the permits without changes, but granted a new permit allowing substantially the same 
development on October 17, 1988. 
The county gave preliminary approval to Good’s plan on November 9, 1989. Final 
county approval, however, was subject to fifteen conditions, the most significant of which was 
approval of the project by the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD). 
Good filed an application with SFWMD. A few months later, SFWMD notified Good 
that its staff recommended denying the application, based on “the unmitigated loss of wetlands, 
the loss of habitat for the endangered species within them [i.e., the state-listed mud turtle and 
Lower Keys marsh rabbit] and the lack of reasonable assurance that future unmitigated wetlands 
destruction will not occur due to the lack of the above-requested dedication.” In view of this 
negative review, Good requested that his application be removed from SFWMD’s agenda. He 
never reactivated the application or otherwise obtained SFWMD approval for his project. 
Apparently despairing of ever obtaining approval for his 54-lot plan, Good submitted a 
new, scaled-down plan to the Corps in July 1990. In this 1990 permit application, Good proposed 
building only sixteen homes, together with a canal and tennis court. Although the new plan 
                                                 
5 
FLAWAC is composed of the Governor and Cabinet of the State of Florida. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§14.202, 380.07 
(West 1997). 
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greatly reduced the overall number of houses, it located all of them in the wetlands area. The 
overall wetlands loss, therefore, was only reduced from 10.53 acres to 10.17 acres. 
Between the time the Corps issued Good’s 1988 permit and the time he applied for the 
1990 permit, the Lower Keys marsh rabbit was listed as an endangered species under the 
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). See 16 U.S.C. §1533 (1994); 55 Fed. Reg. 25,588 (June 21, 
1990). The Corps was therefore required to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) 
to insure that issuing the requested permit would not place the continued existence of the species 
in jeopardy. See 16 U.S.C. §1536 (a)(2) (1994). 
Under this so-called “section 7 consultation,” FWS prepared a biological opinion as to 
whether the proposed permit would put the rabbit in jeopardy. In its biological opinion, issued 
February 19, 1991, FWS concluded that the project proposed in Good’s 1990 permit application 
would not jeopardize the continued existence of the marsh rabbit. Nevertheless, it recommended 
denial of the permit based on the development’s overall environmental impact.6 
The FWS biological opinion also instructed the Corps to notify Good not to proceed 
under his 1988 permit. The 1988 permit had been issued before the marsh rabbit was listed as an 
endangered species and proposed a different project than the 1990 permit application. Therefore, 
the FWS “no jeopardy” finding did not apply to the earlier permit, and development pursuant to 
the 1988 permit could violate the ESA. 
On May 14, 1991, the Corps notified FWS that Good intended to proceed with the project 
allowed by the 1988 permit. The Corps also noted that it did not believe the project would 
jeopardize the marsh rabbit, but noted that the silver rice rat had been listed as an endangered 
species subsequent to the FWS biological opinion on the 1990 permit application. See 56 Fed. 
Reg. 19,809 ( April 30, 1991). 
In response, FWS initiated consultation under the ESA and notified the Corps that it 
would prepare a new biological opinion evaluating the effect of Good’s 1988 plan on both 
endangered species. On December 18, 1991, FWS released its new biological opinion, 
concluding that both the 1988 and 1990 plans jeopardized the continued existence of both the 
Lower Keys marsh rabbit and the silver rice rat.
7
 FWS recommended that the Corps deny the 
1990 application and modify the 1988 permit to include FWS’s “reasonable and prudent 
alternatives,” which included locating all homesites in upland areas and limiting water access to 
a single communal dock. 
The Corps denied Good’s 1990 permit application on March 17, 1994. At the same time, 
the Corps notified Good that his 1988 permit had expired. The Corps based its denial on the 
threat that either project posed to the endangered rat and rabbit. 
                                                 
6
 FWS made its recommendation pursuant to the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934, 16 U.S.C. §§662-666 
(1994). The Corps was not required to follows this recommendation. 
7
 FWS had earlier concluded that the 1990 plan did not place the marsh rabbit in jeopardy, but changed its mind in 
view of information showing further decline in the marsh rabbit population. 
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Proceedings in the Court of Federal Claims 
On July 11, 1994, Good filed suit, alleging that the Corps’ denial of his permit worked an 
uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. On cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment in favor of the government. 
The court held that the Corps’ denial of Good’s permit did not constitute a “per se” taking under 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 
(1992), because the ESA did not require that the property be left in its natural state and because 
the government had shown that the property retained value, either for development or for sale of 
transferrable development rights (TDRs), after the permit denial. The court found that Good had 
not presented sufficient evidence to show a reasonable dispute over the value of the property and 
rejected Good’s legal challenge to the use of TDRs in the value calculation. 
The court also held that there had been no taking under the ad hoc analysis of Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 
2646 (1978). The court held that Good lacked reasonable, investment-backed expectations since 
federal and state regulations imposed significant restrictions on his ability to develop his 
property both at the time he purchased it and at the time he began to develop it. Finding the lack 
of reasonable expectations determinative, the court held that no taking had occurred. 
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
This court has jurisdiction over an appeal from a final judgment of the Court of Federal 
Claims. See 28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(3) (1994). We review a grant of summary judgment completely 
and independently, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See State of Montana v. United States, 
124 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
Analysis 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that private property 
shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The 
government can “take” private property by either physical invasion or regulatory imposition. 
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868, 102 
S. Ct. 3164 (1982); Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886. Appellant in this 
case alleges a regulatory taking. 
It has long been recognized that “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 415, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922). The Supreme Court has set out “several 
factors that have particular significance” in determining whether a regulation effects a taking.  
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. These factors are (1) the character of the government action, (2) 
the extent to which the regulation interferes with distinct, investment-backed expectations, and 
(3) the economic impact of the regulation. See id. See also Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United 
States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994);  Florida Rock Inds., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 
1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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Because we find the expectations factor dispositive, we will not further discuss the character of 
the government action or the economic impact of the regulation. 
Reasonable, Investment-backed Expectations 
For any regulatory takings claim to succeed, the claimant must show that the 
government’s regulatory restraint interfered with his investment-backed expectations in a manner 
that requires the government to compensate him. See Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1179. The 
requirement of investment-backed expectations “limits recovery to owners who can demonstrate 
that they bought their property in reliance on the non-existence of the challenged regulation.” 
Creppel, 41 F.3d at 632.  These expectations must be reasonable. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-1006, 81 L. Ed. 2d 815, 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984). 
Reasonable, investment-backed expectations are an element of every regulatory takings 
case. See Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1179. See also id. at 1177 (“In legal terms, the owner 
who bought with knowledge of the restraint could be said to have no reliance interest, or to have 
assumed the risk of any economic loss. In economic terms, it could be said that the market had 
already discounted for the risk, so that a purchaser could not show a loss in his investment 
attributable to it.”); Creppel, 41 F.3d at 632 (“One who buys with knowledge of a restraint 
assumes the risk of economic loss.”). 
Good argues that the Supreme Court has eliminated the requirement for reasonable, 
investment-backed expectations, at least in cases where the challenged regulation eliminates 
virtually all of the economic value of the landowner’s property. In support, Appellant cites 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, and argues that Loveladies Harbor should be reversed as contrary to 
Lucas. 
However, we agree with the Loveladies Harbor court that the Supreme Court in Lucas 
did not mean to eliminate the requirement for reasonable, investment-backed expectations to 
establish a taking. It is true that the Court in Lucas set out what it called a “categorical” taking 
“where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.” 505 U.S. at 
1015. The Lucas Court, however, clarified that by “categorical” it meant those “categories of 
regulatory action [that are] compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest 
advanced in support of the restraint.” Id. (emphasis added). A Lucas-type taking, therefore, is 
categorical only in the sense that the courts do not balance the importance of the public interest 
advanced by the regulation against the regulation’s imposition on private property rights. See 
Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1179. 
The Lucas Court did not hold that the denial of all economically beneficial or productive 
use of land eliminates the requirement that the landowner have reasonable, investment-backed 
expectations of developing his land. In Lucas, there was no question of whether the plaintiff had 
satisfied that criterion. See 505 U.S. at 1006-1007 (“In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas paid 
$975,000 for two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, on 
which he intended to build single-family homes. In 1988, however, the South Carolina 
Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act, S.C. Code Ann. §48-39-250 et seq. (Supp. 
1990), which had the direct effect of barring petitioner from erecting any permanent habitable 
structures on his two parcels.”). 
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In addition, it is common sense that “one who buys with knowledge of a restraint 
assumes the risk of economic loss. In such a case, the owner presumably paid a discounted price 
for the property. Compensating him for a ‘taking’ would confer a windfall.” Creppel, 41 F.3d at 
632 (citations omitted). 
Appellant alternatively argues that he had reasonable, investment-backed expectations of 
building a residential subdivision on his property. Appellant reasons that the permit requirements 
of the Rivers and Harbors Act and the Clean Water Act are irrelevant to his reasonable 
expectations at the time he purchased the subject property, because he obtained the federal 
dredge-and-fill permits required by those acts three times, and was only denied a permit, based 
on the provisions of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), when two endangered species were 
found on his property. Therefore, since the ESA did not exist when he bought his land, he could 
not have expected to be denied a permit based on its provisions. 
Appellant’s position is not entirely unreasonable, but we must ultimately reject it. In view 
of the regulatory climate that existed when Appellant acquired the subject property, Appellant 
could not have had a reasonable expectation that he would obtain approval to fill ten acres of 
wetlands in order to develop the land. 
In 1973, when Appellant purchased the subject land, federal law required that a permit be 
obtained from the Army Corps of Engineers in order to dredge or fill in wetlands adjacent to a 
navigable waterway. Even in 1973, the Corps had been considering environmental criteria in its 
permitting decisions for a number of years. See Deltona Corp. v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 476, 
657 F.2d 1184, 1187 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (“On December 18, 1968, in response to a growing national 
concern for environmental values and related federal legislation, the Corps [announced that it] 
would consider the following additional factors in reviewing permit applications: fish and 
wildlife, conservation, pollution, aesthetics, ecology, and the general public interest.”). See also 
657 F.2d at 1190 (“Since the late 1960’s  the regulatory jurisdiction of the Army Corps of 
Engineers has substantially expanded pursuant to §404 of the [Clean Water Act] and–under the 
spur of steadily evolving legislation–the Corps has greatly added to the substantive criteria 
governing the issuance of dredge and fill permits”). By 1973, the Corps had denied dredge-and-
fill permits solely on environmental grounds. See, e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 
1970). 
In addition to the federal regulations, development of the subject land required approval 
by both the state of Florida and Monroe County. See the discussion of Good’s permit application 
process, supra. 
At the time he bought the subject parcel, Appellant acknowledged both the necessity and 
the difficulty of obtaining regulatory approval. The sales contract specifically stated that “the 
Buyers recognize that ... as of today there are certain problems in connection with the obtaining 
of State and Federal permission for dredging and filling operations.” Appellant thus had both 
constructive and actual knowledge that either state or federal regulations could ultimately 
prevent him from building on the property. Despite his knowledge of the difficult regulatory path 
ahead, Appellant took no steps to obtain the required regulatory approval for seven years. 
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During this period, public concern about the environment resulted in numerous laws and 
regulations affecting land development. For example: 
In December 1973, the Endangered Species Act was enacted.  16 U.S.C. §1531 et seq. 
(1994). The ESA prohibited federal actions that would be “likely to jeopardize the continued 
existence of any endangered species,” 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2), and made it unlawful to “take” 
(i.e., kill, harass, etc.) any endangered animal. See 16 U.S.C. §§1532(19), 1538(a)(1)(B).  
In 1975, the Corps of Engineers issued regulations broadening its interpretation of its 
§404 authority to regulate dredging and filling in wetlands. See United States v. Riverside 
Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 123-124, 88 L. Ed. 2d 419, 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985). In 1977, the 
Corps further broadened its definition of wetlands subject to §404’s permit requirements. See id. 
Also in 1977, Florida enacted its own Endangered and Threatened Species Act, FLA. 
STAT. ANN. §372.072 (West 1997), further emphasizing the public concern for Florida’s 
environment. In 1979, the Florida Keys Protection Act was enacted, designating the Keys an 
Area of Critical State Concern. FLA. STAT. ANN. §380.0552 (West 1997). 
Thus, rising environmental awareness translated into ever-tightening land use regulations. 
Surely Appellant was not oblivious to this trend. 
The picture emerges, then, of Appellant in 1973 acknowledging the difficulty of 
obtaining approval for his project, then waiting seven years, watching as the applicable 
regulations got more stringent, before taking any steps to obtain the required approval. When in 
1980 he finally retained a land development firm to seek the required permits, he acknowledged 
that “obtaining said permits is at best difficult and by no means assured.” 
While Appellant’s prolonged inaction does not bar his takings claim, it reduces his ability 
to fairly claim surprise when his permit application was denied. Appellant was aware at the time 
of purchase of the need for regulatory approval to develop his land. He must also be presumed to 
have been aware of the greater general concern for environmental matters during the period of 
1973 to 1980. In light of the growing consciousness of and sensitivity toward environmental 
issues, Appellant must also have been aware that standards could change to his detriment, and 
that regulatory approval could become harder to get. 
We therefore conclude that Appellant lacked a reasonable, investment-backed 
expectation that he would obtain the regulatory approval needed to develop the property at issue 
here. We have previously held that the government is entitled to summary judgment on a 
regulatory takings claim where the plaintiffs lacked reasonable, investment-backed expectations, 
even where the challenged government action “substantially reduced the value of plaintiffs’ 
property.” Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Here, too, Appellant’s 
lack of reasonable, investment-backed expectations defeats his takings claim as a matter of law. 
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Conclusion 
Appellant lacked the reasonable, investment-backed expectations that are necessary to 
establish that a government action effects a regulatory taking. Therefore, we affirm the grant of 
summary judgment to the United States. 
AFFIRMED.   
PALAZZOLO v. RHODE ISLAND 
533 U.S. 606 (2001) 
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and 
O’CONNOR, SCALIA, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, and in which STEVENS, J., joined as to Part 
II-A. O’CONNOR, J., and SCALIA, J., filed concurring opinions. STEVENS, J., filed an 
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which SOUTER and BREYER, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion.   
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Anthony Palazzolo owns a waterfront parcel of land in the town of Westerly, 
Rhode Island. Almost all of the property is designated as coastal wetlands under Rhode Island 
law. After petitioner’s development proposals were rejected by respondent Rhode Island Coastal 
Resources Management Council (Council), he sued in state court, asserting the Council’s 
application of its wetlands regulations took the property without compensation in violation of the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, binding upon the State through the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner sought review in this Court, contending the Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island erred in rejecting his takings claim. We granted certiorari.  531 U.S. 923 
(2000). 
I 
The town of Westerly is on an edge of the Rhode Island coastline. The town’s western 
border is the Pawcatuck River, which at that point is the boundary between Rhode Island and 
Connecticut. Westerly today has about 20,000 year-round residents, and thousands of summer 
visitors come to enjoy its beaches and coastal advantages. 
One of the more popular attractions is Misquamicut State Beach, a lengthy expanse of 
coastline facing Block Island Sound and beyond to the Atlantic Ocean. The primary point of 
access to the beach is Atlantic Avenue, a well-traveled 3-mile stretch of road running along the 
coastline within the town’s limits. At its western end, Atlantic Avenue is something of a 
commercial strip, with restaurants, hotels, arcades, and other typical seashore businesses. The 
pattern of development becomes more residential as the road winds eastward onto a narrow spine 
of land bordered to the south by the beach and the ocean, and to the north by Winnapaug Pond, 
an intertidal inlet often used by residents for boating, fishing, and shellfishing. 
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In 1959 petitioner, a lifelong Westerly resident, decided to invest in three undeveloped, 
adjoining parcels along this eastern stretch of Atlantic Avenue. To the north, the property faces, 
and borders upon, Winnapaug Pond; the south of the property faces Atlantic Avenue and the 
beachfront homes abutting it on the other side, and beyond that the dunes and the beach. To 
purchase and hold the property, petitioner and associates formed Shore Gardens, Inc. (SGI). 
After SGI purchased the property petitioner bought out his associates and became the sole 
shareholder. In the first decade of SGI’s ownership of the property the corporation submitted a 
plat to the town subdividing the property into 80 lots; and it engaged in various transactions that 
left it with 74 lots, which together encompassed about 20 acres. During the same period SGI also 
made initial attempts to develop the property and submitted intermittent applications to state 
agencies to fill substantial portions of the parcel. Most of the property was then, as it is now, salt 
marsh subject to tidal flooding. The wet ground and permeable soil would require considerable 
fill–as much as six feet in some places–before significant structures could be built. SGI’s 
proposal, submitted in 1962 to the Rhode Island Division of Harbors and Rivers (DHR), sought 
to dredge from Winnapaug Pond and fill the entire property. The application was denied for lack 
of essential information. A second, similar proposal followed a year later. A third application, 
submitted in 1966 while the second application was pending, proposed more limited filling of the 
land for use as a private beach club. These latter two applications were referred to the Rhode 
Island Department of Natural Resources,   which indicated initial assent. The agency later 
withdrew approval, however, citing adverse environmental impacts. SGI did not contest the 
ruling. 
No further attempts to develop the property were made for over a decade. Two 
intervening events, however, become important to the issues presented. First, in 1971, Rhode 
Island enacted legislation creating the Council, an agency charged with the duty of protecting the 
State’s coastal properties. Regulations promulgated by the Council designated salt marshes like 
those on SGI’s property as protected “coastal wetlands,” Rhode Island Coastal Resources 
Management Program (CRMP) §210.3 (as amended, June 28, 1983) on which development is 
limited to a great extent. Second, in 1978 SGI’s corporate charter was revoked for failure to pay 
corporate income taxes; and title to the property passed, by operation of state law, to petitioner as 
the corporation’s sole shareholder. 
In 1983 petitioner, now the owner, renewed the efforts to develop the property. An 
application to the Council, resembling the 1962 submission, requested permission to construct a 
wooden bulkhead along the shore of Winnapaug Pond and to fill the entire marsh land area. The 
Council rejected the application, noting it was “vague and inadequate for a project of this size 
and nature.” The agency also found that “the proposed activities will have significant impacts 
upon the waters and wetlands of Winnapaug Pond,” and concluded that “the proposed alteration . 
. . will conflict with the Coastal Resources Management Plan presently in effect.”. Petitioner did 
not appeal the agency’s determination. 
Petitioner went back to the drawing board, this time hiring counsel and preparing a more 
specific and limited proposal for use of the property. The new application, submitted to the 
Council in 1985, echoed the 1966 request to build a private beach club. The details do not tend to 
inspire the reader with an idyllic coastal image, for the proposal was to fill 11 acres of the 
property with gravel to accommodate “50 cars with boat trailers, a dumpster, port-a-johns, picnic 
tables, barbecue pits of concrete, and other trash receptacles.” 
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The application fared no better with the Council than previous ones. Under the agency’s 
regulations, a landowner wishing to fill salt marsh on Winnapaug Pond needed a “special 
exception” from the Council. In a short opinion the Council said the beach club proposal 
conflicted with the regulatory standard for a special exception. To secure a special exception the 
proposed activity must serve “a compelling public purpose which provides benefits to the public 
as a whole as opposed to individual or private interests.” This time petitioner appealed the 
decision to the Rhode Island courts, challenging the Council’s conclusion as contrary to 
principles of state administrative law. The Council’s decision was affirmed. 
Petitioner filed an inverse condemnation action in Rhode Island Superior Court, asserting 
that the State’s wetlands regulations, as applied by the Council to his parcel, had taken the 
property without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The suit 
alleged the Council’s action deprived him of “all economically beneficial use” of his property, 
ibid. resulting in a total taking requiring compensation under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). He sought damages in the 
amount of $3,150,000, a figure derived from an appraiser’s estimate as to the value of a 74-lot 
residential subdivision. The State countered with a host of defenses. After a bench trial, a justice 
of the Superior Court ruled against petitioner, accepting some of the State’s theories. 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed.  746 A.2d 707 (2000). Like the Superior 
Court, the State Supreme Court recited multiple grounds for rejecting petitioner’s suit. The court 
held, first, that petitioner’s takings claim was not ripe,; second, that petitioner had no right to 
challenge regulations predating 1978, when he succeeded to legal ownership of the property 
from SGI,; and third, that the claim of deprivation of all economically beneficial use was 
contradicted by undisputed evidence that he had $200,000 in development value remaining on an 
upland parcel of the property.  In addition to holding petitioner could not assert a takings claim 
based on the denial of all economic use the court concluded he could not recover under the more 
general test of Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 
S. Ct. 2646 (1978). On this claim, too, the date of acquisition of the parcel was found 
determinative, and the court held he could have had “no reasonable investment-backed 
expectations that were affected by this regulation” because it predated his ownership. 
We disagree with the Supreme Court of Rhode Island as to the first two of these 
conclusions; and, we hold, the court was correct to conclude that the owner is not deprived of all 
economic use of his property because the value of upland portions is substantial. We remand for 
further consideration of the claim under the principles set forth in Penn Central. 
II 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 41 L. Ed. 979, 17 S. 
Ct. 581 (1897), prohibits the government from taking private property for public use without just 
compensation. The clearest sort of taking occurs when the government encroaches upon or 
occupies private land for its own proposed use. Our cases establish that even a minimal 
“permanent physical occupation of real property” requires compensation under the Clause. 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868, 102 S. 
Ct. 3164 (1982). In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 
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(1922), the Court recognized that there will be instances when government actions do not 
encroach upon or occupy the property yet still affect and limit its use to such an extent that a 
taking occurs. In Justice Holmes’ well-known, if less than self-defining, formulation, “while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as 
a taking.” 
Since Mahon, we have given some, but not too specific, guidance to courts confronted 
with deciding whether a particular government action goes too far and effects a regulatory 
taking. First, we have observed, with certain qualifications that a regulation which “denies all 
economically beneficial or productive use of land” will require compensation under the Takings 
Clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all 
economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex 
of factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the 
regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the 
government action.   These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the Takings Clause, which is 
to prevent the government  from “forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 
U.S. 40, 49, 4 L Ed. 2d 1554, 80 S. Ct. 1563 (1960). 
Petitioner seeks compensation under these principles. At the outset, however, we face the 
two threshold considerations invoked by the state court to bar the claim: ripeness, and acquisition 
which postdates the regulation. 
A 
In Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985), the Court explained the requirement that 
a takings claim must be ripe. The central question in resolving the ripeness issue, under 
Williamson County and other relevant decisions, is whether petitioner obtained a final decision 
from the Council determining the permitted use for the land. As we have noted, SGI’s early 
applications to fill had been granted at one point, though that assent was later revoked. Petitioner 
then submitted two proposals: the 1983 proposal to fill the entire parcel, and the 1985 proposal to 
fill 11 of the property’s 18 wetland acres for construction of the beach club. The court reasoned 
that, notwithstanding the Council’s denials of the applications, doubt remained as to the extent of 
development the Council would allow on petitioner’s parcel. We cannot agree. 
The court based its holding in part upon petitioner’s failure to explore “any other use for 
the property that would involve filling substantially less wetlands.” 746 A.2d at 714. It relied 
upon this Court’s observations that the final decision requirement is not satisfied when a 
developer submits, and a land use authority denies, a grandiose development proposal, leaving 
open the possibility that lesser uses of the property might be permitted.. The suggestion is that 
while the Council rejected petitioner’s effort to fill all of the wetlands, and then rejected his 
proposal to fill 11 of the wetland acres, perhaps an application to fill (for instance) 5 acres would 
have been approved. Thus, the reasoning goes, we cannot know for sure the extent of permitted 
development on petitioner’s wetlands. 
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This is belied by the unequivocal nature of the wetland regulations at issue and by the 
Council’s application of the regulations to the subject property. With respect to the wetlands on 
petitioner’s property, the Council’s decisions make plain that the agency interpreted its 
regulations to bar petitioner from engaging in any filling or development activity on the 
wetlands, a fact reinforced by the Attorney General’s forthright responses to our questioning 
during oral argument in this case. The rulings of the Council interpreting the regulations at issue, 
and the briefs, arguments, and candid statements by counsel for both sides, leave no doubt on 
this point: On the wetlands there can be no fill for any ordinary land use. There can be no fill for 
its own sake; no fill for a beach club, either rustic or upscale; no fill for a subdivision; no fill for 
any likely or foreseeable use. And with no fill there can be no structures and no development on 
the wetlands. Further permit applications were not necessary to establish this point.  
As noted above, however, not all of petitioner’s parcel constitutes protected wetlands. 
The trial court accepted uncontested testimony that an upland site located at the eastern end of 
the property would have an estimated value of $200,000 if developed. So there is no genuine 
ambiguity in the record as to the extent of permitted development on petitioner’s property, either 
on the wetlands or the uplands. 
B 
We turn to the second asserted basis for declining to address petitioner’s takings claim on 
the merits. When the Council promulgated its wetlands regulations, the disputed parcel was 
owned not by petitioner but by the corporation of which he was sole shareholder. When title was 
transferred to petitioner by operation of law, the wetlands regulations were in force. The state 
court held the post regulation acquisition of title was fatal to the claim for deprivation of all 
economic use, 746 A.2d at 716, and to the Penn Central claim, id. at 717. While the first holding 
was couched in terms of background principles of state property law, see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1015, and the second in terms of petitioner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, see 
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, the two holdings together amount to a single, sweeping, rule: A 
purchaser or a successive title holder like petitioner is deemed to have notice of an earlier-
enacted restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a taking. 
The theory underlying the argument that post-enactment purchasers cannot challenge a 
regulation under the Takings Clause seems to run on these lines: Property rights are created by 
the State. See, e.g., Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156, 163, 141 L. Ed. 2d 
174, 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998). So, the argument goes, by prospective legislation the State can 
shape and define property rights and reasonable investment-backed expectations, and subsequent 
owners cannot claim any injury from lost value. After all, they purchased or took title with notice 
of the limitation. 
The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle. The right to 
improve property, of course, is subject to the reasonable exercise of state authority, including the 
enforcement of valid zoning and land-use restrictions. See Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 
413 (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law”). The Takings Clause, 
however, in certain circumstances allows a landowner to assert that a particular exercise of the 
State’s regulatory power is so unreasonable or onerous as to compel compensation. Just as a 
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prospective enactment, such as a new zoning ordinance, can limit the value of land without 
effecting a taking because it can be understood as reasonable by all concerned, other enactments 
are unreasonable and do not become less so through passage of time or title. Were we to accept 
the State’s rule, the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to 
defend  any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be 
allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule. 
Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value 
of land. 
Nor does the justification of notice take into account the effect on owners at the time of 
enactment, who are prejudiced as well. Should an owner attempt to challenge a new regulation, 
but not survive the process of ripening his or her claim (which, as this case demonstrates, will 
often take years), under the proposed rule the right to compensation may not by asserted by an 
heir or successor, and so may not be asserted at all. The State’s rule would work a critical 
alteration to the nature of property, as the newly regulated landowner is stripped of the ability to 
transfer the interest which was possessed prior to the regulation. The State may not by this means 
secure a windfall for itself. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 
164, 66 L. Ed. 2d 358, 101 S. Ct. 446 (1980) (“[A] State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private 
property into public property without compensation”); cf. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102  Yale 
L. J. 1315, 1368-1369 (1993) (right to transfer interest in land is a defining characteristic of the 
fee simple estate). The proposed rule is, furthermore, capricious in effect. The young owner 
contrasted with the older owner, the owner with the resources to hold contrasted with the owner 
with the need to sell, would be in different positions. The Takings Clause is not so quixotic. A 
blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right when a claim becomes ripe 
is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to compensate for what is taken. 
A challenge to the application of a land-use regulation does not mature until ripeness 
requirements have been satisfied, under principles we have discussed; until this point an inverse 
condemnation claim alleging a regulatory taking cannot be maintained. It would be illogical, and 
unfair, to bar a regulatory takings claim because of the post-enactment transfer of ownership 
where the steps necessary to make the claim ripe were not taken, or could not have been taken, 
by a previous owner. 
In Lucas the Court observed that a landowner’s ability to recover for a government 
deprivation of all economically beneficial use of property is not absolute but instead is confined 
by limitations on the use of land which “inhere in the title itself.” This is so, the Court reasoned, 
because the landowner is constrained by those “restrictions that background principles of the 
State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.” It is asserted here that 
Lucas stands for the proposition that any new regulation, once enacted, becomes a background 
principle of property law which cannot be challenged by those who acquire title after the 
enactment. 
We have no occasion to consider the precise circumstances when a legislative enactment 
can be deemed a background principle of state law or whether those circumstances are present 
here. It suffices to say that a regulation that otherwise would be unconstitutional absent 
compensation is not transformed into a background principle of the State’s law by mere virtue of 
the passage of title. This relative standard would be incompatible with our description of the 
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concept in Lucas, which is explained in terms of those common, shared understandings of 
permissible limitations derived from a State’s legal tradition. A regulation or common-law rule 
cannot be a background principle for some owners but not for others. The determination whether 
an existing, general law can limit all economic use of property must turn on objective factors, 
such as the nature of the land use proscribed. A law does not become a background principle for 
subsequent owners by enactment itself. 
For reasons we discuss next, the state court will not find it necessary to explore these 
matters on remand in connection with the claim that all economic use was deprived; it must 
address, however, the merits of petitioner’s claim under Penn Central. That claim is not barred 
by the mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed restriction. 
III 
As the case is ripe, and as the date of transfer of title does not bar petitioner’s takings 
claim, we have before us the alternative ground relied upon by the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
in ruling upon the merits of the takings claims. It held that all economically beneficial use was 
not deprived because the uplands portion of the property can still be improved. On this point, we 
agree with the court’s decision. Petitioner accepts the Council’s contention and the state trial 
court’s finding that his parcel retains $200,000 in development value under the State’s wetlands 
regulations. He asserts, nonetheless, that he has suffered a total taking and contends the Council 
cannot sidestep the holding in Lucas “by the simple expedient of leaving a landowner a few 
crumbs of value.” 
In his brief submitted to us petitioner attempts to revive this part of his claim by 
reframing it. He argues, for the first time, that the upland parcel is distinct from the wetlands 
portions, so he should be permitted to assert a deprivation limited to the latter. This contention 
asks us to examine the difficult, persisting question of what is the proper denominator in the 
takings fraction. Some of our cases indicate that the extent of deprivation effected by a 
regulatory action is measured against the value of the parcel as a whole, see, e.g., Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497, 94 L. Ed. 2d 472, 107 S. Ct. 1232 
(1987); but we have at times expressed discomfort with the logic of this rule, see Lucas, supra, at 
1016-1017, n. 7, a sentiment echoed by some commentators, see, e.g., Epstein, Takings: Descent 
and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 16-17 (1987); Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in 
Regulatory Takings Claims, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1535 (1994). Whatever the merits of these 
criticisms, we will not explore the point here. Petitioner did not press the argument in the state 
courts, and the issue was not presented in the petition for certiorari. The case comes to us on the 
premise that petitioner’s entire parcel serves as the basis for his takings claim, and, so framed, 
the total deprivation argument fails. 
For the reasons we have discussed, the State Supreme Court erred in finding petitioner’s 
claims were unripe and in ruling that acquisition of title after the effective date of the regulations 
barred the takings claims. The court did not err in finding that petitioner failed to establish a 
deprivation of all economic value, for it is undisputed that the parcel retains significant worth for 
construction of a residence. The claims under the Penn Central analysis were not examined, and 
for this purpose the case should be remanded. 
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The judgment of the Rhode Island Supreme Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, 
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court but with my understanding of how the issues discussed in 
the opinion must be considered on remand. 
The Court’s opinion addresses the circumstance, present in this case, where a takings 
claimant has acquired title to the regulated property after the enactment of the regulation at issue. 
As the Court holds, the Rhode Island Supreme Court erred in effectively adopting the sweeping 
rule that the pre-acquisition enactment of the use restriction ipso facto defeats any takings claim 
based on that use restriction. Accordingly, the Court holds that petitioner’s claim under Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978), 
“is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed 
restriction.” 
The more difficult question is what role the temporal relationship between regulatory 
enactment and title acquisition plays in a proper Penn Central analysis. Today’s holding does not 
mean that the timing of the regulation’s enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial 
to the Penn Central analysis. Indeed, it would be just as much error to expunge this consideration 
from the takings inquiry as it would be to accord it exclusive significance. Our polestar instead 
remains the principles set forth in Penn Central itself and our other cases that govern partial 
regulatory takings. Under these cases, interference with investment-backed expectations is one of 
a number of factors that a court must examine. Further, the regulatory regime in place at the time 
the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those 
expectations. 
We have “identified several factors that have particular significance” in these “essentially 
ad hoc, factual inquiries.” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Two such factors are “the economic 
impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.”  Another is “the character of the 
governmental action.” The purposes served, as well as the effects produced, by a particular 
regulation inform the takings analysis.  Id. at 127 (“[A] use restriction on real property may 
constitute a ‘taking’ if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public 
purpose, [citations omitted],  or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner’s use of 
the property”); see also Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523, 118 L. Ed. 2d 153, 112 S. Ct. 1522 
(1992) (Regulatory takings cases “necessarily entail complex factual assessments of the purposes 
and economic effects of government actions”). Penn Central does not supply mathematically 
precise variables, but instead provides important guideposts that lead to the ultimate 
determination whether just compensation is required. 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that, because the wetlands regulations 
predated petitioner’s acquisition of the property at issue, petitioner lacked reasonable investment-
backed expectations and hence lacked a viable takings claim. 746 A.2d 707, 717 (2000). The 
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court erred in elevating what it believed to be “[petitioner’s] lack of reasonable investment-
backed expectations” to “dispositive” status. Ibid. Investment-backed expectations, though 
important, are not talismanic under Penn Central. Evaluation of the degree of interference with 
investment-backed expectations instead is one factor that points toward the answer to the 
question whether the application of a particular regulation to particular property “goes too far.” 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922). 
Further, the state of regulatory affairs at the time of acquisition is not the only factor that 
may determine the extent of investment-backed expectations. For example, the nature and extent 
of permitted development under the regulatory regime vis-a-vis the development sought by the 
claimant may also shape legitimate expectations without vesting any kind of development right 
in the property owner. We also have never held that a takings claim is defeated simply on 
account of the lack of a personal financial investment by a post-enactment acquirer of property, 
such as a donee, heir, or devisee. Cf.  Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 714-718, 95 L. Ed. 2d 668, 
107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987). Courts instead must attend to those circumstances which are probative of 
what fairness requires in a given case. 
If investment-backed  expectations are given exclusive significance in the Penn Central 
analysis and existing regulations dictate the reasonableness of those expectations in every 
instance, then the State wields far too much power to redefine property rights upon passage of 
title. On the other hand, if existing regulations do nothing to inform the analysis, then some 
property owners may reap windfalls and an important indicium of fairness is lost.
1
 As I 
understand it, our decision today does not remove the regulatory backdrop against which an 
owner takes title to property from the purview of the Penn Central inquiry. It simply restores 
balance to that inquiry. Courts properly consider the effect of existing regulations under the 
rubric of investment-backed expectations in determining whether a compensable taking has 
occurred. As before, the salience of these facts cannot be reduced to any “set formula.” Penn 
Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (internal quotation marks omitted). The temptation to adopt what 
amount to per se rules in either direction must be resisted. The Takings Clause requires careful 
examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances in this context. The court below 
therefore must consider on remand the array of relevant factors under Penn Central before 
deciding whether any compensation is due. 
JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring. 
                                                 
1 JUSTICE SCALIA’S inapt “government-as-thief” simile is symptomatic of the larger failing of his opinion, which 
is that he appears to conflate two questions. The first question is whether the enactment or application of a 
regulation constitutes a valid exercise of the police power. The second question is whether the State must 
compensate a property owner for a diminution in value effected by the State’s exercise of its police power. We have 
held that “the ‘public use’ requirement [of the Takings Clause] is . . . coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s 
police powers.” Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984). 
The relative timing of regulatory enactment and title acquisition, of course, does not affect the analysis of whether a 
State has acted within the scope of these powers in the first place. That issue appears to be the one on which 
JUSTICE SCALIA focuses, but it is not the matter at hand. The relevant question instead is the second question 
described above. It is to this inquiry that “investment-backed expectations” and the state of regulatory affairs upon 
acquisition of title are relevant under Penn Central. JUSTICE SCALIA’S approach therefore would seem to require 
a revision of the Penn Central analysis that this Court has not undertaken. 
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I write separately to make clear that my understanding of how the issues discussed in the 
Court’s opinion must be considered on remand is not JUSTICE O’CONNOR’S. 
The principle that underlies her separate concurrence is that it may in some (unspecified) 
circumstances be “unfai[r],” and produce unacceptable “windfalls,” to allow a subsequent 
purchaser to nullify an unconstitutional partial taking (though, inexplicably, not an 
unconstitutional total taking) by the government.. The polar horrible, presumably, is the situation 
in which a sharp real estate developer, realizing (or indeed, simply gambling on) the 
unconstitutional excessiveness of a development restriction that a naive landowner assumes to be 
valid, purchases property at what it would be worth subject to the restriction, and then develops it 
to its full value (or resells it at its full value) after getting the unconstitutional restriction 
invalidated. 
This can, I suppose, be called a windfall–though it is not much different from the 
windfalls that occur every day at stock exchanges or antique auctions, where the knowledgeable 
(or the venturesome) profit at the expense of the ignorant (or the risk averse). There is something 
to be said (though in my view not much) for pursuing abstract “fairness” by requiring part or all 
of that windfall to be returned to the naive original owner, who presumably is the “rightful” 
owner of it. But there is nothing to be said for giving it instead to the government–which not 
only did not lose something it owned, but is both the cause of the miscarriage of “fairness” and 
the only one of the three parties involved in the miscarriage (government, naive original owner, 
and sharp real estate developer) which acted unlawfully– indeed unconstitutionally. JUSTICE 
O’CONNOR would eliminate the windfall by giving the malefactor the benefit of its 
malefaction. It is rather like eliminating the windfall that accrued to a purchaser who bought 
property at a bargain rate from a thief clothed with the indicia of title, by making him turn over 
the “unjust” profit to the thief.2 
In my view, the fact that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took title (other 
than a restriction forming part of the “background principles of the State’s law of property and 
nuisance,” Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992)) should have no bearing upon the determination of whether the restriction 
is so substantial as to constitute a taking. The “investment-backed expectations” that the law will 
take into account do not include the assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives 
property of so much of its value as to be unconstitutional. Which is to say that a Penn Central 
taking, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. 
Ct. 2646 (1978), no less than a total taking, is not absolved by the transfer of title. 
JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE BREYER join, 
dissenting. 
                                                 
2
 Contrary to JUSTICE O’CONNOR’S assertion,  at  my contention of governmental wrongdoing does not assume 
that the government exceeded its police powers by ignoring the “public use” requirement of the Takings Clause, see 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984). It is wrong for 
the government to take property, even for public use, without tendering just compensation. 
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A regulatory takings claim is not ripe for adjudication, this Court has held, until the 
agency administering the regulations at issue, proceeding in good faith, “has arrived at a final, 
definitive position regarding how it will apply [those regulations]  to the particular land in 
question.” Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172, 191, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985). Absent such a final decision, a 
court cannot “know the nature and extent of permitted development” under the regulations, and 
therefore cannot say “how far the regulations go,” as regulatory takings law requires. Therefore, 
even when a landowner seeks and is denied permission to develop property, if the denial does 
not demonstrate the effective impact of the regulations on the land, the denial does not represent 
the “final decision” requisite to generate a ripe dispute.  Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 190. 
As the Rhode Island Supreme Court saw the case, Palazzolo’s claim was not ripe for 
several reasons, among them, that Palazzolo had not sought permission for “development only of 
the upland portion of the parcel.” 746 A.2d at 714. The Rhode Island court emphasized the 
“undisputed evidence in the record that it would be possible to build at least one single-family 
home on the existing upland area, with no need for additional fill.” 
Today, the Court rejects the Rhode Island court’s determination that the case is unripe, 
finding no “uncertainty as to the [uplands’] permitted use.” The Court’s conclusion is, in my 
view, both inaccurate and inequitable. It is inaccurate because the record is ambiguous. And it is 
inequitable because, given the claim asserted by Palazzolo in the Rhode Island courts, the State 
had no cause to pursue further inquiry into potential upland development. But Palazzolo presses 
other claims here, and at his behest, the Court not only entertains them, but also turns the State’s 
legitimate defense against the claim Palazzolo originally stated into a weapon against the State. I 
would reject Palazzolo’s bait-and-switch ploy and affirm the judgment of the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court. 
In sum, as I see this case, we still do not know “the nature and extent of permitted 
development” under the regulation in question. I would therefore affirm the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court’s judgment. 
JUSTICE BREYER, dissenting. 
I agree with JUSTICE GINSBURG that Palazzolo’s takings claim is not ripe for 
adjudication, and I join her opinion in full. Ordinarily I would go no further. But because the 
Court holds the takings claim to be ripe and goes on to address some important issues of 
substantive takings law, I add that, given this Court’s precedents, I would agree with JUSTICE 
O’CONNOR that the simple fact that a piece of property has changed hands (for example, by 
inheritance) does not always and automatically bar a takings claim. Here, for example, without in 
any way suggesting that Palazzolo has any valid takings claim, I believe his post-regulatory 
acquisition of the property (through automatic operation of law) by itself should not prove 
dispositive. 
As JUSTICE O’CONNOR explains, under Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978), much depends upon whether, or how, the 
timing and circumstances of a change of ownership affect whatever reasonable investment-
backed expectations might otherwise exist. Ordinarily, such expectations will diminish in force 
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and significance–rapidly and dramatically–as property continues to change hands over time. I 
believe that such factors can adequately be taken into account within the Penn Central 
framework. 
Several amici have warned that to allow complete regulatory takings claims, see Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), to 
survive changes in land ownership could allow property owners to manufacture such claims by 
strategically transferring property until only a non-usable portion remains. But I do not see how a 
constitutional provision concerned with “‘fairness and justice,’” Penn Central, supra, at 123-124 
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1554, 80 S. Ct. 1563 (1960)), 
could reward any such strategic behavior.  
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
In an admirable effort to frame its inquiries in broadly significant terms, the majority 
offers commentary on the issue of whether an owner of property can challenge regulations 
adopted prior to her acquisition of that property without ever discussing the particular facts or 
legal claims at issue in this case. While I agree with some of what the Court has to say on this 
issue, an examination of the issue in the context of the facts of this case convinces me that the 
Court has over-simplified a complex calculus and conflated two separate questions. I 
Though States and local governments have broad power to adopt regulations limiting 
land usage, those powers are constrained by the Constitution and by other provisions of state 
law. In adopting land-use restrictions, local authorities must follow legally valid and 
constitutionally sufficient procedures and must adhere to whatever substantive requirements are 
imposed by the Constitution and supervening law. If a regulating body fails to adhere to its 
procedural or substantive obligations in developing land- use restrictions, anyone adversely 
impacted by the restrictions may challenge their validity in an injunctive action. If the 
application of such restriction to a property owner would cause her a “direct and substantial 
injury,” e.g., Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U.S. 77, 83, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1174, 78 S. Ct. 
1063  (1958), I have no doubt that she has standing to challenge the restriction’s validity whether 
she acquired title to the property before or after the regulation was adopted. For, as the Court 
correctly observes, even future generations “have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations 
on the use and value of land.” 
It by no means follows, however, that, as the Court assumes, a succeeding owner may 
obtain compensation for a taking of property from her predecessor in interest. A taking is a 
discrete event, a governmental acquisition of private property for which the state is required to 
provide just compensation. Like other transfers of property, it occurs at a particular time, that 
time being the moment when the relevant property interest is alienated from its owner.
3
 
                                                 
3 A regulation that goes so “far” that it violates the Takings Clause may give rise to an award of compensation or it 
may simply be invalidated as it would be if it violated any other constitutional principle (with the consequence that 
the State must choose between adopting a new regulatory scheme that provides compensation or forgoing 
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Precise specification of the moment a taking occurred and of the nature of the property 
interest taken is necessary in order to determine an appropriately compensatory remedy. For 
example, the amount of the award is measured by the value of the property at the time of taking, 
not the value at some later date. Similarly, interest on the award runs from that date. Most 
importantly for our purposes today, it is the person who owned the property at the time of the 
taking that is entitled to the recovery. See, e.g., Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284, 84 
L. Ed. 240, 60 S. Ct. 231 (1939) (“For the reason that compensation is due at the time of taking, 
the owner at that time, not the owner at an earlier or later date, receives the payment”). The 
rationale behind that rule is true whether the transfer of ownership is the result of an arm’s-length 
negotiation, an inheritance, or the dissolution of a bankrupt debtor. Cf.  United States v. Dow, 
357 U.S. 17, 20-21, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1109, 78 S. Ct. 1039 (1958).
4
 
II 
Much of the difficulty of this case stems from genuine confusion as to when the taking 
Palazzolo alleges actually occurred. According to Palazzolo’s theory of the case, the owners of 
his Westerly, Rhode Island, property possessed the right to fill the wetland portion of the 
property at some point in the not-too-distant past. In 1971, the State of Rhode Island passed a 
statute creating the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council (Council)  and 
delegating the Council the authority to promulgate regulations restricting the usage of coastal 
land. The Council promptly adopted regulations that, inter alia, effectively foreclosed petitioner 
from filling his wetlands. As the regulations nonetheless provided for a process through which 
petitioner might seek permission to fill the wetlands, he filed two applications for such 
permission during the 1980s, both of which were denied. 
The most natural reading of petitioner’s complaint is that the regulations in and of 
themselves precluded him from filling the wetlands, and that their adoption therefore constituted 
the alleged taking. This reading is consistent with the Court’s analysis in Part II-A of its opinion 
(which I join) in which the Court explains that petitioner’s takings claims are ripe for decision 
because respondents’ wetlands regulations unequivocally provide that there can be “no fill for 
                                                                                                                                                             
regulation). While some recent Court opinions have focused on the former remedy, Justice Holmes appears to have 
had a regime focusing on the latter in mind in the opinion that began the modern preoccupation with “regulatory 
takings.” See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922) (because the 
statute in question takes private property without just compensation “the act cannot be sustained”). 
4
 The Court argues, that a regulatory taking is different from a direct state appropriation of property and that the 
rules this Court has developed for identifying the time of the latter do not apply to the former. This is something of 
an odd conclusion, in that the entire rationale for allowing compensation for regulations in the first place is the 
somewhat dubious proposition that some regulations go so “far” as to become the functional equivalent of a direct 
taking. 
Ultimately, the Court’s regulations-are-different principle rests on the confusion of two dates: the time an injury 
occurs and the time a claim for compensation for that injury becomes cognizable in a judicial proceeding. That we 
require plaintiffs making the claim that a regulation is the equivalent of a taking to go through certain pre-litigation 
procedures to clarify the scope of the allegedly infringing regulation does not mean that the injury did not occur 
before those procedures were completed. To the contrary, whenever the relevant local bodies construe their 
regulations, their construction is assumed to reflect “what the [regulation] meant before as well as after the decision 
giving rise to that construction.” Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312-313, 128 L. Ed. 2d 274, 114 S. 
Ct. 1510 (1994). 
790 
any likely or foreseeable use.” If it is the regulations themselves of which petitioner complains, 
and if they did, in fact, diminish the value of his property, they did so when they were adopted. 
To the extent that the adoption of the regulations constitute the challenged taking, 
petitioner is simply the wrong party to be bringing this action. If the regulations imposed a 
compensable injury on anyone, it was on the owner of the property at the moment the regulations 
were adopted. Given the trial court’s finding that petitioner did not own the property at that time, 
in my judgment it is pellucidly clear that he has no standing to claim that the promulgation of the 
regulations constituted a taking of any part of the  property that he subsequently acquired. 
III 
The title Palazzolo took by operation of law in 1978 was limited by the regulations then 
in place to the extent that such regulations represented a valid exercise of the police power. For 
the reasons expressed above, I think the regulations barred petitioner from filling the wetlands on 
his property. At the very least, however, they established a rule that such lands could not be filled 
unless the Council exercised its authority to make exceptions to that rule under certain 
circumstances. Under the reading of the regulations most favorable to Palazzolo, he acquired no 
more than the right to a discretionary determination by the Council as to whether to permit him 
to fill the wetlands. As his two hearings before that body attest, he was given the opportunity to 
make a presentation and receive such a determination. Thus, the Council properly respected 
whatever limited rights he may have retained with regard to filling the wetlands. 
If the existence of valid land-use regulations does not limit the title that the first post-
enactment purchaser of the property inherits, then there is no reason why such regulations should 
limit the rights of the second, the third, or the thirtieth purchaser. Perhaps my concern is 
unwarranted, but today’s decision does raise the spectre of a  tremendous–and tremendously 
capricious–one-time transfer of wealth from society at large to those individuals who happen to 
hold title to large tracts of land at the moment this legal question is permanently resolved. 
IV 
In the final analysis, the property interest at stake in this litigation is the right to fill the 
wetlands on the tract that petitioner owns. Whether either he or his predecessors in title ever 
owned such an interest, and if so, when it was acquired by the State, are questions of state law. If 
it is clear –as I think it is and as I think the Court’s disposition of the ripeness issue assumes–that 
any such taking occurred before he became the owner of the property, he has no standing to seek 
compensation for that taking. On the other hand, if the only viable takings claim has a different 
predicate that arose later, that claim is not ripe and the discussion in Part II-B of the Court’s 
opinion is superfluous dictum. In either event, the judgment of the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
should be affirmed in its entirety. 
I respectfully dissent. 
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Session 31. Background Principles of Property and Nuisance 
“Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically 
beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically 
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed 
use interests were not part of his title to begin with... Any limitation so severe 
cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in 
the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of 
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.  A law or decree with 
such an effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that 
could have been achieved in the courts–by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely 
affected persons) under the State’s law of private nuisance, or by the State under 
its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or 
otherwise.” Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 
HENDLER v. UNITED STATES 
952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
Before ARCHER, PLAGER and CLEVENGER, Circuit Judges.  
Plager, Circuit Judge. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This is a takings case. It involves an almost decade-long dispute between the Government 
and the property owners over the distinction between a regulatory taking and a taking by 
permanent physical occupation, and what the scope of proper discovery should be in such a case. 
The case began with the efforts of the United States, acting through the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (Government or EPA), to combat ground water pollution from a major 
hazardous waste site, the Stringfellow Acid Pits in California. Utilizing its authority under 
CERCLA,
1
 commonly known as Superfund, the Government, in conjunction with the State of 
California, undertook a broad-ranging attack on the problem. 
As part of this attack, the Government decided to locate ground water wells and 
associated equipment in the general area of the acid pits to monitor the movement of 
contaminated ground water. The area of concern included not only the site of the acid pits, but 
nearby properties as well.  Plaintiffs own one of those nearby properties. This case is about the 
Government’s enlistment of plaintiffs’ property, without plaintiffs’ consent, in the battle against 
pollution, and plaintiffs’ efforts to be recompensed for that use.  
In 1983 the Government first undertook activities on plaintiffs’ land. In 1984 plaintiffs 
filed suit in the Claims Court for just compensation for the alleged taking of plaintiffs’ property. 
                                                 
1
 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§9601-57 (1982). 
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The suit dragged on for years, with two different trial judges. Extensive discovery was 
undertaken. Before the first trial judge, the Government moved for summary judgment that there 
had been no regulatory taking, and that the United States was not responsible for the activities on 
the property undertaken by the State of California. The court granted both motions. The plaintiffs 
moved for summary judgment that there had been a physical occupation amounting to a taking. 
The court denied plaintiffs’ motion, and ordered trial. (Hendler v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 91 
(1986) (Hendler I).) 
III.  BACKGROUND 
A 
Plaintiffs own property in Riverside County, California near the hazardous waste disposal 
site known as the Stringfellow Acid Pits (Stringfellow).  EPA became aware that a plume of 
ground water contaminated with toxic substances from Stringfellow was threatening to enter a 
nearby source of drinking and agricultural water.  EPA requested access to plaintiffs’ property to 
install wells for monitoring and extracting these migrating hazardous substances. Plaintiffs 
refused. 
In September 1983, EPA issued an administrative order granting itself and the State of 
California access to plaintiffs’ property for, inter alia, “locating, constructing, operating, 
maintaining, and repairing monitor/extraction wells.”  Henry Hendler, Order (EPA Sept. 20, 
1983); see infra note 10.  Shortly after, EPA went upon plaintiffs’ property and began the 
installation of a series of wells; five were installed by contractors for the EPA, and  (by the time 
of the first hearing) at least another thirteen by the State of California.  
Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on September 5, 1984.  Plaintiffs alleged that the 
EPA’s actions constituted a taking of their property; they sought $4.5 million as compensation. 
The Government filed its answer on November 1, 1984.  After an initial court conference at 
which the parties agreed that no material facts were in dispute, the court approved a briefing 
schedule that set May 29, 1985 as the final deadline for the filing of responses to discovery 
requests.  A few weeks later, the parties filed Joint Fact Stipulations which set out the events 
leading up to the law suit; the document detailed the five wells placed on the property by the 
EPA and the thirteen installed by the State of California pursuant to its role under a cooperative 
agreement with the EPA.  Hendler I at 98. 
In Hendler I, the trial judge, in his memorandum order of October 24, 1986, determined 
that: 
(1) the mere issuance of the EPA Order of September 1983 did not constitute a 
regulatory taking of any of plaintiffs’ property (the court did not address the 
question of whether the Order as subsequently applied might be deemed such a 
taking); 
(2) the record afforded insufficient evidence upon which to base a decision 
whether there had been a taking by physical occupation--the court wanted to 
know more about the Government’s long-range intentions; and  
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(3) the activities of the State of California were not attributable to the Government 
for purposes of takings law.  
The Government’s motion for summary judgment was granted on points one and three. 
Point two was left for trial–the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of taking by 
physical occupation was denied.  
B 
A man’s home may be his castle, but that does not keep the Government from taking it. 
As an incident to its sovereignty, the Government has the authority to take private property for a 
public purpose. In England, when the King did so, payment for what was taken was, at least 
before Magna Carta, a sometime thing, and largely at the discretion of the sovereign. See 1 P. 
Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain §2 (1917).  In the United States, the Constitution does not 
leave that issue to the sovereign’s good will. The ringing phrases of the Fifth Amendment 
conclude with the simple statement: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”  U.S. Const. amend. V. 
At the time of the writing of the Constitution and for many years thereafter a government 
taking meant exactly that–the Government would physically occupy the land.  If the Government 
needed a place for a military base, or for a building to house a government office or activity, that 
was a public purpose for which a government taking was authorized upon payment of just 
compensation.  Much of the law of eminent domain–both statutory and case–developed for the 
purpose of providing the procedural structure for government takings; the main issue in the cases 
was what compensation was just.  See J. Sackman, Nichols’ The Law of Eminent Domain §8 
(1991); see generally L. Orgel, Valuation under the Law of Eminent Domain (2d ed. 1953). 
As government activities expanded, situations arose in which government action resulted 
in an invasion of an owner’s private property, but the government had not undertaken the 
procedural steps called for by statute to acquire the affected property interests.  For example, the 
government’s road-building activity on A’s land, the taking of which was authorized and paid for 
by the government, might cause permanent flooding on the nearby land of B. The suit by B, to 
require the government to pay just compensation for the taking of B’s property as well, acquired 
the name of inverse condemnation.  
Since the suit was based upon the constitutional provision protecting property rights, and 
the provision was considered to be self-executing with respect to compensation, it escaped the 
problems of sovereign immunity. See Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 78 L. Ed. 142, 54 S. 
Ct. 26 (1933); 3 J. Sackman, supra, at §§8.01[2] & 8.01[4] [a]. Whether by planned acquisition 
through the exercise of eminent domain, or a payment after the fact through inverse 
condemnation, there was routinely present in these cases the fact of physical entry upon and 
occupation of private property by the government. 
Occasionally an issue arose as to whether the government’s activity was so short lived as 
to be more like the tort of trespass than a taking of property. The distinction between the 
government vehicle parked one day on O’s land while the driver eats lunch, on the one hand, and 
the entry on O’s land by the government for the purpose of establishing a long term storage lot 
794 
for vehicles and equipment, on the other, is clear enough. The fact that sovereign immunity 
might insulate the government from liability in the tort but not in the taking makes for interesting 
line-drawing in the close cases, and provides employment for lawyers. See 1 P. Nichols, supra., 
at §113.  
Traditional takings doctrine, based as it is on the indicia of physical occupation of land, 
does not fit easily into the issues that arose with the emergence of the regulatory state. In an early 
case Justice Holmes declared this basic proposition:  “the general rule at least is, that while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking.”  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 
(1922). 
A few years later the Supreme Court was confronted with what had emerged as the 
government’s most pervasive mechanism for regulating land use: zoning. While upholding 
zoning as a constitutionally permissible activity in general, the Court reserved in a passing nod to 
Justice Holmes the thought that there could be specific instances in which a zoning regulation 
would be so intrusive as to violate the constitutional norm. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 71 L. Ed. 303, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926).  Two years later, in Nectow v. City 
of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 72 L. Ed. 842, 48 S. Ct. 447 (1928), that passing thought became 
law, and a specific zoning regulation was held constitutionally invalid as applied to plaintiff’s 
property.  
For the next fifty years the Supreme Court left it largely to the state courts to sort out the 
validity of zoning ordinances and other regulatory enactments affecting land use. Those that 
were found too intrusive– had gone ‘too far’ –were struck down by the courts as violative of the 
Constitution. 
For purposes of this opinion we need not explore in detail the various articulations of 
what constitutes a regulatory taking that have emerged from the cases.  Much ink has flowed in 
attempts to critique and explain.  The Supreme Court itself likes to point out that no set formula 
exists to determine whether compensation is constitutionally due for a government restriction of 
property; instead the court must engage in “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.” See Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 at 124 (1978).  But at bottom what 
emerges is at least the basic notion that the government, under the guise of regulation, cannot 
take from a property owner the core economic value of the property, leaving the owner with a 
mere shell of shambled expectations. 
For our purposes here, the important point is that in 1989 when the trial judge dismissed 
the case, there were two clear lines of Supreme Court authority under which a taking for which 
just compensation must be paid could be held to have occurred: the traditional physical 
occupation theory, and the newly-developed regulatory taking theory. And by that time, a series 
of critical rulings had been made: the 1983 EPA Order alone was not a regulatory taking, 
although the question of whether that Order plus the subsequent events alleged could constitute a 
regulatory taking was not foreclosed; there was not yet a taking by physical occupation--the trial 
judge wanted to know more about the Government’s long-range intentions; and the activities for 
which the Federal Government bore responsibility were only those it undertook directly--the 
activities of the State of California, although pursuant to the Order, were nevertheless not 
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attributable to the Government. We examine each of these rulings and the impact the rulings had 
on the dismissal sanction.  
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. The Question of a Regulatory Taking 
The first issue before the trial court in Hendler I was whether there was evidence 
sufficient to establish a regulatory taking by the Government.  The judge was of the view that 
there was no regulatory taking as a result of the EPA Order itself. That Order mandated that EPA 
officials and other authorized personnel, including state officials, were to have access to 
plaintiffs’ property for the purposes of installing wells and related equipment such as pipes, 
tanks, and other storage facilities, and to carry on various activities such as storing and 
transporting ground water, conducting tests, extraction operations and so on. (The terms of the 
Order are set out in the footnote below.
2
)  Plaintiffs were ordered not to interfere in any manner 
with the EPA/state activities, under pain of significant civil penalties, including punitive 
damages.  Hendler I at 93. 
The trial judge construed this Order as “not purporting to dispossess plaintiffs or limit 
their use of the property . . . . While [the Order’s] terms were expansive, they were not 
necessarily inimical to simultaneous use of the property by plaintiffs, as long as they did not 
interfere with defendant’s admittedly beneficent activities.”  Hendler I at 95. 
This misconceives the meaning and purpose of the constitutional protections underlying 
the Fifth Amendment. The Government does not have the right to declare itself a co-tenant-in-
possession with a property owner. Among a citizen’s–including a property owner’s–most 
cherished rights is the right to be let alone. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 72 L. 
Ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see generally Warren & Brandeis, The 
Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).  In the bundle of rights we call property, one of the 
most valued is the right to sole and exclusive possession–the right to exclude strangers, or for 
that matter friends, but especially the Government.  
The notion of exclusive ownership as a property right is fundamental to our theory of 
social organization. In addition to its central role in protecting the individual’s right to be let 
                                                 
2
 The order required, inter alia, that EPA officials and other authorized personnel, including state officials, be given: 
A. Access to [plaintiffs’ property] for the following purposes: (1) locating[,] constructing, operating, maintaining, 
and repairing, monitor/extraction wells; (2) taking measurements and samples from those wells; (3) performing 
groundwater extraction operations, if necessary, including off-site disposal of such extracted groundwater. 
B. Access to [plaintiffs’ property] to accomplish all the activities described in paragraph A of this Order, and any 
necessary activities incident thereto, which shall include but shall not be limited to storing and transporting 
groundwater, and constructing facilities for such purposes, and the installation, operation, maintenance and repair of 
electric lines, pipes and storage tanks. 
C. Access to [plaintiffs’ property] to conduct any and all other activities necessary to investigate, monitor, survey, 
test and perform information gathering to identify the existence and extent of the release of hazardous substances or 
the threat thereof, the source and nature of the hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants involved, and the 
extent of the danger to the public health or welfare or to the environment. Hendler I at 93. 
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alone, the importance of exclusive ownership-- the ability to exclude freeriders --is now 
understood as essential to economic development, and to the avoidance of the wasting of 
resources found under common property systems. See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 
162 Science 1243 (1968); Barzel, Optimal Timing of Inventions, 50 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 348 
(1968); Lunn, The Roles of Property Rights and Market Power in Appropriating Innovative 
Output, 14 J. Legal Stud. 423 (1985). 
The intruder who enters clothed in the robes of authority in broad daylight commits no 
less an invasion of these rights than if he sneaks in in the night wearing a burglar’s mask.  In 
some ways, entry by the authorities is more to be feared, since the citizen’s right to defend 
against the intrusion may seem less clear. Courts should leave no doubt as to whose side the law 
stands upon.  
In the case before us, the Order issued by the EPA purported to authorize Government 
agents, both federal and state, to come on plaintiffs land and to establish a Government presence 
there. That it was for a beneficent purpose, from the viewpoint of the general public at least, is 
not at issue; plaintiffs did not contest, nor do we think they could, that the Order qualifies under 
the “public purpose” language of the Fifth Amendment. 
The question addressed by the Claims Court in Hendler I was whether that Order, 
standing alone, met the tests for a regulatory taking. The court concluded no. On the facts then 
before the court, and in light of the absence by plaintiffs of proof of facts addressed specifically 
to the tests for a regulatory taking based on the Order alone, we do not disagree with that ruling. 
We note, however, that that ruling says nothing about whether subsequent events, in light 
of the character of the Government’s action and plaintiffs’ distinct investment-backed 
expectations, might have had sufficient economic impact on the plaintiffs to constitute a 
regulatory taking. Given the fact-specific findings required for determining under current 
regulatory takings law when such a taking occurs, we understand the trial judge to have refrained 
from deciding this issue on summary judgment. It remains an issue in the case.  
B. Takings under the Traditional Physical Occupation Theory 
1.  The second issue before the trial court was whether the Government’s actions, in 
placing wells on plaintiffs’ property and engaging in other activities on the site, was a taking–an 
inverse condemnation–under traditional physical occupation theory. With regard to the wells, the 
trial judge felt more evidence was needed to establish “whether the devices are truly permanently 
affixed to plaintiffs’ property.”  Hendler I at 97.  But on the facts before the judge, that 
conclusion again misperceives the thrust of the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment. 
A physical occupation of private property by the government which is adjudged  to be of 
a permanent nature is a taking, and that is true without regard to whether the action achieves an 
important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner.  Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868, 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982) 
(placement by authority of the government of cable television (CATV) cable and connection 
boxes on the roof of an  apartment building was a taking under the traditional test). As Justice 
Marshall said in Loretto: “when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a permanent 
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physical occupation, a taking has occurred.  In such a case, ‘the character of the government 
action’ not only is an important factor in resolving whether the action works a taking but also is 
determinative.”  Id. at 426. 
In this context, ‘permanent’ does not mean forever, or anything like it. A taking can be 
for a limited term–what is ‘taken’ is, in the language of real property law, an estate for years, that 
is, a term of finite duration as distinct from the infinite term of an estate in fee simple absolute. 
(While called an estate for years, the term can be for less than a year. See generally Cribbet, 
Principles of the Law of Property 54 (3d ed. 1989).)  
In United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 89 L. Ed. 311, 65 S. Ct. 357 
(1945), the government’s appropriation of the unexpired term of a warehouse lease was a taking; 
the fact that it was finite went to the determination of compensation rather than to the question of 
whether a taking had occurred.  
There is nothing ‘temporary’ about the wells the Government installed on plaintiffs’ 
property, in the sense in which we used it in referring to the parked truck of the lunchtime visitor. 
Years have passed since the Government installed the first wells. The wells are some 100 feet 
deep, lined with plastic and stainless steel, and surrounded by gravel and cement.  Each well was 
capped with a cement casing lined with reinforcing steel bars, and enclosed by a railing of steel 
pipe set in cement.  These surveillance wells are at least as ‘permanent’ in this sense as the 
CATV equipment in Loretto, which comprised only a few cables attached by screws and nails 
and a box attached by bolts.  458 U.S. at 422.  Nothing in the Government’s activities suggests 
that the wells were a momentary excursion shortly to be withdrawn, and thus little more than a 
trespass.  Nor does the Order or the Government’s subsequent actions disclose any indication of 
a timetable for withdrawal. 
If the term ‘temporary’ has any real world reference in takings jurisprudence, it logically 
refers to those governmental activities which involve an occupancy that is transient and 
relatively inconsequential, and thus properly can be viewed as no more than a common law 
trespass quare clausum fregit.  Our truckdriver parking on someone’s vacant land to eat lunch is 
an example. 
We do not by that example mean to suggest that that defines the boundaries of the case. 
We need not decide here what physical occupancy, of what kind, for what duration, constitutes a 
Loretto taking. It is enough to say that, on the facts before the Claims Court on the motion for 
summary judgment, we conclude that the occupancy by the Government was comfortably within 
the degree necessary to make out a taking. When the governmental intrusion is as substantial a 
physical occupancy of private property as this is, Loretto establishes that there is a taking. 
2.  By like token, the concept of permanent physical occupation does not require that in 
every instance the occupation be exclusive, or continuous and uninterrupted. The evidence 
before the court was that Government vehicles and equipment entered upon plaintiffs’ land from 
time to time, without permission, for purposes of installing and servicing the various wells. They 
remained on the land for whatever duration was necessary to conduct their activities, and then 
left, only to return again when the Government desired.  
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In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979), 
the property owners had formed a marina by dredging a shallow lagoon and a connecting outlet 
into contiguous navigable waters. An exclusive subdivision community was then built around the 
marina. The lagoon had been private property before the development, and the property owners 
continued to deny access to the public after the development. 
Subsequently, the government claimed that the property owners were required to open 
the lagoon to members of the public who might choose to visit by boat, since it was now subject 
to the “navigational servitude.”  The Court held that if the Government wished to impose public 
use–even intermittent public use–of the lagoon upon the property owners, it was required to pay 
just compensation. 
The evidence before the court in Hendler I reflected a situation in which the Government 
behaved as if it had acquired an easement not unlike that claimed in Kaiser Aetna. Pursuant to 
the easement, the Government at its convenience drove equipment upon plaintiffs’ land for the 
purpose of installing and periodically servicing and obtaining information from the various wells 
it had located there. Kaiser Aetna would seem to leave little doubt that such activity, even though 
temporally intermittent, is not ‘temporary.’  It is a taking of the plaintiffs’ right to exclude, for 
the duration of the period in which the wells are on the property and subject to the Government’s 
need to service them.
3
  
We emphasize that the issue is not whether the Government had the right to impose itself 
and its activities on these plaintiffs. Whatever right the plaintiffs had to be let alone was 
overcome by the Government’s need in the interest of public health and safety to monitor the 
ground water contamination. Indeed, plaintiffs expressly concede that point. 
The issue before the court in Hendler I was whether, on the facts before it, the 
Government took any property by permanent physical occupation, thus obligating it to pay 
plaintiffs just compensation. The trial judge thought not, absent more facts; we think nothing 
more needed to be shown. The trial judge denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on 
this point; he should have granted it. 
CONCLUSION 
The case is remanded to the Claims Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
                                                 
3
 Accord, United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 90 L. Ed. 1206, 66 S. Ct. 1062 (1946) (the noise from government 
planes passing a mere 83 feet above the plaintiff’s property constituted a taking, even though such overflights 
occurred for only 4% of the takeoffs and for 7% of the landings). 
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HENDLER  v. UNITED STATES 
175 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
Before PLAGER, Circuit Judge, ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge, and CLEVENGER, 
Circuit Judge.   
PLAGER, Circuit Judge. 
In this takings case, we approach the final chapter in a decade-long dispute between the 
landowners and the Government. The dispute was initiated when the Government entered upon 
the land of the plaintiffs, without their consent and over their objection, for the purpose of 
sinking wells for monitoring of ground water migration from adjacent properties. Over time the 
Government continued to establish additional wells and to service them, all without payment to 
the landowners for the use of their property. The landowners sued, claiming inverse 
condemnation. 
After several false starts at the trial level this court determined that plaintiffs had a good 
cause of action. We held that the Government, however well motivated and however important 
its cause, must adhere to fundamental Constitutional principles: if private property is taken for 
public use, just compensation must be paid. See Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991). The cause was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.   
Subsequently, the Court of Federal Claims undertook to determine, on the facts of the 
case, what was the just compensation mandated by the Constitution. After trials on liability 
theories and damages issues, the Court of Federal Claims determined that plaintiffs ultimately 
were due no compensation. See Hendler v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 574 (1996); Hendler v. 
United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 611 (1997). Plaintiffs appeal that judgment, and the findings that 
underlay it. 
BACKGROUND 
The State of California and the United States, acting through the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (“Government”), undertook cleanup efforts pursuant to federal authority 
under CERCLA, commonly known as Superfund. As part of its efforts, the Government decided 
to locate wells and associated equipment on plaintiffs’ property to monitor the movement of the 
contaminated groundwater from Stringfellow. When the Government approached plaintiffs with 
this proposal, plaintiffs resisted. Shortly thereafter, in 1983, the Government issued an order 
(herein “access order”) mandating that government officials, including both state and federal 
officials and their agents, were to have access to plaintiffs’ land for purposes of installing wells 
and related equipment, and conducting tests and other related activities. The access order further 
ordered that plaintiffs were not to interfere in any manner. 
Well-drilling then began on plaintiffs’ property. Over the course of the following three 
years, twenty wells were installed on the property. During this period and well beyond, 
Government officials and agents periodically entered the property to monitor the groundwater, 
using the installed wells. Based on information derived from the wells, a plume of contaminated 
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water from Stringfellow was located flowing directly under portions of plaintiffs’ land, and on 
down to lower-lying communities. 
The Government undertook extensive cleanup and remediation activities at Stringfellow. 
Groundwater samples since taken from the wells on plaintiffs’ property have shown these efforts 
to have been successful. The groundwater contamination under plaintiffs’ property has been 
greatly reduced, to the extent that, it is reported, the groundwater as of May 1995 has been 
restored almost to its pre-polluted condition, nearly meeting drinking water standards. 
In 1994 the Government formally terminated the 1983 access order. As noted, the 
litigation triggered by the order had started some ten years earlier when plaintiffs filed suit 
against the Government in the Claims Court (now the Court of Federal Claims). This was shortly 
after the Government began installing the wells on their property. In their suit, plaintiffs claimed 
that their property suffered a regulatory and physical taking by way of the access order and the 
associated activities taken thereunder on their land; they sought just compensation for the alleged 
takings. 
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ suit on procedural grounds, and entered a final 
judgment. We reversed the dismissal and concluded that the trial court should have entered 
summary judgment for plaintiffs on their physical taking claim, opining that “the Government 
behaved as if it had acquired an easement . . . .” 952 F.2d at 1378. We also noted with respect to 
the physical taking that plaintiffs would have “the opportunity to establish their severance 
damages, the damages accruing to their retained land as a result of the taking.” With respect to 
plaintiffs’ regulatory taking claim, we indicated concurrence in the trial court’s view that the 
access order did not, alone, effect a regulatory taking. However, we noted that “subsequent 
events . . . might have had sufficient economic impact on the plaintiffs to constitute a regulatory 
taking.” 
On remand, the trial court bifurcated the trial between the liability issues and damages. 
The trial court determined that the physical taking was in the form of well-site and access-
corridor easements. 36 Fed. Cl. at 584. Specifically, the court found that each well-site easement 
“comprises a 50 by 50 foot square area for activities related to the well(s) contained therein,” and 
that each access-corridor easement comprises a “16 foot wide access corridor [from a well-site] 
to a public right of way.” With regard to the regulatory taking issue, the court determined that 
there had been no regulatory taking because, among other reasons, in its view the nuisance 
doctrine defeated the claim and there was insufficient adverse economic impact on plaintiffs. 
In the damages trial, the court heard evidence on the valuation of the well-site and access-
corridor easements, as well as evidence as to whether and to what extent plaintiffs’ remaining 
property was harmed or benefited from the Government’s activity on their land. The court found 
that neither the easements nor the access order damaged the remaining part of plaintiffs’ 
property, and hence determined that the remaining part suffered no compensable severance 
damage. The court further determined that plaintiffs’ remaining property received substantial 
“special benefits” and that those benefits outweighed the value of the easements taken. As a 
consequence, the court concluded that plaintiffs are due no compensation for the value of the 
easements, and plaintiffs were awarded no compensation for the access order and the 
Government’s activities thereunder. 
 801 
Plaintiffs appeal, asserting that the trial court erred in denying them compensation for the 
partial physical taking of their land, both for the value of the part taken and severance damages 
to the remainder. Plaintiffs also assert that the trial court erred in determining that there has not 
been a regulatory taking of their land. We consider these issues in turn. 
DISCUSSION: COMPENSATION FOR THE PART TAKEN 
With regard to the partial physical taking of plaintiffs’ land in the form of the well-site 
and access-corridor easements, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in rejecting their expert’s 
valuation of the easements as of 1983 at $67,364 (which with interest to 1996 totaled $185,000). 
Plaintiffs’ valuation was based on the scope of use permitted under the access order, rather than 
on the Government’s actual use. They additionally assert that the trial court erroneously 
determined that their retained land (the part not taken) received special benefits as a result of the 
taking. 
The trial court’s conclusion that plaintiffs are not entitled to compensation for the value 
of the part of their property taken hinged on this latter determination, that the retained property 
received special benefits. In particular, the court determined that the special benefits conferred 
on the property as a result of the taking more than offset the value of the easements–even under 
plaintiffs’ valuation–and hence no compensation therefore is due. Accordingly, we first consider 
plaintiffs’ arguments that the trial court erred in its special benefits determination. 
In the case before us, the trial court, based on the testimony of the Government’s experts, 
found three types of special benefits arising from the taking of the easements: (1) the 
investigation, (2) the characterization, and (3) the remediation of the contaminated groundwater. 
The trial court found that, with regard to the “investigation” benefit, it would have been 
necessary for the plaintiffs to investigate, by way of testing and sampling, the contamination 
underneath the subject property prior to its commercial development. The trial court noted that 
both parties’ experts explained that property suspected of containing contamination is 
investigated in two phases when a property owner is preparing a plan of development. Phase One 
is an assessment of the likelihood of contamination based on available public records and 
historical data. Phase Two is scientific analysis involving actual testing and sampling. 
The court considered that the installation of the wells and attendant testing by the 
Government provided the necessary information and is the equivalent of a completed Phase Two 
investigation. The court found that a private undertaking of the investigation would have cost at 
least $100,000 (with interest, $195,000).  
With regard to the “characterization” benefit, the trial court found that the Government, 
by way of its activities on plaintiffs’ land, characterized the nature and extent of the 
contamination, thereby eliminating uncertainty as to the land and as a result restoring its 
otherwise depressed value due to uncertainty. Similarly, the court found that the Government’s 
remediation of the contamination in conjunction with the activities on plaintiffs’ land conferred a 
“remediation” benefit to plaintiffs. 
The Government’s expert valued the characterization benefit at $280,000 and the 
remediation benefit at $244,000. The trial court appears to have credited the Government’s 
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characterization and remediation valuations, but it did not expressly find them to be correct. 
Rather, the court stated that even if it “limits the special benefits to the $100,000 cost avoided for 
a required Phase Two study, the special benefits would outweigh any damage from the physical 
taking. Therefore, no compensation is due to plaintiffs for the physical taking.” In particular, the 
court noted that even if plaintiffs’ valuation of the easements is adopted (with interest, 
$185,000), the investigation benefit (with interest, $195,000) outweighs the value of the 
easements. 
Plaintiffs do not challenge the valuation of this benefit. To the contrary, the trial court 
noted that plaintiffs concurred that privately-undertaken equivalent tests and analyses, as part of 
a proposed commercial development, would have cost at least $100,000, totaling with interest 
$195,000. We have no basis for concluding that this finding is clearly erroneous. 
Furthermore, given the record in this case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in 
offsetting this special benefit against the value of the easements taken. However harsh by 
modern day standards the federal offset rule may seem, which allows the Government to escape 
any payment for private property actually taken for public use, we accept it as the governing rule 
for purposes of this case. If the rule is to be changed, and to make it more consistent with the rule 
followed in the states, it is for Congress to make that change. 
Because the unchallenged trial court’s valuation of that benefit completely offsets even 
plaintiffs’ valuation of the easements taken, we need not address the correctness of the other 
special benefits found by the trial court. Simply put, because the court did not err in determining 
that the value, however measured, of the easements taken is outweighed by the special benefits 
conferred to the remainder, we affirm the denial of compensation for the value of those 
easements. 
III 
SEVERANCE DAMAGES 
Next we consider plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court erred in finding that their 
retained property suffered no severance damage. In cases of a partial physical taking as that here, 
just compensation under the takings clause of the Constitution includes “not only the market 
value of that part of the tract appropriated, but the damage to the remainder resulting from that 
taking, embracing . . . injury due to the use to which the part appropriated is to be devoted.” 
However, plaintiffs bear the burden of proving severance damages. 
Plaintiffs presented through their expert the proposition in essence that the access order 
and the Government’s activities thereunder made their retained property unmarketable, or at least 
greatly depreciated. This damage, they contend, was caused by the access order and attendant 
activities significantly interfering with development of their property and creating the false 
impression that the property was a source of contamination. Plaintiffs’ expert valued the alleged 
severance damage at over one million dollars (with interest, $3.1 million). 
The trial court rejected this aspect of plaintiffs’ theory. The court found unconvincing 
their assertion that the access order and associated activities created the false impression that 
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their property was contaminated, thereby decreasing its value.. Instead, the court “found that the 
‘evidence shows that the value of plaintiffs’ property was reduced by the contamination [from 
Stringfellow], rather than by the actions pursuant to the access order.’” The court went on to state 
that “it defies logic that the monitoring wells, rather than the actual existence of groundwater 
contamination, would devalue plaintiffs’ property.” 38 Fed. Cl. at 622. Thus, the trial court’s 
rejection of plaintiffs’ “false impression” theory turned on causation, a question of fact. 
While we might have reached contrary findings had we sat as the trier of fact, that does 
not entitle us to reverse the trial court’s findings. We are limited to the clearly erroneous standard 
of review, and plaintiffs’ have failed to convince us that the findings fail that standard. In view of 
these findings, we must affirm the judgment with respect to severance damages. 
IV 
REGULATORY TAKING 
Lastly, we consider plaintiffs’ assertion that the trial court erred in determining that there 
has been no regulatory taking of their property. In Hendler I, the trial court held that the access 
order, standing alone, did not work a regulatory taking. We remanded for “the fact-specific 
findings required for determining” whether a regulatory taking has occurred.  That is what the 
trial court set out to do, but plaintiffs claim that it erred. 
A pivotal criterion governing whether a regulatory taking has occurred is the impact the 
regulatory imposition has had on the economic use, and hence value, of the property. See Florida 
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Loveladies Harbor, 
Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  If a regulation categorically prohibits 
all economically beneficial use of land there is, without more, a compensable taking. See Florida 
Rock, 18 F.3d at 1564-65. On the other hand, though it is not necessary to have a total wipeout 
before the Constitution compels compensation, if the regulatory action is not shown to have had 
a negative economic impact on the property, there is no regulatory taking. See generally 18 F.3d 
at 1569-71; Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1180. The question of the economic impact of a particular 
regulatory action is of course fact-specific to the case. See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1570. 
Plaintiffs’ economic impact theory for their regulatory taking claim is quite similar to 
their severance damage theory. They contend that the access order and attendant activities falsely 
stigmatized their property as a source of contamination, and significantly interfered with its 
development. As a result, they contend, the property was unmarketable for a period of up to 
twelve years, yielding a loss in the range of $16-18 million. 
The trial court’s rejection of this claimed economic impact parallels its analysis and 
findings with respect to plaintiffs’ severance damage claim. The court found that their property 
was stigmatized by the actual contamination from Stringfellow, rather than the Government’s 
actions pursuant to the access order. See Hendler IV, 36 Fed. Cl. at 588. Furthermore, the court 
found that the access order and Government actions thereunder did not interfere with the 
development or marketing of the property. 
804 
We have already concluded (with respect to the question of severance damages) that 
these factual findings by the trial court are not clearly erroneous, and thus cannot be disturbed. In 
light of these findings, we cannot say that the court erred in determining that plaintiffs have not 
suffered a regulatory taking. In sum, as found by the trial court, plaintiffs failed to prove that 
their “use” was sufficiently interfered with to constitute a regulatory taking. See Florida Rock, 18 
F.3d at 1568-71. 
The trial court alternatively based its rejection of plaintiffs’ regulatory taking claim on 
the theory that “the nuisance exception described in Loveladies, Lucas, and other cases” is 
applicable and defeats the claim.  Hendler IV, 36 Fed. Cl. at 585-86. However, having concluded 
that the trial court did not err in determining that there was insufficient economic impact to give 
rise to a regulatory taking, it is unnecessary for us to consider this further theory; under the 
circumstances, we choose not to. Thus, while in appropriate cases the nuisance doctrine is an 
available defense (see Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1565 n.10; Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1182-83), we 
do not decide whether it has any applicability to this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Court of Federal Claims is AFFIRMED. 
ESPLANADE PROPERTIES v. CITY OF SEATTLE 
307 F.3d 978(2002) 
B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: 
Plaintiff Esplanade Properties, LLC challenges the legality of the City of Seattle's ("the 
City's") denial of its application to develop shoreline property on Elliot Bay in Seattle, 
Washington. Esplanade contends that the City's action resulted in a complete deprivation of 
economic use of its property, constituting an inverse condemnation in violation of federal and 
state constitutional law, and violating both federal and state substantive due process. 
Specifically, plaintiff appeals three decisions of the district court which, in toto, resulted in the 
dismissal of its claims against the defendant, to wit, granting summary judgment to the defendant 
on plaintiff's takings claim, granting summary judgment to the defendant on plaintiff's federal 
substantive due process claim, and dismissing plaintiff's state substantive due process claim. We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291 and we affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In 1992, Esplanade began a long, and ultimately unsuccessful, process of attempting to 
secure permission to construct single-family residential housing on and over tidelands located 
below Magnolia bluff, near both a large city park and a large marina. The property is classified 
as first class tideland, and is submerged completely for roughly half of the day, during which 
time it resembles a large sand bar. 
Esplanade purchased the property for $40,000 in 1991, and quickly retained a 
development team to design and secure permits for nine waterfront homes, each to be 
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constructed on platforms supported by pilings. In June of 1992, Esplanade applied for building 
permits, as well as various use permits, variance permits, and special use permits. None of these 
applications were ever approved. 
1
  
After reviewing Esplanade's permit applications, the City's Department of Construction 
and Land Use ("DCLU") identified three significant code compliance issues related to the 
proposed project: (1) the size of the proposed piers and docks, (2) the design of the causeway 
access to the houses, and (3) lack of parking on dry land. The City notified Esplanade of its 
concerns in a Correction Notice. Esplanade responded to the City's concerns, and sought three 
formal code interpretations from the DCLU, each relating to the issues raised by the City. 
Central to the ongoing dispute, the City was asked, inter alia, to interpret the code with respect to 
parking.
2
  According to the City's interpretation, parking built over water in a single-family zone 
was prohibited, despite the general requirement that single-family homes be constructed with 
onsite parking. Esplanade appealed this interpretation, which was eventually affirmed by the 
Washington Court of Appeals on the ground that residential housing was not a waterdependent 
or water-related use. 
At the end of the appeals process, in November of 1997, Esplanade was informed by the 
City that it had 60 days to submit formal alterations to its proposed plan, in light of the DCLU's 
code interpretations, without which the application would be cancelled. Esplanade, instead of 
altering its parking proposal, simply applied for a variance. Because Esplanade failed to modify 
its plans with respect to each of the three design concerns raised by the City, on April 13, 1998, 
the City cancelled Esplanade's application and later refused to reconsider its unappealable 
decision. 
On June 5, 2000, Esplanade served a letter on the City threatening to make an inverse 
condemnation claim as a result of the cancellation of its application. Without a response from the 
City, Esplanade made good on its threat and filed the current action against the City on August 
22, 2000. 
In its complaint, Esplanade alleges, "inverse condemnation []in violation of the federal 
and state constitutional provisions prohibiting the taking of private property without just 
compensation." Plaintiff seeks "monetary damages" under 42 U.S.C. §1983. 
                                                 
1
 Under Washington's Shoreline Management Act ("SMA"), RCW 90.58.010, enacted in 1971, localities are 
required to develop a set of regulations with respect to their shorelines. Before 1992, under the Seattle Shoreline 
Master Program ("SSMP"), developed pursuant to the dictates of the SMA, above-water residential construction was 
seemingly allowed where the lots had less than 30 feet of dry land. Though the Seattle City Council later amended 
that provision in the SSMP, instead allowing for such use only where a lot has at least 15 feet of dry land, Esplanade 
filed its building permit applications before this change took effect, thus vesting its application to the former 
provision.  West Main Assoc. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wn.2d 47, 720 P.2d 782, 786 (Wash. 1986) ("A vested right 
merely establishes the ordinances to which a building permit and subsequent development must comply.").  
2
 SSMP prohibits parking above water unless it is accessory to a waterdependent or water-related use. SMC 
23.60.092. 
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The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on Esplanade's 
claim, to wit, the City's alleged taking of its property without just compensation, in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment. The court held that because Esplanade failed to establish that the City's 
action was the "proximate cause" of its alleged damages, and alternatively, because the 
"background principles" of Washington state law would have precluded the development, under 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 S. Ct. 2886 
(1992), the City was not liable to Esplanade. 
Esplanade appealed, challenging each of the district court's three decisions.   
III. DISCUSSION 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from taking 
"private property ... for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. This 
clause prohibits "Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in 
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978) (quoting 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1554, 80 S. Ct. 1563 (1960)). In 
addition to instances of physical invasion or confiscation, the Supreme Court has long held that 
"if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393, 415, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922). 
"Courts have had little success in devising any set formula for determining when 
government regulation of private property amounts to a regulatory taking," Tahoe-Sierra Preserv. 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 771-72 (9th Cir. 2000), affirmed by  
Tahoe-Sierra Preserv. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517, 122 S. 
Ct. 1465 (2002). However, it is clear that under the "categorical" takings doctrine articulated in 
Lucas, "when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically 
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, 
he has suffered a taking." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; see also  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 
606, 617, 150 L. Ed. 2d 592, 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001). Where a regulation "denies all 
economically beneficial or productive use of land," the multi-factor analysis established in Penn 
Central is not applied, and a compensable taking has occurred unless "the logically antecedent 
inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part 
of his title to begin with." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. In other words, for a government entity to 
avoid liability, any "law or decree" depriving the property owner of all economically beneficial 
use of her property "must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of 
the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership." 
Here, the district court found no taking of plaintiff's property for two reasons. First, the 
court found that the City's interpretation of the SSMP and its ultimate cancellation of Esplanade's 
development applications were not the proximate cause of Esplanade's alleged damages. Second, 
the court found that the background principles of Washington law, specifically the public trust 
doctrine, burdened plaintiff's property and precluded Esplanade from prevailing in a takings 
action against the City. 
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We agree with the district court that under both federal and state law a plaintiff must 
make a showing of causation between the government action and the alleged deprivation. See 
Tahoe-Sierra (9th Cir. 2000), 216 F.3d at 783 & n. 33 (discussing requirement that "plaintiff [in 
takings claim] must establish both causation-in-fact and proximate causation," and noting that 
while "true that there is little discussion of a 'causation' requirement in any of the case law 
involving regulatory takings," despite a passing reference to proximate cause in Penn Central, 
438 U.S. at 124, "this is due to nothing more than the fact that, in most regulatory takings cases, 
there is no doubt whatsoever about whether the government's action was the cause of the alleged 
taking."); Ventures N.W. Ltd. P'ship v. State, 81 Wn. App. 353, 914 P.2d 1180, 1187 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1996) ("An owner claiming loss of the economically viable use of property must show that 
the challenged government regulation proximately caused the loss of all such use.") (citing 
Guimont v. Clarke, 854 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1176, 127 L. Ed. 2d 563, 
114 S. Ct. 1216  (1994); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wn.2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987), cert. 
denied, 486 U.S. 1022, 100 L. Ed. 2d 227, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988)). However, because we find 
that the background principles of Washington state law would have precluded development of 
the proposed project, and therefore that plaintiff's claimed property right never existed, we do not 
address the question of causation. 
1. Background Principle: Washington's Public Trust Doctrine 
As discussed above, a deprivation by the government of all beneficial uses of one's 
property results in a taking unless, inter alia, the "background principles" of state law already 
serve to deprive the property owner of such uses.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. In Lucas, subsequent 
to plaintiff's purchase of two residential lots of shoreline property, the state of South Carolina 
passed a statute having the "direct effect of barring petitioner from erecting any permanent 
structures on his two parcels," rendering them "valueless." 505 U.S. at 1007. In response, the 
plaintiff sued, alleging that the government effected a complete deprivation of his property. The 
Court held that "any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without 
compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of 
the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership," and remanded for a 
determination of whether such "background principles" would have prevented the proposed use 
of plaintiff's property.  Id., 505 U.S. at 1029. 
In this case, the "restrictions that background principles" of Washington law place upon 
such ownership are found in the public trust doctrine. As the Washington Supreme Court 
recently explained, the "state's ownership of tidelands and shorelands is comprised of two 
distinct aspects— the jus privatum and the jus publicum."  State v. Longshore, 141 Wn.2d 414, 5 
P. 3d 1256, 1262 (Wash. 2000). Relevant here, the "jus publicum, or public trust doctrine, is the 
right 'of navigation, together with its incidental rights of fishing, boating, swimming, water 
skiing, and other related recreational purposes generally regarded as corollary to the right of 
navigation and the use of public waters.' "Id. (quoting Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wn.2d 662, 732 
P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The "doctrine 
reserves a public property interest, the jus publicum, in tidelands and the waters flowing over 
them, despite the sale of these lands into private ownership." Weden v. San Juan County, 135 
Wn.2d 678, 958 P.2d 273, 283 (Wash. 1998), (citing Ralph W. Johnson et al., The Public Trust 
Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management in Washington State, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 521, 524 
(1992)). "The state can no more convey or give away this jus publicum interest than it can 
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'abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the 
peace.' " Caminiti, 732 P.2d at 994 (quoting Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 36 
L. Ed. 1018, 13 S. Ct. 110 (1892)). Instead, the state may only divest itself of interests in the 
state's waters in a manner that does not substantially impair the public interest.  732 P.2d at 993-
95. 
It is beyond cavil that "a public trust doctrine has always existed in Washington."  Orion 
Corp., 747 P.2d at 1072 (citing Caminiti, 732 P.2d at 994). The doctrine is "partially 
encapsulated in the language of [Washington's] constitution which reserves state ownership in 
'the beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state.' " Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 122 
Wn.2d 219, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (Wash. 1993) (quoting Wash. Const. art. 17, §1). The doctrine is 
also reflected in Washington's Shoreline Management Act ("SMA"),  adopted in 1971. RCW 
§§90.58.010-.930. Following a long history "favoring the sale of tidelands and shorelands," 
resulting in the privatization of approximately 60 percent of the tidelands and 30 percent of the 
shorelands originally owned by the state, Caminiti, 732 P.2d at 996, the Washington legislature 
found that the SMA was necessary because "unrestricted construction on the privately owned or 
public owned shorelines ... is not in the best public interest." RCW 90.58.020.  
The public trust doctrine, reflected in part in the SMA, unquestionably burdens 
Esplanade's property. 
We agree with the district court that the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Orion 
controls the outcome of this case, and that Washington's public trust doctrine ran with the title to 
the tideland properties and alone precluded the shoreline residential development proposed by 
Esplanade. 
In Orion, the plaintiff corporation, prior to the enactment of the SMA, purchased tideland 
property in Padilla Bay, the "most diverse, least disturbed, and most biologically productive of 
all major estuaries on Puget Sound." Id., 747 P.2d at 1065. Orion Corp. proposed dredging and 
filling of the Bay to create a significant residential community. Id. In addressing plaintiff's 
challenge to subsequent local and state environmental regulations, which it alleged combined to 
completely deprive it of all economically viable use of its property, the court decided that the 
tidelands of the Bay were burdened by the public trust doctrine prior to the enactment of the 
SMA. 747 P.2d at 1072. At the time of Orion's purchase, "Orion could make no use of the 
tidelands which would substantially impair the [public] trust." 747 P.2d at 1073. Specifically, 
"Orion never had the right to dredge and fill its tidelands, either for a residential community or 
farmlands since a property right must exist before it can be taken, neither the SMA nor the 
SCSMMP effected a taking ..." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
We find that the development proposed by Esplanade would suffer the same fate under 
the public trust doctrine as the project proposed by Orion Corp. 
Esplanade's argument that Orion lacks authority, following the Court's decision in Lucas, 
is without merit. Lucas, while articulating an expansive concept of what constitutes a regulatory 
taking, effectively recognized the public trust doctrine: 
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Any [regulation that prohibits all economically beneficial use of land] ... must inhere in 
the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and 
nuisance already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, in other 
words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts - by 
adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private 
nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public 
generally, or otherwise .... The principal "otherwise" that we have in mind is litigation absolving 
the State (or private parties) of liability for the destruction of "real and personal property, in 
cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire" or to orestall other grave threats to 
the lives and property of others. 505 U.S. at 1029 & n. 16 (internal citations omitted).  
Lucas does nothing to disturb Orion's application of Washington's public trust doctrine. 
Esplanade's contention that the proposed development was consistent with the SMA at 
the time his project vested in 1992 is similarly without merit. As the City concedes, at the time of 
the purchase, the SMA, theoretically, permitted single-family dwellings to be constructed on the 
property. As the district court noted, however, "there are numerous limitations that the SMA 
places on developments of shorelines, even if those developments, like Esplanade's, are not 
categorically prohibited." (citing, e.g., RCW 90.58.020(2) (requiring that shoreline developments 
"preserve the natural character of the shoreline"), and RCW 90.58.020(4) (requiring that 
"projects protect the resources and ecology of the shoreline")). In this case, because Esplanade's 
tideland property is navigable for the purpose of public recreation (used for fishing and general 
recreation, including by Tribes), and located just 700 feet from Discovery Park, the development 
would have interfered with those uses, and thus would have been inconsistent with the public 
trust doctrine. Therefore, Esplanade's development plans never constituted a legally permissible 
use. 
As the district court correctly noted, "Esplanade ... took the risk," when it purchased this 
large tract of tidelands in 1991 for only $40,000, "that, despite extensive federal, state, and local 
regulations restricting shoreline development, it could nonetheless overcome those numerous 
hurdles to complete its project and realize a substantial return on its limited initial investment. 
Now, having failed ..., it seeks indemnity from the City." The takings doctrine does not supply 
plaintiff with such a right to indemnification. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Esplanade's proposal to construct concrete pilings, driveways and houses in the navigable 
tidelands of Elliot Bay, an area regularly used by the public for various recreational and other 
activities, was inconsistent with the public trust that the State of Washington is obligated to 
protect. 
For the reasons given, we affirm. 
AFFIRMED.   
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McQUEEN v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL 
354 S.C. 142; 580 S.E.2D 116 (2003) 
US Supreme Court certiorari denied  
JUSTICE MOORE: This regulatory takings case is before us on remand from the United 
States Supreme Court to reconsider our previous decision in light of  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
533 U.S. 606, 150 L. Ed. 2d 592, 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001). 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
In the early 1960's, respondent McQueen purchased two non-contiguous lots located on 
manmade saltwater canals in the Cherry Grove section of North Myrtle Beach. He paid  $2,500 
in 1961 for a lot on 53rd Avenue and $1,700 in 1963 for a lot on 48th Avenue. Since then, both 
lots have remained unimproved. The lots surrounding McQueen's are improved and have 
bulkheads or retaining walls. 
In 1991, McQueen filed applications with petitioner Office of Ocean and Coastal 
Resource Management (OCRM) to build bulkheads on his lots. After an administrative delay, he 
reapplied in 1993 requesting permits to backfill his lots and build bulkheads. In January 1994, a 
hearing was held at which the following facts were put into evidence. 
At the time of the hearing, the majority of both lots had reverted to tidelands or critical 
area saltwater wetlands. This reversion was caused by "continuous" erosion, although little 
change had occurred since the permits were originally sought in 1991. The 53rd Avenue lot is 
inundated regularly by tidal flow all the way up to the street. The 48th Avenue lot has less tidal 
flow but contains more critical area wetland vegetation. On both lots, only some irregular 
portions of high ground remain. 
The proposed backfill would permanently destroy the critical area environment on these 
lots. Without the backfill and bulkheads, the property does not have enough high ground to be 
developed. Eventually tidal water will reach the roads bordering these lots which will require 
bulkheads to protect the public roads. 
In October 1994, a final decision was issued denying both permits based on OCRM's 
evaluation of McQueen's lots as predominantly critical area wetlands.
1
 McQueen then 
commenced this action seeking compensation for a regulatory taking. The master-in-equity 
found the denial of the permits deprived McQueen of all economically beneficial use of the lots 
and awarded him $50,000 per lot as just compensation.  
                                                 
1
 S.C. Code Ann. §48-39-130(C) (Supp. 2002) provides that "no person shall fill, remove, dredge, drain or erect any 
structure on or in any way alter any critical area without first obtaining a permit from the department." Under §48-
39-10(J), "critical area" includes tidelands. "Tidelands" means "all areas which are at or below mean high tide and 
coastal wetlands, mudflats, and similar areas that are contiguous or adjacent to coastal waters and are an integral part 
of the estuarine systems involved." §48-39-10. 
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OCRM appealed. By a divided court, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of a 
taking because McQueen was deprived of all economically beneficial use of his property. The 
majority held: "The definitive issue is what rights McQueen possessed when he purchased the 
lots and . . . the right to add a bulkhead and fill were McQueen's at the time of purchase."  
McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 329 S.C. 588, 595, 496 S.E.2d 643, 647 (Ct. App. 
1998). The Court of Appeals found the evidence insufficient, however, to support the amount of 
compensation awarded by the master and the case was remanded. OCRM then sought a writ of 
certiorari in this Court which was granted. 
On review of the Court of Appeals' decision, we reversed. We found it was uncontested 
that McQueen was deprived of all economically beneficial use of his property but found he had 
no reasonable investment-backed expectations because of pre-existing wetlands regulations, 
therefore no taking had occurred.  McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 340 S.C. 65, 530 
S.E.2d 628 (2000). The United States Supreme Court then granted McQueen's petition for a writ 
of certiorari, summarily vacated our opinion, and remanded for further consideration in light of 
the recent Palazzolo decision. 
Palazzolo involved a partial taking of property including wetlands. The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court found the landowner had not been deprived of all economically beneficial use of 
his property and, even if he had, the right to fill wetlands was not part of his ownership estate 
because regulations prohibiting such activity were enacted before he acquired title.  Palazzolo v. 
State, 746 A.2d 707 (2000). On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed 
holding that pre-existing regulation was not dispositive in itself, either in the context of 
determining ownership rights under background principles of state law or in determining the 
investment-backed expectation factor in a partial taking.  Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626 & 629-30. 
ISSUE 
Do background principles of South Carolina property law absolve the State from 
compensating McQueen? 
DISCUSSION 
First, we accept as uncontested that McQueen's lots retain no value and therefore a total 
taking has occurred.
2
 When there has been a total deprivation of all economically beneficial use, 
                                                 
2 
Our analysis differs depending on whether a taking is characterized as partial or total. When there has been a 
partial taking by government regulation, the court determines if compensation is due by applying a complex of 
factors referred to as the  Penn Central factors: the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to 
which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government 
action.  Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617. Where regulation compels the property owner to suffer a physical occupation or 
deprives the owner of all economically beneficial use of his property, however, with "certain qualifications," 
compensation is due.  Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617; see also Sea Cabins on  Ocean IV Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. 
City of North Myrtle Beach, 345 S.C. 418, 548 S.E.2d 595 (2001). In these two instances, the owner must be 
compensated "without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint," a factor in 
the Penn Central complex.  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798, 112 
S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
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the threshold issue in determining whether compensation is due is whether the landholder's rights 
of ownership are "confined by limitations on the use of land which 'inhere in the title itself.'"  
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629 (quoting  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029); see also  Rick's Amusement, Inc. 
v. State, 351 S.C. 352, 570 S.E.2d 155 (2001) cert. denied  535 U.S. 1053, 122 S. Ct. 1909, 152 
L. Ed. 2d 819 (2002) (threshold inquiry in regulatory  taking is whether the property interest 
affected is inherent in the plaintiff's ownership rights). Background principles of State property 
and nuisance law inform this inquiry.  Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629. Where the proscribed use is 
not part of the owner's title to begin with, no compensatory taking has occurred.  Lucas, 505 U.S. 
at 1027.  
Public Trust Doctrine 
As a coastal state, South Carolina has a long line of cases regarding the public trust 
doctrine in the context of land bordering navigable waters. Historically, the State holds 
presumptive title to land below the high water mark. As stated by this Court in 1884, not only 
does the State hold title to this land in jus privatum, it holds it in jus publicum, in trust for the 
benefit of all the citizens of this State.  State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50, 84 (1884); see 
also  State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 193 S.E.2d 497 (1972);  Rice Hope Plantation v. South 
Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950), overruled on other grounds,  
McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985).  
The State has the exclusive right to control land below the high water mark for  the public 
benefit,  Port Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood, 30 S.C. 519, 9 S.E. 686 (1889), and cannot permit 
activity that substantially impairs the public interest in marine life, water quality, or public 
access.  Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Assocs., 318 S.C. 119, 456 S.E.2d 397 (1995); see also  
Heyward v. Farmers' Min. Co., 42 S.C. 138, 19 S.E. 963 (1884) (public trust land cannot be 
placed entirely beyond direction and control of the  State); Cape Romain Land & Improvement 
Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co., 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434 (1928) (protected public 
purposes of trust include navigation and fishery). The State's presumptive title applies to 
tidelands.  State v. Yelsen Land Co., 265 S.C. 78, 216 S.E.2d 876 (1975). 
Significantly, under South Carolina law, wetlands created by the encroachment of 
navigable tidal water belong to the State.  Coburg Dairy, Inc. v. Lesser, 318 S.C. 510, 458 S.E.2d 
547 (1995). Proof that land was highland at the time of grant and tidelands were subsequently 
created by the rising of tidal water cannot defeat the State's presumptive title to tidelands.  State 
v. Fain, 273 S.C. 748, 259 S.E.2d 606 (1979). 
                                                                                                                                                             
Lucas left much confusion, however, about whether another Penn Central factor, "investment-backed expectations," 
survived in the context of a total deprivation case. Compare  Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(this factor applies even in total deprivation case) and  Palm Beach Isles Assocs., 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(Lucas eliminated this factor in total deprivation case), petition for rehearing en banc denied  231 F.3d 1365 
(Gajarsa, J. dissenting); see also  Westside Quik Shop, Inc. v. Stewart, 341 S.C. 297, 534 S.E.2d 270 (2000) 
(following Good). Palazzolo has not clearly resolved this issue. In light of our disposition on the threshold issue of 
background principles of state law discussed below, we need not decide whether this factor applies to a total taking. 
 813 
As described above, each of McQueen's lots borders a man-made tidal canal.
3
 At the time 
the permits were denied,
4
 n8 the lots had reverted to tidelands with only irregular portions of 
highland remaining. This reversion to tidelands effected a restriction on McQueen's property 
rights inherent in the ownership of property bordering tidal water. 
The tidelands included on McQueen's lots are public trust property subject to control of 
the State. McQueen's ownership rights do not include the right to backfill or place bulkheads on 
public trust land and the State need not compensate him for the denial of permits to do what he 
cannot otherwise do.  Accord  Esplanade Props., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 
2002) (finding no taking where state public trust doctrine precludes dredging and filling 
tidelands). Any taking McQueen suffered is not a taking effected by State regulation but by the 
forces of nature and McQueen's own lack of vigilance in protecting his property. 
We find no compensation is due. After reconsideration in light of Palazzolo, we reach the 
same conclusion we originally reached in this case and reverse the Court of Appeals. 
REVERSED. 
                                                 
3
 While many of the cases cited above refer to land bordering "navigable tidal" water, under South Carolina law tidal 
water is presumed navigable unless shown incapable of navigation in fact, a showing not made here.  State v. Pacific 
Guano Co., supra. The fact that a waterway is artificial is irrelevant since it is considered the functional equivalent 
of a natural waterway.  Hughes v. Nelson, 303 S.C. 102, 399 S.E.2d 24 (1990). 
4
 The value of the interest in land is to be determined at the time of condemnation.  City of Folly Beach v. Atlantic 
House Props., Ltd., 318 S.C. 450, 458 S.E.2d 426 (1995). Condemnation occurred when the permits were denied by 
a final decision. See  Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 618. Regulatory delay does not give rise to a compensatory taking. Sea 
Cabins, supra. 
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Session 32. Judicial Takings 
MUHLKER v. NEW YORK AND HARLEM RAILROAD COMPANY  
197 U.S. 544 (1905)  
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA, after stating the case, announced the judgment of the court 
and delivered the following opinion:  
The Appellate Division [held that under the case] of Lewis v. New York & Harlem R.R. 
Co. that …. the railroad company the [did not have the] the right to [violate easements of light 
and air when constructing a]  viaduct … above ground, in [the street] to front of the plaintiff's 
premises.  The case of Lewis applies fully to the one at bar.  
In the case at bar there is a complete change of ruling by the N.Y. Court of Appeals.  The 
Lewis case is declared, in so far as it expressed rights of abutting property owners, to have been 
improvidently decided.   But it does not follow that private property can be taken either by the 
erection of the structure or its use.  This was plainly seen and expressed in the Lewis case as to 
the use of the structure. The rights of abutting property owners must be considered, and against 
their infringement plaintiff urges the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States and 
the Fourteenth Amendment.   
It will be observed from the statement of facts that before the construction of the viaduct 
complained of the railroad ran partly on the surface of the street and partly in a cut or trench, the 
latter being flanked by masonry walls three feet high.  The viaduct is a solid roadbed thirty-one 
feet above the surface, having iron girders on the sides and in the middle, and supported by iron 
columns, of which there are six in front of the plaintiff's land. The new construction impairs or 
destroys the plaintiff's easements of light and air. And such easements … belonged to plaintiff in 
common with other abutters upon the public streets of New York  
The Lewis case, we have seen, was overruled by the Court of Appeals in the case at bar, 
We think that the Lewis case …[ is]  in point and decisive. When the plaintiff acquired his title 
those cases were the law of New York, and assured to him that his easements of light and air 
were secured by contract as expressed in those cases, and could not be taken from him without 
payment of compensation.  
Judgment is reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, dissenting. 
I regret that I am unable to agree with the judgment of the court, and as it seems to me to 
involve important principles I think it advisable to express my disagreement and to give my 
reasons for it.  
The plaintiff owns no soil within the limits of the avenue.  The New York and Harlem 
Railroad Company at the time of the change was and long had been the owner, and the other 
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defendant was the lessee of a railroad with four tracks along the middle of Park avenue, in front 
of the plaintiff's land, at the south end being at the surface of the avenue, and at the north in a 
trench about four feet and a half deep, the railroad being bounded on both sides by a masonry 
wall three feet high, which prevented crossing or access to the tracks. This is the finding of the 
court of first instance and I take it to be binding upon us.   
The plaintiff's rights, whether expressed in terms of property or of contract, are all a 
construction of the courts, deduced by way of consequence from dedication to and trusts for the 
purposes of a public street. They never were granted to him or his predecessors in express words, 
or, probably, by any conscious implication.  If at the outset the New York courts had  decided 
that apart from statute or express grant the abutters on a street had only the rights of the public 
and no private easement of any kind, it would have been in no way amazing.   
If the decisions, which I say conceivably might have been made, had been made as to the 
common law, they would have infringed no rights under the Constitution of the United States.  
So much, I presume, would be admitted by every one.  But if that be admitted, I ask myself what 
has happened to cut down the power of the same courts as against that same Constitution at the 
present day.  So far as I know the only thing which has happened is that they have decided the 
elevated railroad cases, to which I have referred.  It is on that ground alone that we are asked to 
review the decision of the Court of Appeals upon what otherwise would be purely a matter of 
local law.  
The doctrine now is explained, however, not to mean that a change in the decision 
impairs the obligation of contracts, and certainly never has been supposed to mean that all 
property owners in a State have a vested right that no general proposition of law shall be 
reversed, changed or modified by the courts if the consequence to them will be more or less 
pecuniary loss.  I know of no constitutional principle to prevent the complete reversal of the 
elevated railroad cases to-morrow.  
But again, if the plaintiff had an easement over the whole street he got it as a tacit 
incident of an appropriation of the street to the uses of the public.  The most obvious aspect of 
the change is that the whole street now is open to travel, and that an impassable barrier along its 
width has been removed, in other words, that the convenience of travellers on the highway has 
been considered and enhanced.  It was possible for the New York Courts to hold, as they seem to 
have held, that the easement which they had declared to exist is subject to the fullest exercise of 
the primary right out of which it sprang, and that any change in the street for the benefit of public 
travel is a matter of public right, as against what I have called the parasitic right which the 
plaintiff claims.   
The foregoing distinctions seem to me not wanting in good sense.  Certainly I should 
have been inclined to adopt one or both of them, or in some way to avoid the earlier decisions.  
But I am not discussing the question whether they are sound.  If my disagreement was confined 
to that I should be silent.  I am considering what there is in the Constitution of the United States 
forbidding the Court of Appeals to hold them sound.  I think there is nothing; and there being 
nothing, and the New York decision obviously not having been given its form for the purpose of 
evading this court, I think we should respect and affirm it, if we do not dismiss the case.  
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What the plaintiff claims is really property, a right in rem. It is called contract merely to 
bring it within the contract clause of the Constitution.  It seems to me a considerable extension of 
the power to determine for ourselves what the contract is, which we have assumed when it is 
alleged that the obligation of a contract has been impaired, to say that we will make the same 
independent determination when it is alleged that property is taken without due compensation.  
But it seems to me that it does not help the argument.  The rule adopted as to contract is simply a 
rule to prevent an evasion of the constitutional limit to the power of the States, and, it seems to 
me, should not be extended to a case like this.  Bearing in mind that, as I have said, the plaintiff's 
rights, however expressed, are wholly a construction of the courts, I cannot believe that 
whenever the Fourteenth Amendment or Article I, section 10, is set up we are free to go behind 
the local decisions on a matter of land law, and, on the ground that we decide what the contract 
is, declare rights to exist which we should think ought to be implied from a dedication or location 
if we were the local courts 
If we are bound by local decisions as to local rights in real estate, then we equally are 
bound by the distinctions and the limitations of those rights declared by the local courts.  If an 
exception were established in the case of a decision which obviously was intended to evade 
constitutional limits, I suppose I may assume that such an evasion would not be imputed to a 
judgment which four Justices of this court think right.  
As I necessarily have dealt with the merits of the case for the purpose of presenting my 
point, I will add one other consideration.  Suppose that the plaintiff has an easement and that it 
has been impaired, bearing in mind that his damage is in respect of light and air, not access, and 
is inflicted for the benefit of public travel, I should hesitate to say that in inflicting it the 
legislature went beyond the constitutional exercise of the police power.  To a certain and to an 
appreciable extent the legislature may alter the law of nuisance, although property is affected.  
To a certain and to an appreciable extent the use of particular property may be limited without 
compensation.  Not every such limitation, restriction or diminution of value amounts to a taking 
in a constitutional sense.  I have a good deal of doubt whether it has been made to appear that 
any right of the plaintiff has been taken or destroyed for which compensation is necessary under 
the Constitution of the United States 
HUGHES v. WASHINGTON 
389 U.S. 290 (1967) 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question for decision is whether federal or state law controls the ownership of land, 
called accretion, gradually deposited by the ocean on adjoining upland property conveyed by the 
United States prior to statehood. The circumstances that give rise to the question are these.  Prior 
to 1889 all land in what is now the State of Washington was owned by the United States, except 
land that had been conveyed to private parties.  At that time owners of property bordering the 
ocean, such as the predecessor in title of Mrs. Stella Hughes, the petitioner here, had under the 
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common law a right to include within their lands any accretion gradually built up by the ocean.
1
 
Washington became a State in 1889, and Article 17 of the State's new constitution, as interpreted 
by its Supreme Court, denied the owners of ocean-front property in the State any further rights in 
accretion that might in the future be formed between their property and the ocean.  This is a suit 
brought by Mrs. Hughes, the successor in title to the original federal grantee, against the State of 
Washington as owner of the tidelands to determine whether the right to future accretions which 
existed under federal law in 1889 was abolished by that provision of the Washington 
Constitution.  The trial court upheld Mrs. Hughes' contention that the right to accretions 
remained subject to federal law, and that she was the owner of the accreted lands.  The State 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that state law controlled and that the State owned these lands. 
67 Wash. 2d 799, 410 P. 2d 20 (1966). We granted certiorari. 385 U.S. 1000 (1967). We hold 
that this question is governed by federal, not state, law and that under federal law Mrs. Hughes, 
who traces   her title to a federal grant prior to statehood, is the owner of these accretions.   
While the issue appears never to have been squarely presented to this Court before, we 
think the path to decision   is indicated by our holding in Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 
(1935). In that case we dealt with the rights of a California property owner who held under a 
federal patent, and in that instance, unlike the present case, the patent was issued after statehood. 
We held that 
"the question as to the extent of this federal grant, that is, as to the limit of the 
land conveyed, or the boundary between the upland and the tideland, is 
necessarily a federal question.  It is a question which concerns the validity and 
effect of an act done by the United States; it involves the ascertainment of the 
essential basis of a right asserted under federal law." 296 U.S., at 22. 
No subsequent case in this Court has cast doubt on the principle announced in Borax.  
See also United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1935). The State argues, and the court 
below held, however, that the Borax case should not be applied here because that case involved 
no question as to accretions.  While this is true, the case did involve the question as to what 
rights were conveyed by the federal grant and decided that the extent of ownership under the 
federal grant is governed by federal law.  This is as true whether doubt as to any boundary is 
based on a broad question as to the general definition of the shoreline or on a particularized 
problem relating to the ownership of accretion.  See United States v. Washington, 294 F.2d 830, 
832 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1962). We therefore find no significant 
difference between Borax and the present case. 
Recognizing the difficulty of distinguishing Borax, respondent urges us to reconsider it. 
Borax itself, as well as United States v. Oregon, supra, and many other cases, makes clear that a 
dispute over title to lands owned by the Federal Government is governed by federal law, 
although of course the Federal Government may, if it desires, choose to select a state rule as the 
federal rule.  Borax holds that there has been no such choice in this area, and we have no 
difficulty in concluding that Borax was correctly decided.  The rule deals with waters that lap 
                                                 
1 
Jones v. Johnston, 18 How. 150 (1856); County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46 (1874). 
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both the lands of the State and the boundaries of the international sea.  This relationship, at this 
particular point of the marginal sea, is too close to the vital interest of the Nation in its own 
boundaries to allow it to be governed by any law but the "supreme Law of the Land." 
This brings us to the question of what the federal rule is.  The State has not attempted to 
argue that federal law gives it title to these accretions, and it seems clear to us that it could not. A 
long and unbroken line of decisions of this Court establishes that the grantee of land bounded by 
a body of navigable water acquires a right to any natural and gradual accretion formed along the 
shore.  In Jones v. Johnston, 18 How. 150 (1856), a dispute between two parties owning land 
along Lake Michigan over the ownership of soil that had gradually been deposited along the 
shore, this Court held that "land gained from the sea either by alluvion or dereliction, if the same 
be by little and little, by small and imperceptible degrees, belongs to the owner of the land 
adjoining." 18 How., at 156. The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this rule, County of St. Clair v. 
Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46 (1874); Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178 (1890), and the 
soundness of the principle is scarcely open to question.  Any other rule would leave riparian 
owners continually in danger of losing the access to water which  is often the most valuable 
feature of their property, and continually vulnerable to harassing litigation challenging the 
location of the original water lines. While it is true that these riparian rights are to some extent 
insecure in any event, since they are subject to considerable control by the neighboring owner of 
the tideland, this is insufficient reason to leave these valuable rights at the mercy of natural 
phenomena which   may in no way affect the interests of the tideland owner.  See Stevens v. 
Arnold, 262 U.S. 266, 269-270 (1923). We therefore hold that petitioner is entitled to the 
accretion that has been gradually formed along her property by the ocean. 
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of 
Washington for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.  
Reversed and remanded. 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring. 
I fully agree that the extent of the 1866 federal grant to which Mrs. Hughes traces her 
ownership was originally measurable by federal common law, and that under the applicable 
federal rule her predecessor in title acquired the right to all accretions gradually built up by the 
sea.  For me, however, that does not end the matter.  For the Supreme Court of Washington 
decided in 1966, in the case now before us, that Washington terminated the right to oceanfront 
accretions when it became a State in 1889.  The State concedes that the federal grant in question 
conferred such a right prior to 1889.  But the State purports to have reserved all post-1889 
accretions for the public domain. Mrs. Hughes is entitled to the beach she claims in this case 
only if the State failed in its effort to abolish all private rights to seashore accretions.  
Surely it must be conceded as a general proposition that the law of real property is, under 
our Constitution, left to the individual States to develop and administer.  And surely Washington 
or any other State is free to make changes, either legislative or judicial, in its general rules of real 
property law, including the rules governing the property rights of riparian owners.  Nor are 
riparian owners who derive their title from the United States somehow immune from the 
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changing impact of these general state rules.  Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332, 342. For if they 
were, then the property law of a State like Washington, carved entirely out of federal territory, 
would be forever frozen into the mold it occupied on the date of the State's admission to the 
Union.  It follows that Mrs. Hughes cannot claim immunity from changes in the property law of 
Washington simply because her title derives from a federal grant.  Like any other property 
owner, however, Mrs. Hughes may insist, quite apart from the federal origin of her title, that the 
State not take her land without just compensation.  Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 
226, 236-241. 
Accordingly, if Article 17 of the   Washington Constitution had unambiguously provided, 
in 1889, that all accretions along the Washington coast from that  day forward would belong to 
the State rather than to private riparian owners, this case would present two questions not 
discussed by the Court, both of which I think exceedingly difficult.  First: Does such a 
prospective change in state property law constitute a compensable taking?  Second: If so, does 
the constitutional right to compensation run with the land, so as to give not only the 1889 owner, 
but also his successors – including Mrs. Hughes – a valid claim against the State? 
The fact, however, is that Article 17 contained no such unambiguous provision.  In that 
Article, the State simply asserted its ownership of "the beds and shores of all navigable waters in 
the state up to and including the line of ordinary high tide, in waters where the tide ebbs and 
flows, and up to and including the line of ordinary high water within the banks of all navigable 
rivers and lakes." In the present case the Supreme Court of Washington held that, by this 1889 
language, "littoral rights of upland owners were terminated." 67 Wash. 2d 799, 816, 410 P. 2d 
20, 29.  Such a conclusion by the State's highest court on a question of state law would ordinarily 
bind this Court, but here the state and federal questions are inextricably intertwined. For if it 
cannot reasonably be said that the littoral rights of upland owners were terminated in 1889, then 
the effect of the decision now before us is to take from these owners, without compensation, land 
deposited by the Pacific Ocean from 1889 to 1966. 
We cannot resolve the federal question whether there has been such a taking without first 
making a determination of our own as to who owned the seashore accretions between 1889 and 
1966.  To the extent that the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington on that issue arguably 
conforms to reasonable expectations, we must of course accept it as conclusive.  But to the extent 
that it constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant precedents, 
no such deference would be appropriate.  For a State cannot be permitted to defeat the 
constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process of law by the simple 
device of asserting retroactively that the property it has taken never existed at all.  Whether the 
decision here worked an unpredictable change in state law thus inevitably presents a federal 
question for the determination of this Court.  See Demorest v. City Bank Co., 321 U.S. 36, 
42-43. Cf. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95. The Washington court insisted that its 
decision was "not startling." 67 Wash. 2d 799, 814, 410 P. 2d 20, 28. What is at issue here is the 
accuracy of that characterization. 
The state court rested its result upon Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 26 P. 539, but 
that decision involved only the relative rights of the State and the upland owner in the tidelands 
themselves.  The Eisenbach court declined to resolve the accretions question presented here. This 
 821 
question was resolved in 1946, in Ghione v. State, 26 Wash. 2d 635, 175 P. 2d 955. There the 
State asserted, as it does here, that Article 17 operated to deprive private riparian owners of 
post-1889 accretions.  The Washington Supreme Court rejected that assertion in Ghione and held 
that, after 1889 as before, title to gradual accretions under Washington law vested in the owner 
of the adjoining land.  In the present case, 20 years after its Ghione decision, the Washington 
Supreme Court reached a different conclusion.  The state court in this case sought to distinguish 
Ghione: The water there involved was part of a river.  But the Ghione court had emphatically 
stated that the same "rule of accretion . . . applies to both tidewaters and fresh waters." 26 Wash. 
2d 635, 645, 175 P. 2d 955, 961. I can only conclude, as did the dissenting judge below, that the 
state court's most recent construction of Article 17 effected an unforeseeable change in 
Washington property law as expounded by the State Supreme Court.  
There can be little doubt about the impact of that change upon Mrs. Hughes: The beach 
she had every reason to regard as hers was declared by the state court to be in the public domain.  
Of course the court did not conceive of this action as a taking.  As is so often the case when a 
State exercises its power to make law, or to regulate, or to pursue a public project, pre-existing 
property interests were impaired here without any calculated decision to deprive anyone of what 
he once owned.  But the Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a State says, or 
by what it intends, but by what it does.  Although the State in this case made no attempt to take 
the accreted lands by eminent domain, it achieved the same result by effecting a retroactive 
transformation of private into public property -- without paying for the privilege of doing so.  
Because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids such confiscation by a 
State, no less through its courts than through its legislature, and no less when a taking is 
unintended than when it is deliberate, I join in reversing the judgment.  
STEVENS v. CITY OF CANNON BEACH 
510 U.S. 1207 (1994) 
OPINION: The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE O’CONNOR joins, dissenting.  
This is a suit by owners of a parcel of beachfront property against the City of Cannon 
Beach and the State of Oregon. Petitioners purchased the property in 1957. In 1989, they sought 
a building permit for construction of a seawall on the dry-sand portion of the property. When the 
permit was denied, they brought this inverse condemnation action against the city in the Circuit 
Court of Clatsop County, alleging a taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
That court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Ore. Rule Civ. Proc. 
21A(8), on the ground that under State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 
(1969), petitioners never possessed the right to obstruct public access to the dry-sand portion of 
the property.  The Court of Appeals, 114 Ore. App. 457, 835 P.2d 940 (1992), and then the 
Supreme Court of Oregon, 317 Ore. 131, 854 P.2d 449 (1993), both relying on Thornton, 
affirmed. The landowners have petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court 
of Oregon. They allege an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation, and a 
denial of due process of law. 
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In order to clarify the nature of the constitutional questions that the case presents, a brief 
sketch of Oregon case law involving beachfront property is necessary. 
I 
In 1969, the State of Oregon brought suit to enjoin owners of certain beachfront tourist 
facilities from constructing improvements on the “dry-sand” portion of their properties. The trial 
court granted an injunction. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969). In 
defending that judgment on appeal to the Supreme Court of Oregon, the State briefed and argued 
its case on the theory that by implied dedication or prescriptive easement the public had acquired 
the right to use the dry-sand area for recreational purposes, precluding development. The 
Supreme Court of Oregon found “a better legal basis” for affirming the decision and decided the 
case on an entirely different theory: 
“The most cogent basis for the decision in this case is the English doctrine of 
custom. Strictly construed, prescription applies only to the specific tract of land 
before the court, and doubtful prescription cases could fill the courts for years 
with tract-by-tract litigation. An established custom, on the other hand, can be 
proven with reference to a larger region. Ocean-front lands from the northern to 
the southern border of the state ought to be treated uniformly.” Id., at 595, 462 
P.2d, at 676. 
The court set forth what it said were the seven elements of the doctrine of custom
1
 and 
concluded that “the custom of the people of Oregon to use the dry-sand area of the beaches for 
public recreational purposes meets every one of Blackstone’s requisites.” Id., at 597, 462 P.2d, at 
677. The court affirmed the injunction, saying that “it takes from no man anything which he has 
had a legitimate reason to regard as exclusively his.” Id., at 599, 462 P.2d, at 678. Thus, 
Thornton declared as the customary law of Oregon the proposition that the public enjoys a right 
of recreational use of all dry-sand beach, which denies property owners development rights. 
Or so it seemed until 1989. That year, the Supreme Court of Oregon revisited the issue of 
dry-sand beach in the case of McDonald v. Halvorson, 308 Ore. 340, 780 P.2d 714 (1989). 
There, the beachfront property owners who were plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration that their 
property included a portion of dry-sand area adjacent to a cove of the Pacific Ocean. With such a 
declaration in place, they hoped to gain access (under Thornton, as members of the public) to the 
remaining dry-sand area of the cove lying on property to which the defendants held record title. 
The State intervened to assert the public’s right (under the doctrine of custom) to use the dry-
sand area of the cove, and to enjoin defendants from interfering with that right. The Supreme 
Court of Oregon held that the public had no right to recreational use of the dry-sand portions of 
                                                 
1 
The Supreme Court of Oregon described the English doctrine of custom as applying to land used in a certain 
manner (1) so long that the mind runneth not to the contrary; (2) without interruption; (3) peaceably; (4) where the 
public use has been appropriate to the land and the usages of the community; (5) where the boundary is certain; (6) 
where the custom is obligatory (not left up to individual landowners as to whether they will recognize the public’s 
right to access); and (7) where the custom is not repugnant to or inconsistent with other customs or laws. 
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the cove beach. 308 Ore., at 360, 780 P.2d, at 724. McDonald noted what it called 
inconsistencies in Thornton, 308 Ore., at 358-359, 780 P.2d, at 723, and resolved them by stating 
that “nothing in [Thornton] fairly can be read to have established beyond dispute a public claim 
by virtue of ‘custom’ to the right to recreational use of the entire Oregon coast.” Id., at 359, 780 
P.2d, at 724. “There may also be [dry-sand] areas,” the court said, “to which the doctrine of 
custom is not applicable.” Ibid. The court noted that “there [was] no testimony in this record 
showing customary use of the narrow beach on the bank of the cove. . . . The doctrine of custom 
announced in [Thornton] simply does not apply to this controversy. The public has no right to 
recreational use of the [dry-sand beach area of the cove] because there is no factual predicate for 
application of the doctrine.” Id., at 360, 780 P.2d, at 724. 
With McDonald now the leading case interpreting the law of custom, petitioners here 
brought their takings challenge in the Oregon state trial court. As recited above, that court 
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, saying that “[Thornton] 
teaches us that ocean front owners cannot enclose or develop the dry sand beach area so as to 
exclude the public therefrom. . . . Because of the public’s ancient and continued use of the dry 
sand area on the Oregon coast . . . its future use thereof cannot be curtailed or limited.” App. to 
Pet. for Cert. C-24. The trial court did not cite McDonald, and its peremptory dismissal 
prevented petitioners from doing what McDonald clearly contemplated their doing: providing the 
factual predicate for their challenge through testimony of customary use showing that their 
property is one of those areas “to which the doctrine of custom [was] not applicable.” McDonald, 
supra, at 359, 780 P.2d, at 724. Moreover, when petitioners attempted to introduce such factual 
material on appeal they were rebuffed on grounds that appeal was confined to the purely legal 
question of whether the complaint stated a claim under Oregon law. App. to Pet. for Cert. I-197 – 
I-198 (Tr., Mar. 3, 1993); see also id., at I-185 – I-190. 
In its decision here, the Supreme Court of Oregon quoted portions of Thornton’s 
sweeping language appearing to declare the law of custom for all the Oregon shore. But it then 
read Thornton (which also originated in a dispute over property in Cannon Beach) to have said 
that the “historic public use of the dry sand area of Cannon Beach met [Blackstone’s] 
requirements.” 317 Ore., at 140, 854 P.2d, at 454 (emphasis added).2  The court then framed the 
issue as the continuing validity of Thornton in light of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
505 U.S.___, (1992). The court quoted our opinion in Lucas: “Any limitation so severe [as to 
prohibit all economically beneficial use of land] cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without 
compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of 
the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.” 317 Ore., at 142, 
                                                 
2 This reading of Thornton is in my view unsupportable. Thornton did not limit itself to “the dry sand area of Cannon 
Beach.” On the contrary, Thornton includes the following statements: “Ocean-front lands from the northern to the 
southern border of the state ought to be treated uniformly.” 254 Ore., at 595, 462 P.2d, at 676. “This case deals 
solely with the dry-sand area along the Pacific shore . . . .” Ibid.  “The custom of the people of Oregon to use the 
dry-sand area of the beaches for public recreational purposes meets every one of Blackstone’s requisites.” Id., at 
597, 462 P.2d, at 677. “The custom of the inhabitants of Oregon and of visitors in the state to use the dry sand as a 
public recreation area is so notorious that notice of the custom . . . must be presumed.” Id., at 598, 462 P.2d, at 678. 
The passage in which Thornton actually applies Blackstone’s seven-factor test contains not a single mention of the 
city of Cannon Beach. Id., at 595-597, 462 P.2d, at 677. 
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854 P.2d, at 456 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S., at    , (slip op., at 23-24) (emphasis added by the 
Oregon court). The court held that the doctrine of custom was just such a background principle 
of Oregon property law, and that petitioners never had the property interests that they claim were 
taken by respondents’ decisions and regulations. 317 Ore., at 143, 854 P.2d, at 456. It then 
affirmed the dismissal. 
II 
As a general matter, the Constitution leaves the law of real property to the States. But just 
as a State may not deny rights protected under the Federal Constitution through pretextual 
procedural rulings, see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 455-458 (1958), 
neither may it do so by invoking nonexistent rules of state substantive law. Our opinion in Lucas, 
for example, would be a nullity if anything that a State court chooses to denominate “background 
law” – regardless of whether it is really such – could eliminate property rights. “[A] State cannot 
be permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process 
of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it has taken never existed 
at all.” Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-297 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). No more 
by judicial decree than by legislative fiat may a State transform private property into public 
property without compensation. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 
164 (1980). See also Lucas, 505 ___ U.S., at ___, (slip op., at 26). Since opening private 
property to public use constitutes a taking, see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 
825, 831 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979), if it cannot fairly be 
said that an Oregon doctrine of custom deprived Cannon Beach property owners of their rights to 
exclude others from the dry sand, then the decision now before us has effected an 
uncompensated taking.  
To say that this case raises a serious Fifth Amendment takings issue is an understatement. 
The issue is serious in the sense that it involves a holding of questionable constitutionality; and it 
is serious in the sense that the land-grab (if there is one) may run the entire length of the Oregon 
coast.
3
  It is by no means clear that the facts–either as to the entire Oregon coast, or as to the 
small segment at issue here– meet the requirements for the English doctrine of custom. The 
requirements set forth by Blackstone included, inter alia, that the public right of access be 
exercised without interruption, and that the custom be obligatory, i.e., in the present context that 
it not be left to the option of each landowner whether he will recognize the public’s right to go 
on the dry-sand area for recreational purposes. In Thornton, however, the Supreme Court of 
Oregon determined the historical existence of these fact-intensive criteria (as well as five others) 
in a discussion that took less than one full page of the Pacific Reporter. That is all the more 
remarkable a feat since the Supreme Court of Oregon was investigating these criteria in the first 
                                                 
3 From Thornton to McDonald to the decision below, the Supreme Court of Oregon’s vacillations on the scope of the 
doctrine of custom make it difficult to say how much of the coast is covered. They also reinforce a sense that the 
court is creating the doctrine rather than describing it. 
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instance; the trial court had not rested its decision on the basis of custom and the state did not 
argue that theory to the Supreme Court.
4
  
As I have described, petitioners’ takings claim rests upon the assertion both that the 
new-found “doctrine of custom” is a fiction, and that if it exists the facts do not support its 
application to their property. The validity of both those assertions turns upon the facts regarding 
public entry – but that is no obstacle to our review. What is an obstacle to our review, however, 
is the fact that neither in the present case (because it was decided on motion to dismiss) nor even 
in Thornton itself (because the doctrine of custom was first injected into the case at the Supreme 
Court level) was any record concerning the facts compiled. It is beyond our power – unless we 
take the extraordinary step of appointing a master to conduct factual inquiries – to evaluate 
petitioners’ takings claim.  
Petitioners’ due process claim, however, is another matter.  I believe that petitioners have 
sufficiently preserved their due process claim, and believe further that the claim is a serious one. 
Petitioners, who owned this property at the time Thornton was decided, were not parties to that 
litigation.  Particularly in light of the utter absence of record support for the crucial factual 
determinations in that case, whether the Oregon Supreme Court chooses to treat it as having 
established a “custom” applicable to Cannon Beach alone, or one applicable to all “dry-sand” 
beach in the State, petitioners must be afforded an opportunity to make out their constitutional 
claim by demonstrating that the asserted custom is pretextual. If we were to find for petitioners 
on this point, we would not only set right a procedural injustice, but would hasten the 
clarification of Oregon substantive law that casts a shifting shadow upon federal constitutional 
rights the length of the State. 
                                                 
4
 In Thornton, the Supreme Court of Oregon appears to have misread Blackstone in applying the law of custom to 
the entire Oregon coast. “Customs . . . affect only the inhabitants of particular districts.” 1 W. Blackstone, 
Commentaries 74.  McDonald seems to suggest that a custom may extend to all property “similarly situated” in 
terms of its physical characteristics, i.e., all dry-sand beach abutting the ocean. 308 Ore., at 359, 780 P.2d, at 724. 
That does not appear to comport with Blackstone’s requirement that the custom affect “inhabitants of particular 
districts.” See Post v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. 425, 440 (N. Y. Ct. Err. 1839); see also Fitch v. Rawling, 2 Bl. H. 393, 
398-399, 126 Eng. Rep. 614, 616-617 (C. P. 1795) (“Customs must in their nature be confined to individuals of a 
particular description [and not to all inhabitants of England], and what is common to all mankind, can never be 
claimed as a custom”); Sherborn v. Bostock, Fitzg. 51, 94 Eng. Rep. 648, 649 (K. B. 1729) (“the custom . . . being 
general, and such a one as may extend to every subject, whether a citizen or a stranger, is void”). 
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STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
557 U.S. 903 (2009) 
Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the 
Court with respect to Parts I, IV, and V, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III, in which 
The Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito join. 
We consider a claim that the decision of a State's court of last resort took property 
without just compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied 
against the States through the Fourteenth, see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374, 383-384 
(1994).  
I 
A 
Generally speaking, state law defines property interests, Phillips v. Washington Legal 
Foundation, 524 U. S. 156, 164 (1998), including property rights in navigable waters and the 
lands underneath them. In Florida, the State owns in trust for the public the land permanently 
submerged beneath navigable waters and the foreshore (the land between the low-tide line and 
the mean high-water line). Fla. Const., Art. X, §11. Thus, the mean high-water line (the average 
reach of high tide over the preceding 19 years) is the ordinary boundary between private 
beachfront, or littoral property, and state-owned land. 
Littoral owners have, in addition to the rights of the public, certain "special rights" with 
regard to the water and the foreshore, rights which Florida considers to be property, generally 
akin to easements.
1
 These include the right of access to the water, the right to use the water for 
certain purposes, the right to an unobstructed view of the water, and the right to receive 
accretions and relictions to the littoral property. This is generally in accord with well-established 
common law, although the precise property rights vary among jurisdictions.   
At the center of this case is the right to accretions and relictions. Accretions are additions 
of alluvion (sand, sediment, or other deposits) to waterfront land; relictions are lands once 
covered by water that become dry when the water recedes. F. Maloney, S. Plager, & F. Baldwin, 
Water Law and Administration: The Florida Experience §126, pp. 385-386 (1968) (For 
simplicity's sake, we shall refer to accretions and relictions collectively as accretions, and the 
process whereby they occur as accretion.) In order for an addition to dry land to qualify as an 
accretion, it must have occurred gradually and imperceptibly--that is, so slowly that one could 
not see the change occurring, though over time the difference became apparent. When, on the 
                                                 
1
 Many cases and statutes use "riparian" to mean abutting any body of water. The Florida Supreme Court, however, 
has adopted a more precise usage whereby "riparian" means abutting a river or stream and "littoral" means abutting 
an ocean, sea, or lake. Walton Cty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105, n. 3 (2008). 
When speaking of the Florida law applicable to this case, we follow the Florida Supreme Court's terminology. 
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other hand, there is a "sudden or perceptible loss of or addition to land by the action of the water 
or a sudden change in the bed of a lake or the course of a stream," the change is called an 
avulsion.  
In Florida, as at common law, the littoral owner automatically takes title to dry land 
added to his property by accretion; but formerly submerged land that has become dry land by 
avulsion continues to belong to the owner of the seabed (usually the State.  2 W. Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England 261-262 (1766) (hereinafter Blackstone). Thus, 
regardless of whether an avulsive event exposes land previously submerged or submerges land 
previously exposed, the boundary between littoral property and sovereign land does not change; 
it remains (ordinarily) what was the mean high-water line before the event. It follows from this 
that, when a new strip of land has been added to the shore by avulsion, the littoral owner has no 
right to subsequent accretions. Those accretions no longer add to his property, since the property 
abutting the water belongs not to him but to the State.  
B 
In 1961, Florida's Legislature passed the Beach and Shore Preservation Act. The Act 
establishes procedures for "beach restoration and nourishment projects," designed to deposit sand 
on eroded beaches (restoration) and to maintain the deposited sand (nourishment). A local 
government may apply to the Department of Environmental Protection for the funds and the 
necessary permits to restore a beach. When the project involves placing fill on the State's 
submerged lands, authorization is required from the Board of Trustees of the Internal 
Improvement Trust Fund which holds title to those lands.   
Once a beach restoration "is determined to be undertaken," the Board sets what is called 
"an erosion control line." It must be set by reference to the existing mean high-water line, though 
in theory it can be located seaward or landward of that.  Much of the project work occurs 
seaward of the erosion-control line, as sand is dumped on what was once submerged land. The 
fixed erosion-control line replaces the fluctuating mean high-water line as the boundary between 
privately owned littoral property and state property.  Once the erosion-control line is recorded, 
the common law ceases to increase upland property by accretion (or decrease it by erosion). 
Thus, when accretion to the shore moves the mean high-water line seaward, the property of 
beachfront landowners is not extended to that line (as the prior law provided), but remains 
bounded by the permanent erosion-control line. Those landowners "continue to be entitled," 
however, "to all common-law riparian rights" other than the right to accretions. If the beach 
erodes back landward of the erosion-control line over a substantial portion of the shoreline 
covered by the project, the Board may, on its own initiative, or must, if asked by the owners or 
lessees of a majority of the property affected, direct the agency responsible for maintaining the 
beach to return the beach to the condition contemplated by the project. If that is not done within 
a year, the project is canceled and the erosion-control line is null and void. Finally, by regulation, 
if the use of submerged land would "unreasonably infringe on riparian rights," the project cannot 
proceed unless the local governments show that they own or have a property interest in the 
upland property adjacent to the project site.  
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C 
In 2003, the city of Destin and Walton County applied for the necessary permits to 
restore 6.9 miles of beach within their jurisdictions that had been eroded by several hurricanes. 
The project envisioned depositing along that shore sand dredged from further out. It would add 
about 75 feet of dry sand seaward of the mean high-water line (to be denominated the erosion-
control line). The Department issued a notice of intent to award the permits, and the Board 
approved the erosion-control line.  
The petitioner here, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., is a nonprofit corporation 
formed by people who own beachfront property bordering the project area (we shall refer to 
them as the Members). It brought an administrative challenge to the proposed project which was 
unsuccessful; the Department approved the permits. Petitioner then challenged that action in 
state court under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, Fla.  The District Court of Appeal 
for the First District concluded that, contrary to the Act's preservation of "all common-law 
riparian rights," the order had eliminated two of the Members' littoral rights: (1) the right to 
receive accretions to their property; and (2) the right to have the contact of their property with 
the water remain intact. Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection 
This, it believed, would be an unconstitutional taking, which would "unreasonably infringe on 
riparian rights," and therefore require the showing under Fla. Admin. Code Rule 18-21.004(3)(b) 
that the local governments owned or had a property interest in the upland property. It set aside 
the Department's final order approving the permits and remanded for that showing to be made. It 
also certified to the Florida Supreme Court the following question (as rephrased by the latter 
court):  
"On its face, does the Beach and Shore Preservation Act unconstitutionally 
deprive upland owners of littoral rights without just compensation?" 998 So. 2d, 
at 1105  
The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, and quashed 
the First District's remand.  It faulted the Court of Appeal for not considering the doctrine of 
avulsion, which it concluded permitted the State to reclaim the restored beach on behalf of the 
public.  It described the right to accretions as a future contingent interest, not a vested property 
right, and held that there is no littoral right to contact with the water independent of the littoral 
right of access, which the Act does not infringe. Id., at 1112, 1119-1120. Petitioner sought 
rehearing on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court's decision itself  effected a taking of the 
Members' littoral rights contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal 
Constitution.
 
 The request for rehearing was denied. We granted certiorari, 557 U. S. ___ (2009).  
II 
Before coming to the parties' arguments in the present case, we discuss some general 
principles of our takings jurisprudence. The Takings Clause--"nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation," U. S. Const., Amdt. 5--applies as fully to the taking 
of a landowner's riparian rights as it does to the taking of an estate in land. See Yates v. 
Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 504 (1871). Moreover, though the classic taking is a transfer of 
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property to the State or to another private party by eminent domain, the Takings Clause applies 
to other state actions that achieve the same thing. Thus, when the government uses its own 
property in such a way that it destroys private property, it has taken that property. See United 
States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 261-262 (1946); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 
177-178 (1872). Similarly, our doctrine of regulatory takings "aims to identify regulatory actions 
that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking." Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U. S. 
528, 539 (2005). Thus, it is a taking when a state regulation forces a property owner to submit to 
a permanent physical occupation, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 
419, 425-426 (1982), or deprives him of all economically beneficial use of his property, Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1019 (1992). Finally (and here we approach the 
situation before us), States effect a taking if they re-characterize as public property what was 
previously private property. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155, 
163-165 (1980).  
The Takings Clause (unlike, for instance, the Ex Post Facto Clauses, see Art. I, §9, cl. 3; 
§10, cl. 1) is not addressed to the action of a specific branch or branches. It is concerned simply 
with the act, and not with the governmental actor ("nor shall private property be taken" 
(emphasis added)). There is no textual justification for saying that the existence or the scope of a 
State's power to expropriate private property without just compensation varies according to the 
branch of government effecting the expropriation. Nor does common sense recommend such a 
principle. It would be absurd to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause 
forbids it to do by legislative fiat. See Stevens v. Cannon Beach, 510 U. S. 1207, 1211-1212 
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  
Our precedents provide no support for the proposition that takings effected by the judicial 
branch are entitled to special treatment, and in fact suggest the contrary. PruneYard Shopping 
Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 (1980), involved a decision of the California Supreme Court 
overruling one of its prior decisions which had held that the California Constitution's guarantees 
of freedom of speech and of the press, and of the right to petition the government, did not require 
the owner of private property to accord those rights on his premises. The appellants, owners of a 
shopping center, contended that their private property rights could not "be denied by invocation 
of a state constitutional provision or by judicial reconstruction of a State's laws of private 
property," We held that there had been no taking, citing cases involving legislative and executive 
takings, and applying standard Takings Clause analysis. We treated the California Supreme 
Court's application of the constitutional provisions as a regulation of the use of private property, 
and evaluated whether that regulation violated the property owners' "right to exclude others," 
Our opinion addressed only the claimed taking by the constitutional provision. Its failure to 
speak separately to the claimed taking by "judicial reconstruction of a State's laws of private 
property" certainly does not suggest that a taking by judicial action cannot occur, and arguably 
suggests that the same analysis applicable to taking by constitutional provision would apply.  
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, supra, is even closer in point. There the purchaser of an 
insolvent corporation had interpleaded the corporation's creditors, placing the purchase price in 
an interest-bearing account in the registry of the Circuit Court of Seminole County, to be 
distributed in satisfaction of claims approved by a receiver. The Florida Supreme Court 
construed an applicable statute to mean that the interest on the account belonged to the county, 
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because the account was "considered 'public money,' " We held this to be a taking. We noted that 
"[t]he usual and general rule is that any interest on an interpleaded and deposited fund follows 
the principal and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to be the owners of that principal," 
449 U. S., at 162. "Neither the Florida Legislature by statute, nor the Florida courts by judicial 
decree," we said, "may accomplish the result the county seeks simply by re-characterizing the 
principal as 'public money.' "  
In sum, the Takings Clause bars the State from taking private property without paying for 
it, no matter which branch is the instrument of the taking. To be sure, the manner of state action 
may matter: Condemnation by eminent domain, for example, is always a taking, while a 
legislative, executive, or judicial restriction of property use may or may not be, depending on its 
nature and extent. But the particular state actor is irrelevant. If a legislature or a court declares 
that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that 
property, no less than if the State had physically appropriated it or destroyed its value by 
regulation. "[A] State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property 
without compensation." Ibid.  
III 
Respondents put forward a number of arguments which contradict, to a greater or lesser 
degree, the principle discussed above, that the existence of a taking does not depend upon the 
branch of government that effects it. First, in a case claiming a judicial taking they would add to 
our normal takings inquiry a requirement that the court's decision have no "fair and substantial 
basis." This is taken from our jurisprudence dealing with the question whether a state-court 
decision rests upon adequate and independent state grounds, placing it beyond our jurisdiction to 
review. To assure that there is no "evasion" of our authority to review federal questions, we insist 
that the nonfederal ground of decision have "fair support." Broad River Power Co. v. South 
Carolina ex rel. Daniel, 281 U. S. 537, 540 (1930).  A test designed to determine whether there 
has been an evasion is not obviously appropriate for determining whether there has been a taking 
of property. But if it is to be extended there it must mean (in the present context) that there is a 
"fair and substantial basis" for believing that petitioner's Members did not have a property right 
to future accretions which the Act would take away. This is no different, we think, from our 
requirement that petitioners' Members must prove the elimination of an established property 
right.  
Next, respondents argue that federal courts lack the knowledge of state law required to 
decide whether a judicial decision that purports merely to clarify property rights has instead 
taken them. But federal courts must often decide what state property rights exist in nontakings 
contexts, see, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577-578 (1972) 
(Due Process Clause). And indeed they must decide it to resolve claims that legislative or 
executive action has effected a taking. For example, a regulation that deprives a property owner 
of all economically beneficial use of his property is not a taking if the restriction "inhere[s] in the 
title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and 
nuisance already place upon land ownership." Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1029. A constitutional 
provision that forbids the uncompensated taking of property is quite simply insusceptible of 
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enforcement by federal courts unless they have the power to decide what property rights exist 
under state law.  
Respondents also warn us against depriving common-law judging of needed flexibility. 
That argument has little appeal when directed against the enforcement of a constitutional 
guarantee adopted in an era when, as we courts had no power to "change" the common law. But 
in any case, courts have no peculiar need of flexibility. It is no more essential that judges be free 
to overrule prior cases that establish property entitlements than that state legislators be free to 
revise pre-existing statutes that confer property entitlements, or agency-heads pre-existing 
regulations that do so. And insofar as courts merely clarify and elaborate property entitlements 
that were previously unclear, they cannot be said to have taken an established property right.  
Finally, the city and county argue that applying the Takings Clause to judicial decisions 
would force lower federal courts to review final state-court judgments. The finality principles 
that we regularly apply to takings claims, see Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172, 186-194 (1985), would require the claimant to 
appeal a claimed taking by a lower court to the state supreme court, whence certiorari would 
come to this Court. If certiorari were denied, the claimant would no more be able to launch a 
lower-court federal suit against the taking effected by the state supreme-court opinion than he 
would be able to launch such a suit against a legislative or executive taking approved by the state 
supreme-court opinion; the matter would be res judicata. And where the claimant was not a party 
to the original suit, he would be able to challenge in federal court the taking effected by the state 
supreme-court opinion to the same extent that he would be able to challenge in federal court a 
legislative or executive taking previously approved by a state supreme-court opinion.  
For its part, petitioner proposes an unpredictability test. Quoting Justice Stewart's 
concurrence in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U. S. 290, 296 (1967), petitioner argues that a 
judicial taking consists of a decision that " 'constitutes a sudden change in state law, 
unpredictable in terms of relevant precedents.' " The focus of petitioner's test is misdirected. 
What counts is not whether there is precedent for the allegedly confiscatory decision, but 
whether the property right allegedly taken was established. A "predictability of change" test 
would cover both too much and too little. Too much, because a judicial property decision need 
not be predictable, so long as it does not declare that what had been private property under 
established law no longer is.  A decision that clarifies property entitlements (or the lack thereof) 
that were previously unclear might be difficult to predict, but it does not eliminate established 
property rights. And the predictability test covers too little, because a judicial elimination of 
established private-property rights that is foreshadowed by dicta or even by holdings years in 
advance is nonetheless a taking. If, for example, a state court held in one case, to which the 
complaining property owner was not a party, that it had the power to limit the acreage of 
privately owned real estate to 100 acres, and then, in a second case, applied that principle to 
declare the complainant's 101st acre to be public property, the State would have taken an acre 
from the complainant even though the decision was predictable.  
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IV 
Petitioner argues that the Florida Supreme Court took two of the property rights of the 
Members by declaring that those rights did not exist: the right to accretions, and the right to have 
littoral property touch the water (which petitioner distinguishes from the mere right of access to 
the water). Under petitioner's theory, because no prior Florida decision had said that the State's 
filling of submerged tidal lands could have the effect of depriving a littoral owner of contact with 
the water and denying him future accretions, the Florida Supreme Court's judgment in the 
present case abolished those two easements to which littoral property owners had been entitled. 
This puts the burden on the wrong party. There is no taking unless petitioner can show that, 
before the Florida Supreme Court's decision, littoral-property owners had rights to future 
accretions and contact with the water superior to the State's right to fill in its submerged land. 
Though some may think the question close, in our view the showing cannot be made.  
Two core principles of Florida property law intersect in this case. First, the State as 
owner of the submerged land adjacent to littoral property has the right to fill that land, so long as 
it does not interfere with the rights of the public and the rights of littoral landowners. Second, as 
we described if an avulsion exposes land seaward of littoral property that had previously been 
submerged, that land belongs to the State even if it interrupts the littoral owner's contact with the 
water. The issue here is whether there is an exception to this rule when the State is the cause of 
the avulsion. Prior law suggests there is not. In  Martin v. Busch,  93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 
(1927), the Florida Supreme Court held that when the State drained water from a lakebed 
belonging to the State, causing land that was formerly below the mean high-water line to become 
dry land, that land continued to belong to the State. Id., at 574, 112 So., at 287; see also Bryant, 
supra, at 838-839 (analogizing the situation in Martin to an avulsion). " 'The riparian rights 
doctrine of accretion and reliction,' " the Florida Supreme Court later explained, " 'does not apply 
to such lands.' " Bryant, supra, at 839 (quoting Martin, supra, at 578, 112 So., at 288 (Brown, J., 
concurring)). This is not surprising, as there can be no accretions to land that no longer abuts the 
water.  
Thus, Florida law as it stood before the decision below allowed the State to fill in its own 
seabed, and the resulting sudden exposure of previously submerged land was treated like an 
avulsion for purposes of ownership. The right to accretions was therefore subordinate to the 
State's right to fill. Thiesen v. Gulf, Florida & Alabama R. Co. suggests the same result. That 
case involved a claim by a riparian landowner that a railroad's state-authorized filling of 
submerged land and construction of tracks upon it interfered with the riparian landowners' rights 
to access and to wharf out to a shipping channel. The Florida Supreme Court determined that the 
claimed right to wharf out did not exist in Florida, and that therefore only the right of access was 
compensable. 75 Fla., at 58-65, 78 So., at 501-503. Significantly, although the court recognized 
that the riparian-property owners had rights to accretion, see id., at 64-65, 78 So., at 502-503, the 
only rights it even suggested would be infringed by the railroad were the right of access (which 
the plaintiff had claimed) and the rights of view and use of the water (which it seems the plaintiff 
had not claimed), see id., at 58-59, 78, 78 So., at 501, 507.  
The Florida Supreme Court decision before us is consistent with these background 
principles of state property law. Cf. Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1028-1029.  It did not abolish the 
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Members' right to future accretions, but merely held that the right was not implicated by the 
beach-restoration project, because the doctrine of avulsion applied. See 998 So. 2d, at 1117, 
1120-1121. The Florida Supreme Court's opinion describes beach restoration as the reclamation 
by the State of the public's land, just as Martin had described the lake drainage in that case. 
Although the opinion does not cite Martin and is not always clear on this point, it suffices that its 
characterization of the littoral right to accretion is consistent with Martin and the other relevant 
principles of Florida law we have discussed.  
What we have said shows that the rule of Sand Key, which petitioner repeatedly invokes, 
is inapposite. There the Florida Supreme Court held that an artificial accretion does not change 
the right of a littoral-property owner to claim the accreted land as his own (as long as the owner 
did not cause the accretion himself). 512 So. 2d, at 937-938. The reason Martin did not apply, 
Sand Key explained, is that the drainage that had occurred in Martin did not lower the water 
level by " 'imperceptible degrees,' " and so did not qualify as an accretion. 512 So. 2d, at 940-
941.  
The result under Florida law may seem counter-intuitive. After all, the Members' 
property has been deprived of its character (and value) as oceanfront property by the State's 
artificial creation of an avulsion. Perhaps state-created avulsions ought to be treated differently 
from other avulsions insofar as the property right to accretion is concerned. But nothing in prior 
Florida law makes such a distinction, and Martin suggests, if it does not indeed hold, the 
contrary. Even if there might be different interpretations of Martin and other Florida property-
law cases that would prevent this arguably odd result, we are not free to adopt them. The Takings 
Clause only protects property rights as they are established under state law, not as they might 
have been established or ought to have been established. We cannot say that the Florida Supreme 
Court's decision eliminated a right of accretion established under Florida law.  
Petitioner also contends that the State took the Members' littoral right to have their 
property continually maintain contact with the water. To be clear, petitioner does not allege that 
the State relocated the property line, as would have happened if the erosion-control line were 
landward of the old mean high-water line (instead of identical to it). Petitioner argues instead that 
the Members have a separate right for the boundary of their property to be always the mean high-
water line. Petitioner points to dicta in Sand Key that refers to "the right to have the property's 
contact with the water remain intact," 512 So. 2d, at 936. Even there, the right was included in 
the definition of the right to access, ibid., which is consistent with the Florida Supreme Court's 
later description that "there is no independent right of contact with the water" but it "exists to 
preserve the upland owner's core littoral right of access to the water," 998 So. 2d, at 1119. 
Petitioner's expansive interpretation of the dictum in Sand Key would cause it to contradict the 
clear Florida law governing avulsion. One cannot say that the Florida Supreme Court 
contravened established property law by rejecting it.  
V 
Because the Florida Supreme Court's decision did not contravene the established property 
rights of petitioner's Members, Florida has not violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is therefore affirmed.  
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It is so ordered. 
Justice Stevens took no part in the decision of this case.  
Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Sotomayor joins, concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment. 
The Court's analysis of the principles that control ownership of the land in question, and 
of the rights of petitioner's members as adjacent owners, is correct in my view, leading to my 
joining Parts I, IV, and V of the Court's opinion. As Justice Breyer observes, however, this case 
does not require the Court to determine whether, or when, a judicial decision determining the 
rights of property owners can violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. This separate opinion notes certain difficulties that should be considered 
before accepting the theory that a judicial decision that eliminates an "established property 
right," ante, at 21, constitutes a violation of the Takings Clause.  
The Takings Clause is an essential part of the constitutional structure, for it protects 
private property from expropriation without just compensation; and the right to own and hold 
property is necessary to the exercise and preservation of freedom. The right to retain property 
without the fact or even the threat of that sort of expropriation is, of course, applicable to the 
States under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. 
Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 239 (1897).  
The right of the property owner is subject, however, to the rule that the government does 
have power to take property for a public use, provided that it pays just compensation. See First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 314-
315 (1987). This is a vast governmental power. And typically, legislative bodies grant substantial 
discretion to executive officers to decide what property can be taken for authorized projects and 
uses. As a result, if an authorized executive agency or official decides that Blackacre is the right 
place for a fire station or Greenacre is the best spot for a freeway interchange, then the weight 
and authority of the State are used to take the property, even against the wishes of the owner, 
who must be satisfied with just compensation.  
In the exercise of their duty to protect the fisc, both the legislative and executive branches 
monitor, or should monitor, the exercise of this substantial power. Those branches are 
accountable in their political capacity for the proper discharge of this obligation.  
This is just one aspect of the exercise of the power to select what property to condemn 
and the responsibility to ensure that the taking makes financial sense from the State's point of 
view. And, as a matter of custom and practice, these are matters for the political branches--the 
legislature and the executive--not the courts. See First English, supra, at 321 ("[T]he decision to 
exercise the power of eminent domain is a legislative function").  
If a judicial decision, as opposed to an act of the executive or the legislature, eliminates 
an established property right, the judgment could be set aside as a deprivation of property 
without due process of law. The Due Process Clause, in both its substantive and procedural 
 835 
aspects, is a central limitation upon the exercise of judicial power. And this Court has long 
recognized that property regulations can be invalidated under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U. S. 528, 542 (2005); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 
590, 591, 592-593 (1962);; Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 188 (1928); Village of Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 395 (1926); see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U. S. 393, 413 (1922) (there must be limits on government's ability to diminish property values 
by regulation "or the contract and due process clauses are gone"). It is thus natural to read the 
Due Process Clause as limiting the power of courts to eliminate or change established property 
rights.  
The Takings Clause also protects property rights, and it "operates as a conditional 
limitation, permitting the government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge." Eastern 
Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U. S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and 
dissenting in part). Unlike the Due Process Clause, therefore, the Takings Clause implicitly 
recognizes a governmental power while placing limits upon that power. Thus, if the Court were 
to hold that a judicial taking exists, it would presuppose that a judicial decision eliminating 
established property rights is "otherwise constitutional" so long as the State compensates the 
aggrieved property owners. Ibid. There is no clear authority for this proposition.  
When courts act without direction from the executive or legislature, they may not have 
the power to eliminate established property rights by judicial decision. "Given that the 
constitutionality" of a judicial decision altering property rights "appears to turn on the 
legitimacy" of whether the court's judgment eliminates or changes established property rights 
"rather than on the availability of compensation, ... the more appropriate constitutional analysis 
arises under general due process principles rather than under the Takings Clause." Ibid. Courts, 
unlike the executive or legislature, are not designed to make policy decisions about "the need for, 
and likely effectiveness of, regulatory actions." Lingle, supra, at 545. State courts generally 
operate under a common-law tradition that allows for incremental modifications to property law, 
but "this tradition cannot justify a carte blanch judicial authority to change property definitions 
wholly free of constitutional limitations." Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, 
Regulatory Takings, and Judicial Takings, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 379, 435.  
The Court would be on strong footing in ruling that a judicial decision that eliminates or 
substantially changes established property rights, which are a legitimate expectation of the 
owner, is "arbitrary or irrational" under the Due Process Clause. Lingle, 544 U. S., at 542; see 
id., at 548-549 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 601 
(1972) (" '[P]roperty' " interests protected by the Due Process Clauses are those "that are secured 
by 'existing rules or understandings' " (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 
U. S. 564, 577 (1972))). Thus, without a judicial takings doctrine, the Due Process Clause would 
likely prevent a State from doing "by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by 
legislative fiat." The objection that a due process claim might involve close questions concerning 
whether a judicial decree extends beyond what owners might have expected is not a sound 
argument; for the same close questions would arise with respect to whether a judicial decision is 
a taking. See Apfel, supra, at 541 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("Cases attempting to decide when a 
regulation becomes a taking are among the most litigated and perplexing in current law"); Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 123 (1978) ("The question of what 
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constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of 
considerable difficulty").  
To announce that courts too can effect a taking when they decide cases involving 
property rights, would raise certain difficult questions. Since this case does not require those 
questions to be addressed, in my respectful view, the Court should not reach beyond the 
necessities of the case to announce a sweeping rule that court decisions can be takings, as that 
phrase is used in the Takings Clause. The evident reason for recognizing a judicial takings 
doctrine would be to constrain the power of the judicial branch. Of course, the judiciary must 
respect private ownership. But were this Court to say that judicial decisions become takings 
when they overreach, this might give more power to courts, not less.  
Consider the instance of litigation between two property owners to determine which one 
bears the liability and costs when a tree that stands on one property extends its roots in a way that 
damages adjacent property. See, e.g., Fancher v. Fagella, 274 Va. 549, 650 S. E. 2d 519 (2007). 
If a court deems that, in light of increasing urbanization, the former rule for allocation of these 
costs should be changed, thus shifting the rights of the owners, it may well increase the value of 
one property and decrease the value of the other. This might be the type of incremental 
modification under state common law that does not violate due process, as owners may 
reasonably expect or anticipate courts to make certain changes in property law. The usual due 
process constraint is that courts cannot abandon settled principles. See, e.g., Rogers v. 
Tennessee, 532 U. S. 451, 457 (2001) (citing Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347, 354 
(1964)); Apfel, 524 U. S., at 548-549 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).  
But if the state court were deemed to be exercising the power to take property, that 
constraint would be removed. Because the State would be bound to pay owners for takings 
caused by a judicial decision, it is conceivable that some judges might decide that enacting a 
sweeping new rule to adjust the rights of property owners in the context of changing social needs 
is a good idea. Knowing that the resulting ruling would be a taking, the courts could go ahead 
with their project, free from constraints that would otherwise confine their power. The resulting 
judgment as between the property owners likely could not be set aside by some later enactment. 
And if the litigation were a class action to decide, for instance, whether there are public rights of 
access that diminish the rights of private ownership, a State might find itself obligated to pay a 
substantial judgment for the judicial ruling. Even if the legislature were to subsequently rescind 
the judicial decision by statute, the State would still have to pay just compensation for the 
temporary taking that occurred from the time of the judicial decision to the time of the statutory 
fix. See First English, 482 U. S., at 321.  
The idea, then, that a judicial takings doctrine would constrain judges might just well 
have the opposite effect. It would give judges new power and new assurance that changes in 
property rights that are beneficial, or thought to be so, are fair and proper because just 
compensation will be paid. The judiciary historically has not had the right or responsibility to say 
what property should or should not be taken.  
Indeed, it is unclear whether the Takings Clause was understood, as a historical matter, to 
apply to judicial decisions. The Framers most likely viewed this Clause as applying only to 
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physical appropriation pursuant to the power of eminent domain. See Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1028, n. 15 (1992). And it appears these physical 
appropriations were traditionally made by legislatures. See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States §1784, p. 661 (1833). Courts, on the other hand, lacked the 
power of eminent domain. See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 135 (W. Lewis ed. 1897). The 
Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence has expanded beyond the Framers' understanding, as it 
now applies to certain regulations that are not physical appropriations. See Lucas, supra, at 1014 
(citing Mahon, 260 U. S. 393). But the Court should consider with care the decision to extend the 
Takings Clause in a manner that might be inconsistent with historical practice.  
There are two additional practical considerations that the Court would need to address 
before recognizing judicial takings. First, it may be unclear in certain situations how a party 
should properly raise a judicial takings claim. "[I]t is important to separate out two judicial 
actions--the decision to change current property rules in a way that would constitute a taking, and 
the decision to require compensation." Thompson, Judicial Takings, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1449, 1515 
(1990). In some contexts, these issues could arise separately. For instance, assume that a state-
court opinion explicitly holds that it is changing state property law, or that it asserts that is not 
changing the law but there is no "fair or substantial basis" for this statement. Broad River, 281 U. 
S., at 540. (Most of these cases may arise in the latter posture, like inverse condemnation claims 
where the State says it is not taking property and pays no compensation.) Call this Case A. The 
only issue in Case A was determining the substance of state property law. It is doubtful that 
parties would raise a judicial takings claim on appeal, or in a petition for a writ of certiorari, in 
Case A, as the issue would not have been litigated below. Rather, the party may file a separate 
lawsuit--Case B--arguing that a taking occurred in light of the change in property law made by 
Case A. After all, until the state court in Case A changes the law, the party will not know if his or 
her property rights will have been eliminated. So res judicata probably would not bar the party 
from litigating the takings issue in Case B.  
Second, it is unclear what remedy a reviewing court could enter after finding a judicial 
taking. It appears under our precedents that a party who suffers a taking is only entitled to 
damages, not equitable relief: The Court has said that "[e]quitable relief is not available to enjoin 
an alleged taking of private property for a public use ... when a suit for compensation can be 
brought against the sovereign subsequent to the taking," Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 
986, 1016 (1984), and the Court subsequently held that the Takings Clause requires the 
availability of a suit for compensation against the States, First English, supra, at 321-322. It 
makes perfect sense that the remedy for a Takings Clause violation is only damages, as the 
Clause "does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just 
compensation." Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson 
City, 473 U. S. 172, 194 (1985).  
It is thus questionable whether reviewing courts could invalidate judicial decisions 
deemed to be judicial takings; they may only be able to order just compensation. In the posture 
discussed above where Case A changes the law and Case B addresses whether that change is a 
taking, it is not clear how the Court, in Case B, could invalidate the holding of Case A. If a single 
case were to properly address both a state court's change in the law and whether the change was a 
taking, the Court might be able to give the state court a choice on how to proceed if there were a 
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judicial taking. The Court might be able to remand and let the state court determine whether it 
wants to insist on changing its property law and paying just compensation or to rescind its 
holding that changed the law. Cf. First English, 482 U. S., at 321 ("Once a court determines that 
a taking has occurred, the government retains the whole range of options already available--
amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent 
domain"). But that decision would rest with the state court, not this Court; so the state court 
could still force the State to pay just compensation. And even if the state court decided to rescind 
its decision that changed the law, a temporary taking would have occurred in the interim. See 
ibid.  
These difficult issues are some of the reasons why the Court should not reach beyond the 
necessities of the case to recognize a judicial takings doctrine. It is not wise, from an institutional 
standpoint, to reach out and decide questions that have not been discussed at much length by 
courts and commentators. This Court's dicta in Williamson County, , regarding when regulatory 
takings claims become ripe, explains why federal courts have not been able to provide much 
analysis on the issue of judicial takings. See San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 545 U. S. 323, 351 (2005) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment) ("Williamson 
County's state-litigation rule has created some real anomalies, justifying our revisiting the 
issue"). Until Williamson County is reconsidered, litigants will have to press most of their 
judicial takings claims before state courts, which are "presumptively competent ... to adjudicate 
claims arising under the laws of the United States." Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U. S. 455, 458 (1990). 
If and when future cases show that the usual principles, including constitutional principles that 
constrain the judiciary like due process, are somehow inadequate to protect property owners, 
then the question whether a judicial decision can effect a taking would be properly presented. In 
the meantime, it seems appropriate to recognize that the substantial power to decide whose 
property to take and when to take it should be conceived of as a power vested in the political 
branches and subject to political control.  
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment. 
I agree that no unconstitutional taking of property occurred in this case, and I therefore 
join Parts I, IV, and V of today's opinion. I cannot join Parts II and III, however, for in those 
Parts the plurality unnecessarily addresses questions of constitutional law that are better left for 
another day.  
In Part II of its opinion, the plurality concludes that courts, including federal courts, may 
review the private property law decisions of state courts to determine whether the decisions 
unconstitutionally take "private property" for "public use without just compensation." U. S. 
Const., Amdt. 5. And in doing so it finds "irrelevant" that the "particular state actor" that takes 
private property (or unconstitutionally redefines state property law) is the judicial branch, rather 
than the executive or legislative branch. cf. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U. S. 290, 296-298 
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).  
In Part III, the plurality determines that it is "not obviously appropriate" to apply this 
Court's " 'fair and substantial basis' " test when evaluating whether a state-court property decision 
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enacts an unconstitutional taking. The plurality further concludes that a state-court decision 
violates the Takings Clause not when the decision is "unpredictab[le]" on the basis of prior law, 
but rather when the decision takes private property rights that are "established." And finally, it 
concludes that all those affected by a state-court property law decision can raise a takings claim 
in federal court, but for the losing party in the initial state-court proceeding, who can only raise 
her claim (possibly for the first time) in a petition for a writ of certiorari here.  
I do not claim that all of these conclusions are unsound. I do not know. But I do know 
that, if we were to express our views on these questions, we would invite a host of federal 
takings claims without the mature consideration of potential procedural or substantive legal 
principles that might limit federal interference in matters that are primarily the subject of state 
law. Property owners litigate many thousands of cases involving state property law in state 
courts each year. Each state-court property decision may further affect numerous nonparty 
property owners as well. Losing parties in many state-court cases may well believe that 
erroneous judicial decisions have deprived them of property rights they previously held and may 
consequently bring federal takings claims. And a glance at Part IV makes clear that such cases 
can involve state property law issues of considerable complexity. Hence, the approach the 
plurality would take today threatens to open the federal court doors to constitutional review of 
many, perhaps large numbers of, state-law cases in an area of law familiar to state, but not 
federal, judges. And the failure of that approach to set forth procedural limitations or canons of 
deference would create the distinct possibility that federal judges would play a major role in the 
shaping of a matter of significant state interest— state property law.  
In the past, Members of this Court have warned us that, when faced with difficult 
constitutional questions, we should "confine ourselves to deciding only what is necessary to the 
disposition of the immediate case." Whitehouse v. Illinois Central R. Co., 349 U. S. 366, 373 
(1955); see also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439, 445 (1988) 
I heed this advice here. There is no need now to decide more than what the Court decides in Parts 
IV and V, namely, that the Florida Supreme Court's decision in this case did not amount to a 
"judicial taking." 
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Session 33. Regulatory Taking Miscellany 
CIENEGA GARDENS v. UNITED STATES 
331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
Before NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge, and MICHEL, 
Circuit Judge. 
MICHEL, Circuit Judge. 
In this Fifth Amendment regulatory takings case, Plaintiffs Cienega Gardens ("the 
Owners") appeal the United States Court of Federal Claims' grant of summary judgment to the 
government. Specifically, the Owners contend that when Congress enacted the Emergency Low 
Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987 (hereinafter "ELIHPA"), and the Low-Income 
Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act of 1990 (hereinafter "LIHPRHA"), it 
abrogated the Owners' contractual rights to prepay their forty-year mortgage loans after twenty 
years. In doing so, the Owners argue, the government prevented them from regaining possession 
and control of their real estate because only extinguishment of their mortgages released the 
Owners from the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") low-rent housing 
programs. This harmed the Owners because, under the programs, rental rates were held below 
market rates. On exiting the programs, however, the Owners could charge market rentals or sell 
their properties. 
We conclude that on this record the trial court erred in holding: (1) that developers who 
voluntarily participated in the HUD housing programs had no vested property rights despite their 
two agreements -- one with the lenders and one with HUD -- and despite their ownership in fee 
simple of the land; and (2) that if any taking occurred, it could not, as a matter of law, be a 
compensable taking. Under constitutional, real estate, and contract law, we conclude a property 
right vested in the Owners that was temporarily taken. We also conclude that there is no reason 
this taking is not, as a matter of law, compensable under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. We further hold that (the Owners) are entitled to 
"just compensation." We therefore reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment of no 
taking as to the plaintiffs.   
BACKGROUND 
The Owners are real estate developers who received loans from private lenders to 
construct housing projects that for a period of years would be under the housing programs 
established by sections 221(d)(3) and 236 of the National Housing Act (generally  codified at 12 
U.S.C. §§701 et seq.). HUD provided participants' mortgage insurance, which facilitated low-
interest, forty-year mortgages. In return, each participant entered into a "Regulatory Agreement" 
with HUD. 
Each Regulatory Agreement placed a variety of restrictions on the Owners, including 
restrictions on the income levels of tenants, allowable rental rates, and the maximum rate of 
return on initial equity that the Owners could receive from their housing projects. The 
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Regulatory Agreement also prohibited sale or further mortgage of the property without HUD 
approval and required each participant to submit to extensive HUD audits, inspections, and 
management reviews. The Regulatory Agreements were to remain in effect only "so long as the 
contract of mortgage insurance continues in effect." The Regulatory Agreements also referenced 
the relevant provisions of the National Housing Act. 
HUD's regulations then in effect included recognition of the Owners' rights to prepay 
their forty-year mortgages after twenty years and the mortgage documents themselves were 
reviewed by HUD and drafted to conform to existing HUD regulations. The mortgage trust notes 
provided that the Owners could not prepay their mortgages (without HUD approval) during the 
first twenty years of the mortgage, but could do so "without such approval" after twenty years. 
Though not a party to the mortgage contracts, HUD reviewed, endorsed, and approved them and 
their terms mirrored HUD regulations. Thus, under the original regulatory scheme, the 
Regulatory Agreements and their attendant restrictions were to remain in effect for at least 
twenty years, at which point the Owners would have the option of prepaying the mortgages and 
thereby dissolve the mortgage insurance and hence the restrictive Regulatory Agreements. 
The relevant HUD regulations also provided that they could be amended but not to the 
prejudice of the lenders. The mortgage documents themselves, however, contained no explicit 
reference to the amendment provision. The Regulatory Agreements each mention either section 
221(d)(3) or section 236 and the corresponding regulations in their preambles but do not 
otherwise cite any further provision of the statutes or regulations.  
As the Owners' participation in the housing programs approached the twenty-year mark, 
it became clear to Congress that large numbers of owners would prepay their mortgages and 
remove their properties from the federally-assisted low-income housing pool. Loss of this 
federally-assisted, low-income housing "would inflict unacceptable harm on current tenants and 
would precipitate a grave national crisis in the supply of low income housing that was neither 
anticipated nor intended when contracts for these units were entered into." ELIHPA §202(a)(4). 
To avert the problem, Congress enacted ELIHPA in 1987 as a temporary measure. Under 
ELIHPA, even after twenty years, all housing program participants had to obtain HUD approval 
in order to prepay their mortgages despite their mortgage contracts containing a provision 
guaranteeing prepayment "without [HUD] approval." Moreover, HUD could grant approval only 
if prepayment would not "materially increase economic hardship for current tenants" by 
increasing monthly rental payments by more than 10 percent or "involuntarily displace current 
tenants (except for good cause) where comparable and affordable housing is not readily 
available." Id. §225.  
LIHPRHA was enacted three years later to replace ELIHPA. It extended indefinitely the 
prohibition on prepayment without HUD approval. Thus, these statutes annulled the provision of 
the mortgage trust notes that prepayment was allowed after twenty years "without [HUD] 
approval." The restrictions imposed by ELIHPA and LIHPRHA were essentially lifted by the 
Housing Opportunity Program Extension (HOPE) Act of 1996. Thus, this case involves the 
economic effects of ELIHPA and LIHPRHA during a period of up to eight years.  
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The immediate effect of ELIHPA and LIHPRHA was to nullify the Owners' option to 
prepay their mortgages. This lawsuit arose from the Owners' resulting inability to exit the 
housing programs after twenty years and thereby regain normal rights of ownership.  
After the second remand from this court (holding that the regulatory takings claims of the 
plaintiffs' cases were ripe for adjudication), the Court of Federal Claims judge ordered summary 
judgment for the government without further analysis. (No summary judgment motion was filed 
by either party, but rather, the court acted sua sponte.) This appeal reviews that grant of summary 
judgment.   
DISCUSSION 
There are two principal questions in this appeal. First: did a property interest vest in the 
Owners, which was then taken by the enactment of ELIHPA and LIHPRHA? For any Fifth 
Amendment takings claim, the complaining party must show it owned a distinct property interest 
at the time it was allegedly taken, even for regulatory takings (holding that "the existence of a 
valid property interest is necessary in all takings claims"). Second: if plaintiffs owned such a 
vested property interest, did the regulatory restrictions in the new statutes go "too far" in 
constraining them, thereby entitling the plaintiffs to compensation? For this inquiry, the 
complaining party must offer evidence to show that the government has improperly shifted a 
public burden to a small class of private parties.  
The Court of Federal Claims answered both of these principal questions in the negative. 
We hold that the Court of Federal Claims erred in granting summary judgment in this case 
because the conclusion that housing program participants did not suffer a compensable taking 
was incorrect. 
I 
Addressing the first principal question, we hold that the Owners did have vested property 
interests at the time of the passage of ELIHPA and LIHPRHA. Specifically, in abrogating the 
Owners' contractual prepayment rights, the statutes intentionally defeated the Owners' real 
property rights to sole and exclusive possession after twenty years and to convey or encumber 
their properties after twenty years. The Owners thus had property interests and these were based 
on the interaction of both real property rights and contractual rights. Also, the Owners' property 
interests vested long before the statutes were enacted, for they arose immediately upon execution 
of the mortgage loan agreement and the purchase of the land, both occurring in the 1970's. 
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A 
1. Considering the real property interests first, as titleholders to land on which the 
apartment buildings were erected, the plaintiffs had fee simple ownership.
1
 An owner of land in 
fee simple generally has inherent rights to rent his or her land at any price he or she can 
command. Precedent shows that the ability to exercise every one of the "sticks" (rights) in the 
"bundle" of fee simple rights at the time of a taking is not a prerequisite to establishing a valid 
property interest under the Fifth Amendment. Present possessory rights are not necessary. It is 
also clear that fee owners who transfer a leasehold interest are still entitled to compensation. 
Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 303, 47 L. Ed. 2d 1, 96 S. Ct. 910 (1976) 
(explaining that a lessor is entitled to compensation for the taking of leased land regardless of 
whether the lessor has possession of the land at the time it is taken -- the measure of damages 
simply does not include the value of the leasehold interest if the lessor does not have possession). 
In fact, "every sort of [real property] interest the citizen may possess" counts as a property 
interest under the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378, 89 
L. Ed. 311, 65 S. Ct. 357 (1945). 
In this case, the Owners contractually deferred enjoyment of a limited number of rights in 
their land. They relinquished only the right to exclude certain tenants, and only for a fixed period 
of time – twenty years. They never conveyed to HUD any interest in their land; they merely 
contracted with the government not to assert rights that they otherwise could. The owners are not 
somehow deprived of their Fifth Amendment rights merely because they temporarily 
relinquished some of their rights of fee simple ownership. Their retained rights put them well 
within the categories shown by precedent to invoke the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
2. Turning next to the plaintiffs' contractual rights, there is also ample precedent for 
acknowledging a property interest in contract rights under the Fifth Amendment. Here the 
Owners had unequivocal contractual rights after twenty years to prepay their mortgages; thus 
they had a property interest in those rights – both in the subject matter of the contract (the real 
property rights) and in the contract itself. 
Thus, the mortgage contracts were the basis of the time constraints in the Regulatory 
Agreements that were essentially land use contracts. This interrelation was obvious from the start 
of the Owners' participation in the HUD programs. When Congress enacted ELIHPA and 
LIHPRHA, it intentionally deferred the Owners' ability to exit the housing programs and make 
more profitable use of their land from twenty years to forty years (or whenever in between those 
dates HUD consented). The significance of the contract right here lies not in the right to prepay 
as such, but the exercise of the contract right as a prerequisite of the Owners' right to exit the 
program. 
                                                 
1
 Their ownership was not affected by their mortgages. "A mortgage creates only a security interest in real estate and 
confers no right to possession of that real estate on the mortgagee." Restatement 3d of Property: Mortgages §4.1(a) 
(1997). 
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3.  Having concluded that the Owners did have a property interest in the contractual right 
to prepay and exit the housing programs, we next focus on the question whether this property 
interest vested before enactment of the statutes. The plaintiffs' real property rights automatically 
vested upon their taking title to the property. Their contract rights vested when the contracts were 
signed, because there was no explicit contract provision to the contrary. As already explained, 
the plaintiffs in this case contracted to waive certain ownership rights and to be entitled to end 
the waivers after twenty years. There was no condition, precedent or subsequent, in their 
contracts. Their contracts, and thereby their consequent property interests were, thus, 
unquestionably vested by the time Congress enacted ELIHPA and LIHPRHA more than a 
decade later. Contrary to the view of the government, that the contract rights were not assertable 
until twenty years passed did not mean they were not vested. 
B 
On the question whether the Owners had vested property interests, the government's 
position is that "enforceable rights sufficient to support a taking claim against the United States 
cannot arise in an area voluntarily entered into and one which, from the start, is subject to 
pervasive Government control, such as the Section 221(d)(3) and 236 insured housing programs. 
" Because the prepayment right at issue in this case was created by the Owners' private contracts 
with private lenders, the position urged by the government means that all such contract rights are 
purely illusory if they concern activity "subject to pervasive Government control." To understand 
what is wrong with this argument it is necessary to understand the true scope of the effect 
implied by this viewpoint. The government, essentially, asks us to hold that nothing in the 
Owners' private mortgage agreements has any force and effect. The government, thus, advocates 
a legal regime that eviscerates century-old understandings of the stable and enduring nature of 
contract and real property rights. This interpretation of the implications of a regulatory program 
on the existence of property interests is unwarranted. The government can point to nothing in 
either the mortgage contracts or the Regulatory Agreements that supports the position that 
contract and real property rights were premature, suspended or diluted almost to the point of 
meaninglessness. Instead, the government boldly asserts that this court should read into private 
contracts limitations that are not even hinted at in their text. The government's position is 
unconvincing. The government's contention is, in effect, that Congress could retroactively alter 
the Owners' mortgage contracts in any way it chose without any recourse for the Owners. That 
cannot be, and is not, the law.  
C 
Yet the trial court accepted this very same argument. The court further explained that 
"plaintiffs did not have compensable property rights for purposes of the Fifth Amendment 
because regulations authorizing the program reserved to the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development the right to amend those regulations at any time."  
The trial court's assertion that owners could not acquire vested rights is unsound. This 
case is comparable to Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 135 L. Ed. 2d 964, 116 S. Ct. 2432. Though 
Winstar was a breach of contract case and not a takings case, it showed that the abrogation by 
legislation of clear, unqualified contract rights requires a remedy, even in a highly regulated 
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industry, there banking, because the contracts embodied the commitments of the contracting 
parties. The Owners' contractual prepayment rights are such clear, unqualified rights. The 
purpose of contracts is precisely to fix obligations and entitlements so that they will not be 
affected by subsequent background changes. Nor were the Owners' rights subject to divestiture 
simply because of their voluntary participation in a housing program under government control. 
To hold otherwise would mean that Congress could have changed the mortgage contracts in any 
way to affect any of the rights established by the contracts -- including changing the contracts to 
extend their term from forty to, for example, eighty years -- and the Owners would be without a 
remedy. Again, this is not and cannot be the law. 
II 
As we hold that each of the Owners did have a vested property interest that was affected 
by the enactment of ELIHPA and LIHPRHA, we must next decide whether the enactments 
constituted a compensable taking. A regulatory action only becomes a compensable taking under 
the Fifth Amendment if the government interference has gone "too far." Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393, 415, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922) ("The general rule at least is, that while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking."). Under the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a 
public use without just compensation, the designation that a government action has gone "too 
far" refers to circumstances where the government has forced "some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong, 
364 U.S. at 49  
Whether a given regulation goes "too far" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment is 
determined by an "ad hoc, factual inquiry." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Under Penn Central, 
courts use a three-factor analysis to assess claimed regulatory takings: (1) character of the 
governmental action, (2) economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, and (3) extent to 
which the regulation interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.  
The trial court held that the taking of owners' property interests failed, by definition, to be 
compensable. This was error. We hold that Congress' enactment of ELIHPA and LIHPRHA did 
go "too far" with respect to the Model Plaintiffs and therefore the Model Plaintiffs are entitled to 
compensation. 
We are able to make this decision for the Plaintiffs outright, instead of simply remanding 
the case for further analysis for several reasons: (1) the extensive fact-finding already completed 
for these plaintiffs; (2) our ability to construe the relevant contracts, regulations, and legislation 
as a matter of law because there are no disputed facts pertaining to these sources, only disputed 
implications; (3) the lack of arguments by the government controverting the plaintiffs' specific 
arguments with respect to each of the three Penn Central factors.  
A. Character of Governmental Action 
The plaintiffs identify two rights that ELIHPA and LIHPRHA curtailed, namely, their 
right to exclude low-rent tenants and their right to sell or lease their properties to parties not 
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included in the programs. With respect to the first right, they argue that by requiring the Owners 
to continue to rent their properties at below-market rents to government-approved low-income 
tenants beyond twenty years, ELIHPA and LIHPRHA eviscerated the Owners' right to exclude, 
and this is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
The plaintiffs also argue that ELIHPA and LIHPRHA had the character of a taking 
because the statutes authorize the continuing physical occupation of particular developers' 
properties to address a societal shortage of low-income housing and that this is intrusive beyond 
the level of traditional governmental limits on land titles. The plaintiffs analogize the 
government in this case to a holdover tenant – HUD effectively rented apartment buildings from 
the Owners beyond the term of the agreed leasehold and then sublet apartments to low-income 
tenants. We agree that the enactment of ELIHPA and LIHPRHA could fairly be characterized as 
akin to this type of physical invasion. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 
380 (holding that a tenant was entitled to compensation for being required to give up tenancy of 
property even beyond the fair market rental value because "the right to occupy,  for a day, a 
month, a year, or a series of years, in and of itself and without reference to the actual use, needs, 
or collateral arrangements of the occupier, has a value."). 
As for the abrogation of the second right, the right to transfer, the plaintiffs argue that 
ELIHPA and LIHPRHA had the character of a taking under Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 
(1987), which held that a statute abrogating the common-law right to devise to one's heirs even a 
small portion of a property was a taking – even absent a showing of economic harm or 
interference with investment-backed expectations – because the character of the government 
regulation was "extraordinary." 
We agree with the plaintiffs' characterization of the effects of the statutes. The character 
of the government's action is that of a taking of a property interest, albeit temporarily, and not an 
example of government regulation under common law nuisance or other similar doctrines, which 
we would treat differently.  
Unquestionably, Congress acted for a public purpose (to benefit a certain group of people 
in need of low-cost housing), but just as clearly, the expense was placed disproportionately on a 
few private property owners. Congress' objective in passing ELIHPA and LIHPRHA – 
preserving low-income housing – and method – forcing some owners to keep accepting below-
market rents – is the kind of expense-shifting to a few persons that amounts to a taking. This is 
especially clear where, as here, the alternative was for all taxpayers to shoulder the burden. 
Congress could simply have appropriated more money for mortgage insurance and thereby 
induced more developers to build low-rent apartments in the public housing program to replace 
housing, such as the plaintiffs', that was no longer part of the program. 
Congress' purpose in enacting the statutes may have been entirely legitimate but the 
government has not shown that the actions Congress took – the enactment of ELIHPA and 
LIHPRHA – were within its powers to exercise without also granting compensation. The 
disproportionate imposition on the Owners of the public's burden of providing low-income 
housing is not rendered any more acceptable by worthiness of purpose. The principles, as used 
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by the trial court in this context, misconstrue what type of government action counts as a 
compensable taking by focusing on the purpose rather than the nature of the action. 
We conclude, as matter of law, that the government's actions in enacting ELIHPA and 
LIHPRHA, insofar as they abrogated the Plaintiffs' contractual rights to prepay their mortgages 
and thereby exit the housing programs, had a character that supports a holding of a compensable 
taking.  
B. Economic Impact 
What has evolved in the case law is a threshold requirement that plaintiffs show "serious 
financial loss" from the regulatory imposition in order to merit compensation. Loveladies, 28 
F.3d at 1177. There is not, however, "an automatic numerical barrier preventing compensation, 
as a matter of law, in cases involving a smaller percentage diminution in value." Yancey v. 
United States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1539, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  
The Plaintiffs freely conceded at oral argument that not every owner who participated in 
the housing programs suffered a compensable taking. Whether or not there was a compensable 
taking, the Plaintiffs admitted, depends on whether, after twenty years, a program participant was 
not allowed to prepay its mortgage and, as a result, suffered a financial loss during the years 
when ELIHPA and LIHPRHA were in effect. The implication of this admission, which is also a 
correct statement of the law, is that specific findings of fact about the effects of the legislation on 
the plaintiffs are necessary to complete the analysis of the economic impact factor. The trial 
court erred by not using specific facts pertaining to these plaintiffs to analyze this factor. 
With respect to the Plaintiffs we do not need to remand because the trial court already 
made findings of fact that are dispositive of the question of economic impact.. The fact-finding at 
trial was sufficient in scope and depth to permit an economic impact analysis." Using the trial 
court's findings we can be confident of the plaintiffs' expert's calculation that the aggregate 
amount of the Plaintiffs' annual earnings at the time of their respective prepayment eligibility 
dates totaled $45,741. The Plaintiffs' actual equity in their properties – the agreed-upon market 
values less their mortgage balances – shortly after their respective prepayment dates was 
calculated by the plaintiffs' expert as $17,452,045. The Plaintiffs were, thus, on average, limited 
to an annual return of approximately 0.3% on their real equity in their properties.  
By comparing this rate of return to low-risk Fannie Mae bonds, which, according to Dr. 
Peiser, would have generated an 8.5% rate of return, we can make a rough estimate of the 
Plaintiffs' percentage loss of return. Indeed, doing so, we calculate that the Plaintiffs would have 
received, by exiting the programs and reinvesting their money, on average, at least, 28 times 
greater return than they did have by being forced to stay in the programs. (An 8.5% rate of return 
is about 28 times more than a 0.3% rate of return.) This calculation of an approximately 96% 
percent loss of return on equity offers us a way to understand that a 0.3% rate of return actually 
demonstrates that the abrogation of the Plaintiffs' prepayment rights had sufficient economic 
impact to merit compensation even under stringent conceptions in the case law of the percent 
diminution necessary to merit compensation. The loss of 96% of the possible rate of return on 
the investment is, even under the most conservative view, a "serious financial loss."  
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In opposing this interpretation of the economic impact, the government cites Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 ( 2002) for 
the principle that "logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary 
prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition 
is lifted." This citation is inapt because of a fundamental error in the government's 
characterization of this lawsuit. The Owners' theory of recovery is not that their fee simple 
estates were taken or their land rendered "valueless." The Owners' entitlement to compensation is 
based on the taking of the real property interests reflected in the mortgage loan notes and the 
Regulatory Agreements. The difference is that the Owners' loss of the contractual prepayment 
rights was both total and immediate. They were barred from the unregulated rental market and 
other more lucrative property uses. 
This court's assessment of the economic impact is that the Plaintiffs' expert's calculations 
(and the finding by the trial court about the credibility of their expert's methods) proved 
sufficient financial loss on the part of the Plaintiffs for this factor to favor compensation for each 
of them, especially in view of the lack of any specific challenge by the government of the trial 
court's findings or of the Plaintiffs' methods and data.  
C. Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations 
The purpose of consideration of plaintiffs' investment-backed expectations is to limit 
recoveries to property owners who can demonstrate that "they bought their property in reliance 
on a state of affairs that did not include the challenged regulatory regime." Loveladies Harbor, 28 
F.3d at 1177. This factor also incorporates an objective test -- to support a claim for a regulatory 
taking, an investment-backed expectation must be "reasonable." Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 
467 U.S. 986, 1005, 81 L. Ed. 2d 815, 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984). Here, the issue is not an 
imposition of a new "regulatory regime," but legislative abrogation of the key rule of a pre-
existing regime. The critical question is whether a reasonable developer confronted with the 
particular circumstances facing the Owners would have expected the government to nullify the 
twentieth-year prepayment right in the mortgage contract and in the regulations. This is an 
objective, but fact-specific inquiry into what, under all the circumstances, the Owners should 
have anticipated. 
We are able to complete an analysis of this Penn Central factor for the Plaintiffs based on 
earlier fact-finding by the trial court, a number of undisputed facts, our own authority to construe 
contracts, statutes, and regulations as a matter of law, and the lack of specific arguments by the 
government alleging error in the plaintiffs' arguments. 
Before examining the critical question about reasonableness for the Plaintiffs, we start 
with an analysis of the Plaintiffs' actual expectation because we require actual expectation of, or 
reliance on the government not nullifying the Plaintiffs' contractual and regulatory rights as a 
threshold matter. The Plaintiffs' expectation about prepayment would not really be "investment-
backed" unless they actually believed in a certain outcome and entered the program in reliance 
on it. 
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1.  The trial court made findings of fact in earlier phases of the lawsuit that have direct 
relevance to the question of the actual expectations of the Plaintiffs. First, the trial court found 
that "the evidence presented during the trial strongly indicates that plaintiffs intended from the 
beginning to prepay their existing mortgage balances on the original prepayment date and to 
convert their subsidized properties to conventional ones," and that the right to do so was "an 
essential aspect of Sections 221(d)(3) and 236." Cienega III, 38 Fed. Cl. at 75 (emphasis added). 
The trial court also found as a fact that the right to prepay and terminate the HUD restrictions 
without HUD approval after twenty years was one of the primary incentives HUD offered 
precisely to encourage their voluntary participation in the public housing programs.. We think 
the clear implication of these findings is that the Plaintiffs did not expect cancellation of their 
primary incentive or the nullification of their long-term plan. 
Second, the trial court's findings in also show that the Plaintiffs' business plan anticipated 
a higher rate of return after the twenty years upon entry into the commercial market, sale of their 
properties, or refinancing of their properties. The trial court found that each of the Plaintiffs' 
properties had "great potential for refinancing well above the amount owed and reinvesting the 
proceeds in other investment opportunities or for conversion and resale as condominium 
complexes." Id. at 76 (citation omitted). In view of these findings, we conclude that it would be 
only normal business judgment under the circumstances for the Model Plaintiffs to plan from the 
start to terminate their Regulatory Agreements as soon as possible to take advantage of more 
profitable opportunities. These findings, therefore, further establish that the Plaintiffs expected 
all along to be able to exit the housing programs after twenty years. 
The Plaintiffs, we conclude, are the type of landowners who bought their property and 
entered into contracts in reliance on a different regulatory regime. The effect of ELIHPA and 
LIHPRHA – the Owners being indefinitely constrained by the Regulatory Agreements after 
twenty years – was contrary to what they were explicitly guaranteed by the mortgage contract 
and the regulations that were referenced in the Regulatory Agreement. ELIHPA and LIHPRHA 
cancelled the consideration for their entering the program. The Plaintiffs agreed to enter the 
programs in reliance on prepayment as the consideration for signing the Regulatory Agreement. 
The later legislation thus conflicted with the Plaintiffs' investment-backed expectations. 
2.  Next, we must determine whether a reasonable developer in the Model Plaintiffs' 
circumstances would believe that the twentieth-year prepayment right was guaranteed by the 
regulations and that HUD "authorized"
2
 and endorsed mortgage contracts expressly including it. 
We start from the assumption that a contract term that was both material, in that it gave the 
duration of a business arrangement with limited profit, and apparently justified, in that it was 
consistent with (and identical to) the relevant regulation, if not also explicitly prescribed by the 
agency, is one that gives rise to reasonable expectations of fulfillment of the contract term. We 
then consider whether there are grounds for changing this supposition because additional 
                                                 
2
 The trial court noted that "plaintiffs' prepayment expectations were based on express language contained in their 
deed of trust notes and authorized by HUD." Cienega I, 33 Fed. Cl. at 222 (emphasis added). The government also 
does not contest the Owners' characterization that HUD "approved and prescribed" the mortgage contracts. 
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circumstances or facts show that a reasonable developer should not have expected fulfillment of 
the contract term despite its presence in the contract. 
In contrast to the government's argument, a Regulatory Agreement referring to 
regulations that contain a provision that they are amendable does not mean that program 
participants are reasonably on notice for every possible change and therefore could not have had 
a reasonable investment-backed expectation of no change to the prepayment right. Some changes 
would have been outside of the realm of the reasonably expected. See United Nuclear, 912 F.2d 
at 1436 ("The fact that United agreed that the leases would be subject to future regulations does 
not indicate that United fairly can be said to have anticipated that the Secretary would apply a 
new policy requiring tribal approval of mining plans to leases entered into almost six years 
earlier, in reliance on which United had expended some $5 million."). Abrogating the 
prepayment right was such an unexpected change. It was reasonable for the Model Plaintiffs to 
have expected the twentieth-year prepayment right to remain unchanged because it was a 
material inducement to the Model Plaintiffs signing the mortgage contracts and Regulatory 
Agreements, and the government presented no evidence of notice to the contrary. Once a 
plaintiff has shown that its expectation is reflected by a material contract term of which the 
government is aware, the government cannot establish a lack of reasonable expectations simply 
by showing that the regulations were amendable by HUD or nullifiable by Congress. We 
conclude that a prepayment term would be presumptively material for any housing program 
participant with similar documents. This is because by fixing an exit date from participation in 
the programs, the prepayment right would be a significant factor in the calculation of the total 
profit that could be expected over the lifetime of the investment in the property. The prepayment 
right specifies at what year revenue from the property could potentially be increased through 
higher rental rates, sale, or refinancing. This total profit calculation would, in turn, determine 
whether a developer decided to participate in the program in the first place. Because without the 
prepayment right the developers might have earned more profit investing elsewhere and 
therefore have declined to enter the programs, abrogation of this right would not reasonably be 
expected simply because the regulations were amendable or subject to legislative alteration. 
Moreover, the mortgage contract and the regulations incorporated by reference into the 
Regulatory Agreements both explicitly established a prepayment right which allowed them to 
end the mortgage contracts and, thereby the Regulatory Agreements. HUD reviewed, approved, 
and endorsed the deed of trust notes, including the riders containing the express prepayment 
right. The Model Plaintiffs, thus, also had every indication from HUD that this term in their 
private mortgage contracts was acceptable and would continue to control the duration of the 
Regulatory Agreements. 
Similarly, no legislation was cited that contradicts the reasonableness of the Model 
Plaintiffs' expectation that the prepayment right would be undisturbed. At the time of the Model 
Plaintiffs' entry into the housing programs the only legislative reference to their ability to exit 
from the housing programs were broad delegations by Congress to HUD that, for example the 
Secretary "may at any time, under such terms and conditions as he may prescribe, consent to the 
release of the mortgagor from his liability under the mortgage or the credit instrument secured 
thereby, or consent to the release of parts of the mortgaged property from the lien of the 
mortgage." Housing Act of 1954, amended by Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-560, tit. I, 
§114, 78 Stat. 778-79 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §1715l(e)(2)(2000)). The explicit 
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legislative delegation to HUD also, thus, makes reliance on the mandatory prepayment provision 
in HUD's then-regulations reasonable; Congress broadly authorized such a regulation. The 
regulations were self-executing and gave HUD no discretion to specify who could prepay. 
Rather, they mandated that certain categories of housing program participants could prepay after 
twenty years at their own discretion. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. §221.524 ("A mortgage indebtedness 
may be prepaid in full and the Commissioner's controls terminated without the prior consent of 
the Commissioner . . . ."). 
We conclude, on this well-developed record, our own analysis of the explicit language of 
the relevant documents and relevant legislation, and given the limited arguments advanced by the 
government, described post, that the Model Plaintiffs' expectations were not only distinct and 
backed by investment, but were also reasonable. 
3. The government focuses its arguments mainly on one theory: that the Owners could 
not have formed a reasonable expectation because the Owners could not reasonably have 
assumed that if faced with a shortage in the supply of low-income rental housing, Congress 
would respond with a solution other than abrogating the right of prepayment. To this end, the 
government points out the trial court's statements that the "plaintiffs knew that they were 
entering a sensitive and highly regulated field that was subject to continuing congressional 
interest and attention" and they "could have anticipated that Congress might concern itself with 
the possibility of a low-income housing shortage and act to prevent or delay such a shortage." 
Alexander Investment, 51 Fed. Cl. at 110. Indeed, the court also suggested that owners could 
have "insisted on contract language that would have shifted the risk of later congressional action 
to the Government." Id. The housing programs themselves, the government argues, were entirely 
creatures of statute and regulation and therefore the Owners would have had no reasonable 
expectation that Congress would not change provisions of the programs' requirements during the 
first twenty years of each Owner's participation. 
We, however, do not think the reasoning used by the trial court or anything else in the 
record compels the result sought by the government. Certainly, Congress could have met the 
need for replacement housing by funding new mortgage insurance to induce new participation 
under these very programs. We know that this is what Congress had done before because these 
housing programs were not new, but were instead long-standing programs (the first relevant 
legislation is from 1961). We conclude then that it was reasonable to assume that Congress 
would continue down the path it had long pursued to alleviate a housing shortage. At the very 
least, one would not reasonably expect Congress to make legislative changes that would actually 
discourage parties from participating in the programs in the future. 
Nor is the fact that the industry is regulated dispositive. A business that operates in a 
heavily-regulated industry should reasonably expect certain types of regulatory changes that may 
affect the value of its investments. But that does not mean that all regulatory changes are 
reasonably foreseeable or that regulated businesses can have no reasonable investment-backed 
expectations whatsoever. See United Nuclear, 912 F.2d at 1436. 
The government cites Branch ex. rel. Maine National Bank v. United States, 69 F.3d 
1571, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995), for the proposition that investment-backed expectations are "greatly 
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reduced in a highly regulated field." This is an accurate statement of law but its simplicity of 
language conceals a complexity of analysis. The statement is not a rule dictating how we must 
proceed, but rather, a generalized description of prior decisions. For expectations to be "greatly 
reduced" does not mean that the reasonableness of every expectation of the status quo is by 
definition eliminated. It is our task then to determine whether the expectations the Model 
Plaintiffs had were reasonable ones. The range of expectations that is reasonable may be reduced 
in proportion to the amount of regulation, but this is not a blanket rule that disqualifies parties' 
expectations without inquiry. Also, what "highly regulated" and "field" are is not self-defining. 
Branch concerned the banking industry, and the power of the government to allocate the burdens 
of bank failures in a way that protects the public, regardless of the principle of limited corporate 
liability. Id. All this shows is that at the extremes, where history shows consistent, intrusive and 
changing government regulation of all facets of all transactions even arguably within a field, for 
example, banking, the effect of being in so highly a regulated field is clear. We have no evidence 
that the housing programs involved here were part of such an extreme field and therefore cannot, 
as the government urges, rely solely on the fact of regulation, but must probe into its content and 
other considerations. We thus conclude that Congress' abrogation of what was an explicit and 
material term of their mortgage contracts is simply not a change the Model Plaintiffs should have 
expected. 
In sum, in light of the unchallenged findings of fact made by the trial court in Cienega III, 
we must conclude that the Model Plaintiffs did in fact expect to retain the right to prepay and exit 
the housing programs after twenty years. Our analysis of the circumstances surrounding their 
participation, the indications given to them by the written agreements – the explicit right to 
twentieth-year prepayment in the mortgage contracts and the regulations mandating that HUD 
grant twentieth-year prepayment – and the ultimately unpersuasive nature of all of the contrary 
arguments presented to us by the government, moreover, lead us to conclude as a matter of law 
that their expectations were reasonable. 
The trial court thus erred in accepting the government's assertion that no expectation of 
the continuation of the prepayment term in a housing program participant's mortgage contract 
could be reasonable in light of the applicable regulation. "Knowledge of the Government's role in 
their chosen business venture," Alexander Investment, 51 Fed. Cl. at 110, we hold, is not enough 
to destroy the reasonableness of the expectation of this right to prepay that was expressly granted 
both by contract and by regulation when the Owners entered the programs. Where a trial court 
erred in granting summary judgment, ordinarily we would have to remand the case. Here, 
however, the reasonableness of the Model Plaintiffs' expectations can be confidently adjudicated 
without a remand because of the very specific factual findings following a trial on a contract 
claim about the two housing programs, the text of the relevant documents, regulations, and 
legislation, and the role of HUD in approving and endorsing the mortgage contracts and the 
riders therefore which contain the express prepayment right. We, therefore, hold that ELIHPA 
and LIHPRHA frustrated the Model Plaintiffs' reasonable investment-backed expectations that 
they would be entitled to prepay. We thus hold that all three of the Penn Central factors 
individually and together establish that the Model Plaintiffs are entitled to compensation without 
need for further fact-finding. 
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CONCLUSION 
We vacate the trial court's sua sponte grant of judgment in favor of the government. 
Contrary to the trial court, we hold that all of the Owners had vested property interests under the 
Fifth Amendment in their contractual and regulatory rights to post-twentieth-year prepayment 
and under real property law to repossess. These property interests were expressly and 
deliberately abrogated by ELIHPA and LIHPRHA. Unlike the trial court we see no basis in 
takings case law for holding that as a matter of law ELIHPA and LIHPRHA could not effect a 
compensable taking under Penn Central. In addition, because whether or not a taking has 
occurred is a question of law based on factual underpinnings, Bass Enters., 133 F.3d at 895, and 
because we have findings of fact by the trial court adequate for a Penn Central analysis, we can 
and do conclude that the Plaintiffs suffered a compensable, temporary, regulatory taking. As to 
these plaintiffs, we reverse. We further direct that the original damages judgment entered in 
Cienega III, 38 Fed. Cl. 64, be reinstated in the amount awarded therein for each of the four 
Model Plaintiffs. We hold that for the thirty-eight non-model plaintiffs for whom this court has 
no findings of fact, it is not possible to complete a Penn Central analysis. Thus, because the 
record before us is not developed at all as to, for example, economic impact, we remand for the 
trial court to allow the parties to develop an appropriate record and to rule on liability, and if 
liability is found, also on damages. 
VACATED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, and REMANDED. 
COSTS 
Costs to be awarded to the appellants. 
GUGGENHEIM v. CITY OF GOLETA 
582 F.3d 996; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 21313 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Rehearing, en banc, granted by Guggenheim v. City of 
Goleta, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5211 (9
th
 Cir., Mar. 12, 2010) 
BYBEE, Circuit Judge: 
Daniel Guggenheim and others bring a facial challenge to the City of Goleta's mobile 
home rent control ordinance. Guggenheim argues that the ordinance, which effects a transfer of 
nearly 90 percent of the property value from mobile home park owners to mobile home tenants, 
constitutes a regulatory taking under Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978). We have fielded such challenges before, but 
have never reached the merits of the takings claim.  
To determine whether a taking has occurred we must decide several issues. We must first 
determine whether the mobile home park owners have standing to bring this case. Additionally, 
we must consider whether this case is ripe under Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 
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(1985). If so, then we must determine whether the city ordinance constitutes a regulatory taking 
under Penn Central. 
The district court did not address either the standing or ripeness questions due to the 
unusual procedural history of the case, but implicitly found the case was properly brought. The 
district court found that no taking had occurred. For the reasons explained below, we agree with 
the district court that this case is properly brought and ripe for decision, but we disagree with the 
district court on the merits of the takings claim. Because we find that a taking has occurred, we 
reverse and remand to the district court to determine what compensation is due.  
A 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236, 17 S. Ct. 
581, 41 L. Ed. 979 (1897), provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." The Takings Clause "does not prohibit the taking of private 
property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power." First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 96 
L. Ed. 2d 250 (1987). The Takings Clause was drafted so as "not to limit the governmental 
interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of 
otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking." Id. at 315. The Takings Clause "'bar[s] 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness  and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.'" Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 
537, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 161 l. Ed. 2d 876 (2005) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 
49, 80 S. Ct. 1563, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1554 (1960)). 
To determine whether a mobile-home rent control ordinance constitutes a taking under 
the Constitution, we must first understand some unique characteristics of mobile homes. "The 
fact that these homes can be moved does not mean that they do move." JOHN STEINBECK, 
TRAVELS WITH CHARLEY: IN SEARCH OF AMERICA 96 (Penguin Books 1986) (1962). 
As described by the Supreme Court: 
The term "mobile home" is somewhat misleading. Mobile homes are largely immobile as 
a practical matter, because the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of the value of 
the mobile home itself. They are generally placed permanently in parks; once in place, only 
about 1 in every 100 mobile homes is ever moved . . . . A mobile home owner typically rents a 
plot of land, called a "pad," from the owner of a mobile home park. The park owner provides 
private roads within the park, common facilities such as washing machines or a swimming pool, 
and often utilities. The mobile home owner often invests in site-specific improvements such as a 
driveway, steps, walkways, porches, or landscaping. When the mobile home owner wishes to 
move, the mobile home is usually sold in place, and the purchaser continues to rent the pad on 
which the mobile home is located. 
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 118 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1992) 
(citation omitted). 
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The County of Santa Barbara, California (the "County"), first enacted its Rent Control 
Ordinance (the "RCO") in 1979, and amended it in 1987. In 2002, the City of Goleta 
incorporated within the County. As required by California law, the new City of Goleta 
immediately adopted by reference the County's code in its entirety, including the RCO, as its 
provisional new code. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §57376 (2008); City of Goleta Ordinance No. 
02-01. About two months later, the City re-adopted by reference most provisions of the County 
code, including the RCO, as permanent city ordinances. City of Goleta Ordinance No. 02-17. 
The statement of "Purpose" in the RCO has remained unchanged since the RCO was first 
passed by the County in 1979. The purpose was to prevent mobile home park owners from 
charging exorbitant rents to exploit local housing shortages and the fact that mobile home owners 
could not easily move their homes: 
A growing shortage of housing units resulting in a critically low vacancy rate and rapidly 
rising and exorbitant rents exploiting this shortage constitutes serious housing problems affecting 
a substantial portion of those Santa Barbara County residents who reside in rental housing . . . . 
Especially acute is the problem of low vacancy rates and rapidly rising and exorbitant rents in 
mobile home parks in the County of Santa Barbara. Because of such factors and the high cost of 
moving mobilehomes, . . . the board of supervisors finds and declares it necessary to protect the 
owners and occupiers of mobilehomes from unreasonable rents while at the same time 
recognizing the need for mobile home park owners to receive a fair return on their investment 
and rent increases sufficient to cover their increased costs. RCO §11A-1.  
The RCO limits any increases in mobile home rents on an annual basis to 75 percent of 
the increase in the local Consumer Price Index ("CPI"). This increase is referred to as the 
"automatic increase." Mobile home park owners may also increase the rent by an additional 
amount to pass through increased operating costs, capital expenses, and capital improvements. 
This increase is referred to as the "discretionary increase." The RCO sets out an arbitration 
process by which park owners must work with the mobile home owners and an arbitrator to 
determine the total amount of the permissible rent increase for each year. 
The RCO also contains a vacancy control provision, which limits the permissible rent 
increase to 10 percent when a unit is sold. In sum, the RCO mandates that a "just and reasonable 
return" for the park owners must always be less than or equal to exactly one half of 75 percent of 
the annual increase of the CPI. The RCO permits park owners to go to arbitration to pass through 
additional costs, but such costs must be re-captured without any return on investment. In the 
event a tenant sells his or her unit, the park owners are entitled to a one-time rent increase of 10 
percent; subsequent increases are capped by the regular formula. 
B 
1 
Appellants Daniel Guggenheim, Susan Guggenheim, and Maureen H. Pierce 
(collectively, the "Park Owners") purchased the Ranch Mobile Estates mobile home park ("the 
Park") in 1997, at which time the Park was located in an unincorporated part of the County. At 
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the time of the purchase, therefore, the Park was subject to the County's RCO as amended in 
1987. When the City incorporated in 2002, the Park fell within the new city's jurisdiction. 
Because the City adopted the RCO by reference, the Park continued to be subject to the RCO 
after the City incorporated. 
A month after the City incorporated, the Park Owners brought suit in federal court, 
alleging only facial challenges to the RCO. The Park Owners claimed violations of the Takings 
Clause.  
The district court stayed the viable federal claims under the Pullman doctrine, to permit 
the resolution of certain complex state law claims that might "moot or narrow the constitutional 
questions." San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 
1998). The parties settled their state law claims after litigating in Santa Barbara Superior Court, 
and then returned to federal court for a second time.
1
  
2 
Back in federal court, the Park Owners moved for partial summary judgment. The district 
court reviewed the undisputed facts and the affidavits and documents proffered by the parties. 
The court found that during the time the Park Owners owned the Park, housing costs in the City 
increased approximately 225 percent. Because of the RCO, the rents charged by the Park Owners 
did not keep pace with this increase. The below-market rents resulted in the ability of mobile 
home owners to sell their homes at a significant premium (the transfer premium). The district 
court found, based on a report provided by the Park Owners, that the transfer premium amounted 
to, on average, 88 percent of the sale price. "In other words," the district court found, "an average 
mobile home worth $12,000 would sell for approximately $100,000." The district court found 
that "the uncontroverted facts . . . establish the existence of a premium," and that even "[t]he City 
has acknowledged the existence of such a premium." 
The district court granted summary judgment on the takings claim in favor of the Park 
Owners on October 29, 2004. At the time the district court made its determination, the law in the 
Ninth Circuit was that a government regulation effected a taking if such regulation did not 
"substantially advance" legitimate state interests. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 
255, 260, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 65 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1980). The district court found it undisputed that 
the RCO effected a one-time wealth transfer from the Park Owners to the incumbent tenants, and 
that the RCO failed to substantially advance its stated purpose of providing affordable housing. 
The court found, therefore, that the RCO was an unconstitutional regulatory taking and the Park 
Owners were entitled to just compensation. The City timely appealed. 
                                                 
1
 Of particular relevance to this appeal, the parties stipulated that there was a gap in time when no rent control 
ordinance was in effect over the Park. This stipulated fact was necessary to support the timeliness of the Park 
Owners' facial challenges to the RCO. The statute of limitations for a facial takings claim begins to run with the 
passage of the challenged law. See Equity Lifestyle, 548 F.3d at 1193. The supposed "gap in time" clarified that the 
City's RCO, for purposes of this litigation, was enacted in 2002. Thus, the Park Owners' suit, initiated in 2002, was 
timely. 
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On May 23, 2005, while the case was on appeal, the Supreme Court decided Lingle v. 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 161 L. Ed. 2d 876 (2005). Lingle repudiated 
the "substantially advances" theory upon which the Park Owners had prevailed. In light of this 
development, the parties stipulated to vacate the district court's judgment and return for what 
would now be their fourth round of litigation before a trial court. 
3 
After some renewed pre-trial litigation, the district court issued a series of summary 
judgment rulings in which it found in favor of the City on each of the Park Owners' remaining 
constitutional claims. On April 5, 2006, the district court denied the Park Owners' motion for 
partial summary judgment, finding that the Park Owners were not entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law as to whether the RCO constituted a regulatory taking under Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978). 
The court reviewed both parties' expert reports and found that the evidence as to the economic 
impact of the regulation was "mixed": 
 Although [the Park Owners] have enjoyed a rate of return comparable to other real estate 
investments, [the Park Owners'] evidence tends to suggest that they would have earned more--
perhaps much more--in the absence of the RCO. 
The parties continued to prepare for trial--designating experts, agreeing to witness and 
exhibit lists, and filing motions in limine. 
On July 27, 2006, the district court sua sponte issued an Order to Show Cause why the 
court should not, on its own motion, enter summary judgment in favor of the City. On September 
6, 2006, after reviewing the parties' responses, the district court entered summary judgment in 
favor of the City on all of the Park Owners' remaining causes of action. The court stated: 
Because this is a facial challenge to the ordinance in question, the evidence [the Park 
Owners] seek to present at trial vis[-]a[-]vis their Fifth Amendment [T]akings [C]lause claim is 
irrelevant. To facially attack the ordinance as an uncompensated "taking," [the Park Owners] 
must demonstrate that the mere enactment of the ordinance constitutes a taking.  
The court then complained that the Park Owners had "impermissibly attempted to convert 
this action, de facto, into an as-applied challenge." The district court did not, however, identify 
which evidence it found "irrelevant" or "impermissible" in a facial takings claim. The district 
court also did not make explicit whether it incorporated its April 5 analysis of the Park Owners' 
Penn Central claim into its final judgment or whether it entered final judgment solely on the 
ground the Park Owners were barred from presenting evidence in a facial challenge. The Park 
Owners appealed in a timely manner. 
2 
This case has already been litigated through three full rounds at the trial level, including 
one in state court and two in federal court, producing one victory for the Park Owners, one for 
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the City, and one tie (the settlement). Accordingly, it may come as a surprise that before we 
reach the merits of the Park Owners' appeal, we must consider whether the plaintiffs have 
standing to bring this case and whether this case is ripe for decision. 
A 
Under Article III, our power to adjudicate is limited to "cases" and "controversies." U.S. 
CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 1. Accordingly, we are not authorized to decide a dispute "merely 
because a party requests a court of the United States to declare its legal rights, and has couched 
that request for forms of relief historically associated with courts of law in terms that have a 
familiar ring to those trained in the legal process." Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United 
for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S. Ct. 752, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700 
(1982). Rather, we must first determine whether a litigant has "standing" to bring suit in the 
federal forum for his alleged injury.  
The Supreme Court has defined standing generally as "the question of . . . whether the 
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues." 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975). A plaintiff must 
first "have suffered an injury in fact--an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) 
concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotations omitted). " 
We must still determine whether the Park Owners have an "actual injury"--that they have 
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete 
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of  issues upon which the court so largely depends 
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S. Ct. 
691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962).  
In this case the Park Owners satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirements. 
Although the Park Owners purchased the burdened property in 1997, eighteen years after the 
County first passed the RCO and ten years after it was amended, the City adopted the RCO in 
2002, after the Park Owners were in possession of the Park. Additionally, the parties stipulated 
that there was some time period between the City's incorporation and the City's adoption of the 
RCO in which no rent control ordinance was in effect. The Park Owners are precisely the sort of 
plaintiffs Carson Harbor Village envisioned bringing a facial challenge to the City's RCO. 
"[F]acial [takings] claims necessarily rest on the premise that an interest in property was taken 
from all mobile home property owners upon the statute's enactment."  Carson Harbor Village, 37 
F.3d at 476 . We therefore find that the Park Owners have standing to bring their takings claim. 
B 
"[A] takings claim must [also] . . . comply with timeliness requirements. It must 
be filed neither too early (unripe) nor too late (barred by a statute of limitations)." 
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of 
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 185 (1985), the Supreme Court held that a takings 
claim is not ripe until the property owner has attempted to obtain just 
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compensation for the loss of his or her property through the procedures provided 
by the state for obtaining such compensation and been denied. Williamson also 
set forth an additional hurdle, applicable only to as-applied challenges: the 
property owner must have received a "final decision" from the appropriate 
regulatory entity as to how the challenged law will be applied to the property at 
issue. The latter requirement is not applicable here because the Park Owners have 
raised only a facial challenge. "Facial challenges are exempt from the ["final 
decision"] prong of the Williamson ripeness analysis because a facial challenge 
by its nature does not involve a decision applying the statute or regulation." 
Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651, 655 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 
In order to determine whether the Park Owners's claims are ripe under Williamson, and, 
if so, whether they have satisfied the Williamson requirements, we must look closely at 
Williamson and its progeny.  The Court has explicitly held that the Williamson requirements are 
merely prudential requirements. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court stated 
that the Williamson requirements were prudential.  
The Court's clarification that Williamson created mere "prudential requirements" is 
crucial to our analysis for two reasons. First, if Williamson were grounded in Article III ripeness, 
we would be required to raise the issue sua sponte even though neither party raised it. Because 
Williamson has been held to be merely a set of prudential, exhaustion-type requirements, 
although we asked the parties for their views, we were not obligated to raise the issue. Second, 
because Williamson exhaustion is prudential only, the requirement may be waived or forfeited. 
Here, the City of Goleta forfeited the claim that this case was not ripe for review by failing to 
raise it. 
In this case, then, where the Park Owners have obviously presented a live case or 
controversy, , it is clear that any further questions under Williamson do not raise the spectre of 
an Article III jurisdictional bar. Having reviewed the Williamson jurisprudence, we find that we 
may reach the merits of the Park Owners' takings claim. Given the Park Owners' substantial 
compliance with the Williamson requirements, and the City's forfeiture of the ripeness claim, we 
believe that Lucas compels us to reach the merits of this case. 
III 
Having held that we may reach the merits of the Park Owners' takings claims, we now 
turn to those claims. As we have recently summarized, the Supreme Court has identified three 
basic categories of regulatory takings claims.
2
 We must first address each factor in turn, and then 
                                                 
2
 [1] where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of property, see Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S. Ct. 3164, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868 (1982); [2] where a 
regulation deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use of property, see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1992); and [3] where the Penn Central factors are met, 
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978). 
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weigh the factors together, in what has famously been described as an "essentially ad-hoc, 
factual inquir[y]." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Before we can apply the Penn Central factors, 
however, we must consider the viability of a facial challenge under Penn Central, and determine 
what facts we may consider when engaging in Penn Central's ad-hoc factual inquiry.  
A 
The Park Owners have brought only a facial challenge to the RCO under Penn Central--
they have not brought a corollary as-applied claim. Unlike an as-applied challenge, which asserts 
that a statute or regulation "by its own terms, infringe[s] constitutional freedoms in the 
circumstances of the particular case," United States v. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc., 404 
U.S. 561, 565, 92 S. Ct. 663, 30 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1972), a facial challenge alleges that the statute 
or regulation is unconstitutional in the abstract: that "no set of circumstances exists under which 
the [a]ct would be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 
2d 697 (1987). 
The Park Owners' decision to refrain from an as-applied challenge has two important 
consequences. First, as noted above, the decision exempts the Park Owners from the "final 
decision" prong of Williamson. See Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates, 353 F.3d at 655 ("Facial 
challenges are exempt from the ["final decision"] prong of the Williamson ripeness analysis 
because a facial challenge by its nature does not involve a decision applying the statute or 
regulation."). Second, the Park Owners' decision to cast their Penn Central claim as a facial 
challenge places limits on the types of evidence that can be considered in adjudicating the claim. 
"In facial takings claims, our inquiry is limited to 'whether the mere enactment of the [regulation] 
constitutes a taking.'" Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 
764, 773 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining 
& Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295, 101 S. Ct. 2352, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1981). More 
specifically, in a facial challenge "we look only to the regulation's general scope and dominant 
features, rather than to the effect of the application of the regulation in specific circumstances." 
Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 773. 
For this reason, the Supreme Court has noted that property owners bringing a facial 
takings challenge "face an uphill battle." Suitum, 520 U.S. at 736 n.10. The fact that the Park 
Owners have characterized their facial challenge under Penn Central creates further 
complications. In a typical Penn Central claim, the court must consider factors that will usually 
not be found in the text of the statute, such as the economic impact on the claimant and the 
claimant's investment-backed expectations. Nevertheless, when adjudicating a facial challenge, 
the court must be careful not to simply look at "the effect of the application of the regulation in 
specific circumstances." Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 773. The Park Owner's facial Penn Central 
claim requires us to address this apparent paradox: we must confront the question of whether a 
facial challenge under Penn Central is actually a viable legal claim; and if we determine that it is, 
we must then consider what evidence the Park Owners may present to prove their claim. 
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1 
In the district court's summary judgment ruling of April 5, 2006, the court reviewed the 
record and engaged in a detailed Penn Central analysis. Each party had proffered an expert report 
in support of its position: the Park Owners proffered a report by Dr. John M. Quigley, 3 and the 
City responded with a report by Mr. William Thomsen.
4
 The district court found in favor of the 
City under Penn Central. The district court stated that the evidence the Park Owners sought to 
present "at trial" was "irrelevant" to a facial challenge, and complained that the Park Owners had 
"impermissibly attempted to convert this action, de facto, into an as-applied challenge." Because 
of the necessarily "ad hoc" nature of a Penn Central challenge, if the district court was adopting a 
rule that a property owner may present no evidence of the effect of a regulation on his property 
in a facial challenge, the court would essentially be adopting the rule that there is no such thing 
as a facial challenge under Penn Central.  
 Both logic and Supreme Court precedent support our conclusion that a facial challenge 
under Penn  Central must exist as a viable legal claim. Certainly it is apparent that a facial 
challenge is easier to mount under either Loretto or Lucas. It is far easier to prove that a 
regulation effects a physical invasion or that it denies an owner of all economically viable use of 
his property without considering evidence beyond the face of the regulation than it is to 
demonstrate that the regulation's effect satisfies the multi-factor test of Penn Central. However, 
we have recently described the Loretto and Lucas tests as categorical "exceptions to the 
application of the regulatory takings test" as set forth in Penn Central. In fact, the Supreme Court 
has emphasized that per se takings claims are disfavored, whereas Penn Central claims are 
preferred. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
321, 339, 342, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2002). It would seem incongruous indeed if 
only the disfavored exceptions to Penn Central could be brought as facial challenges, where a 
claim under the general rule of Penn Central could not. 
Supreme Court precedent also demonstrates the viability of a facial challenge under Penn 
Central. In Keystone, the Court emphasized the difficulty of prevailing on a facial challenge 
under Penn Central, and ultimately concluded that the mere enactment of the challenged statute 
did not effect a taking. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493-99. The Court's ruling implicitly 
recognizes that a facial Penn Central challenge is feasible. Moreover, in Keystone, the Court 
considered the limited evidence that the property owners had proffered, including the actual 
tonnage of coal that the challenged statutes prevented the owners from removing, and the 
percentage of total coal in the mine that the restricted tonnage represented. The Court found that 
the property owners' facial challenge under Penn Central failed because the evidence the 
property owners provided was insufficient to demonstrate economic harm in any significant 
amount. Thus, the Court found against the property owners not because the Court was not 
                                                 
3
 Dr. Quigley is a professor of economics, business, and policy at the University of California, Berkeley and serves 
as the Director of the Berkeley Program on Housing and Urban Poicy. He served as President and Director of the 
American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association and has been a member of the National Academy of 
Sciences/National Research Council Committee on National Urban Policy. 
Mr. Thomsen is an MBA/CFA with the accounting firm of Grobstein, Horwath & Company, LLP. 
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permitted to consider the evidence provided, but rather because the property owners' evidence 
did not show that the mere enactment of the statute amounted to a taking.  
The fact that the Court's precedents approve of a facial challenge under Penn Central 
requires us to consider what kinds of evidence beyond the text of the challenged regulation the 
reviewing court may consider. The proper inquiry in a facial challenge is not whether the 
property owners can demonstrate that property has been taken without providing evidence 
beyond the text of the regulation; the inquiry is whether the "mere enactment" of the regulation 
constitutes a taking. Thus, in a takings claim, we must look not only at what the statute says, but 
also at what its mere enactment does. At a minimum, we must look to the general economic 
principles that allow us to interpret the statute's effect, so that we may understand the regulation's 
general scope and dominant features. In addition, there must be a way to understand the 
economic impact on the complaining property owner. A property owner who is not permitted at 
least to present evidence that proves that he has actually suffered the kind of economic harm of 
which he complains would be precluded from even proving his own standing to bring the claim – 
the property owner must be permitted to adduce evidence that he has suffered the injury for 
which he seeks redress. Thus, even in a facial challenge, the court may consider evidence related 
to the individual property owner that illustrates the economic impact that the mere enactment of 
the statute had on that owner and proves that the owner has suffered the injury of which he 
complains.  
In this case, the Park Owners submitted evidence of the effect that the mere enactment of 
the RCO had on their property. The Park Owners principally relied on the report by Dr. Quigley. 
The City did not object to the use of this report; on the contrary, the City responded by producing 
its own expert report by Mr. Thomsen. The district court reviewed both parties' expert reports in 
preparation for its summary judgment ruling in April. In conducting its analysis, the district court 
did not rely on the detailed information provided in each report about the actual economic impact 
of the RCO on each particular mobile home within the Park, nor did it rely on the information 
about the actual impact on the Park as a whole. Instead, the district court relied on the core 
findings of the expert reports and the general findings taken from economic studies and academic 
literature about the effects of mobile rent control ordinances generally. On appeal to this court, 
the City has defended the district court's analysis and its use of core findings from each party's 
expert report. It has argued, however, that attempts by the Park Owners to provide evidence 
beyond the core findings of the Quigley Report is an impermissible attempt to convert a facial 
challenge into an as-applied challenge. The City has not identified which evidence would be so 
property-specific as to be impermissible in a facial challenge. 
We need not, however, determine the exact boundaries between permissible and 
impermissible kinds of evidence to support a facial challenge.  The City has defended the district 
court's use of core findings from each party's report. Therefore, we will confine ourselves to 
review of these same core findings in our review of the Park Owners' facial Penn Central 
challenge. We will provide additional figures from the Quigley Report only for purposes of 
demonstrating that the Park Owners have suffered the actual economic injury of which they 
complain and illustrating in concrete terms the economic impact that the "mere enactment" of the 
RCO had in Goleta. In addition, we may consider the district court's undisputed factual findings 
about property values in the City of Goleta, as these values affect the entire City, and thus 
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everyone subject to the City's RCO, and are not specific to the RCO's application to the Park 
Owners. With these limitations in mind, we consider the three factors of the Penn Central 
analysis. 
B 
The three factors described in Penn Central are: (1) the economic impact of the regulation 
on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with investment-backed 
expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action. We consider each in turn. 
1 
The first consideration under Penn Central  is the "economic impact of the regulation on 
the claimant." Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). There is no 
mathematical formula provided by the Constitution, but "if [the] regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking." Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 
(1922). By definition, under Penn Central, the property owners need not show a complete 
deprivation of all economically viable use of the property. Deprivation of all economically viable 
use would entitle the property owners to just compensation under Lucas, and there would be no 
need to apply a Penn Central analysis. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 ("Where a regulation 
places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking 
nonetheless may have occurred . . . ." ). In sum, to prevail under Penn Central, the property 
owner must demonstrate a loss of value that may be less than 100 percent, but high enough to 
have "go[ne] too far." Id. 
There is a broad consensus that a mobile home rent control ordinance like the RCO 
causes a wealth transfer from the mobile home park owners to the incumbent mobile home 
tenants. The Quigley Report explained how the RCO affects the mobile home market. Mobile 
homes have a divided ownership. A park owner owns the real estate, consisting of the home 
sites, while the home itself is owned by the tenant who rents the site. When a jurisdiction enacts 
a rent control ordinance, the right to occupy a mobile home site at a below-market rent acquires 
its own intrinsic value distinct from the value of the land. The owner of a given mobile home at 
the time the RCO is passed will capitalize this value (equal to the present value of the future 
stream of rent discounts) into the selling price of the home. This is referred to as the "transfer 
premium." A new mobile home tenant, anxious to acquire the right to regulated, below-market 
rent, pays the transfer premium in the form of a higher purchase price for the home. The net 
effect is that the cost of the home and the rental site is approximately the same whether there is 
an RCO or not; the difference is that under the RCO, the value of the capitalized rent is paid to 
the mobile home owner instead of to the park owner.
5
 Accordingly, in the end, the RCO does not 
                                                 
5
 The Quigley Report illustrated these points with figures for the average property in its sample of dwellings sold in 
the Park during the relevant period. The Report estimated that, based on comparable land rental rates, the annual 
unregulated market rental rate of the average site in the Park would be $13,344. The RCO-regulated rental rate on 
the average site is only $3,256. Thus, a home owner pays roughly $10,000 less in annual rent to the Park Owners. 
This annual savings, however, is reflected in the selling price of the mobile home. The Report estimated that the 
average mobile home, but for the RCO, would be worth $14,037. Because of the RCO, however, the average mobile 
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actually decrease housing costs at all for the new tenant. If a new tenant purchases the home, the 
new tenant will have to pay an amount equal to the rental discount in the form of the transfer 
premium. 
The Quigley Report summarizes the effect of the RCO:  
For every dollar by which housing costs are reduced through lower mobile home 
rents, consumers are forced to pay higher purchase prices for these mobile homes. 
These two effects roughly cancel. Thus, the principal effect of the rent control 
regulation is to inhibit increases in the supply of affordable housing in the market 
and consequently to increase rents in the local economy. The principal costs are 
borne by those consumers who otherwise would have been able to reside in lower 
cost housing in the region. 
The Quigley Report estimated that the RCO forced the Park Owners to rent the entire 
Park at close to an 80 percent discount below the market rate. The RCO has resulted in transfer 
premiums of approximately 90 percent of the sale price of mobile homes, enjoyed by the 
incumbent tenants. 
The district court credited the Quigley Report's findings and found that the RCO causes a 
wealth transfer from the Park Owners to their tenants. The district court found that housing costs 
in the City of Goleta increased "approximately 205% from 1997 to 2003, and increased another 
21.1% in 2004. The rent on the rent-controlled spaces in the Park [has] not kept up with the 
increase in housing costs." The court found: 
The RCO has resulted in what is known as "transfer premiums" in the sale of mobile 
homes. These transfer premiums constitute approximately 90% of the sale price of mobile homes 
in the Park. No provisions in the RCO prevents the seller of a mobile home from capturing 
transfer premiums. 
                                                                                                                                                             
home sold for $119,091. This difference equals $105,054, or a full 88 percent of the entire sale price, and represents 
the net present value to the mobile home owner of being able to save roughly $10,000 a year in rent. 
As a hypothetical, the Quigley Report then calculated what would happen if a mobile home owner financed the 
average home with a typical mortgage product used for these kinds of purchases. The Quigley Report found that, 
under the RCO, the average annual housing-related payments of the purchaser would be: $13,968 in loan repayment 
plus $3,256 in regulated rent. Without the RCO, because the same home would have sold for $105,054 less, but rent 
would have been more, the average annual housing-related payments would be: $1,646 in loan repayment plus 
$13,344 in rent. As the Quigley Report noted, in this particular example, the mobile home owner would actually be 
paying more annually under the City's RCO than he would in an unregulated market. This is due in part to the fact 
that mobile home mortgage products tend to have higher interest rates and their purchasers often have low asset 
levels or weaker credit histories. In general, however, the Quigley Report suggests that mobile home owners will 
end up paying roughly the same amount in annual expenses whether or not the RCO is in effect. The difference is in 
who captures the value of the rent-controlled site in the Park. Without the RCO, the Park owners receive roughly 
$10,000 more a year in rent. With the RCO, the incumbent mobile home owners receive a one-time premium of 
$105,054, captured in the sale value of their home. 
866 
More simply, "an average mobile home worth $12,000 would sell for approximately 
$100,000." The district court concluded that "the uncontroverted facts . . . establish the existence 
of a premium." Indeed, it found that even "[t]he City has acknowledged the existence of such a 
premium." The Supreme Court observed the same wealth transfer phenomenon in Yee: 
[T]he effect of the rent control ordinance, coupled with the restrictions on the park 
owner's freedom to reject new tenants, is to increase significantly the value of the 
mobile home. This increased value normally benefits only the tenant in possession 
at the time the rent control is imposed. Petitioners are correct in citing the 
existence of this premium as a difference between the alleged effect of the 
[challenged] ordinance and that of an ordinary apartment rent control statute. 
Most apartment tenants do not sell anything to their successors (and are often 
prohibited from charging "key money"), so a typical rent control statute will 
transfer wealth from the landlord to the incumbent tenant and all future tenants. 
By contrast, petitioners contend that the [challenged] ordinance transfers wealth 
only to the incumbent mobile home owner. 503 U.S. at 530 (internal citation 
omitted). 
The Court in Yee, however, left open the question of whether the wealth transfer 
constitutes a regulatory taking under Penn Central because the only issue before the Court was 
whether the wealth transfer constituted a per se taking under Loretto.  
Our past cases have observed the wealth transfer effect as well, but the posture of those 
cases or differences in takings law when those cases were decided made it unnecessary to reach 
the question of whether the wealth transfer effected a regulatory taking under Penn Central.
6
  
The wealth transfer from the Park Owners to their tenants is a naked transfer 
accomplished by the mere enactment of the RCO. By taking the value of the Park Owners' 
mobile home sites and transferring it to the Park's incumbent tenants, the RCO has effected "the 
distribution of resources or opportunities to one group rather than another solely on the ground 
that those favored have exercised the raw political power to obtain what they want." Cass R. 
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1689 (1984). In 
the classic naked transfer, the government takes property from A to give to B for the sole benefit 
of B. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 162 L. Ed. 2d 439 
(2005) ("[I]t has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the 
sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just 
compensation."). In this case, the RCO works slightly differently, as the government does not act 
as a fiscal intermediary. Because of the divided ownership of mobile homes--the Park Owners 
own the real estate and the tenants own the home itself--the transfer can be effected directly by 
                                                 
6
  Academic literature has also discussed the wealth transfer created by mobile home rent control ordinances. See, 
e.g., William A. Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why Is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?, 
67 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 865, 872-75 (1991); Werner Z. Hirsch & Joel G. Hirsch, Legal-Economic Analysis of Rent 
Controls in a Mobile Home Context: Placement  Values and Vacancy Decontrol, 35 UCLA L. REV. 399, 405, 423-
31 (1988); Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741, 758-
59 (1988). 
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the mere enactment of the RCO. The RCO takes wealth from A, the Park Owners, and transfers 
it to B, the incumbent tenants, who reap the benefits in the form of mobile homes worth several 
times their original value.
7
 
Incumbent tenants are not the only group that benefit from the City's passage of the RCO. 
The RCO also benefits another group: those who would like to support affordable housing 
initiatives without paying for it themselves, for example, owners and developers of other forms 
of housing such as apartments that might otherwise be forced to provide subsidized housing, and 
taxpayers who want to subsidize affordable housing without actually increasing their own tax 
liability to pay for it. See Pennell, 485 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) ("The politically attractive feature of [rent control] regulation is not that it permits wealth 
transfers to be achieved that could not be achieved otherwise; but rather that it permits them to 
be achieved 'off budget,' . . . ." ) Thus, the City, "solely on the ground that those favored have 
exercised the raw political power to obtain what they want," has taken from A to give to B, both 
for the benefit of B (the incumbent tenants) and for a larger group, who does not wish to support 
affordable housing through more politic means. The Takings Clause does not prohibit this use of 
the police power, see Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489-90, but the Takings Clause does not ask us to 
pretend that such a naked transfer does not cause a severe, observable economic impact on the 
property owner whose property has been conscripted for the public's use. 
The City's principal argument in response is that, even conceding the wealth transfer, the 
RCO's economic impact on the Park Owners does not amount to a Penn Central taking because 
the Park Owners can still earn a return on their investment.
8
 The City supplied some evidence in 
the Thomsen Report to show that the Park Owners have earned, depending on the analysis, 
roughly 10 percent on their investment annually. According to the report, this return is, again 
depending on the analysis, comparable to or occasionally better than the return on investment 
earned by real estate investment trusts and other kinds of investments according to national 
indices. 
The district court credited both the Park Owners' evidence of the wealth transfer and the 
City's evidence of return on investment. Reviewing the reports together it found: 
                                                 
7
 As a result, the RCO is unlikely to increase the availability of affordable housing in the City of Goleta, for the 
widely-recognized reasons summarized in the Quigley Report. The RCO only affects a small portion of the total 
housing market in the City, and because of the potential to capitalize the value of the regulated rent into the sale 
price of the mobile home, even within the mobile home market, the RCO does not actually generate mobile home 
sites that are cheaper to live on than they would be if rents were unregulated. It is easy to see why mobile home 
tenants would encourage the City to adopt the County's RCO without further investigation as to whether such 
regulation was necessary in the real estate market of 2002. 
8
 The City also claimed that incumbent tenants do not necessarily benefit from the one-time wealth transfer in the 
form of the "transfer premium" because the transfer is not realized until the tenants sell their homes, and they do not 
all sell their homes. This claim is irrelevant to the point that real wealth has been transferred. Even if an incumbent 
tenant does not sell his mobile home, he may have realized value in it. He might, for example, be permitted to 
borrow against the increased value of the home created by the RCO while he remained in the home. To use the 
district court's figures, an incumbent tenant who purchased his home before the passage of the RCO for $12,000 
could, after the passage of the RCO, take out a home equity loan against a $100,000 house. 
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Considering all this evidence, a reasonable inference that may be drawn is that although 
Plaintiffs have received a rate of return on investment comparable to other real estate 
investments, and although they have enjoyed a significant appreciation in value of their property, 
Plaintiffs could have received higher rates of return in the absence of the [regulations]. 
The district court concluded that the wealth transfer was greater than any return on 
investment: 
The evidence of the rate of return is mixed. Although Plaintiffs have enjoyed a 
rate of return comparable to other real estate investments, Plaintiffs' evidence 
tends to suggest that they would have earned more – perhaps much more – in the 
absence of the RCO. 
Nevertheless, the district court reasoned that because the Park Owners could receive 
some return on investment – even though it was less, perhaps even substantially less, than their 
wealth transfer loss – the Park Owners had not suffered a regulatory taking. 
We disagree with the district court's reasoning. The fact that the Park Owners earned 
some return on investment is not, as the district court reasoned, the end of their Penn Central 
claim. Even if the Park Owners earned some return on investment, a taking may have occurred. 
If the Park Owners could show that the RCO denies them all return on investment, they could, of 
course, prevail on a per se takings claim under Lucas, and we would not have to labor through 
the Penn Central analysis. Penn Central thus practically assumes that the Park Owners may be 
able to earn some return on investment. Our challenge under Penn Central is to figure out what 
loss of potential return on investment, greater than zero but less than 100 percent, is significant 
enough to constitute a regulatory taking. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330. The district court 
thus erred in the conclusion that because plaintiffs can realize a "rate of return comparable to 
other real estate investments," the Park Owners have not suffered significant economic harm. Cf. 
Hall, 833 F.2d at 1278 ("The city's argument that [the mobile home park owners] are adequately 
compensated by the rents they receive is irrelevant to the determination of whether a taking has 
occurred . . . . Whether compensation is adequate is an inquiry separate from whether there has 
been a taking.").  
The Park Owners may have enjoyed a positive rate of return, perhaps even a rate of 
return comparable to some other real estate investments, but the district court found, and neither 
the City nor the Thomsen Report denies, that the Park Owners "would have earned more--
perhaps much more" if not for the RCO. Although the "much more" does not appear to have 
been reduced to a total dollars-and-cents loss, the district court also found--again without 
contradiction--that the loss could be as high as almost 90 percent of the sale price on a site-by-
site, home-by-home basis. To illustrate this impact, the Quigley Report did estimate possible 
losses for individual units in the Park, and some of the figures run upwards of $100,000 per site. 
By any measure, that is a significant economic transfer from the Park Owners to the tenants, one 
that must be characterized as a loss for the Park Owners. Cf. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 
331 F.3d 1319, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that an extraction of 96 percent of the property's 
value was severe enough to constitute a taking under Penn Central). The undisputed evidence 
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shows that the mere enactment of the RCO has caused a significant economic loss for the Park 
Owners. This factor weighs heavily in the Park Owners' favor. 
2 
The next consideration is "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations." Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 
124). Here, it is undisputed that the RCO was passed in Santa Barbara County in 1979 and 
amended in 1987, and that the Park Owners purchased the Park in 1997. The purchase was 
eighteen years after the RCO was first passed by the County, but five years before the City of 
Goleta adopted the RCO in 2002. We agree with the finding of the district court, therefore, that 
the Park Owners "got exactly what they bargained for when they purchased the Park--a mobile-
home park subject to a detailed rent control ordinance."
9
 Thus, we take pause at the notion that 
the Park Owners can claim that the challenged regulation took between 80 and 90 percent of the 
value out of their rental park when, apparently, this value had been extracted before they 
purchased the park. 
Our analysis of this issue is controlled by Palazzolo. In that case, a corporation owned 
property at the time the government enacted the challenged regulation. 533 U.S. at 613. 
Palazzolo came into possession of the property in 1978 when the corporation's charter was 
revoked and title to the property passed, by operation of law, to Palazzolo as the sole 
shareholder. Id. at 614. At that time, the property was already subject to the regulation that 
designated the property as part of protected "coastal wetlands" upon which development would 
be limited. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Palazzolo could not, therefore, bring a 
takings claim because "[a] purchaser or a successive title holder like [Palazzolo] is deemed to 
have notice of an earlier-enacted  restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a taking.". 
As the Supreme Court described the state high court's reasoning, "by prospective legislation the 
State can shape and define property rights and reasonable investment-backed expectations, and 
subsequent owners cannot claim any injury from lost value. After all, they purchased . . . with 
notice of the limitation." Id. 
The Supreme Court reversed:  
The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle . . . . 
Were we to accept the State's rule, the postenactment transfer of title would 
absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no 
matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect, to put 
an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule. Future 
                                                 
9
   The parties stipulated in their state-court settlement agreement that the RCO, originally a County ordinance, was 
not in effect for a brief period during the City's process of incorporation, as we have previously noted, supra n.2. 
This fact is relevant to the timeliness of the suit. Nonetheless, for the purposes of considering the Park Owners' 
investment-backed expectations, the district court found that the RCO had, for all practical purposes, been in effect 
"unchanged in substance, for all times relevant to the present action." 
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generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and 
value of land.
10
 
Further, the Court pointed out that "[t]he State's rule would work a critical alteration to 
the nature of property, as the newly regulated landowner is stripped of the ability to transfer the 
interest which was possessed prior to the regulation. . . . A blanket rule that purchasers with 
notice have no compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to 
accord with the duty to compensate for what is taken." Id. at 627. 
The Court's concern, that a rule precluding post-enactment purchasers from bringing a 
regulatory taking claim would undesirably insulate the government from liability and allow the 
state to "secure a windfall for itself,", is particularly salient on the facts before us. In 2002, the 
City of Goleta adopted the County's RCO, created to manage housing problems as they existed 
in 1979, apparently without any formal consideration of whether the problems still existed. Were 
the fact that the Park Owners purchased the Park when the County RCO was already in existence 
sufficient to bar their takings claim, the City of Goleta would be insulated from liability for the 
effects of adopting the RCO when the City incorporated in 2002. All of the existing park owners 
at that time had bought their parks when the land was still part of unincorporated Santa Barbara 
County. Unless any of these park owners had purchased their park prior to the original RCO 
enactment in 1979, all the park owners would have purchased with notice of the original RCO. 
By its own theory, the City was free to adopt the law with complete impunity, notwithstanding 
its obvious effects. 
The Palazzolo Court explained why subsequent property owners do not lose their right to 
challenge the government's actions:  
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 
(1987), presented the question whether it was consistent with the Takings Clause for a state 
regulatory agency to require oceanfront landowners to provide lateral beach access to the public 
as the condition for a development permit. The principal dissenting opinion observed it was a 
policy of the California Coastal Commission to require the condition, and that the Nollans, who 
purchased their home after the policy went into effect, were "on notice that new developments 
would be approved only if provisions were made for lateral beach access." Id., at 860 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). A majority of the Court rejected the proposition. "So long as the Commission 
could not have deprived the prior owners of the easement without compensating them," the Court 
reasoned, "the prior owners must be understood to have transferred their full property rights in 
conveying the lot." Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629 (internal citations omitted) 
The Court also rejected analogies between purchasing a property subject to a challenged 
land-use regulation and purchasing a property whose contours are shaped by background 
principles of state law: 
                                                 
10
  The Court limited its reasoning to regulatory takings claims; physical takings claims resulting from a state's direct 
condemnation of property were distinguished as properly brought only by the property owner at the time of the 
condemnation. 533 U.S. at 628. 
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It suffices to say that a regulation that otherwise would be unconstitutional absent 
compensation is not transformed into a background principle of the State's law by 
mere virtue of the passage of title. . . . A regulation or common-law rule cannot be 
a background principle for some owners but not for others. 
. . . A law does not become a background principle for subsequent owners by 
enactment itself. Lucas did not overrule our holding in Nollan, which, as we have 
noted, is based on essential Takings Clause principles. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629-
30. 
The Court concluded by remanding for consideration of Palazzolo's Penn Central claim, 
stating, "[t]hat claim is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date 
of the state-imposed restriction."
11 
 
Palazzolo left open the question of how to apply the "investment-backed expectations" 
analysis to property owners who purchased subject to the regulation. It merely remanded the case 
with instructions to address the merits of Palazzolo's claim under Penn Central. 533 U.S. at 630. 
Our sister circuits have yet to address the issue. Penn Central will not aid us because it never 
supplied "any 'set formula'" in the first place. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Instead, it 
"identified several factors that have particular significance" in what the Court described as an "ad 
hoc, factual inquir[y]." Id. After Palazzolo, we must continue to consider "[t]he economic impact 
of the regulation on the claimant" and the "character of the governmental action," id., but we 
must not deem a regulatory takings claim forfeited simply because the property changed hands 
after the regulations went into effect.  
We read Palazzolo to mean that even though the Park Owners purchased the Park in a 
regulated state similar to the one imposed by the City, the Park Owners may still prevail under 
Penn Central. How we are to apply Penn Central post-Palazzolo is less clear. The question of 
investment-backed expectations yields mixed results. On the one hand, as the district court 
found, the Park Owners' "expectations of the value of the Park when purchased, as well as the 
income to be received from the Park, should have been, at all times, tempered by the knowledge 
that the RCO would have an adverse effect on their investment." On the other hand, when the 
Park Owners acquired the property, they also arguably acquired the prior owner's interest in the 
property, including the right to bring a takings action. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627; see also 
CAMSI IV v. Hunter Tech. Corp., 230 Cal. App. 3d 1525, 282 Cal. Rptr. 80, 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1991) ("the harm implicit in a tortious injury to property is harm to the property itself, and thus 
to any owner of the property once the property has been injured and not necessarily to a 
particular owner"). At the very least, the Park Owners have the right to bring a takings action 
based on the City's 2002 adoption of the RCO. 
                                                 
11
 Finally, we note that even before Palazzolo, the Supreme Court permitted property owners who purchased 
property subsequent to the enactment of the challenged regulation to bring regulatory takings claims. In Penn 
Central itself, one of the appellants, Union General Properties, acquired its leasehold interest in Grand Central 
Terminal in 1968, a year after the Terminal was designated as a landmark in 1967. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115-16. 
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These two interests are in tension and are, in some respects, self-referential: The new 
owner's investment-backed expectation depends on the value of any takings claim, but whether 
there is a regulatory taking turns on the owner's investment-backed expectations. In other words, 
in this context we cannot address the investment-backed expectation prong of Penn Central 
without referring to the merits of the takings claim, but in order to decide the takings claim, we 
must determine the Park Owners' investment-backed expectations. There is no easy way out of 
this conundrum. For now we will acknowledge the dilemma: the Park Owners took possession of 
the Park knowing that it was subject to the County's (but not the City's) RCO. They also assumed 
ownership with some hope that they would be able to challenge the RCO under the Takings 
Clause and, as they have done here, on equal protection, due process and state law grounds. We 
conclude, therefore, that the question of investment-backed expectations is not determinative but 
must be considered in tandem with the economic impact of the regulation on the Park Owners, 
and the character of the governmental action.  See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) ("[I]nterference with investment-backed expectations is one of a number of factors 
that a court must examine."). 
3 
The final consideration is "the character of the governmental action." Lingle, 544 U.S. at 
539 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). We have seen two divergent interpretations of this 
test, both of which appear to derive from different portions of Penn Central. We consider each in 
turn.  
One test, applied less frequently in practice, considers "whether [the governmental 
action] amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through 'some 
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good.'" Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). The application of this 
test to our case is controlled by Yee, in which mobile home park owners claimed that a rent 
control ordinance almost identical to the RCO amounted to a physical taking under Loretto. See 
503 U.S. at 529-30. The Supreme Court held that the rent control ordinance did not amount to 
the imposition of a physical invasion. Id. The Court, however, proceeded to state in no uncertain 
terms that the fact that the regulations caused a one-time wealth transfer from landlord to the 
incumbent tenants "might have some bearing on whether the ordinance causes a regulatory 
taking." Id. at 530. 
The district court thought "the character of the governmental action is less like a per se 
taking and more like a permissible shifting of economic benefits and burdens." We disagree. 
Although we understand that the RCO does not amount to a physical taking, the RCO is 
substantially more like a "regulatory taking," Yee, 503 U.S. at 530, than a "mere[diminution of 
the Park Owners'] property interests through 'some public program adjusting the benefits and 
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.'" Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (quoting Penn 
Central, 438 U.S. at 124). The RCO is quite unlike zoning or other restrictions that apply broadly 
to businesses and residences and inevitably restrict the property's uses. The Court has explained 
that its various formulations of the test for regulatory takings "(reflected in Loretto, Lucas, and 
Penn Central) . . . aim to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic 
taking." The RCO effects a transfer of the right to rents for the use of the property from the Park 
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Owners to the tenants. The Park Owners may own the property on which the mobile homes rest, 
but under the RCO the tenants have the right to convey the home with the right to remain on the 
site at a much-reduced rent. This looks much more like a classic taking than a mere regulatory 
burden. This iteration of the "character of the governmental action" test weighs in favor of the 
Park Owners. 
The second, more frequently applied iteration of the "character of the governmental 
action" test considers whether the tax base. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 
S. Ct. 1563, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1554 (1960)  ("The [Takings Clause] was designed to bar Government 
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should 
be borne by the public as a whole."); see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542-43 (discussing Armstrong 
with approval); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-19, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1987) (applying Armstrong in 
a regulatory takings claim); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123. 
We find Cienega Gardens persuasive as to the application of the Armstrong analysis in 
this case. See 331 F.3d at 1338. Cienega Gardens found a Penn Central taking where two federal 
statutes abrogated property developers' contractual rights to prepay their forty-year mortgage 
loans after twenty years. The effect of the statutes was to prevent the developers from exiting the 
low-rent housing programs in which they were required to participate while carrying the loans. 
These statutes led to a 96 percent loss of return on equity for the developers. Cienega Gardens 
found that the government action at issue placed the expense of low-income housing on a few 
private property owners (those who had previously participated in the federal loan program but 
now wanted to exit), instead of distributing the expense among all taxpayers in the form of 
incentives for developers to construct more low-rent apartments. See 331 F.3d at 1338-39.
12 
 
Here, the RCO applies only to mobile home park owners. The district court found that the 
City did not impose comparable costs on any other property owners in the City, except as a 
condition of new development. The City has singled out the Park Owners and imposed solely on 
them a burden to support affordable housing. We find the Federal Circuit's reasoning persuasive 
and applicable to the facts of this case:  
Unquestionably, Congress acted for a public purpose (to benefit a certain group of 
people in need of low-cost housing), but just as clearly, the expense was placed 
                                                 
12
 The City argues that Cienega Gardens involved an abrogation of the plaintiffs' contractual property rights whereas 
this case involves an abrogation of the Park Owners' right to charge market rental rates. This distinction is not 
relevant here. Regulatory takings cases necessarily involve economic analyses, in which the formal characteristics of 
the transaction are less relevant than the economic substance. For example, in this case, the fact that Park Owners 
are not allowed to raise rents could also be considered an abrogation of contract rights--their right to contract for 
annual market-based rent increases. Similarly, the case could be analogized (creatively) to a land-use extraction 
case: the Park Owners are only permitted to operate a mobile home park in exchange for an agreement to rent it at 
80 percent below existing market rates (which in turn could be analogized as an extraction that they may rent 20 
percent of the park at full market rates if they agree to permit 80 percent of the tenants to live rent-free). See, e.g., 
Yee, 503 U.S. at 530 (suggesting that a mobile home rent control ordinance may be analogized to a land-use 
extraction and referencing Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 
677 (1987)). 
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disproportionately on a few private property owners. Congress' objective in 
passing ELIHPA and LIHPRHA – preserving low-income housing – and method 
– forcing some owners to keep accepting below-market rents – is the kind of 
expense-shifting to a few persons that amounts to a taking. This is especially clear 
where, as here, the alternative was for all taxpayers to shoulder the burden. 
Congress could simply have appropriated more money for mortgage insurance 
and thereby induced more developers to build low-rent apartments in the public 
housing program to replace housing, such as the plaintiffs', that was no longer part 
of the program. 331 F.3d at 1338-39; see also Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 416 
We do not doubt that the City's objective in passing the RCO was to increase the 
availability of low-cost housing. Singling out mobile home park owners, however, and forcing 
them to rent their property at a discount of 80 percent below its market value, "is the kind of 
expense-shifting to a few persons that amounts to a taking." Cienega Gardens, 331 F.3d at 1338-
39. Moreover, the City has numerous alternatives for supporting affordable housing--such as tax 
incentives, low-cost loans, rent supports, or vouchers--without directing the burden at such a 
limited group. In sum, taking account of the "character of the governmental action" test in this 
case also weighs strongly in the Park Owners' favor. 
C 
Having reviewed each factor individually, we must weigh them together. We conclude 
that the RCO has caused substantial economic hardship to the Park Owners. Property values in 
the area have increased by 225 percent in the time that the Park Owners have owned the Park, 
yet the Park Owners have not been permitted to increase rents beyond 75 percent of the annual 
increase in the CPI. This is a zero-sum game; loss to the Park Owners has become gain to their 
tenants. The RCO has forced the Park Owners to rent their property at an 80 percent discount 
below the market value, esulting in transfer premiums equal to approximately 90 percent of the 
selling price of a mobile home. Thus, the savings created by these below-market rents are 
transferred directly into the pockets of the incumbent  mobile home tenants, who can now sell 
their mobile homes for almost ten times their purchase price. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 530. Next, we 
agree with the district court that the RCO has not strongly interfered with the Park Owners' 
investment-backed expectations because the Park Owners purchased the Park when the Park was 
already regulated. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the Park Owners bought the Park in its 
regulated state does not mean that the City has not taken property by regulation or that the Park 
Owners cannot bring such a claim. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627-28. Finally, we conclude that 
the RCO looks more like a classic taking than a mere shifting of benefits and burdens, see Yee, 
503 U.S. at 530, and that the RCO singles out mobile home park owners and forces them to bear 
a burden of providing affordable housing in the City that should fairly be born by the taxpayers 
as a whole. See Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. 
On balance, the City's RCO "goes too far" and constitutes a regulatory taking under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments for which just compensation must be paid. If the City of 
Goleta wishes to attempt to increase the availability of affordable housing by transferring the 
value of renting land within its jurisdiction from the Park Owners to the incumbent tenants, there 
is no constitutional impediment to doing so. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 
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however, requires that the City compensate the Park Owners for taking their property by 
regulation. 
VI 
State and local governments have a legitimate interest in increasing the availability of 
affordable housing for their citizens. Translating that interest into effective public policy, 
however, has proven difficult. The Supreme Court and our court have addressed regulations like 
the City's RCO with some regularity; we have consistently questioned their ineffectiveness at 
increasing the availability of affordable housing, and we have commented on their pernicious 
side effects. See, e.g., Yee, 503 U.S. at 530 
Nevertheless, so long as these rent control ordinances are "designed to accomplish an 
objective within the government's police power, and if a rational relationship existed between the 
provisions and the purpose of the ordinances," the Constitution affords state and local 
governments the flexibility to experiment to find a workable approach to the problem.  
When such ordinances "go too far," however, and require some property owners to 
support policies that "in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole," the 
Constitution requires that the government provide just compensation. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 
(citation omitted). The Williamson prudential ripeness requirements have, for the most part, 
forced us to close the courthouse door to aggrieved property owners like the Park Owners, and to 
close our eyes to the extreme effects of laws like the City's RCO. The Park Owners, however, 
have managed to pry these doors open a bit by developing their case through three rounds of 
litigation in state and federal court, and the City has forfeited any objection that the case is not fit 
for review. We will not, therefore, throw these property owners back out and slam the court-
house door shut behind them. Today, our eyes are open. We have weighed the Penn Central 
factors, and we find that the RCO has effected a regulatory taking. Just compensation is due. 
We therefore reverse the district court's judgment on the takings claim and remand to the 
district court for further proceedings. On remand, the district court may of course consider any 
materials presented by either party that are relevant to determining the total amount of just 
compensation due to the Park Owners. See, e.g., Cienega Gardens, 331 F.3d at 1354. We have 
now held that a facial challenge under Penn Central exists as a viable legal claim, and affirmed 
that this court's precedents and the nature of a takings inquiry allow for some evidence outside 
the text of the statute to be admissible. The district court may therefore properly consider such 
"detailed figures," in addition to any other evidence it deems relevant, in conducting its analysis 
to ascertain the precise amount of just compensation owed to the Park Owners.  
Costs shall be awarded to the Appellants. 
REVERSED and REMANDED. 
KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
[OMITTED] 
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PART VIII. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FREE EXPRESSION 
“[F]reedom of thought and speech… is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of 
nearly every other form of freedom.” JUSTICE CARDOZA in Pafko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) 
Session 34. First Amendment Primer 
SCHENCK v. UNITED STATES 
249 U.S. 47 (1919) 
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.  
This is an indictment in three counts.  The first charges a conspiracy to violate the 
Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, c.  30, §3, 40 Stat. 217, 219, by causing and attempting  to 
cause  insubordination, &c., in the military and naval forces of the United States, and to obstruct 
the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States, when the United States was at war 
with the German Empire, to-wit, that the defendants wilfully conspired to have printed and 
circulated to men who had been called and accepted for military service under the Act of May 
18, 1917, a document set forth and alleged to be calculated to cause such insubordination and 
obstruction. The defendants were found guilty on all the counts.  They set up the First 
Amendment to the Constitution forbidding Congress to make any law abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press, and bringing the case here on that ground have argued some other points 
also of which we must dispose.  
The documents would not have been sent unless it had been intended to have some effect, 
and we do not see what effect it could be expected to have upon persons subject to the draft 
except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out.  The defendants do not deny that the 
jury might find against them on this point.  
But it is said, suppose that that was the tendency of this circular, it is protected by the 
First Amendment to the Constitution.  Two of the strongest expressions are said to be quoted 
respectively from well-known public men.  It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging 
the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have 
been the  main purpose, as intimated in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462. We admit that 
in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular 
would have been within their constitutional rights.  But the character of every act depends upon 
the circumstances in which it is done.  The most stringent protection of free speech would not 
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.  The question in every case 
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a 
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right 
to prevent.  It is a question of proximity and degree.  When a nation is at war many things that 
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be 
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endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any 
constitutional right.  It seems to be admitted that if an actual obstruction of the recruiting service 
were proved, liability for words that produced that effect might be enforced.  The statute of 1917 
in §4 punishes conspiracies to obstruct as well as actual obstruction. If the act, (speaking, or 
circulating a paper,) its tendency and the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive 
no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.  Goldman v. United 
States, 245 U.S. 474, 477. Indeed that case might be said to dispose of the present contention if 
the precedent covers all media concludendi. But as the right to free speech was not referred to 
specially, we have thought fit to add a few words.  
It was not argued that a conspiracy to obstruct the draft was not within the words of the 
Act of 1917.  The words are "obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service," and it might be 
suggested that they refer only to making it hard to get volunteers.  
Judgments affirmed.  
GITLOW v. NEW YORK 
268 U.S. 652 (1923) 
MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Benjamin Gitlow was indicted in the Supreme Court of New York, with three others, for 
the statutory crime of criminal anarchy.  He was separately tried, convicted, and sentenced to 
imprisonment. The judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Division and by the Court of 
Appeals.  The case is here on writ of error to the Supreme Court. 
The indictment was in two counts.  The first charged that the defendant had advocated, 
advised and taught the duty, necessity and propriety of overthrowing and overturning organized 
government by force, violence and unlawful means, by certain writings therein set forth entitled 
"The Left Wing Manifesto"; the second that he had printed, published and knowingly circulated 
and distributed a certain paper called "The Revolutionary Age," containing the writings set forth 
in the first count advocating, advising and teaching the doctrine that organized government 
should be overthrown by force, violence and unlawful means. 
The following facts were established on the trial by undisputed evidence and admissions: 
The defendant is a member of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party, a dissenting branch or 
faction of that party formed in opposition to its dominant policy of "moderate Socialism." 
Membership in both is open to aliens as well as citizens.  The Left Wing Section was organized 
nationally at a conference in New York City in June, 1919, attended by ninety delegates from 
twenty different States. The conference elected a National Council, of which the defendant was a 
member, and left to it the adoption of a "Manifesto." This was published in The Revolutionary 
Age, the official organ of the Left Wing.  The defendant was on the board of managers of the 
paper and was its business manager.  He arranged for the printing of the paper and took to the 
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printer the manuscript of the first issue which contained the Left Wing Manifesto, and also a 
Communist Program and a Program of the Left Wing that had been adopted by the conference.  
Sixteen thousand  copies were printed, which were delivered at the premises in New York City 
used as the office of the Revolutionary Age and the headquarters of the Left Wing, and occupied 
by the defendant and other officials.  These copies were paid for by the defendant, as business 
manager of the paper.  Employees at this office wrapped and mailed out copies of the paper 
under the defendant's direction; and copies were sold from this office.  It was admitted that the 
defendant signed a card subscribing to the Manifesto and Program of the Left Wing, which all 
applicants were required to sign before being admitted to membership; that he went to different 
parts of the State to speak to branches of the Socialist Party about the principles of the Left Wing 
and advocated their adoption; and that he was responsible for the Manifesto as it appeared, that 
"he knew of the publication, in a general way and he knew of its publication afterwards, and is 
responsible for its circulation." 
The precise question presented, and the only question which we can consider under this 
writ of error, then is, whether the statute, as construed and applied in this case by the state courts, 
deprived the defendant of his liberty of expression in violation of the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
That the jury were warranted in finding that the Manifesto advocated not merely the 
abstract doctrine of overthrowing organized government by force, violence and unlawful means, 
but action to that end, is clear. 
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press -- 
which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress -- are among the 
fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by the States. 
It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press 
which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, 
without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that 
gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who 
abuse this freedom. Reasonably limited this freedom is an inestimable privilege in a free 
government; without such limitation, it might become the scourge of the republic. 
By enacting the present statute the State has determined, through its legislative body, that 
utterances advocating the overthrow of organized government by force, violence and unlawful 
means, are so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of substantive evil that 
they may be penalized in the exercise of its police power.  That determination must be given 
great weight.  Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute.  Mugler 
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661. And the case is to be considered "in the light of the principle that 
the State is primarily the judge of regulations required in the interest of public safety and 
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welfare;" and that its police "statutes may only be declared unconstitutional where they are 
arbitrary or unreasonable  It cannot be said that the State is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably 
when in the exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the public peace and 
safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed 
into the conflagration. 
We cannot hold that the present statute is an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the 
police power of the State unwarrantably infringing the freedom of speech or press; and we must 
and do sustain its constitutionality. In other words, when the legislative body has determined 
generally, in the constitutional exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve 
such danger of substantive evil that they may be punished, the question whether any specific 
utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about the 
substantive evil, is not open to consideration.  It is sufficient that the statute itself be 
constitutional and that the use of the language comes within its prohibition. 
Affirmed. 
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, dissenting.  
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS and I are of opinion that this judgment should be reversed.  
The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word 'liberty' as there 
used, although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than 
is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the laws of the 
United States.  If I am right, then I think that the criterion sanctioned by the full Court in 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, applies.  "The question in every case is whether the 
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and 
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that [the State] has a right to 
prevent." If what I think the correct test is applied, it is manifest that there was no present danger 
of an attempt to overthrow the government by force on the part of the admittedly small minority 
who shared the defendant's views.  It is said that this manifesto was more than a theory, that it 
was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted 
on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its 
birth.  The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the 
narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result.  Eloquence may set fire to reason.  But 
whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting a 
present conflagration.  If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are 
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free 
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way. 
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LOVELL v. CITY OF GRIFFIN 
303 U.S. 444 (1938) 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Appellant, Alma Lovell, was convicted in the Recorder's Court of the City of Griffin, 
Georgia, of the violation of a city ordinance and was sentenced to imprisonment for fifty days in 
default of the payment of a fine of fifty dollars.  The Superior Court of the county refused 
sanction of a petition for review; the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Superior 
Court (55 Ga. App. 609; 191 S. E. 152); and the Supreme Court of the State denied an 
application for certiorari.  The case comes here on appeal. 
The ordinance in question is as follows: 
"Section 1. That the practice of distributing, either by hand or otherwise, circulars, 
handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articles are being 
delivered free, or whether same are being sold, within the limits of the City of 
Griffin, without first obtaining written permission from the City Manager of the 
City of Griffin, such practice shall be deemed a nuisance, and punishable as an 
offense against the City of Griffin. 
"Section 2. The Chief of Police of the City of Griffin and the police force of the 
City of Griffin are hereby required and directed to suppress the same and to abate 
any nuisance as is described in the first section of this ordinance." 
The violation, which is not denied, consisted of the distribution without the required 
permission of a pamphlet and magazine in the nature of religious tracts, setting forth the gospel 
of the "Kingdom of Jehovah." Appellant did not apply for a permit, as she regarded herself as 
sent "by Jehovah to do His work" and that such an application would have been "an act of 
disobedience to His commandment." 
Upon the trial, with permission of the court, appellant demurred to the charge and moved 
to dismiss it upon a number of grounds, among which was the contention that the ordinance 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution  of the United States in abridging "the 
freedom of the press" and prohibiting "the free exercise of petitioner's religion." This contention 
was thus expressed: 
"Because said ordinance is contrary to and in violation of the first amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States, which reads: 
'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances.' 
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"Said ordinance is also contrary to and in violation of the fourteenth amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States, which had the effect of making the said 
first amendment applicable to the States, and which reads: 
'All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein 
they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' 
"Said ordinance absolutely prohibits the distribution of any literature of any kind 
within the limits of the City of Griffin without the permission of the City Manager 
and thus abridges the freedom of the press, contrary to the provisions of said 
quoted amendments. 
"Said ordinance also prohibits the free exercise of petitioner's religion and the 
practice thereof by prohibiting the distribution of literature about petitioner's 
religion in violation of the terms of said quoted amendments." 
The Court of Appeals, overruling these objections, sustained the constitutional validity of 
the ordinance, saying – 
"The ordinance is not unconstitutional because it abridges the freedom of the 
press or prohibits the distribution of literature about the petitioner's religion, in 
violation of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States." 
Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are protected by the First 
Amendment from infringement by Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights and 
liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action It is 
also well settled that municipal ordinances adopted under state authority constitute state action 
and are within the prohibition of the amendment.   
The ordinance is comprehensive with respect to the method of distribution.  It covers 
every sort of circulation "either by hand or otherwise." There is thus no restriction in its 
application with respect to time or place.  It is not limited to ways which might be regarded as 
inconsistent with the maintenance of public order or as involving disorderly conduct, the 
molestation of the inhabitants, or the misuse or littering of the streets.  The ordinance prohibits 
the distribution of literature of any kind at any time, at any place, and in any manner without a 
permit from the City Manager. 
We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face.  Whatever the motive which induced its 
adoption, its character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by 
subjecting it to license and censorship. The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily 
directed against the power of the licensor.  It was against that power that John Milton directed his 
assault by his "Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing." And the liberty of the press 
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became initially a right to publish "without a license what formerly could be published only with 
one." 
1
 While this freedom from previous restraint upon publication cannot be regarded as 
exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose in the 
adoption of the constitutional provision. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462; Near v. 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-716; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245, 246. 
Legislation of the type of the ordinance in question would restore the system of license and 
censorship in its baldest form.  
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily 
embraces pamphlets and leaflets.  These indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of 
liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest. The 
press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of 
information and opinion.  What we have had recent occasion to say with respect to the vital 
importance of protecting this essential liberty from every sort of infringement need not be 
repeated.  Near v. Minnesota, supra; Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra; De Jonge v. 
Oregon, supra.   
As the ordinance is void on its face, it was not necessary for appellant to seek a permit 
under it. She was  entitled to contest its validity in answer to the charge against her.  Smith v. 
Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 562. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
Reversed.  
MARSH v. ALABAMA 
326 U.S. 501 (1945) 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case we are asked to decide whether a State, consistently with the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, can impose criminal punishment on a person who undertakes to 
distribute religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town contrary to the wishes of 
the town's management. The town, a suburb of Mobile, Alabama, known as Chickasaw, is owned 
by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation.  Except for that it has all the characteristics of any other 
American town. The property consists of residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a 
sewage disposal plant and a "business block" on which business places are situated.  A deputy of 
the Mobile County Sheriff, paid by the company, serves as the town's policeman.  Merchants and 
service establishments have rented the stores and business places on the business block and the 
United States uses one of the places as a post office from which six carriers deliver mail to the 
people of Chickasaw and the adjacent area.  The town and the surrounding neighborhood, which 
cannot be distinguished from the Gulf property by anyone not familiar with the property lines, 
                                                 
1
 See Wickwar, "The Struggle for the Freedom of the Press," p. 15. 
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are thickly settled, and according to all indications the residents use the business block as their 
regular shopping center.  To do so, they now, as they have for many years, make use of a 
company-owned paved street and sidewalk located alongside the store fronts in order to enter 
and leave the stores and the post office.  Intersecting company-owned roads at each end of the 
business block lead into a four-lane public highway which runs parallel to the business block at a 
distance of thirty feet.  There is nothing to stop highway traffic from coming onto the business 
block and upon arrival a traveler may make free use of the facilities available there.  In short the 
town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by the public in general and there 
is nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping center except the fact that the 
title to the property belongs to a private corporation. 
Appellant, a Jehovah's Witness, came onto the sidewalk we have just described, stood 
near the post office and undertook to distribute religious literature.  In the stores the corporation 
had posted a notice which read as follows: "This Is Private Property, and Without Written 
Permission, No Street, or House Vendor, Agent or Solicitation of Any Kind Will Be Permitted." 
Appellant was warned that she could not distribute the literature without a permit and told that no 
permit would be issued to her.  She protested that the company rule could not be constitutionally 
applied so as to prohibit her from distributing religious writings.  When she was asked to leave 
the sidewalk and Chickasaw she declined. The deputy sheriff arrested her and she was charged in 
the state court with violating Title 14, §426 of the 1940 Alabama Code which makes it a crime to 
enter or remain on the premises of another after having been warned not to do so.  Appellant 
contended that to construe the state statute as applicable to her activities would abridge her right 
to freedom of press and religion contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution.  This contention was rejected and she was convicted.  The Alabama Court of 
Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute as applied was constitutional because 
the title to the sidewalk was in the corporation and because the public use of the sidewalk had not 
been such as to give rise to a presumption under Alabama law of its irrevocable dedication to the 
public.  21 So. 2d 558. The State Supreme Court denied certiorari, 246 Ala. 539, 21 So. 2d 564, 
and the case is here on appeal under §237 (a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. §344 (a). 
Had the title to Chickasaw belonged not to a private but to a municipal corporation and 
had appellant been arrested for violating a municipal ordinance rather than a ruling by those 
appointed by the corporation to manage a company town it would have been clear that 
appellant's conviction must be reversed.  Under our decision in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 
and others which have followed that case, neither a State nor a municipality can completely bar 
the distribution of literature containing religious or political ideas on its streets, sidewalks and 
public places or make the right to distribute dependent on a flat license tax or permit to be issued 
by an official who could deny it at will.  We have also held that an ordinance completely 
prohibiting the dissemination of ideas on the city streets cannot be justified on the ground that 
the municipality holds legal title to them.  Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413. And we have 
recognized that the preservation of a free society is so far dependent upon the right of each 
individual citizen to receive such literature as he himself might desire that a municipality could 
not, without jeopardizing that vital individual freedom, prohibit door to door distribution of 
literature. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146, 147. From these decisions it is clear that had 
the people of Chickasaw owned all the homes, and all the stores, and all the streets, and all the 
sidewalks, all those owners together could not have set up a municipal government with 
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sufficient power to pass an ordinance completely barring the distribution of religious literature.  
Our question then narrows down to this: Can those people who live in or come to Chickasaw be 
denied freedom of press and religion simply because a single company has legal title to all the 
town?  For it is the State's contention that the mere fact that all the property interests in the town 
are held by a single company is enough to give that company power, enforceable by a state 
statute, to abridge these freedoms. 
We do not agree that the corporation's property interests settle the question.  The State 
urges in effect that the corporation's right to control the inhabitants of Chickasaw is coextensive 
with the right of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of his guests.  We cannot accept that 
contention. Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion.  The more an owner, for his 
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become 
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it. 
We do not think it makes any significant constitutional difference as to the relationship 
between the rights of the owner and those of the public that here the State, instead of permitting 
the corporation to operate a highway, permitted it to use its property as a town, operate a 
"business block" in the town and a street and sidewalk on that business block.  Cf. Barney v. 
Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 340.  Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town 
the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such 
manner that the channels of communication remain free.  As we have heretofore stated, the town 
of Chickasaw does not function differently from any other town.  The "business block" serves as 
the community shopping center and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area and 
those passing through.  The managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of 
press and religion of these people consistently with the purposes of the Constitutional guarantees, 
and a state statute, as the one here involved, which enforces such action by criminally punishing 
those who attempt to distribute religious  literature clearly violates the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution. 
Many people in the United States live in company-owned towns. These people, just as 
residents of municipalities, are free citizens of their State and country.  Just as all other citizens 
they must make decisions which affect the welfare of community and nation.  To act as good 
citizens they must be informed.  In order to enable them to be properly informed their 
information must be uncensored. There is no more reason for depriving these people of the 
liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these 
freedoms with respect to any other citizen. 
When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the 
people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact 
that the latter occupy a preferred position.  As we have stated before, the right to exercise the 
liberties safeguarded by the First Amendment "lies at the foundation of free government by free 
men" and we must in all cases "weigh the circumstances and . . . appraise the . . . reasons . . . in 
support of the regulation . . . of the rights." Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161.  In our view 
the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation of liberty, here 
involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's 
permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental 
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liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a state statute.  Insofar as the 
State has attempted to impose criminal punishment on appellant for undertaking to distribute 
religious literature in a company town, its action cannot stand.  The case is reversed and the 
cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
CHAPLINSKY v. NEW HAMPSHIRE 
315 U.S. 568 (1942) 
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Appellant, a member of the sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses, was convicted in the 
municipal court of Rochester, New Hampshire, for violation of Chapter 378, §2, of the Public 
Laws of New Hampshire: 
"No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other 
person who is lawfully in any street       or other public place, nor call him by any 
offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence 
and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from 
pursuing his lawful business or occupation." 
The complaint charged that appellant, "with force and arms, in a certain public place in 
said city of Rochester, to wit, on the public sidewalk on the easterly side of Wakefield Street, 
near unto the entrance of the City Hall, did unlawfully repeat, the words following, addressed to 
the complainant, that is to say, 'You are a God damned racketeer' and 'a damned Fascist and the 
whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists,' the same being offensive, 
derisive and annoying words and names." He was found guilty and the judgment of conviction 
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State.  91 N.H. 310, 18 A. 2d 754. 
By motions and exceptions, appellant raised the questions that the statute was invalid 
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that it placed an 
unreasonable restraint on freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of worship, and 
because it was vague and indefinite.  These contentions were overruled and the case comes here 
on appeal. 
There is no substantial dispute over the facts. It is now clear that "Freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press, which are protected by the First Amendment from infringement by 
Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by action." Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450. Freedom 
of worship is similarly sheltered.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303. 
Appellant assails the statute as a violation of all three freedoms, speech, press and 
worship, but only an attack on the basis of free speech is warranted.  The spoken, not the written, 
word is involved.  And we cannot conceive that cursing a public officer is the exercise of religion 
in any sense of the term.  But even if the activities of the appellant which preceded the incident 
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could be viewed as religious in character, and therefore entitled to the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, they would not cloak him with immunity from the legal consequences 
for concomitant acts committed in violation of a valid criminal statute.  We turn, therefore, to an 
examination of the statute itself. 
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all 
circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 
"fighting" words – those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace.  It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.  
On the authority of its earlier decisions, the state court declared that the statute's purpose 
was to preserve the public peace, no words being "forbidden except such as have a direct 
tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to whom, individually, the remark is 
addressed." It was further said: "The word 'offensive' is not to be defined in terms of what a 
particular addressee thinks. . . .  The test is what men of common intelligence would understand 
would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. . . .  The English language has a 
number of words and expressions which by general consent are 'fighting words' when said 
without a disarming smile. . . .  Such words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight.  
So are threatening, profane or obscene revilings.  Derisive and annoying words can be taken as 
coming within the purview of the statute as heretofore interpreted only when they have this 
characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace. . . .  The statute, 
as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach 
of the peace by the addressee, words whose speaking constitutes a breach of the peace by the 
speaker – including 'classical fighting words', words in current use less 'classical' but equally 
likely to cause violence, and other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and threats." 
We are unable to say that the limited scope of the statute as thus construed contravenes 
the Constitutional right of free expression.  It is a statute narrowly drawn and limited to define 
and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of state power, the use in a public place of 
words likely to cause a breach of the peace. Nor can we say that the application of the statute to 
the facts disclosed by the record substantially or unreasonably impinges upon the privilege of 
free speech. Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate that the appellations "damned racketeer" 
and "damned Fascist" are epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby 
cause a breach of the peace.  
Our function is fulfilled by a determination that the challenged statute, on its face and as 
applied, does not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Affirmed.   
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GRAYNED v. CITY OF ROCKFORD 
408 U.S. 104 (1972) 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Appellant Richard Grayned was convicted for his part in a demonstration in front of West 
Senior High School in Rockford, Illinois.  Negro students at the school had first presented their 
grievances to school administrators.  When the principal took no action on crucial complaints, a 
more public demonstration of protest was planned.  On April 25, 1969, approximately 200 
people – students, their family members, and friends – gathered next to the school grounds. 
Appellant, whose brother and twin sisters were attending the school, was part of this group.  The 
demonstrators marched around on a sidewalk about 100 feet from the school building, which was 
set back from the street. Many carried signs which summarized the grievances: "Black 
cheerleaders to cheer too"; "Black history with black teachers"; "Equal rights, Negro 
counselors." Others, without placards, made the "power to the people" sign with their upraised 
and clenched fists. 
In other respects, the evidence at appellant's trial was sharply contradictory.  Government 
witnesses reported that the demonstrators repeatedly cheered, chanted, baited policemen, and 
made other noise that was audible in the school; that hundreds of students were distracted from 
their school activities and lined the classroom windows to watch the demonstration; that some 
demonstrators successfully yelled to their friends to leave the school building and join the 
demonstration; that uncontrolled latenesses after period changes in the school were far greater 
than usual, with late students admitting that they had been watching the demonstration; and that, 
in general,  orderly school procedure was disrupted.  Defense witnesses claimed that the 
demonstrators were at all times quiet and orderly; that they did not seek to violate the law, but 
only to "make  a point"; that the only noise was made by policemen using loudspeakers; that 
almost no students were noticeable at the schoolhouse windows; and that orderly school 
procedure was not disrupted.  
After warning the demonstrators, the police arrested 40 of them, including appellant.  For 
participating in the demonstration, Grayned was tried and convicted of violating [a] Rockford 
ordinances, hereinafter referred to as the "antinoise" ordinance. A $25 fine was imposed.  Since 
Grayned challenged the constitutionality of [the[ ordinance, he appealed directly to the Supreme 
Court of Illinois.  Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 302.  He claimed that the ordinances were invalid on their 
face, but did not urge that, as applied to him, the ordinances had punished constitutionally 
protected activity.  The Supreme Court of Illinois held that [the] ordinance constitutional on 
…[its] face.  46 Ill. 2d 492, 263 N. E. 2d 866 (1970).  We noted probable jurisdiction, 404 U. S. 
820 (1971). We affirm the court below with respect to the antinoise ordinance. . 
The antinoise ordinance reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
"No person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in which 
a school or any  class thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist in the 
making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or 
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good order of such school session or class thereof. . . ." Code of Ordinances, c. 28, 
§19.2 (a). 
Appellant claims that, on its face, this ordinance is both vague and overbroad, and 
therefore unconstitutional.  We conclude, however, that the ordinance suffers from neither of 
these related infirmities. 
A. Vagueness 
 It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its 
prohibitions are not clearly defined.  Vague laws offend several important values.  First, because 
we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws 
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so 
that he may act accordingly.  Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. 
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide 
explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy 
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the 
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a vague 
statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,"
1
 it "operates to inhibit 
the exercise of [those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "'steer far wider 
of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." 
Although the question is close, we conclude that the antinoise ordinance is not 
impermissibly vague.  
Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect  mathematical certainty from our 
language. Although the prohibited quantum of disturbance is not specified in the ordinance, it is 
apparent from the statute's announced purpose that the measure is whether normal school activity 
has been or is about to be disrupted.  We do not have here a vague, general "breach of the peace" 
ordinance, but a statute written specifically for the school context, where the prohibited 
disturbances are easily measured by their impact on the normal activities of the school.  Given 
this "particular context," the ordinance gives "fair notice to those to whom [it] is directed."  
[The] Rockford's antinoise ordinance does not permit punishment for the expression of an 
unpopular point of view, and it contains no broad invitation to subjective or discriminatory 
enforcement.  Rockford does not claim the broad power to punish all "noises" and "diversions." 
The vagueness of these terms, by themselves, is dispelled by the ordinance's requirements that 
(1) the "noise or diversion" be actually incompatible with normal school activity; (2) there be a 
demonstrated causality between the disruption that occurs and the "noise or diversion"; and (3) 
the acts be  "willfully" done. The ordinance does not permit people to "stand on a public 
sidewalk . . . only at the whim of any police officer."  Rather, there must be demonstrated 
interference with school activities.  As always, enforcement requires the exercise of some degree 
of police judgment, but, as confined, that degree of judgment here is permissible.  The Rockford 
                                                 
1
 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964). 
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City Council has made the basic policy choices, and has given fair warning as to what is 
prohibited.  "The ordinance defines boundaries sufficiently distinct"  for citizens, policemen, 
juries, and appellate judges. It is not impermissibly vague. 
B. Overbreadth  
A clear and precise enactment may nevertheless be "overbroad" if in its reach it prohibits 
constitutionally protected conduct. Although appellant does not claim that, as applied to him,  the 
antinoise ordinance has punished protected expressive activity, he claims that the ordinance is 
overbroad on its face.  Because overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activity, our 
cases firmly establish appellant's standing to raise an overbreadth challenge. The crucial 
question, then, is whether the ordinance sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be punished 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  Specifically, appellant contends that the Rockford 
ordinance unduly interferes with First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to picket on a public 
sidewalk near a school.  We disagree. 
In considering the right of a municipality to control the use of public streets for the 
expression of religious [or political] views, we start with the words of Mr. Justice Roberts that 
'Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for 
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.' Hague v. CIO, 307 
U.S. 496, 515 (1939)." Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951). .The right to use a public 
place for expressive activity may be restricted only for weighty reasons.  
Clearly, government has no power to restrict such activity because of its message. Our 
cases make equally clear, however, that reasonable "time, place and manner" regulations may be 
necessary to further significant governmental interests, and are permitted. For example, two 
parades cannot march on the same street simultaneously, and government may allow only one.  
A demonstration or parade on a large street during rush hour might put an intolerable burden on 
the essential flow of traffic, and for that reason could be prohibited.  If overamplified 
loudspeakers assault the citizenry, government may turn them down.  Subject to such reasonable 
regulation, however, peaceful demonstrations in public places are protected by the First 
Amendment. Of course, where demonstrations turn violent, they lose their protected quality as 
expression under the First Amendment. 
The nature of a place, "the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations 
of time, place, and manner that are reasonable."  Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 
Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 1042 (1969)  Although a silent vigil may not unduly interfere with a public 
library, Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966), making a speech in the reading room almost 
certainly would.  That same speech should be perfectly appropriate in a park. The crucial 
question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity 
of a particular place at a particular time.  Our cases make clear that in assessing the 
reasonableness of a regulation, we must weigh heavily the fact that communication is involved; 
the regulation must be narrowly tailored  to further the State's legitimate interest. Access  to the 
"streets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places . . . for the purpose of exercising [First 
Amendment rights] cannot constitutionally be denied broadly . . . Food Employees v. Logan 
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Valley Plaza, 391 U.S., at 315." Free expression "must not, in the guise of regulation, be 
abridged or denied." Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S., at 516. 
In light of these general principles, we do not think that Rockford's ordinance is an 
unconstitutional regulation of activity around a school.  Our touchstone is Tinker v. Des Moines 
School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), in which we considered the question of how to 
accommodate First Amendment rights with the "special characteristics of the school 
environment." Just as Tinker made clear that school property may not be declared off limits for 
expressive activity by students, we think it clear that the public sidewalk adjacent to school 
grounds may not be declared off limits for expressive activity by members of the public.  But in 
each case, expressive activity may be prohibited if it "materially disrupts classwork or involves 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 
393 U.S., at 513. 
Rockford's antinoise ordinance goes no further than Tinker says a municipality may go to 
prevent interference with its schools.  It is narrowly tailored to further Rockford's compelling 
interest in having an undisrupted school session conducive to the students' learning, and does not 
unnecessarily interfere with First Amendment rights.  Far from having an impermissibly broad 
prophylactic ordinance, 43 Rockford punishes only conduct which disrupts or is about to disrupt 
normal school activities.  That decision is made, as it should be, on an individualized basis, given 
the particular fact situation.  Peaceful picketing which does not interfere with the ordinary 
functioning of the school is permitted.  And the ordinance gives no license to punish anyone 
because of what he is saying.  
We recognize that the ordinance prohibits some picketing that is neither violent nor 
physically obstructive.  Noisy demonstrations that disrupt or are incompatible with normal 
school activities are obviously within the ordinance's reach.  Such expressive conduct may be 
constitutionally protected at other places or other times but next to a school, while classes are in 
session, it may be prohibited.  The antinoise ordinance imposes no such restriction on expressive 
activity before or after the school session, while the student/faculty "audience" enters and leaves 
the school. 
Such a reasonable regulation is not inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The antinoise ordinance is not invalid on its face.  
The judgment is 
Affirmed . 
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting in part. 
While I join Part I of the Court's opinion, I would also reverse the appellant's conviction 
under the antinoise ordinance. 
The municipal ordinance on which this case turns is c. 28, §19.2 (a) which provides in 
relevant part: 
892 
"That no person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in 
which a school or any class thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist in 
the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace 
or good order of such school session or class thereof." 
Appellant was one of 200 people picketing a school and carrying signs promoting a black 
cause – “Black cheerleaders to cheer too," "Black history with black teachers," "We want our 
rights," and the like.  Appellant, however, did not himself carry a picket sign.  There was no 
evidence that he yelled or made any noise whatsoever.  Indeed, the evidence reveals that 
appellant simply marched quietly and on one occasion raised his arm in the "power to the 
people" salute. 
The pickets were mostly students; but they included former students, parents of students, 
and concerned citizens.  They had made proposals to the school board on their demands and 
were turned down.  Hence the picketing. The picketing was mostly by black students who were 
counseled and advised by a faculty member of the school.  The school contained 1,800 students.  
Those counseling the students advised they must be quiet, walk hand in hand, no whispering, no 
talking. 
Twenty-five policemen were stationed nearby.  There was noise but most of it was 
produced by the police who used loudspeakers to explain the local ordinance and to announce 
that arrests might be made.  The picketing did not stop, and some 40 demonstrators, including 
appellant, were arrested. 
The picketing lasted 20 to 30 minutes and some students went to the windows of the 
classrooms to observe it.  It is not clear how many there were.  The picketing was, however, 
orderly or, as one officer testified, "very orderly." There was no violence.  And appellant made 
no noise whatever. 
What Mr. Justice Roberts said in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-516, has never been 
questioned: 
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been 
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions.  Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient 
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.  
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for 
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of 
all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the 
general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; 
but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied." 
The school where the present picketing occurred was the center of a racial conflict.  Most 
of the pickets were indeed students in the school.  The dispute doubtless disturbed the school; 
and the blaring of the loudspeakers of the police was certainly a "noise or diversion" in the 
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meaning of the ordinance. But there was no evidence that appellant was noisy or boisterous or 
rowdy.  He walked quietly and in an orderly manner.  As I read this record, the disruptive force 
loosed at this school was an issue dealing with race -- an issue that is preeminently one for 
solution by First Amendment means.  That is all that was done here; and the entire picketing, 
including appellant's part in it, was done in the best First Amendment tradition. 
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AMALGAMATED FOOD UNION v. LOGAN VALLEY PLAZA 
391 U.S. 308 (1968) 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether peaceful picketing of a business enterprise 
located within a shopping center can be enjoined on the ground that it constitutes an unconsented 
invasion of the property rights of the owners of the land on which the center is situated. We 
granted certiorari to consider petitioners' contentions that the decisions of the state courts 
enjoining their picketing as a trespass are violative of their rights under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution.  We reverse.  
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. (Logan), one of the two respondents herein, owns a large, newly 
developed shopping center complex, known as the Logan Valley Mall, located near the City of 
Altoona, Pennsylvania.  The shopping center is situated at the intersection of Plank Road, which 
is to the east of the center, and Good's Lane, which is to the south.  Plank Road, also known as 
U.S. Route 220, is a heavily traveled highway along which traffic moves at a fairly high rate of 
speed. There are five entrance roads into the center, three from Plank Road and two from Good's 
Lane. Aside from these five entrances, the shopping center is totally separated from the adjoining 
roads by earthen berms. The berms are 15 feet wide along Good's Lane and 12 feet wide along 
Plank Road. 
At the time of the events in this case, Logan Valley Mall was occupied by two 
businesses, Weis Markets, Inc. (Weis), the other respondent herein, and Sears, Roebuck and Co. 
(Sears), although other enterprises were then expected and have since moved into the center.  
Weis operates a supermarket and Sears operates both a department store and an automobile 
service center.  The Weis property consists of the enclosed supermarket building, an open but 
covered porch along the front of the building, and an approximately five-foot-wide parcel pickup 
zone that runs 30 to 40 feet along the porch. The porch functions as a sidewalk in front of the 
building and the pickup zone is used as a temporary parking place for the loading of purchases 
into customers' cars by Weis employees. 
Between the Weis building and the highway berms are extensive macadam parking lots 
with parking spaces and driveways lined off thereon.  These areas, to which Logan retains title, 
provide common parking facilities for all the businesses in the shopping center. The distance 
across the parking lots to the Weis store from the entrances on Good's Lane is approximately 350 
feet and from the entrances on Plank Road approximately 400 to 500 feet.  The entrance on 
Plank Road farthest from the Weis property is the main entrance to the shopping center as a 
whole and is regularly used by customers of Weis.  The entrance on Plank Road nearest to Weis 
is almost exclusively used by patrons of the Sears automobile service station into which it leads 
directly. 
On December 8, 1965, Weis opened for business, employing a wholly nonunion staff of 
employees.  A few days after it opened for business, Weis posted a sign on the exterior of its 
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building prohibiting trespassing or soliciting by anyone other than its employees on its porch or 
parking lot. On December 17, 1965, members of Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 
590, began picketing Weis.  They carried signs stating that the Weis market was nonunion and 
that its employees were not "receiving union wages or other union benefits." The pickets did not 
include any employees of Weis, but rather were all employees of competitors of Weis.  The 
picketing continued until December 27, during which time the number of pickets varied between 
four and 13 and averaged around six.  The picketing was carried out almost entirely in the parcel 
pickup area and that portion of the parking lot immediately adjacent thereto.  Although some 
congestion of the parcel pickup area occurred, such congestion was sporadic and infrequent.  The 
picketing was peaceful at all times and unaccompanied by either threats or violence. 
On December 27, Weis and Logan instituted an action in equity in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Blair County, and that court immediately issued an ex parte order enjoining petitioners 
from, inter alia, "picketing and trespassing upon . . . the [Weis] storeroom, porch and parcel pick-
up area . . . [and] the [Logan] parking area and all entrances and exits leading to said parking 
area." The effect of this order was to require that all picketing be carried on along the berms 
beside the public roads outside the shopping center. Picketing continued along the berms and, in 
addition, handbills asking the public not to patronize Weis because it was nonunion were 
distributed, while petitioners contested the validity of the ex parte injunction. After an 
evidentiary hearing, which resulted in the establishment of the facts set forth above, the Court of 
Common Pleas continued indefinitely its original ex parte injunction without modification.   
That court explicitly rejected petitioners' claim under the First Amendment that they were 
entitled to picket within the confines of the shopping center.  The trial judge held that the 
injunction was justified both in order to protect respondents' property rights and because the 
picketing was unlawfully aimed at coercing Weis to compel its employees to join a union.  On 
appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, with three Justices dissenting, affirmed the issuance of 
the injunction on the sole ground that petitioners' conduct constituted a trespass on respondents' 
property.  
We start from the premise that peaceful picketing carried on in a location open generally 
to the public is, absent other factors involving the purpose or manner of the picketing, protected 
by the First Amendment. To be sure, this Court has noted that picketing involves elements of 
both speech and conduct, i. e., patrolling, and has indicated that because of this intermingling of 
protected and unprotected elements, picketing can be subjected to controls that would not be 
constitutionally permissible in the case of pure speech.  Nevertheless, no case decided by this 
Court can be found to support the proposition that the nonspeech aspects of peaceful picketing 
are so great as to render the provisions of the First Amendment inapplicable to it altogether. 
The case squarely presents the question whether Pennsylvania's generally valid rules 
against trespass to private property can be applied in these circumstances to bar petitioners from 
the Weis and Logan premises.  It is clear that if the shopping center premises were not privately 
owned but instead constituted the business area of a municipality, which they to a large extent 
resemble, petitioners could not be barred from exercising their First Amendment rights there on 
the sole ground that title to the property was in the municipality.  Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 
(1938); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).The essence of those opinions is that streets, 
sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places are so historically associated with the exercise 
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of First Amendment rights that access to them for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot 
constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely. 
This Court has …held, in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), that under some 
circumstances property that is privately owned may, at least for First Amendment purposes, be 
treated as though it were publicly held.  In Marsh, the appellant, a Jehovah's Witness, had 
undertaken to distribute religious literature on a sidewalk in the business district of Chickasaw, 
Alabama.  Chickasaw, a so-called company town, was wholly owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding 
Corporation.   
The corporation had posted notices in the stores stating that the premises were private 
property and that no solicitation of any kind without written permission would be permitted. 
Appellant Marsh was told that she must have a permit to distribute her literature and that a 
permit would not be granted to her.  When she declared that the company rule could not be 
utilized to prevent her from exercising her constitutional rights under the First Amendment, she 
was ordered to leave Chickasaw.  She refused to do so and was arrested for violating Alabama's 
criminal trespass statute. In reversing her conviction under the statute, this Court held that the 
fact that the property from which appellant was sought to be ejected for exercising her First 
Amendment rights was owned by a private corporation rather than the State was an insufficient 
basis to justify the infringement on appellant's right to free expression occasioned thereby. 
Likewise the fact that appellant Marsh was herself not a resident of the town was not considered 
material. 
The similarities between the business block in Marsh and the shopping center in the 
present case are striking.  The perimeter of Logan Valley Mall is a little less than 1.1 miles.  
Inside the mall were situated, at the time of trial, two substantial commercial enterprises with 
numerous others soon to follow.  Immediately adjacent to the mall are two roads, one of which is 
a heavily traveled state highway and from both of which lead entrances directly into the mall. 
Adjoining the buildings in the middle of the mall are sidewalks for the use of pedestrians going 
to and from their cars and from building to building.  In the parking areas, roadways for the use 
of vehicular traffic entering and leaving the mall are clearly marked out.  The general public has 
unrestricted access to the mall property.  The shopping center here is clearly the functional 
equivalent of the business district of Chickasaw involved in Marsh. 
All we decide here is that because the shopping center serves as the community business 
block "and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area and those passing through," 
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S., at 508,  the State may not delegate the power, through the use of its 
trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members of the public wishing to exercise their First 
Amendment rights on the premises in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant with the 
use to which the property is actually put with the First Amendment, justify a bar on picketing 
which was not thus directly related in its purpose to the use to which the shopping center 
property was being put. 
It is …. clear that the restraints on picketing and trespassing approved by the 
Pennsylvania courts here substantially hinder the communication of the ideas which petitioners 
seek to express to the patrons of Weis.  The fact that the nonspeech aspects of petitioners' 
activity are also rendered less effective is not particularly compelling in light of the absence of 
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any showing, or reliance by the state courts thereon, that the patrolling accompanying the 
picketing sought to be carried on was significantly interfering with the use to which the mall 
property was being put by both respondents and the general public. The… mere fact that speech 
is accompanied by conduct does not mean that the speech can be suppressed under the guise of 
prohibiting the conduct.  Here it is perfectly clear that a prohibition against trespass on the mall 
operates to bar all speech within the shopping center to which respondents object.  Yet this Court 
stated many years ago, "One is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate 
places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." Schneider v. State, 308 
U.S. 147, 163 (1939). 
The sole justification offered for the substantial interference with the effectiveness of 
petitioners' exercise of their First Amendment rights to promulgate their views through 
handbilling and picketing is respondents' claimed absolute right under state law to prohibit any 
use of their property by others without their consent.  However, unlike a situation involving a 
person's home, no meaningful claim to protection of a right of privacy can be advanced by 
respondents here.  Nor on the facts of the case can any significant claim to protection of the 
normal business operation of the property be raised.  Naked title is essentially all that is at issue. 
The economic development of the United States in the last 20 years reinforces our 
opinion of the correctness of the approach taken in Marsh.  The large-scale movement of this 
country's population from the cities to the suburbs has been accompanied by the advent of the 
suburban shopping center, typically a cluster of individual retail units on a single large privately 
owned tract. It has been estimated that by the end of 1966 there were between 10,000 and 11,000 
shopping centers in the United States and Canada, accounting for approximately 37% of the total 
retail sales in those two countries.   
These figures illustrate the substantial consequences for workers seeking to challenge 
substandard working conditions, consumers protesting shoddy or overpriced merchandise, and 
minority groups seeking nondiscriminatory hiring policies that a contrary decision here would 
have. Business enterprises located in downtown areas would be subject to on-the-spot public 
criticism for their practices, but businesses situated in the suburbs could largely immunize 
themselves from similar criticism by creating a cordon sanitaire of parking lots around their 
stores.  Neither precedent nor policy compels a result so at variance with the goal of free 
expression and communication that is the heart of the First Amendment. 
Therefore, as to the sufficiency of respondents' ownership of the Logan Valley Mall 
premises as the sole support of the injunction issued against petitioners, we simply repeat what 
was said in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S., at 506, "Ownership does not always mean absolute 
dominion.  The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in 
general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of 
those who use it." Logan Valley Mall is the functional equivalent of a "business block" and for 
First Amendment purposes must be treated in substantially the same manner.  
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is reversed and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting. 
While I generally accept the factual background of this case presented in the Court's 
opinion, I think it is important to focus on just where this picketing which was enjoined by the 
state courts was actually taking place 
Respondent Weis Markets, Inc., the owner-occupant of the supermarket here being 
picketed, owns the real property on which it constructed its store, porch, and parcel pickup zone. 
Respondent Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. owns the other property in the shopping center, including 
the large area which has been paved and marked off as a general parking lot for customers of the 
shopping center. 
In affirming petitioners' contentions the majority opinion relies on Marsh v. Alabama, 
supra, and holds that respondents' property has been transformed to some type of public 
property.  But Marsh was never intended to apply to this kind of situation.  Marsh dealt with the 
very special situation of a company-owned town, complete with streets, alleys, sewers, stores, 
residences, and everything else that goes to make a town.  I think it is fair to say that the basis on 
which the Marsh decision rested was that the property involved encompassed an area that for all 
practical purposes had been turned into a town; the area had all the attributes of a town and was 
exactly like any other town in Alabama.  I can find very little resemblance between the shopping 
center involved in this case and Chickasaw, Alabama.  There are no homes, there is no sewage 
disposal plant, there is not even a post office on this private property which the Court now 
considers the equivalent of a "town." Indeed, at the time this injunction was issued, there were 
only two stores on the property.  
But I respectfully suggest that this reasoning completely misreads Marsh and begs the 
question. The question is, under what circumstances can private property be treated as though it 
were public? The answer that Marsh gives is when that property has taken on all the attributes of 
a town, i. e., "residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a 
'business block' on which business places are situated." 326 U.S., at 502. I can find nothing in 
Marsh which indicates that if one of these features is present, e. g ., a business district, this is 
sufficient for the Court to confiscate a part of an owner's private property and give its use to 
people who want to picket on it. 
In allowing the trespass here, the majority opinion indicates that Weis and Logan invited 
the public to the shopping center's parking lot. This statement is contrary to common sense.  Of 
course there was an implicit invitation for customers of the adjacent stores to come and use the 
marked off places for cars.  But the whole public was no more wanted there than they would be 
invited to park free at a pay parking lot. Is a store owner or are several owners together less 
entitled to have a parking lot set aside for customers than other property owners?  To hold that 
store owners are compelled by law to supply picketing areas for pickets to drive store customers 
away is to create a court-made law wholly disregarding the constitutional basis on which private 
ownership of property rests in this country.  And of course picketing, that is patrolling, is not free 
speech and not protected as such.   
For these reasons I respectfully dissent. 
900 
LLOYD CORP., LTD. v. TANNER 
407 U.S. 551 (1972) 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question reserved by the Court in Amalgamated Food Employees 
Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), as to the right of a privately owned shopping 
center to prohibit the distribution of handbills on its property when the handbilling is unrelated to 
the shopping center's operations.  Relying primarily on Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), 
and Logan Valley, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon sustained an 
asserted First Amendment right to distribute handbills in petitioner's shopping center, and issued 
a permanent injunction restraining petitioner from interfering with such right.  308 F.Supp. 128 
(1970). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 446 F.2d 545 (1971). We granted 
certiorari to consider petitioner's contention that the decision below violates rights of private 
property protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  404  U.S. 1037 (1972). 
Lloyd Corp., Ltd. (Lloyd), owns a large, modern retail shopping center in Portland, 
Oregon. Lloyd Center embraces altogether about 50 acres, including some 20 acres of open and 
covered parking facilities which accommodate more than 1,000 automobiles.  It has a perimeter 
of almost one and one-half miles, bounded by four public streets. It is crossed in varying degrees 
by several other public streets, all of which have adjacent public sidewalks. Lloyd owns all land 
and buildings within the Center, except these public streets and sidewalks. There are some 60 
commercial tenants, including small shops and several major department stores. 
The Center embodies a relatively new concept in shopping center design.  The stores are 
all located within a single large, multi-level building complex sometimes referred to as the 
"Mall." Within this complex, in addition to the stores, there are parking facilities, malls, private 
sidewalks, stairways, escalators, gardens, an auditorium, and a skating rink.  Some of the stores 
open directly on the outside public sidewalks, but most open on the interior privately owned 
malls. Some stores open on both.  There are no public streets or public sidewalks within the 
building complex, which is enclosed and entirely covered except for the landscaped portions of 
some of the interior malls. 
They are a distinctive feature of the Center, serving both utilitarian and esthetic functions.  
Essentially, they are private, interior promenades with 10-foot sidewalks serving the stores, and 
with a center strip 30 feet wide in which flowers and shrubs are planted, and statuary, fountains, 
benches, and other amenities are located.  There is no vehicular traffic on the malls. An 
architectural expert described the purpose of the malls as follows: 
"In order to make shopping easy and pleasant, and to help realize the goal of 
maximum sales [for the Center], the shops are grouped about special pedestrian 
ways or malls. Here the shopper is isolated from the noise, fumes, confusion and 
distraction which he normally finds along city streets, and a controlled, carefree 
environment is provided . . . ."  
Although the stores close at customary hours, the malls are not physically closed, as 
pedestrian window shopping is encouraged within reasonable hours. Lloyd employs 12 security 
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guards, who are commissioned as such by the city of Portland.  The guards have police authority 
within the Center, wear uniforms similar to those worn by city police, and are licensed to carry 
handguns. They are employed by and subject to the control of Lloyd.  Their duties are the 
customary ones, including shoplifting surveillance and general security  
At a few places within the Center, small signs are embedded in the sidewalk which state: 
"NOTICE -- Areas In Lloyd Center Used By The Public Are Not Public Ways 
But Are For The Use Of Lloyd Center Tenants And The Public Transacting 
Business With Them. Permission To Use Said Areas May Be Revoked At Any 
Time.  Lloyd Corporation, Ltd." 
The Center is open generally to the public, with a considerable effort being made to 
attract shoppers and prospective shoppers, and to create "customer motivation" as well as 
customer goodwill in the community.  In this respect the Center pursues policies comparable to 
those of major stores and shopping centers across the country, although the Center affords 
superior facilities for these purposes.  Groups and organizations are permitted, by invitation and 
advance arrangement, to use the auditorium and other facilities.  Rent is charged for use of the 
auditorium except with respect to certain civic and charitable organizations, such as the Cancer 
Society and Boy and Girl Scouts.  The Center also allows limited use of the malls by the 
American Legion to sell poppies for disabled veterans, and by the Salvation Army and 
Volunteers of America to solicit Christmas contributions. It has denied similar use to other civic 
and charitable organizations.  Political use is also forbidden, except that presidential candidates 
of both parties have been allowed to speak in the auditorium.  
The Center had been in operation for some eight years when this litigation commenced. 
Throughout this period it had a policy, strictly enforced, against the distribution of handbills 
within the building complex and its malls. No exceptions were made with respect to handbilling, 
which was considered likely to annoy customers, to create litter, potentially to create disorders, 
and generally to be incompatible with the purpose of the Center and the atmosphere sought to be 
preserved. 
On November 14, 1968, the respondents in this case distributed within the Center 
handbill invitations to a meeting of the "Resistance Community" to protest the draft and the 
Vietnam war. The distribution, made in several different places on the mall walkways by five 
young people, was quiet and orderly, and there was no littering.  There was a complaint from one 
customer. Security guards informed the respondents that they were trespassing and would be 
arrested unless they stopped distributing the handbills within the Center. The guards suggested 
that respondents distribute their literature on the public streets and sidewalks adjacent to but 
outside of the Center complex.  Respondents left the premises as requested "to avoid arrest" and 
continued the handbilling outside.  Subsequently this suit was instituted in the District Court, 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 
The District Court, emphasizing that the Center "is open to the general public," found that 
it is "the functional equivalent of a public business district." 308 F.Supp., at 130. That court then 
held that Lloyd's "rule prohibiting the distribution of handbills within the Mall violates . . . First 
Amendment rights." 308 F.Supp., at 131. In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals held that 
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it was bound by the "factual determination" as to the character of the Center, and concluded that 
the decisions of this Court in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), and Amalgamated Food 
Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), compelled affirmance.  
In Logan Valley the Court extended the rationale of Marsh to peaceful picketing of a 
store located in a large shopping center, known as Logan Valley Mall, near Altoona, 
Pennsylvania. The courts below considered the critical inquiry to be whether Lloyd Center was 
"the functional equivalent of a public business district." This phrase was first used in Logan 
Valley, but its genesis was in Marsh. It is well to consider what Marsh actually decided.  As 
noted above, it involved an economic anomaly of the past, "the company town." One must have 
seen such towns to understand that functionally" they were no different from municipalities of 
comparable size. They developed primarily in the Deep South to meet economic conditions, 
especially those which existed following the Civil War. Impoverished States and especially 
backward areas thereof, needed an influx of industry and capital.  Corporations attracted to the 
area by natural resources and abundant labor were willing to assume the role of local 
government.  Quite literally, towns were built and operated by private capital with all of the 
customary services and utilities normally afforded by a municipal or state government: there 
were streets, sidewalks, sewers, public lighting, police and fire protection, business and 
residential areas, churches, postal facilities, and sometimes schools.  In short, as Mr. Justice 
Black said, Chickasaw, Alabama, had "all the characteristics of any other American town." 326 
U.S., at 502. The Court simply held that where private interests were substituting for and 
performing the customary functions of government, First Amendment freedoms could not be 
denied where exercised in the customary manner on the town's sidewalks and streets. Indeed, as 
title to the entire town was held privately, there were no publicly owned streets, sidewalks, or 
parks where such rights could be exercised. 
Logan Valley extended Marsh to a shopping center situation in a different context from 
the company town setting, but it did so only in a context where the First Amendment activity was 
related to the shopping center's operations.  There is some language in Logan Valley, 
unnecessary to the decision, suggesting that the key focus of Marsh was upon the "business 
district," and that whenever a privately owned business district serves the public generally its 
sidewalks and streets become the functional equivalents of similar public facilities.  
The holding in Logan Valley was not dependent upon the suggestion that the privately 
owned streets and sidewalks of a business district or a shopping center are the equivalent, for 
First Amendment purposes, of municipally owned streets and sidewalks.  No such expansive 
reading of the opinion of the Court is necessary or appropriate.  The opinion was carefully 
phrased to limit its holding to the picketing involved, where the picketing was "directly related in 
its purpose to the use to which the shopping center property was being put," 391 U.S., at 320 n. 
9, and where the store was located in the center of a large private enclave with the consequence 
that no other reasonable opportunities for the pickets to convey their message to their intended 
audience were available. Neither of these elements is present in the case now before the Court. 
The basic issue in this case is whether respondents, in the exercise of asserted First 
Amendment rights, may distribute handbills on Lloyd's private property contrary to its wishes 
and contrary to a policy enforced against all handbilling. In addressing this issue, it must be 
remembered that the First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free speech and 
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assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of private property used 
nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only.  The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments are also relevant to this case.  They provide that "no person shall . . . be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." There is the further 
proscription in the Fifth Amendment against the taking of "private property . . . for public use, 
without just compensation." 
Although accommodations between the values protected by these three Amendments are 
sometimes necessary, and the courts properly have shown a special solicitude for the guarantees 
of the First Amendment, this Court has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may 
exercise general rights of free speech on property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily 
for private purposes only.   
Respondents contend, however, that the property of a large shopping center is "open to 
the public," serves the same purposes as a "business district" of a municipality, and therefore has 
been dedicated to certain types of public use.  The argument is that such a center has sidewalks, 
streets, and parking areas which are functionally similar to facilities customarily provided by 
municipalities. It is then asserted that all members of the public, whether invited as customers or 
not, have the same right of free speech as they would have on the similar public facilities in the 
streets of a city or town. 
The argument reaches too far.  The Constitution by no means requires such an attenuated 
doctrine of dedication of private property to public use.  The closest decision in theory, Marsh v. 
Alabama, supra, involved the assumption by a private enterprise of all of the attributes of a state-
created municipality and the exercise by that enterprise of semi-official municipal functions as a 
delegate of the State. In effect, the owner of the company town was performing the full spectrum 
of municipal powers and stood in the shoes of the State.  In the instant case there is no 
comparable assumption or exercise of municipal functions or power.  
Nor does property lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited 
to use it for designated purposes.  Few would argue that a free-standing store, with abutting 
parking space for customers, assumes significant public attributes merely because the public is 
invited to shop there.  Nor is size alone the controlling factor.  The essentially private character 
of a store and its privately owned abutting property does not change by virtue of being large or 
clustered with other stores in a modern shopping center. This is not to say that no differences 
may exist with respect to government regulation or rights of citizens arising by virtue of the size 
and diversity of activities carried on within a privately owned facility serving the public.  There 
will be, for example, problems with respect to public health and safety which vary in degree and 
in the appropriate government response, depending upon the size and character of a shopping 
center, an office building, a sports arena, or other large facility serving the public for commercial 
purposes.  We do say that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of private property 
owners, as well as the First Amendment rights of all citizens, must be respected and protected.  
The Framers of the Constitution certainly did not think these fundamental rights of a free society 
are incompatible with each other. There may be situations where accommodations between them, 
and the drawing of lines to assure due protection of both, are not easy.  But on the facts presented 
in this case, the answer is clear.  
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We hold that there has been no such dedication of Lloyd's privately owned and operated 
shopping center to public use as to entitle respondents to exercise therein the asserted First 
Amendment rights.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the case to the Court of 
Appeals with directions to vacate the injunction. 
It is so ordered.   
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE 
BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join, dissenting.[omitted]  
UNITED STATES v. GRACE  
461 U.S. 171(1983) 
JUDGES: WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and 
BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.   
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.  
 In this case we must determine whether 40 U. S. C.  §13k, which prohibits, among other 
things, the "display [of] any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public 
notice any party, organization, or movement"  in the United States Supreme Court building and 
on its grounds, violates the First Amendment. 
In May 1978 appellee Thaddeus Zywicki, standing on the sidewalk in front of the 
Supreme Court building, distributed leaflets to passersby.  The leaflets were reprints of a letter to 
the editor of the Washington Post from a United States Senator concerning the removal of unfit 
judges from the bench.  A Supreme Court police officer approached Zywicki and told him, 
accurately, that Title 40 of the United States Code prohibited the distribution of leaflets on the 
Supreme Court grounds, which includes the sidewalk.  Zywicki left. 
In January 1980 Zywicki again visited the sidewalk in front of the Court to distribute 
pamphlets containing information about forthcoming meetings and events concerning "the 
oppressed peoples of Central America." Zywicki again was approached by a Court police officer 
and was informed that the distribution of leaflets on the Court grounds was prohibited by law.  
The officer indicated that Zywicki would be arrested if the leafletting continued.  Zywicki left. 
Zywicki reappeared in February 1980 on the sidewalk in front of the Court and 
distributed handbills concerning oppression in Guatemala.  Zywicki had consulted with an 
attorney concerning the legality of his activities and had been informed that the Superior Court 
for the District of Columbia had construed the statute that prohibited leafletting, 40 U. S. C. 
§13k, to prohibit only conduct done with the specific intent to influence, impede, or obstruct the 
administration of  justice. Zywicki again was told by a Court police officer that he would be 
subject to arrest if he persisted in his leafletting. Zywicki complained that he was being denied a 
right that others were granted, referring to the newspaper vending machines located on the 
sidewalk. Nonetheless, Zywicki left the grounds. 
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Around noon on March 17, 1980, appellee Mary Grace entered upon the sidewalk in front 
of the Court and began to display a four foot by two and a half foot sign on which was inscribed 
the verbatim text of the First Amendment. A Court police officer approached Grace and 
informed her that she would have to go across the street if she wished to display the sign.  Grace 
was informed that Title 40 of the United States Code prohibited her conduct and that if she did 
not cease she would be arrested.  Grace left the grounds. 
On May 13, 1980, Zywicki and Grace filed the present suit in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia.  They sought an injunction against continued enforcement of 
40 U. S. C. §13k and a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional on its face.  On 
August 7, 1980, the District Court dismissed the complaint.   
The Court of Appeals determined that the District Court's dismissal was erroneous and 
went on to strike down §13k on its face as an unconstitutional restriction on First Amendment 
rights in a public place. The Government appealed from the Court of Appeals' judgment.   
Section 13k prohibits two distinct activities: it is unlawful either "to parade, stand, or 
move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds," or "to display 
therein any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, 
organization, or movement."  Each appellee appeared individually on the public sidewalks to 
engage in expressive activity, and it goes without saying that the threat of arrest to which each 
appellee was subjected was for violating the prohibition against the display of a "banner or 
device." Accordingly, our review is limited to the latter portion of the statute. Likewise, the 
controversy presented by appellees concerned their right to use the public sidewalks surrounding 
the Court building for the communicative activities they sought to carry out, and we shall address 
only whether the proscriptions of §13k are constitutional as applied to the public sidewalks. 
The statutory ban is on the display of a "flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to 
bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement." 40 U. S. C. §13k. It is undisputed 
that Grace's picket sign containing the text of the First Amendment falls within the description of 
a "flag, banner, or device." Although it is less obvious, it is equally uncontested that Zywicki's 
leaflets fall within the proscription as well.  
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech. . . ." There is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful picketing and 
leafletting are expressive activities involving "speech" protected by the First Amendment. E. g., 
;Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). It is also true that "public places" historically associated 
with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are 
considered, without more, to be "public forums." In such places, the government's ability to 
permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very limited: the government may enforce reasonable 
time, place, and manner regulations as long as the restrictions "are content-neutral, are narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication." Additional restrictions such as an absolute prohibition on a particular type of 
expression will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental 
interest. 
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Publicly owned or operated property does not become a "public forum" simply because 
members of the public are permitted to come and go at will.  Although whether the property has 
been "generally opened to the public" is a factor to consider in determining whether the 
government has opened its property to the use of the people for communicative purposes, it is 
not determinative of the question.  We have regularly rejected the assertion that people who wish 
"to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever  and however 
and wherever they please." There is little doubt that in some circumstances the government may 
ban the entry on to public property that is not a "public forum" of all persons except those who 
have legitimate business on the premises.  The government, "no less than a private owner of 
property, has the power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is 
lawfully dedicated."  
It is argued that the Supreme Court building and grounds fit neatly within the description 
of nonpublic forum property.  Although the property is publicly owned, it has not been 
traditionally held open for the use of the public for expressive activities. The property is not 
transformed into "public forum" property merely because the public is permitted to freely enter 
and leave the grounds at practically all times and the public is admitted to the building during 
specified hours. Under this view it would be necessary only to determine that the restrictions 
imposed by §13k are reasonable in light of the use to which the building and grounds are 
dedicated and that there is no discrimination on the basis of content.  We need not make that 
judgment at this time, however, because §13k covers the public sidewalks as well as the building 
and grounds inside the sidewalks. As will become evident, we hold that §13k may not be applied 
to the public sidewalks. 
The prohibitions imposed by §13k technically cover the entire grounds of the Supreme 
Court . That section describes the Court grounds as extending to the curb of each of the four 
streets enclosing the block on which the building is located.  Included within this small 
geographical area, therefore, are not only the building, the plaza and surrounding promenade, 
lawn area, and steps, but also the sidewalks. The sidewalks comprising the outer boundaries of 
the Court grounds are indistinguishable from any other sidewalks in Washington, D. C., and we 
can discern no reason why they should be treated any differently. Sidewalks, of course, are 
among those areas of public property that traditionally have been held open to the public for 
expressive activities and are clearly within those areas of public property that may be considered, 
generally without further inquiry, to be public forum property.  There is no separation,  no fence, 
and no indication whatever to persons stepping from the street to the curb and sidewalks that 
serve as the perimeter of the Court grounds that they have entered some special type of enclave.  
The inclusion of the public sidewalks within the scope of §13k's prohibition, however, results in 
the destruction of public forum status that is at least presumptively impermissible.  Traditional 
public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment protection and 
will not lose its historically recognized character for the reason that it abuts government property 
that has been dedicated to a use other than as a forum for public expression.  Nor may the 
government transform the character of the property by the expedient of including it within the 
statutory definition of what might be considered a nonpublic forum parcel of property.  The 
public sidewalks forming the perimeter of the Supreme Court grounds, in our view, are public 
forums and should be treated as such for First Amendment purposes. 
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The Government submits that §13k qualifies as a reasonable time, place, and manner 
restriction which may be imposed to restrict communicative activities on public forum property 
such as sidewalks. The argument is that the inquiry should not be confined to the Supreme Court 
grounds but should focus on "the vicinity of the Supreme Court" or "the public places of 
Washington, D. C."  Viewed in this light, the Government contends that there are sufficient 
alternative areas within the relevant forum, such as the streets around the Court or the sidewalks 
across those streets to permit §13k to be considered a reasonable "place" restriction having only a 
minimal  impact on expressive activity.  We are convinced, however, that the section, which 
totally bans the specified communicative activity on the public sidewalks around the Court 
grounds, cannot be justified as a reasonable place restriction primarily because it has an 
insufficient nexus with any of the public interests that may be thought to undergird §13k. Our 
reasons for this conclusion will become apparent below, where we decide that §13k, insofar as 
its prohibitions  reach to the public sidewalks, is unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently 
serve those public interests that are urged as its justification.   
Section 13k was part of an 11-section statute, enacted in 1949, "[relating]  to the policing 
of the building and grounds of the Supreme Court of the United States." The occasion for its 
passage was the termination of the practice by District of Columbia authorities of appointing 
Supreme Court guards as special policemen for the District.  This action left the Supreme Court 
police force without authority to make arrests and enforce the law in the building and on the 
grounds of the Court.  The Act, which was soon forthcoming, was modeled on the legislation 
relating to the Capitol grounds. It authorizes the appointment by the Marshal of special officers 
"for duty in connection with the policing of the Supreme Court Building and grounds and 
adjacent streets." Sections 2-6 of the Act prohibit certain kinds of  conduct in the building or 
grounds.  Section 6, codified as 40 U. S. C. §13k, is at issue here.  Other sections authorize the 
Marshal to issue regulations, provide penalties for violations of the Act or regulations, and 
authorize the Court's special police to make arrests for violation of the Act's prohibitions or of 
any law of the United States occurring within the building and grounds and on the adjacent 
streets. Section 11 of the Act, 13 U. S. C. §13p, defines the limits of the Court's grounds as 
including the sidewalks surrounding the building. 
Based on its provisions and legislative history, it is fair to say that the purpose of the Act 
was to provide for the protection of the building and grounds and of the persons and property 
therein, as well as the maintenance of proper order and decorum.  Section 6, 40 U. S. C. §13k, 
was one of the provisions apparently designed for these purposes.  At least, no special reason 
was stated for its enactment. 
We do not denigrate the necessity to protect persons and property or to maintain proper 
order and decorum within the Supreme Court grounds, but we do question whether a total ban on 
carrying a flag, banner, or device on the public sidewalks substantially serves these purposes.  
There is no suggestion, for example, that appellees' activities in any way obstructed the 
sidewalks or access to the building, threatened injury to any person or property, or in any way 
interfered with the orderly administration of the building or other parts of the grounds.  As we 
have said, the building's perimeter sidewalks are indistinguishable from other public sidewalks in 
the city that are normally open to the conduct that is at issue here and that §13k forbids.  A total 
ban on that conduct is no more necessary for the maintenance of peace and tranquility on the 
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public sidewalks surrounding the building than on any other sidewalks in the city. Accordingly, 
§13k cannot be justified on this basis. 
We thus perceive insufficient justification for §13k's prohibition of carrying signs, 
banners, or devices on the public sidewalks surrounding the building.  We hold that under the 
First Amendment the section is unconstitutional as applied to those sidewalks. Of course, this is 
not to say that those sidewalks, like other sidewalks, are not subject to reasonable  time, place, 
and manner restrictions, either by statute or by regulations issued pursuant to 40 U. S. C. §13l. 
The judgment below is accordingly affirmed to the extent indicated by this opinion and is 
otherwise vacated. 
So ordered.   
UNITED STATES v. KOKINDA 
497 U.S. 720, 110 S.Ct. 3115 (1990) 
Justice O'CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in 
which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice WHITE, and Justice SCALIA join. 
We are called upon in this case to determine whether a United States Postal Service 
regulation that prohibits "[s]oliciting alms and contributions" on postal premises violates the 
First Amendment.  We hold the regulation valid as applied. 
I 
The respondents in this case, Marsha B. Kokinda and Kevin E. Pearl, were volunteers for 
the National Democratic Policy Committee, who set up a table on the sidewalk near the entrance 
of the Bowie, Maryland, post office to solicit contributions, sell books and subscriptions to the 
organization's newspaper, and distribute literature addressing a variety of political issues.  The 
postal sidewalk provides the sole means by which customers of the post office may travel from 
the parking lot to the post office building and lies entirely on Postal Service property.  The 
District Court for the District of Maryland described the layout of the post office as follows: 
"[T]he Bowie post office is a freestanding building, with its own sidewalk and parking lot.  It is 
located on a major highway, Route 197.  A sidewalk runs along the edge of the highway, 
separating the post office property from the street.  To enter the post office, cars enter a driveway 
that traverses the public sidewalk and enter a parking lot that surrounds the post office building.  
Another sidewalk runs adjacent to the building itself, separating the parking lot from the 
building.  Postal patrons must use the sidewalk to enter the post office.  The sidewalk belongs to 
the post office and is used for no other purpose."  App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a. 
During the several hours that respondents were at the post office, postal employees 
received between 40 and 50 complaints regarding their presence.  The record does not indicate 
the substance of the complaints with one exception.  One individual complained "because she 
knew the Girl Scouts were not allowed to sell cookies on federal property."  866 F.2d 699, 705 
(CA4 1989).  The Bowie postmaster asked respondents to leave, which they refused to do.  
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Postal inspectors arrested respondents, seizing their table as well as their literature and other 
belongings. 
Respondents were tried before a United States Magistrate in the District of Maryland and 
convicted of violating 39 CFR §232.1(h)(1)(1989), which provides in relevant part: 
"Soliciting alms and contributions, campaigning for election to any public office, 
collecting private debts, commercial soliciting and vending, and displaying or 
distributing commercial advertising on postal premises are prohibited." 
Respondent Kokinda was fined $50 and sentenced to 10 days' imprisonment; respondent 
Pearl was fined $100 and received a 30-day suspended sentence under that provision.  
Respondents appealed their convictions to the District Court, asserting that application of 
§232.1(h)(1) violated the First Amendment.  The District Court affirmed their convictions, 
holding that the postal sidewalk was not a public forum and that the Postal Service's ban on 
solicitation is reasonable.  A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit reversed.  866 F.2d 699 (1989).  The Court of Appeals held that the postal sidewalk is a 
traditional public forum and analyzed the regulation P as a time, place, and manner regulation.  
The Court determined that the Government has no significant interest in banning solicitation and 
that the regulation is not narrowly tailored to accomplish the asserted governmental interest. 
Respondents' petition for rehearing and a suggestion for rehearing en banc were denied.  Because 
the decision below conflicts with other decisions by the Courts of Appeals, see United States v. 
Belsky, 799 F.2d 1485 (CA11 1986); United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643 (CA3 1986), we 
granted certiorari.  493 U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 47, 107 L.Ed.2d 16 (1989). 
II 
Solicitation is a recognized form of speech protected by the First Amendment.  See 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S.  620, 629, 100 S.Ct. 826, 832, 63 
L.Ed.2d 73 (1980); Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 788-789, 
108 S.Ct. 2667, 2673-2674, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988).  Under our First Amendment 
jurisprudence, we must determine the level of scrutiny that applies to the regulation of protected 
speech at issue. 
In Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 
L.Ed.2d 794 (1983), the Court announced a tripartite framework for determining how First 
Amendment interests are to be analyzed with respect to Government property.  Regulation of 
speech activity on governmental property that has been traditionally open to the public for 
expressive activity, such as public streets and parks, is examined under strict scrutiny.  Id., at 45, 
103 S.Ct., at 954-955.  Regulation of speech on property that the Government has expressly 
dedicated to speech activity is also examined under strict scrutiny.  Ibid.  But regulation of 
speech activity where the Government has not dedicated its property to First Amendment activity 
is examined only for reasonableness.  Id., at 46, 103 S.Ct., at 955-956. 
Respondents contend that although the sidewalk is on postal service property, because it 
is not distinguishable from the municipal sidewalk across the parking lot from the post office's 
entrance, it must be a traditional public forum and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.  This 
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argument is unpersuasive.  The mere physical characteristics of the property cannot dictate forum 
analysis. 
The postal sidewalk at issue does not have the characteristics of public sidewalks 
traditionally open to expressive activity.  The municipal sidewalk that runs parallel to the road in 
this case is a public passageway.  The Postal Service's sidewalk is not such a thoroughfare.  
Rather, it leads only from the parking area to the front door of the post office.  Unlike the public 
street described in Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.  640, 101 S.Ct. 
2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981), which was "continually open, often uncongested, and constitute[d] 
not only a necessary conduit in the daily affairs of a locality's citizens, but also a place where 
people [could] enjoy the open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed 
environment," id., at 651, 101 S.Ct., at 2566, the postal sidewalk was constructed solely to 
provide for the passage of individuals engaged in postal business.  The sidewalk leading to the 
entry of the post office is not the traditional public forum sidewalk referred to in Perry. 
III 
The Postal Service has been entrusted with this mission at a time when the mail service 
market is becoming much more competitive.  It is with this mission in mind that we must 
examine the regulation at issue. 
The Government asserts that it is reasonable to restrict access of postal premises to 
solicitation, because solicitation is inherently disruptive of the postal service's business.  We 
agree.  "Since the act of soliciting alms or contributions usually has as its objective an immediate 
act of charity, it has the potentiality for evoking highly personal and subjective reactions.  
Reflection usually is not encouraged, and the person solicited often must make a hasty decision 
whether to share his resources with an unfamiliar organization while under the eager gaze of the 
solicitor."  43 Fed.Reg. 38824 (1978).  The dissent avoids determining whether the sidewalk is a 
public forum because it believes the regulation, 39 CFR §232.1(h) (1989), does not pass muster 
even under the reasonableness standard applicable to nonpublic fora.  In concluding that 
§232.1(h) is unreasonable, the dissent relies heavily on the fact that the Service permits other 
types of potentially disruptive speech on a case-by-case basis.  The dissent's criticism in this 
regard seems to be that solicitation is not receiving the same treatment by the Postal Service that 
other forms of speech receive.  See post, at 3137 (criticizing "inconsistent treatment"). That 
claim, however, is more properly addressed under the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment.  In any event, it is anomalous that the Service's allowance of some avenues of 
speech would be relied upon as evidence that it is impermissibly suppressing other speech.  If 
anything, the Service's generous accommodation of some types of speech testifies to its 
willingness to provide as broad a forum as possible, consistent with its postal mission. 
The Postal Service's judgment is based on its long experience with solicitation.  It has 
learned from this experience that because of a continual demand from a wide range of groups for 
permission to conduct fundraising or vending on postal premises, postal facility managers were 
distracted from their primary jobs by the need to expend considerable time and energy fielding  
competing demands for space and administering a program of permits and  approvals.  See Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 9 ("The Postal Service concluded after an experience with limited solicitation that 
there wasn't enough room for everybody who wanted to solicit on postal property and further 
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concluded that allowing limited solicitation carried with it more problems than it was worth").  
Thus, the Service found that "even the limited activities permitted by [its] program ... produced 
highly unsatisfactory results."  42 Fed.Reg. 63911 (1977).  It is on the basis of this real-world 
experience that the Postal Service enacted the regulation at issue in this case.  In short, the Postal 
Service has prohibited the use of its property and resources where the intrusion creates 
significant interference with Congress' mandate to ensure the most effective and efficient 
distribution of the mails.  This is hardly unreasonable. 
It is clear that this regulation passes constitutional muster under the Court's usual test for 
reasonableness.  See Lehman, 418 U.S., at 303, 94 S. Ct., at 2717;  Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 808, 
105 S.Ct., at 3452.  Accordingly, we conclude, as have the Courts of Appeals for the Third and 
Eleventh Circuits, that the Postal Service's regulation of solicitation is reasonable as applied.  See 
United States v. Belsky, 799 F.2d 1485 (CA11 1986); United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643 
(CA3 1986). 
The judgment of the court of appeals is, Reversed. 
Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL and Justice STEVENS join and 
with whom Justice BLACKMUN joins as to Part I, dissenting. 
Today the Court holds that a United States Postal Service regulation prohibiting persons 
from "[s]oliciting alms and contributions" on postal premises does not violate the First 
Amendment as applied to members of a political advocacy group who solicited contributions 
from a sidewalk outside the entrance to a post office.  A plurality finds that the sidewalk is not a 
public forum and that the Postal Service regulation is valid because it is "reasonable."  Justice 
KENNEDY concludes that although the sidewalk might well be a public forum, the regulation is 
permissible as applied because it is a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction on 
protected speech.  Neither of these conclusions is justified.  I think it clear that the sidewalk in 
question is a "public forum" and that the Postal Service regulation does not qualify as a content-
neutral time, place, or manner restriction.  Moreover, even if I did not regard the sidewalk in 
question as a public forum, I could not subscribe to the plurality's position that respondents can 
validly be excluded from the sidewalk, because I believe that the distinction drawn by the postal 
regulation between solicitation and virtually all other kinds of speech is not a reasonable one. 
I 
Some postal patrons may thank the Court for sparing them the inconvenience of having to 
encounter solicitors with whose views they do not agree.  And postal officials can rest assured in 
the knowledge that they can silence an entire category of expression without having to apply the 
existing postal regulations governing disruptive conduct or having to craft more narrow time, 
place, or manner rules.  Perhaps only three groups of people will be saddened by today's 
decision.  The first includes solicitors, who, in a farce of the public forum doctrine, will 
henceforth be permitted at postal locations to solicit the public only from such inhospitable 
locations as the busy four-lane highway that runs in front of the Bowie Post Office.  The next to 
be disappointed will be those members of the public who would prefer not to be deprived of the 
views of solicitors at postal locations.  The last group, unfortunately, includes all of us who are 
conscious of the importance of the First Amendment.  I respectfully dissent. 
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INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS v. LEE 
505 U.S. 672 (1992) 
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, O'CONNOR, 
SCALIA, and THOMAS, JJ., joined.  O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion.  KENNEDY, 
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in Part I of which BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and 
SOUTER, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and 
STEVENS, JJ., joined. 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case we consider whether an airport terminal operated by a public authority is a 
public forum and whether a regulation prohibiting solicitation in the interior of an airport 
terminal violates the First Amendment. 
The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute. Petitioner International Society for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) is a not-for-profit religious corporation whose members 
perform a ritual known as sankirtan.  The ritual consists of "going into public places, 
disseminating religious literature and soliciting funds to support the religion." 925 F. 2d 576, 577 
(CA2 1991). The primary purpose of this ritual is raising funds for the movement.  
Respondent Walter Lee, now deceased, was the police superintendent of the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey and was charged with enforcing the regulation at issue.  
The Port Authority owns and operates three major airports in the greater New York City area: 
John F. Kennedy International Airport (Kennedy), La Guardia Airport (La Guardia), and Newark 
International Airport (Newark). The three airports collectively form one of the world's busiest 
metropolitan airport complexes. They serve approximately 8% of this country's domestic airline 
market and more than 50% of the trans-Atlantic market. By decade's end they are expected to 
serve at least 110 million passengers annually. Id., at 578. 
The airports are funded by user fees and operated to make a regulated profit. Most space 
at the three airports is leased to commercial airlines, which bear primary responsibility for the 
leasehold.  The Port Authority retains control over unleased portions, including La Guardia's 
Central Terminal Building, portions of Kennedy's International Arrivals Building, and Newark's 
North Terminal Building (we refer to these areas collectively as the "terminals").  The terminals 
are generally accessible to the general public and contain various commercial establishments 
such as restaurants, snack stands, bars, newsstands, and stores of various types. Id., at 578. 
Virtually all who visit the terminals do so for purposes related to air travel.  These visitors 
principally include passengers, those meeting or seeing off passengers, flight crews, and terminal 
employees. Ibid. 
The Port Authority has adopted a regulation forbidding within the terminals the repetitive 
solicitation of money or distribution of literature. The regulation states: 
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"1. The following conduct is prohibited within the interior areas of buildings or 
structures at an air terminal if conducted by a person to or with passers-by in a 
continuous or repetitive manner: 
"(a) The sale or distribution of any merchandise, including but not limited to 
jewelry, food stuffs, candles, flowers, badges and clothing. 
"(b) The sale or distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets, books or any 
 “(c) Solicitation and receipt of funds."    Id., at 578-579. 
The regulation governs only the terminals; the Port Authority permits solicitation and 
distribution on the sidewalks outside the terminal buildings.  The regulation effectively prohibits 
petitioner from performing sankirtan in the terminals.  As a result, petitioner brought suit seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the regulation worked to 
deprive them of rights guaranteed under the First Amendment.  The District Court analyzed the 
claim under the "traditional public forum" doctrine.  It concluded that the terminals were akin to 
public streets, 721 F. Supp. 572, 577 (SDNY 1989), the quintessential traditional public fora.  
This conclusion in turn meant that the Port Authority's terminal regulation could be sustained 
only if it was narrowly tailored to support a compelling state interest. Id., at 579.  In the absence 
of any argument that the blanket prohibition constituted such narrow tailoring, the District Court 
granted petitioner summary judgment. Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. 925 F. 2d 576 (1991).  
Relying on our recent decision in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S.  (1990), a divided panel 
concluded that the terminals are not public fora.  As a result, the restrictions were required only 
to satisfy a standard of reasonableness.  The Court of Appeals then concluded that, presented 
with the issue, this Court would find that the ban on solicitation was reasonable, but the ban on 
distribution was not. Petitioner sought certiorari respecting the Court of Appeals' decision that 
the terminals are not public fora and upholding the solicitation ban.  Respondent cross-petitioned 
respecting the court's holding striking down the distribution ban. We granted both petitions, 502 
U.S.     (1992), to resolve whether airport terminals are public fora, a question on which the 
Circuits have split and on which we once before granted certiorari but ultimately failed to reach.  
Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987). 
It is uncontested that the solicitation at issue in this case is a form of speech protected 
under the First Amendment. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 
452 U.S. 640 (1981); Kokinda, supra, at (citing Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 629 (1980)); Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 
U.S. 781, 788-789 (1988). But it is also well settled that the government need not permit all 
forms of speech on property that it owns and controls.  United States Postal Service v. Council of 
Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). 
Where the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than 
acting as lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its action will not be subjected to the 
heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject. Thus, we have upheld a 
ban on political advertisements in city-operated transit vehicles, Lehman v. City of Shaker 
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), even though the city permitted other types of advertising on those 
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vehicles. Similarly, we have permitted a school district to limit access to an internal mail system 
used to communicate with teachers employed by the district.  Perry Education Assn. v. Perry 
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
The parties do not disagree that this is the proper framework. Rather, they disagree 
whether the airport terminals are public fora or nonpublic fora.  They also disagree whether the 
regulation survives the "reasonableness" review governing nonpublic fora, should that prove the 
appropriate category. Like the Court of Appeals, we conclude that the terminals are nonpublic 
fora and that the regulation reasonably limits solicitation. 
The terminals here are far from atypical.  Airport builders and managers focus their 
efforts on providing terminals that will contribute to efficient air travel. See, e.g., R. Horonjeff & 
F. McKelvey, Planning and Design of Airports 326 (3d. ed. 1983) ("the terminal is used to 
process passengers and baggage for the interface with aircraft and the ground transportation 
modes"). Although many airports have expanded their function beyond merely contributing to 
efficient air travel, few have included among their purposes the designation of a forum for 
solicitation and distribution activities.  Thus, we think that neither by tradition nor purpose can 
the terminals be described as satisfying the standards we have previously set out for identifying a 
public forum. 
The restrictions here challenged, therefore, need only satisfy a requirement of 
reasonableness. We reiterate what we stated in Kokinda, the restriction "needed only be 
reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation."  496 U.S., 
(plurality opinion) (quoting Cornelius, supra, at 808). We have no doubt that under this standard 
the prohibition on solicitation passes muster. 
We have on many prior occasions noted the disruptive effect that solicitation may have 
on business.  "Solicitation requires action by those who would respond: The individual solicited 
must decide whether or not to contribute (which itself might involve reading the solicitor's 
literature or hearing his pitch), and then, having decided to do so, reach for a wallet, search it for 
money, write a check, or produce a credit card." Kokinda, supra, at    ; see Heffron, 452 U.S., at 
663 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Passengers who wish to avoid 
the solicitor may have to alter their path, slowing both themselves and those around them.  The 
result is that the normal flow of traffic is impeded. Id., at 653.  This is especially so in an airport, 
where "air travelers, who are often weighted down by cumbersome baggage . . . may be hurrying 
to catch a plane or to arrange ground transportation." 925 F. 2d, at 582.  Delays may be 
particularly costly in this setting, as a flight missed by only a few minutes can result in hours 
worth of subsequent inconvenience. 
The Port Authority has concluded that its interest in monitoring the activities can best be 
accomplished by limiting solicitation and distribution to the sidewalk areas outside the terminals. 
Sloane Supp.  This sidewalk area is frequented by an overwhelming percentage of airport users, 
see id., at para. 14, 2 App. 515-516 (noting that no more than 3% of air travelers passing through 
the terminals are doing so on intraterminal flights, i.e. transferring planes). Thus the resulting 
access of those who would solicit the general public is quite complete.  In turn we think it would 
be odd to conclude that the Port Authority's terminal regulation is unreasonable despite the Port 
Authority having otherwise assured access to an area universally traveled. Affirmed. 
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UNITED STATES v. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION 
539 U.S. 194 (2003)  
Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, 
in which Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas joined.  
To address the problems associated with the availability of Internet pornography in public 
libraries, Congress enacted the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), 114 Stat. 2763A-335.  
Under CIPA, a public library may not receive federal assistance to provide Internet access unless 
it installs software to block images that constitute obscenity or child pornography, and to prevent 
minors from obtaining access to material that is harmful to them.  The District Court held these 
provisions facially invalid on the ground that they induce public libraries to violate patrons' First 
Amendment rights.  We now reverse.  
To help public libraries provide their patrons with Internet access, Congress offers two 
forms of federal assistance.  First, the E-rate program established by the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 entitles qualifying libraries to buy Internet access at a discount.  Second, pursuant to 
the Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA), 110 the Institute of Museum and Library 
Services makes grants to state library administrative agencies to "electronically link libraries 
with educational, social, or information services," "assist libraries in accessing information 
through electronic networks.  
By connecting to the Internet, public libraries provide patrons with a vast amount of 
valuable information.  But there is also an enormous amount of pornography on the Internet, 
much of which is easily obtained. The accessibility of this material has created serious problems 
for libraries, which have found that patrons of all ages, including minors, regularly search for 
online pornography.  Some patrons also expose others to pornographic images by leaving them 
on Internet terminals or printed at library printers.  Id., at 423.  
Upon discovering these problems, Congress became concerned that the E-rate and LSTA 
programs were facilitating access to illegal and harmful pornography. But Congress also learned 
that filtering software that blocks access to pornographic Web sites could provide a reasonably 
effective way to prevent such uses of library resources.  By 2000, before Congress enacted 
CIPA, almost 17% of public libraries used such software on at least some of their Internet 
terminals, and 7% had filters on all of them.  A library can set such software to block categories 
of material, such as "Pornography" or "Violence."  When a patron tries to view a site that falls 
within such a category, a screen appears indicating that the site is blocked.  But a filter set to 
block pornography may sometimes block other sites that present neither obscene nor 
pornographic material, but that nevertheless trigger the filter. To minimize this problem, a library 
can set its software to prevent the blocking of material that falls into categories like "Education," 
"History," and "Medical."   
Responding to this information, Congress enacted CIPA.  It provides that a library may 
not receive E-rate or LSTA assistance unless it has "a policy of Internet safety for minors that 
includes the operation of a technology protection measure . . . that protects against access" by all 
persons to "visual depictions" that constitute "obscenity" or "child pornography," and that 
protects against access by minors to "visual depictions" that are "harmful to minors."  
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Appellees are a group of libraries, library associations, library patrons, and Web site 
publishers, including the American Library Association (ALA) and the Multnomah County 
Public Library in Portland, Oregon (Multnomah).  They sued the United States and the 
Government agencies and officials responsible for administering the E-rate and LSTA programs 
in District Court, challenging the constitutionality of CIPA's filtering provisions. A three-judge 
District Court convened.   
After a trial, the District Court ruled that CIPA was facially unconstitutional and enjoined 
the relevant agencies and officials from withholding federal assistance for failure to comply with 
CIPA.  The District Court held that Congress had exceeded its authority under the Spending 
Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 1, because, in the court's view, "any public library that 
complies with CIPA's conditions will necessarily violate the First Amendment."  The court 
acknowledged that "generally the First Amendment subjects libraries' content-based decisions 
about which print materials to acquire for their collections to only rational [basis] review."  But it 
distinguished libraries' decisions to make certain Internet material inaccessible.  "The central 
difference," the court stated, "is that by providing patrons with even filtered Internet access, the 
library permits patrons to receive speech on a virtually unlimited number of topics, from a 
virtually unlimited number of speakers, without attempting to restrict patrons' access to speech 
that the library, in the exercise of its professional judgment, determines to be particularly 
valuable." Reasoning that "the provision of Internet access within a public library . . . is for use 
by the public . . . for expressive activity," the court analyzed such access as a "designated public 
forum."  The District Court also likened Internet access in libraries to "traditional public fora . . . 
such as sidewalks and parks" because it "promotes First Amendment values in an analogous 
manner."   
Based on both of these grounds, the court held that the filtering software contemplated by 
CIPA was a content-based restriction on access to a public forum, and was therefore subject to 
strict scrutiny.  Ibid. Applying this standard, the District Court held that, although the 
Government has a compelling interest "in preventing the dissemination of obscenity, child 
pornography, or, in the case of minors, material harmful to minors," the use of software filters is 
not narrowly tailored to further those interests. We noted probable jurisdiction, and now reverse.  
Congress has wide latitude to attach conditions to the receipt of federal assistance in 
order to further its policy objectives.  But Congress may not "induce" the recipient "to engage in 
activities that would themselves be unconstitutional." To determine whether libraries would 
violate the First Amendment by employing the filtering software that CIPA requires, we must 
first examine the role of libraries in our society.  
Public libraries pursue the worthy missions of facilitating learning and cultural 
enrichment.  Appellee  ALA's Library Bill of Rights states that libraries should provide "books 
and other . . . resources . . . for the interest, information, and enlightenment of all people of the 
community the library  serves." To fulfill their traditional missions, public libraries must have 
broad discretion to decide what material to provide to their patrons. Although they seek to 
provide a wide array of information, their goal has never been to provide "universal coverage."  
Instead, public libraries seek to provide materials "that would be of the greatest direct benefit or 
interest to the community." To this end, libraries collect only those materials deemed to have 
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"requisite and appropriate quality." See W. Katz, Collection Development: The Selection of 
Materials for Libraries 6 (1980)  
We have held in two analogous contexts that the government has broad discretion to 
make content-based judgments in deciding what private speech to make available to the public.  
In Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, we held that public forum principles do not 
generally apply to a public television station's editorial judgments regarding the private speech it 
presents to its viewers.  "Broad rights of access for outside speakers would be antithetical, as a 
general rule, to the discretion  that stations and their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill their 
journalistic purpose and statutory obligations."  Recognizing a broad right of public access 
"would [also] risk implicating the courts in judgments that should be left to the exercise of 
journalistic discretion.” 
Similarly, in National Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 141 L. Ed. 2d 500, 
118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998), we upheld an art funding program that required the National Endowment 
for the Arts (NEA) to use content-based criteria in making funding decisions.  We explained that 
"any content-based considerations that may be taken into account in the grant-making process 
are a consequence of the nature of arts funding." 
The principles underlying Forbes and Finley also apply to a public library's exercise of 
judgment in selecting the material it provides to its patrons. Just as forum analysis and 
heightened judicial scrutiny are incompatible with the role of public television stations and the 
role of the NEA, they are also incompatible with the discretion that public libraries must have to 
fulfill their traditional missions.  Public library staffs necessarily consider content in making 
collection decisions and enjoy broad discretion in making them.  
The public forum principles on which the District Court relied are out of place in the 
context of this case.  Internet access in public libraries is neither a "traditional" nor a 
"designated" public forum. First, this resource--which did not exist until quite recently--  has not 
"immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, . . . been used 
for purposes of assembly, communication of thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions."  International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679, 679, 
120 L. Ed. 2d 541, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We have "rejected 
the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its historic confines."  Forbes, supra,  
The doctrines surrounding traditional public forums may not be extended to situations where 
such history is lacking.  
Nor does Internet access in a public library satisfy our definition of a "designated public 
forum." To create such a forum, the government must make an affirmative choice to open up its 
property for use as a public forum.   
The situation here is very different.  A public library does not acquire Internet terminals 
in order to create a public forum for Web publishers to express themselves, any more than it 
collects books in order to provide a public forum for the authors of books to speak.  It provides 
Internet access to facilitate research, learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of 
requisite and appropriate quality.  As Congress recognized, "the Internet is simply another 
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method for making information available in a school or library." It is "no more than a 
technological extension of the book stack."  
The District Court disagreed because, whereas a library reviews and affirmatively 
chooses to acquire every book in its collection, it does not review every Web site that it makes 
available.  Based on this distinction, the court reasoned that a public library enjoys less discretion 
in deciding which Internet materials to make available than in making book selections.  We do 
not find this distinction constitutionally relevant.  A library's failure to make quality-based 
judgments about all the material it furnishes from the Web does not somehow taint the 
judgments it does make.  A library's need to exercise judgment in making collection decisions 
depends on its traditional role in identifying suitable and worthwhile material; it is no less 
entitled to play that role when it collects material from the Internet than when it collects material 
from any other source.  Most libraries already exclude pornography from their print collections 
because they deem it inappropriate for inclusion.  We do not subject these decisions to 
heightened scrutiny; it would make little sense to treat libraries' judgments to block online 
pornography any differently, when these judgments are made for just the same reason.  
Moreover, because of the vast quantity of material on the Internet and the rapid pace at 
which it changes, libraries cannot possibly segregate, item by item, all the Internet material that 
is appropriate for inclusion from all that is not.  While a library could limit its Internet collection 
to just those sites it found worthwhile, it could do so only at the cost of excluding an enormous 
amount of valuable information that it lacks the capacity to review.  Given that tradeoff, it is 
entirely reasonable for public libraries to reject that approach and instead exclude certain 
categories of content, without making individualized judgments that everything they do make 
available has requisite and appropriate quality.  
Because public libraries' use of Internet filtering software does not violate their patrons' 
First Amendment rights, CIPA does not induce libraries to violate the Constitution, and is a valid 
exercise of Congress' spending power.  Nor does CIPA impose an unconstitutional condition on 
public libraries.  Therefore, the judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania is reversed.   
[Concurrences and dissents omitted]  
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Session 36. Commercial Speech 
LINMARK ASSOCIATES v. TOWNSHIP OF WILLINGBORO 
431 U.S. 85 (1977) 
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined 
except REHNQUIST, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the First Amendment permits a municipality to 
prohibit the posting of “For Sale” or “Sold” signs when the municipality acts to stem what it 
perceives as the flight of white homeowners from a racially integrated community. 
Petitioner Linmark Associates, a New Jersey corporation, owned a piece of realty in the 
township of Willingboro, N.J.  Petitioner decided to sell its property, and on March 26, 1974, 
listed it with petitioner Mellman, a real estate agent.  To attract interest in the property, 
petitioners desired to place a “For Sale” sign on the lawn.  Willingboro, however, narrowly limits  
the types of signs that can be erected on land in the township.  Although prior to March 1974 
“For Sale” and “Sold” signs were permitted subject to certain restrictions not at issue here, on 
March 18, 1974, the Township Council enacted Ordinance 5-1974, repealing the statutory 
authorization for such signs on all but model homes.  Petitioners brought this action against both 
the township and the building inspector charged with enforcing the ban on “For Sale” signs, 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.  The District Court granted a declaration of 
unconstitutionality, but a divided Court of Appeals reversed, 535 F. 2d 786 (CA3 1976).  We 
granted certiorari, 429 U.S. 938 (1976) and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
The township of Willingboro is a residential community located in southern New Jersey 
near Fort Dix, McGuire Air Force Base, and offices of several national corporations.  The 
township was developed as a middle-income community by Levitt & Sons, beginning in the late 
1950’s.  It is served by over 80 real estate agents. 
During the 1960’s Willingboro underwent rapid growth.  The white population increased 
by almost 350%, and the nonwhite population rose from 60 to over 5,000, or from .005% of the 
population to 11.7%.  As of the 1970 census, almost 44,000 people resided in Willingboro.  In 
the 1970’s, however, the population growth slowed; from 1970 to 1973, the latest year for which 
figures were available at the time of trial, Willingboro’s population rose by only 3%.  More 
significantly, the white population actually declined by almost 2,000 in this interval, a drop of 
over 5%, while the nonwhite population grew by more than 3,000, an increase of approximately 
60%.  By 1973, nonwhites constituted 18.2% of the township’s population. 
At the trial in this case respondents presented testimony from two real estate agents, two 
members of the Township Council, and three members of the Human Relations Commission, all 
of whom agreed that a major cause in the decline in the white population was “panic selling” - 
that is, selling by whites who feared that the township was becoming all black, and that property 
values would decline.  One real estate agent estimated that the reason 80% of the sellers gave for 
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their decision to sell was that “the whole town was for sale, and they didn’t want to be caught in 
any bind.”  App. in No. 75-1448 (CA3), pp. 219a-220a.  Respondents’ witnesses also testified 
that in their view “For Sale” and “Sold” signs were a major catalyst of these fears. 
William Kearns, the Mayor of Willingboro during the year preceding enactment of the 
ordinance and a member of the Council when the ordinance was enacted, testified concerning the 
events leading up to its passage.  Id., at 183a-186a.  According to Kearns, beginning at least in 
1973 the community became concerned about the changing population.  At a town meeting in 
February 1973, called to discuss “Willingboro, to sell or not to sell,” a member of the community 
suggested that real estate signs be banned.  The suggestion received the overwhelming support of 
those attending the meeting.  Kearns brought the proposal to the Township Council, which 
requested the Township Solicitor to study it.  The Council also contacted National Neighbors, a 
nationwide organization promoting integrated housing, and obtained the names of other 
communities that had prohibited “For Sale” signs.  After obtaining a favorable report from 
Shaker Heights, Ohio, on its ordinance, and after receiving an endorsement of the proposed ban 
from the Willingboro Human Relations Commission, the Council began drafting legislation. 
Rather than following its usual procedure of conducting a public hearing only after the 
proposed law had received preliminary Council approval, the Council scheduled two public 
meetings on Ordinance 5-1974.  The first took place in February 1974, before the initial Council 
vote, and the second in March 1974, after the vote.  At the conclusion of the second hearing, the 
ordinance was approved unanimously. 
The transcripts of the Council hearings were introduced into evidence at trial.  They 
reveal that at the hearings the Council received important information bearing on the need for 
and likely impact of the ordinance.  With respect to the justification for the ordinance, the 
Council was told (a) that a study of Willingboro home sales in 1973 revealed that the turnover 
rate was roughly 11%, App. in No. 75-1448 (CA3), p. 89a;  (b) that in February 1974–a typical 
month–230 “For Sale” signs were posted among the 11,000 houses in the community, id., at 94a, 
37a;  and (c) that the Willingboro Tax Assessor had reported that “by and large the increased 
value of Willingboro properties was way ahead of ... comparable communities.”  Id., at 106a.  
With respect to the projected effect of the ordinance, several real estate agents reported that 30%-
35% of their purchaser— clients came to them because they had seen one of the agent’s “For 
Sale” or “Sold” signs, id., at 33a, 47a, 49a, 57a, n4 and one agent estimated, based on his 
experience in a neighboring community that had already banned signs, that selling realty without 
signs takes twice as long as selling with signs, id., at 42a. 
The transcripts of the Council hearings also reveal that the hearings provided useful 
barometers of public sentiment toward the proposed ordinance.  The Council was told, for 
example, that surveys in two areas of the township found overwhelming support for the law, id., 
at 29a, 84a.  In addition, at least at the second meeting, the citizens, who were not real estate 
agents and who spoke, favored the proposed ordinance by a sizable margin. Interestingly, 
however, at both meetings those defending the ordinance focused primarily on aesthetic 
considerations and on the effect of signs– and transiency generally –on property values.  Few 
speakers directly referred to the changing racial composition of Willingboro in supporting the 
proposed law. 
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Although the ordinance had been in effect for nine months prior to trial, no statistical data 
were presented concerning its impact.  Respondents’ witnesses all agreed, however, that the 
number of persons selling or considering selling their houses because of racial fears had declined 
sharply.  But several of these witnesses also testified that the number of sales in Willingboro had 
not declined since the ordinance was enacted.  Moreover, respondents’ real-estate-agent 
witnesses both stated that their business had increased by 25% since the ordinance was enacted, 
id., at 164a, 226a, and one of these agents reported that the racial composition of his clientele 
remained unchanged, id., at 160a. 
The District Court did not make specific findings of fact.  In the course of its opinion, 
however, the court stated that Willingboro “is to a large extent a transient community, partly due 
to its proximity to the military facility at Fort Dix and in part due to the numerous transfers of 
real estate.” The court also stated that there was “no evidence” that whites were leaving 
Willingboro en masse as “For Sale” signs appeared, but “merely an indication that its residents 
are concerned that there may be a large influx of minority groups moving in to the town with the 
resultant effect being a reduction in property values.”  The Court of Appeals essentially accepted 
these “findings,” although it found that Willingboro was experiencing “incipient” panic selling, 
535 F. 2d, at 799, and that a “fear psychology [had] developed,” id., at 790. 
The starting point for analysis of petitioners’ First Amendment claim must be the two 
recent decisions in which this Court has eroded the “commercial speech” exception to the First 
Amendment.  In Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), decided less than two years ago, this 
Court for the first time expressed its dissatisfaction with the then-prevalent approach of resolving 
a class of First Amendment claims simply by categorizing the speech as “commercial.” Id., at 
826.  “Regardless of the particular label,” we stated, “a court may not escape the task of 
assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the public interest 
allegedly served by the regulation.”  Ibid.  After conducting such an analysis in Bigelow we 
concluded that Virginia could not constitutionally punish the publisher of a newspaper for 
printing an abortion referral agency’s paid advertisement which not only promoted the agency’s 
services but also contained information about the availability of abortions. 
One year later, in Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 
U.S. 748 (1976), we went further.  Conceding that “[some] fragment of hope for the continuing 
validity of a ‘commercial speech’ exception arguably might have persisted because of the subject 
matter of the advertisement in Bigelow,” id., at 760, we held quite simply, that commercial 
speech is not “wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment,” id., at 761.  Although 
recognizing that “[some] forms of commercial speech regulations”–such as regulation of false or 
misleading speech–”are surely permissible,” id., at 770, we had little difficulty in finding that 
Virginia’s ban on the advertising of prescription drug prices by pharmacists was 
unconstitutional. 
Respondents contend, as they must, that the “For Sale” signs banned in Willingboro are 
constitutionally distinguishable from the abortion and drug advertisements we have previously 
considered.  It is to the distinctions respondents advance that we now turn. 
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Respondents do seek to distinguish Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy Bd. by relying on the 
vital goal this ordinance serves: namely, promoting stable, racially integrated housing.  There can 
be no question about the importance of achieving this goal.  This Court has expressly recognized 
that substantial benefits flow to both whites and blacks from interracial association and that 
Congress has made a strong national commitment to promote integrated housing.  Trafficante v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
That this ordinance was enacted to achieve an important governmental objective, 
however, does not distinguish the case from Virginia Pharmacy Bd.  In that case the State argued 
that its prohibition on prescription drug price advertising furthered the health and safety of state 
residents by preventing low cost, low quality pharmacists from driving reputable pharmacists out 
of business.  We expressly recognized the “strong interest” of a State in maintaining 
“professionalism on the part of licensed pharmacists.”  25 U.S., at 766.  But we nevertheless 
found the Virginia law unconstitutional because we were unpersuaded that the law was necessary 
to achieve this objective, and were convinced that in any event, the First Amendment disabled 
the State from achieving its goal by restricting the free flow of truthful information.  For the 
same reasons we conclude that the Willingboro ordinance at issue here is also constitutionally 
infirm. 
The record here demonstrates that respondents failed to establish that this ordinance is 
needed to assure that Willingboro remains an integrated community.  As the District Court 
concluded, the evidence does not support the Council’s apparent fears that Willingboro was 
experiencing a substantial incidence of panic selling by white homeowners.  A fortiori, the 
evidence does not establish that “For Sale” signs in front of 2% of Willingboro homes were a 
major cause of panic selling.  And the record does not confirm the township’s assumption that 
proscribing such signs will reduce public awareness of realty sales and thereby decrease public 
concern over selling.  
The constitutional defect in this ordinance, however, is far more basic.  The Township 
Council here, like the Virginia Assembly in Virginia Pharmacy Bd., acted to prevent its residents 
from obtaining certain information.  That information, which pertains to sales activity in 
Willingboro, is of vital interest to Willingboro residents, since it may bear on one of the most 
important decisions they have a right to make: where to live and raise their families.  The 
Council has sought to restrict the free flow of these data because it fears that otherwise 
homeowners will make decisions inimical to what the Council views as the homeowners’ 
self-interest and the corporate interest of the township: they will choose to leave town.  The 
Council’s concern, then, was not with any commercial aspect of “For Sale” signs–with offerors 
communicating offers to offerees–but with the substance of the information communicated to 
Willingboro citizens.  If dissemination of this information can be restricted, then every locality in 
the country can suppress any facts that reflect poorly on the locality, so long as a plausible claim 
can be made that disclosure would cause the recipients of the information to act “irrationally.”  
Virginia Pharmacy Bd. denies government such sweeping powers.  As we said there in rejecting 
Virginia’s claim that the only way it could enable its citizens to find their self-interest was to 
deny them information that is neither false nor misleading: 
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“There is... an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach.  That alternative is 
to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive 
their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best 
means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close 
them....  But the choice among these alternative approaches is not ours to make or 
the Virginia General Assembly’s.  It is precisely this kind of choice, between the 
dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely 
available, that the First Amendment makes for us.”  425 U.S., at 770.I 
Since we can find no meaningful distinction between Ordinance 5-1974 and the statute 
overturned in Virginia Pharmacy Bd., we must conclude that this ordinance violates the First 
Amendment. 
III 
In invalidating this law, we by no means leave Willingboro defenseless in its effort to 
promote integrated housing.  The township obviously remains free to continue “the process of 
education” it has already begun.  It can give widespread publicity–through “Not for Sale” signs 
or other methods–to the number of whites remaining in Willingboro.  And it surely can endeavor 
to create inducements to retain individuals who are considering selling their homes. 
Reversed. 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
CENTRAL HUDSON GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF NEW YORK 
447 U.S. 557 (1980) 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.  
This case presents the question whether a regulation of the Public Service Commission of 
the State of New York violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it completely bans 
promotional advertising by an electrical utility. 
I 
In December 1973, the Commission, appellee here, ordered electric utilities in New York 
State to cease all advertising that “[promotes] the use of electricity.”.  The order was based on 
the Commission’s finding that “the interconnected utility system in New York State does not 
have sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to continue furnishing all customer demands for 
the 1973-1974 winter.” Id., at 26a. 
Three years later, when the fuel shortage had eased, the Commission requested comments 
from the public on its proposal to continue the ban on promotional advertising. Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp., the appellant in this case, opposed the ban on First Amendment grounds.  
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App. A10.  After reviewing the public comments, the Commission extended the prohibition in a 
Policy Statement issued on February 25, 1977. 
The Commission declared all promotional advertising contrary to the national policy of 
conserving energy. It acknowledged that the ban is not a perfect vehicle for conserving energy. 
For example, the Commission’s order prohibits promotional advertising to develop consumption 
during periods when demand for electricity is low.  By limiting growth in “off-peak” 
consumption, the ban limits the “beneficial side effects” of such growth in terms of more 
efficient use of existing powerplants. And since oil dealers are not under the Commission’s 
jurisdiction and thus remain free to advertise, it was recognized that the ban can achieve only 
“piecemeal conservationism.” Still, the Commission adopted the restriction because it was 
deemed likely to “result in some dampening of unnecessary growth” in energy consumption.  
The Commission’s order explicitly permitted “informational” advertising designed to 
encourage “shifts of consumption” from peak demand times to periods of low electricity 
demand. .  Informational advertising would not seek to increase aggregate consumption, but 
would invite a leveling of demand throughout any given 24-hour period.  The agency offered to 
review “specific proposals by the companies for specifically described [advertising] programs 
that meet these criteria.” 
Appellant challenged the order in state court, arguing that the Commission had restrained 
commercial speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Commission’s  
order was upheld by the trial court and at the intermediate appellate level. The New York Court 
of Appeals affirmed.  It found little value to advertising in “the noncompetitive market in which 
electric corporations operate.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 47 N. Y. 2d 
94, 110, 390 N. E. 2d 749, 757 (1979). Since consumers “have no choice regarding the source of 
their electric power,” the court denied that “promotional advertising of electricity might 
contribute to society’s interest in ‘informed and reliable’ economic decisionmaking.” Ibid.  The 
court also observed that by encouraging consumption, promotional advertising would only 
exacerbate the current energy situation.  Id., at 110, 390 N. E. 2d, at 758. The court concluded 
that the governmental interest in the prohibition outweighed the limited constitutional value of 
the commercial speech at issue.  We noted probable jurisdiction, 444 U.S. 962 (1979), and now 
reverse. 
II 
The Commission’s order restricts only commercial speech, that is, expression related 
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.  Virginia Pharmacy Board v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) The First Amendment, as applied 
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects commercial speech from unwarranted 
governmental regulation. Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the 
speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible 
dissemination of information.  In applying the First Amendment to this area, we have rejected 
the “highly paternalistic” view that government has complete power to suppress or regulate 
commercial speech. “[People] will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough 
informed, and . . . the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication, rather 
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than to close them. . . .” id., at 770; see Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 
(1977). Even when advertising communicates only an incomplete version of the relevant facts, 
the First Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better than no information at 
all. 
Nevertheless, our decisions have recognized “the ‘commonsense’ distinction between 
speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to 
government regulation, and other varieties of speech.  “ Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 
U.S. 447, 455-456 (1978); see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, at 381; see also Jackson & 
Jeffries, “Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment,” 65 Va. L. 
Rev. 1, 38-39 (1979). The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial 
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.  436 U.S., at 456, 457. The 
protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the 
expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation. 
The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational 
function of advertising. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). 
Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial 
messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.  The government may 
ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, Friedman v. 
Rogers, supra, at 13, 15-16; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., supra, at 464-465, or commercial 
speech related to illegal activity, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 
376, 388 (1973). 
If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the 
government’s power is more circumscribed.  The State must assert a substantial interest  to be 
achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in 
proportion to that interest.  The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve 
the State’s goal.  Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria.  First, the 
restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained 
if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose.  Second, if the 
governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial 
speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive. 
In commercial speech cases a four-part analysis has developed.  At the outset, we must 
determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech 
to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. 
Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.  If both inquiries yield 
positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental 
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.   
III 
We now apply this four-step analysis for commercial speech to the Commission’s 
arguments in support of its ban on promotional advertising. 
926 
A 
The Commission does not claim that the expression at issue either is inaccurate or relates 
to unlawful activity.  Yet the New York Court of Appeals questioned whether Central Hudson’s 
advertising is protected commercial speech. Because appellant holds a monopoly over the sale of 
electricity in its service area, the state court suggested that the Commission’s order restricts no 
commercial speech of any worth.  The court stated that advertising in a “noncompetitive market”   
could not improve the decisionmaking of consumers. 47 N. Y. 2d, at 110, 390 N. E. 2d, at 757. 
The court saw no constitutional problem with barring commercial speech that it viewed as 
conveying little useful information. 
This reasoning falls short of establishing that appellant’s advertising is not commercial 
speech protected by the First Amendment. Monopoly over the supply of a product provides no 
protection from competition with substitutes for that product.  Electric utilities compete with 
suppliers of fuel oil and natural gas in several markets, such as those for home heating and 
industrial power.  This Court noted the existence of interfuel competition 45 years ago, see West 
Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 294 U.S. 63, 72 (1935). Each energy source continues 
to offer peculiar advantages and disadvantages  that may influence consumer choice.  For 
consumers in those competitive markets, advertising by utilities is just as valuable as advertising 
by unregulated firms.   
Even in monopoly markets, the suppression of advertising reduces the information 
available for consumer decisions and thereby defeats the purpose of the First Amendment. The 
New York court’s argument appears to assume that the providers of a monopoly service or 
product are willing to pay for wholly ineffective advertising. Most businesses–even regulated 
monopolies–are unlikely to underwrite promotional advertising that is of no interest or use to 
consumers. Indeed, a monopoly enterprise legitimately may wish to inform the public that it has 
developed new services or terms of doing business.  A consumer may need information to aid his 
decision whether or not to use the monopoly service at all, or how much of the service he should 
purchase.  In the absence of factors that would distort the decision to advertise, we  may assume 
that the willingness of a business to promote its products reflects a belief that consumers are 
interested in the advertising. Since no such extraordinary conditions have been identified in this 
case, appellant’s monopoly position does not alter the First Amendment’s protection for its 
commercial speech. 
B 
The Commission offers two state interests as justifications for the ban on promotional 
advertising. The first concerns energy conservation. Any increase in demand for electricity–
during peak or off-peak periods–means greater consumption of energy. The Commission argues, 
and the New York court agreed, that the State’s interest in conserving energy is sufficient to 
support suppression of advertising designed to increase consumption of electricity. In view of 
our country’s dependence on energy resources beyond our control, no one can doubt the 
importance of energy conservation. Plainly, therefore, the state interest asserted is substantial. 
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The Commission also argues that promotional advertising will aggravate inequities 
caused by the failure to base the utilities’ rates on marginal cost.  The utilities argued to the 
Commission that if they could promote the use of electricity in periods of low demand, they 
would improve their utilization of generating capacity.  The Commission responded that 
promotion of off-peak consumption also would increase consumption during peak periods.  If 
peak demand were to rise, the absence of marginal cost rates would mean that the rates charged 
for the additional power would not reflect the true costs of expanding production.  Instead, the 
extra costs would be borne by all consumers through higher overall rates.  Without promotional 
advertising, the Commission stated, this inequitable turn of events would be less likely to occur.  
The choice among rate structures involves difficult and important questions of economic supply 
and distributional fairness. The State’s concern that rates be fair and efficient represents a clear 
and substantial governmental interest. 
C 
Next, we focus on the relationship between the State’s interests and the advertising 
ban.The State’s interest in energy conservation is directly advanced by the Commission order at 
issue here.  There is an immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity. 
Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it believed that promotion would 
increase its sales.  Thus, we find a direct link between the state interest in conservation and the 
Commission’s order. 
D 
We come finally to the critical inquiry in this case: whether the Commission’s complete 
suppression of speech ordinarily protected by the First Amendment is no more extensive than 
necessary to further the State’s interest in energy conservation. The Commission’s order reaches 
all promotional advertising, regardless of the impact of the touted service on overall energy use.  
But the energy conservation rationale, as important as it is, cannot justify suppressing 
information about electric devices or services that would cause no net increase in total energy 
use.  In addition, no showing has been made that a more limited restriction on the content of 
promotional advertising would not serve adequately the State’s interests. 
Appellant insists that but for the ban, it would advertise products and services that use 
energy efficiently.  These include the “heat pump,” which both parties acknowledge to be a 
major improvement in electric heating, and the use of electric heat as a “backup” to solar and 
other heat sources.  Although the Commission has questioned the efficiency of electric heating 
before this Court, neither the Commission’s Policy Statement nor its order denying rehearing 
made findings on this issue. In the absence of authoritative findings to the contrary, we must 
credit as within the realm of possibility the claim that electric heat can be an efficient alternative 
in some circumstances. 
The Commission’s order prevents appellant from promoting electric services that would 
reduce energy use by diverting demand from less efficient sources, or that would consume 
roughly the same amount of energy as do alternative sources.  In neither situation would the 
utility’s advertising endanger conservation or mislead the public.  To the extent that the 
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Commission’s order suppresses speech that in no way impairs the State’s interest in energy 
conservation, the Commission’s order violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments and must 
be invalidated.  
The Commission also has not demonstrated that its interest in conservation cannot be 
protected adequately by more limited regulation of appellant’s commercial expression.  To 
further its policy of conservation, the Commission could attempt to restrict the format and 
content of Central Hudson’s advertising. It might, for example, require that the advertisements 
include information about the relative efficiency and expense of the offered service, both under 
current conditions and for the foreseeable future.  In the absence of a showing that more limited 
speech regulation would be ineffective, we cannot approve the complete suppression of Central 
Hudson’s advertising. 
In view of our conclusion that the Commission’s advertising policy violates the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, we do not reach appellant’s claims that the agency’s order also violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that it is both overbroad and 
vague. 
IV 
Our decision today in no way disparages the national interest in energy conservation. We 
accept without reservation the argument that conservation, as well as the development of 
alternative energy sources, is an imperative national goal.  Administrative bodies empowered to 
regulate electric utilities have the authority–and indeed the duty–to take appropriate action to 
further this goal.  When, however, such action involves the suppression of speech, the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments require that the restriction be no more extensive than is necessary to 
serve the state interest. In this case, the record before us fails to show that the total ban on   
promotional advertising meets this requirement.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is Reversed. 
METROMEDIA, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO 
453 U.S. 490 (1981) 
JUSTICE WHITE announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in 
which JUSTICE STEWART, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE POWELL joined. 
This case involves the validity of an ordinance of the city of San Diego, Cal., imposing 
substantial prohibitions on the erection of outdoor advertising displays within the city. 
I 
Stating that its purpose was "to eliminate hazards to pedestrians and motorists brought 
about by distracting sign displays" and "to preserve and improve the appearance of the City," San 
Diego enacted an ordinance to prohibit "outdoor advertising display signs."  The California 
Supreme Court subsequently defined the term "advertising display sign" as "a rigidly assembled 
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sign, display, or device permanently affixed to the ground or permanently attached to a building 
or other inherently permanent structure constituting, or used for the display of, a commercial or 
other advertisement to the public."  26 Cal. 3d 848, 856, n. 2 (1980). 
The ordinance provides two kinds of exceptions to the general prohibition: onsite signs 
and signs falling within 12 specified categories.  Onsite signs are defined as those "designating 
the name of the owner or occupant of the premises upon which such signs are placed, or 
identifying such premises; or signs advertising goods manufactured or produced or services 
rendered on the premises upon which such signs are placed." 
The specific categories exempted from the prohibition include: government signs; signs 
located at public bus stops; signs manufactured, transported, or stored within the city, if not used 
for advertising purposes; commemorative historical plaques; religious symbols; signs within 
shopping malls; for sale and for lease signs; signs on public and commercial vehicles; signs 
depicting time, temperature, and news; approved temporary, off-premises, subdivision 
directional signs; and "[temporary] political campaign signs."  Under this scheme, onsite 
commercial advertising is permitted, but other commercial advertising and noncommercial 
communications using fixed-structure signs are everywhere forbidden unless permitted by one of 
the specified exceptions. 
Appellants are companies that were engaged in the outdoor advertising business in San 
Diego at the time the ordinance was passed.  Each owns a substantial number of outdoor 
advertising displays (approximately 500 to 800) within the city.  These signs are all located in 
areas zoned for commercial and industrial purposes, most of them on property leased by the 
owners to appellants for the purpose of maintaining billboards.  Each sign has a remaining useful 
income-producing life of over 25 years, and each sign has a fair market value of between $2,500 
and $25,000.  Space on the signs was made available to "all comers" and the copy on each sign 
changed regularly, usually monthly.  Although the purchasers of advertising space on appellants' 
signs usually seek to convey a commercial message, their billboards have also been used to 
convey a broad range of noncommercial political and social messages. 
Appellants brought suit in state court to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance ... [T]he 
California Supreme Court ... held that the two purposes of the ordinance were within the city's 
legitimate interests and that the ordinance was "a proper application of municipal authority over 
zoning and land use for the purpose of promoting the public safety and welfare."  26 Cal. 3d, at 
858.  The court rejected appellants' argument that the ordinance was facially invalid under the 
First Amendment.  Appellants sought review in this Court, arguing that the ordinance was 
facially invalid on First Amendment grounds and that the city's threatened destruction of the 
outdoor advertising business was prohibited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  We noted probable jurisdiction. 449 U.S. 897.  
III 
This Court has often faced the problem of applying the broad principles of the First 
Amendment to unique forums of expression.  Even a cursory reading of these opinions reveals 
that at times First Amendment values must yield to other societal interests.  These cases support 
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the cogency of Justice Jackson's remark in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949): Each 
method of communicating ideas is "a law unto itself" and that law must reflect the "differing 
natures, values, abuses and dangers" of each method.  We deal here with the law of billboards. 
Billboards are a well-established medium of communication, used to convey a broad 
range of different kinds of messages.  As Justice Clark noted in his dissent below: 
"The outdoor sign or symbol is a venerable medium for expressing political, 
social and commercial ideas.  From the poster or 'broadside' to the billboard, 
outdoor signs have played a prominent role throughout American history, rallying 
support for political and social causes."  26 Cal. 3d, at 888, 610 P. 2d, at 430-431. 
 The record in this case indicates that besides the typical commercial uses, San Diego 
billboards have been used "to publicize the 'City in motion' campaign of the City of San Diego, 
to communicate messages from candidates for municipal, state and national offices, including 
candidates for judicial office, to propose marriage, to seek employment, to encourage the use of 
seat belts, to denounce the United Nations, to seek support for Prisoners of War and Missing in 
Action, to promote the United Crusade and a variety of other charitable and socially-related 
endeavors and to provide directions to the traveling public." 
But whatever its communicative function, the billboard remains a "large, immobile, and 
permanent structure which like other structures is subject to . . . regulation."  Id., at 870, 610 P. 
2d, at 419.  Moreover, because it is designed to stand out and apart from its surroundings, the 
billboard creates a unique set of problems for land-use planning and development. 
As construed by the California Supreme Court, the ordinance restricts the use of certain 
kinds of outdoor signs.  That restriction is defined in two ways: first, by reference to the 
structural characteristics of the sign; second, by reference to the content, or message, of the sign.  
Thus, the regulation only applies to a "permanent structure constituting, or used for the display 
of, a commercial or other advertisement to the public."  Within that class, the only permitted 
signs are those (1) identifying the premises on which the sign is located, or its owner or 
occupant, or advertising the goods produced or services rendered on such property and (2) those 
within one of the specified exemptions to the general prohibition, such as temporary political 
campaign signs.  To determine if any billboard is prohibited by the ordinance, one must 
determine how it is constructed, where it is located, and what message it carries. 
Thus, under the ordinance (1) a sign advertising goods or services available on the 
property where the sign is located is allowed; (2) a sign on a building or other property 
advertising goods or services produced or offered elsewhere is barred; (3) noncommercial 
advertising, unless within one of the specific exceptions, is everywhere prohibited.  The occupant 
of property may advertise his own goods or services; he may not advertise the goods or services 
of others, nor may he display most noncommercial messages. 
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IV 
Appellants' principal submission is that enforcement of the ordinance will eliminate the 
outdoor advertising business in San Diego and that the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
prohibit the elimination of this medium of communication.  Appellants contend that the city may 
bar neither all offsite commercial signs nor all noncommercial advertisements and that even if it 
may bar the former, it may not bar the latter.  Appellants may raise both arguments in their own 
right because, although the bulk of their business consists of offsite signs carrying commercial 
advertisements, their billboards also convey a substantial amount of noncommercial advertising.  
Because our cases have consistently distinguished between the constitutional protection afforded 
commercial as opposed to noncommercial speech, in evaluating appellants' contention we 
consider separately the effect of the ordinance on commercial and noncommercial speech. 
 However, we have never held that one with a "commercial interest" in speech also 
cannot challenge the facial validity of a statute on the grounds of its substantial infringement of 
the First Amendment interests of others.  Were it otherwise, newspapers, radio stations, movie 
theaters and producers - often those with the highest interest and the largest stake in a First 
Amendment controversy - would not be able to challenge government limitations on speech as 
substantially overbroad. 
The extension of First Amendment protections to purely commercial speech is a 
relatively recent development in First Amendment jurisprudence.  In Virginia Pharmacy Board v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), we plainly held that speech proposing 
no more than a commercial transaction enjoys a substantial degree of First Amendment 
protection: A State may not completely suppress the dissemination of truthful information about 
an entirely lawful activity merely because it is fearful of that information's effect upon its 
disseminators and its recipients.  That decision, however, did not equate commercial and 
noncommercial speech for First Amendment purposes; indeed, it expressly indicated the 
contrary.  See id., at 770-773, and n. 24. See also id., at 779-781 (STEWART,   J., concurring). 
Although the protection extended to commercial speech has continued to develop, 
commercial and noncommercial communications,   in the context of the First Amendment, have 
been treated differently....  [I]n Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 
447 U.S. 557 (1980), we held: "The Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial 
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.  The protection available for a 
particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the 
governmental interests served by its regulation."  Id., at 562-563 (citation omitted).  We then 
adopted a four-part test for determining the  validity of government restrictions on commercial 
speech as distinguished from more fully protected speech.  (1) The First Amendment protects 
commercial speech only if that speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.  A 
restriction on otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it (2) seeks to implement a 
substantial governmental interest, (3) directly advances that interest, and (4) reaches no further 
than necessary to accomplish the given objective. 
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Appellants agree that the proper approach to be taken in determining the validity of the 
restrictions on commercial speech is that which was articulated in Central Hudson, but assert that 
the San Diego ordinance fails that test. We do not agree. 
There can be little controversy over the application of the first, second, and fourth 
criteria.  There is no suggestion that the commercial advertising at issue here involves unlawful 
activity or is misleading.  Nor can there be substantial doubt that the twin goals that the 
ordinance seeks to further - traffic safety and the appearance of the city - are substantial 
governmental goals. Similarly, we reject appellants' claim that the ordinance is broader than 
necessary and, therefore, fails the fourth part of the Central Hudson test.  If the city has a 
sufficient basis for believing that billboards are traffic hazards and are unattractive, then 
obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach to solving the problems they 
create is to prohibit them.  The city has gone no further than necessary in seeking to meet its 
ends.  Indeed, it has stopped short of fully accomplishing its ends: It has not prohibited all 
billboards, but allows onsite advertising and some other specifically exempted signs. 
The more serious question, then, concerns the third of the Central Hudson criteria: Does 
the ordinance "directly advance" governmental interests in traffic safety and in the appearance of 
the city?  It is asserted that the record is inadequate to show any connection between billboards 
and traffic safety.  The California Supreme Court noted the meager record on this point but held 
"as a matter of law that an ordinance which eliminates billboards designed to be viewed from 
streets and highways reasonably relates to traffic safety."  26 Cal. 3d, at 859, 610 P. 2d, at 412. 
Noting that "[billboards] are intended to, and undoubtedly do, divert a driver's attention from the 
roadway," ibid., and that whether the "distracting effect contributes to traffic accidents invokes 
an issue of continuing controversy," ibid., the California Supreme Court agreed with many other 
courts that a legislative judgment that billboards are traffic hazards is not manifestly 
unreasonable and should not be set aside.  We likewise hesitate to disagree with the accumulated, 
commonsense judgments of local lawmakers and of the many reviewing courts that billboards 
are real and substantial hazards to traffic safety. 
We reach a similar result with respect to the second asserted justification for the 
ordinance - advancement of the city's esthetic interests.  It is not speculative to recognize that 
billboards by their very nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be perceived as 
an "esthetic harm."  San Diego, like many States and other municipalities, has chosen to 
minimize the presence of such structures.  Such esthetic judgments are necessarily subjective, 
defying objective evaluation, and for that reason must be carefully scrutinized to determine if 
they are only a public rationalization of an impermissible purpose.  But there is no claim in this 
case that San Diego has as an ulterior motive the suppression of speech, and the judgment 
involved here is not so unusual as to raise suspicions in itself. 
It is nevertheless argued that the city denigrates its interest in traffic safety and beauty 
and defeats its own case by permitting onsite advertising and other specified signs.  Appellants 
question whether the distinction between onsite and offsite advertising on the same property is 
justifiable in terms of either esthetics or traffic safety.  The ordinance permits the occupant of 
property to use billboards located on that property to advertise goods and services offered at that 
location; identical billboards, equally distracting and unattractive, that advertise goods or 
 933 
services available elsewhere are prohibited even if permitting the latter would not multiply the 
number of billboards.  Despite the apparent incongruity, this argument has been rejected, at least 
implicitly, in all of the cases sustaining the distinction between offsite and onsite commercial 
advertising.  We agree with those cases and with our own decisions in Suffolk Outdoor 
Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 439 U.S. 808 (1978); Markham Advertising Co. v. Washington, 393 
U.S. 316 (1969); and Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 440 U.S. 901 (1979). 
In the first place, whether onsite advertising is permitted or not, the prohibition of offsite 
advertising is directly related to the stated objectives of traffic safety and esthetics.  This is not 
altered by the fact that the ordinance is underinclusive because it permits onsite advertising.  
Second, the city may believe that offsite advertising, with its periodically changing content, 
presents a more acute problem than does onsite advertising.  Third, San Diego has obviously 
chosen to value one kind of commercial speech - onsite advertising - more than another kind of 
commercial speech - offsite advertising.  The ordinance reflects a decision by the city that the 
former interest, but not the latter, is stronger than the city's interests in traffic safety and 
esthetics.  The city has decided that in a limited instance - onsite commercial advertising - its 
interests should yield.  We do not reject that judgment.  As we see it, the city could reasonably 
conclude that a commercial enterprise -- as well as the interested public -- has a stronger interest 
in identifying its place of business and advertising the products or services available there than it 
has in using or leasing its available space for the purpose of advertising commercial enterprises 
located elsewhere.  It does not follow from the fact that the city has concluded that some 
commercial interests outweigh its municipal interests in this context that it must give similar 
weight to all other commercial advertising.  Thus, offsite commercial billboards may be 
prohibited while onsite commercial billboards are permitted. 
 The constitutional problem in this area requires resolution of the conflict between the 
city's land-use interests and the commercial interests of those seeking to purvey goods and 
services within the city.  In light of the above analysis, we cannot conclude that the city has 
drawn an ordinance broader than is necessary to meet its interests, or that it fails directly to 
advance substantial government interests.  In sum, insofar as it regulates commercial speech the 
San Diego ordinance meets the constitutional requirements of Central Hudson, supra. 
V 
It does not follow, however, that San Diego's general ban on signs carrying 
noncommercial advertising is also valid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  The fact 
that the city may value commercial messages relating to onsite goods and services more than it 
values commercial communications relating to offsite goods and services does not justify 
prohibiting an occupant from displaying its own ideas or those of others. 
As indicated above, our recent commercial speech cases have consistently accorded 
noncommercial speech a greater degree of protection than commercial speech.  San Diego 
effectively inverts this judgment, by affording a greater degree of protection to commercial than 
to noncommercial speech.  There is a broad exception for onsite commercial advertisements, but 
there is no similar exception for noncommercial speech.  The use of onsite billboards to carry 
commercial messages related to the commercial use of the premises is freely permitted, but the 
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use of otherwise identical billboards to carry noncommercial messages is generally prohibited.  
The city does not explain how or why noncommercial billboards located in places where 
commercial billboards are permitted would be more threatening to safe driving or would detract 
more from the beauty of the city.  Insofar as the city tolerates billboards at all, it cannot choose to 
limit their content to commercial messages; the city may not conclude that the communication of 
commercial information concerning goods and services connected with a particular site is of 
greater value than the communication of noncommercial messages. 
Furthermore, the ordinance contains exceptions that permit various kinds of 
noncommercial signs, whether on property where goods and services are offered or not, that 
would otherwise be within the general ban.  A fixed sign may be used to identify any piece of 
property and its owner.  Any piece of property may carry or display religious symbols, 
commemorative plaques of recognized historical societies and organizations, signs carrying news 
items or telling the time or temperature, signs erected in discharge of any governmental function, 
or temporary political campaign signs.  No other noncommercial or ideological signs meeting the 
structural definition are permitted, regardless of their effect on traffic safety or esthetics. 
Although the city may distinguish between the relative value of different categories of 
commercial speech, the city does not have the same range of choice in the area of 
noncommercial speech to evaluate the strength of, or distinguish between, various 
communicative interests.  With respect to noncommercial speech, the city may not choose the 
appropriate subjects for public discourse: "To allow a government the choice of permissible 
subjects for public debate would be to allow that government control over the search for political 
truth."  Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S., at 538.  Because some noncommercial messages may 
be conveyed on billboards throughout the commercial and industrial zones, San Diego must 
similarly allow billboards conveying other noncommercial messages throughout those zones.  
There can be no question that a prohibition on the erection of billboards infringes 
freedom of speech:  The exceptions do not create the infringement, rather the general prohibition 
does.  But the exceptions to the general prohibition are of great significance in assessing the 
strength of the city's interest in prohibiting billboards.  We conclude that by allowing commercial 
establishments to use billboards to advertise the products and services they offer, the city 
necessarily has conceded that some communicative interests, e. g., onsite commercial 
advertising, are stronger than its competing interests in esthetics and traffic safety.  It has 
nevertheless banned all noncommercial signs except those specifically excepted. 
Because the San Diego ordinance reaches too far into the realm of protected speech, we 
conclude that it is unconstitutional on its face. The judgment of the California Supreme Court is 
reversed, and the case is remanded to that court. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, concurring in the 
judgment. [omitted] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting in part. 
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If enforced as written, the ordinance at issue in this case will eliminate the outdoor 
advertising business in the city of San Diego.  The principal question presented is, therefore, 
whether a city may prohibit this medium of communication.  Instead of answering that question, 
the plurality focuses its attention on the exceptions from the total ban and, somewhat ironically, 
concludes that the ordinance is an unconstitutional abridgment of speech because it does not 
abridge enough speech. 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. 
Today the Court takes an extraordinary -- even a bizarre -- step by severely limiting the 
power of a city to act on risks it perceives to traffic safety and the environment posed by large, 
permanent billboards.  Those joining the plurality opinion invalidate a city's effort to minimize 
these traffic hazards and eyesores simply because, in exercising rational legislative judgment, it 
has chosen to permit a narrow class of signs that serve special needs.  
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting [omitted] 
LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY v. REILLY 
533 U.S. 525 (2001)  
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In January 1999, the Attorney General of Massachusetts promulgated comprehensive 
regulations governing the advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. 
Petitioners, a group of cigarette, smokeless tobacco, and cigar manufacturers and retailers, filed 
suit in Federal District Court claiming that the regulations violate federal law and the United 
States Constitution.  In large measure, the District Court determined that the regulations are valid 
and enforceable. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed in part and 
reversed in part, concluding that the regulations are not pre-empted by federal law and do not 
violate the First Amendment. The first question presented for our review is whether certain 
cigarette advertising regulations are pre-empted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act (FCLAA), 79 Stat. 282, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §1331 et seq. The second 
question presented is whether certain regulations governing the advertising and sale of tobacco 
products violate the First Amendment. 
In November 1998, Massachusetts, along with over 40 other States, reached a landmark 
agreement with major manufacturers in the cigarette industry. The signatory States settled their 
claims against these companies in exchange for monetary payments and permanent injunctive 
relief. At the press conference covering Massachusetts' decision to sign the agreement, then-
Attorney General Scott Harshbarger announced that as one of his last acts in office, he would 
create consumer protection regulations to restrict advertising and sales practices for tobacco 
products. He explained that the regulations were necessary in order to "close holes" in the 
settlement agreement and "to stop Big Tobacco from recruiting new customers among the 
children of Massachusetts."  
936 
In January 1999, pursuant to his authority to prevent unfair or deceptive practices in trade 
the Massachusetts Attorney General (Attorney General) promulgated regulations governing the 
sale and advertisement of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. The purpose of the cigarette 
and smokeless tobacco regulations is "to eliminate deception and unfairness in the way cigarettes 
and smokeless tobacco products are marketed, sold and distributed in Massachusetts in order to 
address the incidence of cigarette smoking and smokeless tobacco use by children under legal 
age   . . . [and] in order to prevent access to such products by underage consumers." The similar 
purpose of the cigar regulations is "to eliminate deception and unfairness in the way cigars and 
little cigars are packaged, marketed, sold and distributed in Massachusetts [so that] . . . 
consumers may be adequately informed about the health  risks associated with cigar smoking, its 
addictive properties, and the false perception that cigars are a safe alternative to cigarettes . . . 
[and so that] the incidence of cigar use by children under legal age is addressed . . . in order to 
prevent access to such products by underage consumers." The regulations have a broader scope 
than the master settlement agreement, reaching advertising, sales practices, and members of the 
tobacco industry not covered by the agreement. The regulations place a variety of restrictions on 
outdoor advertising, point-of-sale advertising, retail sales transactions, transactions by mail, 
promotions, sampling of products, and labels for cigars. 
The cigarette and smokeless tobacco regulations being challenged before this Court 
provide: 
"(2) Retail Outlet Sales Practices. Except as otherwise provided in [§21.04(4)], it 
shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice for any person who sells or 
distributes cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products through a retail outlet located 
within Massachusetts to engage in any of the following retail outlet sales 
practices: 
. . . . . 
"(c) Using self-service displays of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products; 
"(d) Failing to place cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products out of the reach of 
all consumers, and in a location accessible only to outlet personnel." 
§§21.04(2)(c)-(d). 
"(5) Advertising Restrictions. Except as provided in [§21.04(6)], it shall be an 
unfair or deceptive act or practice for any manufacturer, distributor or retailer to 
engage in any of the following practices: 
"(a) Outdoor advertising, including advertising in enclosed stadiums and 
advertising from within a retail establishment that is directed toward or visible 
from the  [*535]  outside of the establishment, in any location that is within a 
1,000 foot radius of any public playground, playground area in a public park, 
elementary school or secondary school; 
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"(b) Point-of-sale advertising of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products any 
portion of which is placed lower than five feet from the floor of any retail 
establishment which is located within a one thousand foot radius of any public 
playground,  playground area in a public park, elementary school or secondary 
school, and which is not an adult-only retail establishment." §§21.04(5)(a)-(b). 
The cigar regulations that are still at issue provide: 
"(1) Retail Sales Practices. Except as otherwise provided in [§22.06(4)], it shall be 
an unfair or deceptive act or practice for any person who sells or distributes cigars 
or little cigars directly to consumers within Massachusetts to engage in any of the 
following practices:  
 "(a) sampling of cigars or little cigars or promotional give-aways of cigars or 
little cigars." §21.06(1)(a). 
"(2) Retail Outlet Sales Practices. Except as otherwise provided in [§22.06(4)], it 
shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice for any person who sells or 
distributes cigars or little cigars through a retail outlet located within 
Massachusetts to engage in any of the following retail outlet sales practices: 
. . . . . 
"(c) Using self-service displays of cigars or little cigars; 
"(d) Failing to place cigars and little cigars out of the reach of all consumers, and 
in a location accessible only to outlet personnel." §§22.06(2)(c)-(d). 
"(5) Advertising Restrictions. Except as provided in [§22.06(6)], it shall be an 
unfair or deceptive act or practice for any manufacturer, distributor or retailer to 
engage in any of the following practices: 
 "(a) Outdoor advertising of cigars or little cigars, including advertising in 
enclosed stadiums and advertising from within a retail establishment that is 
directed toward or visible from the outside of the establishment, in any location 
within a 1,000 foot radius of any public playground, playground area in a public 
park, elementary school or secondary school; 
"(b) Point-of-sale advertising of cigars or little cigars any portion of which is 
placed lower than five feet from the floor of any retail establishment which is 
located within a one thousand foot radius of any public playground, playground 
area in a public park, elementary school or secondary school, and which is not an 
adult-only retail establishment." §§22.06(5)(a)- (b). 
The term "advertisement" is defined as: 
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"any oral, written, graphic, or pictorial statement or representation, made by, or on 
behalf of, any person who manufactures, packages, imports for sale, distributes or 
sells within Massachusetts [tobacco products], the purpose or effect of which is to 
promote the use or sale of the product. Advertisement includes, without 
limitation, any picture, logo, symbol, motto, selling message, graphic display, 
visual image, recognizable color or pattern of colors, or any other indicia of 
product identification identical or similar to, or identifiable with, those used for 
any brand of [tobacco product]. This includes, without limitation, utilitarian items 
and permanent or semi-permanent fixtures with such indicia of product 
identification such as lighting fixtures, awnings, display cases, clocks and door 
mats, but does not include utilitarian items with a volume of 200 cubic inches or 
less." §§21.03, 22.03. 
Before the effective date of the regulations, February 1, 2000, members of the tobacco 
industry sued the Attorney General in the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts. Four cigarette manufacturers (Lorillard Tobacco Company, Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corporation, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, and Philip Morris Incorporated), a 
maker of smokeless tobacco products (U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company), and several cigar  
manufacturers and retailers claimed that many of the regulations violate the Commerce Clause,  
the Supremacy Clause, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.S.C. 
§1983. The parties sought summary judgment. 
II 
Before reaching the First Amendment issues, we must decide to what extent federal law 
pre-empts the Attorney General's regulations. The cigarette petitioners contend that the FCLAA, 
15 U.S.C. §1331 et seq., pre-empts the Attorney General's cigarette advertising 
regulations…..[analysis omitted}We hold … that the FCLAA pre-empts state regulations 
targeting cigarette advertising. States remain free to enact generally applicable zoning 
regulations, and to regulate conduct with respect to cigarette use and sales. 
Although the FCLAA prevents States and localities from imposing special requirements 
or prohibitions "based on smoking and health" "with respect to the advertising or promotion" of 
cigarettes, that language still leaves significant power in the hands of States to impose generally 
applicable zoning regulations and to regulate conduct.  
For instance, the FCLAA does not restrict a State or locality's ability to enact generally 
applicable zoning restrictions. We have recognized that state interests in traffic safety and 
esthetics may justify zoning regulations for advertising. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 
U.S. 490, 507-508, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981). See also St. Louis Poster 
Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269, 274, 63 L. Ed. 599, 39 S. Ct. 274, 17 Ohio L. Rep. 62 
(1919); Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 529-531, 61 L. Ed. 472, 37 S. Ct. 190 
(1917). Although Congress has taken into account the unique concerns about cigarette smoking 
and health in advertising, there is no indication that Congress intended to displace local 
community interests in general regulations of the location of billboards or large marquee 
advertising, or that Congress intended cigarette advertisers to be afforded special treatment in 
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that regard. Restrictions on the location and size of advertisements that apply to cigarettes on 
equal terms with other products appear to be outside the ambit of the pre-emption provision. 
Such restrictions are not "based on smoking and health." 
The FCLAA also does not foreclose all state regulation of conduct as it relates to the sale 
or use of cigarettes. The FCLAA's pre-emption provision explicitly governs state regulations of 
"advertising or promotion." * Accordingly, the FCLAA does not pre-empt state laws prohibiting 
cigarette sales to minors. To the contrary, there is an established congressional policy that 
supports such laws; Congress has required States to prohibit tobacco sales to minors as a 
condition of receiving federal block grant funding for substance abuse treatment activities. 106 
Stat. 394, 388, 42 U.S.C. §§300x-26(a)(1), 300x-21. 
III 
By its terms, the FCLAA's pre-emption provision only applies to cigarettes. Accordingly, 
we must evaluate the smokeless tobacco and cigar petitioners' First Amendment challenges to the 
State's outdoor and point-of-sale advertising regulations. The cigarette petitioners did not raise a 
pre-emption challenge to the sales practices regulations. Thus, we must analyze the cigarette as 
well as the smokeless tobacco and cigar petitioners' claim that certain sales practices regulations 
for tobacco products violate the First Amendment. 
For over 25 years, the Court has recognized that commercial speech does not fall outside 
the purview of the First Amendment. Central Hudson Gas and Electric v. Public 447 U.S. 557 
(1980). Instead, the Court has afforded commercial speech a measure of First Amendment 
protection "'commensurate'" with its position in relation to other constitutionally guaranteed 
expression. In recognition of the "distinction between speech proposing a commercial 
transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other 
varieties of speech," we developed a framework for analyzing regulations of commercial speech 
that is "substantially similar" to the test for time, place, and manner restrictions. The analysis 
contains four elements:  
"At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First 
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least 
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the 
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive 
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest." Central Hudson, supra, at 566. 
Petitioners urge us to reject the Central Hudson analysis and apply strict scrutiny. They 
are not the first litigants to do so. Admittedly, several Members of the Court have expressed 
doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and whether it should apply in particular cases. See, 
e.g., Greater New Orleans, supra, at 197 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment. But here, as in 
Greater New Orleans, we see "no need to break new ground. Central Hudson, as applied in our 
more recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for decision." 527 U.S. at 184. 
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Only the last two steps of Central Hudson's four-part analysis are at issue here. The 
Attorney General has assumed for purposes of summary judgment that petitioners' speech is 
entitled to First Amendment protection.  218 F.3d at 43; 84 F. Supp. 2d at 185-186. With respect 
to the second step, none of the petitioners contests the importance of the State's interest in 
preventing the use of tobacco products by minors.  
The third step of Central Hudson concerns the relationship between the harm that 
underlies the State's interest and the means identified by the State to advance that interest. It 
requires that: 
"the speech restriction directly and materially advance the asserted governmental 
interest. 'This burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a 
governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must 
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact 
alleviate them to a material degree.'" Greater New Orleans, supra, at 188  
We do not, however, require that "empirical data come . . . accompanied by a surfeit of 
background information . . . We have permitted litigants to justify speech restrictions by 
reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether, or even, in a case 
applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and 'simple 
common sense.'" Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 628 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
The last step of the Central Hudson analysis "complements" the third step, "asking 
whether the speech restriction is not more extensive than necessary to serve the interests that 
support it." Greater New Orleans, supra, at 188. We have made it clear that "the least restrictive 
means" is not the standard; instead, the case law requires a reasonable "'fit between the 
legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends, . . . a means narrowly tailored 
to achieve the desired objective.'" Focusing on the third and fourth steps of the Central Hudson 
analysis, we first address the outdoor advertising and point-of-sale advertising regulations for 
smokeless tobacco and cigars. We then address the sales practices regulations for all tobacco 
products. 
The outdoor advertising regulations prohibit smokeless tobacco or cigar advertising 
within a 1,000-foot radius of a school or playground. The District Court and Court of Appeals 
concluded that the Attorney General had identified a real problem with underage use of tobacco 
products, that limiting youth exposure to advertising would combat that problem, and that the 
regulations burdened no more speech than necessary to accomplish the State's goal. The 
smokeless tobacco and cigar petitioners take issue with all of these conclusions. 
The smokeless tobacco and cigar petitioners contend that the Attorney General's 
regulations do not satisfy Central Hudson's third step. They maintain that although the Attorney 
General may have identified a problem with underage cigarette smoking, he has not identified an 
equally severe problem with respect to underage use of smokeless tobacco or cigars. The 
smokeless tobacco petitioner emphasizes the "lack of parity" between cigarettes and smokeless 
tobacco. The petitioners finally contend that the Attorney General cannot prove that advertising 
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has a causal link to tobacco use such that limiting advertising will materially alleviate any 
problem of underage use of their products.  
In previous cases, we have acknowledged the theory that product advertising stimulates 
demand for products, while suppressed advertising may have the opposite effect. The Attorney 
General cites numerous studies to support this theory in the case of tobacco products. 
Our review of the record reveals that the Attorney General has provided ample 
documentation of the problem with underage use of smokeless tobacco and cigars. In addition, 
we disagree with petitioners' claim that there is no evidence that preventing targeted campaigns 
and limiting youth exposure to advertising will decrease underage use of smokeless tobacco and 
cigars. On this record and in the posture of summary judgment, we are unable to conclude that 
the Attorney General's decision to regulate advertising of smokeless tobacco and cigars in an 
effort to combat the use of tobacco products by minors was based on mere "speculation [and] 
conjecture." Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. at 770. 
Whatever the strength of the Attorney General's evidence to justify the outdoor 
advertising regulations, however, we conclude that the regulations do not satisfy the fourth step 
of the Central Hudson analysis. The final step of the Central Hudson analysis, the "critical 
inquiry in this case," requires a reasonable fit between the means and ends of the regulatory 
scheme.  The Attorney General's regulations do not meet this standard. The broad sweep of the 
regulations indicates that the Attorney General did not "carefully calculate the costs and benefits 
associated with the burden on speech imposed" by the regulations.  
The outdoor advertising regulations prohibit any smokeless tobacco or cigar advertising 
within 1,000 feet of schools or playgrounds. The substantial geographical reach of the Attorney 
General's outdoor advertising regulations is compounded by other factors. "Outdoor" advertising 
includes not only advertising located outside an establishment, but also advertising inside a store 
if that advertising is visible from outside the store. The regulations restrict advertisements of any 
size and the term advertisement also includes oral statements.  
In some geographical areas, these regulations would constitute nearly a complete ban on 
the communication of truthful information about smokeless tobacco and cigars to adult 
consumers. The breadth and scope of the regulations, and the process by which the Attorney 
General adopted the regulations, do not demonstrate a careful calculation of the speech interests 
involved.  
In addition, the range of communications restricted seems unduly broad. For instance, it 
is not clear from the regulatory scheme why a ban on oral communications is necessary to further 
the State's interest. Apparently that restriction means that a retailer is unable to answer inquiries 
about its tobacco products if that communication occurs outdoors. Similarly, a ban on all signs of 
any size seems ill suited to target the problem of highly visible billboards, as opposed to smaller 
signs. To the extent that studies have identified particular advertising and promotion practices 
that appeal to youth, tailoring would involve targeting those practices while permitting others. As 
crafted, the regulations make no distinction among practices on this basis. 
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The State's interest in preventing underage tobacco use is substantial, and even 
compelling, but it is no less true that the sale and use of tobacco products by adults is a legal 
activity. We must consider that tobacco retailers and manufacturers have an interest in conveying 
truthful information about their products to adults, and adults have a corresponding interest in 
receiving truthful information about tobacco products. As the State protects children from 
tobacco advertisements, tobacco manufacturers and retailers and their adult consumers still have 
a protected interest in communication.  
In some instances, Massachusetts' outdoor advertising regulations would impose 
particularly onerous burdens on speech. For example, we disagree with the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion that because cigar manufacturers and retailers conduct a limited amount of 
advertising in comparison to other tobacco products, "the relative lack of cigar advertising also 
means that the burden imposed on cigar advertisers is correspondingly small." If some retailers 
have relatively small advertising budgets, and use few avenues of communication, then the 
Attorney General's outdoor advertising regulations potentially place a greater, not lesser, burden 
on those retailers' speech. Furthermore, to the extent that cigar products and cigar advertising 
differ from that of other tobacco products, that difference should inform the inquiry into what 
speech restrictions are necessary. 
In addition, a retailer in Massachusetts may have no means of communicating to 
passersby on the street that it sells tobacco products because alternative forms of advertisement, 
like newspapers, do not allow that retailer to propose an instant transaction in the way that onsite 
advertising does. The ban on any indoor advertising that is visible from the outside also presents 
problems in establishments like convenience stores, which have unique security concerns that 
counsel in favor of full visibility of the store from the outside. It is these sorts of considerations 
that the Attorney General failed to incorporate into the regulatory scheme. 
 We conclude that the Attorney General has failed to show that the outdoor advertising 
regulations for smokeless tobacco and cigars are not more extensive than necessary to advance 
the State's substantial interest in preventing underage tobacco use. We believe that a remand is 
inappropriate in this case because the State had ample opportunity to develop a record with 
respect to tailoring (as it had to justify its decision to regulate advertising), and additional 
evidence would not alter the nature of the scheme before the Court.  
A careful calculation of the costs of a speech regulation does not mean that a State must 
demonstrate that there is no incursion on legitimate speech interests, but a speech regulation 
cannot unduly impinge on the speaker's ability to propose a commercial transaction and the adult 
listener's opportunity to obtain information about products. After  reviewing the outdoor 
advertising regulations, we find the calculation in this case insufficient for purposes of the First 
Amendment. 
Massachusetts has also restricted indoor, point-of-sale advertising for smokeless tobacco 
and cigars. Advertising cannot be "placed lower than five feet from the floor of any retail 
establishment which is located within a one thousand foot radius of" any school or playground. 
We conclude that the point-of-sale advertising regulations fail both the third and fourth steps of 
the Central Hudson analysis. A regulation cannot be sustained if it "'provides only ineffective or 
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remote support for the government's purpose,'" Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 or if there is 
"little chance" that the restriction will advance the State's goal, Greater New Orleans, supra, at 
193 (internal quotation marks omitted). As outlined above, the State's goal is to prevent minors 
from using tobacco products and to curb demand for that activity by limiting youth exposure to 
advertising. The 5 foot rule does not seem to advance that goal. Not all children are less than 5 
feet tall, and those who are certainly have the ability to look up and take in their surroundings. 
Massachusetts may wish to target tobacco advertisements and displays that entice 
children, much like floor-level candy displays in a convenience store, but the blanket height 
restriction does not constitute a reasonable fit with that goal. We conclude that the restriction on 
the height of indoor advertising is invalid under Central Hudson's third and fourth prongs. 
We have observed that "tobacco use, particularly among children and adolescents, poses 
perhaps the single most significant threat to public health in the United States." FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 161. From a policy perspective, it is understandable for 
the States to attempt to prevent minors from using tobacco products before they reach an age 
where they are capable of weighing for themselves the risks and potential benefits of tobacco 
use, and other adult activities. Federal law, however, places limits on policy choices available to 
the States. 
In this case, Congress enacted a comprehensive scheme to address cigarette smoking and 
health in advertising and pre-empted state regulation of cigarette advertising that attempts to 
address that same concern, even with respect to youth. The First Amendment also constrains 
state efforts to limit advertising of tobacco products, because so long as the sale and use of 
tobacco is lawful for adults, the tobacco industry has a protected interest in communicating 
information about its products and adult customers have an interest in receiving that information. 
To the extent that federal law and the First Amendment do not prohibit state action, 
States and localities remain free to combat the problem of underage tobacco use by appropriate 
means. 
CONCUR BY: KENNEDY; THOMAS; SOUTER (In Part); STEVENS (In Part)  
DISSENT BY: SOUTER (In Part); STEVENS (In Part)  
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Session 37. Content-Based Restrictions 
YOUNG v. AMERICAN MINI THEATRES 
427 U.S. 50 (1976) 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Zoning ordinances adopted by the city of Detroit differentiate between motion picture 
theaters which exhibit sexually explicit "adult" movies and those which do not.  The principal 
question presented by this case is whether that statutory classification is unconstitutional because 
it is based on the content of communication protected by the First Amendment.
1
 
Effective November 2, 1972, Detroit adopted the ordinances challenged in this litigation.  
Instead of concentrating "adult" theaters in limited zones, these ordinances require that such 
theaters be dispersed.  Specifically, an adult theater may not be located within 1,000 feet of any 
two other "regulated uses" or within 500 feet of a residential area.  The term "regulated uses" 
includes 10 different kinds of establishments in addition to adult theaters.
2 
 
The classification of a theater as "adult" is expressly predicated on the character of the 
motion pictures which it exhibits.  If the theater is used to present "material distinguished or 
characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified Sexual 
Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas,'"
3
  it is an adult establishment.
4
 
                                                 
1
 "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...."     
2
 In addition to adult motion picture theaters and "mini" theaters, which contain less than 50 seats, the regulated uses 
include adult bookstores; cabarets (group "D"); establishments for the sale of beer or intoxicating liquor for 
consumption on the premises; hotels or motels; pawnshops; pool or billiard halls; public lodging houses; 
secondhand stores; shoeshine parlors; and taxi dance halls. 
3
 These terms are defined as follows: 
"For the purpose of this Section, 'Specified Sexual Activities' is defined as: 
"1.  Human Genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal;  
"2.  Acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse or sodomy;  
"3.  Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, public region, buttock or female breast. 
"And 'Specified Anatomical Areas' is defined as: 
"1.  Less than completely and opaquely covered: (a) human genitals, pubic region, (b) buttock, and (c) female breast 
below a point immediately above the top of the areola; and 
"2.  Human male genitals in a discernibly turgid state, even if completely and opaquely covered." 
4
 There are three types of adult establishments - bookstores, motion picture theaters, and mini motion picture 
theaters - defined respectively as follows: 
"Adult Book Store 
"An establishment having as a substantial or significant portion of its stock in trade, books, magazines, and other 
periodicals which are distinguished or characterized by their emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 
'Specified Sexual Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas,' (as defined below), or an establishment with a segment 
or section devoted to the sale or display of such material. 
"Adult Motion Picture Theater 
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The 1972 ordinances were amendments to an "Anti-Skid Row Ordinance" which had 
been adopted 10 years earlier.  At that time the Detroit Common Council made a finding that 
some uses of property are especially injurious to a neighborhood when they are concentrated in 
limited areas.  The decision to add adult motion picture theaters and adult book stores to the list 
of businesses which, apart from a special waiver, could not be located within 1,000 feet of two 
other "regulated uses," was, in part, a response to the significant growth in the number of such 
establishments.  In the opinion of urban planners and real estate experts who supported the 
ordinances, the location of several such businesses in the same neighborhood tends to attract an 
undesirable quantity and quality of transients, adversely affects property values, causes an 
increase in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages residents and businesses to move 
elsewhere.  
Respondents are the operators of two adult motion picture theaters.  One, the Nortown, 
was an established theater which began to exhibit adult films in March 1973.  The other, the 
Pussy Cat, was a corner gas station which was converted into a "mini theater," but denied a 
certificate of occupancy because of its plan to exhibit adult films.  Both theaters were located 
within 1,000 feet of two other regulated uses and the Pussy Cat was less than 500 feet from a 
residential area.  The respondents brought two separate actions against appropriate city officials, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinances were unconstitutional and an injunction 
against their enforcement.  Federal jurisdiction was properly invoked  and the two cases were 
consolidated for decision. 
The District Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.  On the basis of 
the reasons stated by the city for adopting the ordinances, the court concluded that they 
represented a rational attempt to preserve the city's neighborhoods.  The court analyzed and 
rejected respondents' argument that the definition and waiver provisions in the ordinances were 
impermissibly vague; it held that the disparate treatment of adult theaters and other theaters was 
justified by a compelling state interest and therefore did not violate the Equal Protection Clause; 
and finally it concluded that the regulation of the places where adult films could be shown did 
not violate the First Amendment 
The Court of Appeals reversed.  American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F. 2d 1014 
(CA6 1975). The majority opinion concluded that the ordinances imposed a prior restraint on 
constitutionally protected communication and therefore "merely establishing that they were 
designed to serve a compelling public interest" provided an insufficient justification for a 
classification of motion picture theaters on the basis of the content of the materials they purvey 
to the public.  Relying primarily on Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, the 
court held the ordinance invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.  Judge Celebrezze, in dissent, 
                                                                                                                                                             
"An enclosed building with a capacity of 50 or more persons used for presenting material distinguished or 
characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified Sexual Activities' or 'Specified 
Anatomical Areas,' (as defined below) for observation by patrons therein.  
"Adult Mini Motion Picture Theater 
"An enclosed building with a capacity for less than 50 persons used for presenting material distinguished or 
characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified Sexual Activities' or 'Specified 
Anatomical Areas,' (as defined below), for observation by patrons therein." 
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expressed the opinion that the ordinance was a valid "'time, place and manner' regulation,"  
rather than a regulation of speech on the basis of its content. 
Because of the importance of the decision, we granted certiorari, 423 U.S. 911. 
As they did in the District Court, respondents contend (1) that the ordinances are so 
vague that they violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) that they are 
invalid under the First Amendment as prior restraints on protected communication; and (3) that 
the classification of theaters on the basis of the content of their exhibitions violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  We consider their arguments in that order. 
I 
We are not persuaded that the Detroit zoning ordinances will have a significant deterrent 
effect on the exhibition of films protected by the First Amendment.   ...[T]he only vagueness in 
the  ordinances relates to the amount of sexually explicit activity that may be portrayed before 
the material can be said to be "characterized by an emphasis" on such matter.  For most films the 
question will be readily answerable; to the extent that an area of doubt exists, we see no reason 
why the ordinances are not "readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts." 
Since there is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the 
borderline between pornography and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of 
social and political significance, and since the limited amount of uncertainty in the ordinances is 
easily susceptible of a narrowing construction, we think this is an inappropriate case in which to 
adjudicate the hypothetical claims of persons not before the Court. 
The only area of protected communication that may be deterred by these ordinances 
comprises films containing material falling within the specific definitions of "Specified Sexual 
Activities" or "Specified Anatomical Areas."  The fact that the First Amendment protects some, 
though not necessarily all, of that material from total suppression does not warrant the further 
conclusion that an exhibitor's doubts as to whether a borderline film may be shown in his theater, 
as well as in theaters licensed for adult presentations, involves the kind of threat to the free 
market in ideas and expression that justifies the exceptional approach to constitutional 
adjudication recognized in cases like Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479. 
The application of the ordinances to respondents is plain; even if there is some area of 
uncertainty about their application in other situations, we agree with the District Court that 
respondents' due process argument must be rejected. 
II 
Petitioners acknowledge that the ordinances prohibit theaters which are not licensed as 
"adult motion picture theaters" from exhibiting films which are protected by the First 
Amendment.  Respondents argue that the ordinances are therefore invalid as prior restraints on 
free speech. 
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The ordinances are not challenged on the ground that they impose a limit on the total 
number of adult theaters which may operate in the city of Detroit.  There is no claim that 
distributors or exhibitors of adult films are denied access to the market or, conversely, that the 
viewing public is unable to satisfy its appetite for sexually explicit fare.  Viewed as an entity, the 
market for this commodity is essentially unrestrained. 
It is true, however, that adult films may only be exhibited commercially in licensed 
theaters.  But that is also true of all motion pictures.  The city's general zoning laws require all 
motion picture theaters to satisfy certain locational as well as other requirements; we have no 
doubt that the municipality may control the location of theaters as well as the location of other 
commercial establishments, either by confining them to certain specified commercial zones or by 
requiring that they be dispersed throughout the city.  The mere fact that the commercial 
exploitation of material protected by the First Amendment is subject to zoning and other 
licensing requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating these ordinances. 
Putting to one side for the moment the fact that adult motion picture theaters must satisfy 
a locational restriction not applicable to other theaters, we are also persuaded that the 1,000-foot 
restriction does not, in itself, create an impermissible restraint on protected communication.  The 
city's interest in planning and regulating the use of property for commercial purposes is clearly 
adequate to support that kind of restriction applicable to all theaters within the city limits.  In 
short, apart from the fact that the ordinances treat adult theaters differently from other theaters 
and the fact that the classification is predicated on the content of material shown in the respective 
theaters, the regulation of the place where such films may be exhibited does not offend the First 
Amendment.
5 
  We turn, therefore, to the question whether the classification is consistent with 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
III 
A remark attributed to Voltaire characterizes our zealous adherence to the principle that 
the government may not tell the citizen what he may or may not say.  Referring to a suggestion 
that the violent overthrow of tyranny might be legitimate, he said: "I disapprove of what you say, 
but I will defend to the death your right to say it." 
6
 The essence of that comment has been 
repeated time after time in our decisions invalidating attempts by the government to impose 
selective controls upon the dissemination of ideas. 
Thus, the use of streets and parks for the free expression of views on national affairs may 
not be conditioned upon the sovereign's agreement with what a speaker may intend to say.   Nor 
may speech be curtailed because it invites dispute, creates dissatisfaction with conditions the way 
they are, or even stirs people to anger.  The sovereign's agreement or disagreement with the 
                                                 
5
Reasonable regulations of the time, place, and manner of protected speech, where those regulations are necessary to 
further significant governmental interests, are permitted by the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 
U.S. 77 (limitation on use of sound trucks); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (ban on demonstrations in or near a 
courthouse with the intent to obstruct justice); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (ban on willful making, 
on grounds adjacent to a school, of any noise which disturbs the good order of the school session). 
6
 S. Tallentyre, The Friends of Voltaire 199 (1907).  
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content of what a speaker has to say may not affect the regulation of the time, place, or manner 
of presenting the speech. 
The question whether speech is, or is not, protected by the First Amendment often 
depends on the content of the speech.  Thus, the line between permissible advocacy and 
impermissible incitation to crime or violence depends, not merely on the setting in which the 
speech occurs, but also on exactly what the speaker had to say.  Similarly, it is the content of the 
utterance that determines whether it is a protected epithet or an unprotected "fighting comment."  
And in time of war "the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location 
of troops" may unquestionably be restrained, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 
716, although publication of news stories with a different content would be protected. 
Even within the area of protected speech, a difference in content may require a different 
governmental response.  In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, we recognized that 
the First Amendment places limitations on the States' power to enforce their libel laws.  We held 
that a public official may not recover damages from a critic of his official conduct without proof 
of "malice" as specially defined in that opinion.  Implicit in the opinion is the assumption that if 
the content of the newspaper article had been different - that is, if its subject matter had not been 
a public official - a lesser standard of proof would have been adequate. 
The essence of that rule is the need for absolute neutrality by the government; its 
regulation of communication may not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of view 
being expressed by the communicator.  Thus, although the content of a story must be examined 
to  decide whether it involves a public figure or a public issue, the Court's application of the 
relevant rule may not depend on its favorable or unfavorable appraisal of that figure or that issue. 
We have recently held that the First Amendment affords some protection to commercial 
speech.
7 
 We have also made it clear, however, that the content of a particular advertisement may 
determine the extent of its protection.  A public rapid transit system may accept some 
advertisements and reject others. A state statute may permit highway billboards to advertise 
businesses located in the neighborhood but not elsewhere, and regulatory commissions may 
prohibit businessmen from making statements which, though literally true, are potentially 
deceptive. The measure of   constitutional protection to be afforded commercial speech will 
surely be governed largely by the content of the communication. 
More directly in point are opinions dealing with the question whether the First 
Amendment prohibits the State and Federal Governments from wholly suppressing sexually 
oriented materials on the basis of their "obscene character."  In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 
629, the Court upheld a conviction for selling to a minor magazines which were concededly not 
"obscene" if shown to adults.  Indeed, the Members of the Court who would accord the greatest 
protection to such materials have repeatedly indicated that the State could prohibit the 
distribution or exhibition of such materials to juveniles and unconsenting adults.  Surely the First 
Amendment does not foreclose such a prohibition; yet it is equally clear that any such 
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Virginia Pharmacy Board  v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748.  
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prohibition must rest squarely on an appraisal of the content of material otherwise within a 
constitutionally protected area. 
Such a line may be drawn on the basis of content without violating the government's 
paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication.  For the 
regulation of the places where sexually explicit films may be exhibited is unaffected by whatever 
social, political, or philosophical message a film may be intended to communicate; whether a 
motion picture ridicules or characterizes one point of view or another, the effect of the 
ordinances is exactly the same. 
Moreover, even though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total 
suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society's 
interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than 
the interest in untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire's immortal comment.  Whether 
political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to despise what is said, every 
schoolchild can understand why our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same.  But few 
of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 
"Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice.  Even though the First 
Amendment protects communication in this area from total suppression, we hold that the State 
may legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis for placing them in a different 
classification from other motion pictures. 
The remaining question is whether the line drawn by these ordinances is justified by the 
city's interest in preserving the character of its neighborhoods.  On this question the record 
discloses a factual basis for the Common Council's conclusion that this kind of restriction will 
have the desired effect. 
8
 It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of its decision to require 
adult theaters to be separated rather than concentrated in the same areas.  In either event, the 
city's interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high 
respect.  Moreover, the city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with 
solutions to admittedly serious problems. 
Since what is ultimately at stake is nothing more than a limitation on the place where 
adult films may be exhibited, even though the determination of whether a particular film fits that 
characterization turns on the nature of its content, we conclude that the city's interest in the 
present and future character of its neighborhoods adequately supports its classification of motion 
pictures.  We hold that the zoning ordinances requiring that adult motion picture theaters not be 
located within 1,000 feet of two other regulated uses does not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. 
                                                 
8
The Common Council's determination was that a concentration of "adult" movie theaters causes the area to 
deteriorate and become a focus of crime, effects which are not attributable to theaters showing other types of films.  
It is this secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of "offensive" 
speech. 
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MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE 
MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting. 
The Court today holds that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not prevent the city 
of Detroit from using a system of prior restraints and criminal sanctions to enforce content-based 
restrictions on the geographic location of motion picture theaters that exhibit non-obscene but 
sexually oriented films.  I dissent from this drastic departure from established principles of First 
Amendment law. 
This case does not involve a simple zoning ordinance,
9
  or a content-neutral time, place, 
and manner restriction, or a regulation of obscene expression or other speech that is entitled to 
less than the full protection of the First Amendment. The kind of expression at issue here is no 
doubt objectionable to some, but that fact does not diminish its protected status any more than 
did the particular content of the "offensive" expression in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 
U.S. 205 (display of nudity on a drive-in movie screen); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 
130 (utterance of vulgar epithet); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (utterance of vulgar remark); 
Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (indecent remarks in campus 
newspaper); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (wearing of clothing inscribed with a vulgar 
remark); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (utterance of racial slurs); or Kingsley Pictures 
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (alluring portrayal of adultery as proper behavior). 
What this case does involve is the constitutional permissibility of selective interference 
with protected speech whose content is thought to produce distasteful effects.  It is elementary 
that a prime function of the First Amendment is to guard against just such interference.  By 
refusing to invalidate Detroit's ordinance the Court rides roughshod over cardinal principles of 
First Amendment law, which require that time, place, and manner regulations that affect 
protected expression be content neutral except in the limited context of a captive or juvenile 
audience.  In place of these principles the Court invokes a concept wholly alien to the First 
Amendment. Since "few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the 
citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice," ante, at 
70, the Court implies that these films are not entitled to the full protection of the Constitution.  
This stands "Voltaire's immortal comment," ibid., on its head.  For if the guarantees of the First 
Amendment were reserved for expression that more than a "few of us" would take up arms to 
defend, then the right of free expression would be defined and circumscribed by current popular 
opinion.  The guarantees of the Bill of Rights were designed to protect against precisely such 
majoritarian  limitations on individual liberty. 
The fact that the "offensive" speech here may not address "important" topics - "ideas of 
social and political significance," in the Court's terminology, ante, at 61 - does not mean that it is 
less worthy of constitutional protection.  "Wholly neutral futilities ... come under the protection 
of free speech as fully as do Keats' poems or Donne's sermons." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 
507, 528 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); accord, Cohen v. California, supra, at 25.  Moreover, in the 
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Contrast Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, which upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted no 
substantive right guaranteed by the Constitution. 
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absence of a judicial determination of obscenity, it is by no means clear that the speech is not 
"important" even on the Court's terms. "[S]ex and obscenity are not synonymous....  The 
portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny 
material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press.  Sex, a great and 
mysterious motive force in human life, has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to 
mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern." 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (footnotes omitted).  See also Kingsley Pictures Corp. 
v. Regents, supra, at 688-689. 
I can only interpret today's decision as an aberration.  The Court is undoubtedly 
sympathetic, as am I, to the well-intentioned efforts of Detroit to "clean up" its streets and 
prevent the proliferation of "skid rows."  But it is in those instances where protected speech 
grates most unpleasantly against the sensibilities that judicial vigilance must be at its height.  
Heretofore, the Court has not shied from its responsibility to protect "offensive" speech from 
governmental interference.    The Court must never forget that the consequences of rigorously 
enforcing the guarantees of the First Amendment are frequently unpleasant.  Much speech that 
seems to be of little or no value will enter the marketplace of ideas, threatening the quality of our 
social discourse and, more generally, the serenity of our lives.  But that is the price to be paid for 
constitutional freedom. 
CITY OF RENTON v. PLAYTIME THEATRES, INC.  
475 U.S. 41(1985) 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case involves a constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance, enacted by appellant 
city of Renton, Washington, that prohibits adult motion picture theaters from locating within 
1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school.  
Appellees, Playtime Theatres, Inc., and Sea-First Properties, Inc., filed an action in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Washington seeking a declaratory judgment that 
the Renton ordinance violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and a permanent injunction 
against its enforcement.  The District Court ruled in favor of Renton and denied the permanent 
injunction, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for 
reconsideration.  748 F.2d 527 (1984). We noted probable jurisdiction, 471 U.S. 1013 and now 
reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. 
In May 1980, the Mayor of Renton, a city of approximately 32,000 people located just 
south of Seattle, suggested to the Renton City Council that it consider the advisability of enacting 
zoning legislation dealing with adult entertainment uses.  No such uses existed in the city at that 
time.  Upon the Mayor's suggestion, the City Council referred the matter to the city's Planning 
and Development Committee.  The Committee held public hearings, reviewed the experiences of 
Seattle and other cities, and received a report from the City Attorney's Office advising as to 
developments in other cities.  The City Council, meanwhile, adopted Resolution No. 2368, which 
imposed a moratorium on the licensing of "any business . . . which . . . has as its primary purpose 
the selling, renting or showing of sexually explicit materials."  The resolution contained a clause 
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explaining that such businesses "would have a severe impact upon surrounding businesses and 
residences." 
In April 1981, acting on the basis of the Planning and Development Committee's 
recommendation, the City Council enacted Ordinance No. 3526.  The ordinance prohibited any 
"adult motion picture theater" from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or 
multiple-family dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of any school.  The term "adult 
motion picture theater" was defined as "[an] enclosed building used for presenting motion picture 
films, video cassettes, cable television, or any other such visual media, distinguished or 
[characterized] by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'specified sexual 
activities' or 'specified anatomical areas' . . . for observation by patrons therein." 
In early 1982, respondents acquired two existing theaters in downtown Renton, with the 
intention of using them to exhibit feature-length adult films. The theaters were located within the 
area proscribed by Ordinance No. 3526.  At about the same time, respondents filed the 
previously mentioned lawsuit challenging the ordinance on First and Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.  While the federal action was pending, the 
City Council amended the ordinance in several respects, adding a statement of reasons for its 
enactment and reducing the minimum distance from any school to 1,000 feet. 
In November 1982, the Federal Magistrate to whom respondents' action had been referred 
recommended the entry of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Renton ordinance 
and the denial of Renton's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.  The District Court 
adopted the Magistrate's recommendations and entered the preliminary injunction, and 
respondents began showing adult films at their two theaters in Renton.  Shortly thereafter, the 
parties agreed to submit the case for a final decision on whether a permanent injunction should 
issue on the basis of the record as already developed. 
The District Court then vacated the preliminary injunction, denied respondents' requested 
permanent injunction, and entered summary judgment in favor of Renton.  The court found that 
the Renton ordinance did not substantially restrict First Amendment interests, that Renton was 
not required to show specific adverse impact on Renton from the operation of adult theaters but 
could rely on the experiences of other cities, that the purposes of the ordinance were unrelated to 
the suppression of speech, and that the restrictions on speech imposed by the ordinance were no 
greater than necessary to further the governmental interests involved.  Relying on Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 
(1968), the court held that the Renton ordinance did not violate the First Amendment. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.  The Court of Appeals first 
concluded, contrary to the finding of the District Court, that the Renton ordinance constituted a 
substantial restriction on First Amendment interests.  Then, using the standards set forth in 
United States v. O'Brien, supra, the Court of Appeals held that Renton had improperly relied on 
the experiences of other cities in lieu of evidence about the effects of adult theaters on Renton, 
that Renton had thus failed to establish adequately the existence of a substantial governmental 
interest in support of its ordinance, and that in any event Renton's asserted interests had not been 
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shown to be unrelated to the suppression of expression.  The Court of Appeals remanded the case 
to the District Court for reconsideration of Renton's asserted interests. 
In our view, the resolution of this case is largely dictated by our decision in Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., supra.  There, although five Members of the Court did not agree 
on a single rationale for the decision, we held that the city of Detroit's zoning ordinance, which 
prohibited locating an adult theater within 1,000 feet of any two other "regulated uses" or within 
500 feet of any residential zone, did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  The 
Renton ordinance, like the one in American Mini Theatres, does not ban adult theaters 
altogether, but merely provides that such theaters may not be located within 1,000 feet of any 
residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school.  The ordinance is 
therefore properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation.  Id., at 63, and n. 
18; id., at 78-79 (POWELL, J., concurring). 
Describing the ordinance as a time, place, and manner regulation is, of course, only the 
first step in our inquiry.  This Court has long held that regulations enacted for the purpose of 
restraining speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment.  On the 
other hand, so-called "content-neutral" time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable so 
long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably 
limit alternative avenues of communication.  
At first glance, the Renton ordinance, like the ordinance in American Mini Theatres, does 
not appear to fit neatly into either the "content-based" or the "content-neutral" category.  To be 
sure, the ordinance treats theaters that specialize in adult films differently from other kinds of 
theaters.  Nevertheless, as the District Court concluded, the Renton ordinance is aimed not at the 
content of the films shown at "adult motion picture theatres," but rather at the secondary effects 
of such theaters on the surrounding community.  The District Court found that the City Council's 
"predominate concerns" were with the secondary effects of adult theaters, and not with the 
content of adult films themselves.  App. to Juris. Statement 31a (emphasis added).  But the Court 
of Appeals, relying on its decision in Tovar v. Billmeyer, 721 F.2d 1260, 1266 (CA9 1983), held 
that this was not enough to sustain the ordinance.  According to the Court of Appeals, if "a 
motivating factor" in enacting the ordinance was to restrict respondents' exercise of First 
Amendment rights the ordinance would be invalid, apparently no matter how small a part this 
motivating factor may have played in the City Council's decision. 748 F.2d, at 537 (emphasis in 
original).  This view of the law was rejected in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S., at 382-386, 
the very case that the Court of Appeals said it was applying: 
"It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down 
an otherwiseconstitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative 
motive. . . . What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not 
necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are 
sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork." 
The District Court's finding as to "predominate" intent, left undisturbed by the Court of 
Appeals, is more than adequate to establish that the city's pursuit of its zoning interests here was 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.  The ordinance by its terms is designed to 
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prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values, and generally "[protect] 
and [preserve] the quality of [the city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of 
urban life," not to suppress the expression of unpopular views.  As JUSTICE POWELL observed 
in American Mini Theatres, "[if] [the city] had been concerned with restricting the message 
purveyed by adult theaters, it would have tried to close them or restrict their number rather than 
circumscribe their choice as to location." 
In short, the Renton ordinance is completely consistent with our definition of "content-
neutral" speech regulations as those that "are justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech."  Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (emphasis added); Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 293; 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, supra, at 648. The ordinance does not 
contravene the fundamental principle that underlies our concern about "content-based" speech 
regulations: that "government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds 
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views." 
Mosley, supra, at 95-96. 
It was with this understanding in mind that, in American Mini Theatres, a majority of this 
Court decided that, at least with respect to businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials, 
zoning ordinances designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of such businesses are 
to be reviewed under the standards applicable to "content-neutral" time, place, and manner 
regulations.  JUSTICE STEVENS, writing for the plurality, concluded that the city of Detroit 
was entitled to draw a distinction between adult theaters and other kinds of theaters "without 
violating the government's paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected 
communication," 427 U.S., at 70, noting that "[it] is [the] secondary effect which these zoning 
ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of 'offensive' speech," JUSTICE POWELL, in 
concurrence, elaborated: 
"[The] dissent misconceives the issue in this case by insisting that it involves an 
impermissible time, place, and manner restriction based on the content of 
expression.  It involves nothing of the kind.  We have here merely a decision by 
the city to treat certain movie theaters differently because they have markedly 
different effects upon their surroundings. . . .  Moreover, even if this were a case 
involving a special governmental response to the content of one type of movie, it 
is possible that the result would be supported by a line of cases recognizing that 
the government can tailor its reaction to different types of speech according to the 
degree to which its special and overriding interests are implicated. 
The appropriate inquiry in this case, then, is whether the Renton ordinance is 
designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and allows for reasonable 
alternative avenues of communication.  It is clear that the ordinance meets such a 
standard.  As a majority of this Court recognized in American Mini Theatres, a 
city's "interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must 
be accorded high respect." Exactly the same vital governmental interests are at 
stake here. 
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The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that because the Renton ordinance was 
enacted without the benefit of studies specifically relating to "the particular 
problems or needs of Renton," the city's justifications for the ordinance were 
"conclusory and speculative." We think the Court of Appeals imposed on the city 
an unnecessarily rigid burden of proof. 
We hold that Renton was entitled to rely on the experiences of Seattle and other 
cities, and in particular on the "detailed findings" summarized in the Washington 
Supreme Court's Northend Cinema opinion, in enacting its adult theater zoning 
ordinance.  The First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an 
ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that 
already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the  city relies 
upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.  
That was the case here.  Nor is our holding affected by the fact that Seattle 
ultimately chose a different method of adult theater zoning than that chosen by 
Renton, since Seattle's choice of a different remedy to combat the secondary 
effects of adult theaters does not call into question either Seattle's identification of 
those secondary effects or the relevance of Seattle's experience to Renton. 
We also find no constitutional defect in the method chosen by Renton to further 
its substantial interests.  Cities may regulate adult theaters by dispersing them, as 
in Detroit, or by effectively concentrating them, as in Renton.  "It is not our 
function to appraise the wisdom of [the city's] decision to require adult theaters to 
be separated rather than concentrated in the same areas. . . .  [The] city must be 
allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly 
serious problems." American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S., at 71 .  Moreover, the 
Renton ordinance is "narrowly tailored" to affect only that category of theaters  
shown to produce the unwanted secondary effects.  
Finally, turning to the question whether the Renton ordinance allows for 
reasonable alternative avenues of communication, we note that the ordinance 
leaves some 520 acres, or more than five percent of the entire land area of Renton, 
open to use as adult theater sites.  The District Court found, and the Court of 
Appeals did not dispute the finding, that the 520 acres of land consists of 
"[ample], accessible real estate," including "acreage in all stages of development 
from raw land to developed, industrial, warehouse, office, and shopping space 
that is criss-crossed by freeways, highways, and roads." 
Respondents argue, however, that some of the land in question is already occupied by 
existing businesses, that "practically none" of the undeveloped land is currently for sale or lease, 
and that in general there are no "commercially viable" adult theater sites within the 520 acres left 
open by the Renton ordinance.  The Court of Appeals accepted these arguments, concluded that 
the 520 acres was not truly "available" land, and therefore held that the Renton ordinance "would 
result in a substantial restriction" on speech.  
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 We disagree with both the reasoning and the conclusion of the Court of Appeals.  That 
respondents must fend for themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing with other 
prospective purchasers and lessees, does not give rise to a First Amendment violation.  In our 
view, the First Amendment requires only that Renton refrain from effectively denying 
respondents a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult theater within the city, and the 
ordinance before us easily meets this requirement. 
In sum, we find that the Renton ordinance represents a valid governmental response to 
the "admittedly serious problems" created by adult theaters.  Renton has not used "the power to 
zone as a pretext for suppressing expression," id., at 84 (POWELL, J., concurring), but rather has 
sought to make some areas available for adult theaters and their patrons, while at the same time 
preserving the quality of life in the community at large by preventing those theaters from 
locating in other areas.  This, after all, is the essence of zoning.  Here, as in American Mini 
Theatres, the city has enacted a zoning ordinance that meets these goals while also satisfying the 
dictates of the First Amendment.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore 
Reversed. 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN concurs in the result. 
DISSENT: JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting. 
Despite the evidence in the record, the Court reasons that the fact "[that] respondents 
must fend for themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing with other prospective 
purchasers and lessees, does not give rise to a First Amendment violation."  .  However, 
respondents are not on equal footing with other prospective purchasers and lessees, but must 
conduct business under severe restrictions not imposed upon other establishments.  The Court 
also argues that the First Amendment does not compel "the government to ensure that adult 
theaters, or any other kinds of speech-related businesses for that matter, will be able to obtain 
sites at bargain prices."    However, respondents do not ask Renton to guarantee low-price sites 
for their businesses, but seek only a reasonable opportunity to operate adult theaters in the city.  
By denying them this opportunity, Renton can effectively ban a form of protected speech from 
its borders.  The ordinance "greatly [restricts] access to . . . lawful speech," American Mini 
Theatres, supra, (plurality opinion), and is plainly unconstitutional. 
CITY OF LADUE v. GILLEO 
512 U.S. 43 (1994) 
JUDGES: STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  O'CONNOR, J., 
filed a concurring opinion. 
An ordinance of the City of Ladue prohibits homeowners from displaying any signs on 
their property except "residence identification" signs, "for sale" signs, and signs warning of 
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safety hazards. The ordinance permits commercial establishments, churches, and nonprofit 
organizations to erect certain signs that are not allowed at residences. The question presented is 
whether the ordinance violates a Ladue resident's right to free speech.
1 
 
I 
Respondent Margaret P. Gilleo owns one of the 57 single-family homes in the Willow 
Hill subdivision of Ladue.
2
 On December 8, 1990, she placed on her front lawn a 24- by 36-inch 
sign printed with the words "Say No to War in the Persian Gulf, Call Congress Now." After that 
sign disappeared, Gilleo put up another but it was knocked to the ground. When Gilleo reported 
these incidents to the police, they advised her that such signs were prohibited in Ladue. The City 
Council denied her petition for a variance.
3
 Gilleo then filed this action under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 
against the City, the Mayor, and members of the City Council, alleging that Ladue's sign 
ordinance violated her First Amendment right of free speech. 
The District Court issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the ordinance. 
Gilleo then placed an 8.5- by 11-inch sign in the second story window of her home stating, "For 
Peace in the Gulf." The Ladue City Council responded to the injunction by repealing its 
ordinance and enacting a replacement.
4
 Like its predecessor, the new ordinance contains a 
general prohibition of "signs" and defines that term broadly.
5
 The ordinance prohibits all signs 
except those that fall within one of ten exemptions. Thus, "residential identification signs" no 
larger than one square foot are allowed, as are signs advertising "that the property is for sale, 
lease or exchange" and identifying the owner or agent. '. Also exempted are signs "for churches, 
religious institutions, and schools," "commercial signs in commercially or industrial zoned 
districts," and on-site signs advertising "gasoline filling stations."  Unlike its predecessor, the 
                                                 
1
The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . 
. ." The Fourteenth Amendment makes this limitation applicable to the States, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652, 69 L. Ed. 1138, 45 S. Ct. 625 (1925), and to their political subdivisions, see Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 82 
L. Ed. 949, 58 S. Ct. 666 (1938).    
2
 Ladue is a suburb of St. Louis, Missouri. It has a population of almost 9,000, and an area of about 8.5 square miles, 
of which only 3% is zoned for commercial or industrial use. 
3
 The ordinance then in effect gave the Council the authority to "permit a variation in the strict application of the 
provisions and requirements of this chapter . . . where the public interest will be best served by permitting such 
variation." App. 72. 
4
The new ordinance eliminates the provision allowing for variances and contains a grandfather clause exempting 
signs already lawfully in place.  
5
 Section 35-2 of the ordinance declares that "No sign shall be erected [or] maintained" in the City except in 
conformity with the ordinance; ' 35-3 authorizes the City to remove nonconforming signs. App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a. 
Section 35-1 defines "sign" as: 
"A name, word, letter, writing, identification, description, or illustration which is erected, placed upon, affixed to, 
painted or represented upon a building or structure, or any part thereof, or any manner upon a parcel of land or lot, 
and which publicizes an object, product, place, activity, opinion, person, institution, organization or place of 
business, or which is used to advertise or promote the interests of any person. The word 'sign' shall also include 
'banners', 'pennants', 'insignia', 'bulletins boards', 'ground signs', 'billboard', 'poster billboards', 'illuminated signs', 
'projecting signs', 'temporary signs', 'marquees', 'roof signs', 'yard signs', 'electric signs', 'wall signs', and 'window 
signs', wherever placed out of doors in view of the general public or wherever placed indoors as a window sign." Id., 
at 39a. 
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new ordinance contains a lengthy "Declaration of Findings, Policies, Interests, and Purposes," 
part of which recites that the  "proliferation of an unlimited   number of signs in private, 
residential, commercial, industrial, and public areas of the City of Ladue would create ugliness, 
visual blight and clutter, tarnish the natural beauty of the landscape as well as the residential and 
commercial architecture, impair property values, substantially impinge upon the privacy and 
special ambience of the community, and may cause safety and traffic hazards to motorists, 
pedestrians, and children[.]"  
Gilleo amended her complaint to challenge the new ordinance, which explicitly prohibits 
window signs like hers. The District Court held the ordinance unconstitutional, and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed. 986 F.2d 1180 (CA8 1993). Relying on the plurality opinion in Metromedia, 
Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981), the Court of Appeals 
held the ordinance invalid as a "content based" regulation because the City treated commercial 
speech more favorably than noncommercial speech and favored some kinds of noncommercial 
speech over others. Acknowledging that "Ladue's interests in enacting its ordinance are 
substantial," the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that those interests were "not 
sufficiently 'compelling' to support a content-based restriction."  
We granted the City of Ladue's petition for certiorari, and now affirm. 
II 
While signs are a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause, they pose 
distinctive problems that are subject to municipalities' police powers.  Unlike oral speech, signs 
take up space and may obstruct views, distract motorists, displace alternative uses for land, and 
pose other problems that legitimately call for regulation. It is common ground that governments 
may regulate the physical characteristics of signs— just as they can, within reasonable bounds 
and absent censorial purpose, regulate audible expression in its capacity as noise. See, e.g., Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989); Kovacs v. 
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 93 L. Ed. 513, 69 S. Ct. 448 (1949). However, because regulation of a 
medium inevitably affects communication itself, it is not surprising that we have had occasion to 
review the constitutionality of municipal ordinances prohibiting the display of certain outdoor 
signs. 
In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 52 L. Ed. 2d 155, 97 S. Ct. 1614 
(1977), we addressed an ordinance that sought to maintain stable, integrated neighborhoods by 
prohibiting homeowners  from placing "For Sale" or "Sold" signs on their property. Although we 
recognized the importance of Willingboro's objective, we held that the First Amendment 
prevented the township from "achieving its goal by restricting the free flow of truthful 
information." Id., at 95. In some respects Linmark is the mirror image of this case. For instead of 
prohibiting "For Sale" signs without banning any other signs, Ladue has exempted such signs 
from an otherwise virtually complete ban. Moreover, whereas in Linmark we noted that the 
ordinance was not concerned with the promotion of aesthetic values unrelated to the content of 
the prohibited speech, here Ladue relies squarely on that content-neutral justification for its 
ordinance. 
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In Metromedia, we reviewed an ordinance imposing substantial prohibitions on outdoor 
advertising displays within the City of San Diego in the interest of traffic safety and aesthetics. 
The ordinance generally banned all except those advertising "on-site" activities. The Court 
concluded that the City's interest in traffic safety and its aesthetic interest in preventing "visual 
clutter" could justify a prohibition of off-site commercial billboards even though similar on-site 
signs were allowed. Nevertheless, the Court's judgment in Metromedia, supported by two 
different lines of reasoning, invalidated the San Diego ordinance in its entirety. According to 
Justice White's plurality opinion, the ordinance impermissibly discriminated on the basis of 
content by permitting on-site commercial speech while broadly prohibiting noncommercial 
messages. On the other hand, Justice Brennan, joined by JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concluded 
"that the practical effect of the San Diego ordinance [was] to eliminate the billboard as an 
effective medium of communication" for noncommercial messages, and that the city had failed 
to make the strong showing needed to justify such "content-neutral prohibitions of particular 
media of communication." The three dissenters also viewed San Diego's ordinance as tantamount 
to a blanket prohibition of billboards, but would have upheld it because they did not perceive 
"even a hint of bias or censorship in the city's actions" nor "any reason to believe that the overall 
communications market in San Diego is inadequate." 
In City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 80 L. Ed. 2d 
772, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984), we upheld a Los Angeles ordinance that prohibited the posting of 
signs on public property. Noting the conclusion shared by seven Justices in Metromedia that San 
Diego's "interest in avoiding visual clutter" was sufficient to justify a prohibition of commercial 
billboards, id., at 806-807, in Vincent we upheld the Los Angeles ordinance, which was justified 
on the same grounds. We rejected the argument that the validity of the City's aesthetic interest 
had been compromised by failing to extend the ban to private property, reasoning that the 
"private citizen's interest in controlling the use of his own property justifies the disparate 
treatment." Id., at 811. We also rejected as "misplaced" respondents' reliance on public forum 
principles, for they had "failed to demonstrate the existence of a traditional right of access 
respecting such items as utility poles . . . comparable to that recognized for public streets and 
parks." Id., at 814. 
These decisions identify two analytically distinct grounds for challenging the 
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance regulating the display of signs. One is that the measure 
in effect restricts too little speech because its exemptions discriminate on the basis of the signs' 
messages. See Metromedia, 453 U.S., at 512-517 (opinion of White, J.). Alternatively, such 
provisions are subject to attack on the ground that they simply prohibit too much protected 
speech. The City of Ladue contends, first, that the Court of Appeals' reliance on the former 
rationale was misplaced because the City's regulatory purposes are content-neutral, and, second, 
that those purposes justify the comprehensiveness of the sign prohibition. A comment on the 
former contention will help explain why we ultimately base our decision on a rejection of the 
latter. 
III 
While surprising at first glance, the notion that a regulation of speech may be 
impermissibly underinclusive is firmly grounded in basic First Amendment principles. Thus, an 
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exemption from an otherwise permissible regulation of speech may represent a governmental 
"attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to 
the people." First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Alternatively, through 
the combined operation of a general speech restriction and its exemptions, the government might 
seek to select the "permissible subjects for public debate" and thereby to "control . . . the search 
for political truth." Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Service Comm'n of N.Y. 447 U.S. 
530, 538, 65 L. Ed. 2d 319, 100 S. Ct. 2326 (1980).  
The City argues that its sign ordinance implicates neither of these concerns, and that the 
Court of Appeals therefore erred in demanding a "compelling" justification for the exemptions. 
The mix of prohibitions and exemptions in the ordinance, Ladue maintains, reflects legitimate 
differences among the side effects of various kinds of signs. These differences are only 
adventitiously connected with content, and supply a sufficient justification, unrelated to the 
City's approval or disapproval of specific messages, for carving out the specified categories from 
the general ban. Thus, according to the Declaration of Findings, Policies, Interests, and Purposes 
supporting the ordinance, the permitted signs, unlike the prohibited signs, are unlikely to 
contribute to the dangers of "unlimited proliferation" associated with categories of signs that are 
not inherently limited in number. Because only a few residents will need to display "for sale" or 
"for rent" signs at any given time, permitting one such sign per marketed house does not threaten 
visual clutter. Because the City has only a few businesses, churches, and schools,  the same 
rationale explains the exemption for on-site commercial and organizational signs.  Moreover, 
some of the exempted categories (e.g., danger signs) respond to unique public needs to permit 
certain kinds of speech. Even if we assume the validity of these arguments, the exemptions in 
Ladue's ordinance nevertheless shed light on the separate question of whether the ordinance 
prohibits too much speech.    Exemptions from an otherwise legitimate regulation of a medium 
of speech may be noteworthy for a reason quite apart from the risks of viewpoint and content 
discrimination: they may diminish the credibility of the government's rationale for restricting 
speech in the first place. In this case, at the very least, the exemptions from Ladue's ordinance 
demonstrate that Ladue has concluded that the interest in allowing certain messages to be 
conveyed by means of residential signs outweighs the City's aesthetic interest in eliminating 
outdoor signs. Ladue has not imposed a flat ban on signs because it has determined that at least 
some of them are too vital to be banned.  
Under the Court of Appeals' content discrimination rationale, the City might theoretically 
remove the defects in its ordinance by simply repealing all of the exemptions. If, however, the 
ordinance is also vulnerable because it prohibits too much speech, that solution would not save 
it. Moreover, if the prohibitions in Ladue's ordinance are impermissible, resting our decision on 
its exemptions would afford scant relief for respondent Gilleo. She is primarily concerned not 
with the scope of the exemptions available in other locations, such as commercial areas and on 
church property. She asserts a constitutional right to display an antiwar sign at her own home. 
Therefore, we first ask whether Ladue may properly prohibit Gilleo from displaying her sign, 
and then, only if necessary, consider the separate question whether it was improper for the City 
simultaneously to permit certain other signs. In examining the propriety of Ladue's near-total 
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prohibition of residential signs, we will assume, arguendo, the validity of the City's submission 
that the various exemptions are free of impermissible content or viewpoint discrimination.
6
 
IV 
In Linmark we held that the City's interest in maintaining a stable, racially integrated 
neighborhood was not sufficient to support a prohibition of residential "For Sale" signs. We 
recognized that even such a narrow sign prohibition would have a deleterious effect on residents' 
ability to convey important information because alternatives were "far from satisfactory." 431 
U.S., at 93. Ladue's sign ordinance is supported principally by the City's interest in minimizing 
the visual clutter associated with signs, an interest that is concededly valid but certainly no more 
compelling than the interests at stake in Linmark. Moreover, whereas the ordinance in Linmark 
applied only to a form of commercial speech, Ladue's ordinance covers even such absolutely 
pivotal speech as a sign protesting an imminent governmental decision to go to war. 
The impact on free communication of Ladue's broad sign prohibition, moreover, is 
manifestly greater than in Linmark. Gilleo and other residents of Ladue are forbidden to display 
virtually any "sign" on their property. The ordinance defines that term sweepingly. A prohibition 
is not always invalid merely because it applies to a sizeable category of speech; the sign ban we 
upheld in Vincent, for example, was quite broad. But in Vincent we specifically noted that the 
category of speech in question- signs placed on public property -was not a "uniquely valuable or 
important mode of communication," and that there was no evidence that "appellees' ability to 
communicate effectively is threatened by ever-increasing restrictions on expression." 466 U.S., 
at 812.  
Here, in contrast, Ladue has almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of 
communication that is both unique and important. It has totally foreclosed that medium to 
political, religious, or personal messages. Signs that react to a local happening or express a view 
on a controversial issue both reflect and animate change in the life of a community. Often placed 
on lawns or in windows, residential signs play an important part in political campaigns, during 
which they are displayed to signal the resident's support for particular candidates, parties, or 
causes.
7
  They may not afford the same opportunities for conveying complex ideas as do other 
media, but residential signs have long been an important and distinct medium of expression. 
Our prior decisions have voiced particular concern with laws that foreclose an entire 
medium of expression. Thus, we have held invalid ordinances that completely banned the 
distribution of pamphlets within the municipality. Although prohibitions foreclosing entire media 
                                                 
6
 Because we set to one side the content discrimination question, we need not address the City's argument that the 
ordinance, although speaking in subject-matter terms, merely targets the "undesirable secondary effects" associated 
with certain kinds of signs. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29, 106 S. Ct. 925 
(1986). The inquiry we undertake below into the adequacy of alternative channels of communication would also 
apply to a provision justified on those grounds. See id., at 50.  
7
 "Small [political campaign] posters have maximum effect when they go up in the windows of homes, for this 
demonstrates that citizens of the district are supporting your candidate--an impact that money can't buy." D. 
Simpson, Winning Elections: A Handbook in Participatory Politics 87 (rev. ed. 1981). 
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may be completely free of content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose to the 
freedom of speech is readily apparent- by eliminating a common means of speaking, such 
measures can suppress too much speech.  
Ladue contends, however, that its ordinance is a mere regulation of the "time, place, or 
manner" of speech because residents remain free to convey their desired messages by other 
means, such as hand-held signs, "letters, handbills, flyers, telephone calls, newspaper 
advertisements, bumper stickers, speeches, and neighborhood or community meetings." 
However, even regulations that do not foreclose an entire medium of expression, but merely shift 
the time, place, or manner of its use, must "leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication." Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 82 L. Ed. 
2d 221, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984). In this case, we are not persuaded that adequate substitutes exist 
for the important medium of speech that Ladue has closed off. 
 Displaying a sign from one's own residence often carries a message quite distinct from 
placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text or picture by other means. 
Precisely because of their location, such signs provide information about the identity of the 
"speaker." As an early and eminent student of  rhetoric observed, the identity of the speaker is an 
important component of many attempts to persuade. 
A sign advocating "Peace in the Gulf" in the front lawn of a retired general or decorated 
war veteran may provoke a different reaction than the same sign in a 10-year-old child's bedroom 
window or the same message on a bumper sticker of a passing automobile. An espousal of 
socialism may carry different implications when displayed on the grounds of a stately mansion 
than when pasted on a factory wall or an ambulatory sandwich board. 
Residential signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication. 
Especially for persons of modest means or limited mobility, a yard or window sign may have no 
practical substitute. Even for the affluent, the added costs in money or time of taking out a 
newspaper advertisement, handing out leaflets on the street, or standing in front of one's house 
with a hand-held sign may make the difference between participating and not participating in 
some public debate. Furthermore, a person who puts up a sign at her residence often intends to 
reach neighbors, an audience that could not be reached nearly as well by other means. 
A special respect for individual liberty in the home has long been part of our culture and 
our law. Most Americans would be understandably dismayed, given that tradition, to learn that it 
was illegal to display from their window an 8- by 11-inch sign expressing their political views. 
Whereas the government's need to mediate among various competing uses, including expressive 
ones, for public streets and facilities is constant and unavoidable its need to regulate temperate 
speech from the home is surely much less pressing, see Spence, 418 U.S., at 409. 
Our decision that Ladue's ban on almost all residential signs violates the First 
Amendment by no means leaves the City powerless to address the ills that may be associated 
with residential signs. It bears mentioning that individual residents themselves have strong 
incentives to keep their own property values up and to prevent "visual clutter" in their own yards 
and neighborhoods- incentives markedly different from those of persons who erect signs on 
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others' land, in others' neighborhoods, or on public property. Residents' self-interest diminishes 
the danger of the "unlimited" proliferation of residential signs that concerns the City of Ladue. 
We are confident that more temperate measures could in large part satisfy Ladue's stated 
regulatory needs without harm to the First Amendment rights of its citizens. As currently framed, 
however, the ordinance abridges those rights. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.  
VAN ORDEN v. PERRY 
545 U.S. 677 (2005) 
JUDGES: REHNQUIST, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an 
opinion, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., and 
THOMAS, J., filed concurring opinions. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the 
judgment. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined. 
O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion. SOUTER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
STEVENS and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an 
opinion, in which JUSTICE SCALIA, JUSTICE KENNEDY, and JUSTICE THOMAS join. 
The question here is whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment allows 
the display of a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol 
grounds. We hold that it does. 
The 22 acres surrounding the Texas State Capitol contain 17 monuments and 21 
historical markers commemorating the "people, ideals, and events that compose Texan identity." 
Tex. H. Con. Res. 38, 77th Leg. (2001). The monolith challenged here stands 6-feet high and 3-
feet wide. It is located to the north of the Capitol building, between the Capitol and the Supreme 
Court building. Its primary content is the text of the Ten Commandments. An eagle grasping the 
American flag, an eye inside of a pyramid, and two small tablets with what appears to be an 
ancient script are carved above the text of the Ten Commandments. Below the text are two Stars 
of David and the superimposed Greek letters Chi and Rho, which represent Christ. The bottom of 
the monument bears the inscription "PRESENTED TO THE PEOPLE AND YOUTH OF 
TEXAS BY THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES OF TEXAS 1961." 
The legislative record surrounding the State's acceptance of the monument from the 
Eagles -- a national social, civic, and patriotic organization -- is limited to legislative journal 
entries. After the monument was accepted, the State selected a site for the monument based on 
the recommendation of the state organization responsible for maintaining the Capitol grounds. 
The Eagles paid the cost of erecting the monument, the dedication of which was presided over by 
two state legislators. 
Petitioner Thomas Van Orden is a native Texan and a resident of Austin. At one time he 
was a licensed lawyer, having graduated from Southern Methodist Law School. Van Orden 
testified that, since 1995, he has encountered the Ten Commandments monument during his 
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frequent visits to the Capitol grounds. His visits are typically for the purpose of using the law 
library in the Supreme Court building, which is located just northwest of the Capitol building. 
Forty years after the monument's erection and six years after Van Orden began to 
encounter the monument frequently, he sued numerous state officials in their official capacities 
under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.S.C. §1983, seeking both a declaration that the monument's 
placement violates the Establishment Clause and an injunction requiring its removal.  After a 
bench trial, the District Court held that the monument did not contravene the Establishment 
Clause. It found that the State had a valid secular purpose in recognizing and commending the 
Eagles for their efforts to  reduce juvenile delinquency. The District Court also determined that a 
reasonable observer, mindful of the history, purpose, and context, would not conclude that this 
passive monument conveyed the message that the State was seeking to endorse religion. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's holdings with respect to the monument's purpose 
and effect. 351 F.3d 173 (CA5 2003). We granted certiorari, 543 U.S. ___, 160 L. Ed. 2d 220, 
125 S. Ct. 346 (2004), and now affirm. 
Our cases, Januslike, point in two directions in applying the Establishment Clause. One 
face looks toward the strong role played by religion and religious traditions throughout our 
Nation's history. As we observed in School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 10 L. Ed. 2d 844, 83 S. Ct. 1560 (1963): 
"It is true that religion has been closely identified with our history and 
government . . . The fact that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there 
was a God and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly 
evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution 
itself . . . . It can be truly said, therefore, that today, as in the beginning, our 
national life reflects a religious people who, in the words of Madison, are 
'earnestly praying, as . . . in duty bound, that the Supreme Lawgiver of the 
Universe . . . guide them into every measure which may be worthy of his [blessing 
. . . .]'" Id., at 212-213, 10 L. Ed. 2d 844, 83 S. Ct. 1560.   
The other face looks toward the principle that governmental intervention in religious 
matters can itself endanger religious freedom. 
This case, like all Establishment Clause challenges, presents us with the difficulty of 
respecting both faces. Our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being, yet these institutions must 
not press religious observances upon their citizens. One face looks to the past in 
acknowledgment of our Nation's heritage, while the other looks to the present in demanding a 
separation between church and state. Reconciling these two faces requires that we neither 
abdicate our responsibility to maintain a division between church and state nor evince a hostility 
to religion by disabling the government from in some ways recognizing our religious heritage: 
"When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious 
authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows 
the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people 
and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may 
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not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a 
callous indifference to religious groups . . . . We find no constitutional 
requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and 
to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious 
influence." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-314, 96 L. Ed. 954, 72 S. Ct. 
679 (1952).  
These two faces are evident in representative cases both upholding  and invalidating laws 
under the Establishment Clause. Over the last 25 years, we have sometimes pointed to Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971),  as providing the governing 
test in Establishment Clause challenges. Yet, just two years after Lemon was decided, we noted 
that the factors identified in Lemon serve as "no more than helpful signposts." Hunt v. McNair, 
413 U.S. 734, 741, 37 L. Ed. 2d 923, 93 S. Ct. 2868 (1973). Many of our recent cases simply 
have not applied the Lemon test. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 153 L. Ed. 
2d 604, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002); Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 150 L. 
Ed. 2d 151, 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001). Others have applied it only after concluding that the 
challenged practice was invalid under a different Establishment Clause test. 
Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has 
erected on its Capitol grounds. Instead, our analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument 
and by our Nation's history. 
Recognition of the role of God in our Nation's heritage has also been reflected in our 
decisions. We have acknowledged, for example, that "religion has been closely identified with 
our history and government,"  School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S., at 212, 
10 L. Ed. 2d 844, 83 S. Ct. 1560, and that "the history of man is inseparable from the history of 
religion," Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434, 8 L. Ed. 2d 601, 82 S. Ct. 1261 (1962). This 
recognition has led us to hold that the Establishment Clause permits a state legislature to open its 
daily sessions with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S., at 
792, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1019, 103 S. Ct. 3330. Such a practice, we thought, was "deeply embedded in 
the history and tradition of this country." Id., at 786, 77 L. Ed 2d 1019, 103 S. Ct. 3330. As we 
observed there, "it would be incongruous to interpret [the Establishment Clause] as imposing 
more stringent First Amendment limits on the states than the draftsmen imposed on the Federal 
Government." Id., at 790-791, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1019, 103 S. Ct 3330. With similar reasoning,  we 
have upheld laws, which originated from one of the Ten Commandments, that prohibited the sale 
of merchandise on Sunday. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431-440, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 81 
S. Ct. 1101 (1961); see id., at 470-488, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 81 S. Ct. 1101 (separate opinion of 
Frankfurter, J.). 
In this case we are faced with a display of the Ten Commandments on government 
property outside the Texas State Capitol. Such acknowledgments of the role played by the Ten 
Commandments in our Nation's heritage are common throughout America. We need only look 
within our own Courtroom. Since 1935, Moses has stood, holding two tablets that reveal portions 
of the Ten Commandments written in Hebrew, among other lawgivers in the south frieze. 
Representations of the Ten Commandments adorn the metal gates lining the north and south 
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sides of the Courtroom as well as the doors leading into the Courtroom. Moses also sits on the 
exterior east facade of the building holding the Ten Commandments tablets. 
Similar acknowledgments can be seen throughout a visitor's tour of our Nation's Capital. 
For example, a large statue of Moses holding the Ten Commandments, alongside a statue of the 
Apostle Paul, has overlooked the rotunda of the Library of Congress' Jefferson Building since 
1897. And the Jefferson Building's Great Reading Room contains a sculpture of a woman beside 
the Ten Commandments with a quote above her from the Old Testament (Micah 6:8). A 
medallion with two tablets depicting the Ten Commandments decorates the floor of the National 
Archives. Inside the Department of Justice, a statue entitled "The Spirit of Law" has two tablets 
representing the Ten Commandments lying at its feet. In front of the Ronald Reagan Building is 
another sculpture that includes a depiction of the Ten Commandments. So too a 24-foot-tall 
sculpture, depicting, among other things, the Ten Commandments and a cross, stands outside the 
federal courthouse that houses  both the Court of Appeals and the District Court for the District 
of Columbia. Moses is also prominently featured in the Chamber of the United States House of 
Representatives.  
Of course, the Ten Commandments are religious -- they were so viewed at their inception 
and so remain. The monument, therefore, has religious significance. According to Judeo-
Christian belief, the Ten Commandments were given to Moses by God on Mt. Sinai. But Moses 
was a lawgiver as well as a religious leader. And the Ten Commandments have an undeniable 
historical meaning, as the foregoing examples demonstrate. Simply having religious content or 
promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause.  
There are, of course, limits to the display of religious messages or symbols. For example, 
we held unconstitutional a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in 
every public schoolroom. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 66 L. Ed. 2d 199, 101 S. Ct. 192 (1980) 
(per curiam). In the classroom context, we found that the Kentucky statute had an improper and 
As evidenced by Stone's almost exclusive reliance upon two of our school prayer cases, it stands 
as an example of the fact that we have "been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance   
with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools," Neither Stone itself nor 
subsequent opinions have indicated that Stone's holding would extend to a legislative chamber. 
The placement of the Ten Commandments monument on the Texas State Capitol grounds 
is a far more passive use of those texts than was the case in Stone, where the text confronted 
elementary school students every day. Indeed, Van Orden, the petitioner here, apparently walked 
by the monument for a number of years before bringing this lawsuit. The monument is therefore 
also quite different from the prayers involved in Schempp and Lee v. Weisman. Texas has 
treated her Capitol grounds monuments as representing the several strands in the State's political 
and legal history. The inclusion of the Ten Commandments monument in this group has a dual 
significance, partaking of both religion and government. We cannot say that Texas' display of 
this monument violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
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It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring.  
I join the opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE because I think it accurately reflects our 
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence -- or at least the Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
we currently apply some of the time. I would prefer to reach the same result by adopting an 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence that is in accord with our Nation's past and present practices, 
and that can be consistently applied -- the central relevant feature of which is that there is 
nothing unconstitutional in a State's favoring religion generally,  honoring God through public 
prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten 
Commandments. See McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union,, 162 L. Ed. 2d 729, 125 S. 
Ct. 2722, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 5211 (June 27, 2005) post, at 1-11 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). 
JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring. [omitted] 
JUSTICE BREYER, concurring in the judgment. [omitted] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins, dissenting. 
The sole function of the monument on the grounds of Texas' State Capitol is to display 
the full text of one version of the Ten Commandments. The monument is not a work of art and 
does not refer to any event in the history of the State. It is significant because, and only because, 
it communicates the following message: 
"I AM the LORD thy God. 
"Thou shalt have no other gods before me. 
"Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images. 
"Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain. 
"Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy. 
"Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which 
the Lord thy God giveth thee. 
"Thou shalt not [***50]  kill. 
"Thou shalt not commit adultery. 
"Thou shalt not steal. 
"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor. 
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"Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house. 
"Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor his 
maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything that is thy neighbor's."   
Viewed on its face, Texas' display has no purported connection to God's role in the 
formation of Texas or the founding of our Nation; nor does it provide the reasonable observer 
with any basis to guess that it was erected to honor any individual or organization. The message 
transmitted by Texas' chosen display is quite plain: This State endorses the divine code of the 
"Judeo-Christian" God. 
For those of us who learned to recite the King James version of the text long before we 
understood the meaning of some of its words, God's Commandments may seem like wise 
counsel. The question before this Court, however, is whether it is counsel that the State of Texas 
may proclaim without violating the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. If any fragment of 
Jefferson's metaphorical "wall of separation between church and State" is to be preserved -- if 
there remains any meaning to the "wholesome 'neutrality' of which this Court's [Establishment 
Clause] cases speak," School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222, 10 L. 
Ed. 2d 844, 83 S. Ct. 1560 (1963) – a negative answer to that question is mandatory.  
McCREARY COUNTY v. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
545 U.S. 844 (2005) 
JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Executives of two counties posted a version of the Ten Commandments on the walls of 
their courthouses. After suits were filed charging violations of the Establishment Clause, the 
legislative body of each county adopted a resolution calling for a more extensive exhibit meant 
to show that the Commandments are Kentucky's "precedent legal code," The result in each 
instance was a modified display of the Commandments surrounded by texts containing religious 
references as their sole common element. After changing counsel, the counties revised the 
exhibits again by eliminating some documents,  expanding the text set out in another, and adding 
some new ones. 
The issues are whether a determination of the counties' purpose is a sound basis for ruling 
on the Establishment Clause complaints, and whether evaluation of the counties' claim of secular 
purpose for the ultimate displays may take their evolution into account. We hold that the 
counties' manifest objective may be dispositive of the constitutional enquiry, and that the 
development of the presentation should be considered when determining its purpose. 
I 
In the summer of 1999, petitioners McCreary County and Pulaski County, Kentucky 
(hereinafter Counties), put up in their respective courthouses large, gold-framed copies of an 
abridged text of the King James version of the Ten Commandments, including a citation to the 
Book of Exodus.  In McCreary County, the placement of the Commandments responded to an 
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order of the county legislative body requiring "the display [to] be posted in 'a very high traffic 
area' of the courthouse." 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 684 (ED Ky. 2000). In Pulaski County, amidst 
reported controversy over the propriety of the display, the Commandments were hung in a 
ceremony presided over by the county Judge-Executive, who called them "good rules to live by" 
and who recounted the story of an astronaut who became convinced "there must be a divine 
God" after viewing the Earth from the moon. The Judge-Executive was accompanied by the 
pastor of his church, who called the Commandments "a creed of ethics" and told the press after 
the ceremony that displaying the Commandments was "one of the greatest things the judge could 
have done to close out the millennium." In both counties, this was the version of the 
Commandments posted: 
"Thou shalt have no other gods before me.  
"Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven images.  
"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.  
"Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.  
"Honor thy father and thy mother.  
"Thou shalt not kill.  
"Thou shalt not commit adultery.  
"Thou shalt not steal.  
"Thou shalt not bear false witness.  
"Thou shalt not covet. 
"Exodus 20:3-17."  
In each county, the hallway display was "readily visible to . . . county citizens who use 
the courthouse to conduct their civic business, to obtain or renew driver's licenses and permits, to 
register cars, to pay local taxes, and to register to vote." 96  F. Supp. 2d., at 684; American Civil 
Liberties Union of Kentucky v. Pulaski County, Kentucky, 96 F. Supp. 2d 691, 695 (ED Ky. 
2000). 
In November 1999, respondents American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky et al. sued 
the Counties in Federal District Court under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.S.C. §1983, and sought a 
preliminary injunction against maintaining the displays, which the ACLU charged were 
violations of the prohibition of religious establishment included in the First Amendment of the 
Constitution. Within a month, and before the District Court had responded to the request for 
injunction, the legislative body of each County authorized a second, expanded display, by nearly 
identical resolutions reciting that the Ten Commandments are "the precedent legal code upon 
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which the civil and criminal codes of . . . Kentucky are founded," and stating several grounds for 
taking that position: that "the Ten Commandments are codified in Kentucky's civil and criminal 
laws"; that the Kentucky House of Representatives had in 1993 "voted unanimously . . . to 
adjourn . . . 'in remembrance and honor of Jesus Christ, the Prince of Ethics'"; that the "County 
Judge and . . . magistrates agree with the arguments set out by Judge [Roy] Moore" in defense of 
his "display [of] the Ten Commandments in his courtroom"; and that the "Founding Fathers [had 
an] explicit understanding of the duty of elected officials to publicly acknowledge God as the 
source of America's strength and direction."  
As directed by the resolutions, the Counties expanded the displays of the Ten 
Commandments in their locations, presumably along with copies of the resolution, which 
instructed that it, too, be posted, in addition to the first display's large framed copy of the edited 
King James version of the Commandments, the second included eight other documents in 
smaller frames, each either having a religious theme or excerpted to highlight a religious 
element. The documents were the "endowed by their Creator" passage from the Declaration of 
Independence; the Preamble to the Constitution of Kentucky; the national motto, "In God We 
Trust"; a page from the Congressional Record of February 2, 1983, proclaiming the Year of the 
Bible and including a statement of the Ten Commandments; a proclamation by President 
Abraham Lincoln designating April 30, 1863, a National Day of Prayer and Humiliation; an 
excerpt from President Lincoln's "Reply to Loyal Colored People of Baltimore upon Presentation 
of a Bible," reading that "the Bible is the best gift God has ever given to man"; a proclamation by  
President Reagan marking 1983 the Year of the Bible; and the Mayflower    Compact. 96 F. 
Supp. 2d, at 684; 96 F. Supp. 2d, at 695-696. 
After argument, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction on May 5, 2000, 
ordering that the "display . . . be removed from [each] County Courthouse IMMEDIATELY" 
and that no county official "erect or cause to be erected similar displays." 96 F. Supp. 2d, at 691; 
96 F. Supp. 2d, at 702-703. The court's analysis of the situation followed the three-part 
formulation first stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745, 91 S. Ct. 2105 
(1971). As to governmental purpose, it concluded that the original display "lacked any secular 
purpose" because the Commandments "are a distinctly religious document, believed by many 
Christians and Jews to be the direct and revealed word of God." 96 F. Supp. 2d, at 686; 96 F. 
Supp. 2d, at 698. Although the Counties had maintained that the original display was meant to be 
educational, "the narrow scope of the display – a single religious text unaccompanied by any 
interpretation explaining its role as a foundational document – can hardly be said to present 
meaningfully the story of this country's religious traditions." 96 F. Supp. 2d, at 686-687; 96 F. 
Supp. 2d, at 698. The court found that the second version also "clearly lacked a secular purpose" 
because the "Counties narrowly tailored [their] selection of foundational documents to 
incorporate only those with specific references to Christianity." 96 F. Supp. 2d, at 687; 96 F. 
Supp. 2d, at 699. 
The Counties filed a notice of appeal from the preliminary injunction but voluntarily 
dismissed it after hiring new lawyers. They then installed another display in each courthouse, the 
third within a year. No new resolution authorized this one, nor did the Counties repeal the 
resolutions that preceded the second. The posting consists of nine framed documents of equal 
size,  one of them setting out the Ten Commandments explicitly identified as the "King James 
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Version" at Exodus 20:3-17, 145 F. Supp. 2d 845, 847 (ED Ky. 2001) and quoted at greater 
length than before: 
"Thou shalt have no other gods before me.  
"Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing 
that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water 
underneath the earth: Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: 
for I the LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers 
upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me.  
"Thou shalt not take the name of the LORD thy God in vain: for the LORD will 
not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain.  
"Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.  
"Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon the land 
which the LORD thy God giveth thee.  
"Thou shalt not kill.  
"Thou shalt not commit adultery.  
"Thou shalt not steal.  
"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.  
"Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's 
wife,  nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor  
anything that is thy neighbour's."  
Assembled with the Commandments are framed copies of the Magna Carta, the 
Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics of the Star Spangled Banner, the 
Mayflower Compact, the National Motto, the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, and a 
picture of Lady Justice. The collection is entitled "The Foundations of American Law and 
Government Display" and each document comes with a statement about its historical and legal 
significance. The comment on the Ten Commandments reads: 
The Ten Commandments have profoundly influenced the formation of Western 
legal thought and the formation of our country. That influence is clearly seen in 
the Declaration of Independence, which declared that 'We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the 
pursuit of Happiness.' The Ten Commandments provide the moral background of 
the Declaration of Independence and the foundation of our legal tradition. 
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The ACLU moved to supplement the preliminary injunction to enjoin the Counties' third 
display, and the Counties responded with several explanations for the new version, including 
desires "to demonstrate that the Ten Commandments were part of the foundation of American 
Law and Government" and "to educate the citizens of the county regarding some of the 
documents that played a significant role in the foundation of our system of law and government." 
145 F. Supp. 2d, at 848 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court, however, took the 
objective of proclaiming the Commandments' foundational value as "a religious, rather than 
secular, purpose" under Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 66 L. Ed. 2d 199, 101 S. Ct. 192 (1980) 
(per curiam), 145 F. Supp. 2d, at 849, and found that the assertion that the Counties' broader 
educational goals are secular "crumbles . . . upon an examination of the history of this litigation," 
In light of the Counties' decision to post the Commandments by themselves in the first instance, 
contrary to Stone, and later to "accentuate" the religious objective by surrounding the 
Commandments with "specific references to Christianity, "the District Court understood the 
Counties” ‘clear’ purpose as being to post the Commandments, not to educate.  
As requested, the trial court supplemented the injunction, and a divided panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Circuit majority stressed that under Stone, 
displaying the Commandments bespeaks a religious object unless they are integrated with other 
material so as to carry "a secular message," 354 F.3d 438, 449 (2003). The majority judges saw 
no integration here because of a "lack of a demonstrated analytical or historical connection 
[between the Commandments and] the other documents.". They noted in particular that the 
Counties offered no support for their claim that the Ten Commandments "provided the moral 
backdrop" to the Declaration of Independence or otherwise "profoundly influenced" it. Ibid. 
(Internal quotation marks omitted). The majority found that the Counties' purpose was religious, 
not educational, given the nature of the Commandments as "an active symbol of religion [stating] 
'the religious duties of believers,'" The judges in the majority understood the identical displays to 
emphasize "a single religious influence, with no mention of any other religious or secular 
influences," and they took the very history of the litigation as evidence of the Counties' religious 
objective. 
Judge Ryan dissented on the basis of wide recognition that religion, and the Ten 
Commandments in particular, have played a foundational part in the evolution of American law 
and government; he saw no reason to gainsay the Counties' claim of secular purposes.. The 
dissent denied that the prior displays should have any bearing on the constitutionality of the 
current one: a "history of unconstitutional displays cannot be used as a sword to strike down an 
otherwise constitutional display."  
We granted certiorari, and now affirm. 
II 
Twenty-five years ago in a case prompted by posting the Ten Commandments in 
Kentucky's public schools, this Court recognized that the Commandments "are undeniably a 
sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths" and held that their display in public classrooms 
violated the First Amendment's bar against establishment of religion. Stone, 449 U.S., at 41, 66 
L. Ed. 2d 199, 101 S. Ct. 192. Stone found a predominantly religious purpose in the 
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government's posting of the Commandments, given their prominence as "'an instrument of 
religion,'". The Counties ask for a different approach here by arguing that official purpose is 
unknowable and the search for it inherently vain. In the alternative, the Counties would avoid the 
District Court's conclusion by having us limit the scope of the purpose enquiry so severely that 
any trivial rationalization would suffice, under a standard oblivious to the history of religious 
government action like the progression of exhibits in this case. 
A 
Ever since Lemon v. Kurtzman summarized the three familiar considerations for 
evaluating Establishment Clause claims, looking to whether government action has "a secular 
legislative purpose" has been a common, albeit seldom dispositive, element  of our cases. 
Though we have found government action motivated by an illegitimate purpose only four times 
since Lemon, and "the secular purpose requirement alone may rarely be determinative . . ., it 
nevertheless serves an important function." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75, 86 L. Ed. 2d 29, 
105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). 
The touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the "First Amendment mandates 
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion." 
By showing a purpose to favor religion, the government "sends the . . . message to . . . 
nonadherents 'that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members . . . .'" Santa Fe 
Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-310, 147 L. Ed. 2d 295, 120 S. Ct. 2266 
(2000) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688, 79 L. Ed. 2d 604, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring)). 
Indeed, the purpose apparent from government action can have an impact more 
significant than the result expressly decreed: when the government maintains Sunday closing 
laws, it advances religion only minimally because many working people would take the day as 
one of rest regardless, but if the government justified its decision with a stated desire for all 
Americans to honor Christ, the divisive thrust of the official action would be inescapable. This is 
the teaching of McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 81 S. Ct. 1101 (1961), 
which upheld Sunday closing statutes on practical,  secular grounds after finding that the 
government had forsaken the religious purposes behind  centuries-old predecessor laws. Id., at 
449-451, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 81 S. Ct. 1101. 
B 
Despite the intuitive importance of official purpose to the realization of Establishment 
Clause values, the Counties ask us to abandon Lemon's purpose test, or at least to truncate any 
enquiry into purpose here. Their first argument is that the very consideration of purpose is 
deceptive: according to them, true "purpose" is unknowable, and its search merely an excuse for 
courts to act selectively and unpredictably in picking out evidence of subjective intent. The 
assertions are as seismic as they are unconvincing. 
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Examination of purpose is a staple of statutory interpretation that makes up the daily fare 
of every appellate court in the country. With enquiries into purpose this common, if they were 
nothing but hunts for mares' nests deflecting attention from bare judicial will, the whole notion 
of purpose in law would have dropped into disrepute long ago. 
But scrutinizing purpose does make practical sense, as in Establishment Clause analysis, 
where an understanding of official objective emerges from readily discoverable fact, without any 
judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter's heart of hearts. The eyes that look to purpose belong to an 
"'objective observer,'" one who takes account of the traditional external signs that show up in the 
"'text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,'" or comparable official act. Santa Fe 
Independent School Dist. v. Doe, supra, at 308 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S., at 73, 86 L. 
Ed. 2d 29, 105 S. Ct. 2479) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment)) There is, then, nothing 
hinting at an unpredictable or disingenuous exercise when a court enquires into purpose after a 
claim is raised under the Establishment Clause. 
The cases with findings of a predominantly religious purpose point to the straightforward 
nature of the test. In Stone, the Court held that the "posting of religious texts on the wall served 
no . . . educational function," and found that if "the posted copies of the Ten Commandments 
[were] to have any effect at all, it [would] be to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, 
perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments." 449 U.S., at 42, 66 L. Ed. 2d 199, 101 S. Ct. 
192. In each case, the government's action was held unconstitutional only because openly 
available data supported a commonsense conclusion that a religious objective permeated the 
government's action. 
C 
Lemon said that government action must have "a secular . . . purpose," 403 U.S., at 612, 
29 L. Ed. 2d 745, 91 S. Ct. 2105, and after a host of cases it is fair to add that although a 
legislature's stated reasons will generally get deference, the secular purpose required has to be 
genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective. Even the Counties' own 
cited authority confirms that we have not made the purpose test a pushover for any secular claim. 
As we said, the Court often does accept governmental statements of purpose, in keeping with the 
respect owed in the first instance to such official claims. But in those unusual cases where the 
claim was an apparent sham, or the secular purpose secondary, the unsurprising results have been 
findings of no adequate secular object, as against a predominantly religious one.  
III 
This case comes to us on appeal from a preliminary injunction. We accordingly review 
the District Court's legal rulings de novo, and its ultimate conclusion for abuse of discretion. 
[There is no denying] that the Commandments have had influence on civil or secular law; a 
major text of a majority religion is bound to be felt. The point is simply that the original text 
viewed in its entirety is an unmistakably religious statement dealing with religious obligations 
and with morality subject to religious sanction. When the government initiates an effort to place 
this statement alone in public view, a religious object is unmistakable. 
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Once the Counties were sued, they modified the exhibits and invited additional insight 
into their purpose in a display that hung for about six months. This new one was the product of 
forthright and nearly identical Pulaski and McCreary County resolutions listing a series of 
American historical documents with theistic and Christian references, which were to be posted in 
order to furnish a setting for displaying the Ten Commandments and any "other Kentucky and 
American historical document" without raising concern about "any Christian or religious 
references" in them. As mentioned, the resolutions expressed support for an Alabama judge who 
posted the Commandments in his courtroom, and cited the fact the Kentucky Legislature once 
adjourned a session in honor of "Jesus Christ, Prince of Ethics." Together, the display and 
resolution presented an indisputable, and undisputed, showing of an impermissible purpose. 
Today, the Counties make no attempt to defend their undeniable objective, but instead 
hopefully describe version two as "dead and buried." After the Counties changed lawyers, they 
mounted a third display, without a new resolution or repeal of the old one. The result was the 
"Foundations of American Law and Government" exhibit, which placed the Commandments in 
the company of other documents the Counties thought especially significant in the historical 
foundation of American government. These new statements of purpose were presented only as a 
litigating position, there being no further authorizing action by the Counties' governing boards. 
No reasonable observer could swallow the claim that the Counties had cast off the objective so 
unmistakable in the earlier displays.  
IV 
The prohibition on establishment covers a variety of issues from prayer in widely varying 
government settings, to financial aid for religious individuals and institutions, to comment on 
religious questions. In these varied settings, issues of about interpreting inexact Establishment 
Clause language, like difficult interpretative issues generally, arise from the tension of competing 
values, each constitutionally respectable, but none open to realization to the logical limit. 
The First Amendment has not one but two clauses tied to "religion," the second 
forbidding any prohibition on the "the free exercise thereof," and sometimes, the two clauses 
compete: spending government money on the clergy looks like establishing religion, but if the 
government cannot pay for military chaplains a good many soldiers and sailors would be kept 
from the opportunity to exercise their chosen religions. At other times, limits on governmental 
action that might make sense as a way to avoid establishment could arguably limit freedom of 
speech when the speaking is done under government auspices.  
Given the variety of interpretative problems, the principle of neutrality has provided a 
good sense of direction: the government may not favor one religion over another, or religion over 
irreligion, religious choice being the prerogative of individuals under the Free Exercise Clause. 
The principle has been helpful simply because it responds to one of the major concerns that 
prompted adoption of the Religion Clauses. The Framers and the citizens of their  time intended 
not only to protect the integrity of individual conscience in religious matters, Wallace v. Jaffree, 
472 U.S., at 52-54, 86 L. Ed. 2d 29, 105 S. Ct. 2479, and n. 38, but to guard against the civic 
divisiveness that follows when the Government weighs in on one side of religious debate; 
nothing does a better job of roiling society, a point that needed no explanation to the descendants 
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of English Puritans and Cavaliers (or Massachusetts Puritans and Baptists). E.g., Everson, supra, 
at 8, 91 L. Ed. 711, 67 S. Ct. 504 ("A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came 
here from Europe to escape [religious persecution]"). A sense of the past thus points to 
governmental neutrality as an objective of the Establishment Clause, and a sensible standard for 
applying it. To be sure, given its generality as a principle, an appeal to neutrality alone cannot 
possibly lay every issue to rest, or tell us what issues on the margins are substantial enough for 
constitutional significance, a point that has been clear from the Founding era to modern times.  
Historical evidence thus supports no solid argument for changing course (whatever force 
the argument might have when directed at the existing precedent), whereas public discourse at 
the present time certainly raises no doubt about the value of the interpretative approach invoked 
for 60 years now. We are centuries away from the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre and the 
treatment of heretics in early Massachusetts, but the divisiveness of religion in current public life 
is inescapable. This is no time to deny the prudence of understanding the Establishment Clause 
to require the Government to stay neutral on religious belief, which is reserved for the 
conscience of the individual. 
V 
Given the ample support for the District Court's finding of a predominantly religious 
purpose behind the Counties' third display, we affirm the Sixth Circuit in upholding the 
preliminary injunction. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring. [omitted] 
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE THOMAS join, 
and with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins [in part]dissenting . 
I would uphold McCreary County and Pulaski County, Kentucky's (hereinafter Counties) 
displays of the Ten Commandments. I shall discuss … why the judgment here is wrong. 
What distinguishes the rule of law from the dictatorship of a shifting Supreme Court 
majority is the absolutely indispensable requirement that judicial opinions be grounded in 
consistently applied principle. That is what prevents judges from ruling now this way, now that – 
thumbs up or thumbs down – as their personal preferences dictate. Today's opinion forthrightly 
(or actually, somewhat less than forthrightly) admits that it does not rest upon consistently 
applied principle. In a revealing the Court acknowledges that the "Establishment Clause 
doctrine" it purports to be applying "lacks the comfort of categorical absolutes." What the Court 
means by this lovely euphemism is that sometimes the Court chooses to decide cases on the 
principle that government cannot favor religion, and sometimes it does not. The footnote goes on 
to say that "in special instances we have found good reason" to dispense with the principle, but 
"no such reasons present themselves here." It does not identify all of those "special instances," 
much less identify the "good reason" for their existence. 
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The only "good reason" for ignoring the neutrality principle set forth in any of these cases 
was the antiquity of the practice at issue. That would be a good reason for finding the neutrality 
principle a mistaken interpretation of the Constitution, but it is hardly a good reason for letting 
an unconstitutional practice continue. Historical practices thus demonstrate that there is a 
distance between the acknowledgment of a single Creator and the establishment of a religion.  
JUSTICE STEVENS argues that original meaning should not be the touchstone anyway, 
but that we should rather "expound the meaning of constitutional provisions with one eye 
towards our Nation's history and the other fixed on its democratic aspirations." Van Orden, ante, 
at 27-28, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 5215 (dissenting opinion). This is not the place to debate the merits 
of the "living Constitution."
1
 Even assuming, however, that the meaning of the Constitution 
ought to change according to "democratic aspirations," why are those aspirations to be found in 
Justices' notions of what the Establishment Clause ought to mean, rather than in the 
democratically adopted dispositions of our current society? As I have observed above, numerous 
provisions of our laws and numerous continuing practices of our people demonstrate that the 
government's invocation of God (and hence the government's invocation of the Ten 
Commandments) is unobjectionable – including a statute enacted by Congress almost 
unanimously less than three years ago, stating that "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance is 
constitutional, see 116 Stat., at 2058. To ignore all this is not to give effect to "democratic 
aspirations" but to frustrate them. 
As bad as the Lemon test is, it is worse for the fact that, since its inception, its seemingly 
simple mandates have been manipulated to fit whatever result the Court aimed to achieve. 
Today's opinion is no different. I have remarked before that it is an odd jurisprudence that bases 
the unconstitutionality of a government practice that does not actually advance religion on the 
hopes of the government that it would do so. See Edwards, 482 U.S., at 639, 96 L. Ed. 2d 510, 
107 S. Ct. 2573. But that oddity pales in comparison to the one invited by today's analysis: the 
legitimacy of a government action with a wholly secular effect would turn on the misperception 
of an imaginary observer that the government officials behind the action had the intent to 
advance religion. 
In sum: The first displays did not necessarily evidence an intent to further religious 
practice; nor did the second displays, or the resolutions authorizing them; and there is in any 
event no basis for attributing whatever intent motivated the first and second displays to the third. 
Given the presumption of regularity that always accompanies our review of official action, the 
Court has identified no evidence of a purpose to advance religion in a way that is inconsistent 
with our cases. The Court may well be correct in identifying the third displays as the fruit of a 
desire to display the Ten Commandments, but neither our cases nor our history support its 
assertion that such a desire renders the fruit poisonous. 
                                                 
1
 See Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 Cincinnati L. Rev. 852-853 (1989). 
